United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-30151

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Fazon Davis, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:20-CR-110-1

Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Fazon Davis pleaded guilty to a single count of production of child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251. He was sentenced within the 

advisory guidelines range to 240 months of imprisonment, to be followed by 

five years of supervised release. Davis challenges the sentence imposed.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

September 2, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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Davis maintains that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. He 

asserts that his sentence resulted from an incorrect balancing of the 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) factors and thus was greater than necessary to achieve the goals of 

§ 3553(a). Specifically, he arguesthat the district court gave too much weight 

to the guidelines range and afforded too little weight to his claim that the twolevel adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii) for use of a computer, 

which applied in this case, skewed his guidelines range. He contends that his 

sentence was rendered unreasonable, and the presumption of reasonableness 

should not apply to his sentence, because his guidelines range was increased 

by the enhancement. 

We review preserved challenges to the substantive reasonableness of 

a sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Vargas, 21 F.4th 332, 

334 (5th Cir. 2021). Sentences within a properly calculated guidelines range, 

as in this case, are presumed to be substantively reasonable, and the court will 

infer from such a sentence that the district court considered all the factors for 

a fair sentence set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. 

Candia, 454 F.3d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 2006). The presumption may be rebutted

upon a showing that the sentence fails to account for a factor that should have 

been afforded significant weight, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or 

improper factor, or represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the 

sentencing factors. United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009).

The record establishes that the district court made an individualized 

assessment based on the facts and circumstances of the case and found that a 

within-guidelines sentence was sufficient but not greater than necessary to 

account for the factors set forth in § 3553(a). The district court considered 

Davis’s claim that the advisory guidelines range was unreasonably skewed by 

application of a § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii) enhancement and determined that other 

sentencing factors merited a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range. 

The district court was in a superior position to find facts and determine their 

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relevance for purposes of § 3553(a), and we will not reweigh the district 

court’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors or their relative significance. See 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007). Davis’s disagreement with 

his sentence or with the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors does 

not rebut the presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Ruiz, 621 

F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 

565-66 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Davis does not dispute that the advisory guidelines range was properly 

determined, and the district court had to take that range into account in its 

analysis of the sentence to impose. See United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d 114, 

121-23 (5th Cir. 2011). He has pointed to nothing in the record to support 

that the district court’s presumptively reasonable choice of sentence was an 

abuse of discretion. See Vargas, 21 F.4th at 334; Candia, 454 F.3d at 473. To

the extent that he argues that the district court should have imposed a lower 

sentence on policy grounds to account for the application of the adjustment 

under § 2G2.1(b)(6)(B)(ii), or that the presumption of reasonableness should 

not apply because the adjustment is assessed in most cases, his contention is 

unavailing. See, e.g., United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 367 

(5th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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