[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12800

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JAMES BATMASIAN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:08-cr-60089-KAM-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12800

Before BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON,∗ District 

Judge.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

We sua sponte vacate our previous opinion and substitute 

the following in lieu thereof.1

* * *

Pardoned felon James Batmasian appeals the district court’s 

denial of his motion to expunge the records of his criminal 

conviction. Batmasian argues that the district court erred in

concluding that, (1) it lacked jurisdiction over his claim; and (2)

even if it had jurisdiction, the merits of his motion did not warrant 

expungement. After oral argument and consideration of the record 

below, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction over 

Batmasian’s motion. However, because the district court assumed

that it had jurisdiction and evaluated and denied Batmasian’s 

motion on the merits, we vacate and remand with instructions to 

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

∗ Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle 

District of Florida, sitting by designation.

1 We note that Batmasian has a pending petition for panel rehearing, which 

we DENY as moot in light of the substituted opinion.

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21-12800 Opinion of the Court 3

I. Background 

In April 2008, the United States charged James Batmasian 

with failure to pay federal withholding taxes in violation of 26 

U.S.C. § 7202. Batmasian pleaded guilty, and the district court 

sentenced him to eight months imprisonment, two years of 

supervised release, and a $30,000 fine. After Batmasian completed 

his sentence and paid his fine, Florida Governor Rick Scott restored 

his civil rights in March 2017, and President Donald Trump issued 

him a complete pardon in December 2020.

In April 2021, after receiving the presidential pardon, 

Batmasian filed with the district court in the same criminal action 

as his underlying conviction a “verified motion to expunge and seal 

judicial records after a Presidential Pardon.” Batmasian, selfdescribed as a person of extraordinary wealth with a history of 

charitable giving, alleged that he was denied participation in many 

philanthropic efforts because of his conviction. Despite the 

presidential pardon and the restoration of his civil rights, Batmasian 

claimed that the conviction “continue[d] to cause exceptional 

difficulties and hardships” to his “pioneering philanthropic 

endeavors and the desire to be proactive with . . . charity.” For 

example, he explained that a Florida university had declined his 

offer to endow a “Real Estate Chair,” that a Bill Gates charity called 

“The Giving Pledge” had not processed his application to be a 

participant, that several charities had removed him from their

boards of directors, and that a charity he founded had not received 

any grant funding. Batmasian alleged that “[o]nly with the 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12800

expungement can [he] exercise his basic legal right of charitable 

giving to the fullest extent possible.” 

In his expungement motion, Batmasian asserted that federal 

district courts have the “inherent equitable power ancillary to their 

criminal jurisdiction” to order the expungement of criminal 

records. The government responded, arguing that the district 

court should deny the motion because it lacked jurisdiction to hear 

it, citing the Supreme Court’s analysis of the limited reach of 

ancillary jurisdiction in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. 

of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). In reply, Batmasian asserted that 

the district court had ancillary jurisdiction over his request, arguing

for the first time that his motion to expunge was based, at least in 

part, on constitutional, rather than purely equitable, grounds—

namely, “his [c]onstitutionally protected rights to dispose of his 

wealth.”

The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to 

hear the request for expungement. The district court then assumed

that it had the authority to consider the motion, evaluated the 

motion, and denied the motion on the merits. Batmasian appeals 

the district court’s decision. 

II. Discussion 

Batmasian argues that the district court had ancillary 

jurisdiction to hear his expungement motion because his request 

was “based entirely on the constitutional impairment that his 

[c]onviction causes on his First Amendment rights to give away his 

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wealth and participate with the benefitted charities.” We disagree 

and hold the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Batmasian’s 

expungement motion.

“We review de novo a district court’s determination of 

whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Gupta v. McGahey, 

709 F.3d 1062, 1064–65 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Bender v. 

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“[E]very 

federal appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not 

only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a 

cause under review. . . .’” (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 

237, 244 (1934))). When an appellant fails to challenge properly on 

appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its 

judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that 

ground. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 

(11th Cir. 2014).

As “[a] court[] of limited jurisdiction,” a federal court 

“possess[es] only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and 

statute[s], which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted). Indeed, “[i]t 

is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, 

and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 

asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

As Batmasian acknowledges, no federal statute authorizes 

district courts to hear the type of expungement motion he brings. 

Instead, Batmasian relies on the doctrine of “ancillary jurisdiction, 

which recognizes federal courts’ jurisdiction over some matters 

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(otherwise beyond their competence) that are incidental to other 

matters properly before them.” Id. at 378. 

In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court clarified that ancillary 

jurisdiction can be invoked for two limited purposes: “(1) to permit 

disposition by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects 

and degrees, factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to 

function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate 

its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 379–80 (internal

citations omitted). 

Although expungement was not at issue in Kokkonen, 

courts have consistently applied the Kokkonen framework to 

requests from defendants to utilize their ancillary jurisdiction to 

expunge criminal records. In doing so, courts have evaluated 

requests for two potential forms of expungement under their

ancillary jurisdiction—“equitable” expungement and 

“constitutional” expungement. 

We first turn to equitable expungements. While Batmasian 

argued below that his request is for an equitable expungement, he 

expressly disclaims any argument for an equitable expungement on 

appeal.2 Thus, we need not address whether the district court had

2 In fact, Batmasian admits in his initial brief that if his “request for 

expungement was equitable, the District Court below would have been 

correct.”

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ancillary jurisdiction to hear a motion for an equitable 

expungement.3 Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.

3 We note that the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 

Circuits have declined to recognize that they have ancillary jurisdiction to hear 

equitable expungement motions in light of Kokkonen. See United States v. 

Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 48–49, 52 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that “Kokkonen 

forecloses any ancillary jurisdiction to order expungement based on [the 

individual’s] proffered equitable reasons”); Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192, 

199 (2d Cir. 2016) (denying jurisdiction to equitably expunge a criminal 

conviction where the “exercise of ancillary jurisdiction . . . [would serve] 

neither of the goals identified in Kokkonen”); United States v. Dunegan, 251 

F.3d 477, 479–80 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Kokkonen and holding that “a 

District Court does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record” on 

equitable grounds); United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871, 874–76 (6th Cir. 

2010) (applying Kokkonen and holding that “federal courts lack ancillary 

jurisdiction to consider expungement motions” on equitable grounds); United

States v. Wahi, 850 F.3d 296, 302 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying Kokkonen and 

holding that “ancillary jurisdiction does not include a general equitable power 

to expunge judicial records”); United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 860 (8th 

Cir. 2006) (holding “that post-Kokkonen a motion to expunge a criminal 

record that is based solely on equitable grounds does not invoke the ancillary 

jurisdiction of the district court”); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 

(9th Cir. 2000) (applying Kokkonen and holding that “district court[s] [do not 

have] the power to expunge a record of a valid arrest and conviction solely for 

equitable considerations”). 

To our knowledge, only the Tenth Circuit has come to the opposite 

conclusion post-Kokkonen. See Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 

1214, 1234–35 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is well settled in this circuit that courts 

have inherent equitable authority to order the expungement of an arrest 

record or a conviction in rare or extreme circumstances.”). But Camfield

relied on longstanding Tenth Circuit precedent established before the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Kokkonen, and Camfield does not address or 

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Instead, Batmasian’s sole contention on appeal is that his 

request is for a constitutional expungement. At the outset, we note 

that, post-Kokkonen, no circuit has expressly embraced ancillary 

jurisdiction for constitutional expungement requests.4 

reference Kokkonen. Further, the issue in Camfield was whether the district 

court had the ability to expunge specific identifying information from a police 

report, so the more general statement about the expungement of arrest 

records or convictions was not central to the Court’s holding and was 

therefore dicta.

4 Although unclear, Batmasian appears to assert that one circuit has held there 

is jurisdiction for constitutional expungement claims. He cites to United 

States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006), and claims that Rowlands

held that “a district court has the inherent authority to expunge records to 

preserve basic legal rights.” This argument is disingenuous, as Rowlands was 

an equitable expungement case where the Third Circuit held that the district 

court had no jurisdiction over the appellant’s motion for an equitable 

expungement. Id. at 179. Specifically, the defendant in Rowlands argued that 

the Third Circuit had jurisdiction over his expungement motion based on the 

Third Circuit’s statement in United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 956 (3d 

Cir. 1990), that, “a federal court has the inherent power to expunge an arrest 

and conviction record.” Id. at 176. The Third Circuit explained in Rowlands

that the defendant had taken the statement from Noonan out of context, 

noting that in Noonan the Court held that it had jurisdiction over 

expungement motions in certain narrow circumstances, which were not 

present in Noonan’s case. Id. at 177. Importantly, Noonan was decided in 

1990, four years before Kokkonen, and, as the Rowlands Court noted, “the 

cases upon which Noonan relied support[ted] [its subsequent] conclusion [in 

Rowlands] that [it had] jurisdiction over petitions for expungement in narrow 

circumstances: where the validity of the underlying proceeding is being 

challenged.” Id. And while the Rowlands Court did state that it might have

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Batmasian is indeed correct that several sister circuits have, 

however, recognized that ancillary jurisdiction might exist for 

constitutional expungements. For example, in United States v. 

Field, the Sixth Circuit alluded to this possibility when it rejected 

an appellant’s request to invoke ancillary jurisdiction for an 

equitable expungement, stating that, “post-Kokkonen, federal 

courts lack ancillary jurisdiction over motions for expungement 

based on purely equitable considerations, yet retain ancillary 

jurisdiction over motions challenging an unconstitutional 

conviction.”5 756 F.3d 911, 916 (6th Cir. 2014). But the Sixth 

Circuit went on to clarify that, even where an expungement 

motion “challenges an unconstitutional conviction or illegal 

arrest,” such situations nonetheless require the application of the 

Kokkonen framework—that is, “the assertion of ancillary 

jurisdiction in such situations, the Court ultimately held that there was no 

jurisdiction over the appellant’s expungement motion, so its statement 

regarding Noonan was dicta. Further, while Rowlands was decided after 

Kokkonen, it does not address or reference Kokkonen.

5 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have each similarly noted a possible avenue 

for a constitutional expungement of an unconstitutional arrest or conviction 

through a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction in cases where they expressly 

disclaimed any ancillary jurisdiction for equitable expungement motions. See 

Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861–62 (“A district court may have ancillary jurisdiction to 

expunge criminal records in extraordinary cases to preserve its ability to 

function successfully by enabling it to correct an injustice caused by an illegal 

or invalid criminal proceeding.”); Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014 (“[A] district 

court’s ancillary jurisdiction is limited to expunging the record of an unlawful 

arrest or conviction . . . .”). 

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jurisdiction must enable the court to ‘manage its proceedings, 

vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.’” Id. (quoting 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380).

In line with that approach, we hereby apply Kokkonen to 

Batmasian’s request for a constitutional expungement. Since the 

proceedings from Batmasian’s underlying tax offense—the offense 

for which Batmasian brings his expungement claim—concluded 

more than a decade ago, the invocation of ancillary jurisdiction for 

an expungement of his record so that he can more easily donate to 

charity is not necessary “to permit disposition by a single court of 

claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually 

interdependent,” nor is it necessary for the court to “manage its 

proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379–80. 

We also agree with Field that the only way ancillary 

jurisdiction might exist for a constitutional expungement is where 

the motion challenges an arrest or conviction as unconstitutional. 

Batmasian is making no such challenge. Thus, Batmasian is 

incorrect that we have ancillary jurisdiction over his so-called 

constitutional expungement claim based on First Amendment 

grounds.

Seemingly as a fallback, Batmasian points to broad language 

from several circuits that, he appears to argue, suggests that the 

Constitution may directly provide jurisdiction for an 

expungement, outside the realm of ancillary jurisdiction. See 

Wahi, 850 F.3d at 303 (“Expungement authority must . . . have a 

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source in the Constitution or statutes.”); Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861 

(holding that a district court did not have jurisdiction to expunge a 

defendant’s criminal record where he did not allege that his 

“conviction was in any way invalid or illegal nor did he rely on any 

Constitutional provision or statute authorizing . . . a district court 

. . . to expunge his criminal conviction”); Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1010

(explaining that a district court has the authority to expunge a 

criminal record where a statute “or the Constitution itself” 

otherwise provide for such authority). However, despite these 

cursory mentions, no court has ever held that the Constitution 

directly provides jurisdiction to hear any expungement motions. 

As best as we can tell, these circuits are simply rephrasing the 

requirement that federal courts “possess only that power 

authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 

377. Thus, these courts are not opening up ancillary jurisdiction to 

all expungement motions based on some unspecified constitutional 

provision. As such, even if Batmasian was correct that his 

conviction impaired his “First Amendment rights,”6 the 

6 Seemingly ignoring his own illicit behavior that led to his conviction for the 

tax offense, Batmasian now argues that he is suffering a First Amendment 

violation because certain charities and institutions will not accept charitable 

donations from him or otherwise associate with him, a pardoned felon. But 

because the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear Batmasian’s 

expungement motion, we need not reach the merits of his First Amendment 

claim.

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Constitution nonetheless does not provide the requisite 

jurisdiction for the district court to hear his expungement motion.

In sum, no court has ever recognized ancillary jurisdiction 

over a constitutional expungement where the alleged 

constitutional violation was the natural result of an otherwise valid 

arrest or conviction. We do not do so today. Because Batmasian 

has not satisfied Kokkonen, we do not have ancillary jurisdiction 

over his expungement claim.

III. Conclusion 

Although the district court correctly noted that it lacked the 

requisite ancillary jurisdiction to hear Batmasian’s expungement 

motion, it ultimately impermissibly evaluated and denied the 

motion on the merits. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s 

decision and remand with instructions to dismiss Batmasian’s 

expungement motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

VACATED AND REMANDED. 

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