Assessment of Community Planning for

Mass Transit: Volume 4—Chicago Case

Study

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-253682
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director

Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director

URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority

Walter J. Bierwagen

Amalgamated Transit Union

Robert A. Burco

Oregon DOT

Jeanne J. Fox

Joint Center for

Political Studies

Lawrence A. Goldmuntz

Economics and Science Planning

Dorn McGrath

George Washington University

Bernard M. Oliver

Hewlett-Packard Corporation

Simon Reich

Gibbs and Hill

Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr.

Princeton University

Frederick P. Salvucci

Massachusetts DOT

Stewart F. Taylor

Sanders and Thomas, Inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF

Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager

Mary E. Ames Larry L. Jenney

V. Rodger Digilio Bev Johnson

Thomas E. Hirsch, 111 Teri Miles

CONTRACTORS

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.

111
PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Chicago, Illinois

metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by the Office of

Technology Assessment to provide an information base for an overall

assessment of community planning for mass transit.

The findings of the overall study are reported in the summary

document, AN Assessment of Community Planning /or Mass Transit, which forms the

first volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request of

the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of its

Transportation Subcommittee.

The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’s

Transportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by the

OTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owings

and Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for the

study. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible points

of view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.
INTRODUCTION

This report assesses how one of nine major

United States metropolitan areas made its decisions

about the development or modernization of rail

transit.

The assessment of the nine cities attempts to

identify the factors that help communities, facing

critical technological choices, make wise decisions

that are consistent with local and national goals for

transit. The study investigates the following issues:

● Are there major barriers to communication

and cooperation among governmental

agencies involved in transit planning and

operating? Do these barriers interfere with

making sound decisions ?

. Do transit decisions reflect the combined

interests of all major public groups, including citizen organizations, trade unions,

the business community, and others?

. Does the planning process provide enough

information about the advantages and

disadvantages of alternative courses of

action to provide a solid basis for making

decisions ?

● Does the availability or lack of financing, or

the conditions under which financing has

been provided, unnecessarily limit the

range of options that are considered?

The ultimate purpose of the work has been to

cast light on those prospective changes in national

transit policy and administrative programs which

might improve, in different ways and to different

extents, the way communities plan mass transit

systems. The nine cities were selected to represent

the full range of issues that arise at different stages

in the overall process of planning and developing a

transit system.

San Francisco, for example, has the first regional

rail system built in decades, while Denver is

planning an automated system, and voters in

Seattle have twice said “no” to rail transit funding

proposals.

The assessment of transit planning in each of the

nine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into an

evolving social process. Consequently, the study

results more closely resemble historical analysis

than classical technology assessment.

This study employs a set of evaluation guidelines

to orient the investigation in the nine metropolitan

areas and to provide the basis for comparative

judgments about them. The guidelines were

derived from issues identified during preliminary

visits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federal

requirements for transit planning, and an investigation via the literature into the state-of-theart in the field,

The evaluation guidelines cover major topics

which were investigated during the case assessment process. They deal with the character of the

institutional arrangements and the conduct of the

technical planning process.

GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Some of the most significant influences on

transit planning are exerted by the organizations

responsible for conducting the planning and

making the decisions. Three guidelines were used

to evaluate the institutional arrangements in the

nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

Agencies responsible for various aspects of

transit decisionmaking should cooperate

effectively in a clearly designated “forum”.

The participants in this forum should have

properly designated decisionmaking

authority, and the public should have

formal channels for holding decisionmakers accountable for their actions.

Citizens should participate in the transit

planning process from its beginning and

should have open lines of communication

with decisionmakers.

vii
GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The technical planning process provides the

information that public officials and their constituents draw upon in making plans and decisions.

Four guidelines were used to assess the technical

planning process in the nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

●

Broad, explicit goals and objectives should

guide technical planning and decisionmaking.

A range of realistic alternative solutions

should be developed.

The evaluation of these alternatives should

give balanced consideration to a full range

of goals and objectives.

A practical and flexible plan for financing

and implementation should be developed.

During visits to each of the nine metropolitan

areas, the study team interviewed the principal

representative of the transportation planning

institution and other main participants in the Iocai

planning process. The visits were supplemented by

interviews with UMTA officials in Washington.

Pertinent documents—official plans, reports,

studies, and other material—were reviewed in each

case.

The information thus collected was used in

compiling a history of the transit planning process

in each case area, organized around key decisions

such as the decision to study transit, the selection of

a particular transit system, and public ratification

of the decision to pay for and build the system. The

main political, institutional, financial and technical

characteristics affecting the conduct of the planning process were then assessed in light of the

evaluation guidelines.

The same set of guidelines used in assessing each

case metropolitan area was employed in making a

generalized evaluation of the metropolitan experience. The results of the generalized evaluation

are summarized in the report, A H Assessment of

Community Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Report,

issued by the Office of Technology Assessment in

February 1976.

Vlll
CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . ● . . . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Existing Passenger Transportation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Transportation Planning Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CRITICAL HISTORY OF TRANSIT PLANNING AND

DECISIONMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Early Transit Planning in Chicago . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Joint Transit-Expressway Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

The Skokie Swift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17’

The Central Area Transit Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Crosstown Expressway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The 1995 Transportation System Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT PLANNING PROCESS . . . 29

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING

PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Technical Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

67-739 0.76-2

ix
Summary and Highlights

● Chicago was the first city in the United

States to systematically take advantage of

expressway planning and design in order

to place rail rapid transit lines in the

median strips of highways.

● The joint development of the Congress

Expressway and subsequently the Dan

Ryan and Kennedy Expressways produced 24 miles of modern rapid transit lines

and the potential for 19 additional miles of

lines at relatively low cost.

● The development of the Skokie Swift

service at low cost proved that greater

than anticipated ridership can be attained

with a service that responds to public

desires—time savings through fast service and convenient origin-to-destination

transfers among modes at a reasonable

price.

● The major transit planning and development project in Chicago since 1968 has

been the proposed replacement of the

Loop transit system in the central area

and the additional construction of a

distributor line with extensions to serve

the developing lakefront areas both north

and south of the central business district.

● Acceptance of a financially viable central

area plan and resolution of the longstanding controversy over the Crosstown

Expressway are the major decisions

facing the Chicago area. If and when

these decisions are resolved, the Chicago

area will have established the major

components of its transit and highway

capital investment program for many

years.

● Commuter railroads, which historically

have played an important role in access to

the central business district, took a selfinterested lead in the creation of suburban transit districts in order to obtain

public subsidy funds for capital and

operating expenses. The self-interest (to

avoid absorbing large losses), however,

led to the preservation and substantial

improvement of an important component

of the public transportation system.

● The Chicago Transit Authority, which has

and deserves a reputation for being one of

1
the world’s best transit operating organizations, has been primarily responsible

for rehabilitation and replacement of

transit facilities and rolling stock, and for

significant operating improvements. It

has not, however, been a major force in

planning new or extended rail transit lines

except as a technical resource organization.

● The city of Chicago, through its Department of Development and Planning and

its Department of Public Works, has been

the dominant force in transit planning and

decision making until the last 3 or 4 years.

While the Chicago area still is in a period

of transition in the sense of planning and

decisionmaking responsibility, the

relative power or the city is diminishing.

● The creation of the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), which is still in its

formative stages, is the most important

institutional and financing development

since the creation of CTA in 1945. The

basic RTA organization, its authority and

responsibilities, its financing abilities and

constraints—such as the amendment

requiring that revenues raised in a county

be spent in that county—inevitably force

Chicago to share the decision making role

with suburban county and municipal

governments.

. The State of Illinois, through its Department of Transportation (I DOT), is an

emerging force of some significance in

transportation planning in the Chicago

area. Partially as a result of its own policy

initiatives and partially as a result of

changes in Federal statutes and

regulations, I DOT has been an obstructive force in planning and deciding

whether to build the Crosstown Expressway and Busway, and a constructive

force in trying to resolve the difficulties in

deciding on a viable plan for the replacement of the loop transit system and the

central area distributor.
Metropolitan Settingl

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Since the early settlement of the Mississippi

Valley, Chicago has been an important transportation center—the hub of the Midwest.

Chicago’s strategic location on the Great Lakes

has made it an important port for inland waterborne commerce. Chicago also is one of the most

important centers in transcontinental freight

service. Both regional and transcontinental trucking companies have headquarters or major freight

facilities in Chicago. Its primary airport, O’Hare, is

one of the busiest in the world.

Chicago, the third largest metropolitan area in

the United States, is a major manufacturing,

finance and service center. It is the headquarters

city for several of the largest corporations in the

United States and it has been long established in the

production, processing, and marketing of

agricultural commodities. Chicago is exceeded in

population by only the New York and Los AngelesLong Beach SMSA’S. Between 1960 and 1970 the

population of the Chicago SMSA increased by more

than 750,000 persons to a total of 6,979,000, an

increase of 12.2 percent (see Figure 2).

The city of Chicago has experienced a decline in

population like many other center cities in the

Nation’s largest metropolitan areas. Despite the

metropolitan regional growth, the city of Chicago

lost more than 180,000 population, a decline of 5.1

percent in the decade from 1960 to 197o. The

combination of suburban population gain and

central city loss meant that, for the first time in

history, the city of Chicago had less than half (48

percent) of the metropolitan population in 1970.

The net migration of people to the suburban areas

had the effect of moderately decreasing population

density in the city and increasing the density in all

other areas of the SMSA.

The city of Chicago in 1970 still accounted for

more than half (52 percent) of the employment in

the SMSA, but, like many of the other biggest

I See Figure 1, pages 18 and 1 Q

metropolitan areas, the central city lost jobs to the

suburbs. Chicago lost more than 225,000 jobs in the

decade between 1960 and 197’0, while the suburban

areas gained nearly one-half million jobs. The loss

to the city was 15 percent of its work force.

Although the metropolitan area gained employment in trade, services, and government, it lost jobs

in manufacturing.

The major shifts in population and employment

were accompanied by a significant change in the

location of shopping areas. Although limited data

are available, existing figures note that more than

65 percent of the metropolitan area’s dollar volume

retail sales were in Chicago in 1958; but this

percentage had dropped to .51.5 percent by 1967.

Although dollar volume of sales in the city

increased by less than a billion dollars in this g-year

period, the dollar volume of sales outside the city

increased by more than $3 billion.

Thus the Chicago metropolitan area, like many

others in the United States, has witnessed over the

past two to three decades a fairly constant erosion

of [he central city as the dominant place to live,

work, shop, and carry on many other kinds of social

and recreational activities.

The decentralization of Chicago was made

possible in part by the substantial increase in the

income of families throughout the metropolitan

area. From 1960 to 1970, the median family income

for city of Chicago residents increased by 52

percent, while families in other parts of the

metropolitan area experienced a 62.5 percent

increase in income.

As average income rose, so did acquisition of

automobiles. The number of automobiles in the

Chicago SMSA increased by more than 625,000

between 1960 and 197o. This increase represented

a 37.1 percent gain for the entire SMSA, but a 66.9

percent increase for the area outside the city. Autos

available increased inside the city by a smaller

percentage—~.4.9 percent—in spite of the fact that

there were concurrent higher rates of unemployment and increases in populations unlikely to own

autos, such as elderly persons and families below

the poverty level. The number and percentage of

3
(square miles)

Center City 222. 6

Suburban Ring 3,496.4

Entire SMSA 3,71 9

POPULATION

Suburban Center

Ring City

1960 2,670,50 9 3,550,40 4

1970 3,609,00 0 3,369,00 0

DENSITY

(population/square mile)

Suburban Center

Ring City

1960 764 15,950

1970 1,87 7 15,135

POPULATION

Percent Chanqe 1960-1970

23%

Suburban

Ring

-5%

Center

City

FIGURE 2: CHlCAGO METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

4
households with two or more autos available

increased along with the number of households

with autos available.

These changes in residential and work locations,

income, auto ownership, nature of jobs available,

and other factors combined to significantly change

patterns of work trips in the Chicago SMSA

between 1960 and 1970. For example, in 1970, 39

percent of all work trips both began and ended in

the city of Chicago, with an equal percentage both

beginning and ending in the metropolitan area

outside the city. Only 14 percent were the so-called

commuter trips from suburbs to central city, and 8

percent began from the central city and ended in

the suburbs (see Figure 3).

The absolute change between 1960 and 1970

involved a decrease of 3s.s,000 work trips that both

began and ended inside the city—an amount

greater than the loss of jobs in the city during the

same decade. Work trips from the suburbs into the

city increased by 26,000; but, more importantly, the

number of work trips that began in the city and

ended in the suburbs increased by 118,000.

Thus, between 1960 and 1970 there was a 20

percent decrease in work trips both beginning and

ending in the city, and 8 percent increase in trips

from the suburbs, a 132 percent increase in work

trips from the city to the suburbs, and a 61 percent

increase in work trips that both began and ended in

the suburbs.

The Chicago metropolitan area experienced a 46

percent increase in the use of autos for work trips

between 1960 and 1970 and a decrease of 13

percent in the use of public transportation. Of all

the public transportation modes in the Chicago

area, only commuter rail lines reported an increase

in patronage from 1960 to 1970—an increase of 6

million passengers annually. Work trips probably

accounted for the overwhelming portion of this

increase.

Although there was an overall decline in the use

of public transit for work trips, 35 percent of city of

Chicago residents continued to use transit for work

trips in 1970, while only II percent of the workers

living outside the city used transit to get to their

jobs. But the combination of changes in residences

and places of work and the increased availability of

autos resulted in a 46 percent increase in the use of

autos.

Not surprisingly, all of the factors discussed

above had a marked influence not only on the way

in which people traveled to and from work, but also

on the way in which they made trips for other

purposes—shopping, social, health, recreation, and

other purposes.

In fact, people have continued using transit for

work trips to a greater extent than for all other trip

purposes. When CATS made its original surveys in

1956, 32.66 percent of all trips made for work or

work-related business activities used public

transportation. That percentage dropped to 22.60

percent by 1970. However, the percentage of

people using public transportation for other trip

purposes fell off to a much greater extent. In 1956,

18.83 percent of all shopping trips used transit. By

1970, the transit accounted for only 3.65 percent of

shopping trips. In 1956, 12.60 percent of all social

and recreational trips used transit. By 1970, the

percentage had fallen to 3.25 percent.

The general loss of ridership is a well known fact

in Chicago as well as other places in the United

States. However, the change in the ratio of trips

during the peak hours to trips during the average

nonpeak hour is not sufficiently recognized as the

change in peak-to-base ratio. In other words, the

number of morning and afternoon peak hour

passengers has declined at a slower rate and in some

cases has increased. The major losses have occurred

during the remaining hours of the day and night.

The transit systems, however, have to provide and

therefore pay the costs of a full capacity system

even though it may be fully utilized for only a short

period of the day, usually less than 3 hours.

EXISTING PASSENGER

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

The continued and increasing mobility of the

people in the Chicago metropolitan area has been

accommodated by a significant increase since World

War II in the miles of freeways, expressways, and

toll highways constructed as well as by less

spectacular and costly improvements to the public

transport systems.

Unlike all but a handful of cities in the United

States, Chicago had an extensive public transit

system since the latter part of the nineteenth

century. The first horse-drawn tracked trolley

began operation in 1859. On the other hand, since

World War 11, Chicago, like most other major

metropolitan areas, has experienced increased use

of the automobile, accompanied by construction of

highway facilities to accommodate it.

5
WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION

Center City to Suburban Ring

Suburban Ring to Center City

Beginning and Ending in Center City

and Ending in Suburban

WORK TRIP MODE

1960 1970

Ring

Remaining

stayed at

FIGURE 3: CHICAGO TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS 1960-1970

* .

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book,

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area

cities), usually with a population of at

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

American Institute of Planners and

Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

(SMSA) includes a center city (or

least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

6
Today, the Chicago metropolitan area has a large

system of interconnected highway facilities as well

as a public transport system consisting of subway,

surface, and elevated rail rapid transit, commuter

rail lines, and bus networks that serve the city as

well as many of the suburban jurisdictions. The

total system operates more miles of public transit

routes and carries more passengers than any other

multimodal system except New York’s.

The Chicago metropolitan area has a radial

system of freeways concentrating on the central

business district; which is bounded on the north

and west by the Chicago River, on the south by

Congress Street, and on the east by Lake Michigan.

The radial system includes the Kennedy and Edens

Expressways (1-94 North), serving the north and

northwest areas; the Eisenhower Expressway (I90), serving the western portion of the

metropolitan area; the Stevenson Expressway (1-

s.s), serving the southwest, and the Dan Ryan

Expressway (I-9o and 94 South), serving the

southern portion of the area. 1n addition, the

Chicago Skyway (I-9o) serves the southern portion

of the metropolitan area and the northwestern part

of Indiana, which is also a part of the Chicago

region.2

The Tri-State Tollway (1-294) forms a partially

circumferential highway approximately parallel to

the lakefront at a distance of from 8 to 16 miles to

the west. 1n addition, the Chicago area is served by

numerous other limited or partially controlled

access highway facilities including its boulevard

system.

Eight privately owned and operated commuter

railroads provide service from outlying areas tb

downtown in 12 corridors. The railroads operate

passenger service over 1,160 miles of track and

accommodate nearly 68 million passenger trips

annually. About 62 percent of the passenger trips

either originate or terminate in the central business

district. The commuter railroads serve a more

extensive area and transport more passengers than

any other commuter railroad network in the

Nation except those serving New York City, where

most of the service is provided by the publicly

owned Long Island Railroad.

2 Hc)wever, the Census Bureau definitions for the Standard

Chlcagil Metrtlpolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes only the

lllln(~ls pt~rtl(~ns of the regi~~n.

The Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) is the

primary public transportation carrier in the region

and the only operator of rail mass transit service.

The rapid transit network consists of 243 miles of

track on 10 routes, 8 of which serve the Loop area

of the city. CTA operates approximately 1,2oo

rapid transit cars. The CTA also is the largest bus

operator in the metropolitan area with about 2,700

buses in operation over 131 routes throughout the

city and extends into 30 suburbs in Cook County.

More than 98 percent of the city’s population lives

within three-eighths of a mile of either CTA rapid

transit or bus service.

The metropolitan area is also served by 32 bus

companies which are publicly owned or privately

owned and publicly assisted. These companies

operate almost exclusively in the suburban areas.

Fourteen are new, ptiblic intracommunity bus

systems, financed by local revenue funds, providing

feeder bus or dial-a-bus service. Of the remainder,

13 are privately owned and 5 are municipal] y owned

and operated bus companies offering regularly

scheduled service.

The combined public transportation system in

the Chicago area has experienced a relatively

constant erosion of patronage since World War II.

However, the number of passengers carried by

CTA, particularly on its rapid transit network,

increased moderately during the mid-1960’s until

significant fare increases were put into effect in

1967. CTA served some 510.5 million originating

passengers in 1967, but by 1973 patronage was

down to 368 million. The CTA system, like most

transit systems in the Nation, experienced a

moderate upturn in ridership during the oil

embargo in early 1974 and during the subsequent

increases in the price of gasoline (see Figure 4). This

temporary increase in patronage, however, has

started to slip during 19’75.

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

INSTITUTIONS

The Chicago metropolitan area has a complex

institutional structure for transportation planning

composed of a large number of agencies and

organizations with overlapping and competing

authority and responsibility. The institutional

structure results in part because of the complexity

of the large metropolitan bi-State area. It also

results from various Federal requirements for

regional planning, and from the competition among

67-739 0 -76-3 7
VEHICLE MILES OPERATED

(millions of miles)

Peak Year = 1966 (157.8 million miles

Low Year = 1974 (136:9 million miles)

REVENUE PASSENGERS

(millions of passengers)

Peak Year = 1960 (534.8 million miles)

Low Year = 1974 (381.7 million miles)

NET OPERATING REVENUE

(millions of dollars)

Peak Year = 1962 ($11.7)

Low Year= 1974 (-$78.2)

154.5 155.4 149. 8

)

$8.0 $7.4

$-78.2

FIGURE 4 CHICAGO TRANSIT OPERATIONS

Source: American Public Transit Association records for the Chicago Transit Authority.

I Data was not reported in 1970.
units of government for control of the planning and A significant feature of CTA’S basic authority is

decisionmaking process. that it has no taxing capability and must rely on

revenues, primarily transit fares, for its income. It

can and does receive grants.

TABLE I.—Federally Recognized Regional Agencies

Designation Agency

A-95 Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission

MPO Chicago Area Transportation Study (recognized

by the Federal Highway Administration and

the Federal Aviation Administration); and

Regional Transportation Planning Board

(recognized by the Urban Mass Transportation

Administration).

Regional Transportation Authority (RTA)

The Regional Transportation Authority was

approved by the Illinois State legislature in 1973,

subject to a referendum in the six-county area it

was to serve. Voters in the RTA region approved

the institution and its authority in March 1974.

Organization of the new authority continued

throughout 1974 and into 1975 before it was ready

to fully assume its responsibilities. RTA is empowered to contract for transit services

throughout its service area and to determine fares,

rout es, schedules, and other operating

characteristics.

RTA commands an array of fundin g

mechanisms, including the power to levy a motor

fuel sales tax up to 5 percent and to tax parking lot

revenues. A portion of the State sales tax collected

in the RTA area and $14 from each auto license fee

for cars registered in the area is allocated to RTA. It

also has the authority to issue up to $500 million in

bonds, and it possesses the power of eminent

domain.

Chicago Transit Authority (CTA)

The Chicago Transit Authority has been in

operation since 1947, 2 years after it was authorized by the Illinois State legislature and approved by

referendum. It acquired and since has operated the

rail rapid transit system in the metropolitan area

and most of the transit bus service in the city. It is

controlled by a seven-member board, in which four

of the members are appointed by the Mayor of

Chicago with approval of the Governor, and three

are appointed by the Governor with the approval of

the Mayor.

Local Mass Transit Districts

Eight local mass transit districts have been

formed in the Chicago region along corridors of

existing rail or bus service. The districts are

established under Illinois statute and have the

status of municipal corporations, the right of

eminent domain, and the power to levy a tax on

propert y in the district at a rate not to exceed .05

percent of assessed value, provided a majority of

registered voters approve in a referendum. The

mass transit districts in the Chicago area are the

North Suburban, West Suburban, Chicago South

Suburban, Joliet, Chicago Urban, Greater Lake

County, and Greater McHenry County districts.

Chicago Urban Transit District (CUTD)

The Chicago Urban Transit District is one of the

eight local mass transit districts described in the

preceding paragraph. CUTD, which encompasses

the Chicago central business district, was established in 1970 as the agency responsible for planning,

designing, and building the proposed Loop subway

and distribution system,

Regional Transportation Planning Board (RTPB)

The Regional Transportation Planning Board

was formed in July 1971 by the four major planning

agencies within the eight-county Chicago-Gary

region for the purpose of developing a comprehensive and coordinated transportation planning

program. The participating agencies are the city of

Chicago (through its Department of Development

and Planning and its Department of Public Works),

the Chicago Area Transportation Study, the

Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission, and

the Northwestern Indiana Regional Planning

Commission. The State of Illinois Department of

Transportation is a nonvoting member of the

RTPB.

RTPB was created to coordinate member agencies undertaking a regional transportation planning

program. RTPB administers UMTA planning

grants and both develops and monitors the

9
progress of an interagency work program. The

products of this work program are the plans and

programs of the member agencies. RTPB does not

have the power to adopt these plans or the

Comprehensive Regional Transportation Plan into

which they are assembled. The policy committees,

commissions, councils, and advisory committees of

the autonomous member agencies retain responsibility and authority for adopting plans and

actions.

Chicago Area Transportation Study (CATS)

and CATS Policy Committee

In 1955, the Chicago Area Transportation Study

was created as an ad hoc agency through a

memorandum of agreement between the Illinois

Division of Highways, the Cook County Highway

Department, the city of Chicago Department of

Public Works, and the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads.

CATS became a permanent department of the

State Division of Highways in 1957. Over the years

the CATS policy committee, comprised of heads of

the member agencies, has been expanded to include

all six counties in the Chicago SMSA, the Chicago

Transit Authority, the Illinois State Toll Highway

Authority, as well as one representative each from

the suburban railroads, the regional Council of

Mayors, the mass transit districts, and the suburban bus companies. Efforts are underway by CATS

to add a Regional Transit Authority (RTA)

representative to the committee.

The policy committee is chaired by the State

Secretary of Transportation. CATS has a work

program committee headed by a designee of the

Secretary. The Transit Carriers Coordinating

Committee, organizationally separate from CATS,

includes representatives of the 24 carriers in the

region and meets monthly to discuss common

problems. A representative of this committee is a

member of the CATS technical committee.

CATS is supported primarily by Federal highway

funds channeled through the Illinois Department

of Transportation. In addition, most of the policy

committee members, including the Department of

Transportation, contribute to CATS operations.

The temporary designation of CATS as the

Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) expired on June 30, 1975. However, the Governor of

Illinois has not yet designated another agency

take over MPO functions. CATS continues to

the metropolitan planning agency recognized

10

the Federal Highway Administration and the

Federal Aviation Administration, and RTPB is

recognized by UMTA.3

Council of Mayors

In order to provide local input to the regional

planning process, CATS has organized a Council of

Mayors representing the 258 municipalities in the

region. The Council is subdivided into 11 regional

councils. These regional councils are active and

have set priorities for improvements in their

regions. The Council chairman sits on the CATS

policy committee.

Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission

(NIPC)

The Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission

was created in 1957 and is authorized to develop

and adopt a comprehensive plan for the

Metropolitan Counties Area, which includes the

counties of Cook, Lake, Will, DuPage, Kane, and

McHenry. The Commission is the designated A-954

review agency. Members are appointed by the

Mayor of Chicago, the Governor, and the presiding

officer of each of the six counties.

The Northwestern Indiana Regional

Planning Commission (NIRPC)

The Northwestern Indiana Regional Planning

Commission is the counterpart to NIPC in the

Gary, Indiana, region.

3 The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and the

Federal Highway Administration require Governors to

designate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO), in each

area to carry out the “continuing, comprehensive transportation

planning process . . . carried out cooperatively . . . “ (the “3-C”

process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and

the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974.

According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published in

September 1975, MPO’S must prepare or endorse (1) a longrange general transportation plan, including a separate plan for

improvements in management of the existing transportation

system; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called the

transportation improvement program (TIP), to implement

portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planning

prospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work

programs.

J Office of Management and Budget Circular A-9.5 requires

one agency in each region to be empowered to review all

proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region.

Circular A-95 replaced Circular A-82, which has created to

implement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and

Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 3301).
Illinois-Indiana Bi-State Commission

The Illinois-Indiana Bi-State Commission was

created in 1974 by joint action of the legislatures

and the Governors of Illinois and Indiana. It

consists of six members from each State.

The Commission was created to act as a single

body in coordinating planning and development in

the northwestern Indiana-northeastern Illinois

area. The area is comprised of the Indiana counties

of Lake and Porter and the Illinois counties of Cook,

DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will. It is

empowered to establish project priorities for biState capital improvement programs and to adopt

public plans, policies, programs, and activities of biregional significance. The Commission also may

consider project reviews under Circular A-9.5 of the

U.S. Office of Management and Budget for projects

of bi-regional significance, but such reviews only

supplement, and do not replace, the A-9.5 reviews

undertaken by NIPC and NIRPC.

Funding for the Commission is provided by

earmarking a portion of Federal funds otherwise

available to area agencies, with any necessary nonFederal share being provided in facilities and

services.

In late May 1975 the Governor of Indiana

designated the Commission as the region’s MPO,

but no similar action has been taken by the

Governor of Illinois.

Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT)

The Illinois Department of Transportation

participates in Chicago regional transportation

planning through several channels. The Secretary

of Transportation is chairman of the CATS policy

committee. Technically, CATS is part of IDOT’S

Division of Highways.

In addition, the director of IDOT’S Office of Mass

Transportation (OMT) is an ex officio member of

RTPB board. OMT is located in Chicago and is

responsible for providing technical assistance to

units of local government and for managing the

State’s capital grant and operating assistance

programs. The office originally was responsible to

the Governor but was incorporated into IDOT in

1971.

Illinois Transportation Study Commission

The Illinois Transportation Study Commission

was created in 1969. The 16-member commission

includes members of both houses of the Illinois

legislature and representatives from the general

public. The Commission is responsible for making a

continuing study of the needs, finances, and other

problems relating to the transportation service

needs of the State, including those in the Chicago

area.

City of Chicago

The city of Chicago has been and continues to be

one of the primary institutional actors in Chicago

area transit planning and decision making. Two

departments of the city, the Department of

Development and Planning (DDP) and the Department of Public Works (DPW) have been intimately

involved in essentially all of the major capital

facilities improvements to the CTA rail transit

system during the past 20 years. The Department

of Development and Planning has wide ranging

authority in the city for planning and community

facilities development, including a major role in

transportation planning. The Department of Public

Works, which shares responsibility with DDP for

transit planning, also is responsible for all highway

planning, design, and construction as well as other

public works activities.

Metropolitan Area Transportation Council

The 26-member Metropolitan Area Transportation Council was established in December 1974 by

the Illinois State Legislature to advise the Regional

Transportation Authority. It was granted the

authority to hold public hearings, adopt

resolutions, and otherwise counsel and advise RTA

on transit service, fare structure, and other matters

of policy. The Council members are appointed by

locally elected officials from Chicago area jurisdictions.

11
—

Critical History of Rapid Transit Planning

and Decisionmaking

Transit planning and decisionmaking in the

Chicago area has been significantly influenced by

factors dating back to shortly after the turn of the

century. Three events are noteworthy because

they shape the context in which Chicago’s transit

planning activities were conducted.

In 1913 four rapid transit companies, one of

which dated back to the World’s Columbian

Exposition in 1893, began coordinated service with

a unified scheduling of trains and a single fare over

the elevated Union Loop track. (The four rapid

transit companies were consolidated into the

Chicago Rapid Transit Company in 1924.)

The city of Chicago stimulated the coordination

of all surface transit lines in 1914 by enacting an

ordinance which provided for single management

and coordinated service of the many surface line

transit companies.

Finally, bus transit service, which started in 1917

and expanded significantly during the 1920’s, was

consolidated into a single institutional structure,

the Chicago Motor Coach Company, in 1922. It

continued as the principal bus transit system within

the city until it was acquired by CTA in 1952. Even

earlier, in 1935, intercompany transfers permitting

continuous trips were started.

Thus, Chicago had a long history of unified and

coordinated transit service when the Chicago

Transit Authority took over the rail rapid transit

system and surface streetcar and trolley bus lines in

1947 and the bus transit system in 1952.

This narrative discusses several specific transit

planning and decisionmaking activities whose

conduct and outcome carry lessons for other

metropolitan areas:

● Planning and construction of the State

Street Subway, the Milwaukee-DearbornCongress Subway, and the Elevated Lake

Street Transit Line prior to 1962;

● The several early examples of joint transitexpressway planning, particularly the

Congress Expressway;

Q Planning of the Skokie Swift;

● The Central Area Transit Project;

● The Crosstown Expressway; and

● The 1995 Transportation Plan,

The following discussion is organized under

headings corresponding to these planning activities.

EARLY TRANSIT PLANNING

IN CHICAGO

The Chicago transit system is unique in that

significant capital improvements in both facilities

and rolling stock were made periodically prior to

the availability of Federal capital grants resulting

from the Mass Transportation Act of 1964. Some

of these improvements are specifically mentioned

because they clearly demonstrate the involvement

of the city of Chicago in transit planning and

improvement programs prior to the period of public

ownership, operation, and responsibility.

One such example is the planning and construction of the State Street Subway in the late years of

the Depression and immediately prior to World

War II. As the first of Chicago’s subways, 4.9 miles

in length, it was planned and constructed by the city

even though the rapid transit system was privately

owned and operated. The operator, the Chicago

Rapid Transit Company, assisted in the planning,

design, and implementation.

The State Street Subway was built at a cost of

$34 million. It was financed by the city of Chicago

largely through its Traction and Transit Fund, with

significant contribution from the Federal Government through a combination of grants resulting

from Depression-oriented economic stimulation

and development programs. The subway was

completed and went into operation in October

1943.

One significant feature of the State Street

Subway project was that the Chicago Rapid Transit

13
Company had to assume the responsibility of rental fee from CTA for the use of its rights-of-way

repaying the city for the fixed transportation and facilities common to both systems.

equipment investments built into the subway.

These investments totaled $4,349,231. The liability JOINT TRANSIT-EXPRESSWAY subsequently was transferred to CTA as a part of

the purchase of the private transit company. PLANNING

The second Chicago subway, the MilwaukeeDearborn-Congress Subway, was completed in a

similar manner after CTA took over ownership and

operation responsibilities from the private company. Notwithstanding ownership of the system by

a public authority, the second subway project was

carried forward by the city and the planning,

design, and construction was the city’s responsibility with CTA participation. The 3.99-mile

Milwaukee-Dearborn-Congress Subway was completed at a cost of $4o million and went into

operation in February 1951. The CTA, like its

private predecessor, had to assume the responsibility of repaying the city for fixed transportation

facility investments, which in this case totaled

$4,874,811.

A third capital facilities project, along Lake

Street, also is worthy of note because it involved a

wider range of public institutions in the planning,

design, and construction of a transit facility.

The project involved removal of surface, streetlevel transit tracks and loading platforms and their

relocation to an adjacent elevated structure for 2-1/2

miles. The primary purpose of the project was to

eliminate severe congestion and conflicts in operation between the transit line and the street system.

A total of 22 grade crossings were eliminated, thus

reducing the conflict between transit trains and

motor vehicles as well as pedestrians.

The $4 million project was financed with

$600,000 from the city of Chicago, $800,000 from

the Village of Oak Park, $1 million from Cook

County, $1 million from the State of Illinois, and

$600,000 from CTA. The project was completed

and placed in operation in October 1962.

Construction of the Lake Street Transit Line

elevated section was noteworthy because it involved close cooperation and coordination with the

Chicago and North Western Railway. The new

elevated line utilized rights-of-way owned by the

private railroad through realinement of two of the

railroad’s tracks and construction of a short section

of new track and elevated station platforms. The

railroad, while paying the capital costs for the

improvements to its trackage, receives an annual

Although overlapping in time and related to

other improvements, a new era of transit planning

and development began in Chicago in the early

1950’s that extends to the present.

Chicago, unlike any other city in the United

States, saw the opportunity of utilizing the

burgeoning highway construction program as a

mechanism to improve its rail rapid transit system.

As a result, Chicago has completed and put into

operation nearly 24 miles of rapid transit service in

the medians of expressways. Space is available for

an additional 19 miles of transit service should

transit demand increase and funds become

available.

The utilization of publicly owned rights-of-way,

particularly streets, for fixed guideway transit is a

concept as old as transit service itself. Almost

without exception, early transit service provided by

horse-drawn carriages and tracks and subsequently

by streetcars utilized streets for right-of-way.

With the growing need for more transit capacity,

faster service, greater safety—and to increase the

capacity of the streets to carry automobile traffic—

rail transit was either elevated or depressed. To

obtain the grade-separated rights-of-way, transit

service was placed in subways, particularly in the

most congested and expensive central business

districts, or only elevated sections wherever it was

feasible and acceptable.

The design concept of building grade-separated

transit lines into open-cut depressed and closed

subway sections or elevated sections on structure

dates back into the last century. But the concept

continues to be utilized in the most modern of

systems such as BART in San Francisco and the

new systems being constructed in Washington and

Atlanta. Chicago is the only U.S. city which has

deviated from the traditional design concept and

has systematically exploited the highway planning

and development program as a mechanism to

expand and improve its rail transit system at

relatively low cost.

The first example of joint highway-transit use in

Chicago was the planning development of the

14
Chicago is the only U.S. metropolitan area to systematically build

transit lines and expressways jointly.

Congress Street Expressway in the early 1950’s

prior to the start of the interstate highway

program. The Congress Street Expressway subsequently has been renamed the Eisenhower Expressway and has been incorporated into the

interstate highway system as I-9o. Most of its cost

was paid without 90 percent Federal interstate

program funds because the expressway was

planned, designed, and partially constructed before

the interstate highway program was enacted in

1956.

The Congress Rapid Transit Line connects with

the Milwaukee-Dearborn-Congress Subway near

the west bank of the Chicago River. It extends

westward for about 9 miles, about two-thirds of the

distance in the median of the highway and about

one-third along the south edge of the highway

right-of-way. Space next to the transit tracks also is

utilized by a double track freight line railroad, the

Baltimore and Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad.

The Congress Transit Line replaced the old

Garfield elevated route, which for most of its

length used a right-of-way and structure built in

1895 for the West Side Elevated Railroad. The

right-of-way for the old elevated transit line,

ranging up to 75 feet wide, was far from wide

enough to accommodate the 550-foot highway

right-of-way, but it was continuous for the entire

distance of the highway and therefore was the

single most important parcel of property along the

highway route.

In the planning and design of the highway,

alternatives were considered for replacing the old

elevated Garfield transit line. The design concept

that was selected called for joint use of the right-ofway, with transit partially alongside and partially in

the median, thus giving birth to the modern

concept of joint transit-expressway service in the

same corridor.

67-739 0 -76-4 15
There are other examples of joint or combined

use of rights-of-way in the United States. But none

are as complete or systematically planned and

designed as those in Chicago. One example was the

relocation of a portion of an old Pacific Electric

Railway route in the Hollywood Freeway in Los

Angeles, but service on that route was abandoned

long ago. Another transit median route had been

planned as a part of the Interstate 66 in Northern

Virginia. This route, part of the Washington Metro

System, now is in doubt because of a Federal

Government decision not to build the freeway.

One of the significant results of the Congress

planning and design studies was the conclusion that

rail rapid transit lines could be built in the medians

of freeways much less expensively than on

The relatively low cost of the expressway median

transit line is best demonstrated by the per-mile

cost of about $4 million, including the cost of

stations, signalization, and other fixed facilities as

well as the incremental cost of rolling stock. Even

though costs have rapidly escalated since 1956-58,

it is unlikely that any rapid transit surface line could

be built on its own grade-separated right-of-way in

a major metropolitan area for a similar amount,

even discounted to 1958 prices.

The success of combining highway and transit

planning, design and construction in the Congress

corridor led the city of Chicago to the policy

decision that all future expressway and freeway

construction would include similar facilities or

provide for future development of rail transit lines

independent rights-of-way. The approximate divi- in the medians of all new expressways.

sion of cost between the highway and the transit

line in the Congress corridor was about 80 percent There followed in succession the development of

highway and 20 percent transit. The transit facility rail transit lines in the Dan Ryan and Kennedy

occupied a relatively small portion of the rights-of- Expressways and the reservation of space for

way—about 43 feet out of a total average width of future development of transit lines in the Stevenmore than 500 feet. It also is important to note that son and Calumet Expressways.

modern freeways, even without transit in the

median, are designed with as much separation of

the opposing traffic lanes as can be economically

justified. The length and width of structures on

such expressways constitutes a significant portion

of the total cost. In many instances, the median

width of urban expressways is 36 feet. Thus, if

transit utilizes rights-of-way which would be

provided anyway, at least in part, the provision of

transit does not significantly increase the cost of

structures which carry the expressway over or

under intersecting roadways.

The new Congress Rapid Transit Line was

completed in stages between 1958 and 1960, with

the first service starting on June 22, 1958.

The Congress Line was constructed before there

was any authority to utilize highway funds for

transit costs. Thus, there was a careful accounting

of full costs and a strict division of costs allocated to

the transit improvement, which totaled about $27

million, including the cost of the fixed transit

facilities and equipment. The improvement was

paid for with $25 million raised by the city of

Chicago, through the sale of general obligation

bonds and about $2 million from the sale of revenue

bonds. CTA, as with the improvements mentioned

previously had to assume the responsibility of

repaying the costs of the fixed transit equipment

and facilities, which totaled about $11.7 million.

The Kennedy Expressway, connecting the central business district with O’Hare Airport and the

northwestern suburbs, opened in 1961. The Dan

Ryan Expressway, connecting the central business

district with the southern suburbs, opened to

traffic in 1962. Both were built as part of the

interstate highway system with 90 percent Federal

funding.

No funds were available for developing transit

lines in the median strips of the Kennedy and Dan

Ryan Expressways as these highways were constructed, but space was reserved for future transit

use. The subsequent availability of Federal transit

funds through the Urban Mass Transportation Act

of 1964 made possible the construction of both

lines.

The new Dan Ryan Transit Line was combined

with the old Lake Line to form the present westsouth route, which extends service from the Loop

to Forest Park, a distance of about 9 miles. The line

began service in 1969, 7 years after the highway

was opened to traffic. The Dan Ryan Line was built

by the city of Chicago at a total cost of $4o million,

with two-thirds of the money coming from Federal

capital grants.

The 5-mile extension of CTA’S West-Northwest

route from Logan Square to Jefferson Park,

utilizing the median of the Kennedy Expressway,

16
was completed in 1970. The total cost was $48

million, with two-thirds of the funds provided by

Federal capital grants.

In each of the examples of combined expressway

and rapid transit planning, design, and construction, several institutions were involved. Federal

funds, either 50 percent or 90 percent, were

invested in the highway facilities and administered

by the old Bureau of Public Roads, subsequently

incorporated into the Federal Highway Administration. Thus, all planning, design, and

construction activities had to meet the stringent

tests of acceptable Federal design standards. The

Federal-Aid highway program was administered in

Illinois by the former Illinois Highway Department,

now an integral part of the Illinois Department of

Transportation.

In most States, the State highway agency is

directly responsible for the planning, design, and

construction of all interstate and U.S.-signed

highways, and this nominally is true in Illinois. Yet,

the city of Chicago, primarily through its Department of Public Works, actually took the leadership

and dominated the process that resulted in the

combined expressway and transit facilities. The

Chicago Area Transportation Study played an

important technical support role through its

assigned responsibility y of analyzing and forecasting

traffic usage of the facilities.

CTA, of course, was deeply involved in the

planning and design of the transit facilities that

occupied the median strips of the expressways.

CTA did not initiate or guide the planning,

however, and its role essentially was one of

technical support.

THE SKOKIE SWIFT

Another example of transit planning and

decisionmaking in Chicago is the development of an

express-type suburban rail transit service popularly known as the Skokie Swift. It is cited not only

because it involves an important link in the Chicago

area transit service, but also because of the way in

which it was brought about.

Transit service from the Howard Street station

in Chicago to the Dempster Avenue station in

suburban Skokie, a distance of about 5 miles, began

in 1925. The route was operated by the Chicago

Rapid Transit Company, the predecessor of CTA.

Seven intermediate stations were intended to serve

17
18
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3

19
the booming land development in the late 1920’s.

The Depression intervened, and the rapid transit

line, serving a maximum of about 700,000

passengers annually, never was successful. The

Chicago North Shore and Milwaukee Railroad

utilized the same tracks starting in 1926 to provide

commuter service through the Skokie Valley to

Milwaukee. The North Shore Company owned the

tracks and right-of-way.

CTA ceased its rapid transit service to Skokie in

1948 and substituted bus service to the connecting

rapid transit lines in Chicago. Patronage on the

CTA line had fallen off to about 1,700 riders per day

at the time service was abandoned. The North

Shore Railroad continued its commuter railroad

service until 1963, after 5 years of attempting to

abandon the line. One of the factors influencing the

decision to abandon it was the completion of the

parallel Edens Expressway. Ridership on the

commuter trains had fallen to about 1,5oo riders

per day by the time service was discontinued over

the strong objections of the Village of Skokie and

other communities served.

With the cessation of both rapid transit and

commuter rail service to Skokie, the village began a

campaign for restored service. CATS also

suggested restoration of transit service to Skokie as

part of its study and analysis of transportation

system plans. In addition, CTA had a direct interest

in these planning and promotional activities. CTA

still had to lease facilities and operating rights from

the North Shore Railroad in order to operate trains

from the Howard Street connection over a portion

of the Skokie Line tracks to CTA’S yards and service

facilities near Skokie. The halt to transit service

meant CTA would have to take on the extra

responsibility of operating and servicing the

electrified lines.

The abandonment of all transit service in 1963,

the campaign of the Village of Skokie for renewed

service, and CTA’S need to maintain and operate

part of the line led to the development of the Skokie

Swift demonstration project in 1964.

The project also was made possible, in part, by

the fact that Congress, as a part of the National

Housing Act of 1961, authorized a program of loans

and demonstration grants for mass transit purposes. This modest program, aimed primarily at

preserving failing rail transit and commuter rail

services in the Northeast, was the forerunner of

the Mass Transportation Act of 1964. It was

administered by the Housing and Home Finance

Administration, which subsequently became the

Department of Housing and Urban Development.

The Skokie Swift project originally was budgeted

at a net project cost of $524,000, a very modest

amount for the resulting service. The low figure did

not include any of the costs of right-of-way

acquisition or construction of buildings since the

Federal program at that time did not allow Federal

participation in these capital costs. CTA picked up

the entire cost of these items, as well as certain

other facilities and equipment that would have

been required anyway in order to continue the link

to its yards and maintenance and repair shops.

Disregarding these expenditures, the net cost of

the Skokie Swift project during its 2-year

demonstration period was only $483,000, even

though capital outlays were higher than anticipated. Unexpectedly high patronage and fare

income were the major factors in bringing the

project 8 percent under the original budget. The net

project costs were shared two-thirds by the Federal

Government, 26.23 percent by CTA, and 7.10

percent by Skokie.

The Skokie Swift project, therefore, was an

overwhelmin g success. The project originally was

planned to provide service from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.

weekdays with lo-minute headways during the

peak period and 30-minute headways during the

off peak. Two single cars were to make 50 trips in

order to accommodate the expected 1,00 0

passengers per day.

Instead, nearly 4,OOO passengers used the service

the first day. Five cars were put in operation instead

of two. Headways were cut from 10 minutes to 5

minutes in the peak period and from 30 minutes to

15 minutes in the offpeak. Operations were

increased from 50 trips to 75 trips the first day, to

94 trips the next week, and ultimately to 115 trips

per day, Evening service was extended an hour to

11 p.m. Saturday service was initiated, and special

trips were added on Sundays for special occasions,

including football games.

A significant feature of the project was the

provision of nonstop shuttle service between

Skokie and the Howard Street station of the CTA

system. The 5-mile trip was scheduled for 6?4

minutes of running time. Patrons were charged 45

cents for the trip with free access, at no additional

charge, to the full CTA system at the Howard

Street station.

20
The Village of Skokie, as a participant in the

project, built a 385-space parking lot at the station

which soon had to be expanded to its present

capacity of 555 spaces. All other project planning,

design, and construction activities were the responsibility of CTA.

The success of the project was measured by the

high initial passenger response, and continued

growth in patronage has been widely reported. An

important aspect of this success was the ability of

the CTA engineering department and its shops to

modernize and adapt older PCC transit cars for the

Skokie Swift service. Initially, four single cars were

equipped with higher performance electric motors

and drive systems and adapted to operate both with

“third rail” and overhead trolley electric pickup, a

necessity on the Skokie line. Subsequently, as

demand for equipment rapidly increased, four

other PCC cars were adapted. It soon became

apparent, however, that passenger demand would

exceed the system capacity with single car service,

so CTA converted its 3-unit, 94-passenger articulated PCC cars to the Skokie service. The

higher-capacity trains accommodated more

patrons, particularly during the peak period,

without compromising running time and train

frequency.

Subsequent analysis demonstrated clearly that

relative travel-time savings were the most important factor behind the unexpectedly high patronage

on the Skokie Swift demonstration. Nonstop

shuttle service over the 5-mile distance was

scheduled to take only 6-1/2 minutes. The 45-cent

fare was found to have been relatively less

significant. It is important to note that high

patronage resulted even though the service used an

old existing right-of-way and renovated operating

equipment originally built for a different type of

service.

THE CENTRAL AREA

TRANSIT PROJECT

Whereas the Skokie Swift was one of the most

modest projects undertaken in the Chicago area,

measured in financial terms, the proposed development of the Chicago Central Area Transit Project is

the most ambitious.

The central area project envisions the replacement of the elevated Loop with a Loop subway, the

addition of a downtown transit distributor, and the

extension of the subway system to the west,

northeast, and southeast of the business district.

Most recent unofficial cost estimates for the project

range up to $1.642 billion. While the estimate is

subject to further change, it is clear that the project

now would cost more than triple the originally

estimated $478 million.

Proposals to replace the elevated Loop, from

which Chicago gets the name for its central

business district, date back to 1927. Earlier plans

proposed or conceptualized varying amounts of

new rapid transit subways, but a specific proposal

to replace the elevated Loop with a subway was not

made until that year. From then until 1968,

however, no plan repeated the Loop replacement

proposal; they either proposed only partial replacement or ignored the Loop system altogether.

It is interesting to note that essentially all

transportation plans for the Chicago central area

through 1939 proposed major and fairly extensive

construction of streetcar subways. In some instances, plan proposals emphasized streetcar

subways instead of extensions or replacements for

the heavy rail transit system.

In 1958, CTA, on behalf of the Chicago Plan

Commission, published a plan called New Horizons for

Metropolitan Chicago, which contained the city’s first

proposal for a bus subway to extend under

Washington Street from the Illinois Central

Railroad station east of Michigan Avenue

westward to Chicago and Northwestern Railroad

station west of the Chicago River. The 1958 plan,

the most comprehensive attempt by CTA to

develop a metropolitan-scale plan for the city, also

proposed the elimination of several miles of

elevated transit lines, including the lines that form

the Loop. The CTA plan, however, would not have

replaced the Loop, but instead would have constructed a new north-south subway route through

the central area along Wells Street and a new eastwest route, in addition to the bus subway along

Jackson Street, extending from near the University

of Illinois Circle Campus to east of the railroad

yards near the lake front.

The CTA plan, the first comprehensive transit

plan in the post World War 11 era, also contained a

number of other proposed improvements, many of

which have been subsequently carried out. These

include the transit line in the Congress Expressway

and extensive improvements to stations, train

control, signalization, and other operating and

equipment improvements.

21
The publication of the CATS plan in 1962 was a

milestone in Chicago area transportation planning

for both highways and transit. The CATS effort

was the most innovative planning study ever

undertaken up to that time and many of the

techniques, methodologies, and analyses have been

incorporated in urban area transportation planning

throughout the world.

The comments in this case study, however, are

limited to those portions of the CATS study that

relate directly to mass transportation and

specifically to the central area.

The CATS 1962 report began its discussion of its

public transportation plan with these words:

Any realist can see that planning for future

mass transportation facilities—buses, subway

and elevated lines, and suburban railroads—is

a particularly difficult task. Historical trends

continue to show passenger losses. Risk

capital is scarce. The increasing dispersion of

riders and the harsh economic fact of serving

a more dilute market area cannot be ignored.

Yet the need for mass transportation and the

problems created by increasing use of the

automobile cannot be ignored. Many people in

the Chicago area are completely dependent

upon public transit for transportation, The

economic well being of large parts of the

central city—particularly the core area—is at

stake. Any accelerating decline in the

availability of public transportation wouId be

reflected in lower property values and increased congestion.

Strong efforts are needed to maintain and

improve public transportation services. This

is the policy of the plan presented here—a

policy concurred in by most public officials of

this area. This policy must be effectuated,

however, in full view of the difficulties, and

with a realistic appraisal of problems and

opportunities.

The CATS study evaluated the then existing

commuter rail and rail transit system, the CTA

plan, a modification of the CTA plan, and one

proposed by CATS,

The proposed plan, which ultimately was

recommended in the 1962 report, differed in some

respects from all previous reports, including the

CTA plan. However, the major difference was in

the central area. The CATS plan proposed

operating all rail transit service through the

existing Lake and Dearborn subways and, instead

of adding any new central area subway segments, it

proposed development of an extensive system of

grade-separated moving pedestrian walkways. The

moving sidewalks would connect to the commuter

railroad stations as well as the transit stations. It

consisted of one central north-south segment and

two east-west segments.

The CATS report contained many cautionary

statements that its plan and analysis were

preliminary in nature and subject to much more

refined and detailed planning, design, and analysis

as well as other nontransportation considerations.

Notwithstanding, it indicated that the plan would

achieve an order-of-magnitude saving of more than

$1 million per year in total costs compared with

continued operation of the existing system through

1980. The proposed CTA plan, on the other hand,

would have cost an annual total of about $3.7

million above the cost of operating the existing

system.

The proposed bus subway from the earlier CTA

plan and the moving pedestrian walkways from the

CATS plan never received further serious consideration in central area transportation planning.

The Central Area Transit Project, as it is known

today? dates from 1968 when the city of Chicago,

with cooperation from Federal, State, and local

agencies, produced the Transit Planning Study, Chicago

Central Area. The study was financed largely with

funds from the Community Facilities Administration of HUD rather than its Office of Mass

Transportation, which was a constituent HUD

agency at that time.

The city of Chicago dominated leadership of the

study. It was conducted by the city’s Department of

Development and Planning (DDP), the Department of Public Works (DPW), and CTA. The

chairman of the coordinating committee for the

study was the Commissioner of DDP, and the

study director was the Deputy Commissioner of

DDP. The Commissioner of Public Works was

responsible for the engineering work program, and

other city agencies and CTA were responsible for

all other aspects of the project except one. The lone

exception was that CATS was responsible for

patronage and revenue projects. (CATS was

limited to this type of technical support role until

about 1973. )

22
The 1968 Central Area Study reviewed all of the

comprehensive transportation plans for or affecting the central area dating from 1909, when the

Burnham Plan was produced. In several of the

subsequent plans, in 1916, 1923, 1927, 1930, 1937,

1939, 1958, and 1962, components of the plans

which specifically proposed replacement of the

elevated Loop or made it possible are specifically

noted. The 1962 plan, produced by CATS, deserves

special note.

The Central Area Study report, in commenting

on the CATS plan, notes:

The recommended plan proposes a network

of highways and transit extensions for the

Chicago metropolitan area in a broad and

general manner, leaving detailed solutions to

future studies. . . . The purpose of the report

was to propose the nature, arrangement and

location of future transportation facilities, in

a very general form, to provide projected

capacity needs with consideration of safety

and operating and construction costs based on

projected land developments. Generally, the

report recommends a plan of transportation

for 1980.

Further, the Central Area Study report comments:

The possibilities of removal of existing

elevated Loop structures are treated relatively lightly. No evidence was presented that

alternatives were studied for central area

transit improvements, which would eliminate

or improve problems inherent in the

proposals made in the report.

The Central Area Study review of the 1958 CTA

Plan simply ignores the proposed bus subway along

Washington Street.

The dominating factor in the Central Area Study

was the importance of allowing continued development and redevelopment of the central business

area by providing adequate transportation support

services. The study report states:

The transit plan for the central area proposed

herein embodies four principles aimed toward

reinforcing the vitality of Chicago’s core area

as the center for employment, education, and

culture.

1. Adequate distribution of passengers with

all weather connections to commuter

2,

3.

4.

railroad stations and other traffic

generators.

Expansion of transit service to present

and planned centers of activity such as the

University of Illinois—Chicago Circle

Campus, the Gateway area, railroad

stations, Illinois Central Air Right’s

Development, Wolf Point, the near North

Side, the cultural and recreational area to

the south along the lakeshore, and the

McCormick Place complex.

Reduction of the volume of vehicular

traffic in the central area not only by

promoting greater use of transit, but also

by encouraging the use of fringe parking

facilities for those who continue to drive.

Removal of the existing Loop elevated

structure.

The study developed 14 sketch plans, from which

5 were selected for further analysis and evaluation.

In light of the four principles listed above, plus nine

additional functional or engineering criteria, all

plans were found wanting in some respects.

The recommended plan assembled components

of the five rejected plans into subway and distributor extensions from the Loop area to serve

McCormick Place and Walton Place to the north

and south and Circle Campus. It also proposed an

extensive system of subway pedestrian connections.

The recommended plan was significantly more

extensive than any of the five earlier plans—and

more expensive. It was estimated to cost $478

million. The study report conceded that “a public

works project such as this should provide an

economic gain to justify its cost. ”

The economic analysis conducted as a part of the

project concluded that the project was justified, but

presented no detailed analysis that showed the

recommended alternative to be a public investment

in which the benefits would outweigh the costs.

Neither did the economic analysis compare the

costs and benefits of the alternative plans.

The summary report of the project instead

referenced the economic and social impacts, the

cultural and recreational potential, the esthetic

considerations, expanded employment opportunities, and other factors.

23
The economic analysis concluded that the

Central Area Transit Project might generate an

increase in assessed value of property in the central

business district of as much as $1.8 billion “The

gross tax revenues from this increase in property

values alone will be an amount equivalent to the

total cost of the project improvement in a period of

10 years,” the report concluded.

The economic analysis did not indicate the

relative increase in property value associated with

each alternative, including leaving the Loop system

intact, but it did note that keeping the 70-year-old

elevated Loop in operation would cost in excess of

$2o miIlion or about 4 percent of the cost of the

recommended plan.

The Central Area Study reported that the

development of a specific and detailed financing

plan had been beyond the scope of the study.

Notwithstanding, it reported on four alternative

financing schemes including the potential of

creating a special transit district which would be

supported by property taxes on the property within

the district. Although the study did not make a

recommendation, the special transit district was

authorized by the Illinois Legislature in its 1970

session and subsequently was approved by referendum. The special district, Chicago Urban Transit

District (CUTD), was challenged in the courts as

unconstitutional and eventually was appealed to

the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the act

was valid in 1972.

The CUTD applied for an UMTA capital grant

for the Loop and distributor subways in 1971 in the

amount of $SOO.4 million, the proposed Federal

share of the cost. Technically, the application is still

pending before UMTA, but the CUTD has received

additional study and planning grants in the

subsequent years. The original 1968 study was

updated in 1971 with identical findings.

The recommended project has been highly

controversial, not only because of its high cost and

the fact that the local share of costs would be

obtained through property taxes on central area

owners, but also because of charges and counter

charges of who would benefit and whether the

project was being used to delineate an area of the

city that would receive development and redevelopment benefits to the detriment of adjoining areas.

During the initial planning of the project and up

until quite recently, there was no attempt to carry

out a structured citizen participation program in

the ordinarily accepted meaning of the term.

Instead, there were many meetings with business

and civic leaders primarily interested in the growth

and development of the central business district.

Most recently, there has been a modest effort to get

more citizen input into the project through surveys

and similar activities.

Primarily in response to pressure from the

Federal Government the CUTD started a new

study in 1973 in which 12 alternative plans were

considered and evaluated. Four were selected for

detailed analysis. The study concluded that the

original 1968 plan was the best alternative.

UMTA, however, did not fully accept the results

of the restudies and submitted a list of questions to

be answered separately by the city of Chicago,

CUTD, CTA, and the Illinois Department of

Transportation (IDOT). Instead, all four wrote a

joint letter of response in which they said the

project should go forward with Federal funding and

that remaining problems could be resolved during

detailed planning.

For the remainder of 1974 and the first half of

1975, little progress was made in resolving

disagreements and no additional funds were

provided by UMTA. In June 1975, CUTD organized

an interagency task force to review the controversial portions of the plan and try to agree on a

solution.

The task force, which was headed by CUTD, was

supposed to conclude its work in time to report to

the CUTD board July 28, 1975. The work was to be

undertaken by staff of the participating agencies.

The staff met on a semiweekly basis. The agencies

represented were DDP, DPW, CTA, and IDOT.

The newly created RTA was invited to participate,

but it deferred and reported that CTA would

represent its interests.

The task force developed five alternatives for the

Monroe distributor portion of the plan and four for

the Franklin portion of the plan. These were

presented to the senior task force of agency heads

on July 25, 1975, but no agreement was reached.

There were numerous meetings in the following

month, and, unofficially, alternate plans were

worked out in which portions of the central area

plan could be carried out at a significantly reduced

cost without abandoning the entire concept. But

even reduced plans, as unofficially reported, are

substantiall y beyond the capability of presently

identified sources of funding. However, later in

24
.

August, the CUTD board met and issued a

statement indicating that it would continue planning for the Loop-distributor subway and for a

north-south subway running generally along

Franklin Street. At this writing, the outstanding

problems still remain unresolved.

THE CROSSTOWN EXPRESSWAY

The Crosstown Expressway project illuminates

other important aspects of the institutional structure of transportation and transit planning in the

Chicago area as well as questions pertaining to the

future implementation of Chicago area transportation plans.

The proposed Crosstown Expressway is the last

unconstructed segment of the Chicago area’s

interstate system rout es. The proposed

Crosstown, now estimated to cost more than $1

billion, would connect with the Dan Ryan south

and southwest of the central area, extend

westward to the vicinity of Cicero Avenue, and

then go directly north about 5 miles west of the

central area to a connection with the Kennedy

Expressway in the northwestern portion of the

city.

The expressway project has been controversial

for many years, but the controversy reached a new

height when present Illinois Governor, Daniel

Walker, made opposition to the expressway project

one of his prominent campaign issues in 1972 in

opposition to the policies of Chicago Mayor,

Richard Daley. While the State and city have been

at odds on a number of issues, differences over the

Crosstown Expressway have been the foremost

issues in the transportation sector of public policy.

The transit planning activities in the Chicago

metropolitan area have not included any concerted

effort to develop a citizen participation program

either at the overall regional systems level or in

individual projects. Ironically, the greatest citizen

participation in the Chicago area in recent years

involved the planning for the Crosstown Expressway, and the program was devised largely to

overcome significant citizen and other opposition

to the project.

The Crosstown Expressway, through the

development of a second generation plan, now

contains a transit component in the form of an

exclusive busway. The transit component, however, is not the focus of the disagreement. Rather,

the controversy consists of an open and protracted

disagreement over the expressway itself. The State

takes the position that the expressway should not

be built, whereas the city advocates the project.

The outcome of the dispute is important to the

area transit program. The State’s opposition is

based on its desire to take advantage of the

provisions of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973,

in which interstate system highway funds can be

transferred to transit projects. The State sees the

transfer of funds as the only realistic source of

sufficient funds for building some form of the

Central Area Project as well as for making other

improvements in the area’s transit system.

The stalemate over the Cross town Expressway is

reflected in the 1995 Transportation System Plan

for the Chicago area, as adopted by CATS and

NIRPC. The corridor that contains the proposed

Crosstown Expressway has been designated as a

“high accessibility corridor” without any definition

of what the term means or what kind of facilities

eventually would be provided. A second controversial proposed highway corridor, the North Avenue

Corridor from First Avenue in the western portion

of Cook County to Fox River in DuPage County,

also has been designed as a “highway accessibility

corridor. ” While not as directly or deeply involved

in the Chicago rapid transit planning dispute, the

North Avenue corridor is opposed by IDOT in part

because it would cause disruption and in part

because it would be a radial freeway providing

additional highway capacity into Cook County and

Chicago. IDOT fears the highway facility would

compete with and therefore cause some diversion

from the Chicagoan Northwestern commuter rail

service.

THE 1995 TRANSPORTATION

SYSTEM PLAN

The 1995 Plan is the first plan that addresses the

eight-county metropolitan area of northeastern

Illinois and northwestern Indiana. It was developed

in cooperation with the Northwestern Indiana

Regional Planning Commission. The report is

intended to replace the interim plan adopted in

1971 that was a composite of official public

transportation plans for the eight-county bi-State

metropolitan area.

A formal attempt at citizen participation was

made in connection with the announcement of the

25
—

r

. . . . . .

I

I

I

Kane County

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

I

l-- –– —.. ––

1I

I

I

I

I —- — — —-— —— -—- . — ———.—— I ~ I

Proposed

26
1995 Transportation System Plan for the region.

The plan was presented to the public in a television

program with the opportunity for the public to

either telephone questions during the presentation

or submit questions or comments in writing

following the program. No significant involvement

resulted and no changes were made in the plan.

NIPC, however, reported that it made 30 changes

in the text as a result of citizen comments.

The 1995 Plan is the first plan in the Chicago area

that covers all transportation modes, including

public transit, highways, aviation, and freight. The

plan proposes a fairly extensive network of new

freeway construction, but almost all of the

proposed new routes are in the most outlying areas

of the metropolitan region. No new freeways are

proposed in the city of Chicago. The plan does

propose a very short, controlled-access connector

along Franklin Street in the downtown lakefront

area of new development, a project which is largely

noncontroversial and on which some work has

already been accomplished. A significant feature of

the 1995 freeway plan is that almost all routes are

beltway or circumferential highways in character

and service.

The public transportation plan, however, is

essentially the opposite. It proposes extensions of

three commuter rail lines further into the outlying

areas of the region. It also proposes an extensive

expansion of rail rapid transit routes, including the

plan to replace the Loop and construct the Archer

Avenue distributor with extensions as put forth in

the CUTD plan. Other parts of the proposed

network expansion include extension of the

Kennedy Line to O’Hare Airport, extensions of the

service in the Congress (now Eisenhower), s the

Dan Ryan, and Calumet Expressways and an

extension to Midway Airport that would utilize

part of the median of the Stevenson Expressway. In

addition, the 1995 Plan proposes the development

of a new subway along Archer Avenue from

Harlem Avenue to the Franklin Street connector, a

corridor that now has the most densely utilized bus

service of any bus route into the CBD.

The 1995 Plan also proposes two new transit

lines: one from the Skokie Swift Terminal in Skokie

to the Jefferson Park Station on the Kennedy

Expressway Line; and the second servicing the

Chicago Loop by way of Lawrence Avenue,

connecting to the east-west leg of the present

Ravenswood Line to the Howard Line at Wilson,

and then south along Sheridan Road and Lake

Shore Drive to a new connection in the Loop.

s %me transit lines in expressway medians bear a different

name from the expressway whose right-of-way they share. In

this discussion, the names of the expressways are used

un if Ormly.

27
Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

1858

1892

1897

1914

1917

1927

1939

1945

1947

1952

1958

Chicago’s first “horse subways” were

authorized.

The first elevated line, steam operated,

began service.

Construction of the Loop elevated was

completed. 1962

All street railway properties in Chicago

were unified under one management

(Chicago Surface Lines, CSL).

Chicago Motor Bus Company (CMB), a 1964

luxury bus line, began operations on the

boulevards. (CMB later became the

Chicago Motor Coach Company.)

A Plan for a Unified Transportation System for

The City of Chicago. The plan proposed a

comprehensive system of transit subway and contained the first proposal to

remove the elevated transit main lines

and Union Loop within the central area. 1966

In October, the Committee on Local

Transportation, Department of Subways and Traction, published A Com -

prehensive Plan for the Exlension of Ihe Subway

System of ihe City of Chicago. It proposed 1968

new and extended subways, suggested a

combination of rail rapid transit and

expressway facilities within common

rights-of-way, and provided for new

subways to be utilized for long-haul

traffic, coordinated with surface street

feeder and distributor routes within the

central area. 1969

State legislation was passed creating the

Chicago Transit Authority (CTA); a

local referendum endorsed its funding.

CTA began operations and purchased

the Chicago Rapid Transit Company and

the Chicago Surface Lines.

CTA bought the Chicago Motor Coach

Company.

1970

In April, CTA published New Horizons for

Chicago, recommending a 20-year rapid

transit extension and improvement

program.

In June, the rapid rail line extension in

the Eisenhower Expressway median

opened.

The Chicago Area Transportation Study

published its final report, including

Volume 111: Transportation Plan, which

recommended a general plan of

transportation for 1980.

The Skokie Swift, a 2-year demonstration program funded by an UMTA

demonstration grant, started 5 miles of

commuter rail service between the

village of Skokie and Chicago’s Howard

Street. Since 1966 CTA has operated the

line as part of its regular service. It was

popular beyond expectations and now

serves 12,OOO riders daily.

Voters approved a bond issue to provide

the local share of funds for transit

extensions in the Dan Ryan and

Kennedy Expressway medians (10 and 5

miles, respectively).

In April, the city published the Chicago

Cenlral Area Transit Planning Study, proposing a new subway Loop distributor

subway system and removal of the

elevated Loop. (It is referred to as the

Chicago Central Area Transit Project, or

CCATP.)

In May, extension of CTA’S NorthSouth Rapid Transit Line to a new

terminal in Englewood was completed

with UMTA capital assistance. In

September, also with UMTA money,

extension of CTA’S west-south route in

the median of the Dan Ryan Expressway

was completed.

Service began on the extension of CTA’S

West-Northwest Rapid Transit Line in

the median of the Kennedy Expressway

to Jefferson Park.

29
The Chicago Urban Transit District

(CUTD) was formed as a separate

municipal corporation with tax levying 1973 powers, encompassing the Chicago

CBD.

1971 In January, CLJTD applied for a $500,4

million UMTA capital grant to build the

Loop and distributor subways. The

application is still pending.

In January, for the first time, CTA

received grants from the City of Chicago

and Cook County ($3.5 million) for

operating losses and from the State

($6.3 million) for debt service,

With a $53 million capital grant from

UMTA, CTA began a major facility

renewal program. An additional $4o

million was added to the project in 1972.

1971 /72 Several bills to establish a regional

transportation authority were introduced into the State legislature but

died in the committee.

1971 In July, the State established a transit

capital grant program to be financed

through a $2OO million statewide bond

issue.

1972 O’Hare Express: An Employment Access

Demons/ration Project was published by the

Mayor’s Committee on Economic and

Cultural Development. The project

provided express bus service from the

Jefferson Park rapid transit terminal on

the Kennedy Expressway to O’Hare

International Airport.

1972 The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear

appeals from lower courts on the validity

of financing mechanisms proposed for

the Loop and distributor subway

system.

In August, CUTD received a $5.8 million

grant to start the distributor subway

portion of the CCATP.

RTPB received a technical studies grant

(amended in August 1973 to make a total

of $3,259,000) for preparation of a

regional 5-year transit development 1974

plan. A priority ranking of the proposed

projects was to be undertaken in order

for Chicago to qualify for additional

capital grants.

In January, the Governor’s Transportation Task Force published Crisis and

Solution: Public Transportalion in Northeastern

Illinois, which was designed to provide a

framework for legislative action to

establish a regional transportation

authority. The Task Force Report examined the public transportation

problems in northeastern Illinois and

recommended concepts related to the

purpose, responsibility, legal form,

organizational structure, and governing

structure of a Regional Transportation

Agency.

Early in the year, CTA was threatened

with bankruptcy and its board approved

a 50@ fare and a massive program of

service cuts. The State legislature approved a $12.6 million subsidy, matched

by a $6.3 million city-county subsidy to

last through June 30, 1973. Operating

subsidies also were provided for commuter rail and bus operators.

On June 30, CTA’S subsidy funding ran

out and a large program of service cuts

was proposed. In early July, the city of

Chicago raised $6.5 million, Cook County approved a $2 million subsidy, and the

State added $12 million to help keep the

system in operation at least until late

1973.

[n September, the Chicago 21 Plan was

published by the Central Area Committee. Recommendations for mass

transportation included construction of

the Loop and distributor subways and

initiation of a supplemental, gradeseparated transit system utilizing a

personal rapid transit type of

technology.

In December, the legislature passed an

act creating the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), subject to a

favorable vote in a referendum in the

region.

In March, the public approved creation

of RTA and endowed it with authority to

issue up to $500 million in general

30
obligation bonds and to levy various

other taxes.

In March, in response to gasoline

shortages, CTA instituted a Sunday 25Q

fare (1OO for children and senior

citizens). The special rates continued

through June 30, 1974.

The Indiana-Illinois Bi-State Planning

Commission was created by joint action

of the two State legislatures and Governors.

In September, televised public hearings

were conducted for the 1995 Transportation

Syslem Plan

Later in the fall, NIPC adopted the 1995

Plan.

31
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The institutions and the process of public

transportation planning and decisionmaking in the

Chicago Metropolitan Area are extremely complex.

Some of the complexity is brought about by

external pressures and requirements. Some of the

complexity is deliberate in order to control the

process and decisionmaking.

The Chicago area involves two States, eight

counties, the city of Chicago, hundreds of

municipalities, public and privately owned

transportation companies, and a number of multijurisdictional regional agencies. Bringing together

these institutions into one cohesive planning and

decisionmaking institution would be extremely

difficult under the most optimal set of circumstances and perhaps is impossible as a practical

matter, given the wide-ranging diversity of interests as well as authorities and responsibilities.

An understanding of the institutional aspects of

transit planning and operations in the Chicago area

requires tracing the changes in the institutional

mechanisms over time. Modern transportation

planning in Chicago has been much more of an

evolutionary process than has been true in most of

the other metropolitan areas assessed during this

study, where new transit institutions were

developed to build new systems as well as to

purchase and operate existing systems. The

following discussions take an evolutionary approach to the discussion of the assessment topics.

Forum for Decisionmaking

The institutional relationships among a variety

of agencies with direct or indirect responsibilities

for transit planning in the Chicago area have been

chaotic. In the past this condition allowed the city of

Chicago to play the primary role in making

decisions on transit planning and development. In

1973 the search for more stable financing led to

creation of the Regional Transit Authority, which

Assessment of the Planning and

Decisionmaking Process

has diminished the dominance of the city and

elevated the importance of the State.

Although the RTA appears to provide an

improved forum for regional transit decisionmaking, it does not resolve some of the region’s

fundamental decisionmaking problems, Neither it

nor any other regional organization has the

authority and power to make decisions on future

joint development of transit and highway facilities.

Nor can they effectively coordinate transportation

and land use programs.

Forum for Decisionmaking:

the City of Chicago

The city of Chicago, through its Department of

Public Wotks and later through shared responsibility of DPW and the Department of Planning and

Development, historically has been the dominant

force in the institutional aspects of transit planning

and decisionmaking in the Chicago area. Although

the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) has taken an

important part in Chicago transit planning and

regional organizations have come to the fore in

recent years, the shape of Chicago’s transit system

owes its greatest debt to the city.

The city was the initiator, planner, designer, and

builder of the central area’s two subways long

before there was any serious thought of Federal

programs, regional planning requirements, and

many of the other institutional requirements or

necessities that have emerged through the 1960’s

and 1970’s. The first subway was built when the

rail transit system was still privately owned and

operated. The second was built after CTA was

formed and had the ownership and operating

responsibility for the transit system. In neither

case, however, could the transit owner have

possibly put together the capital required to build

the two subways with any hope of repaying

principal and interest out of income. Thus, the city

assumed and vigorously played the leading role in

these early capital project developments, a role

which it has carefully guarded until most recent

years when economic necessity forced the city to

33
loosen its grip on transportation decisionmaking in

order for the public transportation system to obtain

a broader base for its revenue from other than

passenger fares.

In contrast, two facts stand out about CTA’S role.

First, CTA was regarded as a city institution,

notwithstanding its legally independent status and

the fact that the Mayor and the Governor had

appointive authority with cross-veto rights for

members of the CTA board. Second, CTA, while

having complete authority and responsibility for

transit operations and capital improvements to

fixed transportation equipment and rolling stock,

played only a technical support role in the planning

of new or reconstructed transit lines with but few

exceptions.

The dominant role of the city vis-a-vis CTA and

other transportation organizations in the region is

well illustrated by the evolution of the decision to

build a transit line in the median of the Congress

Expressway. Except for one of the two central area

subways mentioned, the Congress Line was the

first major transit development project after World

War II.

The decision to build the Congress Transit Line

in the 1950’s was both accidental and fortuitous.

The line did not originate as a transit project but

grew out of interest in constructing a new radial

expressway into the central area of Chicago to

serve the auto-oriented suburban expansion to the

west.

The best available corridor in which to build the

new expressway at the lowest cost was occupied by

the old Garfield Elevated Transit Line. CTA, as the

owner and operator of the transit line, wanted to

continue service in the corridor but did not give the

Garfield Line high priority for redevelopment or

reconstruction. The transit planners and those

charged with operations, while desiring to continue

transit service in the corridor, also were skeptical,

and in some cases opposed, to a rail transit line in

the median of a high speed, heavily-traveled

highway because of the difficulty of operations and

maintenance as well as the fact that station access

would be difficult and require more time for transit

patrons walking to stations.

The highway planners, clearly interested in

building a new radial expressway, were not

interested in developing or remodeling the old and

largely dilapidated Garfield transit line. b

Notwithstanding these opposing and conflicting

views, the Congress Expressway and transit line

was designed, constructed, and became a model for

future transit development which is continuing in

the Chicago area.

The city of Chicago, through its Department of

Public Works and its director, George DeMent, was

faced with the problem of developing a new

expressway and preserving transit service in a

narrow corridor with limited resources. The Illinois

Highway Division, which largely deferred to the

city on highway matters within its jurisdiction,

reluctantly went along with Chicago’s decision and

helped the city persuade the Federal Bureau of

Public Roads to provide part of the funds for the

highway portion of the joint use corridor. The BPR,

responding to this reluctance and aided by highway

laws that allowed highway use revenues to be spent

only for highway purposes, required a strict

accounting of costs between those elements of the

construction plans necessary for highway purposes

and those attributable to the joint transit development.

The city of Chicago paid for the right-of-way and

structural elements of the joint corridor that were

attributable to transit with its own general purpose

funds, and CTA was charged with the cost of fixed

transit equipment and rolling stock.

l’hus, the dominant role played by the city

department and its director resulted in the joint use

project that subsequently has been extolled as an

outstanding example of combined highway and

transit planning and development. Ironically, the

Congress corridor has been displayed frequently

and prominently by highway officials t.

demonstrate their longtime interest in compreheno In fact, during this period and extending well into the

interstate program, highway officials developed and implemented very stringent policies which largely prevented the

use of controlled access highway right-of-way for any use other

than highways. The exclusive-use-of -right-of-way policy was

aimed largely at preventing utilities from using shared space,

but the policy extended to any use which interfered with the

safety features of high-speed, median-divided, grade-separated

expressway operation. Thus, most highway planners and

designers were skeptical if not outright opposed to deliberately

planning a rail transit facility and operation within the narrow

confines of the space separating the opposing lanes of the

expressway.

34
sive surface transportation in urban areas without

regard to mode or technology.

Rail transit lines subsequently were built into the

Kennedy and Dan Ryan Expressways, but the

fundamental decision that resulted in Chicago’s

unique system of expressway median transit lines

dates from the middle 1950’s and was a decision

made largely by the city of Chicago with acquiescence by the other parties to the development.

Forum for Decisionmaking:

Toward a Regional Transit Agency

A major development in the institutional process

was the creation of the Chicago Area Transportation Study in 1955. CATS, the first major

metropolitan area transportation study program,

paved the way for a whole new concept of

technically oriented and rigorous transportation

planning and evaluation. Most of the basic concepts

developed and made operational as a part of the

CATS study are in worldwide use today.

CATS, however, has never achieved a role

significantly greater than technical support for the

policy makers in the areas of transit planning and

development. It should be noted that CATS was the

creation of the Illinois Highway Division with

complete cooperation of Chicago, Cook County,

and the other suburban counties. But its policy

control was vested in the highway officials of the

participating jurisdictions. Notwithstanding, the

CATS study and its resulting 1962 plan seriously

examined the potential role of transit in the future

and developed alternative plans which

systematically examined costs and revenue, including the costs of operation and the cost of money

over time.

Almost all of the major plans which have been

developed in recent years in the Chicago area,

including the CATS plan, have some elements

which either have been built or continue to be

contained in current plans. It is obvious, however,

that neither the CATS plan nor the CTA “New

Horizons” plan of 1958 were fully acceptable to the

dominant decisionmaking force, the city of

Chicago. (The CATS plan for highways, however,

was fully accepted and has been carried out to a

large extent except for the controversial

Crosstown Freeway.)

The Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission

(NIPC) was formed in 1957, during the years of the

development of the CTA and CATS plans. NIPC,

while having broad planning authority including

transportation, nevertheless was not a major factor

in the decisionmaking process during these years,

either for highway or transit programs. Its force as

a regional planning body grew incrementally and

was substantially enhanced by its designation as

the A-95 review agency for the metropolitan area

in 1969.

Chicago, unlike any other of the case assessment

cities with the possible exception of Boston, has not

faced many of the problems of other metropolitan

areas with new transit systems in planning or

construction. Chicago area decisions have focused

on revitalizing the existing transit system and

extending it into new service areas. These concerns

are manifested in the series of proposals to build the

Central Area Plan by replacing the elevated Loop

and building the distributor transit line.

Revitalization of the existing system was left

largely to the decisionmaking authority of CTA

leadership and management. Although CTA had

made major strides in renovating its system with

self-generated debt funds and money either

contributed or advanced by the city, CTA still faced

major capital expenditures for fixed facilities and

rolling stock at the time Federal funds became

available for capital investment following the Mass

Transportation Act of 1964. Thus, major portions

of the funds allocated to the Chicago area in the

subsequent years have been used to replace old and

antiquated rolling stock, both rail vehicles and

buses. New maintenance and operations facilities

have been constructed; stations remodeled; and

power, signal, and control facilities replaced or

modernized. All of these investments were critically important for preserving and improving service

but did not result directly in significant expansion

of service to new areas. The investments did,

however, improve service on existing transit and

bus routes and, consequently, they increased

patronage through the 1960’s until overall costs

required large fare increases starting in 1967.

The other major products of Federal transit

capital assistance in Chicago are the new transit

lines in the medians of the Dan Ryan and Kennedy

Expressways and the Skokie Swift. But the

extension of new service into the Kennedy and Dan

Ryan corridors did not represent new decisions.

Rather, the projects grew out of decisions made in

the 1950’s when Chicago, as a matter of policy,

decided to reserve the medians of all future

expressways and freeways for transit service.

35
Although the Central Area Transit Project

continues to dominate the issue of transit improvements in the Chicago area, extensions of

service in the Kennedy, Dan Ryan, and Calumet

Expressway corridors remain relatively high on the

list of priority projects to be undertaken.

Meanwhile, during these same years following

the Mass Transportation Act of 1964, the suburban

transit districts were formed in order to have access

to Federal funds for improvements and additions to

commuter railroad rolling stock suburban stations,

and park-and-ride lots. The suburban districts

subsequently were expanded to provide an institutional mechanism and taxing power for public

and private suburban bus operators as well as the

commuter railroads.

These several developments during the 1960’s

created a condition in which several different

institutions were making separate and uncoordinated applications for funds to UMTA with no

significant indication from any single institutional

source as to regional priorities. Routinely, UMTA

was faced with annual applications for capital grant

funds far in excess of what it could reasonably

allocate to the Chicago area, with no expressed set

of priorities for UMTA guidance in deciding what

projects it would fund and what projects it would

defer.

UMTA started exerting pressure on regional

institutions to designate or create a body which

could coordinate transit capital grant applications

and specifically to present annual applications by

order of priority. UMTA even threatened to cut off

Federal funds for the region unless a coordinating

mechanism was developed, although the threat was

never taken seriously. Responding to UMTA

pressure, the city of Chicago exercised its

leadership by creating the Regional Transportation

Planning Board with membership consisting of the

city of Chicago (through its DPW and DDP),

CATS, NICP, and the Northwestern Indiana

Regional Planning Commission. The State of

Illinois was represented on the board as an ex

officio member.

The RTPB was a paper organization that actually

operated out of the offices of the city’s DDP and

DPW. Its staff support came from the same

agencies that supported transit decisions prior to

36
RTPB’s formation. Thus, the RTPB changed

decisionmaking in the Chicago area in form but not

in substance.

Internal memoranda of UMTA personnel as late

as 1974 demonstrate UMTA’S frustration at the

inadequacy of its attempts to create a truly regional

representative institution to guide Federal participation by setting priorities among area plans for

transit developments. It is important to note that

this fundamental problem in regional decisionmaking was not altered until financial conditions

internal to the Chicago area forced changes

starting in 1971 and extending to the present.

Forum for Decisionmaking:

Creation of the Regional Transit Authority

The CTA first experienced a net operating deficit

in 1971 of $13.2 million (exclusive of depreciation).

This operating deficit in effect forced the city of

Chicago, Cook .County, and the State of Illinois to

make grants to CTA to keep it out of the red and to

avoid even greater fare increases and service

reductions. 7 It was apparent that financial conditions would become more severe in subsequent

years, and this realization started the agonizing

process of developing a different financing system

for transit in the region.

Legislation for various kinds of regional organizations and financing mechanisms was introduced

and considered in the 1972 session of the Illinois

legislature. But no plan could win sufficient

support for enactment. The worsening financial

condition of CTA and a very real threat of

significant fare increases and service cutbacks led to

a crisis, and the legislature finally took action in

1973. The result was the creation of the Regional

Transportation Authority. While still in its formative stages, the RTA clearly is becoming the

dominant decisionmaking forum for transit

development and operations in the entire Chicago

metropolitan region.

The factors that led to creation of RTA are

critical to an assessment of the present and future

decisionmaking process. The State of Illinois, which

had taken only a peripheral interest in Chicago area

transit in previous years, became an important

actor when it started in 1971 to make significant

financial contributions

~ Commuter railroads also

their losses were absorbed in

to transit systems in the

were operating at deficits, but

total railroad revenue.

area. The city of Chicago, with perhaps the largest

stake in the outcome of a new institutional and

financial plan, attempted to exercise as much

leadership as possible in the outcome of the

legislative considerations. But Chicago also

recognized the growing political strength of the

suburban jurisdictions in the legislature as well as

the absolute necessity of broadening the tax

revenue base for transit support. The suburban

jurisdictions banded together and exercised their

political power through the Speaker of the House,

who represented a suburban constituency. He

reactivated the dormant, legislatively created

Transportation Study Commission as the

mechanism for legislative control.

While there were many important issues to be

resolved, primary consideration boiled down to

how the resulting institution would be controlled

and how taxes would be estimated and apportioned.

Governor Richard B. Ogilvie had created a

Governor’s transportation task force during 1972,

and its January 1973 report became the foundation

for subsequent action. The report, Crisis and Solution:

Public Transportation in Norfheastern Illinois,

recommended in broad outline an institutional

mechanism and financing plan similar to that which

was eventually incorporated in the RTA legislation.

The report gave elaborate detail on how a regional

agency should be created, organized, and controlled. The report, however, was much less explicit

on how the regional agency should be financed and

instead suggested a number of taxes that should be

considered.

As the final critical process started in January

1973, Governor Ogilvie was replaced by Governor

Daniel Walker. However, it is clear that the

leadership within the legislature came through the

Transportation Study Commission and not from

the incoming administration of Governor Walker.

The new administration took little active part in the

legislative negotiations until the final stages, and

even then was concerned primarily with the taxing

issues vis-a-vis other State tax programs as distinct

from the organization and control of the regional

transit agency.

The inevitable compromise that resulted from

the legislative process created the RTA, subject to

voter approval, which was to be controlled by a 9-

member board with eight of the members equally

divided between Chicago and the suburban

jurisdictions. It is important to note that the

Governor was given no appointive or veto authori37
ty such as Governors have had in connection with

CTA from its inception. s The eight board members

had the responsibility of choosing the ninth

member, who also would be chairman of the board.

The taxing authority, which will be discussed in

detail later in this section, also was the product of

compromise,

The RTA plan was submitted to voters on March

19,1974. It was approved by the slim margin of only

about 15,000 votes out of 1.3 million cast. It won by

an overwhelming margin in the city but lost in all

other jurisdictions, including Cook County. The

margin of loss was almost 10 to 1 in suburban

McHenry County.

The very significant opposition to RTA in the

suburban jurisdictions led to legislative reconsideration of whether the authorizing legislation

should be amended to such an extent that the

practical result would be a regional agency without

the authority to carry out its responsibilities. The

legislative fight resulted in several changes to the

legislation, including the creation of a metropolitan

area transportation council whose authority and

responsibility is essentially that of oversight by

locally elected officials. The RTA also was constrained in several other ways, but its basic

authority was left intact.

Thus, RTA was created through the decisionmaking forum of the State legislature. The

principal actors were the city of Chicago, the

suburban jurisdictions, and the State of Illinois.

Regional agencies such as CATS and NIPC were

called on for technical support services, and transit

operators, including CTA and the commuter

railroads, were lobbying forces. But the decision

was made in the political arena of the State

legislature with city, suburban, and State elected

officials playing the decisive roles.

Forum for Decisionmaking:

the Outlook for RTA

RTA has gone through and is still experiencing

many of the difficulties of organizing and operating

a new public institution. It is still too early to assess

~ During 1%’.s, the Governor has twice vetoed Chicago Mayor

Richard Daley’s nomination of a board member and chairmandesignate of the CTA. These are the only vetoes that have been

exercised by either the Mayor or the Governor since the

formation of CTA.

its effectiveness, but some comments can be made

on factors that are clearly evident.

The first and foremost issue involving RTA,

aside from legislative and legal challenges that

presumably have been settled, was the selection of

the chairman and its full-time executive leadership.

Immediately after the city and the suburban

jurisdictions named their respective sets of four

board members, the city members proposed the

selection of Milton Pikarsky as the chairman of

RTA. Pikarsky at the time was chairman of CTA

and previously had been Commissioner of the

Department of Public Works. He had long been

regarded as a strong, articulate, and effective leader

of city positions in regional, State, and national

transportation forums.

The strong advocacy of Pikarsky by the city RTA

board members delayed RTA for many months

while the suburban members either opposed his

selection or insisted on a wide-ranging recruitment

and interview program. In the end, Pikarksy was

selected and RTA is in the process of organizing and

initiating its program.

The city’s long and aggressive campaign for

Pikarsky’s selection as RTA chairman indicates that

it intends to exercise as strong a role as possible in

the new agency’s future policies and operations. It

is evident, however, that the city’s power over

regional transit policy has been diminished

significantly. The balanced composition of the RTA

board plus specific legislative requirements designed to protect suburban jurisdictions ensure that

transit policy and operations in the region will be

shared by many jurisdictions. On the other hand,

RTA’s broad authority and funding resources may

eventually make it a semi-independent force of

considerable strength in the region.

The creation of RTA does not settle some of the

region’s fundamental decisionmaking problems.

One such problem is that because authority and

responsibility for highways and streets remain

under the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois and

local cities and counties, RTA does not qualify

under U.S. Department of Transportation

guidelines for designation as the Metropolitan

Planning Organization. The Chicago region,

therefore, still faces the problem of selecting or

creating an institution that meets Federal

guidelines. Previously, the Governor made an

interim designation of CATS, but that designation

expired June 30, 1975, and no subsequent designation has been made. UMTA, on the other hand, still

38
recognizes the RTPB as the regional coordinating

agency for transit funds and programs.

Theoretically, the new Bi-State Transportation

Commission, described earlier in this report, could

become the designated MPO for both transit and

highway programs. But it also is destined to be

largely a paper organization because it has only

loosely defined authorities and responsibilities.

More importantly, it has no designated source of

funds and suffers the ignominity of being

specifically prevented from having any staff other

than an executive director, administrative support

staff, and two planners. The institutions that

continue to control highway funds as well as the

new RTA with its sources of transit funding, are

unlikely to willingly turn over authority for

developing programs, setting priorities, and

allocating funds to any agency in the absence of a

specific statutory directive.

More importantly, the creation of RTA does not

directly tackle the two biggest unresolved

transportation planning and development issues in

the Chicago region—namely, whether to implement the entire Central Area Plan and whether to

build the Crosstown Expressway. The new agency

represents a major step forward by providing the

mechanism and the financing, at least for the

immediate future, for the Chicago region to

provide stable and reasonably high quality regional

transit service on the existing system. However,

RTA does not resolve the problems of how

decisions will be made for the future development

of transit and highway facilities and services.

Accountability of Decisionmakers

In past years, most of the major decisions on

planning and developing new or extended transit

lines have been made by the city of Chicago

through its Department of Development and

Planning and Department of Public Works. Both

departments are headed by commissioners appointed by the Mayor. To the extent that CTA was

involved in technical support of the planning and

decisionmaking activities, its interests were

represented by the CTA chairman, who is appointed by the Mayor with the concurrence of the

Governor. But both in reality and in public

perception, the key transit decisionmaker in the

city of Chicago was its Mayor, who can be held

accountable by the public through the electoral

process.

Starting in 1971, other institutions have taken

significant decision making roles, and the planning

and decisionmaking process has become

progressively complex. The State of Illinois,

through the legislature, has been deeply involved in

Chicago transit activities, primarily through its

decisions to provide State financial assistance for

both capital investments and operating subsidies.

The State legislature also was the forum in which

myriad parties and institutions negotiated the

legislation creating RTA. The State, through its

Department of Transportation, has exercised

policy leadership and dominance of CATS planning

activities. As more organizations became involved

and the forum grew increasingly fragmented,

public accountability was significantly reduced.

The advent of RTA may restore direct and welldefined accountability, although the channels are

different from those of the past. The RTA board,

which has very broad and decisive authority over

the full spectrum of metropolitan area public

transportation, is made up of nine members. Four

are appointed by the Mayor of Chicago. Two are

appointed by elected members of the Cook County

Board outside Chicago, and two are appointed by

the chairmen of the county boards of the remaining

counties in the metropolitan area. The ninth

member (the chairman) is chosen by a majority of

the eight.

Thus, the board members of RTA, and particularly the chairman, are in highly visible

positions and are directly accountable to elected

public officials. More importantly, because RTA

has broad authority and responsibility with a

secure independent source of revenue, it is likely to

become the forum for much of the region’s transit

decisionmaking and thus once again focus public

attention on the decisionmakers who should be

held accountable.

Public Involvement

Public involvement and participation in transit

planning in the Chicago area has not been a

significant factor in the investment decisions that

have been made in the recent past. Until recently,

the transit planning institutions neither sought nor

made any systematic provision for interacting with

the public except through the long-established

practice of working with business and civic

improvement organizations.

The first preliminary steps toward organized and

systematic public involvement were made through

39
the television airing of the metropolitan area’s 1995

Transportation System Plan with the opportunity

for the general public to telephone comments or

questions or follow up in writing. Central Area

Project planners also have made some efforts to

meet with broader and more diverse groups than

the CBD business interests, whom they consulted

regularly during the planning activities.

Amendments to the legislation creating RTA call

for a broadly based metropolitan area transportation council to advise and counsel the RTA board

and its chairman. The 26-member council, which is

to be made up of persons appointed by locally

elected officiaIs, has the authority to hold public

hearings. Whether this will develop into a

mechanism for public participation in the planning

and decisionmaking activities of RTA is yet to be

established.

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The Chicago area has a long history of highly

competent and sophisticated transportation planning.

The area relies heavily on CATS for transportation analysis at the regional and systems level.

Transit operational planning and development is

the domain of CTA and is accomplished largely

through its own planning and engineering staff.

Major new capital construction projects, however,

almost always are accomplished through the use of

consultants under the tight management of the

city’s DDP and DPW.

Two major factors have influenced or are in the

process of influencing the technical planning

process in the Chicago area. The first is the

emergence of the State of Illinois, through its

Department of Transportation, as a major participant in the planning process. The second is the

creation of RTA,

IDOT, starting in 1973, has assumed control and

direction of CATS and its technical work program.

Subsequently, CATS has become much more active

in the transit portion of transportation planning

and has added significant new studies and other

activities to its work program. CATS’ new responsibilities brought additional sophistication and

competence to Chicago transit planning; the results

are reflected in the 1995 Transportation Plan

(developed and adopted in 1974), and the 5-year

transit development program.

RTA’s role in the technical planning process is yet

to be defined. The new agency of necessity will be a

major factor because it is the primary funding

source for all transit operators in the region, not

40
—

only for operating subsidies but also for most

capital improvements.

Goals and Objectives

The Chicago area for the first time developed an

explicit set of goals and objectives as part of its

effort to produce its 5-year mass transit development program as required by UMTA. The 5-year

program, prepared by the Regional Transportation

Planning Board (RTPB) in October 1974, set out in

two and one-half pages its set of goaIs and

objectives. The goals and objectives represent an

explicit statement of the factors that had been

guiding planning and decisionmaking in the past.

RTPB started with three broad and general goals:

economic growth; an attractive, healthful, and

convenient environment; and optimum use of

natural resources. Using these goals as a foundation, RTPB established five broad, functional goals

that led to four statements of objectives postulating

that the transportation system should meet

regional needs for moving people and goods, be

functionally viable, contain desirable amenities,

and promote positive environmental effects and

desirable regional growth.

Within this still general framework, RTPB

developed six investment policies with the explanation that consideration was divided into categories

of maintaining the existing system, improving the

system, and constructing new transit lines. RTPB’s

report states that some investment should be made

in each category consistent with the long-range

plan and some benefits from the program should be

received in every geographic region of the area.

The investment policies become moderately

specific only insofar as to give highest priority to

maintenance of the existing system. There also is

an implication that improving the existing system is

given second priority. The investment policies also

assigned high, medium, and low priorities for each

of the categories.

Development and Evaluation of Alternatives

The Chicago area, with its long history of

established commuter railroads, conventional rail

rapid transit, and bus service, has never undertaken

a full-scale evaluation of alternatives at an areawide

level, although planners have studied alternatives

for new lines or major capital projects. The primary

technical planning, analysis, and evaluation is

concentrated on maintaining and improving the

existing system.

Although this assessment has focused on new

transit lines and extensions, some of the most

significant improvements in Chicago’s transit

system are due to CTA’S competence in operations

management. Their success indicates that CTA’S

widespread reputation as an efficient transit

operations manager is well deserved.

CTA has successfully carried out two major

programs of rolling stock replacement for rail and

bus transit, and it expects within the next 2 or 3

years to replace the remaining stock of old or

rebuilt transit cars and buses. When that is

accomplished, and assuming a reasonably stable

flow of funds, CTA will be able to maintain a

regular cycle of equipment replacement.

CTA still has a large backlog of remodeling,

refurbishing, and other kinds of projects to

improve its fixed transportation facilities and

equipment, including rights-of-way and stations.

However, the completed projects already have

resulted in faster and more efficient operations. For

example, institution of skip-stop service on lines

with low passenger volumes led to major gains in

system speed and reduced passenger travel time.

Although lacking a four-track system, CTA

produced semiexpress service by scheduling certain

trains to stop at all stations while other trains

bypass light passenger stations, thus producing

faster travel speed for patrons.

CTA also has successfully rebuilt and modernized older transit rolling stock, in some instances

using components from phased-out streetcars in

order to obtain the highest operating efficiency at

relatively low cost. The rolling stock for the Skokie

Swift is an excellent example of CTA’S abilities to

modernize and adapt equipment for new and

changed uses.

The commuter railroads also have carried out

large equipment replacement programs, primarily

through Federal capital grant assistance to local

transit districts.

In fact, more than half the capital funds invested

in the Chicago area in recent years have been

expended for maintaining and improving the

existing system as distinct from building new or

extended lines. The region’s present 5-year

development program continues to place high

priority on existing system maintenance and

improvement. Plans for the development of new or

extended transit lines, however, will dominate the

amount of capital funds needed in future years,

41
particularly if the

as recommended.

Central Area Plan is carried out

The 5-year program gives the Central Area

Project and the extension of the Kennedy Line to

O’Hare Airport top priority among new or

extended lines.

The O’Hare extension, which as a practical

matter is likely to be started before any other major

new project, was the subject of a technical study by

a consultant under the direction and supervision of

the DPW in 1973. The consultant made a

preliminary evaluation of a busway to connect the

Jefferson Park Station (the present outer terminus

of the Kennedy Line) with O’Hare and rejected

further consideration because of the lack of

adequate highway space. The consultant also

rejected, after preliminary analysis, consideration

of a dual-mode highway-rail system because of

technological problems. All other alternatives

studied involved variations in Chicago’s standard

rail transit system. The fact that the O’Hare

extension would utilize the median of the Kennedy

Expressway up to the edge of the airport property

meant that all alternatives to the project provided

service connections into the Loop and the CBD.

The study made extensive use of travel and

demand data from previous studies, including

much of the travel forecasting and analysis done by

CATS. The study made a basic assumption, based

on an earlier airport study, that O’Hare would

experience about a 100 percent increase in airline

passengers from 1969 to 1985. This figure

represented about a 50 percent increase over

passenger levels at the time of the study, in 1973.

All the alternatives carried fully through the

study process were systematically analyzed and

evaluated against a specified and documented list of

both quantitative and qualitative criteria. The

study did not include extensive preliminary

engineering although some sketch planning and

engineering evaluation was necessary in order to

develop preliminary cost estimates. The

recommended alternative, while clearly not

providing the highest level of service, had the

highest benefit-cost ratio.

An analysis of the consultant’s report indicates

that the study was carried out systematically, all

relevant factors were fully and fairly analyzed, and

each alternative was evaluated against a

documented set of criteria. The recommended

alternative not only had the highest benefit-cost

42

ratio but also was the least costly of the alternatives

considered.

The Central Area Plan, while clearly much more

complex than the relatively simple airport extension study, was conducted in a very different way.

The study examined alternatives and then officially

reanalyzed the plan in two succeeding study efforts

plus some additional less intensive reexaminations.

Both the original planning study and the studies

that reaffirmed the original decision were based

upon Chicago’s goal of eliminating the elevated

transit loop and maximizing the opportunity for

continued growth and development of the central

business district, including lakefront development

to the north and south. As a result, the Loop

replacement, the Monroe Street distributor, the

extension to the Circle Campus, and the extensions

north and south to serve the growing lakefront

areas were designed to enhance economic growth.

Whether the plan is justified on the basis of

measurable criteria has never been demonstrated.

It appears likely that the selection of projects for the

plan grew out of judgmental assessments about

how best to hold and increase central business

district investment, jobs, and economic activity.

The same or similar criteria used in the O’Hare

extension study would not have justified the more

than $1.6 billion cost of the Central Area Plan.

From the standpoint of pure transportation

economics, the plan is exceedingly expensive. But

taken in the context of the city’s goals for central

business district development and redevelopment,

the plan obviously is desirable. The application now

pending before UMTA for the first allocation of

capital construction funds for the project obviously

will be a major test of what UMTA means by its

new policy of cost-effectiveness evaluation.

Financing and Implementation

TABLE 2.—Federal Assistance to Chicago Transit

Programs From F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975

Type of assistance Federal share Total costs

Capital Grants . . . . . . . . . . . $351,660,000 $612,237,000

Capital Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,500,000 7,500,000

Technical Studies . . . . . . . . 11,663,000 16,992,000

TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370,823,000 636,729,000

Source: Urban Mass Transportation Administration.
The 5-year transit improvement program

recommended by RTPB not only is completely

dependent upon Federal funds, but is dependent on

Chicago’s receiving more than twice the present

annual average level of funding from Federal

sources. ” Thus, the recommended 5-year plan can

be used to justify requests to Congress for

substantial increases in Federal funds for transit

improvement and development.

The recommended 5-year development program

for all categories totals $2,297,674,000; this is far

more money than can be supplied from existing and

presently projected sources of operating and capital

revenues. The program contains all high priority

maintenance and improvement projects and contains some projects from the medium priority lists

for both maintenance and improvement. The

largest share of the funds, $1,431,300,000 would be

allocated to new transit lines, with $1,255,800,000

for the Central Area Project, $174,300,000 to build

the O’Hare Airport extension, and $1,200,000 for

the Archer Avenue Subway.

The 5-year plan makes it clear that the Chicago

metropolitan area does not expect any difficulty in

raising the local share of funds from a variety of

sources, but the plan assumes that revenues from

the State or metropolitan area will be needed only

to pay 20 percent of the total costs; the remainder is

to be paid by Federal funds.

Depending upon the level of funding necessary

to subsidize transit operations, it is clear that RTA,

from its own revenue sources as well as additional

funds from other identifiable sources, can match all

presently projected Federal funds as well as very

large increases in the Federal program. RTA could

not, however, take over the responsibility of

financing a large share of the recommended

program with 100 percent local funds. Thus, the

Chicago area financial plan rests squarely upon the

Q [n fiscal year 197.5 Chicago received about $11.5 million,

which is not much more than the projected annual average for

the area under current total Federal funds levels. Table 2 shows

Federal transit grants to Chicago area transit programs from

1Q62 through spring 1975.

continued availability y of Federal funds in

significantly increasing amounts.

The 5-year development program also identifies

a “low funding alternative” that is within

reasonable limits of the total the Chicago area can

expect to receive under the existing Federal transit

program. However, the program states that the

low funding level would result in such a condition i!

. . . that RTA and other agencies will not—

cannot—fulfill many of the obligations to modify

and improve the region’s public transit system. ”

Under this alternative, the 5-year plan says it would

concentrate its resources on meeting all high and

medium priority projects for maintenance and

improvements, leaving a total of only $296 million

for new lines. Obviously, the Chicago area could

not make much of a start on its high priority

Central Area Project within the next 5 years given

such a level of funding.

Thus, in the final analysis, the success or failure

of the Central Area Plan as recommended will rest

on the availability of Federal funds.

This financial condition places increased

emphasis on the controversy over the Crosstown

Expressway because of the interstate transfer

provision of the Highway Act of 1973, as discussed

briefly earlier in this report. The Crosstown

highway project is estimated to cost well over $1

billion. The provision of the Highway Act, which

permits elimination of a highway project and the

substitution of transit projects, has created a

serious policy dilemma for the city of Chicago. At

this time, the city chooses to build both the

Crosstown Expressway and the Central Area Plan,

notwithstanding the State’s open campaign to kill

the highway project and use the funds for transit.

The State takes the position that the Crosstown

Expressway should not be built under any circumstances and has pledged to prevent its construction.

Meanwhile, the estimated cost of the Central

Area Project has jumped from less than $5O O

million in 1968 to more than $1.6 billion at the

present. It is apparent that unless Congress

authorizes a significant increase in UMTA’S

budget, it is highly unlikely that Chicago will obtain

sufficient UMTA capital grants to carry out the

project.

43
——.

The purpose of this section is to summarize the

transit planning and decisionmaking process in the

Chicago region in light of the guidelines listed in

the Introduction to the case assessments. The

summary, therefore, is divided into two parts: (1)

Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2)

Assessment of the Technical Planning Process.

1. Assessment Of The

Institutional Context

c Forum for Decisionmaking.—The city of

Chicago dominated transit planning and

decisionmaking until the need to broaden

the base for tax revenue for metropolitan

transit led to creation of the Regional

Transit Authority. RTA, because it has

independent t sources of tax revenue, is

likely to become a strong regional institution. However, the creation of RTA does

not resolve the problem of selecting or

creating a metropolitan organization with

responsibility for both highway and transit

planning.

● Accountability of Decisionmakers.—

Accountability to the public for transit

planning and decisionmaking has become

increasingly diffused in the past 5 years as

more agencies became involved in making

decisions, The creation of RTA, with board

members appointed by local elected offiSummary Case Assessment

●

cials, may restore accountability by focusing public attention on the decisionmakers

that should be held accountable.

Public Involvement.—Public participation

in the planning and decision process was

not systematically undertaken in the past,

and whether RTA will develop a structured

program of citizen interaction remains to

be seen.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THE

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

●

●

●

Goals and Objectives.—The 5-year transit

development program published by the

Regional Transportation Planning Board in

1974 developed a set of goals and objectives

that permitted setting priorities among

area transit projects.

Development and Evaluation of

Alternatives.—The Chicago area has

never undertaken a full-scale evaluation of

alternatives at an areawide level, and

primary technical planning, analysis, and

evaluation is concentrated on maintaining

and improving the existing system.

Financing and Implementation.—The

Chicago area’s plans for transit development are heavily dependent on obtaining

Federal funding in amounts significantly

above the level of the present program.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 0-67-739 45