Report to Congressional Requesters

United States General Accounting Office

GAO 

February 2003 DEFENSE 

MANAGEMENT 

Army Needs to 

Address Resource and 

Mission Requirements 

Affecting Its Training 

and Doctrine 

Command 

GAO-03-214 
Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC’s workload has grown as a result of 

new mission requirements, the number of personnel authorized to meet 

those requirements has declined. Also since fiscal year 1995, the Command’s 

operation and maintenance funding increased, but TRADOC allocated these 

and other operations money to support its highest mission priority—

training—while other areas received less emphasis. The table below depicts 

the number of personnel TRADOC believes are needed to perform its 

workload (personnel requirements), as well as the number of personnel the 

Army has authorized for this purpose. Unresolved differences exist between 

TRADOC and Army Headquarters over TRADOC’s personnel requirements. 

Amid the increases in workload and reductions in personnel authorizations, 

TRADOC has met its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, the 

Command has workload backlogs in other mission areas, such as developing 

training materials and Army doctrine. The effect of these backlogs is 

illustrated in TRADOC’s monthly status reports, which show that the 

Command assigned the lowest readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its 

units during fiscal year 2001 and into 2002 and attributed the low ratings 

primarily to the lack of personnel. Furthermore, two Army leadership panels 

concluded that TRADOC’s training and development standards had 

deteriorated, and mechanisms for evaluating training and leader 

development programs were lacking.

Several ongoing and planned Army initiatives may affect TRADOC’s ability 

to perform its mission in the future. These include efforts to reassess 

TRADOC’s process for determining personnel requirements and ongoing 

efforts to transfer forces from TRADOC and other noncombatant commands 

to warfighting forces. At the same time, TRADOC is losing flexibility to shift 

funds from one mission area to another because the Army established the 

Installation Management Agency to manage its facilities. TRADOC is 

developing a reengineering plan that Command officials believe will increase 

TRADOC’s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission requirements; 

however, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and human capital 

issues associated with the plan are not yet clear. 

TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001 

1995 1996 1997 1998 a 1999 a 2000 a 2001 

Personnel required by 

TRADOC 79,298 77,069 76,650 75,613 76,139 76,409 78,255 

Personnel authorized by 

the Army 63,139 57,814 57,700 56,814 55,852 54,659 55,204 

Authorizations as a 

percent of requirements 80% 75% 75% 75% 73% 71% 71% 

Source: TRADOC.

a

Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of two TRADOC subcommands. 

DEFENSE MANAGEMENT 

Army Needs to Address Resource and 

Mission Requirements Affecting Its 

Training and Doctrine Command 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-214.

To view the full report, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Barry Holman 

at (202) 512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-214, a report to 

Congressional Requesters 

February 2003 

The Army’s Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) trains 

soldiers and develops doctrine and 

future warfighting concepts to fight 

the battles of today and tomorrow. 

As such, the Command has been 

designated as the lead in the 

Army’s transformation from a Cold 

War-oriented force into a rapidly 

deployable and responsive force 

better able to meet the diverse 

challenges of the future. Concerns 

have been raised at congressional 

hearings about TRADOC’s 

readiness to perform its mission, 

particularly within the context of 

Army transformation and 

associated funding priorities. GAO 

assessed the impact of budget, 

workload, and personnel changes, 

as well as ongoing transformation 

plans, on TRADOC’s ability to 

perform its mission and deliver 

well-trained soldiers to the combat 

forces. 

GAO recommends that the Army 

validate TRADOC’s workload and 

personnel requirements before 

further reducing the Command’s 

personnel authorizations, and 

ensure that the Command’s 

reengineering plan adequately 

addresses efficiency, effectiveness, 

and human capital issues. In 

commenting on the report, the 

Department of Defense concurred 

with the recommendations related 

to TRADOC’s reengineering but 

expressed various concerns about 

other related recommendations, 

leaving unclear what overall 

actions would be taken. 
Page i GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 5

TRADOC Personnel Authorizations Have Been Reduced, While 

Budget Increases Have Gone to Training and New Workload 10

TRADOC’s Full Workload Requirements Are Not Being Met; 

Leadership Panels and Combat Forces Cite Quality Problems 18

Effect of Ongoing and Planned Actions on TRADOC Is Uncertain 31

Conclusions 40

Recommendations for Executive Action 41

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 44 

Appendix II Overview of Armywide Personnel Reductions 47 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 50 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 51 

Tables 

Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001 11

Table 2: TRADOC’s Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development 

Priorities (as of October 2002) 21

Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies 

Announced during Fiscal Years 1997 and 1999 (as of 

November 2002) 35

Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the 

Active Army and Selected Commands between Fiscal 

Years 1991 and 2001 49

Contents 
Page ii GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Figures 

Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations 6

Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation 9

Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area 10

Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected 

Mission Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001 13

Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a 

Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-

2001 14

Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission 

Areas for Fiscal Years 1995-2001 16

Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for 

Fiscal Years 1995-2001 17

Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003 19

Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002) 22

Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting 

Units, for the Period January 2001 – February 2002 25

Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for 

Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001 47

Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for 

Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001 48

Abbreviations 

AMC Army Materiel Command 

DOD Department of Defense 

FORSCOM Army Forces Command 

IMA Installation Management Agency 

O&M Operations and Maintenance 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

POI Programs of Instruction 

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 

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Page 1 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

February 10, 2003 

The Honorable Joel Heffley 

Chairman 

The Honorable Soloman P. Ortiz 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Readiness 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Army has begun to transform itself from a Cold War-oriented force 

into a more rapidly deployable and responsive force better able to meet 

the diverse challenges of the future. The far-reaching organizational and 

operational changes that the Army plans will affect virtually every element 

of the Army. The Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has 

been designated the lead command for this transformation and, as the 

architect of the Army’s future, TRADOC has a key role in the 

transformation process. TRADOC is responsible for ensuring that the 

Army remains a modern and capable fighting force by developing 

warfighting concepts and doctrine and by providing recruiting, training, 

and associated support for military personnel. Like the Department of 

Defense (DOD) and other Army commands, TRADOC incurred significant 

decreases in its resources—particularly its personnel resources—during 

the 1990s as the department took major steps to reshape and reduce the 

size of its forces. Between fiscal years 1991 and 2001, Army active duty 

military personnel and civilian personnel were reduced by about 33 

percent and 42 percent, respectively. TRADOC incurred similar reductions 

during this period. 

Each year, senior Army officials must decide how to allocate resources 

among competing priorities and programs within and among the Army’s 

operational and institutional forces. In recent years, the Army has chosen 

to give priority to its operational or warfighting units and accept a higher 

level of risk of mission failure in support organizations such as TRADOC. 

At the same time, at congressional hearings over the last few years, 

concerns have been raised about TRADOC’s readiness to perform its 

mission, particularly within the context of Army transformation. At your 

request, we reviewed the resources and workload assigned to the 

Command and its readiness to carry out its mission. Our specific review 

objectives were to examine (1) the Training and Doctrine Command’s 

personnel, workload, and budget trends since 1995; (2) the impact of 

personnel and budget changes on the Command’s ability to perform its 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to the combat forces; and (3) the 

actions taken or planned that could have an effect on the Command’s 

ability to perform its mission. 

In conducting this examination, we reviewed documents and interviewed 

officials at Army Headquarters, the Training and Doctrine Command, and 

Forces Command. Our analysis of the trends in the Command’s personnel 

and budgetary resources focused primarily on fiscal years 1995 through 

2001. A complete description of our methodology is shown in appendix I. 

Since fiscal year 1995, while TRADOC’s workload has grown due to new 

mission requirements and its budget has increased in selected areas, its 

authorized personnel gradually decreased about 13 percent. Specifically, 

the number of authorized personnel declined during this period from 

about 63,000 to 55,000. The current authorization represents about 

70 percent of the personnel that the Command believes are needed to 

perform its work (otherwise known as requirements), which have ranged 

from about 75,000 to 79,000 personnel.1

 The reductions in authorized 

personnel were caused by a number of DOD and Army decisions. Key 

among these were reductions mandated by force structure reshaping 

decisions that began in the early 1990s, such as “Quicksilver,”2

 and other 

department initiatives that occurred since 1995, such as reductions 

recommended by the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.3

 While TRADOC 

officials believe that the Command’s reported personnel requirements are 

accurate, unresolved differences exist between TRADOC and Army 

Headquarters staff over the accuracy of these requirements, particularly as 

they relate to the use of contractors. Despite personnel reductions, the 

Command’s primary funding source—operations and maintenance 

funding—increased about 23 percent (in constant dollars). However, at the 

Command’s discretion, funding for all of TRADOC’s programs did not 

increase—funding devoted to training increased about 13 percent, while 

 1

 Throughout this report, we refer to personnel requirements and personnel authorizations. 

Personnel requirements refer to the number of personnel, both civilian and military, 

deemed necessary by TRADOC to support its workload. Personnel authorizations refer to 

the number of personnel an organization, in this case TRADOC, is allowed to hire. 

Personnel authorizations are often less than requirements because of budget constraints. 

2

 “Quicksilver” was an Army initiative intended to reduce its force structure and create a 

more balanced, versatile, lethal, smaller, and ready force. 

3

 The Quadrennial Defense Review analyzes military strategy for U.S. forces. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

funding devoted to base operations decreased about 20 percent as the 

Command reallocated limited resources to higher-priority missions. Also, 

a large portion of the increased funding was directed to hiring contract 

personnel to support new mission requirements such as Army 

transformation to a lighter force. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, 

contractor support funding increased by about 38 percent, or about 

$317 million, but this increase did not fully offset the loss of personnel 

authorizations, according to Command officials. 

Amid these reductions in personnel authorizations, TRADOC met its 

highest mission priority, training, although not without some concerns 

about quality from other Army organizations. The Command has had more 

difficulty fully meeting other mission requirements—such as those 

involving the development of training materials and doctrine—many of 

which have sizeable workload backlogs. The effect of these workload 

backlogs is illustrated in TRADOC’s monthly status reports. Our analysis 

of these status reports showed that the Command assigned the lowest 

readiness rating to more than two-thirds of its units during fiscal year 2001 

and into 2002, and it attributed the low ratings primarily to the lack of 

personnel. The impact of these conditions has been observed by 

organizations outside TRADOC. Two Army leadership panels chartered by 

the Army Chief of Staff—one representing officers and one representing 

noncommissioned officers—concluded in 2001 and 2002 that TRADOC’s 

training and development standards had deteriorated and that 

mechanisms for evaluating training and leadership development programs 

were lacking. Officials with the Army Forces Command—a primary 

customer of TRADOC services—have also expressed concern about 

TRADOC’s reduced capabilities, but the impact cannot be fully quantified 

due to a lack of Army empirical data and analysis. Although TRADOC does 

not have a formal process to obtain feedback on the quality and relevance 

of the products provided to its customers, Forces Command officials 

indicated that they believe the quality of TRADOC’s individual training 

programs and doctrine products has declined. For example, they cite the 

lack of a training strategy to support operational units’ adoption of digital 

technology, as well as the outdated condition of some doctrine used to 

guide tactics and procedures in the field. On the other hand, Forces 

Command officials noted that TRADOC’s support for an element of the 

Army transformation—the Interim Brigade Combat Teams—had been 

good. Continuing disconnects between mission requirements and 

resources could adversely affect TRADOC’s ability to carry out its mission 

and improve its readiness posture in the future as it continues to address 

additional transformation requirements, while also training and supporting 

the current force. 
Page 4 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Several ongoing and planned actions may affect the Command’s ability to 

perform its mission in the future; however, the overall outcome is unclear 

at this time. In October 2002, a major Army Headquarters initiative, already 

underway, began shifting budgetary resources and about 10,000 personnel 

authorizations related to base operations away from the Command to the 

new Army Installation Management Agency. This reorganization will 

reduce TRADOC’s mission requirements, but will also eliminate base 

operations funds that, in the past, were used by the Command as a source 

of training support; thus, in the future, the Command will have less 

flexibility to shift funding among its primary missions. Another Army 

Headquarters initiative is aimed at reassessing the process used to 

determine personnel requirements for TRADOC and other commands that 

support warfighting units, but the outcome is uncertain because 

differences of opinion exist over TRADOC’s requirements and the extent 

to which its requirements have been offset by contractor support. Also, the 

Army is conducting commercial activities studies to identify opportunities 

to use in-house personnel more efficiently and to contract some activities 

to an outside vendor. Such studies are likely to lead to reduced personnel 

requirements in the activities studied but would not necessarily free 

personnel for assignment to other activities or mission areas where 

shortages exist. In addition, the Army has an initiative underway, known 

as “Manning the Force,” which is transferring military personnel from the 

noncombatant forces across the Army to warfighting forces to improve the 

Army’s combat readiness. This initiative, which continues through fiscal 

year 2003, is reducing the number of military personnel assigned to 

TRADOC; however, the Command has not fully quantified the impact of 

this specific initiative. Finally, TRADOC is developing a reengineering plan 

that is intended to create a more streamlined and efficient command 

structure, rely more heavily on technology, and better position the 

Command to support current and future mission requirements. Command 

officials believe the plan, once finalized and implemented, will increase 

TRADOC’s efficiency and improve its ability to meet mission requirements. 

However, the costs, benefits, performance measures, and human capital 

issues associated with implementing the plan are not yet clear. Also, the 

extent to which this effort will lead to organizational consolidations and 

reductions in personnel requirements remains unclear. These issues could 

take on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts 

and, if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased 

risk in its role as the Army’s architect of the future. 

We are making recommendations for executive action to help the 

Command address workload backlogs; better measure the quality of its 

products and services; and ensure that its reengineering plan adequately 
Page 5 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

addresses efficiency, effectiveness, and human capital issues and is 

properly resourced to support Army transformation. In commenting on a 

draft of the report, DOD concurred with the recommendations related to 

TRADOC’s reengineering process but expressed various concerns about 

other related recommendations, leaving unclear what overall actions 

would be taken. 

The Army consists of both operational and institutional forces. The 

institutional forces support such activities as training, supply, and 

maintenance, and perform a broad range of noncombatant functions that 

enable operational forces—combat and support units—to deploy and fight 

in regional and theater wars. TRADOC is part of the Army’s institutional 

forces. The Command is viewed as the Army’s “architect of the future” 

because much of what it does is focused on identifying future warfighting 

requirements and developing organizations, training curriculum, doctrine, 

and people to fight the battles of tomorrow, as well as those of today. 

TRADOC carries out its mission at 26 schools and several training centers 

located on 15 major installations throughout the continental United States. 

(See fig. 1.) The Command also has 11 battle laboratories, which support 

research and development activities associated with weapon systems and 

combat operations. The schools and battle laboratories specialize in 

developing and testing warfighting capabilities such as air defense, armor, 

artillery, aviation, infantry, and transportation. During fiscal year 2001, 

TRADOC was authorized about 36,500 military personnel and 18,700 

civilian personnel. 

Background 

TRADOC’s Responsibilities 
Page 6 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Figure 1: Major TRADOC Installations 

In general, TRADOC’s overall mission focuses on five primary areas: 

• Combat Development. Through its combat development mission, 

TRADOC identifies needed capabilities and requirements for new and 

existing weapon and battlefield management systems to improve 

warfighting capabilities and responsiveness. The capabilities and 

requirements are designed and incorporated into current and new weapon 

systems to improve the Army’s warfighting capabilities. As part of this 

effort, TRADOC provides an Armywide focus on research and 

development activities and conducts analysis and experimentation. The 

Command’s battle laboratories are heavily involved in the combat 

development mission. 

• Doctrine Development. TRADOC develops doctrine to address the 

complete range of potential tactical and operational missions and 

operating environments—from infantry operations to aviation—that 

combat units might encounter. Doctrine establishes the tactics, 
Page 7 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

techniques, and procedures the combat units might use to carry out their 

warfighting missions; it is essential for conducting warfare. Much of the 

Army’s doctrine is found in its field manuals, which number more than 

600. Doctrine developers write and update the field manuals, as well as 

develop organizational structures for combat units. 

• Training and Training Development. TRADOC’s training and training 

development mission is directed at developing competent soldiers, 

capable leaders, and relevant training materials. TRADOC provides 

soldiers with initial individual entry-level training. The Command also 

provides advanced individual training, such as learning how to operate a 

tank. As the training developer, TRADOC develops course material for 

over 2,000 courses that support individual training. TRADOC also develops 

training material for unit training, which takes place in the combat units. 

In addition, through training development, TRADOC certifies staff and 

faculty associated with its schools, develops a distance-learning 

curriculum, and promotes continuing education for its military personnel. 

During fiscal year 2001, TRADOC trained about 323,000 military and 

civilian personnel at its schools. 

• Accessions/Recruiting. TRADOC is responsible for recruiting soldiers 

for the Army. Recruiting activities are conducted throughout the United 

States, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and at U.S. facilities in 

Germany and Asia. Recruiting is carried out by a TRADOC subcommand 

called the Accessions Command, which was established in February 2002. 

From the beginning of fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2001, accessions 

activities were carried out by the Army Recruiting Command, the Cadet 

Command, and the Military Entrance Processing Command. These 

commands are now components of the Accessions Command. 

• Base Operations. TRADOC has historically maintained the school 

buildings, barracks, roads, training ranges, and other structures used to 

carry out its mission. Base support activities have included facilities 

maintenance as well as equipment repair. However, in October 2002, base 

operations support across the Army was consolidated and transitioning to 

a new Army agency called the Installation Management Agency was begun. 

Like other Army commands, TRADOC will no longer have direct 

responsibility for base operations. A large portion of the TRADOC 

personnel and funding resources associated with base operations is being 

transferred to the new agency. 

TRADOC is also the lead command for Army transformation. This 

transformation, which was announced in October 1999, is a plan to move 

the Army’s Cold War organization and equipment to a lighter, more 

strategically responsive force to fill what the Army sees as a strategic gap 

in its warfighting capabilities. The transformed force is expected to be 

capable of responding to a broad range of operations—from peacekeeping 
Page 8 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

to regional conflicts to major theater wars. To realize the transformation, 

the Army plans to develop new equipment, revise its operating concepts 

and doctrine, build unit-level organizations that can quickly adapt to 

changes in the intensity of a given military operation, and change how it 

trains its soldiers and leaders. Transformation will touch on all of 

TRADOC’s mission areas because TRADOC is heavily involved in 

developing requirements for current and new equipment, revising 

doctrine, developing new organizations, and training soldiers and leaders. 

As part of its transformation responsibilities, TRADOC has already played 

a lead role in developing and fielding the Interim Brigade Combat Teams—

commonly referred to as the Stryker brigades—which are being organized 

and equipped to deploy nearly as quickly as light infantry units but with 

more lethality and survivability. 

In fiscal year 2001, TRADOC was provided a budget of about $3.2 billion to 

carry out its mission.4

 This total, however, does not include funding to pay 

the Command’s military personnel, who are paid from funds that are 

centrally managed at Army Headquarters. Figure 2 depicts TRADOC’s 

funding by appropriation. 

 4

 We focused primarily on TRADOC’s fiscal year 2001 budget because the Command had 

not yet received its final 2002 budget authorization at the time we conducted a significant 

portion of our analysis. 

Overview of TRADOC 

Funding 
Page 9 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Figure 2: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 Funding by Appropriation 

The largest segment of the budget was comprised of Operations and 

Maintenance (O&M) funding. It totaled approximately $2.9 billion, or 

about 91 percent of TRADOC’s total budget. Figure 3 shows how O&M 

funding was allocated among TRADOC mission areas. 
Page 10 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Figure 3: TRADOC Fiscal Year 2001 O&M Funding by Mission Area 

Training and base operations were allocated most of the O&M funding. 

Funding for doctrine development is included in both combat 

developments and training development. 

TRADOC’s O&M funding increased to about $3.5 billion for fiscal year 

2002—about $600 million more than fiscal year 2001. A large portion of the 

increase resulted from additional funding to support the global war on 

terrorism. 

Since at least fiscal year 1995, the number of personnel that TRADOC has 

been authorized to accomplish its mission has been less than the number 

of personnel that TRADOC officials believe are required. While personnel 

requirements remained relatively steady between fiscal years 1995 and 

2001, TRADOC’s workload increased and its personnel authorizations 

decreased as a result of DOD and Army efforts to reshape and constrain 

the size of the in-house workforce. TRADOC and Army Headquarters 

officials do not agree on the accuracy of TRADOC’s personnel 

requirements. As personnel authorizations decreased, TRADOC’s budget 

increased; however, the increase was not applied uniformly across all of 

TRADOC’s programs or mission areas. An increasing percentage of the 

budget was shifted to the Command’s highest-priority mission area—

training. In addition, a portion of the budget increase was directed to new 

mission requirements related to Army transformation. Because TRADOC 

TRADOC Personnel 

Authorizations Have 

Been Reduced, While 

Budget Increases 

Have Gone to Training 

and New Workload 
Page 11 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

did not have the in-house personnel to address the new requirements, the 

Command increased its use of contractors to satisfy some of the new 

mission requirements. 

Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC’s personnel requirements, as identified by 

the Command, have remained somewhat steady. Yet, its personnel 

authorizations and the actual number of personnel on hand have gradually 

declined by nearly 13 percent—from about 63,000 to 55,000—to where 

they represent about 71 percent and 65 percent, respectively, of the 

Command’s personnel requirements. Table 1 details these personnel 

trends. 

Table 1: TRADOC Personnel Trends, Fiscal Years 1995-2001 

 1995 1996 1997 1998a1999a 2000a2001 

Requirements 79,298 77,069 76,650 75,613 76,139 76,409 78,255 

Authorizations 63,139 57,814 57,700 56,814 55,852 54,659 55,204 

Actual 61,207 57,036 57,273 54,839 53,699 51,993 50,936 

Authorizations as 

a percent of 

requirements 80% 75% 75% 75% 73% 71% 71% 

Actual as a 

percent of 

requirements 77% 74% 75% 72% 71% 68% 65% 

Actual as a 

percent of 

authorizations 97% 99% 98% 97% 96% 95% 92% 

Source: TRADOC. 

a

Numbers adjusted for the addition and subsequent elimination of personnel requirements and 

authorizations, and actual personnel that are associated with two TRADOC subcommands: the 

Recruiting Command and Military Entrance Processing Command. (For additional information, see 

app. I). 

TRADOC also experienced a reduction in actual staffing levels between 

fiscal years 1995 and 2001. As shown in table 1, the Command was staffed 

at 77 percent of its requirements in fiscal year 1995 and at only 65 percent 

of its requirements in fiscal year 2001. The table also shows that the 

Command has experienced a decline in the number of actual personnel 

assigned to the Command. According to TRADOC officials, this shortfall in 

actual personnel provides an even clearer indication that the Command’s 

full workload cannot be accomplished. The reductions in TRADOC’s 

personnel authorizations were similar to those of the Army overall, as well 

as for selected commands. See appendix II for a comparison of TRADOC’s 

TRADOC Personnel 

Authorizations Are Down 

Despite Increasing 

Workload and Associated 

Personnel Requirements 
Page 12 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

personnel authorizations with those of other selected major Army 

commands. 

Since fiscal year 1995, TRADOC’s workload has grown due to the addition 

of several new mission requirements. A number of these are associated 

with supporting Army transformation requirements that began to emerge 

after transformation plans were announced in 1999. The Command 

acquired responsibility for conceptualizing and developing two new 

aspects of the Army’s fighting forces—the interim and objective forces—

while still retaining the responsibilities for supporting, modernizing, and 

transforming the current force. These new responsibilities include 

developing weapon systems requirements, combat and training doctrine, 

and training courses to facilitate the transformation. 

In addition, a number of other DOD and Army decisions resulted in 

TRADOC gaining new mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995 

and 2001, the Command assumed responsibility for several smaller 

commands and agencies, including the Army Recruiting Command, the 

Military Entrance Processing Command, and the Army Management Staff 

College.5

 Each of these commands and agencies brought new workload 

requirements with them. However, they also brought most of the 

personnel authorizations associated with that workload. 

The personnel requirements associated with the Command’s major 

mission areas, as identified by TRADOC, fluctuated only slightly between 

fiscal years 1995 and 2001, as depicted in figure 4. 

 5

 TRADOC also assumed responsibility for the Army Civilian Training Education 

Development Student Detachment, the Army Aeronautical Services Agency, and the Army 

Nuclear Chemical Agency. 
Page 13 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Figure 4: TRADOC Personnel Requirement Trends for Selected Mission Areas, Fiscal Years 1995-2001 

Note: The training component of TRADOC’s training and training development mission area has the 

single most personnel requirements and is shown in the chart separately from the training 

development component. The doctrine development mission area is included in the figure, but 

TRADOC does not account for doctrine development personnel separately. Instead, doctrine 

development personnel are accounted for in the training development and combat developments 

mission areas. 

As shown in figure 4, requirements in TRADOC’s training mission area 

ranged from about 35,000 to 37,000, with slight reductions between fiscal 

years 1996 and 1999. Likewise, the personnel requirements for the training 

development, combat development, and base operations mission areas 

had some minor changes from year to year. 

The reductions in personnel authorizations between fiscal years 1995 and 

2001 forced TRADOC to set priorities among its mission areas to ensure 

that it successfully performed its highest-priority function—training. 

Figure 5 shows TRADOC’s authorization allocations relative to personnel 

requirements during this period. In comparison to the other mission areas, 

training was authorized the highest percentage of personnel authorizations 
Page 14 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

in each year. Furthermore, training authorization levels remained 

relatively steady, while those in the base operations mission area were 

steadily reduced. 

Figure 5: Selected Mission Area Personnel Authorizations as a Percentage of Personnel Requirements, Fiscal Years 1995-

2001 

Several DOD and Army force structure decisions were responsible for a 

large portion of TRADOC’s personnel authorization reductions. 

Throughout the 1990s, DOD implemented several force structure 

reshaping initiatives—including those resulting from the 1997 Quadrennial 

Defense Review—that were aimed at streamlining the military services. 

Most of these initiatives directed across-the-board cuts in personnel 

authorizations and often left the military services and their commands to 

determine how to allocate the reductions. For example, one such 

initiative—referred to as “Quicksilver”—was implemented between fiscal 

years 1991 and 1996 to reduce the Army’s force structure to create a 

balanced, versatile, smaller, more lethal, and more ready force than 

existed in the late 1980s. As a result, the initiative eliminated 3,134 civilian 
Page 15 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

positions and 6,224 military positions at TRADOC between fiscal years 

1991 and 2001. 

TRADOC officials expressed confidence in the accuracy of their reported 

personnel requirements. They cite the validation of their requirements 

determination process in 2001 by the Army Manpower Analysis Agency as 

proof that their process produces valid requirements.6

 Also, 

representatives of the Manpower Analysis Agency stated that TRADOC’s 

personnel requirements determination process was based on a sound 

methodology. However, unresolved differences remain between TRADOC 

and Army Headquarters officials regarding the accuracy of the Command’s 

personnel requirements. Representatives of the Army’s Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Operations and Plans question the methods and assumptions used 

by TRADOC to link workload and personnel. More specifically, these 

officials told us they believe that TRADOC does not accurately account for 

work being done by contract personnel, and thus the difference between 

the Command’s requirements and authorizations is not as large as it 

appears. They believe that contractors are filling the gap between 

requirements and authorizations. However, these officials did not provide 

any objective analysis to document the extent to which this might be the 

case. Similarly, TRADOC officials did not have sufficient data to show the 

extent to which they were relying on contractors.7

 However, according to 

TRADOC officials, the Command’s personnel requirements determination 

process appropriately considers work being done by contractors. Although 

we did not independently validate TRADOC’s personnel requirements 

processes, our discussions with knowledgeable officials and review of 

available documentation indicated that their requirements analysis was 

based on a rigorous multistep process and gave due consideration to the 

work being performed by contractors. Furthermore, as discussed later in 

this report, TRADOC frequently cited personnel shortfalls as a cause of 

low readiness ratings. 

 6

 The Army Manpower Analysis Agency is assigned responsibility for overseeing and 

certifying the Army requirements determination processes used by Army commands. The 

Manpower Analysis Agency reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & 

Reserve Affairs). 

7

 During fiscal year 2002, the Army began collecting information to identify the size of its 

contractor workforce. 
Page 16 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, TRADOC’s O&M budget increased 

$544 million, or about 23 percent (expressed in constant fiscal year 2001 

dollars). However, this increase in funding was not uniform across all of 

TRADOC’s mission areas or budget categories. For example, funding for 

the base operations mission decreased by around $20 million, or about 

2 percent, while training mission funds increased by around $326 million, 

or about 36 percent. Over time, funding allocated to the recruiting or 

accessions mission area increased by about $200 million, or almost 

100 percent. (See fig. 6.) 

Figure 6: TRADOC O&M Funding Trends for Selected Mission Areas for Fiscal 

Years 1995-2001 

Likewise, the increase in funding was not uniform across TRADOC budget 

categories. For example, between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, funding in 

the civilian personnel budget category decreased by $60 million, while 

TRADOC Received Budget 

Increases, but Additional 

Funds Benefited Limited 

Areas 
Page 17 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

contract funding increased by $317 million. The decrease in civilian 

personnel funding resulted from the loss of personnel authorizations. 

During this period, an increasing percentage of the budget was shifted 

from base operations accounts to the Command’s highest priority 

mission—training. This is shown in figure 7. This practice generally left 

TRADOC in a position to conduct only minimal repair and maintenance on 

its facilities. 

Figure 7: TRADOC O&M Funding Percentages by Mission Area for Fiscal Years 

1995-2001 

The largest increases in TRADOC’s budget were directly related to 

contracting and added mission responsibilities. Between fiscal years 1995 

and 2001, the amount of funding spent on contracting increased by 

38 percent, or about $317 million (in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars). 

According to TRADOC budget officials, a large portion of this contract 

funding was used to support Army transformation initiatives. They noted 

that in several instances the Army provided funding for transformationrelated activities but did not provide the associated personnel 
Page 18 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

authorizations. TRADOC did not have available in-house personnel to 

address the new requirements, which effectively forced the Command to 

contract for those activities. In fiscal year 2001, the Command received 

$289 million related to new mission funding. Of that total, $150 million, or 

52 percent of new mission funding, was directly associated with Army 

transformation and was used to acquire contractor support. For example, 

contractors were used to develop doctrine and training materials for the 

new Stryker brigades. 

Reductions in personnel authorizations, coupled with unchanged 

personnel requirements, have affected TRADOC’s ability to meet workload 

requirements in some mission areas. The Command has been able to 

perform its training mission, but with difficulty. Moreover, backlogs of 

work exist in the training development, doctrine development, combat 

development, and base operations mission areas. The Command’s inability 

to address its personnel shortages and workload backlogs are reflected in 

its monthly readiness reports, which consistently show low readiness 

levels throughout the Command. At the same time, TRADOC lacks a 

formal process for obtaining customer feedback information to evaluate 

the effectiveness of its mission and alert Army leaders to potential 

problem areas. Two Army leadership panels completing their work in 2001 

and 2002 identified concerns about TRADOC’s ability to effectively carry 

out its mission. Also, anecdotal evidence from U.S. Army Forces 

Command (FORSCOM)—a major TRADOC customer—indicates that the 

quality of TRADOC training provided to individuals has declined and 

confirms that some doctrine is not up to date. Army transformation and 

other potential future requirements will likely place new demands on 

TRADOC, making it even more challenging for the Command to perform 

its mission at its current resource levels. 

Over the past several years TRADOC has been able to perform its training 

mission, but officials noted some concerns about the quality of the 

training. As shown in figure 8, the number of full-time equivalent students 

per year—referred to as the training workload—decreased significantly 

between fiscal years 1991 and 1994, primarily as a result of DOD 

downsizing. Since approximately 1994 the training workload has remained 

relatively steady, between 60,000 and 70,000 full-time equivalent students 

annually. Due to the high priority placed on meeting the training workload, 

TRADOC ensures that the students arriving at its schools receive timely 

scheduled training. 

TRADOC’s Full 

Workload 

Requirements Are Not 

Being Met; Leadership 

Panels and Combat 

Forces Cite Quality 

Problems 

TRADOC Performed 

Training Mission but 

Experienced Difficulty 

Meeting Other Mission 

Workload 
Page 19 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Figure 8: Army Training Workload, Fiscal Years 1991-2003 

However, officials located at both TRADOC Headquarters and the 

TRADOC schools we visited expressed concern about a decline in quality 

in some aspects of the training provided by the Command. They believe 

that the Command does not have enough experienced training instructors 

to provide the quality of training they would like. They noted that 

personnel reductions have resulted in the loss of some of the corporate 

knowledge necessary to develop training courses and doctrine 

publications and that personnel who were once devoted solely to writing 

doctrine are now asked to conduct training first and to write doctrine as a 

secondary responsibility. Furthermore, they told us that the decreasing 

number of personnel, coupled with increasing class sizes, resulted in more 

students per instructor and less individual training time. 

Workload backlogs are evident in some of TRADOC’s primary mission 

areas. A training and doctrine development backlog exists throughout the 

Command. Moreover, the combat development backlog is growing. 

Finally, declining personnel and budgetary resources have affected the 

Command’s ability to carry out base operations. 

Workload Backlogs Exist 

in Some Mission Areas 
Page 20 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

According to TRADOC workload data, a training and doctrine 

development backlog exists throughout the Command. Army training and 

doctrine materials must complement one another so that soldiers are 

trained according to current doctrine. However, as a result of an 

insufficient number of training development personnel, TRADOC has not 

been able to maintain the currency of its highest-priority training 

courses—commonly referred to as programs of instruction (POI)—and 

associated doctrine. TRADOC officials stated that to compensate for the 

shortage of doctrine development personnel, the Command has used 

contractors in some instances to write and revise doctrine publications. 

Even with the use of contractors, backlogs continue. 

TRADOC managers use a database to manage the Command’s highestpriority training and doctrine development workload. TRADOC leadership 

uses the information contained in this database to make resource and 

workload allocation decisions. Table 2, which shows data extracted from 

the database, identifies the Army’s top 13 training and doctrine 

development priorities as understood by TRADOC. However, these top 

priorities do not represent the entirety of the Command’s training and 

doctrine development workload. The work associated with these priorities 

is expressed in terms of staff-years of work and staff-years available to 

perform the work. As the table shows, TRADOC’s available personnel 

cannot complete the workload associated with these top priorities—only 

45 percent of the staff-years required for the top priority training and 

doctrine development work were available, indicating a significant 

shortfall in personnel available to do this work. 

TRADOC Has Training and 

Doctrine Development 

Backlogs 
Page 21 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Table 2: TRADOC’s Top 13 Training and Doctrine Development Priorities (as of 

October 2002) 

Priority ranking Workload categories Staff-years

1 

Contemporary operating environment/force 

protection 717.98

2 Unit set fielding – 1st Cavalry 108.49

3 

Interim B\brigade combat teams (Stryker 

brigades) 850.22

4 Distance learning courseware 1,911.81

5 Doctrine (field manuals, joint and NATO pubs) 306.82

6 Mission training plans 1,403.97

7 Soldier training pubs 17.02

8 TRADOC transformation 103.80

9 Institutional digital education plan 84.00

10 Interim division 187.18

11 Individual training requirements (POI, etc.) 1,326.19

12 Total army training system courseware 35.17

13 Warrior training support packages 265.43

Total staff-year 

requirements 7,318.08

Total staff-years 

available 3,294.00

Shortfall in 

staff-years (4,024.08)

Source: TRADOC. 

Most of the Command’s training and doctrine developers are focusing on 

the top four priorities. TRADOC officials stated that the first and fourth 

priorities are both being filled at nearly 100 percent of the staff-years 

required, while attention given to other areas—such as Mission Training 

Plans and TRADOC Transformation—varies.8

Although many of the areas represented in table 2 have a component of 

doctrine writing, priority number 5 is the area most directly related to 

TRADOC’s doctrine mission. TRADOC doctrine development officials told 

us that the Command had enough personnel to complete about 40 percent 

of its existing doctrine development workload. A large portion of this 

backlog involves field manuals, which have to be written, reviewed 

 8

 TRADOC does not track actual staff-year data. However, officials were confident that the 

Contemporary Operating Environment/Force Protection and the Distance Learning 

Courseware priorities were filled to 100 percent. They identified other areas that have 

received resources, but could not provide a measure of the level of resourcing for these 

areas. 
Page 22 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

periodically, and revised.9 In total, TRADOC is responsible for more than 

600 field manuals and publications, which include joint operations with 

other military services and U.S. allies. 

We calculated that as of January 2002 only about 33 percent of the field 

manuals in the inventory were up to date. (See fig. 9.) The other 67 percent 

of the manuals required work, including the development of at least 81 

new publications, the review of 129 existing publications, and the revision 

of 205 outdated publications. Of the 81 new publications, 26 are directly 

related to the Stryker brigades and Army transformation. Without updated 

field manuals, the Army’s combat units may not have the benefit of the 

tactics, techniques, and procedures needed to help them better perform 

their missions in future conflicts. 

Figure 9: Army Field Manual Status (as of January 2002) 

 9

 The Army doctrine development (field manual development) cycle has six phases: 

(1) assessment, (2) planning, (3) development, (4) production, (5) print and dissemination, 

and (6) implementation and evaluation. This process may take from 18 to 24 months to 

complete. The length of time varies depending on whether a field manual is being newly 

written or revised, the scope and complexity of the material, the extent of the 

staffing/review required, and the level of approval authority required. 
Page 23 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Doctrine writing is one mission area that relies on contractors to satisfy 

some workload requirements. For example, Fort Benning, which is 

responsible for supporting the development and fielding of the Stryker 

brigades, is using contractor personnel to develop doctrine for the new 

brigades. In this particular situation, Fort Benning officials told us that the 

contractor used retired military personnel with infantry experience to help 

write the field manuals. The officials noted that the retired military 

personnel being used by the contractor had relevant experience needed 

for writing doctrine; however, they also expressed concern that reduced 

personnel authorizations may eventually shrink the pool of available 

retired military personnel with the experience needed to fill the contract 

positions. 

TRADOC is also experiencing growing workload backlogs in its combat 

developments mission area. The backlogs include tasks required to 

develop and analyze warfighting concepts and materiel requirements 

related to force modernization and transformation, among other things. 

According to TRADOC officials, the Command is responsible for about 

46,200 combat development tasks per year. Those same officials noted that 

the Command’s workload backlog is growing at a rate of about 33 percent 

per year because the mission area does not have enough personnel to 

address the large volume of tasks that needs to be completed. 

TRADOC’s base operations mission area, which involves activities like 

logistics and the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of real 

property, has also been affected by declining resources. TRADOC officials 

told us that they frequently were able to provide only emergency or 

minimal real property maintenance at installations between fiscal years 

1995 and 2001, due to insufficient personnel and funding. Moreover, during 

that time, TRADOC shifted O&M funding from base operations accounts to 

training accounts to ensure that the training mission could be 

accomplished. This explains, in part, the backlog of reported real property 

maintenance. For example, for fiscal year 2001, the funding level for the 

Command’s base operations was set at about 70 percent of its workload 

requirements, thus TRADOC was able to make more funding available for 

higher-priority mission areas, such as training. 

Various TRADOC officials have also expressed concern about the 

difficulty of staffing and maintaining training ranges. For example, officials 

from both TRADOC and FORSCOM noted that the National Training 

Center, which is used to conduct large-scale collective training exercises, 

has not been adequately staffed to observe the training and provide 

feedback to units involved in the exercises. As a result, FORSCOM units 

Combat Development Backlog 

Is Growing 

Declining Resources Affect 

TRADOC’s Ability to Provide 

Base Operations 
Page 24 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

have had to use their own personnel to augment National Training Center 

personnel, particularly in the area of forward observers; consequently, 

some FORSCOM combat personnel were not able to participate fully in 

training exercises. 

TRADOC prepares a monthly status report that assesses the readiness of 

most of its organizational units. These monthly reports are provided to the 

Army Chief of Staff. Our review of these reports showed that a majority of 

the Command’s organizations were assigned the lowest readiness rating 

throughout most of fiscal year 2001 and into fiscal year 2002 and that 17 of 

TRADOC’s 30 reporting units identified personnel shortages as the primary 

reason for their lower readiness status.10 TRADOC’s readiness rating 

criteria call for a unit to be rated low in the category of personnel if it has 

less than 70 percent of the personnel it requires. Figure 10 shows how the 

30 units included in the reports were rated. 

 10 Readiness ratings are based on specific criteria related to personnel levels, equipment on 

hand, equipment serviceability, and training. The ratings are measures of a 

unit/component’s ability to perform its mission. A C-1 rating represents the highest 

readiness position, denoting that the mission can be fully performed. Conversely, a C-4 

rating represents the lowest readiness position, denoting that the mission cannot be 

accomplished. 

Readiness Reports Show 

Personnel Shortages and 

Effects 
Page 25 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Figure 10: Average Readiness Ratings for 30 TRADOC Reporting Units, for the 

Period January 2001 – February 2002 

Note: GAO analysis of TRADOC monthly status reports. 

A few units that did not report problems with personnel shortages had 

other problems that caused them to report low readiness ratings. For 

example, one reporting unit that was consistently at a C-4 rating identified 

the lack of equipment on hand rather than insufficient personnel as the 

reason for its low readiness ratings. 

Unit commanders include written comments that accompany the 

readiness ratings they provide on monthly readiness reports. The 

comments highlight the types of problems being experienced and the 

effect those problems have on the unit’s mission performance. We 

reviewed the comments for the period covered in figure 10, and the 

following quote is representative of many of the comments that appeared 

in the monthly reports: 

[The] lack of personnel and funding, especially a very limited officer presence, has put 

Combat, Doctrine and Training Development at risk resulting in the use of outdated 

doctrine and training materials....The Operating Force has to compensate by developing 

what it needs on its own. 

According to our analysis, commanders most often reported the shortage 

of doctrine, training, and combat developers as their top readiness 
Page 26 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

concern. For example, one comment stated that TRADOC needs funding 

for 400 permanent civilian training development positions to eliminate the 

Command’s large training development backlog. Another comment noted 

that the 70 percent reduction in military and civilian training developers 

severely degraded the Command’s capability to maintain current force 

training materials as well as support the evolving future forces’ 

requirements. Between January 2001 and January 2002, 28 units reported a 

shortage of developers as a major concern at least once. 

Other comments regarding the lack of personnel referred to reductions in 

the required rank of soldiers that were filling supervisory/training 

positions, thus assigning training responsibilities to less experienced 

military personnel. Likewise, commanders noted that personnel 

reductions had placed civilian personnel in positions for which they were 

marginally qualified or not qualified at all. 

DOD also reports on the readiness of the military services to perform their 

respective training functions. This readiness assessment is presented to 

Congress in the department’s quarterly and annual Institutional Training 

Readiness reports. Although TRADOC has consistently reported a low 

overall readiness status, the quarterly reports DOD provided to Congress 

generally showed Army institutional training readiness at the C-1 and C-2 

levels. The readiness reports provided to Congress, however, only reflect 

the training portion of TRADOC’s mission and do not rate the Command’s 

readiness to carry out training, doctrine, and combat development. For 

example, the department’s annual Institutional Training Readiness 

Report for Fiscal Year 2001, issued January 2002, showed TRADOC’s 

institutional training readiness to be either C-1 or C-2 for six of the seven 

training categories assessed.11 The report did note, however, that 

personnel and funding shortages caused some ratings to drop below C-1, 

particularly in the flight training area. The report also noted that TRADOC 

had to put other mission areas—combat, doctrine, and training 

developments—at risk to meet its primary mission of training. In addition, 

DOD’s Institutional Training Readiness reports compare the number of 

students projected to enter the training system and the number that 

actually receive training. For this reason, the reports do not provide a 

measure of training quality. 

 11 The seven categories of institutional training that were assessed were (1) recruiting, 

(2) one-station unit training, (3) officer acquisition, (4) initial skill training, (5) skill 

progression training, (6) functional training, and (7) flight training. 
Page 27 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

While TRADOC readiness reports show a significant degradation in 

readiness—often attributed to resource constraints—the impact on its 

ability to support operational forces is not well established and is often 

limited to anecdotal concerns voiced by operational leaders. TRADOC 

previously collected and evaluated such anecdotal information in the form 

of feedback from its customers, but it does not currently have the 

capability to do so. According to TRADOC officials, this capability was 

eliminated in the early 1990s as part of the Command’s response to 

reduced personnel authorizations. Nevertheless, collecting feedback from 

customers is a good management practice. The Government Performance 

and Results Act12 as well as prior GAO reports reference the need to obtain 

and analyze data related to the quality of services provided by and to 

government organizations.13 Obtaining feedback from customers is an 

important aspect of assessing the quality of services. Without a systematic 

process to collect and evaluate customer feedback information, the ability 

to plan and prioritize workload based on customers’ needs is hindered. 

The Command decided in fiscal year 2002 to reestablish a quality 

assurance program. According to TRADOC officials, the program’s 

objectives would be to (1) establish and maintain an organizational 

structure within TRADOC to ensure the quality and standardization of 

education/training across components; (2) ensure that all components are 

trained to the same standard and trained to perform in a contemporary 

operating environment;14 (3) ensure that students can perform to training 

standards; and (4) ensure that education/training meets the needs of the 

legacy, interim, and objective forces. However, it is unclear how many 

 12 The Government and Performance and Results Act requires federal agencies to set 

strategic goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which the goals are met. 

Its intent is to focus agencies more on results, service delivery, and program outcomes 

(P.L. 103-62, 1993). 

13 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Logistics: Improving Customer Feedback 

Program Could Enhance DLA’s Delivery of Services, GAO-02-776 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 

9, 2002); Tax Administration: IRS Faces Challenges in Measuring Customer Service, 

GAO/GGD-98-59 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 1998); and Federal Prison Industries: Limited 

Data Available on Customer Satisfaction, GAO/GGD-98-50 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 

1998). 

14 According to the Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook No. 02-8, Operation 

Enduring Freedom Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, the contemporary operational 

environment is the overall operational environment that exists today and in the near future, 

out to the year 2020. The range of threats during this period extends from smaller, lowertechnology opponents using more adaptive, asymmetric methods to larger, modernized 

forces able to engage deployed U.S. forces in more conventional, symmetrical ways. 

TRADOC Lacks 

Information to Evaluate Its 

Mission Effectiveness 
Page 28 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

resources TRADOC would be able to allocate to this program and whether 

the program would incorporate a customer feedback component. 

Two recent Army training and leader development panels and various 

FORSCOM officials indicate that the quality of TRADOC’s products—such 

as well-trained soldiers and adequate field manuals and training 

materials—has declined. Also, officials at FORSCOM Headquarters and at 

one of its major installations, Fort Hood, Texas, provided us with 

anecdotal information about the quality of TRADOC’s products that 

reinforced the panels’ observations. 

During 2001 and 2002, two Army Training and Leader Development 

Panels—one representing officers and one representing noncommissioned 

officers—raised issues about the quality of TRADOC’s products. The 

purpose of these panels, which were chartered by the Army Chief of Staff, 

was to assess the quality of the Army’s training and leader development 

programs and identify areas needing improvement. In particular, the 

panels were to determine the relevancy of existing training and leader 

development programs to the needs of the future forces. The first panel 

focused on evaluating training and leader development efforts related to 

commissioned officers, and the second panel focused on 

noncommissioned officers. 

• The officer panel concluded that (1) TRADOC was not providing the Army 

with up-to-date training and educational products due to a severe lack of 

training development resources; (2) TRADOC was not updating or 

developing training and education products fast enough to support both 

the current and future forces; (3) many of the foundational publications 

and products related to standards-based training and leader development 

were obsolete; and (4) mechanisms for evaluating training and leader 

development programs were lacking. The panel made the general 

observation that the Army’s combat forces were evolving at a pace that 

was not allowing the institutional training base to provide up-to-date 

training and educational products. 

• The noncommissioned officer panel presented similar but more detailed 

conclusions than the officer panel. The panel noted, among other things, 

that (1) more than 40 percent of Army military occupational specialties did 

not have current manuals; (2) the Army training and development 

standards had deteriorated since the early 1990s; and (3) the Army’s failure 

to keep its standards up to date since the Gulf War had created a 

generation of senior noncommissioned officers that do not know and are 

not executing the principles and processes of Army training doctrine. 

Army Leadership Panels 

and FORSCOM Officials 

Believe the Quality of 

TRADOC Products Has 

Declined 
Page 29 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

FORSCOM’s observations complement the findings of the two Training 

and Leader Development Panels. FORSCOM officials consistently noted 

that soldiers graduating from TRADOC schools are not as well trained as 

they once were because TRADOC no longer has the number of personnel 

it needs to ensure comprehensive, quality training. Nor did they feel that 

TRADOC had adequately developed or communicated a strategy for 

training personnel on digital equipment like the new Army Battle 

Command System. Moreover, they noted that some of the equipment being 

used for training was not current, and thus the training being provided on 

those systems was not properly preparing soldiers to operate the 

equipment that their operational units were using. For example, they said 

that armor officers were being trained on older versions of Abrams tanks 

at TRADOC, while several operational units were already using newer 

digitized versions. Several armor battalion commanders at Fort Hood said 

that they had to frequently provide individual training to armor officers 

coming from TRADOC’s Armor School in order to familiarize the officers 

with the digital equipment being used in battalion tanks. 

Some FORSCOM officials also expressed concerns about the age of Army 

doctrine publications, several of which are Cold War-era documents. They 

noted that the lack of current doctrinal publications causes units in 

FORSCOM to develop battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures 

based on doctrinal foundations that do not reflect the current operating 

environment. FORSCOM officials did note one exception to their general 

observations about doctrine: they believed TRADOC had provided both 

timely and quality doctrine development and related support for the new 

Stryker brigades. 

TRADOC’s ability to meet its future responsibilities will likely be 

challenged because the Command continues to acquire new mission 

requirements that will continue to compound its already large workload 

backlogs. For example, Army transformation requirements will continue 

to place new demands on TRADOC over the next several years.15

Transformation will bring changes in equipment as the Army modernizes 

existing equipment and transitions to the interim and objective forces. 

 15 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Transformation: Army Has a 

Comprehensive Plan for Managing Its Transformation but Faces Major Challenges, 

GAO-02-96 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2001). 

TRADOC Likely to Face 

Additional Workload 

Challenges as the Army’s 

“Architect of the Future” 
Page 30 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

This, in turn, will necessitate changes in operating concepts, doctrine, and 

training. 

The Army’s plans, however, do not call for the total elimination of current 

capabilities. While it is developing the objective force and establishing the 

interim force, such as the Stryker brigades, the Army plans to sustain, 

recapitalize (upgrade and rebuild), and modernize many of the systems 

currently in use. For example, all of the Abrams tanks currently in the 

Army’s arsenal will eventually be equipped with digital battlefield 

command systems as part of modernization and transformation efforts and 

will remain in the arsenal until about 2031. Maintaining and upgrading 

current capabilities will continue to place demands on TRADOC’s combat, 

doctrine, and training developments mission areas. 

Available budget data indicate that TRADOC could face increased funding 

challenges as the Army proceeds with its transformation efforts and 

continues to maintain its current weapon systems. We reported in May 

2001 that the modernization and transformation of the current force will 

require significantly more resources—current systems alone would require 

substantial investment to sustain and modernize.16 As we noted in the 

report, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology) said on September 6, 2000, that the Army would require 

$23 billion to modernize its current forces during fiscal years 2002 to 2007, 

but projected that it would only have about $15.5 billion for that purpose, a 

$7.5 billion shortfall. Given this magnitude of budget shortfalls, without 

additional budgetary resources and improved operating efficiencies, the 

Army will have to make trade-offs between modernization initiatives and 

operational demands. Moreover, Army Headquarters has not been 

persuaded to provide TRADOC with significantly more resources, 

primarily because it does not have extra resources available. Officials 

involved in prioritizing Army budgetary resources stated that the Army 

simply had too many other, higher-priority programs and requirements to 

satisfy before it could provide TRADOC with additional funding. 

 16 U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces 

Weapon Systems Challenges, GAO-01-311 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2001). 
Page 31 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Both Army Headquarters and TRADOC have actions or plans in process 

that could affect TRADOC, but it is unclear how these actions will affect 

the Command’s resource posture or its ability to perform its mission. 

Armywide actions include the transfer of responsibility for base 

operations away from all of its commands to a new Armywide 

organization, a reassessment of the process used to determine personnel 

requirements for TRADOC and the other institutional forces, and ongoing 

commercial activities studies that may cause TRADOC to rely more on 

contractors to support future operations. The Command is also losing 

some military personnel to the combat forces as part of the Army’s 

“Manning the Force” initiative. Finally, TRADOC is in the process of 

developing a commandwide reengineering plan, which is intended to 

streamline its organizational structure, make better use of information 

technology, and be more responsive to the Army’s combat forces. Issues 

and questions related to these various initiatives remain unresolved or 

unanswered. 

As part of its effort to transform, streamline its headquarters, and improve 

resource management, the Army announced plans in October 2001 to 

create a new agency for managing all of its base operations activities. The 

new agency, called the Installation Management Agency (IMA), was 

activated in October 2002 and assumed management responsibilities for 

base operations activities such as force protection, logistics, public works, 

facilities maintenance, and morale and welfare programs under one 

management organization.17 The Army hopes to achieve several goals with 

IMA, which include improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 

installation management and allowing mission commanders to focus more 

on maintaining readiness. The Army expects to transfer about 35,000 

personnel authorizations and about $8 billion in funding from various 

Army commands to IMA during fiscal year 2003. 

For fiscal year 2001, TRADOC had about 18,100 personnel requirements 

and about 10,350 personnel authorizations for base operations. The Army 

began to transfer personnel authorizations and associated funding from 

TRADOC to IMA in October 2002. As many as 10,000 personnel may be 

transferred, although the number had not been finalized. The personnel 

 17 IMA is comprised of a headquarters located in the Washington, D.C. area and seven 

regional offices—four located within the continental United States and one each in Hawaii, 

Germany, and Korea. 

Effect of Ongoing and 

Planned Actions on 

TRADOC Is Uncertain 

Base Operations Mission 

Transferred to New 

Organization 
Page 32 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

authorizations to be transferred represent most of the authorizations 

allocated to TRADOC’s base operations mission area. 

The loss of the base operations mission will result in TRADOC having less 

flexibility to shift funding among its primary mission areas. In the past, 

TRADOC has been able provide additional funding to its higher-priority 

mission areas by taking some funds from base operations. For example, in 

fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001, the Command moved $115 million, 

$98 million, and $145 million, respectively, from investment accounts—

which were primarily base operations accounts—to training accounts.18 As 

a result, TRADOC was able to complete its primary mission—training—at 

the expense of some base operations activities, such as the maintenance 

and rehabilitation of facilities. TRADOC officials told us they will no 

longer have the flexibility to do this after base operations funding is 

reallocated to IMA. 

The Army is reassessing the process it uses to determine personnel 

requirements. Army regulations require that the institutional force’s 

personnel requirements be based on workload. A sound workload analysis 

is needed to allocate personnel resources among institutional 

organizations throughout the Army and to ensure that the highest-priority 

functions and missions are funded first. Moreover, current law specifies 

that civilian personnel are to be managed solely on the basis of the 

workload required to carry out the functions and activities of their 

respective military department and the funds made available to the 

department.19 The law also requires the military department secretaries to 

report annually on their compliance with the provisions of this law. 

However, the Army has had longstanding issues with its institutional force 

personnel requirements, as documented in previously published GAO and 

Army Audit Agency reports.20 Since early 1995, the Army has developed 

 18 The investment accounts included funds for (a) infrastructure sustainment, 

rehabilitation, and modernization; (b) facility reduction; (c) integrated training 

management; and (d) combat developments. 

19 The legislative requirements are set out in 10 U.S.C. Section 129; the annual reports are to 

be completed by February 1 of each year. 

20 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Army’s Efforts to Improve 

Efficiency of Institutional Forces Have Produced Few Results, GAO/NSIAD-98-65

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1998) and U.S. Army Audit Agency, Managing Workload, 

Organizations and Staffing, HQ 94-751 (Alexandria, Va.: June 23, 1994). 

Army Reassessing Process 

for Determining 

Institutional Force 

Personnel Requirements 
Page 33 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

plans and taken steps to improve the processes used to develop personnel 

requirements for the institutional forces. Nevertheless, we reported in May 

2001 that the accuracy of the personnel requirements for the Army’s 

institutional forces was questionable.21 We recommended that, among 

other things, the Army use the results of Army Manpower Analysis Agency 

reviews to improve the personnel requirements of the institutional forces. 

While some progress to develop more accurate personnel requirements 

has been made, the Army is still concerned about two primary problems: 

(1) the validity of workload estimates and the resulting personnel 

requirements and (2) the extent to which contractors are satisfying 

workload requirements. For example, in fiscal year 2002, the Army did not 

have accurate information about the size and use of the contractor 

workforce. As a result, the Army was unable to report that it was 

managing its civilian personnel solely on the basis of the workload 

required to carry out the functions and activities of the department during 

fiscal year 2002. A major issue involved the extent to which contractors 

were meeting workload requirements. Although the Army expends about 

one-third of its total obligation authority for contractor support, its 

estimates of the number of contractor personnel supporting the Army 

ranges from about 125,000 to 600,000.22 Without accurate information 

about the contractor workforce, the Army was not confident that its 

civilian personnel requirements were valid. In 2002 the Army began an 

effort to identify the size of its contractor workforce; this effort is still 

underway. 

In early 2002, concerned about the accuracy of its personnel requirements 

and the widening gap between personnel requirements and authorizations, 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans within Army 

Headquarters initiated a study of the requirements determination process 

 21 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Force Structure: Projected Requirements for Some 

Army Forces Not Well Established, GAO-01-485 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2001). 

22 The estimate is based on a study sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

(Manpower & Reserve Affairs), which was completed in March 2002. The Assistant 

Secretary (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) is responsible for Army personnel policies. 
Page 34 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

for all of the commands that comprise the institutional forces.23 The intent 

of the study was twofold—to arrive at a process that produces valid 

requirements and to strengthen the role of Army leadership components in 

the review and approval of the requirements. Among other things, the 

study team proposed in August 2002 that personnel requirements simply 

be adjusted downward so that they would equal personnel authorizations. 

This proposal applied to TRADOC even though its personnel requirements 

determination process had previously been certified as valid by the Army’s 

Manpower Analysis Agency. The proposed change in the process was 

expected to pressure the commands that comprise the institutional force 

to rejustify their respective personnel requirements and give Army 

Headquarters more control over the process. However, the commands, as 

well as some Headquarters offices, opposed the proposal for several 

reasons. They believed that it did not (a) acknowledge valid requirements 

processes that were already in place; (b) acknowledge existing workload 

backlogs in excess of resource levels, which makes areas of risk more 

visible to senior managers; (c) acknowledge the role the commands play in 

validating requirements; and (d) comply with legislative requirements to 

manage personnel requirements solely on the basis of workload. As a 

result of the commands’ concerns, the proposal has been abandoned. 

However, the study team continues to seek out other options for 

strengthening senior Army managers’ control over the process and to 

identify potential new policy guidance related to the personnel 

requirements determination process for institutional forces. The follow-on 

study is not expected to be completed until sometime during fiscal year 

2003. 

Studies conducted as part of the Army’s commercial activities program 

will likely lead to some reduction in personnel authorizations at TRADOC. 

To help meet DOD force reshaping and downsizing goals, the Army 

established a goal for TRADOC to study about 13,600 positions under 

Office of Management Budget Circular A-76. One goal of the A-76 studies is 

to identify commercial functions that could be performed more efficiently, 

either by a streamlined in-house workforce or a contract with the private 

 23 The Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for conducting the Total Army 

Analysis, which determines the allocation of personnel resources among the operational 

and institutional forces. Within Operations and Plans, the Force Management Division has 

had a long-standing role in determining personnel allocations for the Army’s combat forces. 

The Force Management Division was the sponsor of this study and believes it needs to be 

more involved in allocating personnel authorizations to the institutional forces. The Chief 

of Staff for Operations and Plans also receives TRADOC’s monthly status reports on 

readiness. 

Commercial Activity 

Studies Likely to Reduce 

Personnel Requirements 

and Authorizations 
Page 35 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

sector. In either case, the required number of personnel authorizations 

would likely be reduced—either because the in-house workforce would 

become more efficient and would not require as many staff or because the 

function would no longer be performed by current federal employees. 

However, these studies by themselves will not free personnel for 

assignment to other mission areas where shortages exist. 

Most of TRADOC’s commercial activity studies were initiated in fiscal 

years 1997 and 1999. Because studies generally take from 2 to 4 years to 

complete, TRADOC did not begin to implement decisions until fiscal year 

2001. As of November 2002, decisions on 39 of the 57 studies had been 

made. Decisions implemented thus far resulted in a majority of the 

activities under study going to private-sector contractors. Remaining 

decisions will not be made until sometime in fiscal year 2003. Table 3 

shows the status of the studies. 

Table 3: Status of TRADOC Commercial Activity Studies Announced during Fiscal 

Years 1997 and 1999 (as of November 2002) 

 1997 1999 Total

Studies announced 13 44 57

Total positions to be 

studied 4,833 3,999 8,832

Civilian 4,709 2,043 6,752

Military 124 1,956 2,080

Studies completed 13 26 39

Positions retained in-house 935 1,429 2,364

Positions to contract 3,898 423 4,321

Source: TRADOC. 

The studies reviewed a number of commercial activities; however, most of 

the larger studies fell within the base operations mission area and involved 

the logistics and public works functions. Because TRADOC’s base 

operations mission was transferred to IMA beginning in October 2002, the 

Command will not be affected in the future by most of these studies. Of 

TRADOC’s remaining primary mission areas, training and training support 

will be most affected by some of the smaller commercial activities studies 

that are currently underway. 

In addition to the above studies that are nearing completion, the Army 

announced plans in October 2002 to further study all of its functions that 

do not necessarily require military personnel to perform. If these plans are 

carried out, Army officials estimate that as many as 150,000 personnel 
Page 36 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

authorizations Armywide could be eliminated as work shifts to the private 

sector. To what extent this will affect TRADOC remains to be seen. 

Further, although commercial activity studies can reduce TRADOC’s 

personnel requirements and improve operating efficiencies, they can 

increase the Command’s budget requirements when their outcome results 

in military positions being replaced by civilian or contractor personnel. In 

these instances, the Army plans to reallocate the military positions to 

other needs. However, the increase in budgetary requirements occurs 

because the Command must budget for the cost of its civilian personnel 

and contractors, which are paid from O&M funds. They no longer have the 

benefit of the military personnel who were paid by Army Headquarters 

from centrally managed funds. These additional costs are referred to as 

“military buy-back” costs. In September 2001, TRADOC estimated that its 

military buy-back costs would be about $44 million, $90 million, and $92 

million for fiscal years 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. 

The Army’s “Manning the Force” initiative was announced in fiscal year 

2000 and is intended, in part, to transfer military personnel from the 

institutional to the operational forces to improve the readiness of combat 

forces. This initiative will continue at least through fiscal year 2003. 

Initially, TRADOC expected to lose about 1,400 military personnel to the 

combat units as a result of the “Manning the Force” initiative. Since a lack 

of military personnel is already contributing to workload backlogs and low 

readiness reports, the initiative is not likely to improve TRADOC’s ability 

to reduce backlogs and improve readiness. Furthermore, the loss of 

authorized military personnel will not free funds for the Command 

because, as discussed above, military personnel are not paid from 

TRADOC’s O&M funds. 

However, TRADOC officials were not able to identify the number of 

military personnel that either have been or will be sent to the combat units 

as a result of the “Manning the Force” initiative. They explained that 

several initiatives affecting the number of military personnel assigned to 

TRADOC, such as “Quicksilver,” were already underway when the 

“Manning the Force” initiative began. 

TRADOC has begun developing a plan to overhaul its structure and 

processes, and that plan is still evolving. TRADOC officials believe that the 

Command must reengineer or overhaul its structure and processes to 

ensure that it continues to support the combat forces’ readiness and Army 

“Manning the Force” 

Initiative Is Reducing 

TRADOC’s Military 

Authorizations 

TRADOC’s Plan to 

Reengineer the Command 

Is Still Evolving 
Page 37 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

transformation. They believe that an overhaul is needed because (1) the 

rapid pace of change related to transformation is stressing the systems and 

processes associated with combat, doctrine, and training development; 

(2) the current procedures are too resource-intensive; (3) the weapon 

systems requirements determination process does not respond to the 

needs of the combat forces in a timely manner; and (4) the cost of 

maintaining TRADOC’s current organizational structure cannot be 

sustained. 

In May 2002 the Command received approval from the Army Chief of Staff 

to develop a reengineering plan. Its draft plan, referred to as the TRADOC 

Transformation Operational and Organizational Plan, is linked to 

Armywide plans that provide overall strategic direction—the 2002 Army 

Modernization Plan and the Army Transformation Campaign Plan. The 

TRADOC plan is based on two primary goals: (1) streamline the 

Command’s organization and processes and (2) make better and more 

extensive use of information technology. The Command’s staff is also in 

the process of updating policies and regulations to support the 

reengineering effort. 

Although TRADOC’s draft plan has not been finalized, the Command is 

considering the following organizing concepts to help it achieve its goals: 

• Implement new teaming and partnering arrangements. TRADOC is 

considering establishing new teaming and partnering arrangements across 

organizational boundaries to better focus its resources on key mission 

areas. Command officials believe that this approach will maximize 

personnel resources and expertise across the Command to produce better 

products and eventually result in more effective partnership arrangements. 

As part of this organizing concept, the role of TRADOC Headquarters will 

evolve from program management to the integration of functions and 

organizations within TRADOC. 

• Establish a Combined Arms Command. TRADOC is considering 

establishing a subcommand, notionally being referred to as a Combined 

Arms Command. This command will focus on training and leader 

development. Most of TRADOC’s educational institutions will be placed 

under this organization, which will oversee the activities of the schools. 

• Centralize development for training materials, doctrine, and 

combat systems. TRADOC is considering centralizing development 

activities as a by-product of its adoption of a standard schoolhouse model 

(as discussed in the following point). Responsibility for training 

development, doctrine development, and combat development for the 

future force would be shifted from the current 26 schools to six primary 
Page 38 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

battlefield mission areas associated with future combat operations—

maneuver, maneuver support, maneuver sustainment, fires, command and 

control, and special purpose forces. Development of each of these primary 

battlefield mission areas would be under the command of a general 

officer. In addition, each primary battlefield mission area would be 

supported by a battle laboratory. The six battlefield areas would report to 

the Combined Arms Center, leaving the individual schools to become more 

focused on the primary mission of training soldiers. TRADOC believes 

doing this would help the command become more efficient and effective. 

• Readopt the standard schoolhouse model. After TRADOC was 

established in the 1970s, it established school houses/training centers 

(infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) that followed a standard model in the way 

they were organized and staffed. As resources became more constrained, 

the schools were given more flexibility to organize in a manner that suited 

the commanders’ needs and, theoretically, would make the best use of 

TRADOC resources. Management became more decentralized. TRADOC is 

considering a move away from the decentralized management approach 

and back to a standard schoolhouse model. In addition, the schools would 

be clustered or organized under the primary battlefield mission areas 

associated with future combat operations. 

• Refocus battle laboratories and centralize their management. The 

command’s 11 battle laboratories are currently aligned with TRADOC’s 

schools. For example, an armor battle laboratory is part of the armor 

school at Fort Knox, and the infantry battle laboratory is part of the 

infantry school at Fort Benning. TRADOC is considering centralizing the 

management of six laboratories and refocusing them on the six primary 

battlefield mission areas discussed above. TRADOC believes realigning the 

laboratories, along with creating new teaming and partnering 

arrangements, will better focus its resources on broader issues, such as 

Army transformation. 

• Use distance learning more extensively. Distance learning is expected 

to become an integral part of the Command’s training curriculum. 

Implementation of this concept has been underway for some time at 

TRADOC. In general, it allows soldiers to complete computer-based 

training courses or selected modules of a course at their permanent duty 

location rather than traveling to a TRADOC facility to complete the course. 

TRADOC expects to develop at least 525 distance learning courses by 

2010. 

TRADOC officials also believe that better and more extensive use of 

information technology is just as important as the organizational changes 

it is considering. These officials state that information technology will be 

the basic building block of the reengineering effort. TRADOC officials 

believe the Command has to address mission requirements more quickly 
Page 39 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

with fewer resources. They also believe improved processes built on the 

latest technology will allow TRADOC and its customers to share data and 

develop products—such as doctrine, training materials, and operational 

requirements documents—in a timely manner. 

At the time we completed our review of TRADOC, the Command had not 

yet developed costs and benefits associated with the reengineering plan, 

and it was not clear to what extent the reengineering effort would result in 

organizational realignments or consolidations that might reduce personnel 

requirements. TRADOC officials told us that an analysis of costs and 

benefits would take place and be incorporated into an implementation 

plan after the reengineering concepts and organizing principles were 

agreed to within the Army. The analysis is to be completed by mid-fiscal 

year 2003. 

We also inquired about development of performance measures to gauge 

the progress of the reengineering effort and a human capital plan to 

support the effort. Ideally, a reengineering effort such as the one being 

undertaken by TRADOC is guided by an overall strategic framework, 

which sets out the strategic goals to be attained and performance 

measures to be used to measure and report progress toward reaching the 

goals. Moreover, the Government Performance and Results Act requires 

DOD to develop a strategic framework to improve its performance. In 

addition, it is important for DOD and its components to align their human 

capital policies with their strategic goals.24 A human capital plan that 

supports or is integrated with an overall strategic plan can help align the 

policies and identify the necessary workforce size and skills mix and 

where those skills need to be deployed. When the right personnel are on 

board and provided the training, technology, structure, incentives, and 

accountability to work effectively, the likelihood of organizational success 

will be increased. 

We found that TRADOC recognized the need for performance measures 

but had not yet developed them. We also found that the Command has not 

 24 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for 

Agency Leaders, GAO/OCG-00-14G (Washington, D.C.: September 2000, Version I); U.S. 

General Accounting Office, Human Capital: Major Human Capital Challenges at the 

Departments of Defense and State, GAO-01-565T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2001); and 

U.S. General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Oversight Process Needed to Help 

Maintain Momentum of DOD’s Strategic Human Capital Planning, GAO-03-237

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 5, 2002). 
Page 40 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

developed a human capital plan to support the reengineering effort; 

however, it has identified the elements needed for a human capital plan, 

which is to be completed during fiscal year 2003. Thus far, the effort 

addresses civilian personnel and how the Command can better cope with 

the civilian personnel reductions it has incurred; it does not address 

workforce issues associated with military personnel or contractors, which, 

in a broad sense, are also part of the Command’s human capital. Given the 

personnel downsizing that TRADOC has experienced and its potentially 

increasing reliance on contractors to meet its workload, a human capital 

plan could help the Command thoroughly assess its personnel 

requirements and integrate them into the reengineering effort. 

Although TRADOC’s budget has increased in recent years, the Command 

has experienced reductions in personnel authorizations that have 

challenged it to fully meet its workload in most mission areas. TRADOC 

data indicate that its primary problems relate to personnel shortages, and 

its readiness reports indicate that more than two-thirds of its units were 

not ready to perform their missions due primarily to a lack of personnel. 

Most of the training workload is getting done, but a significant amount of 

mission work associated with training material, doctrine, and combat 

developments is not. In addition, TRADOC does not know how well it is 

accomplishing its mission because it does not have a process in place to 

obtain systematic feedback from its customers on the quality and 

relevance of its training and doctrine. Without this type of information, the 

Army and TRADOC are not in a sound position to fully assess the 

Command’s mission effectiveness, which could lead to inefficient 

allocation of resources and ranking of requirement priorities. Army 

Headquarters officials are aware of some of TRADOC’s difficulties, but, 

operating within existing resource constraints, officials have had to make 

difficult choices and allocate resources to higher Army priorities. 

However, issues related to TRADOC’s personnel and workload could take 

on more importance as the Army continues its transformation efforts and, 

if not adequately addressed, could place the Command at increased risk in 

its role as the Army’s architect of the future. TRADOC is currently 

developing a plan to reengineer its mission areas. The extent to which this 

effort could lead to organizational consolidations and reduced personnel 

requirements remains to be seen. A broad assessment of TRADOC’s 

workload requirements and backlogs in conjunction with its reengineering 

plans would help it set its future direction. Because the Command’s 

reengineering effort is still evolving, the Army and TRADOC have an 

opportunity to establish a plan based on a strategic framework for 

Conclusions 
Page 41 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

addressing resource and mission requirements, human capital, 

reengineering costs, and performance measures. 

To ensure that TRADOC retains sufficient resources to carry out all of its 

missions in an effective and efficient manner—supporting current forces 

as well as the transformation effort—we recommend that the Secretary of 

the Army direct the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower & Reserve 

Affairs) to work with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, 

as part of their personnel and force management oversight responsibilities, 

to examine TRADOC’s workload requirements, the adequacy of TRADOC’s 

resources, and TRADOC’s mission performance as it finalizes plans for its 

reengineering efforts. In doing this, action is needed to 

• reassess TRADOC’s backlog of current work and future work 

requirements across all mission areas to ensure that all personnel 

requirements are identified and validated before further reducing 

TRADOC’s personnel authorizations; 

• develop a human capital plan in conjunction with TRADOC’s 

reengineering plan that addresses issues associated with the mix and skills 

of civilian, military, and contractor personnel; 

• establish performance measures to gauge progress and identify the costs 

and benefits associated with the reengineering effort; and 

• develop a feedback system so TRADOC is acquiring the best information 

possible about the quality and relevance of the products and services it 

provides to its customers. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense (Program Integration) stated that the department agreed with the 

recommendations related to TRADOC’s reengineering process without 

elaborating on planned actions, but expressed various concerns about the 

recommendations related to reassessing TRADOC’s personnel 

requirements and developing a customer feedback system—leaving 

unclear what overall actions would be taken. The department’s written 

comments are reprinted in Appendix III. 

DOD interpreted our recommendation to reassess TRADOC’s backlog of 

current workload and personnel requirements before further reducing 

TRADOC’s personnel authorizations as a recommendation to fence 

TRADOC’s current work force, and it cited resource constraints and 

competing demands as making it impractical to do so. Further, the 

department’s response expressed concern that our report did not quantify 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 42 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

the resources required to remedy backlogs in training material, doctrine, 

and combat developments. Our recommendation was not intended to be 

taken in isolation or to suggest an absolute fencing of TRADOC personnel, 

but rather to encourage a reassessment of workload and personnel 

requirements as part of TRADOC’s ongoing reengineering effort. Likewise, 

our intent was not to quantify the resources required to remedy the 

backlogs of work in the various areas noted. That effort can best be done 

by the Army in the context of a number of considerations. From our 

perspective, the Army and TRADOC have several options if they are to 

effectively deal with reported shortfalls in personnel related to workload 

requirements. The options include identifying functions and activities that 

may no longer be required, identifying opportunities to reduce personnel 

requirements or reallocate resources through its reengineering efforts, 

obtaining additional resources, or some combination of these. Given that 

TRADOC’s reengineering effort is still underway, and we understand that 

TRADOC’s new commander has recently directed his staff to focus on the 

potential for reducing workload requirements, it remains unclear what 

changes in resource requirements will ultimately be necessary. Given the 

resource constraints identified by TRADOC commanders in their monthly 

readiness reports, we continue to believe it appropriate that TRADOC 

reassess its work requirements as part of its reengineering efforts. 

Concerning our recommendation for developing a customer feedback 

system, DOD commented that existing informal feedback mechanisms 

help evaluate TRADOC’s support to its customers. It indicated they would 

evaluate our recommendations in terms of the costs, benefits, and likely 

accuracy of more formal reporting processes. DOD also noted that it 

would evaluate potential incentives for TRADOC to further improve 

product relevance and customer responsiveness as part of the TRADOC 

reengineering process. Separately, DOD expressed concern that our report 

did not quantify the impact of shortcomings noted in our report on 

operational force readiness. Our assessment of impact was, aside from 

information contained in TRADOC’s readiness reports, more qualitative in 

nature based on the results of internal Army studies and our limited 

discussions with leaders in the Army’s Forces Command. Given the nature 

of the concerns identified, we continue to believe that the Army could 

benefit from a more formal feedback system, one that, if appropriately 

designed, could be useful to the Army in better determining how well 

TRADOC supports the operational readiness of the combat forces. Absent 

such a system, it will be more difficult to fully assess the impact of the 

shortcomings noted in our report. 
Page 43 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Army; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; 

and interested congressional committees and members. We will also make 

copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have questions concerning this report, please contact 

me on (202) 512-8412 or holmanb@gao.gov. Other GAO contacts and staff 

acknowledgments are identified in appendix IV. 

Barry W. Holman, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 44 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

As requested by the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on 

Readiness, we examined the workload, funding levels, and personnel 

resources at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Our 

review was structured to determine if the Command was adequately 

resourced to carry out its mission. Our specific review objectives were to 

examine (1) TRADOC’s personnel, budget, and workload trends since 

1995; (2) the impact of personnel and budget changes on the Command’s 

ability to perform its mission and deliver well-trained soldiers to combat 

forces; and (3) the actions taken or planned that could have an effect on 

the Command’s ability to perform its mission. 

To determine the extent to which TRADOC has experienced budget, 

personnel, and workload changes over the past several years, we met with 

Army Headquarters and TRADOC budget, personnel, operations, and 

training officials. Pertinent budget, personnel, and workload 

documentation/data were obtained and analyzed to determine the 

magnitude of the changes. We focused our analyses primarily on 

documentation from fiscal years 1995 through 2001 because we were able 

to obtain more complete information for these years. Fiscal year 2002 

budget data had not been finalized at the time we completed our analysis. 

We also examined relevant DOD and Army senior leader guidance, 

including the Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the Army 

Transformation Campaign Plan, TRADOC mid-year budget reviews, and 

TRADOC command plans. We also discussed the allocation of Army 

personnel among its commands resulting from the Total Army Analysis 

process. We identified the primary TRADOC mission areas—combat 

development, doctrine development, training and training development, 

accessions (more commonly referred to as recruiting), and base 

operations—and structured our analysis of budget, personnel, and 

workload data around these mission areas. Our analysis of budget data 

was limited to budgetary obligations for the fiscal years we reviewed. Our 

analysis of personnel data compared the differences in required, 

authorized, and available personnel for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. We 

also discussed and reviewed available documentation pertinent to the 

process used by TRADOC to develop and validate its personnel 

requirements. We held discussions and reviewed documentation with 

TRADOC, Army Manpower Analysis Agency, and Army Force Management 

Support Agency representatives. The documentation included 

mathematical models and studies completed by TRADOC to develop 

manpower estimating criteria. We also compared the changes in 

TRADOC’s civilian and military authorizations with those of the total 

active Army and two of the Army’s largest commands—Army Materiel 

Command and Forces Command—to put the personnel changes into an 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 45 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

overall Army context. We also identified the changes in budgetary 

resources allocated to TRADOC’s mission areas for fiscal years 1995 

through 2001. Because aspects of TRADOC’s accessions mission were 

added to its responsibilities in fiscal year 1998 and subsequently 

eliminated from its responsibilities, we excluded the accessions mission 

when we analyzed the trends in personnel and workload. This included 

personnel requirements, which averaged about 12,400 for fiscal years 1998 

through 2000, and personnel authorizations, which averaged about 11,900 

for this 3-year period. The analyses that excluded the accessions mission 

are noted, where appropriate, in the report. 

To determine the effect of personnel and budget changes on the 

Command’s ability to perform its mission, we met with officials from 

TRADOC and Forces Command Headquarters and several of their 

installations. At TRADOC Headquarters we discussed and obtained 

documentation related to the Command’s ability to measure mission 

effectiveness. This included reviewing the Command’s monthly readiness 

reports for the period November 2000 through April 2002 for all of its 

schools and training facilities; these reports are provided to the Army 

Chief of Staff each month. We also compared TRADOC’s readiness reports 

with DOD’s Institutional Training Readiness reports issued during the 

same period to identify similarities and/or differences between the two; 

the Institutional Training Readiness reports are provided to Congress 

annually. At the TRADOC facilities we visited—the armor school, the air 

defense school, and the infantry school—we discussed the resources 

available to support the facilities’ workload. We also identified examples 

of impacts that resulted from resource shortages and obtained information 

about how the facilities were measuring their mission effectiveness. At 

Forces Command Headquarters and one of its heavy armor installations, 

Fort Hood, we discussed the quality of soldiers coming out of TRADOC 

schools and requested available data that measured the quality of 

TRADOC products—trained soldiers, doctrine, and training support 

materials. We also reviewed numerous reports and analyses of agencies 

and groups that have examined TRADOC—such as RAND Corporation, 

TRADOC Analysis Center, and the Defense Science Board—to obtain any 

additional observations and findings not revealed during our review of 

TRADOC. 

To identify Army actions taken or planned that might have an effect on the 

Command’s ability to perform its mission, we met with Army Headquarters 

officials and TRADOC officials to discuss past, current, or future initiatives 

that could affect the resources TRADOC will have available to carry out its 

mission. During these discussions, we obtained documentation and 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

Page 46 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

testimonial evidence regarding several initiatives. These included the 

Command’s commercial activities program, the Armywide Transformation 

of Installation Management initiative, and the Command’s plan to 

reengineer itself. We analyzed the impact of the commercial activities 

program, which is being carried out under OMB’s Circular A-76 process, 

on TRADOC’s budget and personnel since fiscal year 1995. We determined 

the number of positions announced for competition, the number of 

positions awarded to contractors, and the number of positions retained by 

TRADOC’s in-house workforce. We also discussed the scope and 

implementation schedule for the Army’s Transformation of Installation 

Management initiative, which is an Armywide program that is moving base 

operations and support from garrison commanders to a new agency called 

the Army Installation Management Agency. Finally, we discussed the 

status of plans to reengineer TRADOC, which involves organizational 

streamlining and better use of information technology. 

We communicated regularly with Department of the Army and TRADOC 

officials during the analysis process to ensure that our analysis 

appropriately considered their views, and we conducted work at the 

following locations: 

• Army Headquarters, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia; 

• TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia; 

• Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky; 

• Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas; 

• Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia; 

• Forces Command Headquarters, Fort McPherson, Georgia; 

• 4th Infantry Division and 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; 

• Army Manpower Analysis Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; and 

• Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 

We conducted our review from September 2001 through October 2002 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel 

Reductions 

Page 47 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Since the early 1990s, the Army’s civilian and military personnel 

authorizations have been significantly reduced as DOD reshaped and 

reduced the size of its institutional and operational forces. Overall, the 

Army’s authorizations for civilian and active duty military personnel have 

been reduced by about 41.5 percent and 33.8 percent, respectively, since 

fiscal year 1991.1

 The following figures show the reductions for the Army 

and three of its largest commands: TRADOC; the Army Forces Command 

(FORSCOM), which provides unit training for combat forces; and the 

Army Materiel Command (AMC), which is responsible for acquiring and 

supporting weapon systems. 

Figure 11: Army Civilian Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001 

Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data. 

 1

 The totals do not include members of the Army Reserve and National Guard. 

Appendix II: Overview of Armywide 

Personnel Reductions 
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel 

Reductions 

Page 48 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Figure 12: Army Military Personnel Authorization Trends for Selected Commands, Fiscal Years 1991-2001 

Note: GAO analysis of Army and TRADOC data. 

As shown by these figures, all three commands realized significant 

reductions in civilian personnel. Table 4 summarizes the reductions that 

occurred from fiscal year 1991 through fiscal year 2001. 
Appendix II: Overview of Armywide Personnel 

Reductions 

Page 49 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Table 4: Reductions in Army Personnel Authorizations for the Active Army and 

Selected Commands between Fiscal Years 1991 and 2001 

Civilian personnel Military personnel 

Number of 

reductions Percent 

Number of 

reductions Percent

Active Army 153,200 -41.5 245,400 -33.8

TRADOC 13,515 -41.9 13,549 -27.1

FORSCOM 10,056 -36.4 28,694 -12.4

AMC 41,561 -45.5 5,915 -79.5

Source: Army. 

Note: GAO analysis of Army data. 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 50 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments 

Page 51 GAO-03-214 Defense Management 

James E. Fuquay, (937) 258-7963 

In addition to the person named above, James Hatcher, Nancy Lively, 

Travis Masters, Debra McKinney, Robert Preston, and R.K. Wild made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(350113) 
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