alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
THE STATE OF TEXAS

MANDATE

TO THE 283RD DISTRICT COURT OF DALLAS COUNTY, GREETINGS:

Before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Court of Appeals District of Texas, on the 17th 

day of July, A.D. 2015, the cause upon appeal to revise or reverse your Judgment was determined; 

and therein our said Court made its order in these words:

Jarvis Demoan Fisher, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

No. 06-14-00231-CR

Trial Court No. F14-53102-T

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We note that the appellant, Jarvis Demoan Fisher, has adequately indicated his inability to 

pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

WHEREFORE, WE COMMAND YOU to observe the order of our said Court in this 

behalf, and in all things to have it duly recognized, obeyed, and executed.

WITNESS, the Hon. Josh R. Morriss, III, Chief Justice of our said Court of Appeals, with 

the seal thereof annexed, at the City of Texarkana, this the 11th day of September, A.D. 2015.

DEBRA K. AUTREY, Clerk
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Roy Williams, Appellant.

[634 NYS2d 158]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dunlop, J.), rendered March 3, 1994, convicting him of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial is ordered.

A defendant’s right to be present at trial may be forfeited where he deliberately absents himself from the trial *(see, People v Sanchez, 65*NY2d 436). The defendant failed to appear for jury deliberations, during which portions of the transcript were read to the jury. "Before proceeding in the defendant’s absence, the court should have made inquiry and recited on the record the facts and reasons it relied upon in determining that defendant’s absence was deliberate” *(People v Brooks,*75 NY2d 898, 899). The court’s failure to conduct an inquiry into the defendant’s absence on the record coupled with the court’s reading back of portions of the transcript in the defendant’s absence necessitate reversal *(see, People v Carroll,*196 AD2d 546).

We find no merit to the defendant’s remaining contentions. Bracken, J. P., Sullivan, Miller and Florio, JJ., concur.
#### PEOPLE v SMITH

Docket No. 60236.

Decided November 28, 1977.

On application by defendant for leave to appeal the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, reinstated the defendant’s appeal and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.

Donald S. Smith was convicted, on his plea of guilty, by Wayne Circuit Court, James N. Canham, J., of malicious destruction of property under $100 and attempted escape from lawful custody. The Court of Appeals, Quinn, P. J., and R. B. Burns, J. (M. F. Cavanagh, J., dissenting), dismissed the defendant’s appeal without opinion on the ground that "a conviction based upon a plea of guilty is not appealable” (Docket No. 77-485). Defendant applies for leave to appeal. *Held:*

The Constitution guarantees an appeal as a matter of right in every criminal prosecution. The appellate courts have consistently, until recently, interpreted the constitutional language to give an appeal of right from a conviction on a plea of guilty. A review of these decisions, together with the history of the Constitution and the plain meaning of the constitutional language, convinces the Court of the correctness of that interpretation.

The appeal is reinstated and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.

*People v Webb,*75 Mich App 494; 255 NW2d 661 (1977), overruled.

*Frank J. Kelley,*Attorney General, *Robert A. Derengoski,*Solicitor General, *William L. Cahalan,*Prosecuting Attorney, *Edward Reilly Wilson,*Principal Attorney, Appeals, and *Timothy A. Baughman,*Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

*Carl Ziemba*for defendant.

Per Curiam.

The majority of the Court of Appeals panel in this case and in *People v Webb,*75 *73Mich App 494; 255 NW2d 661 (1977), believes that there is no appeal as a matter of right from a plea-based conviction. We disagree.

Const 1963, art 1, § 20, states in pertinent part: "In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have * * * an appeal as a matter of right.”

The appellate courts of this state have, until recently, consistently interpreted this language to guarantee an appeal as a matter of right from a plea-based conviction. Our review of those decisions, together with § 20’s constitutional history1 and the plain meaning of its language, convinces us of the correctness of this interpretation.

Pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), in lieu of leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals order dismissing defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction is vacated. Defendant’s appeal to the Court of Appeals is reinstated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issue raised. We retain no jurisdiction.

Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams, Levin, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Ryan, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.

1

*See*1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 469, 562-568.
No. 38941.

#### Protest 197837-G of J. E. Bernard & Co., Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Tilson, J.

From the record it was found that certain items consist .of articles in chief value of cellulose filaments similar to those involved in Abstract 37230. The claim at 60 percent under paragraph 31 was therefore sustained.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                     EXHIBIT 4.1


                          [FORM OF FACE OF CERTIFICATE]

                           FIRST SECURITY GROUP, INC.     CUSIP 336312

             Incorporated under the laws of the State of Tennessee
    Total Authorized Issue 20,000,000 Shares of $.01 Par Value Common Stock


         This is to certify that _______________________ is the owner of
_________________________ fully paid and non-assessable shares of the above
corporation transferable only on the books of the Corporation by the holder
thereof in person or by a duly authorized Attorney upon surrender of this
Certificate properly endorsed.

         Witness, the seal of the Corporation and the signatures of its duly
authorized officers.

         Dated
               -----------------------


--------------------------------------       ----------------------------------
                             Secretary                                President


                          [FORM OF BACK OF CERTIFICATE]

         The following abbreviations, when used in the inscription on the face
of this certificate, shall be construed as though they were written out in full
according to applicable laws or regulations.

TEN COM - as tenants in common
TEN ENT - as tenants by the entireties
JT TEN  - as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in
common UNIF GIFT MIN ACT - Custodian (Cust) (Minor) Act (State)

Additional abbreviations may also be used though not in the above list.

For value received, __________________ hereby sell, assign and transfer unto

PLEASE INSERT SOCIAL SECURITY OR OTHER IDENTIFYING NUMBER OF ASSIGNEE

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                      - 1 -
<PAGE>   2

Shares represented by the within Certificate, and do hereby irrevocably
constitute and appoint ______________ Attorney to transfer the said shares on
the books of the within-named Corporation with full power of substitution in the
premises.


Dated
      ---------------------------------

In presence of
               ------------------------


NOTICE: THE SIGNATURE TO THIS ASSIGNMENT MUST CORRESPOND WITH THE NAME AS
WRITTEN UPON THE FACE OF THE CERTIFICATE IN EVERY PARTICULAR, WITHOUT ALTERATION
OR ENLARGEMENT, OR ANY CHANGE WHATEVER.


                                     - 2 -
October 14, 2015

Re: Support letter for Aircraft Technical Support Roswell To Whom It May Concern: Please accept this letter as the City ofRoswell's support ofAircraft Technical Support (ATS) Roswell. ATS alreadyhas an established listofcurrentand potential customers from around the country and globe that require the 145 repair station certification. The granting ofsuch would positively impact Roswell and New Mexico, as a whole, to provide much needed employment as we strive to enhance the economic activity ofour region. Ifapproved, ATS will employee over 100 personnel operatingin the Roswell area. As the City Manager of Roswell and on behalf of ATS, please know that ATS has our full support and we greatly appreciate your consideration oftheir request. Sincerely,



# ~d~~

Steve Polasek, City Manager City ofRoswell, New Mexico
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Highland Hospitality Corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004, as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, James L. Francis, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge: 

 

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operationsof the Company. 

 

Date: May 12, 2004
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT UNITED STATES OF AM ERIC A, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. ALEJANDR O SANC H EZ, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt. No. 13-50367

D.C . No. 8:05-c r-00248-AHS M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the C e ntra l Distric t of C a lifornia Alic e m arie H. Stotle r, Distric t Judge , Pre s iding Subm itte d

Nove m b e r 18, 2014 ** B e fore : LEAVY, FISHER , a nd N.R . SM ITH, C irc uit Judge s. Ale ja ndro Sa n c he z a p p e a ls pro sefrom

the distric t

c ourt’ s orde r de ny ing his m otion to a

m e nd the judgm e nt pursua nt to Fe de ra l R

ule of C rim ina l Proc e dure 36. W e hav e jurisdic tion under 28 U.S.C . § 1291, a nd we a ffirm . 

# F IL ED NOV 26 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).In his R ule 36 m otion, Sa

nc h e za ske d the distric t c ourt to a d just his sente n c e to a c c ount for tim e se rve d in sta te c ustody

be fore he wa s se nte nc e d in fe de ra l c ourt. There c ord re fle c ts tha t the distric t c ourt inte nde d Sanc he z ’ s fe d e ra l se nte nc e to run c onc urre ntly with only

the undisc ha

rge d portion of his sta

te se nte nc e . Ac c ordingly , the distric t c ourt prope rly de nie d San c he z ’ s R

ule 36 m otion be c a

use the re wa s no e rror in the judgm e nt to c orre c t . To thee xte nt Sanc he zargue s tha

t the distric t c ourt e rre d

in fa iling to run the

se nte nc e s fully c onc urre ntly unde r U.S.S.G. 5G1.3, R ule 36 doe s not provide

a ve hic l e for re lie f. Se eUnite d State

s v . Pe nna , 319 F.3d 509, 513 (9th C ir. 2003) (“ R ule 36 is a ve hic le for c o rre c ting c le ric al m ista k e s but it may

not be use d to c orre c t judic ia l e rrors in se nte nc i ng.” ). M ore ove r, the distric t c o urt did not err in c onc luding tha t Sanc he zis not e ntitle d to c re d i t towa rd his fe d e ra l se nte nc e for tim e se rve d in sta te c ustody prior to his fe de ra l se nte nc ing. Se e U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3 c m t. n.3(E) (se c tion 5G1.3(c ) “ doe s not a

uthoriz e an a djustm e nt of these nte nc e for the insta nt offe nse for a p e riod of im

prisonm e nt a lre a dy

se rve d on theundisc ha

rge d te rm of im prisonm e nt” ). W e re je c t a s without support in the re c ord Sanc he z ’ s c onte ntion tha t he wa s in prim ary fe d e ra l c ustody be ginning on Oc tobe r 12, 2005. AFFIRM E D. 1 3 - 5 0 3 6 7 2
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Stephen A. Aanderud, Chief Financial Officer of DayStar Technologies, Inc., certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of DayStar Technologies, Inc. for the three months ended June 30, 2006; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, includingits consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Date: August 11, 2006
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 09**  **- 2349** 

TORINA A. COLLIS , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,
v. BANK OF AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION , Defendant

- Appellee
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for t he District of Maryland , at Greenbelt
. Peter J. Messitte , Senior District Judge. ( 8:06

- cv - 02451

- PJM )

Submitted : March 23, 2011 Decided: March 31, 2011

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Torina A. Collis, Appellant Pro Se. Elena D. Marcuss, MCGUIREWOODS, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Torina A. Collis appeals from the district court’s final judgme nt following her unsuccessful trial in which she alleged employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. She raises numerous issues on appeal. For the reasons that follow we affirm. First, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of Collis’ trial attorney Morris Fischer. We note that Fischer was the fourth attorney hired by Collis and that Collis had ample time prior to trial to hire another attorney. Second, we find that Collis has failed to s how entitlement to a new trial based on her allegation of juror misconduct , and we find no abuse of discretion by the district court regarding the matter. See United States v. Basham , 561 F.3d 302, 319 (4th Cir. 2009) (providing review standard for new
tr ial) , cert. denied , 130 S. Ct. 3353 (2010); United States v. Cheek , 94 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that decision of whether improper contact or communication compromised the impartiality of the jury is reviewed for a “somewhat narrowed” abuse of discretion )
. Third, the jury instruction to which Collis objects is irrelevant, as the jury did not consider the instruction. Fourth, we do not find that the district court abused its3 discretion in limiting Collis to thirteen trial witnesses. United St ates v. Hassan El , 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4t h Cir. 1993)
. Finally, we decline to reverse the district court, as sought by Collis in her fifth issue, and we find no error in the district court’s ruling regarding Collis’ attempt to utilize the judicial notice pro vision of Fed. R. Evid. 201. See generally Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil , 887 F.2d 1236, 1239

- 40 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing Rule 201(b)(2) regarding judicially noticed facts )
. Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts an d legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
#### Matthew Poor and another, *Respondents, v.*The National Union Bank of Watertown and others, Appellants.

Judgment and order affirmed. Opinion by Smith, P. J.
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 63 (Tuesday, April 3, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 15934]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-6122]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Surface Transportation Board

[STB Finance Docket No. 35005]


Chicago Terminal Railroad--Acquisition and Operation Exemption--
Rail Lines of Union Pacific Railroad Company and Canadian Pacific Rail 
System at Elk Grove Village, Cook and DuPage Counties, IL

    Chicago Terminal Railroad (CTM), a Class III rail carrier, has 
filed a verified notice of exemption under 49 CFR 1150.41 to acquire by 
lease and to operate rail lines owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(UP) and Canadian Pacific Rail System (CP) in the Centex Industrial 
Park and adjacent Elk Grove Yard in Elk Grove Village in Cook and 
DuPage Counties, IL. The subject rail lines, owned by UP, or jointly by 
UP and CP, include approximately 25 miles of rail lines in the Centex 
Industrial Park and approximately 11,500 feet of rail line in the 
adjacent Elk Grove Yard, originating at the west end of UP's 
approximate 800-foot Elk Grove Lead track extending from its Milwaukee 
Subdivision at milepost 7.8.
    CTM certifies that its projected annual revenues as a result of 
this transaction will not result in the creation of a Class II or Class 
I rail carrier, and further certifies that its projected annual 
revenues will not exceed $5 million.
    The transaction is scheduled to be consummated on April 15, 2007.
    If the notice contains false or misleading information, the 
exemption is void ab initio. Petitions to revoke the exemption under 49 
U.S.C. 10502(d) may be filed at any time. The filing of a petition to 
revoke will not automatically stay the transaction.
    An original and 10 copies of all pleadings, referring to STB 
Finance Docket No. 35005, must be filed with the Surface Transportation 
Board, 395 E Street, SW., Washington, DC 20423-0001. In addition, one 
copy of each pleading must be served on Fritz R. Kahn, Fritz R. Kahn, 
PC, 1920 N Street, NW., Eighth Floor, Washington, DC 20036-1601.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ By letter filed March 21, 2007, CTM's original counsel 
submitted a notice of withdrawal of counsel. By facsimile received 
on March 28, 2007, Fritz R. Kahn entered his appearance as counsel 
for CTM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Board decisions and notices are available on our Web site at http://www.stb.dot.gov.

    Decided: March 28, 2007.

    By the Board, David M. Konschnik, Director, Office of 
Proceedings.
Vernon A. Williams,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7-6122 Filed 4-2-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915-01-P
No. 38930.

#### Protests 859979-G, etc., of T. J. Krikorian et al. (New York).

Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

On the authority of *United States*v. *Field*(25 C. C. P. A. 308, T. D. 49422) and *Anniston*v. *Davis*(301 U. S. 337) the protests were dismissed.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 

 

I, Stephen A. Aanderud, Chief Financial Officer of DayStar Technologies, Inc., certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of DayStar Technologies, Inc. for the period ended September 30, 2004; 

 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controlsand procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting. 

 

Date: November 12, 2004 

 

By:
 
/s/ Stephen A. Aanderud
  
Stephen A. Aanderud
  
Chief Financial Officer