Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-2387 | September 4, 2019 Page 1 of 10

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Samuel J. Beasley

Muncie, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jaron Leekingdus Ratliff,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 4, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-CR-2387

Appeal from the Delaware Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Marianne L. 

Vorhees, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

18C01-1404-FA-1

May, Judge.

[1] Jaron Leekingdus Ratliff appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to 

discharge the charges against him based on an alleged Criminal Rule 4(C) 

violation. Ratliff also argues the State violated his Sixth Amendment right to a 
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speedy trial under the United States Constitution because there was a delay in 

bringing him to trial of over three years while he was incarcerated in another 

jurisdiction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 1, 2014, police arrested Ratliff after he sold cocaine to two 

confidential informants. On April 8, 2014, the State charged Ratliff with two 

counts of Class A felony dealing in cocaine.1

 The trial court held an initial 

hearing on the matter on April 22, 2014, and set a trial date of August 11, 2014. 

On April 24, 2014, Ratliff was released on bail.

[3] The trial court held a pre-trial hearing on May 3, 2014, and all parties attended. 

On July 7, 2014, the trial court held another pre-trial hearing, but Ratliff and his 

counsel did not appear. The trial court issued a warrant for Ratliff’s arrest. On 

the scheduled trial date, Ratliff and his counsel again did not appear, but an 

unidentified third party announced on the Record that Ratliff was in the 

Madison County Jail and “he’s going to be there for a while.” (Tr. Vol. II at 4.) 

The trial court canceled the jury trial.

[4] On March 29, 2018, the trial court scheduled a status conference on Ratliff’s 

case for May 9, 2018. On May 9, Ratliff moved to continue the status 

conference, and the trial court rescheduled the status conference for June 13, 

 

1 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(b) (2006).
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2018. On June 13, the trial court held the status conference. The next day, the 

court set a pretrial conference for July 25 and set Ratliff’s jury trial for August 6, 

2018.

[5] On July 23, 2018, Ratliff filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Indiana 

Criminal Rule 4(C). On August 6, the trial court held a hearing on the matter 

and denied Ratliff’s motion. The trial court then certified its order for 

interlocutory review, and we subsequently accepted jurisdiction.

Discussion and Decision

Discharge Under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C)

[6] Ratliff contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for discharge 

pursuant to Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C). When we review Criminal Rule 4 

claims, we review questions of law de novo and we review the trial court’s 

factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Mefford v. State, 51 

N.E.3d 327, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) provides:

No person shall be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer 

a criminal charge for a period in aggregate embracing more than 

one year from the date the criminal charge against such 

defendant is filed, or from the date of his arrest on such charge, 

whichever is later; except where a continuance was had on his 

motion, or the delay was caused by his act, or where there was 

not sufficient time to try him during such period because of 

congestion of the court calendar; provided, however, that in the 

last-mentioned circumstance, the prosecuting attorney shall file a 

timely motion for continuance as under subdivision (A) of this 

rule. Provided further, that a trial court may take note of 
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congestion or an emergency without the necessity of a motion, 

and upon so finding may order a continuance. Any continuance 

granted due to a congested calendar or emergency shall be 

reduced to an order, which order shall also set the case for trial 

within a reasonable time. Any defendant so held shall, on 

motion, be discharged.

[7] Under Criminal Rule 4(C), the State was required to bring Ratliff to trial within 

one year from the date he was arrested. Todisco v. State, 965 N.E.2d 753, 755 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. When a trial court, during the one-year 

period, schedules a trial date outside of the one-year period, the defendant must 

object in order to give the trial court an opportunity to cure its mistake. Young 

v. State, 765 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). However, when the trial 

court, after the one-year period has expired, sets a trial date, the defendant need 

only to file a motion for discharge. Id. When a defendant files a motion to 

discharge, it is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the one-year time 

frame has been exceeded and that he is not responsible for the delay. Martin v. 

State, 419 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). 

[8] There are several instances in which the delay bringing a defendant to trial is 

not attributed to the State and, thus, is excluded from the one-year time frame.

Todisco, 965 N.E.2d at 755. Relevant to this case is the number of days 

attributable to the one-year time frame that are tolled when a defendant does 

not appear before the trial court and his whereabouts are unknown. Werner v. 

State, 818 N.E.2d 26, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. The accumulation 
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of days relevant to C.R. 4(C)’s one-year timeframe commences again when the 

trial court is given notice of the defendant’s location. Id. 

[9] At issue in this case is the manner in which the trial court must be given notice 

of a defendant’s location. Ratliff analogizes his case to Allen v. State, 51 N.E.3d 

1202 (Ind. 2016). In that case, Allen was arrested on December 9, 2011. After 

two continuances attributable to Allen, the trial court held a pre-trial conference 

on October 16, 2012. At that hearing, Allen verbally informed the court he had 

entered a guilty plea in another case and had been sentenced to ten years in the 

Indiana Department of Correction. Id. at 1204. The court reporter then stated, 

“you will have to file a transport order to get him back.” Id. The trial court set 

a trial date of January 23, 2013.

[10] On January 23, 2013, Allen did not appear for trial because he was incarcerated 

and defense counsel had not filed a request for transport order. Id. The trial 

court entered a re-arrest warrant for Allen. On September 5, 2013, Allen, pro se, 

filed a Verified Petition for Resolution of Detainer wherein he stated he was 

incarcerated. Allen v. State, 45 N.E.3d 59, 62 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), vacated by

Allen, 51 N.E.3d 1202 (Ind. 2016). The trial court struck that petition from the 

record because it was not required to accept a pro se filing from Allen, who was 

represented by counsel. Id. 

[11] On April 23, 2014, Allen, by counsel, filed a motion for discharge pursuant to 

C.R. 4(C). The trial court held a hearing on the motion on June 25, 2014, and 

denied the motion. The trial court then scheduled Allen’s trial for July 29, 
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2014. Allen requested two subsequent continuances, and his trial was finally 

held on October 8, 2014. Id. at 63. The trial court convicted him as charged 

and sentenced him accordingly.

[12] On appeal, Allen argued the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion for discharge because his trial date went far beyond the one-year time 

limit set forth in C.R. 4(C). Allen, 51 N.E.3d at 1204. Our Indiana Supreme 

Court held the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Allen’s motion 

for discharge because the State and the trial court did not bring Allen to trial 

within a “reasonable time.” Id. at 1205. Ratliff argues the same is true here. 

We disagree.

[13] Allen is distinguishable from the facts before us because the trial court in Allen 

received notice, albeit later stricken, from Allen that he was incarcerated. Allen, 

45 N.E.3d at 62.2 Ratliff did not give any form of written notice to the trial 

court, and thus Allen does not apply. Instead, the facts in Werner v. State, 818 

N.E.2d 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, on which the trial court relied, are 

analogous to Ratliff’s circumstances.

 

2 In his dissent in Allen, Judge Barnes noted that despite the fact Allen’s pro se filing was stricken, it was 

evident the trial court and the State had received Allen’s written notice that he was incarcerated. Judge 

Barnes stated regarding Allen’s written notice and the discussion of Allen’s whereabouts at multiple hearings: 

“If these attempts at notification were not sufficient, what else was Allen to do?” Allen, 45 N.E.3d at 65. 

This further distinguishes the facts of the case before us because it seems Ratliff made no effort to notify the 

court of his incarceration at any point in the proceedings.
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[14] In Werner, police arrested Werner on August 30, 2000. On September 19, 2000, 

Werner appeared at his initial hearing and requested a continuance. On 

November 9, 2000, an unidentified individual called the Randolph County 

Clerk’s Office to report that Werner was being held in the Wayne County Jail. 

Id. at 28. On January 8, 2001, Werner’s bonding company called the bailiff and 

informed him that Werner was in the Wayne County Jail. After subsequent 

continuances, the trial court held the hearing on January 30, 2001. Werner did 

not appear. Id.

[15] Werner was released from the Wayne County Jail on May 25, 2001. After 

subsequent continuances, Werner waived his initial hearing and the trial court 

set a trial date of January 3, 2002. Werner did not object to this trial date. Id. 

On March 31, 2003, Werner filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to C.R. 4(C). 

The trial court denied his motion on December 23, 2003, and certified the 

matter for interlocutory appeal. Id.

[16] On appeal, Werner argued the trial court abused its discretion when it did not 

grant his motion to dismiss pursuant to C.R. 4(C) because two people provided 

oral notice to the trial court of his incarceration in Wayne County and, thus,

any delay in his trial date based on that time frame was not attributable to him. 

Id. We held the trial court did not abuse its discretion because Werner had not 

notified the trial court in writing of his incarceration. Id. at 31. We stated:

Our judicial system has traditionally required a significant degree 

of formality from its participants, and with good reason. Trial 

courts have substantial case loads and complicated dockets to 
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manage, and, if we did not require that litigants communicate

with each other and the court formally and in writing, the system 

would soon devolve into chaos. There is simply no guarantee 

that a telephone message relayed to someone in a bailiff’s office 

or clerk’s office would be communicated to the court or to the

other involved parties.

Id.

[17] The same is true here. Ratliff did not provide written notification of his 

incarceration to the trial court. Instead, on August 11, 2014, an unidentified 

speaker stated:

Yeah. Mr. Beasley [defense counsel], I talked with him on 

Friday. He is actually in the Madison County Jail and Mr. 

Beasley is going to try and report you, Your Honor, he’s going to 

be there for a while. So, as to what we’re going to do - how 

we’re going to handle both of the cases together - so, apparently 

Mr. Beasley has a plan.

(Tr. Vol. II at 4.) Ratliff did not communicate with the trial court to indicate 

his whereabouts until approximately four years after that statement. Guided by 

the holding in Werner, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied Ratliff’s motion to discharge pursuant to C.R. 4(C).3

 

3 Ratliff also contends our Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Allen overruled Werner and related cases that 

held written notice of incarceration in an unrelated matter is required under these circumstances. However, 

Allen did not cite Werner and thus did not explicitly overrule it, and we hold the facts are distinguishable.
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Sixth Amendment

[18] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant 

part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 

speedy and public trial.” To determine if a defendant has been deprived of his 

right to a speedy trial, we consider four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 

U.S. 514, 530 (1972): (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason(s) for the delay; 

(3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) the 

prejudice to the defendant. See Crawford v. State, 669 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. 

1996) (applying Barker factors). 

[19] Ratliff argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for 

discharge because the State’s delay in bringing him to trial violated his Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial. However, Ratliff did not present this 

argument before the trial court, and he may not assert it for the first time on 

appeal. See Hilligoss v. State, 45 N.E.3d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (a party 

waives an issue if it is raised for the first time on appeal). Waiver 

notwithstanding, we hold the trial court’s decision did not violate Ratliff’s Sixth 

Amendment right because, as noted supra, the overwhelming bulk of the delay 

in bringing Ratliff to trial is attributable to Ratliff’s failure to communicate with 

the trial court in writing and he has not demonstrated prejudice in the delay. 

See Vermillion v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 (Ind. 1999) (Vermillion’s Sixth 

Amendment right to a speedy trial was not violated when he was responsible 

for a substantial part of the delay and had not demonstrated prejudice), reh’g 

denied.
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Conclusion

[20] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ratliff’s motion to 

discharge him because his failure to communicate in writing with the trial court 

regarding his incarceration was primarily responsible for the delay in his 

prosecution. Additionally, since the delay was attributable to Ratliff’s actions 

and he has not demonstrated prejudice from the delay, the trial court’s decision 

did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

[21] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.