Supreme Court
No. 2019

- 186

- A ppeal. ( PC 17

- 1994 )

Latonya Marzett :

v. : Amanda Letendre, alias, et al. :

NOTICE : This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222

- 3258 or Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typ ographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. March 10, 2021- 1

- Supreme Court
No. 2019

- 186

- A ppeal. ( PC 17

- 1994 )
Latonya Marzett :

v. : Amanda Letendre, alias, et al. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg , Flaherty, and Robinson , JJ.

O P I N I O N Justice Robinson , for the Court. The instant case arises out of a dispute between the plaintiff

- landlord, Latonya Marzett, and the defendants

- tenants, Amanda Letendre and Jason Gamache (the tenants) , with resp ect to conduct that allegedly occurred in the context of the ir landlord

- tenant relationship

. What first must be decided, however, is the narrow and potentially dispositive issue of whether or not the Superior Court

— where the complaint in this case was ori ginally
filed

— had subject matter jurisdiction over the causes of action set forth in the complaint

. The hearing justice found that the Superior Court could not properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction in this matter ; accordingly, she dismissed Ms.
Ma rzett ’s complaint as well as the ten ants’ counterclaims. Ms. Marzett timely appealed . T his case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to- 2

-

an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be su mmarily decided. After examining the written and oral submissions of the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Travel It is undisputed that Ms. Marzett owns a certain parcel of real property located at 385 Church Street in Burrillville (the subject property). It is further undisputed that, on May 1, 2014, the ten ants entered into a written lease agreement with Ms. Marzett to rent the subject property. Pursuant to the terms of th at agreement, the ten ants agreed to pay monthly rent in the amount of $1,425 ; they also agreed to pay a security deposit in th e same amou nt

. On January 11, 2017, after having resid ed at the premises for over two

- and

- one - half years, the ten ants informed Ms. Marzett that they would not be renewing their lease and that they would be vacating the subject property no later than February 4, 2017

. On May 3, 2017, Ms. Marzett filed a complaint in the Providence County Superior Court seeking damages from the tenants in the amount of $26,101.48 less the security deposit, which she had retained. The tenants answered the complaint on May 15, 2017, set ting forth twenty

- three affirmative defenses; and they also- 3

-

included a six

- count counterclaim. On May 29, 2017, Ms. Marzett filed an answer to the tenants’ counterclaim , and she subsequently filed a motion to amend her answer to the counterclaim on Februa ry 11, 2019 , which motion was ultimately rendered moot by later proceedings. In her complaint, Ms. Marzett alleged that, following the ten ants’ departure, an inspection of the subject property was performed ; according to Ms. Marzett, that inspection discl osed property damage

. Ms. Marzett further alleged that, in view of what the inspection had uncovered, the ten ants were “in direct contravention of provision ‘ 4. ’ of the Lease and R.I.G.L. 34

- 18

- 24, [ since the
ten ants ] willfully, negligently, malicious[ly] , unreasonably and deliberately did destroy, deface, damage and impair the property from it’s [ sic ] move in condition * * *.” Subsequently, o n October 3 0 , 2018, the ten ants filed a motion for summary judgment. O n February 13, 201 9 , a justice of the Superi or Court conducted a hearing on the ten ants’ motion and Ms. Marzett’s objection thereto. At that hearing , the hearing justice questioned (as had the tenants’ counsel) whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to decide the matter

. The hearing justice u ltimately continued the matter to March 13, 2019 so as to give the parties an opportunity to provide written briefs on the issue of jurisdiction. When the parties reconvened on March 13, 2019, the hearing justice , after finding that the Superior Court lac ked- 4

-

jurisdiction over the matter, dismissed all claims and counterclaims. Ms. Marzett timely appealed.
II Standard of Review We have stated that subject matter jurisdiction is “ an indispensable ingredient of any judicial proceeding * * * .” Sidell v. Side ll , 18 A.3d 499, 504 (R.I. 2011). Accordingly, the issue may be raised by the parties at any time , and it may be raised by the court sua sponte
. Id. Importantly, when this Court is

“ confronted with determining the correctness of the Superior Court ’ s dec ision ” with respect to a ruling on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court conducts a de novo review

. Long v. Dell, Inc. , 984 A.2d 1074 , 1078 (R.I. 2009).
III Analysis On appeal, Ms. Marzett argues that the hearing justice erred when she dis miss ed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She specifically contends
that , because the causes of action sounding in breach of contract and damage to property arise out of the former landlord

- tenant relationship between the parties (as
oppose d to a presently existing relationship) , they do not fall within the purview of- 5

-

G

. L

. 1956 § § 8

- 8

- 3(a)(2) 1 and 34

- 18

- 9 2 and , therefore , may be brought originally in the Superior Court

. We are not persuaded by Ms. Marzett’s contention.
After careful conside ration of § § 8

- 8

- 3(a)(2) and 34

- 18

- 9 , we are of the opinion that the hearing justice properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These two provisions of the General Laws make it abundantly
clear that a cause of action between a la ndlord and a tenant which aris e s pursuant
to one or more provision s of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act , chapter 18 of title 34 (the Act) , must first be commenced in the D istrict C ourt ( or in the appropriate housing court )

. We are satisfied that th e act s and failings to act alleged
in the complaint at issue fall within the just

- mentioned statutory criteria and that the hearing justice properly ruled that the complaint should have been originally filed in the D istrict C ourt

.

1 General Laws 1956 § 8

- 8

- 3(a)(2 ) provides as follows: “The district court sh all have exclusive original jurisdiction of * * * [a]ll actions between landlords and tenants pursuant to chapter 18 of title 34 [the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act] and all other actions for possession of premises and estates notwithstanding the prov isions of subsection (c) of this section * * *.” (Emphasis added.)

2 General Laws 1956 § 34

- 18

- 9 provide s as follows: “The district or appropriate housing court of this state shall exercise jurisdiction in both law and equity over any landlord or tenant with respect to any conduct in this state governed by this chapter or with respect to any claim arising from a transaction subject to this chapter. In addition to any other method provided by rule or by statute, personal jurisdiction over a landlord or te nant may be acquired in a civil action or proceeding commenced in the court by the service of process in the manner provided by § 34

- 18

- 10(c).”- 6

-

It is undisputed that t he parties in this case had, for a period of almost three
years, been in a landlord

- tenant relationship

. 3 It is further clear to this Court that
the cause s of action in the present case , which ar o se as a result of the rental agreement and subsequent relat ionship between the parties, fall squarely within the ambit of one or more provisions of the Act

. S ee , e.g. , §§ 34

- 18

- 24, 34

- 18

- 36 , 34

- 18

- 39. In particular , § 34

- 18

- 7 specifically p rovid es that the Act “ applies to, regulates and determines rights, obliga tions, and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located within this state

. ” Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the hearing justice acted appropriately in dismissing this case as a result of the Superior Court’s lack o f subject matter jurisdiction. Ms. Marzett also argues on appeal that th is Court’s decision in Errico v.
LaMountain , 713 A.2d 791 (R.I. 1998) , is controlling with respect to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction

. In that case, a tenant sustained seriou s injuries after she

3 We are not swayed by Ms. Marzett’s argument in favor of the Superior Court ’s exercise of subject matter juri sdiction which focuses on the fact that the defendants were former tenants due to the fact that they had vacated the premises prior to the filing of the complaint in this case. We would note that the plain language of the Act makes no distinction between current and former tenants, and it is certainly not our role to do what the L egislature has chosen not to do

. S ee Moretti v. Division of Intoxicating Beverages , 62 R.I. 281 , 28 6 , 5 A.2d 288, 290 (1939) (“It is our duty to construe the statute, not to redr aft it.”) ; see also Rhode Island Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Burke , 101 R.I. 644 , 647, 226 A.2d 420, 422 (1967) (stating that this Court “will go no farther than the [L] egislature has gone”) (internal quotation marks omitted)

.- 7

-

fell from the balcony of her second

- story apartment as a result of her having lean ed against a rotte d balcony railing. Errico , 713 A.2d at 792. The tenant filed a negligence action against her landlord in Superior Court , and a jury e ventually returned a verdict in the tenant’s favor

. Id. at 79 3 . This Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. Id. at 796. Ms. Marzett presently argues that,
because th e Superior Court in Errico exercised subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy between a tenant and her landlord, th e Superior Court may also exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the landlord

- tenant controversy in the present case

. We are unpersuaded by Ms. Marzett’s a rgument

. Ms. Marzett cites the Errico opinion not for any statements made therein by this Court, but rather for statements not made by this Court. Ms. Marzett relies entirely on the Court’s silence on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in arguing that the Court thereby tacitly acknowled ge d that jurisdiction was proper . We would emphatically emphasize that this Court speaks through its opinions on specific matters and not through its silence. And, although a court may raise sua sponte the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, this Court in Errico did not do so

— nor was it required to do so. Subject matter jurisdiction was not mentioned or alluded to even once in Errico

. In view of those “sounds of silence,” t hat case has no bearing on th e jurisdiction al question before us in the present case. In the pithy- 8

-

and wise words of the trial justice, “ Errico is * * * not determinative of the question of jurisdiction in this case.”
IV Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the order of the Superior Court. The record may be returned to that tribunal.

Justice Flaherty participated in the decision but retired prior to its publication.
Justice Lynch Prata and Justice Long did not participate.SU

- CMS

- 02A (revised June 2020) STATE OF RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT

– CLERK’S OFFICE L icht Judicial Complex 250 Benefit Street Providence, RI 02903
OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Latonya Marzett v . Amanda Letendre, alias, et al.

Case Number No. 2019

- 186

- Appeal. (PC 17

- 1994) Date Opinion Filed March 10, 2021

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
Written By Associate Justice William P. Robinson III
Source of Appeal Providence County Superior Court

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate J ustice Melissa A . Long

Attorney(s) on Appeal For Plaintiff: Steven A. Robinson, Esq. For Defendant: Nicole M. Labonte, Esq.