IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 97-60271

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CITIZENS FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI;

CITY OF QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI

DEMOCRATIC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE;

CITY OF QUITMAN, MISSISSIPPI

ELECTION COMMISSION,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

____________________ July 24, 1998

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges:

PER CURIAM:

After finding that the City of Quitman (“the City” or “Quitman”) had violated Section 2 of

the Voting Rights Act by electing its five alderman from at-large districts, the district court entered

a decree ordering that the City’s alderman be elected from four single-member districts and one atlarge dist rict “unless and until the City of Quitman adopts and effectuates another method of

election.” We reverse and remand. On remand, the district court must either articulate a sufficiently

“singular combination of unique factors” just ifying t he inclusion of an at-large district in its

redistricting plan, Mahan v. Howell

, 410 U.S. 3 15, 333 (1973), or enter a decree redi stri cti ng1 The City does not contest the validity of this finding on appeal.

2 Quitman into five single-member districts.

I.

In 1993, the plaint iff, Citizens for Good Government (“Citizens”), brought suit against

Quitman arguing that the City’s method of electing its alderman from five at-large districts violated

the Voting Rights Act. The complaint sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and a court

order redistricting Quitman into five single-member districts. The district court granted Citizens’

request for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the upcoming 1993 alderman elections.

In response t o t he issuance of the preliminary injunction, the City and Citizens began

negotiating a permanent redistricting plan for Quitman. Consistent with Mississippi law, the parties

agreed to a redistricting plan that provided for four single-member districts and one at-large district

(“the C ity’s 4-1 pl an”). S ee Stewart v. Waller

, 404 F. Supp. 206, 213-15 (N.D. Miss. 1975)

(reinstating Miss. Code Ann. § 3374-36 (1942), which authorizes alderman to be elected from five

at-large districts or four single-member districts and one at-large district). The parties then submitted

this plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. The Attorney General, however, objected to the

redistricting plan, and Citizens’ dilution claim under the Voting Rights Act was subsequently tried

before the district court.

After a bench trial, the district court concluded that the City’s system of electing its five

alderman from at-larg e districts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. 1 The Court then

provided the City with another opportunity to collaborate with Citizens and develop a redistricting

plan for the upcoming 1997 alderman elections. In light of the Attorney General’s objection to their

prior plan, the parties jointly declined this opportunity to negotiate another redistricting plan. Left3

with no choice but to fashion its own redistricting plan, the district court appointed a special master

to devise a redistricting plan “in order that the elections scheduled for May 6, 1997 (and with a

candidate qualifying deadline of April 4, 1996), may ensue.”

The special master recommended a redistricting plan that provided for one at-large district

and four single-member districts (“the special master’s 4-1 plan”). Notwithstanding its recognition

that the Supreme Court has expressed a “preference for utilization of single-member districts in courtordered rem

e dial plans,” the district court adopted the special master’s plan “in order that the

upcoming 1997 City elections may proceed in accordance with this plan.”

Following the entry of this order, Citizens filed a motion requesting the district court to clarify

the interim nature of the special master’s 4-1 plan and to order the City to submit a permanent

redistricting plan to the Attorney General for preclearance. In response, the City indicated that it had

no intention of drafting another redistricting plan and argued that the redistricting plan utilized for

t he 1997 elections should accordingly be made permanent. On April 9, 1997, the district co urt

entered an order adopting the special master’s 4-1 plan as the redistricting plan that will govern the

election of alderman in Quitman until the City devises a new plan that is approved by the Attorney

General. Citizens then filed this appeal.

II.

On appeal, Citizens argues that the district court erred by failing to order the City to adopt

a new redistricting plan and submit it to the Attorney General for preclearance. In addition, Citizen

contends that the district court’s redistricting plan is defective because the at-large seat is not justified

by a “singular combination of unique factors.” In response, the City argues that it cannot be forced

to draft a redistricting plan and that the district court is responsible for creating such a plan because4

the City declined the district court’s invitati on t o do so. The City also contends that Citizens is

est o pped from contesting the validity of the at-large seat because it had previously agreed to a

redistricting plan that included one at-large seat. Finally, the City claims t hat t he district court

correctly determined that the special master’s 4-1 plan is justified by special circumstances.

A.

Citizens’ contentio n t hat the district court erred by not ordering Quitman to develop a

redistricting plan and submit it to the Attorney General for preclearance misconceives the principles

of federalism

at play in this case. Redistricting is a legislative function “`which the federal courts

should mak e every effort not to preempt.’” R amos v. Koebig

, 638 F.2d 838, 843 (5th Cir. 1981)

(quoting Wise v. Lipscomb

, 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978)). Citizens, however, seeks to turn this rule

of comity on its head by invoking it as a justification for a district court order directing a state or local

government to draft a redistricting plan when a dist rict co urt has found an existing plan to be

unlawful. Rather than issue such an order, a district court must give a legislative body “an

opportuni ty to enact” an acceptable plan. Mississippi Chapter, Operation PUSH, Inc. v. Mabus , 932

F.2d 400, 406 (5th Ci r. 1991); s ee Lawyer v. Department of Justice

, 117 S. Ct. 2186, 2192-9 3

(1997); McDaniel v. Sanchez

, 452 U.S. 130, 150 n.30 (1981). If a “governmental body is unable or

unwilling to fulfill its legislative duties” by accepting the district court’s invitati on to devel op a

redistricting plan and submit it t o t he At torney General for preclearance, then it “become[s] the

`unwelcome obligation’ of the [district] court to devise and impose a plan.” R amos

, 638 F.2d at 843;

see Lawyer , 117 S. Ct. at 2192-93; McDaniel , 452 U.S. at 150 n.30.

In this case, the district court provided Quitman with two opportunities to draft a redistricting

plan. After issuing a preliminary injunction, the district court gave the City an opportunity to develop5

a redistricting plan. The City availed it self of this opportunity, but the Attorney General did not

preclear its 4-1 plan. Likewise, after the district court held that Quitman’s use of five at-large

alderman d ist ricts violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, it provided the City with another

opportuni ty to devise a legislative redistricting plan. The City, however, declined to submit another

redistricting plan because it believed that any 4-1 plan that it was authorized to develop under

Mississippi law would again be rejected by the Attorney General. Under these circumstances, the

district court properly appointed a special master to devise a judicial redistricting plan and did not err

by refusing to order Quitman to develop another plan and to submit it to the Attorney General for

preclearance.

B.

According to the City, Citizens is estopped from challenging the inclusion of the at-large seat

in the judicial redistricting plan because it failed to object to the special master’s 4-1 plan when it was

proposed. This co nt ent io n reflects a misunderstanding of the differences between interim and

permanent judicial redistricting plans. As the district court’s order appointing t he special master

indicates, the special master’s 4-1 plan was initially adopted as an interim measure to govern the

u pcoming alderman elections. Under these circumstances, the inclusion of an at-large seat in t he

special master’s interim judicial redistricting plan may have been permissible. S ee Howell

, 410 U.S.

at 333; Corder v. Kirksey

, 639 F.2d 1191, 1195 (5th Cir. 1981) (“ Corder III”) (noting that the “short

time” a district court possesses “to fashion a fair remedy in the face of an impending election” might

justi fy using an at-large district in an “interim” judicial redistricting plan). As Citizens correctly

argued before the district court, however, this justification for the special master’s 4-1 plan did not

provide the court wit h a basis fo r departing from the preference for single-member districts when6

fashioning a permanent judicial remedy. Citizens, therefore, is not estopped from challenging the

inclusion of an at-large seat in the permanent judicial redistric t ing plan simply because it did not

object to the use of such a seat in an interim remedial plan.

C.

We turn now to the heart of Citizens’ appeal, which is its claim that the district court abused

its discretion, East Carrol Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall

, 424 U.S. 636, 639-40 (1976), by adopting

a permanent redistricting plan that included an at-large district. Although we review for an abuse of

discretion, the district court’s discretion to depart from the longstanding general rule that singlemember districts are to be used in judicially crafted redistricting plans, see, e.g.

, C onnor v. Finch

,

431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); E ast Carrol Parish Sch. Bd. , 424 U.S. at 639; Chapman v. Meier

, 420

U.S. 1, 18 (1975); Howell

, 410 U.S. at 333, is quite limit ed. Only if the district court has identified

a “singular combination of unique factors,” Howell

, 410 U.S. at 333, justifying the abandonment of

this clear preference for single-member districts, will its decision be upheld. Corder III, 639 F.2d at

1195. Accordingly, we now consider the sufficiency of the district court’s explanation of why this

case presents “rare” or “exceptional” circumstances “allowing for a court-fashioned election scheme

incorporating an at-large element.” Id.

In it s April 9th order adopting the special magistrate’s 4-1 plan as the redistricting plan t o

remain in effect until the City secures federal approval for a new plan, the di strict court di d not

identify any factors favoring the inclusion of an at-large district in this permanent remedial plan. This

alone would normally mandate a remand. S ee Corder v. Kirksey

, 585 F.2d 708, 715 (5th Cir. 1978)

(“ Corder I”). We will assume, however, that the April 9th order inco rpo rat ed the district court’s

reasons for adopting the special magistrate’s 4-1 plan as an interim redistricting plan . As noted7

above, the district court believed that the use of an at-large district was justified because the parties

had earlier agreed to the inclusion of such a district in the Cit y’s 4-1 plan. In addition, the City

contends that a special circumstance is presented by this case because Mississippi law has traditionally

authorized a city like Quitman to elect its alderman from four single-member districts and one at-large

district.

We pause briefly to explain why these two circumstances provide insufficient support for the

inclusion of an at-large district in a permanent redistricting plan. First, the agreement of the parties

when formulating a legislative redistricting plan has no bearing on the propriety of including an atlarge seat in a judicially crafted redistricting plan. “In contrast [to “court-ordered pl ans”],

reapportionment pl ans prepared by legislative bodies may employ multimember [or at-large]

districts.” M

cDaniel

, 452 U.S. at 139; s ee Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. Westwego

, 872

F.2d 1201, 1204 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that “at-large voting schemes” are not “per se violations of

section 2"); Corder III, 639 F.2d at 1194 (“It is clear that an at-large election scheme is not a per se

unconstitutional dilution of minority votes.”). Second, that Mississippi law has traditionally

authorized Quitman to utilize four single-member districts and one at-large district does not, when

standing alone, rise to the level of a special circumstance justifying the use of an at-large district in

a judicial redistricting plan. In order for an at-large district to be used in Quitman, the district court

must, for example, explain why compliance with Mississippi law “would better serve the values of

fair representation and political access,” Wallace v. House

, 538 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1976), or

why the use of five single-member districts would be “impractical” an d why co mpliance with the

State’s authorization of a 4-1 plan “makes good sense” in light of the structure and function of the

board of alderman, the duties that alderman are elected to perform, and the interests each alderman8

is elected to represent, see Corder III, 639 F.3d at 1195-96 (approving a 4-1 judicial redistricting plan

for the Pickens County School Board because the four alderman elected from single-member districts

each represented one of Pickens County’s four high schools, Alabama had a longstanding policy

favoring the use of five-member school boards because of their “structural desirability,” and the use

of five single-member districts would be impractical and would distort the equality of representation

for each high school under the 4-1 plan); cf. Dillard v. Crenshaw County

, 831 F.2d 246, 250-53 (11th

Cir. 1987) (rejecting the claim that the responsibilities of the chairperson of t he Calhoun County

Commission were sufficiently distinct from those of the associate commissioners to justify continuing

the traditional practice of electing the chairperson from an at-large distri ct). The di stri ct court,

however, made no findings relating to the desirability of adhering to Mississippi law when it adopted

the special master’s 4-1 plan. Further, the City’s cryptic reference to “sound public policy

considerations” as a justification fo r t he at-large district is insufficiently tied to the specific public

policy needs of Quitman to justify the district court’s inclusion of this district in it s permanent

redistricting plan.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s decision to adopt a permanent

redistricting plan including an at-large district and REMAND this case for further proceedings. On

remand, the district court must either sufficiently articulat e t he relevant unique circumstances

just ifying the inclusion of an at-large seat in its redistricting plan or enter an order dividing Quitman

into five single-member districts.