### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs S ep te m be r 9, 200 8

STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . DARNELL HUBB ARD

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 06-08051 Lee V. Coff ee, Judge

No. W2007-02482-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed Augu st 20, 2009

A S helby County Criminal Court J ury convicted the appellant, Darne ll Hubbar d, of the fir st-deg ree preme ditated murder

of his wife, and he was sentenc ed to life without the possibilit y of par ole. On appea l, the appellant c ontends that the trial cour t erre d by admitting evide nce of

his prior ac ts of vio le nc e a g a ins t th e vic tim . H e a lso c hall eng e s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on of e vid e nc e re la tin g to

an e x part e or de r o f p ro te c tio n th a t th e vic timob ta ine d a g a ins t hi m and oth e r state me nts the vic tim

ma de to he r so n a

nd po lic e

. We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti nghe ars ay

state me nts from t h e victim in viol ation of the a ppellant’s conf

rontation rig hts. Howeve r, in light of the

ov e rw he lmi nge vid e nc e of the a pp e lla nt’ s g uil t, the e rr or s we re ha rm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the a ppellant’s convic tion.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt is Affi rm ed.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. G L EN N and C A M I LLE R. M C M UL L EN , J J ., joined.

J ames Ha le, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Dar

nell Hubbar d.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., At

tor ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; Ra c he l E . Wil lis , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Genera l; and Amy

Weirich, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

I n the ea rly morning hours of June 12, 2006, the appellant st ab b ed L ex i e Hubba rd twelve times, kill ing he r. At trial, the victim’s fifte en-y ear -old daug hter, As h ley J ones, testified that she

arr ived home ar ound midnight and sa w her eleve n-y ea r- o l d brother a nd the victim watching-2-

te le vis ion tog e the r i n th e din ing ro om. Th e vic tim ’s so n an d an oth e r da ug hte r we re a sle e p in

the ir bedrooms, and the appellant, “ Ricky ,” wa s in the victim’s bedroom. J ones we nt to b ed. She wa s
awakened by

a cr ashing sound, and she hear d the vi ctim say , “No, Ricky , no. Don’t do it; don’t do it.”

J ones rushe d to her mother’ s bedroom and saw t he appellant pull a nine-inch knife out of the victim’s chest while the vic tim was “slouched” over on the floor. J ones y elled for her olde r brother
, Demar lon Davis, and told him th e ap p el l ant had stabbed their mother. Jones ran to the kitche n, obtained two knives, a

nd g ave the m to Davis. The appellant emer g ed from the bedroom; swung the kn if e he had used

to s ta b th e vic tima t Jone s, Da

vis , a nd oth e rs in t

he ho us e ; and

or de re d th e m to move. Duringthe conf

rontation, the vi ctim moved i nto J ones’ bedroom and locke d the door. The appellant g rabbe d the victim’s ke y s and ran outside, and Davis chased him. Jones init ially ran a fter Da vis and the app ell ant bu t r e tur

ne d to the ho us e be c a

us e sh e wa s c on c e rn e d a bo ut t he vic tim

. Be fore para

medics ar rived, the vic tim was breathing ha rd and was i n and out of consciousness. A firef ighte r at the sc ene inf

ormed Jones that the victim had died.

J ones testified that the victim wanted a di vorce from the appellant so that she could mar ry
someone e lse. Thre e day s befor e the stabbing , the appe llant called a nd left messag es on the victim’s cellular telephone. T he victim let J ones l isten to one of the m essag es i n which the appellant, in an ang ry voice, threatened to kill the victim. J ones said that the appellant had threatened to “g et” he r and her mother in t h e past. She said that the appe llant often threatened a nd tried to fig ht with the vic timwh e n Jon e s’ br oth e rs we re no t aro un d but that whe n the vic tim ’s so ns we re pr e se nt i t “ wo uld be a pe ace ful day .” J ones recalled that the vi ctim called the police a f ew da y s befor e the stabbing beca use t he appellant was try ing to g et i nto their hom e. The poli ce came but told the vi ctim that the appellant wa s allowed in the house be cause they wer e mar ried.

J ones said that she occa sionally clea ned her mother’s room and that a few times she found a lar g e knife from the kitche n knife set tucke d under the mattress on the appellant’s side of the be d. The knife the appellant used to kill the victim wa s one of the knives. J ones remove d the knives she found in the victim’s bedroom and hid them elsewhe re be cause she wa s worrie d that the appe llant was g oing to kill the victim.

J ones testified that a couple of y ear s befor e the victim’s death, she saw the a ppellant threaten to kill the victim wit h a knife . On that occ asion, the appe llant waited until ever y one in the house w as aslee p. J ones aw oke to see the appe llant standing ove r the victim wi t h a k n i fe in his hand. The appellant t h re atened to kill t he victim, but the victim and her c hildren convinc ed him to leave i n s t ea d

. J o n es al s o re ca l l ed an o t h er i n s t an ce wh en s h e s aw t h e ap p el l an tp u n ch t h e v i ct i m , “b u s t i n g” her lip.

The victim’s son, Dema rlon Davis, testified that o n t h e n i g ht of the stabbing he hea rd the

a pp e lla nt ur g ing the vic tim to g o to bed

. He a lso he ard the a pp e lla nt te ll the vic timthat if

he c ou ld not have he r, nobody

would. The victim told Davis that the appe llant thr eate ned to kill her a nd that she did not fee l rig ht with the appellant in t he house. Davis offere d to forc e the appellant to leave,-3-

but the victim de clined and said that she wa s g oing to slee p. Davis we nt to bed and wa s awakened by his sis te r’ s sc re a ms. Da

vis sa id t hat up on he ari ng the sc re a ms, he “ ra n do wn tow ard lik e in [h is] momma’s room and [his] momma’s whole g own was soakin g wet with nothing but blood.” T he victim told hi m that she was “ fix ing to die” and that the appellant had stabbed he r “a whole lot of times.” Davis sawthe appe llant come out of the vic tim’s bedroom with a knife. T he appe llant was

“ sw ing ing ” the kn if

e a t D a vis and

his da ug hte r. Af

te rw ard , th e a

pp e lla nt r an fr om the ho us e . D a vis chase d the appe llant until t he appe llant was appr ehende d by police.

Dr. B ruce L evy , the Chief Medic al Examiner for the State of Tenne ssee, de scribed the victim’s multi ple s tab wounds. He said that the vi ctim had twelve sharp f orce injuries. Ten wounds

we re de sc ri be d a s “ ma

jor sta b w ound s, ” and on e pie rc e d the ri g ht v e ntr ic le of the he art . T he vic tim ble d to de a th a s th e re su lt o f t he inj ur ie s.

Th e vic tim ’s sis te r, L e sli e Ad a ms, te sti fi e d a b o ut t he a pp e lla nt’ s r e la tio ns hip wi th t

he vic tim

. She sa id t hat th e vic tima nd

the a pp ell ant fou gh t f

re qu e ntl y and of te n li ve d a

pa rt . A c c or din g to Adams, the victim moved to the home wher e she was living at the time of her de ath in order to ge t

awa y from the a

ppellant. When the victim lived at her previous residenc e, she asked A dams to stay wi th h e r at ti me s w he n th e a pp e lla nt w a s at th e re sid e nc e be c a us e sh e was afrai d o f h im. Ad a ms
ne ve r saw the a

pp e lla nt hit the vic tim
, bu t, on on e oc c a sio n, sh e sa w him tr y to sta b he r. She sa id that on that occa sion, the victim and appellant were arguing over something petty and the a ppellant tried to sta

b the victim with a long kitchen knife. Adams said that she jumped betwe en the a ppellant and the victim to preve nt the stabbing

.
Ad a ms a lso te sti fi e d r e g ard ingan a lte rc a tio n inv olv ing the a pp e lla nt and the vic tim a t th e ir place of employ

ment. Adams said the a

ppellant had “ whupped” the victim with a chair and poure d bleac h on her. A dams said that af ter the alterc ation, the vi ctim left work and we nt to Adams’ home. The victim was on he r way to “pre ss char g es” a g ainst the appe llant. The victim was ver y upset and

was c rying. T he victim told Adams that “that n--- --, well,

. . . y ou know, said in a violent way that he had done whupped on he r jaw.” Adams said that the a ppellant had knoc ked the victim’s tee th out and that she w as “a ll br

uised up.” The victim wa s “shake n” and said that she could not be lieve that the appellant “flipped” and “did this.” Adams had hear d the appellant threaten the v i ct i m many tim e s a nd ha d h e ard

him te ll h e r t hat if he c ou ld n ot h a ve he r, no bo dy wo uld . T he vic timtol d Adams that the only

way the appe llant would “g et” he r would be in he r sleep.

Debor a Coffma

n, a counse lor with the Shelby County Citi zen’s Di s p ute , te s ti f

ie d th a t she met with the victim on November 9, 2005, and helped the victim a pply for an ex par

te order of protec tion ag ainst the appellant. The victim told C offman that she was a fra id of the appe llant beca use he ha d t h re at en ed t o “ge t ” he r an d b ec au s e he h ad s t ru ck h er wi t h a c h ai r a n d h i s fi s ti nt h e p as t

. Al t h o u gh

an e x part e or de r o f p ro te c tio n w a s is su e d, the c a se wa s d ism iss e d a c ou ple of we e ks la te r b e c a

us e
n ei t h er p ar t y s h o we d u p fo r t h e c o u rt h ea ri n g.
Memphis Poli ce D epar

tment Serg eant D e gr a

h B ell testified that she investig ated the vic tim’s domestic violence complaints ag ainst the appe llant. I n April 2002, the victi m fi l l ed out a police-4-

re p o rt , al l egi n g t h at t h e ap p el l an th adat t ac k edh er wi t h a m et al ch ai r w h i l e s h e w as wo rk i n g. Serg eant B ell met with the victim. The victim was af raid a nd told Serg eant B ell that the appe llant had attacked her because she had refused to g ive hi m a ride home. Afte r a pr osecutor de termined that there was proba

ble ca use, Serg eant B ell prepa

red a war rant for ag g ravated assault ag ainst the appellant. In 2004, Serg eant B ell spoke with the victim by telephone to investig ate a nother police repor t the victim had filed ag ainst the appellant alleg ing domestic violence. The victim told S erg eant B e ll that th e a

pp e lla nt atta c ke d h e r p hy sic a lly and thr e a te ne d to kil l he r w itha kn if e and som e bleac h. The victim said that no further action was neede d on the police r eport be cause the appe llant had moved out of the home and she felt saf e.

II. Ana lys is

On appe al, the appe llant argues that t he trial court improper ly admitted evidenc e of his prior ba d a c ts i n v iolati on of Tenne sse e Rul e of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) and

that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d w he n it allowed the state to introduc e hear say evidenc e of state ments the victim made about the a ppellant in violation of his confrontation rig hts. The appellant does not dispute that he is responsible for the vic tim ’s de a th, bu t he argue s that the tr ia l c ourt ’s e rr or s in a dmi tti ngthe e vid e nc e of his pr ior a c ts of violence and thre ats ag ainst the victim improperly inflamed the jury

when it consider ed whe ther the homicide wa s first or sec ond deg ree murder.

A. Rul e 40 4( b)

Wit h respe ct to Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 404(b), the a ppellant cha lleng es the trial c ourt’s admission of Ashley

J ones’ testimony

that she found knives hid d en i n the victim’s bedroom, he r testimony reg arding the prior incident when she saw the appellant threaten the victim with a knife
, and her testimony

that she saw the appellant “ punch” the victim. He also conte nds that the trial cour t

err ed by allowing L eslie Adams to testify that she had se en him threaten the victim with a knife on a previous occa sion and that Adams shoul d not have be en allowe d to testify about the injuries the appellant inflicte d upon the victim at work.

Gene rally , a par

ty may not introduce e vidence of an individual’s c h ar acter or a particula r char acte r trait in orde r to prove that the individual a cted in c onformity with that char acte r or tra it at

a c e rt a in t ime . T e nn . R. Ev id. 40 4( a ). I n o the r w or ds , a pa rt y may no t u se c ha

ra c te r e vid e nc e to show that a pe rson ac ted in a par ticular w ay b ecause he or she ha d a prope nsity to do so. St ate v. Moore, 6 S.W.3d 235, 239 (T en n

. 1999); State v. Parton, 694 S.W.2d 299, 304 (Tenn. 1985) (obser ving that evidence of anothe r crime is not admissi ble to show that the def endant is the kind of per son who would tend t o commit the offense ); State v. Tizard, 897 S.W .2d 732, 743 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (noting that char acte r evide nce m ay n o t be used to show pr opensity to act). Simi larly , evidenc e “of

other c rimes, wr o n gs , o r ac ts is not admis sible to prove the c hara cter of a person in orde r to show ac tion in conformity with the char acte r trait.” T enn. R. Evid. 404(b).

Ho wever, such e vidence may be admitted for

other purpose s if rele vant to some matter

a c tua lly a t is su e in t

he c a se and

if its pr ob a tiv e va lue is n ot o utw e ig he d by the d ang e r o f i ts-5-

prejudicia l effe ct. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); S tate v. Wy rick, 62 S.W .3d 751, 771 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). I ssues to which such e vidence may be re levant include ide ntity , motive, common scheme or plan, intent
, o r t h e rebuttal of acc ident or mistake def enses. Te nn. R. Evid. 404(b), Advisory Com m’ n Cmts .; Part on , 69 4 S.W. 2d a t 30 2. Ad mis sib ili ty of oth e r c ri me s, wr on g s, or a c ts i s a lso

co n t i n gen tu

p o nt h e t ri al co u rt fi n d i n g b y cl ea r an d co n v i n ci n g ev i d en ce t h at t h e p ri o r c ri m e, wr o n g, or act wa s ac t u all y

committed. Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b); Wy rick, 62 S.W.3d at 771. The jury may consider e vidence admitted under 404( b) as substantive e vidence at trial. Wy rick, 62 S.W .3d at 771.

Be fore the tri al co u rt may permit evidenc e of a

prior cr ime, wrong , or ac t, the following pr oc e dure s mu st b e me t:

(1) The court upon reque st must hold a hear ing outside the j u ry ’s prese nce;
(2) The court must deter m i n e that a material issue e x ists other than

c on du c t c on fo rm ingwi th a ch ara c te r t ra it a nd mus t up on

re qu e st s ta te on the r ecord the mater ial issue, the ruling and the r easons f or admitting the e vidence ;
(3) The court must find proof of the ot her c rime, wrong , or ac t to be clea r and c onvincing ; and
(4 ) Th e c ourt mus t e xclu de the e vid e nc e if its pr ob a tiv e val ue is outweig hed by

the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice.
Tenn. R. Evid. 404(b). Provided that the trial court has complied with the se proce dures, this court will not overturn the trial c ourt’s dec ision to adm i t or exclude evide nce unde r Rule 404(b) a bsent an abuse of discre tion. St ate v. DuB ose, 953 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tenn. 1997).

1. As hle y J one s’ Te st im ony

The a ppellant contends that the trial court erre d in allowing Ashley J ones’ testim ony about fi nd ing kn ive s in the vic tim ’s be dr oo m and he r t e sti mony

that sh e wi tne sse d p ri or

thr e a ts a nd a c ts of violence the appe llant committed ag ainst the victim. I nitially , we note that the appe llant failed to raise a ny issue with respec t to Ashley J ones’ testimony in his motion for new tria l. Rule 3(e) of the Tenne ssee Rules of A ppellate Proc edure specific ally provides that

in all case s tried b y a j u ry , no issue prese nted for r eview sha ll be predic ated upon err or i n the admis sion or exclusion of evidenc e, . . . or other a ction committed or occur ring during the t rial of the case, .

. . un le ss t he same wa s sp e c if

ic a lly state d in

a mot ion fo r a ne w tri a l; otherwise suc h issues will be treate d as wa ived.E ff e c tive J u ly 1 , 2 0 0 9 , R u le 5 2 (b ) o f t h e T e n n e sse e R u le s o f C rim ina l P ro c e d u re w a s d e le te d in its 1

e n tire ty, a n d the p la in e rr o r la n g u a g e w a s a d d e d to R u le 3 6 (b ) o f t h e T e n n e sse e R u le s o f A p p e llate P ro c e d u re

. Se e T enn. R

. A p p

. P

. 36 (b) and T enn. R

. C ri m

. P

. 52 , A d vi sory C o m m ’ n C m t s. (20 0 9 ).

-6- Acc ording ly , the appe llant has waive d these issues.

We further

conclude that the appe llant is not entitled to plain err or re lief with respe ct to the admission of the testimony of Ashley

J ones. See Te nn. R. App. P

. 36(b). “When necessar y to do

su bs tanti a l ju sti c e ,” thi s c ourt may a dd re ss a n “ e rr or that ha s a ff

e c te d th e su

bs tanti a l r ig hts of

a pa rt y at any time, even though the err or was not raised in the m otion for a ne w trial . . . .” I d. For an issue to b e c on sid e re d p la in e rr or , e a c h o f t he fo llo wi ngfi ve fa c tor s mu st b e me t:
(a ) t he re c or d mu st c le arl y e sta bli shwh a t oc c ur

re d in the tr ia l c ourt ; (b) a clea r and unequivocal rule of law must have been br eac hed; (c ) a substantial rig ht of t he ac cused must have been a dverse ly aff ecte d; (d) the a ccuse d did n o t wa i v e the issue f or tac tical re asons; and (e ) consideration of the err or is “nec essar y to do substantial just ice.”

State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 6 4 1 -4 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Tenn. R. Crim. P 52(b) ) (f ootnotes omitt ed); see also State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 283 (Tenn. 2000) (adopting the 1 Adkisson test for dete rmining pla in error ). F urthermor e, the “ ‘plain error’ must be of such a g reat mag nitude that it probably chang ed the outcome of the trial.” Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642 (quoting United States v. Ker ley , 838 F.2d 932, 937 ( 7th Cir. 1988)).

The rec ord ref

lects that the trial court held a jury -out hear ing in c ompliance with Te nnessee Rul e of Ev ide nc e 40 4( b) be fo re a dmi tti ngJone s’ te sti mony

. Th e tr ia l c ourt c on c lud e d th a t Jone s’ testimony conce rning the knives Jones found hidden on the appe llant’s side of t h e bed and her testimony about the ac ts of violence a nd threats she witnessed we re a dmissibl e to show pr e me dit a tio n a

nd int e nt, la c k of a c c ide nt or mis take , mo tiv e , a nd a c omp le te pic tur e of

the e ve nts surrounding the killing. The trial court f urther c oncluded that the pr obative value of t he testimony

wa s n ot o utw e ig he d b y

any da ng e r o f u nf a ir pr e jud ic e . We a g re e wi th t

he tr ia l c ourt ’s a sse ssm e nt. Th e a dmi ssi on of Jone s’ te sti mony did no t br e a c h a c le ar and un e qu ivo c a l ru le of law that a dv e rs e ly aff ecte d a substantial rig ht of the appe llant; ther efor e, the appellant is not entitled to pla in error relief

.

2. Le sli e Ada m s’ Te st im ony
Next, the appellant contends that the trial court e rre d by allowing L eslie Adams’ testimony about the prior incident when the appellant attempted to stab the victim with a knife. He re a g ain, the re cord r efle cts that the t rial court complied wit h the procedura l require ments of Rule 404(b). A t the conclusion of the jury -out hear ing, the trial court ruled that Adams’ testimony was cle ar and

c on vin c inge vid e nc e of

the pr ior inc ide nt a

nd that th e te sti mony

wa s a dm is si bl e to sh ow“ int e nt, kn ow le dg e , p re me dit a tio n,

. . . moti ve ” and to s ho w the “ c omp le te sto ry” of vio le nc e and

ho sti lity-7-

that led to the killing. The tria l court did not abuse its discre tion when it admitted the testimony for the state d p ur

po se s.

I n h is a pp ell ate br ie f, the a

pp e lla nt a lso c ha lle ng e s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on of Ad a ms’ te sti mony a bo ut i nju ri e s th e vic timtol d h e r s he re c e ive d a s th e re su lt o f t he a pp e lla nt hit tin g he r w ith a chai r at work. The appellant ha s waived the issue by failing to include it in his m otion for new trial. Tenn. R. A

pp. P. 3( e). Moreove r, we note that the appellant is not entitled to plain err or re lief

on the iss ue . T he re c or d s up po rt s th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inati on th at the vic tim ’s state me nts to Adams following the attac k wer e excited uttera nces unde r Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 803(2).

B. Hearsay and Conf

rontation

Ne xt, th e a

pp e lla nt co nte nd s tha t the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y a llo wi ngint o e vid e nc e state me nts the victim made to Debor a Coffma n, Demar lon Davis, and Serg eant De g rah B ell. He c ontends that the admission of the statements violated he arsa y rules and his c onstitut ional ri g ht to confront the witnesses ag ainst him. He argues that the trial court err oneously relied on State v. Ivy , 188 S.W .3d 13 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 6)
, and

the fo rf e iture by wr on g do inghe ars ay

e xce pti on

be c a us e the re is n o p ro of

in t h e rec ord that he killed the vic tim to procure he r unava ilability as a w itness. The State conc edes that admission of the hea rsay evidenc e wa s err or but contends that the err or was ha rmless bey ond

a re asonable doubt.

Hea rsay is defined a s “a state ment, other than one made by the dec lara

nt while testify ing at the trial or he aring , offe red in e vidence to prove the t ruth of the matter asser ted.” Te nn. R. Evid. 801(c) . Gene rally , hear say statements are inadmissible unless they fall under one of the re cog nized except io n s to th e h e ar s ay r u le

. T e n n

. R. E v id

. 8 0 2

. T h e “ f o r f e it u r e b y w r o n g d o in g ” exception allows the admission of a hear say statement “ag ainst a party that has eng ag ed in wrong doing that was intended to and did proc ure the unavaila b i l i t y of the de clar ant as a

witness.” Te nn. R. Evid. 804(b)( 6). “Eve n intentional misconduct, such as killing a witness, does not qua lify

unless done for the purpose of

procur ing the witness’s u n av ail ability .” Ne il P. C ohen et a l., Tennesse e L aw of E v id e n c e § 8

. 3 9 [2 ][c ] ( LEXIS publishi n g , 5 t h ed. 2005 ). I n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r h e ars a y is

a dmi ssi ble un der the ru le , th e tr ia l c ourt mus t c on du c t a

jur y -o ut h e ari ngand

“ fi nd that a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e esta blishes 1) that the def

endant wa s involved in or responsible f or pr oc ur ing the un a va ila

bil ity of the de c lara

nt; and 2) that a de fe nd ant’ s a c tio ns we re int e nd e d, a t le a st i np art , t o p r o c u r e t h e a

b s e n c e o f t h e d e c l ar an t

. ” Iv y, 1 8 8 S

. W

. 3 d a t1 4 7

. F o r

t h e e x c e p t i o nt o a

p p l y, the re mus t be “ a

sh ow ingtha

t a de fe nd ant’ s a c tio ns we re int e nd e d, a t least i n p art , to pr e ve nt a witness from testifying.” State v. Br ooks, 249 S.W .3d 323, 325 (Tenn. 2008)

.
Th e fo rf e iture by wr on g do inge xce pti on

to a n a c c us e d’ s c on fr on ta tio n r ig hts un de r t he Sixth Amendment to the Uni t ed States Consti tution li kewise r equire s a showing that the def endant

“ e ng a g e d in c on du c t designed to p re ve nt t he wi tne ss f

ro m te sti fy

ing .” Gi le s v . Ca lif

or nia , _

__ U. S. ___, 128 S. Ct . 2678, 2683 (2008) ( emphasis in orig inal). The Six th Amendment to the Constituti on pr ov ide s th a t “ in a ll c ri min a l pr os e c uti on s, the a c c us e d s ha ll e njo y the ri g ht . . . to b e c on fr on te d w ith the witnesses a g ainst him.” I n addition, article I , section 9 of the Tenne ssee Constit ution provides-8-

that “in all cr iminal prosecutions, the ac cused ha s the rig ht to . . . meet the witnesses fa ce to f ace .”

“ Al tho ug h th e langua g e of the fe de ra l and

state c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s is so me wh a t di ff e re nt, in de te rm ini ngthe ri g hts of

an a c c us e d un de r art ic le I , se c tio n 9, [Te nn e sse e c ourt s] ha ve tr a dit ion a lly adopted a nd ap p l i ed t h e standa

rds enunc iated by

the United States Supreme Court.” State v. Cannon, 254 S.W .3d 287, 301 (Tenn. 2008) ; se e also State v. L ewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 144 (Tenn. 2007).

I n Crawf

ord v. W as h i n gton, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S. C t. 1354 (2004), the Supre me Court analy zed the Six th A mendment rig ht to confrontation and dr ew a distinction between the a dmission of testimonial and nontestimonial hearsa y . The Court expl a in e d

th a t t h e a d mission of nontestim onial hear say is ex empt from Confrontation Cl ause sc rutiny ; however
, the “Si x th Amendment dema nds . . . unavailability

and a pr ior opportunity

for c ross-examination” for the admission of test i m onial he ars ay . 5 41 U. S. at 68 , 1 24 S. Ct . at 13 74 . A lth ou g h th e Court decl in e d to de fi ne “ te sti mon ia l”

c omp r e h e n s i v e l y , i t e xp l a i n e d t h a t t h e t e r m “ a p p l i e s a t a m i n i m um t o p r i o r t e s t i m o n y

. . . a ndto police interr og ations.” I d. Since Crawf ord, the Court has c larified that s t atements to pol ice a re nontestimonial when “the pr imary purpose of

the interrog ation is to enable poli ce assistance to mee t an ong oing e merg ency

. ” Davis v. W ashing ton, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S. C t. 2266, 2273 (2006). Howeve r, statements made in the c ourse of police interr og ations under c ircumstance s indicating that there is no ongoingemer g ency and “that the prim ary purpose of the interrog ation is to establish or pr ov e pa st e ve nts po te nti a lly re le va nt t o late r c ri min a l pr os e c uti on ” are te sti mon ia l. D a vis , 5 47 U. S. at 822, 126 S. Ct. at 2274; see also Cannon, 254 S.W.3d at 302.

The Cra wford c ourt al s o a c k

n o w le d g e d

th e f o r f e it u r e by wrong doing doc trine as a

n exception to an ac cused’ s confr ontation rig hts. The cour t expl ained that “ [t ]he rule of for feiture by wrong doing (which w e acc ept) exti ng uishes confr ontation claims on essentially equitable g rounds.” Cra

wford, 541 U.S. at 62, 124 S. Ct. at 1370. I n other wor ds, “if a w itness is absent by [t he def endant’ s] own wrong ful procur ement, he c annot complain if competent evidenc e is admitted to supply the place of that which he ha s kept awa y .” Rey nolds v. United S tates, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879). “ The rule has its foundation in the maxi m that no one shall be permitted to take advanta g e of his own wrong .” I d. at 159.

The Court fur

ther e x plained the fo rf

ei t u re by wrong doing e x ception to the rig ht of

c o n f r o n tati o n in G il e s v

. Ca li f o r n ia
,

_ _ _ U

. S.

_ _ _ , 1 2 8 S. Ct

. 2 6 7 8 , 2 6 8 3 ( 2 0 0 8 )

. T h r e e wee ks befor e the de fenda

nt shot her to death, the vic tim in Gil es co m p l ai n ed t o police that Giles ha d choked a nd threatened to kill her. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2681-82. The pr osecution introduce d evidenc e of the prior domestic violenc e re port in the murder trial to rebut Giles’ c ontention that he shot the victim in self-defe nse. I d. Wit hout consideringwhether Giles intended to pre vent the victim from testify ing, the trial court a nd California a

ppellate c ourts held t hat admission of the testimony was prope r under

both a state lawhear say exception and under

the forf eit u re by wrong doing e x ception to the Confrontat i o n C lause. The Supreme Court re jected the state cour

t analy sis and held that the for feiture by wrong doing e x ception to the Confrontation Clause re quires a showing that the def

endant intended to preve nt the unavailable witness from testifying. I d. at 2682.-9-

I n rea ching its decision, the Giles court provided some g uidance with respec t to the ty pes of evid en ce that may

be ava ilable to establish a def endant’ s intent to prevent testimony in case s inv olv ingdo me sti c vio le nc e . T he c ourt e xpla ine d:

Ac ts o f d omestic v iol e nc e of te n a re int e nd e d to dis su a de a vic tim fr om r e so rt ingto o uts ide help, and inc lud e c on du c t de sig ne d to preve nt testimony

to police off

icer s or coope ration in criminal pr os e c uti on s. Whe re su c h a n a bu siv e re la tio ns hip c ulm inate s in murder, the evidenc e may support a finding t hat t he cr ime expressed the int e nt t o is olate the vic tim and to sto p he r fr om re po rt ing a bu se to the authorities or c ooperating with a criminal prosec ution – render ing her pr ior statements admissible under the forf eiture doc trine. Ear lier abuse, or threats of abuse, intende d to dissuad e t h e victim from

resor ting to outside help would be highly rele vant to this inquiry , as
wo uld e vid e nc e of

on g oin g c ri min a l pr oc e e din g s at w hic h th e vic tim would have be en expected to testify

.

I d. at 2693.

I n the pre sent ca se, the a

ppellant ar g ues that there is no evidenc e in the re cord de monstrating that he killed the victim to preve nt her testimony and that the tri al co u rt err ed by applying the fo rf e iture by wr on g do inge xce pti on

to t he hear say rule a

nd Con fr on ta tio n Cl a

us e . T he State

conce des th at i t fa i l ed to prove by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the a

ppellant killed the victim to procure he r unavailability as a witness and that the victim’s statements – both testimoni al and nontestimonial – were there fore not admissible under the for feiture by wrong doing e x ception to the hear say

rule or Confr ontation Clause. After car efully revie wing the re cord in thi s case , we ag ree with the parties that the tr ial court e rre d by admitting statements the victim made to Coffman to obtain the order o f protec tion, statements the victim made to Davis, and the domestic violence alleg ations the victim made to Serg eant B ell.

1. Co ffm an Te st im ony

The re cord r efle ct s t h at the trial c ourt initially ruled that De bora Coff man’s testimony

conce rning statements the victim made while obtaining the tempora ry order of protec tion would be inadmissible based on hea rsay and conf

rontation co n ce rn s. Howeve r, without prese nting a ny evidenc e , th e St a te c o n v in c e d th e c o u rt to c h an g e it s r u li n g b a s e d o n St a te v

. I v y , 1 8 8 S. W. 3 d 132 (Tenn. 2006) , during a jury -out h ea ri n g after opening statements. I n finding that the testimony

c on c e rn ingthe a lle g a tio ns the vic timma de in o bta ini ngthe te mpo ra ry or de r o f p ro te c tio n f

it w ith in the forf eiture by wrong doing e x ception, the c ourt explained:

The Court finds that they are hear say statements, but under 804( b)(6)
, the Court further

finds g iven the ruling s of the Supreme Court in the David I vy

case , that the Crawfo rd and Ma clin conce rns ar e-10- exti ng uished by

this defenda

nt making h is victim unavailable, not

nece ssarily for a murder prosec ution, a s ever y victim wo u l d be unavailable for a murder pr osecution, but also, unava ilable for a ny oth e r a c tio ns that th e vic timmig ht h a ve purs ue d a g a ins t th is de fe nd ant, and

the Co urt wi ll a llo w the c on te nts in t he se state me nts that wer e made by

this alleg ed victim to Miss Coffman to be admitted in t he Sta te ’s c a se in c hie f a s th e Sup re me Co urt ha s se e n f it t o r ule that thos e state me nts sh ou ld b e a dmi ssi ble un de r t ho se c ir c ums tanc e s.

The Court does find that they are rele vant as indi cate d ear lier fo r t h e i n tent and knowledg e and pr emeditation, to show all of the circ umstances surr ounding the intent, to show, as the trial court r uled in the David I vy case , what the motive of t his kill ing mig ht have be en, and to pain t an accur ate pictur e of the hostili ty that exis ted in the relationship between . . . Da rnell Hubba

rd . . . and L exie Hubbard, a nd for a ll of those rea sons, all of the fa cts and c ircumstance s surrounding that offe nse will be admissi ble for those limit ed purpose s as indicated

ear lier.

Statements the victim made about the a ppellant in order

to obtain an o rd er o f protection

a g a ins t hi m w e re te sti mon ia l in natur e . B e fo re a pp lyingthe fo rf

e iture by wr on g do inge xce pti on

to the Confrontation Clause a nd hear say

rule, the trial court wa s require d to find by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the a

ppellant’ s ac t i o n s wer e intended, at least in part, to pre vent the victim’s testimony . Giles, __ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct . at 2683; Br ooks, 249 S.W .3d at 328; I vy , 188 S.W .3d at 147. Although the court noted that the vi ctim was unava ilable for othe r ac tions that the victim m ight have pur sued ag ainst the appe llant and that statements the victim made in obtain i n g the orde r of protec tion were rele vant to the appe llant’s motive, the co u rt m ade no f inding with re spect to the appellant’ s intent to prevent the victim from testify ing. T he ca se involving the ex pa rt e o rd er of protec tion had been dismissed, and the State prese nted no evidenc e that the appe llant’s actions we re desig ned to pre vent the victim’s te stimony . Acc ording ly , the victim’s statements to Coffman a nd the aff idavit the victim completed to obtain the orde r of pr otection should have be en excluded.

2. De m ar lon Da vis

W h e nD e m ar l o nD a v i s b e g ant o t e s t i f y t h a t t h e v i c t i m t o l d h i m t h a tt h e a p p e l l an t“ c o n s t a n t l y” thr e a te ne d t o kill he r w he n th e y we re a lon e , th e de fe ns e ob je c te d o n h e ars ay

g ro un ds . T he Sta te responde d that the forf

eiture by wrong doing e x ception applied, a nd the cour

t overrule d the objection ba se d o n it s p re vio us ru lin g s. Da vis wa s a llo we d to te sti fy

that th e vic tim ha d mul tip le pr ob le ms w ith the a pp e lla nt w he n th e y

we re a lon e and

tha t th e vic timtol d h im that th e a pp e lla nt t hr e a te ne d to kil l her. The trial court should ha ve excluded the testimony as inadmissible hear say . The for feiture by wrong doing e x ception to the hearsay rule was inapplicable in the a bsence of proof

that the appe llant’s actions we re intende d to preve nt the victim’s te stimony
, and the State pre sented no proof establishing the applica

bility of any other he arsa

y exception.-11- 3. Se r ge antBe ll
Finally , the appe llant challeng es the a dmission of S erg eant Be ll’s te stimony conce rning the victim’s prior complaints to police. S erg eant Bell t estified that the vi ctim filed a police repor t in 2002

asser ting that the appellant had attac ked her with a metal cha ir, and a

war rant c harg ing the appellant with ag g ravated assault wa s issued. She said that she talked to the vic tim aga in i n 2 0 0 4 wh en the victim filed a re port claiming that the appellant phy sically foug ht her, gr abbed her by the nec k, and threa t en ed t o kill her with a knife a nd some bleac h. The victim told Serg eant B ell that no further action wa s neede d on the 2004 re port bec ause the appellant wa s no longe r living w ith her.

The trial c ourt held a jury -out hea ring in a ccor dance with Rule 404(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Evidenc e bef

ore a dmitti ng Se r g eant B ell’s testimony . I n concludingthat Serg eant B ell’s testimony

was a dmissibl e, the c ourt aga i n ci ted State v. I vy , 188 S.W .3d 132 (Tenn. 2006) , and said that the evidenc e wa s releva

nt “to g ive the jury a complete picture of the violenc e that [the appellant] visit ed upon this victim and the threats that he has made , to show a motive for this killing, his threats having be e n ma de pr e vio us ly

tha t if he c ou ld n ot h a ve Mis s Hub ba rd , th a t no on e wo uld .” Th e c ourt a lso fo un d th a t th e te sti mony wa s a dmi ssi ble to sh ow ho sti lity that e xiste d in

the re la tio ns hip , to

c or ro bo rate the te sti mony of oth e r wit ne sse s who ha d be e n que sti on e d ab ou t whe the r pr ior inc ide nts betwee n the appe llant and victim had bee n repor ted to police, and a s being probative of preme ditation. W e conc lude that the admission of Serg eant B ell’s testimony , without a finding that the appe llant w as motivated, at least in pa rt, to preve nt the victim’s testimony , violated the hea rsay rules and the appellant’ s confr ontation rig hts.

C. Har m le ss E r r or Ana lys is

Ha vin g de te rm ine d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y a dmi tti ngthe vic tim ’s he ars ay state me nts to De bo ra Cof fm an, De marl on

Da vis , a nd Se rg e ant B e ll, we mus t no w d e c ide the e ff e c t of the e rr or s. I n conductingharmless e rror analy sis, our supreme court ha s identified three cate g ories of e rror s: (1) structura l constituti onal er ror; (2) non-structura l constituti onal er ror, a nd (3) non- constitutional error. State v. Rodrigue z, 254 S .W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008); S tate v. Power s, 101 S.W .3d 383, 397 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Gar

rison, 40 S.W .3d 426, 433-34 (Te nn. 2000); State v. Har ris, 989 S.W .2d 307, 314- 15 (Tenn. 1999)

.
Structural constitutional err ors involve “de fec ts in the trial mecha nism” that “compr omise the integ rity of the judicial proc ess itself.” Rodrig uez, 254 S.W .3d at 371

. Structural constitutional

err ors “have an impac t upon ‘[t ] h e en t i re conduct of trial from be g inning to end’ ” and r equire automatic re versa l. Momon v. S tate, 18 S.W.3d 152, 165 (Tenn. 1999) (quotingArizona v. F ulm ina nte , 4 99 U. S. 2 79 , 3 11 , 1 11 S. Ct

. 12 46 , 12 65 (1 99 1) ). Th e de nia l of the ri g ht t o c ouns e l, denial of the rig ht to self-re prese ntation at t ri al, denial of the rig ht to a jury

trial, and ra cial discrimination in gr and jury selec tion a r e examples of structur al constitutional error s. Rodrigue z, 254 S.W .3d at 361; Momon, 18 S.W .3d at 165-66.

Constit utional e rror s that are not struc tural do not r equire automatic reve rsal. “Howe ver, the-12-

burd e n o n th e State to d e mon str a te that a non- str uc tur a l con sti tut ion a l er

ro r i s h arm le ss r e ma ins qu ite str ing e nt. Th e e xiste nc e of a no n- str uc tur a l c on sti tut ion a l er

ro r r e qu ir e s r e ve rs a l un le ss t he Sta te demonstrates be y ond a re asonable doubt that the err or is ha rmless.” Rodrigue z, 254 S .W.2d at 361. The test to be applied is “whe ther it appea rs ‘bey ond a reasonable doubt that the err or complaine d of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” I d. (quoting State v. Allen, 69 S.W.3d 181, 190 (Tenn. 2002)).

As for non- constitutional errors, a defe ndant cha lleng ing a conviction has the bur den of de mon str a tin g tha

t th e e rr or

“ mor e pr ob a

bly tha n n ot a ff e c te d t he ju dg me nt o r w ou ld r e su lt i n pr e jud i c e t o t h e j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s

. ” T e n n

. R

. A p p

. P

. 3 6 ( b ) ; 2 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t 3 6 1

. A p p e l l a te c ou rt s consider the entire r ecor d in evaluating whether the er ror a ffe cted the outc ome of the trial

. I d. To the extent that the trial court er red by admitting non-testimonial he arsa y statements the victim made to D avis, the appellant bear s the burde n of demonstrating that the e rror aff ecte d the outcome of

the trial or pre

judiced the judicial pr ocess.

L ike oth e r C on fr on ta tio n Cl a us e e rr or s, the tr ia l c o u

r t’ s a dmi ssi on

of the state me nts the vic tim

ma de to C of

fm a n a nd Se rg e ant B e ll a

re no n- str uc tur a l c on sti tut ion a l e rr or s. De lawa re v. Va n A rs da ll, 47 5 U .S. 67 3, 68 1, 10 6 S. Ct. 14 31 , 1 43 6 ( 19 86 ); Cann on , 2 54 S.W. 3d at 30 6. Th us, in or de r t o sustain the appellant’ s conviction, the state has the burde n of provingbey ond a re asonable doubt that the er rors did not contribute to the appellant’ s conviction. I n our view, the State has met its burden.
First deg ree murder is the premeditated and intentional killing of another person. Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 1). A pre meditated killing is one “ done af ter the ex erc ise of re flec tion and judgme nt.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( d). Premeditation can be infe rre d from the manne r and circ umstances surr ounding the killing. State v. Bl an d
, 9 5 8 S.W .2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997) . Our supreme c ourt has delin ea t ed sever al circ umstances f rom which a

jury may infer pr emeditation, including, but not limited to, declar ations of the intent to kill, e v i d en ce of the proc ureme nt of a

we ap o n , t h e u s e o f a d ea d l y we ap o nu

p o nan u n ar m edv i ct i m , t h e p ar t i cu l ar cr u e l t y o f t h e k i l l i n g, preparat ions b e fo re the kil lin g fo r t he purp os e of

c on c e a lin g the c ri me , a

nd c a lmn e ss i mme diate ly afte r the killing. I d.

Even without the er

roneously admitted evidenc e of the victim’s pr ior statements, the re cord in this case is reple te with proof that the a ppellant intentionally

and with pre medi t at i o n k illed the vic tim . I t is un dis pu te d th a t th e a pp e lla nt k ill e d th e un arm ed vic timby sta bb inghe r t

we lve tim e s. J ones, Davis, and Adams al l h ea rd the appe llant threate n the victim many times. On numerous

occa sions, Davis and Adams heard the appellant tell the victim that if he c ould not have he r, nobody

wo uld . B oth

Jone s and Ad a ms ha d see n the a pp e lla nt use a kn if

e to t hr e a te n th e vic timin t

he pa st, and Jones had found larg e kitchen knives, including the knife use d to kill t he victim, hidden under the a pp e l l an t ’ s s i d e o f

t h e m a t t r e s s i nt h e v i c t i m ’ s b e dr o o m

. Jo n e s a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a tt h e v i c t im wanted to e nd the relationship with the appe llant and desc ribed how the victim unsuccessfully soug ht police help to kee p the appe llant out of her home a few day s befor e the killing. J ones told the jury about the ang ry

messag e the a

ppellan t left, threatening to kill t he victim just three day s befor e the stabbing . Hours bef

ore the appellant carr ied out the threat, Davis hea rd the a ppellant ag ain tell the-13-

victim that if he could not have her, nobody would. I n light of the overw helming pr oof of the appellant’ s g uilt, we are convince d that the err oneously admitted hear say evidenc e had no impact on the jury ’s ver dict. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the a ppellant’s convic tion.

III. Conclusi on

Ba sed upon the re cord a

nd the par ties’ brief s, we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

_______________________________ NORMA McGEE OGL E, J UDGE