Assessment of Community Planning for

Mass Transit: Volume 3—Boston Case

Study

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-252681
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director

Daniel V. De Simone, Dcputy Director

URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority

Walter J. Bierwagen

Amalgamated Transit Union

Robert A. Burco

Oregon DOT

Jeanne J. Fox

Joint Center for

Political Studies

Lawrence A. Goldmuntz

Economics and Science Planning

Dorn McGrath

George Washington University

Bernard M. Oliver

Hewlett-Packard Corporation

Simon Reich

Gibbs and Hill

Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr.

Princeton University

Frederick P. Salvucci

Massachusetts DOT

Stewart F. Taylor

Sanders and Thomas, Inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF

Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager

Mary E. Ames Larry L. Jenney

V. Rodger Digilio Bev Johnson

Thomas E. Hirsch, 111 Teri Miles

CONTRACTORS

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.

. . 111
PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Boston,

Massachusetts metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by

the Office of Technology Assessment to provide an information base for an

overall assessment of community planning for mass transit.

The findings of the overall study are reported in the summary

document, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit, which forms the

first volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request of

the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of its

Transportation Subcommittee.

The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’s

Transportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by the

OTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owings

and Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for the

study. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible points

of view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.
INTRODUCTION

This report assesses how one of nine major

United States metropolitan areas made its decisions

about the development or modernization of rail

transit.

The assessment of the nine cities attempts to

identif y the factors that help communities, facing

critical technological choices, make wise decisions

that are consistent with local and national goals for

transit. The study investigates the following issues:

• Are there major barriers to communication

and cooperation among governmental

agencies involved in transit planning and

operating ? Do these barriers interfere with

making sound decisions ?

● Do transit decisions reflect the combined

interests of all major public groups, including citizen organizations, trade unions,

the business community, and others?

● Does the planning process provide enough

information about the advantages and

disadvantages of alternative courses of

action to provide a solid basis for making

decisions ?

● Does the availability or lack of financing, or

the conditions under which financing has

been provided, unnecessarily limit the

range of options that are considered?

The ultimate purpose of the work has been to

cast light on those prospective changes in national

transit policy and administrative programs which

might improve, in different ways and to different

extents, the way communities plan mass transit

systems. The nine cities were selected to represent

the full range of issues that arise at different stages

in the overall process of planning and developing a

transit system.

San Francisco, for example, has the first regional

rail system built in decades, while Denver is

planning an automated system, and voters in

Seattle have twice said “no” to rail transit funding

proposals.

The assessment of transit planning in each of the

nine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into an

evolving social process. Consequently, the study

results more closely resemble historical analysis

than classical technology assessment.

This study employs a set of evaluation guidelines

to orient the investigation in the nine metropolitan

areas and to provide the basis for comparative

judgments about them. The guidelines were

derived from issues identified during preliminary

visits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federal

requirements for transit planning, and an investigation via the literature into the state-of-theart in the field.

The evaluation guidelines cover major topics

which were investigated during the case assessment process. They deal with the character of the

institutional arrangements and the conduct of the

technical planning process.

GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Some of the most significant influences on

transit planning are exerted by the organizations

responsible for conducting the planning and

making the decisions. Three guidelines were used

to evaluate the institutional arrangements in the

nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

Agencies responsible for various aspects of

transit decisionmaking should cooperate

effectively in a clearly designated “forum”.

The participants in this forum should have

properly designated decisionmaking

authority, and the public should have

formal channels for holding decisionmakers accountable for their actions.

Citizens should participate in the transit

planning process from its beginning and

should have open lines of communication

with decision makers.

vii
GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The technical planning process provides the

information that public officials and their constituents draw upon in making plans and decisions.

Four guidelines were used to assess the technical

planning process in the nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

●

Broad, explicit goals and objectives should

guide technical planning and decisionmaking.

A range of realistic alternative solutions

should be developed.

The evaluation of these alternatives should

give balanced consideration to a full range

of goals and objectives.

A practical and flexible plan for financing

and implementation should be developed.

During visits to each of the nine metropolitan

areas, the study team interviewed the principal

representative of the transportation planning

institution and other main participants in the local

planning process. The visits were supplemented by

interviews with UMTA officials in Washington.

Pertinent documents—official plans, reports,

studies, and other material—were reviewed in each

case.

The information thus collected was used in

compiling a history of the transit planning process

in each case area, organized around key decisions

such as the decision to study transit, the selection of

a particular transit system, and public ratification

of the decision to pay for and build the system. The

main political, institutional, financial and technical

characteristics affecting the conduct of the planning process were then assessed in light of the

evaluation guidelines.

The same set of guidelines used in assessing each

case metropolitan area was employed in making a

generalized evaluation of the metropolitan experience. The results of the generalized evaluation

are summarized in the report, An Assesstnenf of

Community Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Report,

issued by the Office of Technology Assessment in

February 1976.

Vlll
.—

CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Existing Passenger Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Transportation Planning Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

CRITICAL HISTORY OF TRANSIT PLANNING AND

DECISIONMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Decision to Reevaluate Highway Plans:

The Moratorium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Decision to Recommend Transit Improvements:

The BTPR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Steps Toward Implementing Transit Improvements . . . . . . . . 18

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT PLANNING PROCESS . . . 21

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING

PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Technical Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

ix
Summary and Highlights

New light rail vehicles operate test runs on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority’s Green Line

. Boston’s rapid transit system is one of the

oldest and most extensive in the country.

Because of its age and pattern of

piecemeal growth through evolutionary

stages, the Boston transit system incorporates a melange of technologies: rapid

transit, streetcar trolley, trackless trolley,

commuter rail, and bus. In addition,

tunnels and vehicles in the four subway

lines have different dimensions and

operating characteristics. These physical

features constrain the operating efficien-

● Unlike recent highway and airport

controversies—both of which have aroused vigorous and polarized debate

throughout the Boston area—proposals

for expansion and improvement of the

transit and commuter rail system have not

engendered significant organized opposition on basic ideological grounds.

The consensus in favor of transit has been

both an asset and a liability. On the one

hand, opposition to increased capital

investment in transit has been minimal.

cy of the total system. On the

● Boston’s transit work force is among the projects

highest paid in the country, with a delivery

minimum annual salary for unionized received

workers totaling $14,000. The transit analysis

unions, which have strong supporters in modes.

other hand, proposed transit

and new approaches to the

of transit services have not

the same degree of critical

and evaluation as have other

the State legislature, have been . The Boston Transportation Planning

successful in negotiating favorable con- Review (BTPR) changed the Boston area

tract agreements. transportation planning process by

1
●

●

●

creating an open and participatory

framework for decisionmaking that has

been institutionalized by creation of the

Joint Regional Transportation Committee (JRTC), a policy advisory body,

and the Central Transportation Planning

Staff (CTPS), the technical equivalent of

the BPTR study team.

The Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority (MBTA), Boston’s transit

operating authority, was a reluctant

participant in the BTPR process. MBTA

resisted any fundamental reexamination

or revision of its past plans and priorities.

The BTPR staff of consultants was

oriented by training and experience to

highway planning, Its principal orientation, from a transportation planning

viewpoint, was to resolve specific

highway controversies that had arisen in

subregional corridors, and to reach

project-related decisions on those

proposed highway facilities. While this

orientation sharpened the focus of the

BTPR effort, it also tended to work against

the emergence of a regionwide transportation strategy and the development of

new approaches to transit service.

The BTPR rapid transit proposals are

largely consistent with the pre-BTPR

transit plans for suburban rapid transit

extensions. Although BTPR did investigate (and in some cases resulted in

the adoption of) other types of transit

services or facilities (e.g., preservation

and improvement of commuter rail service, special mobility services for lowincome and elderly groups, circumferential transit service), these services and

facilities appear to remain lower in

priority than rapid transit extensions, with

the exception of the commuter rail

improvement program.

. Despite the apparent consensus in favor

of an aggressive transit expansion

program that was reached following the

BTPR, no Federal approvals have been

granted and no construction has been

initiated on new transit projects during

the post-BTPR period (since January

1973). State and Massachusetts Bay

Transportation Authority officials have

complained about changing and ambiguous environmental review requirements. In addition, in recent project

hearings in the South Quincy area,

considerable local opposition has been

voiced to the proposed Red Line extension project. This opposition indicates

that specific project-related decisions

may raise troublesome problems despite

the region’s overall protransit consensus.
Metropolitan Settingl

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Boston is the cultural and economic “hub” of

New England. The Boston area’s academic institutions and research-oriented industries

support—and are supported by—a large group of

well-trained specialists. This group provides a

resource of technically skilled persons whose

specialties are either directly relevant or readily

adaptable to many of the complex issues raised by

transportation planning.

At the same time the Boston area is comprised of

numerous cities and towns having strong, longestablished, and separate identities. Even within

individual cities and towns, close-knit community

and neighborhood districts—often with a strong

ethnic character—provide a basis for organized

public involvement in planning efforts. By their

very nature, however, the existence of these strong

social and political units tends to work against the

development of regionally based constituencies and

viewpoints.

Boston also is the capital of a small and highly

politicized State. This factor tends to augment the

“visibility” of controversial transportation planning issues in the State in general, and in Boston in

particular.

Geographically, Boston (like all of New England)

is distant from the Nation’s economic markets and

is relatively poor in terms of exploitable natural

resources. Although Logan Airport handles a large

segment of international air traffic, maritime

commerce suffers from competition with more

advantageously located east-coast ports such as

New York and Baltimore.

The Boston metropolitan area is physically

defined by the ocean and three concentric rings of

development. The inner ring, with a radius of 5 to

5% miles from downtown Boston, comprises the

dense urbanized core, and includes Boston,

Brookline, Cambridge, Somerville, Medford,

Everett, Chelsea, Revere, and Winthrop. The

I See Figure 1, pages 12 and 13

second ring, extending some 11 miles from Boston

and roughly congruent with circumferential Route

128, includes a lower-density suburbanized belt of

cities and towns, with nodal concentration around

traditional town centers. The third ring, lying

around Routes 128 and 1-495, is a predominantly

open but suburbanizing portion of the Boston area.

Over the past 20 years, changes in type and

location of employment in Boston have affected

transportation needs. Employment has shifted

dramatically from a manufacturing base to a

predominance of jobs in service industries.

Simultaneously, the past two decades produced a

fairly slow but steady movement of jobs from the

core area (the city and inner suburbs) to the

suburban part of the region.

In absolute terms, the shift in employment has

not greatly affected the distribution of work trips

between the City of Boston and its suburban ring;

between 1960 and 1970 trips originating and

ending outside the city grew little more than 10

percent (see Figure 2). Nevertheless, the shift in

employment has created the need for a transportation system that can serve relatively low-density

employment concentrations because the new jobs

tend to be widely dispersed; only about a third have

been in clustered locations like industrial parks or

commercial-office complexes.

The types of jobs that have tended to move to the

suburbs employ minority workers; the city lost an

estimated 80,000 minority jobs in manufacturing

between 1950 and 1958, while the suburbs gained

12,000. Since minority workers tend to use public

transit to get to work, these shifts indicate

increased dependence upon bus or auto in areas

with relatively low-density employment concentrations.

The pattern of population growth and dispersal

reflects the change in location of employment

centers. From 1960 to 1970 the population of the

City of Boston fell 8.1 percent, and population

density declined at a similar rate. Meanwhile, both

population and density of the suburban ring grew

by 11.3 percent (see Figure 3).

3
WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION

Center City to suburban Rin g

suburban Ring to Center City

Beginning and Ending in Center City

Beginning and Ending in Suburban Ring

WORK TRIP MODE

FIGURE 2: BOSTON SMSA TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000 Plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

4
LAND AREA (1970)’

(square miles)

Suburban Ring 941

Center City 46

Entire SMSA 987

POPULATION

Suburban Center

Ring City

1960 1,898,284 697,197

1970 2,112,629 641,071

DENSITY

(population/square mile)

Suburban Center

Ring City

1960 2,017 15,156

1970 2,245 13,936

Population/Density

Percent Chanqe 1960-1970

11.3%

-8.1%

FIGURE 3: BOSTON METROPOLITAN AREA CHARACTERISTICS

I Does not include two new townships added to the SMSA since the 1970

Census.

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

5
Residents in the Boston central city as well as

residents in the suburbs rely heavily on public

transit for their commute to work. In 1970, 38

percent of all employed central city residents used

public transit to commute to work, while 14 percent

of all employed suburban ring residents used public

transit for this purpose. In each case, only New

York City had a higher percentage utilization of

public transit. By contrast, 44 percent of employed

central city residents and 74 percent of employed

suburban ring residents commuted by auto. Again,

only New York City residents ranked lower in

percentage commutation by auto.

In spite of Boston’s strong showing as a transit

city, transit use is declining in Boston, as it is in

most U.S. cities. The shift of jobs away from areas

served by the current rapid transit and feeder bus

systems parallels the drop in annual MBTA

ridership. From the recent peak of approximately

185 million annual passengers in 1967 (versus 175

million in 1963), ridership dropped steadily to 146

million in 1973. After a modest gain in 1974,

ridership again began to decline in early 1975 (see

Figure 4).

EXISTING PASSENGER

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM

Highways in the Boston area include the Route

128 circumferential highway, one of the earliest

“beltways” to be completed for a major American

city, and Route 495, an outer-ring circumferential.

A major portion of Route 128 has recently been

designated as 1-95 in substitution for the previously

proposed extension of Route 1-95 through the

downtown Boston core. The 1-95 project was

shelved following the Boston Transportation

Planning Review (BTPR) study.

Radial expressway facilities from Route 128 into

the downtown core include the Southeast Expressway, the Massachusetts Turnpike (1-90), and

Route 1-93. Route 2 extends inward from Route

128 to the city of Cambridge, while the Northeast

Expressway extends from downtown Boston to the

city of Revere. The Central Artery serves major

traffic flows within the downtown, connecting

with the Southeast Expressway, the Massachusetts

Turnpike, 1-93, and (via the Mystic River Bridge)

the Northeast Expressway. Numerous arterials

and parkway facilities also serve major vehicular

traffic flows. In addition to the deletion of proposed

Route 1-95, an extension of Route 2 and the Inner

Belt (proposed Route 1-695) were deleted from the

region’s highway plan as a result of the BTPR

study. Route 1-93 was subsequently signed to

follow the Central Artery and the Southeast

Expressway to a junction with Route 128 south of

Boston.

At the present time no major highway construction projects are proposed within the Route 128

perimeter, although major upgrading, minor

connector roads, parking terminals, and other

related highway improvement projects slated for

implementation within Route 128 carry an estimated price tag of $1.2 billion to $1.8 billion. z

Boston’s extensive but aging transit system,

operated by the Massachusetts Bay Transportation

Authority, includes 37 route miles of rail rapid

transit, 43 route miles of streetcar lines, 3,538

route miles of bus service, 8 route miles of trackless

trolley, and 480.2 track miles of commuter rai]

(operated through subsidy agreements with the

Boston & Maine and the Penn-Central Railroads).

The rail rapid transit network includes four main

lines—the Red, Orange, Green, and Blue Lines.

Having developed in piecemeal fashion over the

years, the Boston system is comprised of noninterchangeable vehicles. Not all tunnels in the

subway system can receive all vehicles currently in

operation. In addition, high- and low-level platforms are present on various lines. In essence, the

subway system consists of four separate systems,

with different rolling stock and servicing facilities.

Added to this, electrical buses, regular buses, and

the commuter rail system bring the total of

separate transit systems to seven.

MBTA’s transit operations have long experienced spiraling deficits. By 1960, when its annual

operating deficit reached nearly $15 million,

Boston’s transit system was suffering dramatically

greater losses than any other city studied. Today,

its annual operating deficit is second only to New

York’s. A major reason for this situation is the fact

that Boston’s transit work force is among the

highest paid in the country, with a minimum salary

for unionized workers totaling $14,000. Other

reasons include MBTA’s outdated equipment and

the fact that it generates much of its own power in

inefficient, oil-burning power plants.

MBTA adopted a lo-year transit development

program in 1974 that includes both small- and

2 Joint Regional Transportation Committee, Transportation Plan

for the Bodm Region, 1974-1983, Ju]y 1974.

6
VEHICLE MILES OPERATED

(millions of miles)

Peak Year = 1969 (48.5 million miles)

Low Year = 1965 (37.1 million miles)

1960 1965 1970 1974

307.4

198. 9

REVENUE PASSENGERS’

(millions of passengers)

144.3 Peak Year = 1968 (307.4 million passengers)

Low Year = 1971 (144.3 million passengers)

\

:

1960 1968 1974

NET OPERATING REVENUE

(millions of dollars)

Peak Year = 1962 (-$10,332,457 )

Low Year = 1974 (-$128,508,677 )

1960 1965 1970 1974

-$128. 5

FIGURE 4: BOSTON TRANSIT OPERATIONS. 1960–1974

Source: American Public Transit Association records for operations of the

Massachusetts Transit Authority and the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.

IData on revenue passengers not available for 1961-1966, 1969-1970.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities), usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

67.445 () - 7fi - 3

7
large-scale improvements to the existing system.

Extensions proposed for the Orange, Blue, and Red

Lines are currently under study. The program calls

for improving commuter rail and trackless trolley

service. It also recommends consideration of a

circumferential transit system in the downtown

area using an advanced technology. Finally, it

proposes investigating the feasibility of a new

cross-harbor tunnel exclusively for airport

limousines, buses, emergency vehicles, and

possibly carpools.

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

INSTITUTIONS

The Boston region’s institutional structure for

transportation planning is in the midst of transition. Policymaking functions are being moved away

from older organizations that are tied to the State

legislature to new agencies with a direct line of

responsibility to the Governor.

Executive Office of Transportation

and Construction (EOTC)

The Executive Office of Transportation and

Construction, a State cabinet-level office, was

created in 1971 as part of the reorganization of

State government. The reorganization clarified

lines of responsibility in the executive branch and

has resulted in the consolidation of many commissions and State departments. Although not yet

implemented in full, the reorganization of State

transportation agencies should result in the

streamlining of administration and a more consolidated approach to solving transportation

problems.

TABLE I.—Federally Recognized

Regional Agencies

On January 1, 1975, the Executive Office of

Transportation and Construction assumed responsibility for the preparation and annual revision of

MBTA’s transit development program. EOTC has

assigned this task to the Central Transportation

Planning Staff.

Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS)

The Central Transportation Planning Staff

(CTPS) was organized to provide a technical

transportation planning resource for the region.

This interagency group is intended to provide for

the more effective use of available resources by

permitting a more comprehensive and coordinated

approach to transportation planning. At the

request of EOTC, CTPS prepares the region’s

annual transit development program.

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

(MBTA)

The Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority was established by the State legislature in 1964.

It replaced the Metropolitan Transit Authority,

expanding participation in the transit district from

14 cities and towns to 78 (now 79). MBTA was

mandated to operate the area’s transit systems and

to plan improvements. The cities and towns in the

MBTA operating district are assessed according to

a statutory formula for funds to offset operating

deficits, However, in 1974 and 1975 the State

legislature agreed to pay half the deficit out of

general revenues. The State legislature must

approve bonding authority before MBTA can

launch new capital projects.

Until January 1975, MBTA policy was set by the

board of directors, and the executive function was

performed by a general manager. The general

manager position has been effectively eliminated

by the transfer of leadership to the chairman of the

board of directors.

As noted, responsibility for preparing the

region’s annual transit development program was

moved in January 1975 from MBTA to the State

Executive Office of Transportation and ConstrucDesignation Agency tlon.

A-95 Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC) MBTA Advisory Board

MPO Five agency compact chaired by the Secretary The Advisory Board, consisting of appointed

of the Executive Office of Transportation and representatives of the 79 cities and towns in the

Construction and including the Department MBTA district, does not play an active role in

of Public Works, the Metropolitan Planning

Council, the Massachusetts Bay Transporta- transit planning. Its principal function is to approve

tion Authority, and the MBTA Advisory Board. the annual operating budget of the authority. Since

the operating budget depends in part on the nature

8
and extent of the overall transit system, the

Advisory Board is also empowered by statute to

approve MBTA’s capital improvement program. It

thereby has an important, although indirect, voice

in the region’s transit planning and capital improvement programing functions.

The same legislation that revised the MBTA

board of directors and transferred planning responsibilities to EOTC also provided increased funds

($40,000 per year) for staff for the MBTA Advisory

Board. The additional staff assistance should

provide the Advisory Board with improved

capabilities in carrying out its review functions.

Joint Regional Transportation Committee (JRTC)

In 1973, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

through its Executive Office of Transportation and

Construction (EOTC) and the Department of

Public Works (DPW), joined with Boston’s

Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC), the

Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

(MBTA), and MBTA’s Advisory Board in a

Memorandum of Agreement to establish the Joint

Regional Transportation Committee (JRTC).

Representatives from the five signatory agencies,

delegates from eight other State agencies,

representatives of a dozen cities and towns, and a

number of citizens designated by the EOTC sit on

the committee, which functions as the region’s

policy advisory board for transportation planning

and programing.

Committee of Signatories

In March 1975 the same five agencies that

created JRTC established a second agreement to

service collectively as the region’s Metropolitan

Planning Organization and take charge of coordinating transportation planning in the Boston

areas The EOTC Secretary is chairman of the

group.

Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC)

The Metropolitan Area Planning Council, a

multi jurisdictional agency representing 101 cities

and towns in the Boston area, was created by the

State legislature in 1963. It functions as the A-95

project review agency. 4 MAPC is a signatory to the

Memorandum of Understanding that established

the MPO but its direct role in this committee is

limited primarily to administrative functions.

Massachusetts Department of Public Works

(DPW)

The Massachusetts Department of Public Works

historically was the dominant force in transportation planning in the Boston area. This dominance

ended with declaration of a moratorium on

highway construction in February 1970. Through

the State government reorganization plan, much of

DPW’S policymaking role was transferred to

EOTC.

J The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and the

Federal Highway Administration require Governors to

designate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (M PO) in each

area to carry cm t the “con tin uing, comprehensive transportation

planning process carried out cooperatively .“ (the “3-C”

process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and

the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974.

According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published ]n

September 197.s, MPO’S must prepare or endorse (1) a longrange general transportation plan, including a separate plan for

improvements in management of the existing transportation

system; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called the

Transportation Improvement Program (TIP), to ]mplement

portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planning

prospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work

programs,

J Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95 requires

one agency in each region to be empowered to review all

proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region.

Circular A-95 replaced Circular A-82, which was created to

implement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and

Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U. SC. 3301).

9
Critical History of Transit Planning

and Decisionmaking

Although the principal focus of this case assessment is transit planning, Boston’s recent transit

planning history can be understood only in the

context of all the transportation planning for both

highway and transit in the Boston area. Serious

interest in making improvements to the transit

system grew primarily in response to community

opposition to proposed expressway projects. The

following discussion is organized around three

major phases of the planning and decisionmaking

process: (1) the period of highway planning and the

citizen reaction to it that culminated in the 1970

moratorium on highway construction; (2) the

period of study called the Boston Transportation

Planning Review (BTPR) during which transit

issues came into focus; and (3) steps toward

implementing the BTPR transit proposals in the

period since 1972. The historical narrative is

intended to provide a framework for the discussions that follow of the institutional context and

technical work, in which particular emphasis is

placed on BTPR and its aftermath. The history is

summarized in a chronological listing that follows

this section.

DECISION TO REEVALUATE

HIGHWAY PLANS:

THE MORATORIUM

In the late 1960’s transportation issues in Boston

centered around highway projects proposed during

several decades of planning. Controversy arose as

citizens and elected officials within Route 128

began to realize the extent of residential and open

space displacement that would necessarily accompany expressway construction. The pressure

increased until Governor Francis Sargent placed a

moratorium on highway planning and construction

in February 1970.

Beginning in 1948 the State, through the

Department of Public Works, engaged in a growing

highway construction program that secured

widespread support among the State’s business and

industrial leaders. The culmination of this program

was to be a series of major expressway facilities

within Route 128, including the Inner Belt (Route

695), a third harbor tunnel, the final extensions of

State Route 2 and Route 1-93, and construction of

Route 1-95 from Route 128 in the south, through

downtown Boston and the new harbor tunnel, to

Route 128 in the north.

The Inner Belt—seen as the keystone of the

entire expressway system—was to be the last of the

three circumferential expressways serving Boston.

It was to have encircled downtown Boston, passing

through the Back Bay/Fenway institutional complex, crossing the Charles River, and continuing

through Cambridge and Somerville.

This expressway system, which was rooted in the

1948 Master Highway Plan, was revised and expanded

by the 1968 Recommended Highway and Transit Plan, a

multiyear, $2 billion highway and transit construction program affecting 152 of the State’s 351

communities. The 1968 plan was a product of the

Eastern Massachusetts Regional Planning Project

(EMRPP). EMRPP was begun in 1962 as a joint

undertaking of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA), the State Department of

Public Works (DPW), the Metropolitan Area

Planning Council (MAPC), and the Department of

Commerce and Development.

Although the 1968 EMRPP plan did include a

number of transit extensions and other improvements, it was clear that only the highway

program was assured of the necessary local and

Federal funding resources required for construction. Through State constitutional limitations on

the use of gas tax revenues, s the highway program

enjoyed a ready and growing source of local

matching funds. At the Federal level, the highway

program was generously funded and, for interstate

facilities, required only a 10 percent local matching

share.

By contrast, transit construction projects required specific bonding authorization on a projects In 1974, voters removed this 1 i mi ta t ion i n a statewide

referendum.

11

\

o

N 7

0 .

0

ti D1
by-project basis, and the provision of bonding

authority required a two-thirds affirmative vote on

the part of the State legislature. Since many

legislators resided in areas of the State that would

not directly benefit from MBTA projects, and since

the State normally assisted MBTA in defraying

debt service related to capital construction projects,

this legislative support was often difficult to obtain.

Similarly, at the Federal level, little money was

being made available for extensive transit improvement projects.

In this context popular concern over potentially

destructive side-effects of highway construction

began to grow. By February 1968, Cambridge and

Boston had been successful undemanding a restudy

of the Inner Belt. Federal Highway Administrator

Lowell Bridwell committed the Bureau of Public

Roads to two new studies, one to review the need

for the road and the other to develop roadway

design solutions that attempted to minimize

anticipated adverse effects of the facility.

However, the Inner Belt was but one proposed

element of the planned system. Encouraged by the

Inner Belt restudy but apprehensive that the new

studies would turn out to be “whitewash,” local

action groups continued to develop closer alliances

and to organize protest rallies and demonstrations.

Eventually, the Greater Boston Committee on the

Transportation Crisis (GBC) was organized in

1968-69, and served as an umbrella organization

that began to wield considerable political clout.

In 1969, Governor John Volpe resigned to

become Secretary of the U.S. Department of

Transportation. Governor Volpe, who had formerly served as Commissioner of Public Works and had

taken a strong stand in favor of highway construction, was succeeded by Francis Sargent, also a

former DPW Commissioner, who in the 1960’s had

approved the very expressway system that was

now being called into question.

However, Governor Sargent also had served

previousl y as Commissioner of the Department of

Natural Resources. Continuing his strong interest

in environmental matters, Sargent became concerned over the potential environmental degradation that could result from highway construction.

Sargent and his policy advisors began to give

favorable hearing to the antihighway forces. Atone

critical point in August 1969, Sargent refused to

allow an immediate transfer to DPW of certain

State-owned parkland in the Fowl Meadow that

was essential for the construction of Route 1-9s.

The highway opponents also found support in

Boston’s City Hall, where liberal Mayor Kevin

White had replaced former Mayor John Collins in

1967. During his 8-year term, Collins alined closely

with the Chamber of Commerce and other groups

that favored highway construction and had spoken

out for the expressway system. Mayor White’s

political base, which was organized around

neighborhood interests, made his administration

sensitive to the growing concern over displacement

and disruption. b In fact, several of White’s “Little

City Hall” administrators were in the forefront of

the antihighway (and antiairport expansion)

transportation struggles. Mayor White eventually

withdrew the city’s support of the South End

Bypass, a city-sponsored project that was essential

to the efficient operation of the proposed

Southwest Expressway (1-95).

Thus, by 1969, the stage was set for a complete

reassessment of the State’s transportation policies

for the Boston area. Toward the end of the year,

Governor Sargent appointed a task force, chaired

by Professor Alan Altshuler of MIT, to study the

State’s transportation planning and decisionmaking process. Mayor White, other politicians,

and spokespersons on the antihighways side strongly criticized the Governor for taking a middle

course, and within weeks the task force’s brief but

sharply critical interim report to the Governor

paved the way for the announcement of a general

highway planning and construction moratorium in

February 1970. T Sargent suspended property

acquisition in the proposed expressway rights-ofway and canceled the remaining portions of the

Inner Belt design study. He proposed a larger

“rest udy,” which became the Boston Transportation Planning Review (BTPR), to determine

whether the new roads should be built, as well as

where and how.

DECISION TO RECOMMEND

TRANSIT IMPROVEMENTS:

THE BTPR

Despite the long history of transportationrelated controversy, transit issues played a relatively limited role in the Governor’s moratorium

b Displacement was a real concern, not a potential threat;

DPW had begun land acquisition and clearance in several

expressway corridors.

7 The moratorium was not applied to 1-93, which was by then

well into construction.

14
--

Highway construction issues dominated Boston’s most significant recent transportation

planning program, the Boston Transportation Planning Review

decision. The political issue was highway

construction—and more importantly, the environmental and community impacts associated

with highway construction. Transportation policy,

as such, was not widely debated by the participants

in the controversy, and there was little discussion

of transportation quality or service needs.

Transit proposals had surfaced during the 1960’s

but drew little public attention. The Eastern

Massachusetts Regional Planning Program had

provided an extensive data base that MBTA used to

prepare its Program for Mass Transportation in August

1966. The 1966 plan proposed a series of “action

projects” costing an estimated $340 million. The

proposals included extensions of the Orange and

Red Lines, replacements of rolling stock on the Blue

and Green Lines, and elimination of elevated

structures in Charlestown and South End/Roxbury. The 1966 plan was updated and revised by

MBTA in 1969 based on continuing planning

analyses conducted by ERMPP (which concluded its

work that year). The 1969 revisions updated capital

cost estimates for the 1966 plan based on

preliminary engineering work and inflation factors.

However, the MBTA plan did not figure

prominently in the events of the following year. A

number of loosely related factors account for this.

First, highways presented an immediate,

recognizable threat around which political action

could be organized. Boston already had an established core transit system, and the highway

versus transit choice was not posed as starkly as it

might have been in a city with no rail transit

services at all. Similarly, no major interest group

opposed transit, and even prohighway interests

agreed that transit was a valid type of transportation service, although of lower priority than

highways, Furthermore, most of the proposed

transit improvements contained in the 1968

EMRPP report were located along underused rail

rights-of-wa y and would not require extensive

displacement or disruption of the sort that often

attracts the attention of political leaders. Finally,

transit funding appeared too uncertain to allow

15
antihighway leaders to present transit as a viable

alternative for the short-term future.

Moreover, very few people had a clear concept of

the political or functional interrelationships

between highways and transit. Two major and

visible exceptions were then State Representative

(now Governor) Michael Dukakis, and Professor

Altshuler. Dukakis pressed Governor Sargent in

1969 to provide more highway money in the

western part of the State, where he said it was

needed, and to greatly expand mass transportation

in Boston:

In the western part of the State, the imbalance

of highway money is an excellent political

issue. And the absence of an adequate rapid

transit system is a damn good political issue in

the east. s

For his part, Altshuler supported a joint funding

mechanism for highways and transit and perceived

the role transit should play in a total transportation

system,

As the BTPR Study Design was being formulated

during the latter part of 1970, however, increasing

attention was being given to transit options, Under

the direction of Professor Altshuler, the BTPR

Steering Committee (composed of municipal

appointees and a broad array of community

organization spokespersons) defined a “sketch

planning” process designed to facilitate consideration of a wide range of alternatives—including

modal alternatives as well as highway location and

design options. With all land acquisition and

highwa y construction activities suspended until

completion of BTPR, the pressing concerns over

highway displacement and disruption began to

relax, and the possibility of developing a transportation policy for Boston (as opposed to antihighway

policy) appeared realistic.

Nevertheless, once the Study Design was completed and the BTPR consultant team selected, it

was clear that the highway issues retained first

priority, for both political and practical reasons.

Considerable sums had already been expended to

acquire rights-of-way and to prepare them for

construction; Federal interstate highway monies

were available and, at that time, could be spent only

on the designated highway facilities; and political

commitments had been made at all levels to reach

final highway decisions as quickly as possible.

Moreover, the battle lines between prohighway

and antihighway groups were still clearly and

bitterly defined.

Meanwhile, there was no pressure to reach

definitive transit decisions. Very few direct adverse

impacts were attributable to any of the transit

facilities under study, and those that were present

were minimal in comparison to the adverse impacts

of the proposed highway facilities. Although in

1971 the legislature had authorized $124 million in

bonds for transit facility construction, the ability to

move forward was limited by the availability of

Federal assistance and, more importantly, by the

fact that several of the most important transit

projects were to be built jointly with proposed

highway projects, so that no real progress was

possible until the highway issues had been put to

rest.

Equally important, most of the key members of

the BTPR consultant team had had considerable

prior experience with major projects elsewhere in

the country. They were prepared by training and

experience to focus on highway issues and proved

to be less well prepared for conceptualizing and

detailing innovative transit solutions. Although

MBTA had experienced transit planners on its own

staff, the MBTA executive staff declined to

participate actively in the technical work of the

BTPR or to advocate forcefully an expanded transit

program or an innovative transit solution. MBTA’s

prime objective was to assure that nothing that

occurred during the BTPR would significantly

disturb MBTA preestablished plans and

priorities—which had been cleared through the

State legislature, whose members had been in the

past, and would be in the future, required to

approve MBTA’s bonding requests.

Despite these constraints, BTPR did identify and

analyze a number of transit projects that had not

received top priority in previous transit planning

studies. These projects included (a) the Commuter

Railroad Improvement Program (CRIP);9 (b) a

proposal for circumferential transit service along

the inner belt corridor; lo (c) analysis of replacement

service for Roxbury and the South End; ll (d)

8 Lupo, Colcord, and Fowler, Rites of Way: The Politics of

Transportation in Boston and the U.S. Boston: Little Brown, 1971. The g BTPR, Commuter Rail )mprouement Program. Boston 1972.

long and often bitter history of highway opposition in Boston 10 BTPR, ClrcUmferen/fa/ Tran5if, Boston 1972.

has been ably chronicled in this book. I I BTpR, sou~hu~est Corridor Reporf. Boston 1972.

16
studies of special mobility needs; 12 and (e) a bus

tunnel alternative to the third harbor crossing. 13

(a) The proposed track bed, rolling stock, and

station improvements recommended by the CRIP

study were supported by Governor Sargent and

have been incorporated into BMTA’s 10-Year

Transit Deuelopment Program. The Boston area’s

extensive commuter rail network had been sorely

neglected for years. MBTA’s rapid transit extension program favored the gradual replacement of

commuter rail service by rapid transit extensions

which would generally occupy existing rail rightsof-way. Suburban commuter rail patrons argued

strongly that substitution of transit service often

meant several years’ suspension of any service

during construction, and that the completed rapid

rail extensions rarely served as large an area as the

commuter rail system, despite the high capital costs

involved. BTPR investigated the feasibility of

upgrading and retaining the commuter rail system

in light of the costs to MBTA for continued

subsidization of commuter rail service. The CRIP

study paralleled the State’s negotiation for and

subsequent purchase of the Penn-Central

Railroad’s trackage on the southern side of Boston,

a step which has preserved some 140 miles of track

for transportation purposes. (Similar negotiations

with the Boston & Main Railroad for purchase of

trackage to the north of Boston were completed in

July 1975.)

(b) The circumferential transit service project is

briefly described in MBTA’s Transit Development

Program but is not proposed for construction

within the next decade. The concept was studied

late in 1971 after Governor Sargent decided not to

construct the Inner Belt expressway. The new

facility was considered both because it could make

use of lands already acquired by the State and

because it could provide a much-needed transit link

between the existing radial rapid transit lines. The

possibility of connecting the Red Line in Cambridge

with the Green and Orange Lines in the Back

Bay/Fenway institutional complex in Boston was

particularly attractive. Presently, large volumes of

trips are made between these points, either by bus

or by traveling by transit to downtown Boston and

transferring to an out-bound rail car on the Orange

I z BTpR, Moblllt~ Problems of Elderly Cambridge Residents. Boston

1972, and BTPR, Spetlai Moblllfy Staff Report. Boston 1972. See

also, BTPR, Study E/ement ,? Summary Report: Community Liaison and

Te[hnlcal Assistance, Boston 1973.

IS BTpR, ~hlrd Harbor Cross]ng. Boston 1972.

or Green Lines. The circumferential route could

improve service on these and other already

crowded lines. In a broad conceptual study of the

circumferential line, both PRT and conventional

transit systems were investigated, as well as

alternative alinement locations and distances. The

most extensive version given serious study would

connect South Station in Boston to Sullivan Square

in Charlestown.

(c) MBTA’s proposed Orange Line Relocation

and Extension would have resulted in a reduction of

rapid transit service to two heavily transitdependent Boston neighborhoods. Largely as a

result of continued political pressure, these communities were able to direct the attention of BTPR

toward an analysis of potential transit replacement

services, Although the precise nature of these

replacement transit services has yet to be defined in

detail, the 10-Year Transit Development Program does

provide for “high standard” replacement service to

each community as part of the Orange Line

Relocation Program. This commitment represents

a recognition of the need to balance a policy of

suburban-oriented rapid transit extensions with a

policy of continued quality service for transitdependent inner-city neighborhoods.

(d) BTPR staff assisted several communities in

analyzing the need for special mobility and

coverage transit services in addition to existing bus

and rapid transit services. Although very few

concrete changes resulted from these studies,

several new bus routes were established, and

MBTA has begun to give more attention to

management and other low-capital-intensive transit programs that serve special mobility needs or

provide broader transit coverage. In addition to a

reduced fare for the elderly, which was introduced

prior to BTPR, recent innovations include the use

of prepaid passes, “dime time” fares during midday

hours, and increased express bus services.14

(e) AS an alternative to a general-purpose third

harbor tunnel, BTPR developed a two-lane bus

tunnel option that would be open only to buses,

taxis, airport limousines, emergency vehicles, and

possibly multioccupancy automobiles. The bus

tunnel would provide sufficient capacity to relieve

congestion in the existing harbor tunnels but

would not entail the cost or disruption of the

1 ~ The “dime.time” reduced fare experiment failed to increase

off-peak riders hip on the subway system and was discontinued

in August 197s,

17
previously proposed six-lane general-purpose

tunnel. Although this facility was supported by

Governor Sargent, the legislature has failed to

remove a statutory restriction that prohibits

construction of any new vehicular tunnels in

proximity to the existing harbor tunnels.

STEPS TOWARD IMPLEMENTING

TRANSIT IMPROVEMENTS

Although Governor Sargent dropped most of the

major pending highway proposals and announced

an aggressive transit improvement program for the

Boston area during a statewide televised broadcast

in November 1972, little tangible progress has

taken place during the 2% years since that time. A

number of interrelated factors account for this

failure to move forward with the region’s transit

improvement program.

First, despite the generally favorable press

response and public acceptance of the Governor’s

transportation policy, some prohighway sentiment

continued during the months following the BTPR

study. The Governor and his transportation

advisers came under backstage pressure for a full or

partial reconsideration of various highway project

decisions.

Second, the source of funding for the transit

improvement program was not clear. Secretary

Altshuler had been instrumental in lobbying for

inclusion of an interstate transfer provision in the

Federal Highway Act of 1973. Even though a

transfer provision favorable to Massachusetts was

enacted, a considerable amount of time and effort

was expended by State officials in working out the

details of the interstate transfer program with

Federal officials. The more than $600 million that

was eventually promised to the State was essential

to the definition of a credible transit construction

program, and until this amount was finally

committed, the State had difficulty in developing a

workable schedule and list of priorities for the

region’s 10-year program.

Third, practical and political difficulties involved

in the various transportation agency

reorganizations also have occupied a substantial

amount of staff time. These include the continuing

consolidation of transportation planning and

policymaking responsibilities within EOTC, the

creation of both JRTC and CTPS (as well as the

development of an open participatory planning

process within the JRTC/CTPS framework), and

the restructuring of MBTA, each discussed

elsewhere in this case assessment. Each major shift

of powers and responsibilities has invoIved extensive interagency negotiations and compromise. At

times these political realinements took priority

over technical and administrative matters.

Fourth, UMTAdeclined to accept any of the draft

environmental impact statements prepared by

BTPR. UMTA judged these statements to be

inadequate because, Iike the BTPR study process

itself, they focused largely on highway facility

alternatives. Thus, MBTA has been compelled to

develop additional alternatives and to restudy the

environment} effects of each of the transit

projects included in its current program. Both

former EOTC Secretary Altshuler and the present

secretary, Frederick P. Salvucci, have said that

UMTA’S decision created unnecessary delays in the

implementation of Boston’s transit program,

particularly due to the length of time consumed in

UMTA’S reviews of the new studies, (UMTA—

unlike the Federal Highway Administration—

retains the responsibility for actually preparing and

circulating the formal draft and final environmental impact statements despite its small, overworked

staff. ) Secretary Salvucci has argued further that

the region’s transit program should be exempt

from strict application of environmental review

procedures since transit projects are environmentally “clean,” particularly in comparison with

highway facilities. In any event, the two secretaries’

arguments to date have been ineffective and, some

critics say, they may have contributed to further

delays in advancing projects for final approval and

implementation.

Fifth, despite a continuing broad-based consensus in favor of the general transit policy underlying

Governor Sargent’s transit improvement program,

opposition to specific transit project location and

design details has arisen—as witnessed by controversies over the planning and design issues

surrounding the relocated Orange Line in the

southwest corridor; the Red Line extension from

Harvard Square through Cambridge, Somerville,

Arlington, and Lexington; and the Red Line

extension from Quincy along the South Shore. In

brief, local citizens and officials have expressed

concern over potential environmental, land use,

parking, and local street congestion impacts due to

new transit construction and operation, especially

in the vicinity of transit stations. In large part the
opposition has been aggravated by a lack of

adequate information regarding the potential

social, economic, and environmental effects of the

various projects. However, each of the major

interdisciplinary studies now underway (or soon to

be initiated) 15 should provide the technical data

required to conduct an informed debate on the

issues, even if they do not fully resolve the points in

contrivers y.

During the 1974 gubernatorial election campaign, the present Governor, Michael Dukakis,

sharply criticized Sargent for his administration’s

lack of transit construction activity and promised to

push vigorously at the regional, State, and Federal

levels for increased transit assistance and project

approvals. Nevertheless, despite a continuing

commitment to transit progress, the Dukakis

administration has not had any notably greater

success in advancing the transit program into

actual construction. The basic problems cited

above, as well as the State’s current and pervasive

fiscal crises, continue to plague the program.

MBTA’s continually rising operating deficit also

I‘ see page 29

affects progress toward transit improvements, as

evidenced by the recent abandonment of MBTA’s

off-peak hours “dime time” fare experiment, which

proved to have been unsuccessful in attracting new

ridership.

At the same time, the long-term outlook for

Boston’s transit future remains optimistic. The

basic consensus in favor of an aggressive and

extensive transit improvement program has continued, despite differences over specific location

and design details, the appropriate transit mode,

and implementation priorities. Reorganization of

the region’s and the State’s transportation agencies

promises to improve transit planning and operation. The recent purchase of the Boston & Maine

Railroad’s trackage north of Boston for $39 million

(subject to approval by the bankruptcy trustees),

like the previous Penn-Central system acquisition

to the south, will provide a ready source of rightsof-way for transit and other transportation improvement facilities. Finally, the growing

awareness and concern over environmental, land

use, and energy consumption problems may tend to

encourage transit programs in Boston, provided

localized impact issues can be successfully resolved.

19
Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

1825

1889

1897

1924

1926

1945-7

1948

1957

1962

1964

1966

1968

The first omnibus line was started

between Boston and Roxbury.

The first electric streetcar line was

opened.

The first subway in the United States

was opened. (It is still in use as part of

MBTA’s Green Line.)

The Boston Harbor transit tunnel was

converted to rapid transit use. (It is now

part of Blue Line.)

The Report on Improved Transportation

Facilities developed a plan for the extension of rapid transit facilities.

Reports by the Metropolitan Transit

Recess Commission (Coolidge Commission Reports) recommended extension

and improvement of rapid transit routes

and the creation of a Metropolitan

Transit Authority (MTA).

The Master Highway Plan, was published.

This plan set the philosophy and, with

modifications, the location of major

proposed expressway facilities within

and including Route 128. It was prepared

by C. A. Maguire & Associates.

The Report on Traffic Studies for the Boston

Meiropolitan Area reexamined the Master

Highway Plan in light of revised travel

forecasts. It was prepared by Coverdale

& Colpitts.

The Eastern Massachusetts Regional

Planning Program (EMRPP) began.

The Massachusetts State legislature

established the Massachusetts Bay

Transportation Authority (M BTA),

expanding the 14 city-and-town MTA

District to 78 (now 79) cities and towns,

Program for Mass Transportation was

published by the MBTA.

The Eastern Massachusetts Regional

Planning Project published its

Recommended Highway and Transit Plan.

1969 MBTA released a Reuised Program for Mass

Transporlalion.

1969 Governor Sargent appointed a transportation task force to advise him on steps

to take in reevaluating the region’s

highway program.

1970 In January, the transportation task

force’s interim report recommended a

moratorium on highway construction

and planning, and on February 8 ,

Governor Sargent formally announced

the moratorium.

Later in the year a Governor-appointed

Steering Committee published Study

Design for the Boston Transportation

Planning Review.

1971 The State legislature authorized bonds

totaling $124 million to finance

designated transit improvement projects.

A program to reorganize State administrative agencies was begun and the

Executive Office of Transportation and

Construction created.

1971-3 The 18-month Boston Transportation

Planning Review (BTPR) study was

conducted. At its conclusion the Governor deleted several proposed expressway projects within Route 128 and

opted instead for a transit strategy.

Subsequently the Governor began seeking transfer of Federal interstate funds

and additional transit funds to carry out

a more than $1 billion transit program.

1973 The State legislature voted to assume 50

percent of MBTA’s operating deficit.

The U.S. Federal-Aid Highway Act of

1973 authorized transfer of certain

interstate funds to transit projects and

relaxed the Urban Systems program to

allow some transit funding.

The Joint Regional Transportation

Committee (JRTC) was created by joint

21
agreement of the Executive Office of

Transportation and Construction, the

Department of Public Works, the

Metropolitan Area Planning Council,

the Metropolitan Boston Transportation Authority, and the MBTA Advisory

Board.

1974 The U.S. Department of Transportation

approved an interstate fund transfer of

over $600 million to Boston.

The Central Transportation Planning

Staff (CTPS) organization was created

by State transportation officials.

1974-5 MBTA issued its 10-Year Transit Development Program and selected planningengineering consultants for the Orange

Line, Blue Line, and Red Line extension

projects.

1975 In January, the Executive Office of

Transportation and Construction

(EOTC) assumed responsibility for

preparing the region’s annual transit

improvement program. In March, the

State designated a multiagency group to

be the Metropolitan Planning Organization. This group was created by a fiveagency compact signed by the Executive

Office of Transportation and Construction, the Department of Public Works,

the Metropolitan Area Planning Council, the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, and the MBTA Advisory

Board. The EOTC Secretary was named

chairman.

22
Assessment of the Planning

and Decisionmaking Process

.

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

The institutional context for transit decisionmaking in the Boston region is complex because of

the sheer number of jurisdictions in the area and

the presence of the State capital. However, over the

past few years a relatively effective institutional

structure has evolved in which the State Executive

Office of Transportation and Construction

(EOTC) plays the lead role, working closely with

the region’s Central Transportation Planning

Staff.

Forum for Decisionmaking

Historically, transportation decisions in Boston

were made by semiautonomous highway and

transit agencies and local governments. Recent

agency reorganization programs have centralized

transportation policymaking in EOTC and clarified

transportation planning and project development

responsibilities in the Boston area.

Historically, the Massachusetts Bay Transit

Authority (MBTA), the MBTA Advisory Board,

and the General Court (the State legislature)

shared the power to identify and implement new

capital improvement projects. The General Court

must approve new bonding authority by a twothirds affirmative vote. Since such authority

traditionally has been granted on a project-byproject basis, the General Court has retained a

substantial measure of control over the timing and

location of new capital improvement projects.

Considering that $389 million in bonding authority

was authorized during the first 10 years of MBTA’s

existence (1964-73), the General Court has enjoyed

considerable leverage over MBTA’s construction

program.

As of January 1, 19’75, however, an additional

major actor has been inserted into the decisionmaking process. On that date the Exectuive Office

of Transportation and Construction (EOTC)

assumed responsibilit y for preparation of the

region’s annual program for mass transportation.

Because the Secretary of Transportation and

Construction is appointed by and serves at the

pleasure of the Governor, the executive branch of

23
State government is now directly involved in the

transit planning and decisionmaking process. As its

transit planning responsibilities have shifted to

EOTC, MBTA has come to function primarily as a

transit operating agency. The MBTA Advisory

Board, however, still participates in transit

policymaking, albeit in a minor way, through its

statutory power to approve MBTA’s capital

improvement program.

EOTC holds a powerful position in Boston’s

transportation decisionmaking by virtue of its

responsibility y for all transportation issues—

highway, rail, port, and airport. Since the

governmental reorganization plan of 1971, EOTC

has consolidated under one administrative roof a

number of agencies, boards, and commissions that

previously were autonomous in terms of setting

transportation policies and operating transportation facilities within the Boston area. These entities

include the Department of Public Works, MBTA,

Massport, Masspike, and certain transportation

functions of the Metropolitan District Commission.

In March 1975, ETOC’S lead role in regional

transportation planning was officially sanctioned

when the EOTC Secretary was named chairman of

the five-agency collective Metropolitan Planning

Organization. Thus the EOTC Secretary is ultimately responsible for the distribution of all

Federal transportation grants within the area.

EOTC provides an effective centralized forum for

creation and coordination of basic transportation

policy. This forum has led to more efficient

transportation planning and management of

operations.

The Department of Public Works (DPW), like

MBTA, has transferred much of its policymaking

function to EOTC. Although DPW retains a

considerable amount of power—due to its size

budgetary resources, and political connections

throughout the State—major policy and project

decisions are made by the Secretary of EOTC.

Similarly, although DPW’S Bureau of Transportation Planning and Development maintains a large

staff of transportation planners, CTPS has taken

the lead role in technical transportation planning in

the Boston area.

Because it is the region’s A-95 review body and

coordinates the area’s land use planning efforts, the

Metropolitan Area Planning Council (MAPC)

might be expected to take a relatively strong

position in regional transportation decision making.

However, due to the jealously guarded independence of local cities and towns in the Boston

area, MAPC usually exercises a cautious, advisory

role in the region’s affairs. This approach has

tended to limit the influence exerted by MAPC in

recent years on transportation planning and

decisionmaking, on both a technical and policy

level.

Since its creation in 1974 the Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS) has become the

vehicle for most technical transportation planning

work in the region. CTPS is an interdisciplinary

group of technical specialists modeled after the

BTPR study team. The structure facilitates close

coordination between transportation and land use

planning.

Although officially responsible only for the

technical aspects of the planning process, CTPS

tends to become involved in policy matters through

a close working relationship with EOTC. When

EOTC recently was given responsibility for

preparing the region’s annual transit development

program, it delegated this task to CTPS.

The Joint Regional Transportation Committee

(JRT C) acts principally as an advisory body.

Through this organization DPW, MBTA, and

MAPC—along with numerous delegates from

cities and towns as well as private organizations—

can review decisions reached by EOTC and CTPS.

JRTC does not have a technical staff and has no

specific planning responsibility other than its

reviewing and advisory duties.

Accountability of Decisionmakers

The recent statutory reallocation of transit

decisionmaking responsibilities, discussed in the

preceding paragraphs, tends to focus considerable

attention on the Office of the Secretary of

Transportation and Construction and—

ultimately—on the Governor’s office as well. The

Governor is the only elected official involved in

transit-related decisions who is responsible to the

entire regional electorate, and therefore the

gubernatorial election is the public’s most direct

formal check on the decisionmaking process.

Lodging the power for transit decisionmaking in

a Governor’s appointee has several advantages in

terms of accountability. Decisionmakers are most

directly accountable if the public can vote them in

and out of office. The EOTC secretary is not

elected, of course, but his direct superior is. For the

past several years Massachusetts Governors have

24
been deeply involved in Boston transportation

issues. The Governor and the secretary therefore,

are not only more directly accountable than the

other transportation decisionmakers in the area

but they bring greater visibility to the process. In

addition, the Governor and EOTC can view issues

with more of a truly regional perspective than

representatives from local jurisdictions, who

understandably tend to give first priority to more

parochial interests and obligations.

MBTA is directed by a board of directors who,

although initially appointed by the Governor, serve

for a fixed term and have no direct accountability to

the electorate. However, the chairman of the board

of directors, who also functions as the chief

executive officer of MBTA, does serve at the

pleasure of the Governor.

By virtue of voting to approve financing for

major transit projects, the State legislature influences transit decisions. These legislators are

subject to election and therefore can be held

accountable for their actions. However, representatives of the State legislature are accountable only

to their limited geographic constituencies and—

since many representatives are elected from

districts outside the MBTA area—a large number

have no political ties to the residents and voters of

the MBTA district itself.

Similarly, members of the MBTA Advisory

Board are appointed by each of the 79 member cities

and towns of the MBTA district. Their accountability is also limited to the local area which they

represent. Likewise, each MAPC representative

owes allegiance to one of the 101 cities and towns

participating in that agency.

The Joint Regional Transportation Committee

(JRTC) is an advisory body in which nearly half the

committee members represent various interest

groups. Although the structure may improve the

extent to which the full range of public viewpoints

is brought to bear on the transit decisionmaking

process, there are no formal channels for members

of the public to exercise approval or disapproval of

the way their interests are being represented, The

Central Transportation Planning Staff (CTPS),

because it consists of technicians, is further

removed from accountability.

Public Involvement

BTPR constituted a major experiment of

nationwide significance in its approach to developing an open, participatory study process. The BTPR

philosophy has been carried over to the newly

established JRTC and CTPS.

The BTPR process greatly expanded and refined

the process of citizen and public agency participation in the transportation planning process.

Numerous individuals, groups, and agencies that

previously had little interest or means for becoming

involved in transportation decision making were

provided with a forum in which conflicting views

could be debated and resolved. While not without

flaws, the process of discussion, negotiation,

compromise and—most important y—mutual

education was greatly facilitated.

BTPR involved many private groups and individuals beyond the traditional and relatively wellorganized economic and political interests that

traditionally participated in the formulation of

regional transportation policies. The Steering

Group that developed the BTPR Study Design was a

broadly representative body with delegates from

cities and towns, State agencies, and private

organizations throughout the Boston area. It

continued in operation during the BTPR in a policy

advisory capacity as the BTPR “Working Committee.” Many of the same groups continue to be

involved in transportation planning through

membershi p on the Joint Regional Transportation

Committee.

On the other hand, criticism of the BTPR

approach to community participation was voiced by

organizations and individuals who were dissatisfied

with the study’s findings and felt their interests

were not adequately represented. In particular,

groups fearful that curtailing highway programs

would harm Boston’s economy, and particularly the

viability of the downtown, charged that the

prohighway point of view was under-represented

in the participation scheme. The Boston Chamber

of Commerce, for example, produced its own

evaluation of the economic effects of eliminating

the Southwest Corridor, recommending that the

highway—which would have provided the I-95

connection between Boston’s CBD and Providence

and New York to the south—should be built. The

Chamber’s report made little impact on BTPR

decisionmakers, but post-BTPR citizen involvement campaigns have been careful to welcome

groups such as the Chamber of Commerce and

other traditional urban -develop men t-oriented

organizations into the process.

The BTPR community involvement philosophy

has been incorporated in the procedures and

25
institutions that have been established since

1973—notably in the Joint Regional Transportation Committee, as well as in project-by-project

“working committees” formed from representatives of local and regional groups and public

agencies having a stake in specific project decisions.

Staff support for active and continuing community

participation is provided by the Central Transportation Planning Staff and, as a matter of policy, all

planning budgets or consultant contracts are

expected to set aside 10 percent of project planning

resources for the purposes of community liaison

and technical assistance.

Although project public hearings continue to

provide a definite formal point of public presentation and comment, numerous smaller briefings,

working meetings, and presentations are normally

held as a matter of course for every major and most

minor planning studies. The comments and

criticisms which surface during this involvement

process have an important impact—although one

difficult to measure—on decisions reached by the

responsible decisionmakers.

Nevertheless, the considerable public opposition

to MBTA’s proposed $3o million Red Line extension to the South Shore is evidence of the need to

devote more attention to the early identification

and resolution of potential community-based opposition.

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

With the growth of an increasingly open

transportation planning process, as well as the

involvement of politically and technically astute

community and public agency participants, transit

planning in Boston since BTPR has been

characterized by greater technical detail and clarity.

A broad set of goals has evolved, and at least a

beginning has been made toward a thorough

evaluation of alternative project designs. However,

lack of attention to innovative transit improvements and the tendency to disregard transit’s

possible harmful impacts both are potential

obstacles to continued progress.

Goals and Objectives

Prior to BTPR, transit goals for the Boston

region were relatively narrowly focused. In contrast, BTPR’s goal-setting process was broadly

participatory and has led to a comprehensive set of

formal objectives intended to guide the refinement

of proposals for transit improvements.

When MBTA was authorized in 1964, its

enabling legislation set forth a general statement of

the new agency’s purpose. MBTA was expected to

“develop, finance, and operate the mass transportation facilities and equipment in the public interest . . . and to achieve maximum effectiveness in

complementin g other forms of transportation in

order to promote the general economic and social

well-being of the area and of the Commonwealth. ”l6

MBTA’s 1966 Program for Mass Transportation

elaborated on these broadly stated goals in the

course of explaining the advantages of its proposed

transit improvements. As stated in the 196 6

program, MBTA’s transit objectives were

overwhelmingl y oriented towards cost-efficient

“hardware” improvements which would attract

additional patronage by improving both the image

and the convenience of the region’s transit system.

Primary emphasis was given to rapid rail transit

extensions, new equipment, and modernization of

existing stations. “Outmoded” systems—such as

commuter rail service—were to be reemphasized

unless “satisfactory cost reductions” could be

achieved. No mention was given either to regional

or transit station area land use considerations, to

planning process concerns, or to the identification

and minimization of adverse impacts that might be

associated with a given improvement project. While

these and other nontransportation issues are

recognized in the sections of the 1966 program

containing detailed descriptions of improvement

projects, they are conspicuously absent from the

overall statement of objectives.

In terms of the social and economic bases of the

1966 program, MBTA relied exclusively on the land

use and travel forecasts prepared by the Eastern

Massachusetts Regional Planning Program

(EMRPP). Although the EMRPP study helped

advance the national state-of-the-art in the application of transportation planning and travel behavior

theory, it miscalculated the future changes in the

Boston area’s distribution of population and

10 section 5 (a) of Chapter 161A of the General Laws.

26
employment. 17 The EMRPP assumed that continued low-density suburbanization of population

and employment was both desirable and

inevitable—assumptions that are being called into

question by environmentalists and urban community representatives in the Boston area. MBTA’s 1966 Program for Mass Transportation reflected

this assumption by giving priority to building

attractive and efficient rapid transit extensions to

growing suburban communities rather than improving services and facilities in established

residential communities in and around the regional

core.

BTPR provided a forum for articulating and

debating alternative transportation and land use

goals for the Boston region. As a result of the BTPR

study, new goals and objectives have been

developed to guide MBTA’s planning projects.

These goals reflect a broad range of social,

economic, environmental, and transportation

issues and have been incorporated into MBTA’s 10-

Year ‘Transil Deve/opmenl Program— 1974-83 to assist in

carrying out the region’s emerging transportation

policy of greater emphasis on transit.

One of the MBTA’s principal goals calls for

emphasizing improved access to existing areas of

dense development, particularly the downtown, in

order to support efforts to reduce sprawl and

concentrate development at nodes. The central

business district is considered a “unique regional

and indeed national resource” to which “State and

city policy” encourages workers to commute by

transit. Another important goal, addressing the

question of equity, calls for “an integrated network

of public transportation facilities and services” in

which “intensive coverage of dense close-in

residential areas is as important as extensions into

the suburbs. ” Environmental objectives also are

presented, such as the use of existing transportation rights-of-way. These newly defined goals and

objectives provide a point of reference for

evaluating specific transit programs and improvement projects within the Boston region

I

- The miscalculations were not due to lack of technical

expertise. EM RPP’s analyses were based on reasonable estimates of future conditions; they continue to be an invaluable

source of information on transportation planning in the Boston

region. These projections proved wrong because of inherent

difficulties in forecasting future shifts in public policies, values,

and priorities for growth and development.

Development and Evaluation of Alternatives

Unlike areas that do not have an existing transit

system in operation, the Boston region is not

engaged in a debate over basic transit systems

alternatives. Each of the major elements in the

existing system—rapid rail, commuter rail, express

and local bus service—is recognized as a necessary

component of a total system. Moreover, changes in

any single component in the existing system are

limited to a degree by the practical necessity of

joining with other existing facilities. Thus, the

rapid rail extensions join with existing terminals or

with other major intermediate station locations.

BTPR carried out the most significant alternatives analysis in Boston transportation planning

history. This significance is not due to the depth of

analysis of transit alternatives. BTPR was fundamentally a highway study, in which the transit

alternatives examined were in large part MBTA’s

long-standing rapid transit proposals. Instead, the

strengths of BTPR lay in its procedures for

alternatives analysis and citizen involvement

processes.

The entire alternatives selection process was

carried out at a corridor level, in each of the four

transportation corridors considered by the BTPR.

First, as many transportation alternatives as

possible were generated for each corridor. Each

suggestion—from planners, citizens, the business

community, or other sources—was developed at a

broad sketch plan level of detail, and the less

promising options were eliminated. The remaining

alternatives were studied in greater depth. The

evaluation process was iterative, building time into

the study schedule for reexamining alternatives

that had been passed over and for adding new

options. When the final decisions evolved, a full

environmental impact statement was made for

each set of final alternatives.

BTPR’s citizen participation program used four

vehicles for citizen involvement. The strongest

forum was the Working Committee, a widely

representative group that worked with planners

for over 3 years—all the way from the designing of

the work program and setting goals to the period of

final design at the conclusion of the alternatives

evaluation. More conventional forums included

formal public hearings and a great number of

informal meetings with private individuals and

local groups with specific smaller-focus problems.

Finally, there was a number of community

27
organizers hired individually to help citizens who

felt excluded from the study proceedings.

Since BTPR, three issues have figured most

prominently in MBTA’s development and evaluation of alternatives. One issue involves the

selection of projects for study. Another concern is

the question of setting priorities among the

proposed projects. The final issue relates to the

procedures to be followed in the project-level

technical work.

The current transit program incorporates MBTA’s long-standing rapid transit proposals,

supplemented by a renewed emphasis on the

retention and improvement of commuter rail

service. Several reasons account for the survival of

the MBTA projects over nearly 10 years marked by

changing public opinion and a major transportation

planning program, Most importantly, until recently transit proposals were considered noncontroversial, and no major interest group opposed them.

The public—and BTPR—were concerned primarily

with highways, which threatened far more serious

impacts than the MBTA transit proposals 18 but did

not challenge the earlier ones, which still dominate

MBTA’s list.

The selection of projects to appear on MBTA’s

longstanding list of rapid transit proposals, which

was updated most recently for the 10~-Year Development Program, appears to have been influenced in

some cases by considerations beyond strictly

defined transportation needs. As in previous

MBTA plans, major improvement projects are

distributed among all important transit corridors,

although in some cases the need for a particular

project has been questioned. For example, extension of the Blue Line to the North Shore is included

in the program, although BTPR found that no

extension would be needed due to the presence of

commuter rail service in the corridor. In a different

kind of case, MBTA had budgeted funds to allow

depressing the Orange Line when it is relocated to

the Penn Central right-of-way embankment, even

though the added cost will be $4o to $60 million. In

both instances, MBTA appeared to be responding

to public demand for top-quality transit service and

improved community quality. The proposed options may in fact be the most desirable ones, but the

questions they raise create pressure for under1~ See page 16.

28

taking a thorough reevaluation as the next step in

the planning process.

The popular appeal of conventional rail rapid

transit may account for MBTA’s continued

emphasis on extending and improving its transit

system with attractive new equipment. The 10-Year

Transit Development Program reflects relatively little

attention either to programs for expanding bus

service and other lower-cost transit alternatives or

to technological and service innovations.

Regardless of the grounds for selecting projects,

once the list is compiled the question becomes how

to set priorities among them: funds spent in one

corridor will not be available in another. MBTA’s

strategy has been to give equal weight to three

categories of improvement projects:

●

●

●

Improvements to Existing System

Urgent remedial improvements

Construction of new bus garages

Continued updating of revenue

equipment fleet

Continued modernization of

existing plant

Continued station modernization

Commuter Rail Improvements

Increasing the adequacy of the

revenue equipment fleet

Improving rights-of-way now

owned by MBTA

Acquisition and improvement of

additional rights-of-way

Terminal and service facilities

improvements

Extensions to Electrified System

Completion of Red Line to

South Braintree

Extensions to Orange Line

North Shore Blue Line

improvements

Extension of the Red Line beyond

Harvard Square

Relocation of Orange Line

While this listing provides a generalized statement of priorities within each category, there is no

discussion of potential trade-offs and no schedule

showing the sequence of improvements over the

next decade. MBTA assumes that projects in each

category will be pursued concurrently, both to

permit implementation of some while the in-
evitable delays and reversals hold up progress on

others, and to be in a position to take advantage of

the maximum amount of Federal aid as it may

become available even on short notice. Thus, a final

definition of priorities has been postponed pending

a clarification of project approval requirements and

receipt of Federal funding assistance, By hedging

the priority question in these ways, MBTA avoids

promising to move forward with one project at the

expense of another.

With respect to the project-level evaluations of

alternative location, design, and modal options,

MBTA is relying on project study teams organized

in concert with the Central Transportation Planning Staff to investigate the impacts and benefits of

specific alternatives. The goal is to develop a local

consensus on a preferred alternative, taking into

account non transportation as well as transportation factors in a broad-based evaluation process.

Three project study teams are in the process of

organization or have already begun technical work.

These include the Southwest Corridor study of the

Orange Line relocation, the North Shore study of

the Blue Line extension to Lynn, and two studies in

the Northwest Corridor concerning the Red Line

extension from Harvard Square to Route 128 in

Lexington. As yet, the work has not progressed to

the point where the technical products can be

critically evaluated.

1n the past, at least, there has been a tendency to

compare the transit improvement programs with

the impacts of previous highway system plans

rather than to conduct an assessment of transit

proposals on their own merits. This attitude is

reflected in the resistance of State transportation

officials to recognize that major new transit

facilities often involve significant social, economic,

and environmental impact issues. This approach, if

it continues to exist, could hinder the application of

technically sound evaluation procedures in the

recently initiated studies. However, each of these

major studies has been structured to allow in-depth

consideration of a full range of alternatives,

Financing and Implementation

As noted, MBTA has not addressed the question

of priorities in detail. In part, this issue has been

avoided by assuming the maximum availability of

Federal aid, with the implicit assumption that local

funding will be authorized as needed to match

available Federal funds.

Implementation of the 10-Year Transit Development

Program is estimated to cost a total of $1.75 billion,

with the Federal share amounting to $1.4 billion,

and the local share $35o million (see Table 2).

Funding at these levels will require a marked

increase over previous levels of expenditure in the

Boston area for both locals and the Federal

Government. Between 1965 and 1973, Federal

transit assistance to MBTA averaged $32 million

per year, while local funding averaged $15 million

per year (see Tables 2 and 3). The current program

would require Federal funding at an average rate of

$140 million per year with local funding at $35

million per year,

Under current legislation, the Federal transit

program could not provide the $1.4 billion sum

without seriously undercuttin g assistance to other

urban areas. However, some $ 6OO million in

Federal funds is expected to become available

through the interstate transfer provisions of the

1973 Federal-Aid Highway Act, leaving only $800

million to be obtained from UMTA’S regular

program—a figure that appears reasonable within

the context of increased Federal funding support

for transit.

In terms of local funding, only $100 million of the

total $35o million projected for the lo-year

program has been authorized by the State

legislature. Thus, it is assumed that the remaining

$242 million will be authorized when needed in the

future. Given the State’s current financial crisis, it

is unclear whether these funds will be forthcoming

without difficulty, especiall y since the State

traditionall y has assumed responsibility for a major

share of MBTA’s debt service requirements. If the

State continues to assist MBTA in defraying

current operating costs, it may become increasingly

unwilling to compound its financial obligations

unless it can be demonstrated that the new projects

will result in operating cost savings or efficiencies.

Most critically, however, MBTA’s lo-year cost

estimates are stated in 1974 dollars and therefore

are lower than the real costs will be, depending on

when the projects are carried out. The program

explicitly assumes that the level of Federal aid will

be increased during the next decade “at a rate at

least equal to the rate of inflation,” and it is implicit

that State funds also will keep pace with inflation.

Any difficulties in meeting the stated funding

requirements, of course, will grow more serious as

costs rise.

29
TABLE 2.—Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority

1974-83 Transit Development Program Capitai

Improvements in Miiiions of Doiiars

Total for Local Share Federal Share

Project Period Funded Unfunded Total FY 74-75 FY 76 FY 77 FY 78 FY 79-83

IMPROVEMENTS TO EXISTING SYSTEM

Plant Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $221.9 $31.1 $13.3 $177.5 $74.1 $19.0 $39.8 $6.0 $38.6

Power System Improvements

Consolidated Bus Garages

Plant Maintenance Centers

Plant Improvements-Ill

Communications

Fare Collection

Private Bus Carrier

Blue Line Improvements

Green Line-n

Tracks and Signals

Haymarket-North

South Bay

Plant lmprovements—lV-V

Station Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53.0 10.6 42.4 25.0

Rolling Stock Modernization* . . . . . . 27.0 5.4 21.6 21.6

New Streetcars and Trackless

Trolleys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27,0 1.9 3.5 21.6 8.7 12.9

New Buses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68.0 5.1 8.5 54.4 20.5 4.0 4.3 4.3 21.3

SUB-TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396.9 43.5 35.9 317.5 124.9 23.0 82.0 10.3 77.3

17.4

COMMUTER RAIL IMPROVEMENTS

R-O-W Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52.0 10.4 41.6 10.0 15.0 16.6

Rolling Stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.0 5.6 22.4 7.0 8.4 7.0

Terminals and Terminal Facilities . . 20.0 4.0 16.0 5.0 5.0 6.0

SUB-TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 20.0 80.0 22.0 28.4 29.6

ELECTRIFIED EXTENSIONS

Blue Line

North Shore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “82.0

Back Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80.0

Orange Line-North,

Oak Grove-North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.0

Red Line-Northwest

Harvard-Arlington Heights . . . . . . . 293.0

Arlington Heights

Route 128

Lexington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.0

Orange Line-Southwest

So. Cove-Forest Hills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248.0

Forest Hills-Needham . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63.0

Replacement Service

South End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “58.0

Roxbury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ““275.0

Red Line-South Shore

So. Braintree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42.0

10.0 6.4

16.0

6.4 7.6

3.0 55.6

1.0 6.8

2.0 47.6

12.6

.5 11.1

.5 54.5

8.4

65.6 4.0

64.0

56.0 3.5

234.4 14.0

31.2 .3

198.4 12.0

50.4 3.0

46.4

220.0

33.6 33.6

6.0 26.8 28.8

10.0 21.0 21.5

26.0 40.0 87.2

1.6 5.0 5.0

28.0 40.0 98.0

17.0 30.4

25.4

20.0 20.0

64.0

67.2

19.3

20.4

21.0

160.0

SUB-TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,250.0 44.4 205.6 1,000.0 70.4 88.6 208.6 260.5 371.9

PROGRAM TOTAL . . . . . . . . . 1,746.9 107.9 241.5 1,397.5 217.3 140.0 320.2 270.8 449.2

Federal Aid Received in FY 74 prior to 5-1-74. 17.5

$234.8

● Modernization of Red Line and replacement of Orange and Blue Line fleets would result in a $62M project cost.

● * High estimate.

30
TABLE 3.—Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Statement

on Federal Grants and Loans-Approved Projects March 15, 1974

PROJECT DESCRIPTION DOT PROJ. No. TYPE OF GRANT DOT SHARE LOCAL SHARE TOTAL

1965

Station Modernlzatlon . . . . . . . . . . MA-03-0001 Capital $6,077,280 $3,038,640 $9,115,920

1966

Bus Acqulsltlon (150) . . . . . . . . . . MA-03-0002 Capital 3,136,654 1,568,327 4,704,981

Haymarket Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . MA-03 -OO03 Capital 12,000,000 6,000,000 18,000< 000

$15,136,654 $7,568,327 $22,704,981

1967

Haymarket SoIls Inst. . . . . . . . . . . MA-06-0008 Demonstration $160,000 $80,300 $240,900

Southwest Corridor Study . . . . . . MA-09-0001 Technical Stu. 484,484 242,242 726,726

$645,084 $322,542 $967,626

1968

South Shore RT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MA-03-0004 Capital $34,547,333 $17,273,667 $51,821,000

South Shore RT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MA-03 -0(M)4 Relocation 617,000 — 617,000

Tralning Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MTTR-2 Managerial 19,976 6,658 26,634

$35.184.309 $17.280.325 $52.464.634

1969

Haymarket North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MA-03-0005 Capital $50,862,000 $25,431,000 $76,293,000

Southwest Corridor Amend . . . . MA-09-0001 Technical Stu, 13,333 6,667 20,000

Central Area Systems Stu . . . . . . MA-09-0002 Technical Stu, 522,067 261,034 783,101

HN SoIls Instr Amend . . . . . . . . . MA-06-0008 Demonstration 144,971 72,486 217,457

Service Development . . . . . . . . . . . MASS-MTD-7 Demonstration 35,178 8,252 43,430

Tralnlng Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MTTR-3 Managerial 15,303 5,102 20,405

$51,592,852 $25,784,541 $77,377,393

1970

Tralnlng Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MTTR-4 Managerial $10,238 $3,412 $13,650

1971

SS Rapid Transit Amend . . . . . . . MA-03-0004 Capital $3,657,263 $1,828,632 $5,485,895

So. Bay Maintenance Cen . . . . . MA-03-0007 Capital 18,800,000 9,400,000 28,200,000

Systemwlde Modernlzatlon . . . . . MA-O3-OO1O Capital 3,000,000 1,500,000 4,500,000

Bus Acqulsltlon (310) . . . . . . . . . . MA-03-0011 Capital 8,100,250 4,050,125 12,150,375

Valldatlon Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MASS-MTD-8 Demonstration 346,616 51,422 398,038

Valldatlon Study Amend . . . . . . . MASS-MTD-8 Demonstration 35,100 7,296 42,396

Tralnlng Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MTTR-5,6,7,8,9 Managerial 22,738 7,579 30,317

$33,961,967 $16,845,054 $50,807,021

1972

Bos Trans. Plan. Review . . . . . . . MA-O9-OO1O Technical Stu. $1,693,500 $846,750 $2,540,250

Light Rad Veh. Spec. . . . . . . . . . . . MA-06-0015 Demonstration 109,084 20,841 129,925

So Bay MaIn. Cen. Amend. , . . . MA-03-0007 Capital 320,000 180,000 480,000

Sta. Modernlzatlon Phase II . . . . MA-03-0013 Capital 9,565,086 4,782,544 14,347,630

Green Line Improvements . . . . . . MA-03-0015 Capital 25,413,333 12,706,667 38,120,000

Non-Revenue Equipment . . . . . . . MA-03-0021 Capital 568,940 284,470 853,410

$37,669,943 $18,801,272 $56,471,215

1973

Light Rail Veh Spec. Amend . . . MA-06-0015 Demonstration $24,514 $8,486 $33,000

Green Line Vehicles , . . . . . . . . . . . MA-03-0022 Capital 32,800,000 16,400,000 49,200,000

Plant Improvements PH I . . . . . . . MA-03-0017 Capital 1,573,146 786,574 2,359,720

Rapid Transit Cars (80) . . . . . . . . MA-03-0025 Capital 18,410,600 9,205,300 27,615,900

Safety Improvements . . . . . . . . . . . MA-38-0025 Capital 10,601,640 5,300,820 15,902,460

Plant Improvements , . . . . . . . . . . . MA-03-0026 Capital 7,933,092 3,966,548 11,899,640

Trackless Trolleys-50 PH II . . . . . MA-03-0028 Capital 1,781,500 890,750 2,672,250

Haymarket North Amend, . . . . . . MA-03-0005 Capital 13,126,410 6,653,206 19,689,616

Penn Central Acquisition . . . . . . . MA-03-9001 Loan 19,500,000 0 19,500,000

$105,750,902 $43,121,684 $148,872,586

1974

Rest Orange Line Str. . . . . . . . . . . MA-03-0029 Capital $4,456,872 $1,114,218 $5,571,090

Transit Development Prog. . . . . . MA-09-0016 Technical Stu. 1,200,000 300,000 1,500,000

$5,656,872 $1,414,218 $7,071,090

Source MBTA, 10-Year Transit Development Program, 1974-83, Boston: 1974, pp, II I-3—III-4

31
TABLE 4.—Federal

Programs From

.—

Assistance to Boston Transit

F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975

Type of Assistance Federal Share Total Costs

Capital Grants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $322,852,000 $650,620,000

Capital Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19,500,000 19,500,000

Interstate Transfers . . . . . . . . . 33,040,000 41,300,000

Technical Studies . . . . . . . . . . . 4,965,000 7,108,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $380,357,000 $718,528,000

In summary, MBTA’s financial plan rests on

assumptions that may not be reliable. If Federal and

local funding does not become available in the

amounts that are needed, MBTA will be faced with

the necessity of making hard choices among the

many improvement projects that have been

described in its current lo-year development

program.

Source: Urban Mass Transportation Administration

32
Summary Case Assessment

The purpose of this section is to summarize the

transit planning and decisionmaking process in the

Boston region in light of the guidelines listed in the

Introduction to the case assessments. The summary, therefore, is divided into two parts: (1)

Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2)

Assessment of the Technical Planning Work.

1. ASSESSMENT OF THE

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

. Forum for Decisionmaking.—Historically,

transportation decisions in Boston were

made by semiautonomous highway and

●

● I

transit agencies and local governments.

Recent agency reorganization programs

have centralized transportation policymaking in the Executive Office of Transportation and Construction (EOTC) and have

clarified transportation planning and project development responsibilities in the

Boston area. Through the reorganization

of EOTC and the Massachusetts Bay

Transportation Authority (M BTA), as well

as the five-agency Memorandum of Agreement that established Joint Regional

Transportation Committee and the Central Transportation Planning Staff, the

Boston area has developed the institutional

33
mechanisms necessary to permit effective

interagency and intergovernmental coordination, As its planning responsibilities

have been transferred to EOTC, MBTA

has come to function primarily as a transit

operating agency.

. Accountability of Decisionmakers.—The

Secretary of EOTC—and, ultimately, the

Governor who appoints him—are becoming increasingly involved in setting

transportation policy and reaching major

project decisions in the Boston area.

Because the Governor is the sole elected

official directly accountable to all the

citizens residing within the MBTA service

district, the shift of decisionmaking power

to EOTC gives citizens a greater degree of

formal control in the transportation planning process. The State legislature continues to exercise considerable influence

over the region’s transit programs through

its power to approve or disapprove bonding

authority.

. Publi c Involvement .—The Boston

Transportation Planning Review (BTPR)

constituted a major experiment of

nationwide significance in its approach to

developing an open, participatory study

process. The BTPR philosophy and approach have been carried over to the newly

established JRTC and CTPS institutions.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THE

TECHNICAL PLANNING WORK

. Goals and Objectives.—The transportation goals and objectives for the Boston

region—originally developed during BTPR

and subsequently refined and extended—

constitute a thoughtful attempt to incorporate a broad range of nontransportation

objectives as well as transportation-related

concerns in the region’s transportation

planning process. These goals and objectives provide a basic point of reference for

judging specific projects and proposals

contained in the region’s transit development program.

● Development of Alternatives.—The current transit improvement program incorporates MBTA’s longstanding rapid transit

extension proposals, supplemented by a

renewed emphasis on the retention and

improvement of commuter rail facilities.

However, programs for expanding bus

services and other lower-cost approaches

to transit improvements as well as

technological and service innovations all

merit greater study.

. Evaluation of Alternatives.—BTPR conducted the most significant alternatives

analysis in Boston transportation history,

involving an in-depth iterative process

with continuous citizen and public agency

participation. In general, however, there

has been so little serious controversy over

transit projects in Boston, at least until

recently, that State transportation officials

have resisted undertaking detailed analysis

of the social, economic, and environmental

impact of transit. Each of the major studies

now underway has been structured to

allow indepth consideration of a full range

of alternatives. As yet, the work has not

progressed to the point where the technical

products can be evaluated.

. Financing and Implementation.—MBTA’s

current schedule and capital budget estimates appear optimistic in light of the

authority’s recent lack of success in securing Federal project approvals and funding

commitments, as well as in the assumption

that State and Federal funds will keep pace

with future construction cost inflation.

The State’s current financial crisis and

MBTA’s rising operating deficit (which

would be further aggravated by an expanded transit system) also may hinder

completion of the capital program on its

current schedule.

34

[1. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 0 - 67-445