NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

CHANEL WILEY, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-50235 

D.C. No. 

2:20-cr-00298-JAK-2 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 6, 2024*

Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, BUMATAY, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Chanel Wiley appeals from her conviction and sentence for conspiracy to 

distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. She argues that there 

was insufficient evidence to support her conviction, and that she was convicted 

“only by association” with her boyfriend, Scott Penner, who pled guilty to the 

same charge. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As the parties are 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 29 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.1

Normally, sufficiency of the evidence claims are reviewed under the Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), standard: “[W]hether, after viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319. 

“However, because . . . [Wiley] did not move for acquittal,” we review for plain 

error. United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 2003). Under 

either stringent standard, Wiley’s claim fails. The evidence that she conspired to 

distribute methamphetamine was not insufficient. 

The elements of a § 846 conspiracy are “(1) an agreement to accomplish an 

illegal objective, and (2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United 

States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. 

Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001)). As a result, “[t]he 

government ‘can prove the existence of a conspiracy through circumstantial 

evidence that defendants acted together in pursuit of a common illegal goal.’” 

United States v. Navarrette-Aguilar, 813 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting 

United States v. Bishop, 1 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1993)). For example, evidence 

of a “shared stake” in a drug operation may disprove a defendant’s assertion that 

1 We address Wiley’s argument that her due process rights were violated when her 

ankle monitor beeped during jury selection in a concurrently filed published 

opinion, in which we affirm. 
3 

she did not conspire to distribute, but merely purchased, drugs. See, e.g., United 

States v. Mendoza, 25 F.4th 730, 736 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Moe, 781 F.3d at 

1125). 

The following evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, indicates that Wiley and Penner had an agreement to distribute 

methamphetamine and intended to distribute methamphetamine. First, Penner 

packaged, weighed, and sold methamphetamine out of Wiley’s apartment, which a 

rational juror could have concluded he would not have done “[a]bsent an 

agreement.” See United States v. Mesa-Farias, 53 F.3d 258, 260 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“Absent an agreement, [the defendant’s co-conspirator] would not have allowed 

an outsider to drive a car loaded with cocaine and heroin or sleep in an apartment 

containing drug paraphernalia and substantial amounts of cash.”). 

Second, a rational juror could have determined that Wiley initiated the sale 

because she asked the buyer whether he “need[ed] crap,” which means 

methamphetamine. Immediately afterward, Penner began weighing bags of 

methamphetamine and discussing the price with the buyer. 

Third, Penner structured the drug sale to financially benefit Wiley—he gave 

the buyer a $50 discount on the price of the drugs in exchange for an equivalent 

reduction in Wiley’s outstanding debt to the buyer. Thus, Wiley had a financial 

“stake” in the sale of methamphetamine. Mendoza, 25 F.4th at 736 (quoting Moe, 
4 

781 F.3d at 1125). Wiley asserts that she played no part in the conversation about 

reducing her debt. She argues she was not even in the room while Penner and the 

buyer discussed the price of the methamphetamine. But a rational juror could have 

found that she still heard their exchange because there were no doors in her 

apartment except for the bathroom door. Even if she had not heard the 

conversation, it would not have been irrational to view the fact that Penner 

structured the transaction to benefit her as evidence corroborating her role in the 

conspiracy. 

Fourth, Wiley told the buyer that she had previously tested a batch of 

methamphetamine for fentanyl. She believed that the methamphetamine the buyer 

was purchasing was from that same batch and asked him to test it and let her know 

if it was positive for fentanyl. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government, a rational juror could have interpreted Wiley’s statements to 

indicate that she and Penner had an ongoing agreement to test and sell 

methamphetamine, and that she intended this sale as part of this conspiracy.

Finally, when the buyer returned to Wiley’s home to pay Penner for the 

methamphetamine, the buyer left the money with Wiley. Wiley implies that this 

conduct is not probative because the buyer did not tell Wiley the purpose of the 

payment. But this assertion flips the Jackson standard on its head because Jackson

requires us to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 
5 

443 U.S. at 319. Under Jackson, a rational juror could have interpreted this 

interaction as further evidence of Wiley and Penner’s ongoing agreement and 

intent to sell methamphetamine because Wiley accepted payment for 

methamphetamine on behalf of Penner. 

Consequently, under either Jackson or plain-error review, the evidence that 

Wiley conspired with Penner to distribute methamphetamine was not insufficient. 

AFFIRMED.