SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA 

In Division 

JILL KENNEDY, an individual and ) Arizona Supreme Court 

qualified elector, ) No. CV-12-0277-AP/EL 

 ) 

 Plaintiff/Appellant, ) Coconino County 

 ) Superior Court 

 v. ) No. CV2012-00508 

 ) 

JOSEPH LODGE, an individual, ) 

Real Parties in Interest, THE ) 

HONORABLE CARL TAYLOR, MATT RYAN, ) O P I N I O N 

ELIZABETH ARCHULETA, LENA ) 

FOWLER, AND MANDY METZGER, THE ) 

DULY ELECTED OR APPOINTED ) 

MEMBERS OF THE COCONINO COUNTY ) 

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO ARE ) 

NAMED SOLELY IN THEIR OFFICIAL ) 

CAPACITY; WENDY ESCOFFIER, CLERK ) 

OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, WHO ) 

IS NAMED SOLELY IN HER OFFICIAL ) 

CAPACITY; THE COCONINO COUNTY ) 

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; THE ) 

HONORABLE CANDACE D. OWENS, THE ) 

DULY ELECTED COCONINO COUNTY ) 

RECORDER, WHO IS NAMED SOLELY IN ) 

HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND THE ) 

HONORABLE PATTY HANSEN, THE DULY ) 

APPOINTED COCONINO COUNTY ) 

ELECTION ADMINISTRATOR, WHO IS ) 

SOLELY NAMED IN HER OFFICIAL ) 

CAPACITY, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants/Appellees. ) 

_________________________________ ) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Coconino County 

The Honorable David L. Mackey, Judge 

REVERSED

________________________________________________________________ 

 
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WILLIAMS, ZINMAN, & PARHAM, P.C. Scottsdale 

 By Scott E. Williams 

 Mark B. Zinman 

 Melissa A. Parham 

 Michael A. Parham 

Attorneys for Jill Kennedy 

COPPERSMITH, SCHERMER, & BROCKELMAN, P.L.C. Phoenix 

 By Andrew S. Gordon 

 Roopali H. Desai 

Attorneys for Joseph Lodge 

DAVID W. ROZEMA, COCONINO COUNTY ATTORNEY Flagstaff 

 By Jean E. Wilcox, Deputy County Attorney 

Attorneys for Carl Taylor, Matt Ryan, 

Elizabeth Archuleta, Lena Fowler, Mandy Metzger, 

Wendy Escoffier, Candace Owens, and Patty Hansen 

WILLIAM G. MONTGOMERY, MARICOPA COUNTY ATTORNEY Phoenix 

 By M. Colleen Connor, Deputy County Attorney 

 Bruce P. White, Deputy County Attorney 

Attorneys for Amici Curiae 

Helen Purcell and Karen Osborne 

________________________________________________________________ 

B E R C H, Chief Justice 

¶1 On August 21, 2012, we issued an order reversing the 

superior court’s ruling and disqualifying Joseph Lodge from 

participating as a Libertarian Party write-in candidate for the 

August 28, 2012, primary election. We further ordered that his 

name not be placed on the official ballot for the 2012 general 

election for the office of Coconino County Superior Court Judge, 

Division Five. This opinion explains our Order. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Joseph Lodge is the incumbent judge of Division Five 

of the Superior Court in Coconino County who seeks election to a 
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new term in that office. In an earlier opinion, we held that 

Lodge’s omission of the superior court division number from his 

nominating petitions rendered all of his petitions for the 

primary election fatally defective. Kennedy v. Lodge (Lodge I), 

230 Ariz. 134, 137 ¶ 16, 281 P.3d 488, 491 (2012). Accordingly, 

Lodge was ineligible for the 2012 Democratic primary election. 

Id. at 135 ¶ 5, 137 ¶ 16, 281 P.3d at 489, 491; see also A.R.S. 

§ 16-333 (2006). 

¶3 Lodge then sought to run as a write-in candidate in 

the Libertarian Party primary election. Jill Kennedy, a 

qualified elector, challenged Lodge’s write-in candidacy, 

arguing that A.R.S. § 16-312(F)(3) (Supp. 2011) bars Lodge from 

running as a write-in candidate because he filed nomination 

petitions, but failed to secure enough valid signatures to run 

in the Democratic primary. Kennedy also asserts that the trial 

court in Lodge I implicitly held the individual petition 

signatures to be invalid, therefore barring Lodge from asserting 

their validity here under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 

¶4 Distinguishing invalid nominating petitions from 

invalidation of the individual signatures on those petitions, 

the superior court ruled that the invalidated petitions did not 

trigger application of A.R.S. § 16-312(F)(3). The court 

reasoned that the invalidity of the petitions did not imply a 
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“fail[ure] to provide a sufficient number of valid petition 

signatures” so as to disqualify Lodge’s write-in candidacy. 

¶5 Kennedy timely appealed. We have jurisdiction over 

this expedited appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351(A) (Supp. 

2011). See also ARCAP 8.1 (setting forth procedures for 

expedited election appeals). 

II. DISCUSSION 

¶6 The outcome of this case turns on statutory 

interpretation, an issue of law that we review de novo. Duncan 

v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 308 ¶ 2, 70 

P.3d 435, 437 (2003). Section 16-312(F), A.R.S., bars persons 

from running as write-in candidates in four specific 

circumstances. At issue in this case is § 16-312(F)(3), which 

applies to candidates who have “filed a nomination petition for 

the current primary election for the office sought and failed to 

provide a sufficient number of valid petition signatures as 

prescribed by § 16-322.” Thus, we must determine whether this 

statutory bar applies to a candidate whose petitions were 

invalid in their entirety for failure to substantially comply 

with the statutory requirements.1

 

1

 Lodge had timely filed 99 petitions containing 1,110 

signatures in total, but all of the petitions were invalidated 

in Lodge I, 230 Ariz. at 135 ¶ 3, 137 ¶ 16, 281 P.3d at 489, 

491. Our decision here does not rest on whether the number of 

signatures would otherwise have been sufficient. 
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¶7 Lodge urges this Court to distinguish between 

defective petitions and petitions containing an inadequate 

number of signatures after all challenges to individual 

signatures have been resolved. He asserts that § 16-312(F)(3) 

applies only in the latter situation, construing the phrase “as 

prescribed by § 16-322” as limiting subsection (F)(3)’s 

preceding language. 

¶8 We disagree. Section 16-322 merely sets forth methods 

for calculating the number of signatures required on nomination 

petitions for various elected offices. Contrary to Lodge’s 

suggestion, § 16-322 does not provide any method for determining 

the validity of signatures and does not form an independent 

legal basis for disqualifying candidates or signatures. 

¶9 Lodge also reasons that signatures may still be valid 

for purposes of § 16-312(F)(3) even though the petition forms 

containing the signatures were defective.2

 This Court has 

previously observed, however, that signatures on defective 

petitions are themselves invalid. Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 

 

2

 Lodge argues that Kennedy stipulated during the evidentiary 

hearing in Lodge I that Lodge had enough valid signatures. The 

record, however, clearly reflects that Kennedy intended only to 

waive previously asserted challenges to the individual 

signatures themselves. The Lodge I trial court correctly 

determined that Kennedy conceded that if all the petitions were 

valid, “Mr. Lodge still had sufficient potentially valid 

signatures.” (Emphasis added.) But Kennedy consistently 

maintained that all signatures were invalid because the 

petitions containing them were invalid. 
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94, 101 n.4 ¶ 39, 139 P.3d 612, 619 n.4 (2006); Brousseau v. 

Fitzgerald, 138 Ariz. 453, 456, 675 P.2d 713, 716 (1984). This 

principle applies even though the grounds for invalidation here 

differ from those in Brousseau and Moreno. 

¶10 In Brousseau, we voided petitions that were falsely 

certified as having been circulated by individuals who had not 

collected the signatures. 138 Ariz. at 454, 456, 675 P.2d at 

714, 716. We held that signatures on such petitions “may not be 

considered in determining the sufficiency of the number of 

signatures to qualify for placement on the ballot.” Id. at 456, 

675 P.2d at 716. Counting signatures on defective petitions, we 

noted, was inconsistent with the goal of the statutory 

requirements: to ensure the integrity of nominations by 

guarding against misrepresentations and reducing erroneous 

signatures. Id.

¶11 The reasoning in Brousseau is especially persuasive 

where, as here, the face of the petition might have misled 

signers regarding the office for which the candidate was 

running. As we noted in Lodge I, because Lodge failed to list 

“Division Five” on his petitions, signers could not know from 

the face of the petitions for which office he was seeking 

nomination. 230 Ariz. at 136 ¶ 12, 281 P.3d at 490. Therefore, 

the defects in Lodge’s petitions, although different from those 
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in Brousseau, are no less fatal to the validity of the 

signatures contained on the invalid petitions. 

¶12 Other election statutes support this conclusion. 

Section 16-321, which governs the validity of signatures, 

directs that signatures “shall not be counted” unless they are 

“on a sheet bearing the form prescribed by § 16-314.” A.R.S. 

§ 16-321(A) (Supp. 2011). “The applicable statutes require 

superior court judicial nominating petitions to specifically 

designate the division number of the judicial office sought.” 

Lodge I, 230 Ariz. at 137 ¶ 16, 281 P.3d at 491. Because 

Lodge’s petitions did not contain that required information, 

they did not “substantially comply with statutory requirements.” 

Id. at 136 ¶ 12, 281 P.3d at 490. And “[a]ny petition filed by 

a candidate for [judicial office that] does not comply with the 

provisions of this chapter shall have no force or effect at any 

such election.” A.R.S. § 16-333. 

¶13 We hold that a candidate whose nominating petitions 

have “no force or effect,” id., “fail[s] to provide a sufficient 

number of valid petition signatures” under A.R.S. § 16-

312(F)(3). Kennedy’s successful challenge to all of Lodge’s 

petitions placed Lodge squarely within the scope of the 

statutory bar in § 16-312(F)(3). 

¶14 In view of this conclusion, we need not address the 

res judicata and collateral estoppel arguments Kennedy raised. 
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III. CONCLUSION 

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of 

the superior court. Appellee Joseph Lodge is disqualified from 

participating as a Libertarian Party write-in candidate for the 

office of Coconino County Superior Court Judge, Division Five, 

in the August 28, 2012, primary election. The Coconino County 

Recorder and Elections Administrator shall not count any votes 

for him in the tally of ballots for that election. Nor shall 

Joseph Lodge’s name be placed on the official ballot for the 

2012 general election for the office of Coconino County Superior 

Court Judge, Division Five. 

 __________________________________ 

 Rebecca White Berch, Chief Justice 

CONCURRING: 

__________________________________ 

A. John Pelander, Justice 

__________________________________ 

Robert M. Brutinel, Justice