Professional Military Education for

Air Force Officers:

Comments and Criticisms

Edited by

RICHARD L. DAVIS, Lt Col, USAF

FRANK P. DONNINI, Lt Col, USAF

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

June 1991
Library ofCongress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Professional military education for Air Force officers : comments and

criticisms / edited by Richard L. Davis, Frank P. Donnini

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1 . United States. Air Force-Officers-Education. 2. Military

education-United States. 1. Davis, Richard L.,1947- . II . Donnini, Frank P.

U0638.P76 1991

358.4'007'073-dc20 91-15110

CIP

DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school

environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of

national defense-related concepts . The views expressed in this publication

are those of the editors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of Defense or the United States government .

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review

authorities and is cleared for public release .

ii
To those who think

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

ABOUT THE EDITORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

1 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Inception Phase, 1946-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Trans- and Post-Korean War Phase, 1950-57 . . . 3

Post-Sputnik Phase, 1958-65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Vietnam War Phase, 1965-74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Post-Vietnam War Phase, 1974-79 . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Defense Resurgence Phase, 1980-87 . . . . . . . . . . 9

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2 EVOLUTION OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY

EDUCATION DOCTRINE FOR AIR FORCE

OFFICERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Purpose of Air Force Professional Military

Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Original Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Stated Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Broad versus Specialized Education . . . . . . . . 21

Air University's Professional Military Education

Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Original Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Informal Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Changes in Air University Regulations . . . . . . 30
Air Command and Staff College . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Squadron Officer School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

3 COMMENTARY ONAIR UNIVERSITY,

1946-87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Commentary, 1946-67 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Faculty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Curriculum, Educational Philosophy,

and Teaching Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Student Selection Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Commentary, 1968-87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Faculty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Curricula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Nonresident Professional Military

Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Teaching Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Criticism of Criticisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Board of Visitors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Air Force Educational Requirements

Board Task Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Self-Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Professional Military Education's Foundation:

Defining the Officer Corps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

Professional Military Education Successes and

Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119

Illustrations

Table

1 Evolution of Air War College Curricula . . . . . . . . . 36

2 Evolution of Air Command and Staff College

Curricula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3 Evolution of Squadron Officer School Curricula . . . 42

Vii

Professional military education (PME) has played an important

part in the career development of US Air Force officers since the

USAF became a separate military service in 1947. Although PME

is now well established and considered successful, the system ha:

drawn much criticism over the years. In an attempt to produce

reference source for future evaluations of PME, a special study

team at Air University's Airpower Research Institute undertool

an objective examination of the evolution of professions

education in the Air Force. Their research, begun in 1987, range(

over hundreds of primary documents and yielded a vast amount o:

information, both historical and analytical . This book, edited b3

two members ofthe original team, is a distillation of more than 4(

years of PME appraisals that were unearthed by the larger study.

Such valuations-caustic as well as complimentary-an

presented here in the belief that they are ultimately beneficial tc

PME. If the aim ofAir Force professional education is to produc(

capable officers, then it should be flexible enough to accommodat(

changes whichpursue that goal. Readers ofthis book will discover

that PME continues to serve the best interests of the Air Forc(

because of-rather than in spite of-the steady gaze of critics

Pvec

in Kinshasa, Zaire. He is a former

B-52 aircraft andflight commander,

serving in various flying and staff

positions in the 320th Bombardment

Wing, Mather AFB, California, and

the 43d Bombardment Wing,

Andersen AFB, Guam. He has also

served as a military doctrine analyst

at the Airpower Research Institute,

AirUniversity Center for Aerospace

Doctrine, Research, and Education

(AUCADRE), Maxwell AFB,

Alabama, and as a political-military

affairs officer, advising on military

space operations and security at

USAF SpaceDivision, Los Angeles,

California. Colonel Davis holds a

BA degree in history from the

University of Redlands and an MA

degree in international affairs from

California State University,

Sacramento . He is a graduate of

Squadron Officer School, Air

Command and Staff College, and

Air War College. He has authored a

collegetext on the employmentofair

power in World War II and has

written several articles on Air Force

PME and Air Force doctrine .

Lt Col Frank P. Donnini is the

targets division chief on the

intelligence staff, Headquarters

Tactical Air Command, Langley

AFB, Virginia. Previously, he

served as an international politicalxi
history from Union College and master's degrees in publ:

administration and international relations from Golden Gate Universe

and Creighton University, respectively . He is a candidate for a doctor

degree in public administration from theUniversity ofAlabama. Colon

Donnini is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command ar

Staff College, and Air War College. Author of several publications, l

has recently completed a book on the Australia, NewZealand, and U

(ANZUS) treaty defense alliance, to be published by the Air Universi

Press.

Xii
This study is based on an examination ofprofessional military

education (PME) for United States Air Force officers that was

conducted in 1988 at the Airpower Research Institute (ARI), Air

University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and

Education (AUCADRE), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. The original

study researched the history and evolution ofthe Air Force's PME

system, assessed the current status of Air Force PME, and

compared the PME systems of the other US military services to

that of the Air Force. This extract, however, restricts itself to the

history of Air Force PME between 1946 and 1987. Originally,

seven ARI officers, including the editors of this study, worked on

the project. Collectively, they examined more than 345

documents-letters, regulations, manuals, studies, reports,

catalogs, and histories-in an effort to fully understand the

criticisms made of Air Force PME throughout its history .

The capstone ofAir Force PME is Air University (AU), located

at Maxwell Air Force Base. AU consists of three schools :

Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and

Air War College. During the more than 40 years examined here,

PME became thoroughly institutionalized . Further, the quality of

professional education offered by AUwas constantly assessed and

reassessed . External observers (those outside the Air Force) and

internal observers (bothmilitary and civilian, assigned from within

the Air Force) regularly examined the qualifications and teaching

methods ofthe schools' faculty, as well as the schools' curricula .

Throughoutthis period, PME'spurpose was the subject ofongoing

discussion: whether it should provide broad or specialized

instruction and whether it should address only military issues or

include political and related topics. These questions remain

unanswered because the Air Force has never effectively defined

what it wanted its officers to know or to be.

Although the assessments described in this book are not

exhaustive, they are representative of both internal and external

Xiii
even more difficult . On the other hand, external criticismsparticularly those from non-Department of Defense observerswere prone to find fault with PME. These evaluations were more

likely to be explicitly critical, often bluntly so, and they too were

perhaps not wholly objective . This study seeks a balance between

the two types of criticisms and attempts to determine how they

complement each other.

Indeed, the authors themselves must confess to a certain

prejudice . It was not possible to pursue the original study from a

totally detached point of view. We feel that education in general

and PME in particular should play an important role in the

professional development of competent military leadership. The

selection of subjects to be taught, the scope of coverage, and the

sequence of courses of study are matters that reasonable people

should debate. However, failing to pursue the most applicable and

appropriate solutions produced by such debates or accepting a

particular approach simply because it is "the way it has always

been done" might have unfortunate consequences for national

security. These sentiments were expressed by Maj Gen Muir S.

Fairchild, AU's first commanding general, speaking to the AU

Board ofVisitors in 1946:

Whether a man has gone very far in highereducation is not too important,

as long as he is a simple buck pilot. But when he gets to a position of

greater age, rank and responsibility, those deficiencies [a lack of good

professional education] we feel are apt to show up markedly, resulting in

a more or less mediocre senior officer level.

We would like to thank the people who worked with us on the

original AUCADRE PME study: Col Jeffrey C. Benton; Lt Cols

Richard B. Clark, Jr., Harvey J . Crawford, andBernardD. Claxton;

and Maj Thomas C. Blow. A very special thanks to our mentors,

Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr David MacIsaac. We also appreciate

the assistance of Dr Marvin Bassett, our editor at AU Press, and

xiv


Context and Background

From 1946 to 1987, various study groups made over 120 distinct

assessments of the Air Force professional education program.

Commentaries ranged from casual references to comprehensive

analyses of philosophy, definitions, and objectives for officer

professional military education (PME). Initially, the Air Force

sought to produce a professional officer corps that was not only

educated and aware of wartime techniques and doctrine but also

proficient in the skills necessary to handle the technological

complexities of modem war. Consequently, Air University (AU)

was chartered to manage both a postcommission military

education system, designed to provide broad knowledge to all

officers, and the Air (later Air Force) Institute of Technology,

designed to offer college degrees in specialized subjects.

Although most people seemed to agree that a broad education

for the officer corps was highly desirable, criticisms of AU and its

procedures over the years reveal significant difficulties in

obtaining qualified faculty, designing effective and appropriate

;curricula, procuring the best students, and maintaining sufficient

budgetpriority for PME. This study surveys the specific criticisms

ofAU's attempts to secure effective professional education for Ain

!Force officers. Toward that end, chapter 1 takes a historical

;approach in summarizing key PME studies and conferences, as

well as developments at Air University. Chapter 2 addresses the

purpose of PME from an Air Force perspective and traces the.

revolution of both PME and school curricula. Chapter 3 deals with,

,the specific studies and criticisms ofAU and itsprograms. Finally,'

chapter 4 offers a few observations about officer PME, particularly

with regard to commentary that has gradually evolved and may be

styled a "doctrine" ofPME.

1
Leonard T. Gerow) established baseline standards for postwar

professional military education. Tasked to determine educational

requirements, the board felt that in-depth instruction in all aspects

of national security was the central purpose of PME. Thus, the

board recommended a five-tiered educational structure: two

schools at the national level and three managed by the services.

Officers would progress sequentially through company grade,

intermediate, and senior service schools and then finish their

education with the joint andnational political perspectives offered

by an armed forces college and a national security university,

respectively. The goal was to educate only the best officers,

providing each with a general knowledge of the entire military

establishment and a broad understanding of political-military

affairs. Interestingly, an officer was to complete PME by age 45

"in order to have commanders and staffs of a useful age for any

future war."i

As the newest service, the Air Force responded enthusiastically

to the spirit of the Gerow proposals. Air Force leaders believed

strongly that their service was unique. This conviction was

especially true of Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild, the first commander

of AU, and of Maj Gen David M. Schlatter, the first deputy

commanding general for education at Air University. These

officers reflected this spirit ofuniqueness bypatterning their PME

program after a university system, making the Air Force the only

service to do so. They also established three general goals for Air

Force education: (1) to provide officers with the narrow technical

specialization to do their jobs, (2) to educate officers in the broad

context of national security issues, and (3) to encourage forward

thinking, unhampered by tradition2

Many initial AU concerns involved the facilities and resources

necessary to accommodate Air Force officers in sufficient

numbers. In an effort to educate as many officers as possible, the

Air Force set annual attendance quotas for its PME schools. Due

2
early . AUalso had to compete forpersonnel and resources when

the Army Air Forces (AAF) was reorganizing and expanding to

55 combat groups. This situation created problems with regard to

faculty quality and tenure. Indeed, the procurement and retention

of "greatteachers" were common concerns duringthe early years .

The inception phase ended in 1950 with a military education

board chaired by General Fairchild urging the continuation of

formal education for all active duty officers with regular

commissions. The average officer at the end of World War II had

about one year of college . The Air Force wanted to elevate this

standing to at least the baccalaureate level . Hence, a major focus

of the Fairchild board was to enhance degree-granting

opportunities, including the expansion of Air Institute of

Technology programs and the possible accreditation of Air War

College (AWC) and/or Air Command and Staff School (ACSS),

each of which had resident programs of 10 months' duration. The

board also set PUM school attendance targets : 100 percent of all

officers to attend Air Tactical School (ATS), 60 percent to attend

ACSS, and 25 percent to attend AWC. It admitted, though, that the

targets were "desirable, but probably unrealistic," hoping they

might be met by the end of 19516

Trans- and Post-Korean War Phase, 1950-57

By the fall of 1950, the mobilization requirements ofthe Korean

War interrupted much ofthe groundwork laidby General Fairchild

and the others working with him. The time for completing studies

at both ACSS and AWC was reduced from 10 to five months in

order to meet the increased demand for graduates. However, the

effort to provide the same level of learning to more people in a

shorter time period diluted the quality of education. As the AU

Board ofVisitors (BOV) put it, reduction in course length without

3
in 1955. Tyler reviewed the workings of all three Air Force PME

schools and tried to provide a basic guideline for planning and

conducting AUprograms. He concluded that the Air Force lacked

clear, consistent goals and objectives for PME primarily because

"a comprehensive, authoritative statement ofthe philosophy ofAir

University has not yet been put in writing ."s This observation was

not new, having been made earlier by Dr Jacob S. Orleans in a

report covering the educational program at ACSS in 1949 (Orleans

report). 9 The Tyler study, though, was important enough to be the

point of departure for the Air Force Educational Requirements

Board (AFERB) Task Group efforts of 1962-63.

As the Korean Warwound down, AUresumed year-long ACSS

and AWC courses but continued to have problems with recruiting

and keeping good faculty . This difficulty was largely due to Air

Force efforts to build and maintain an operational force of 137

wings. Faculty tours rarely reached the desired three-year length,

a problem even AU's efforts at selective manning failed to solve. t o

In 1956 the Air Force conducted its sixth major study of

education, chaired by Gen E. W. Rawlings, commander of the Air

Materiel Command." Typical of study groups of the period, the

Rawlings board focused more on general education than PME.

Nevertheless, the study proposed "to critically examine" officer

PME and assess its adequacy, organization, objectives, methods,

and (implicitly) the system's ability to meet the Air Force's

requirements for quality officers. The study also assessed

precommissioning programs, recommending, for example, that

AU manage the new US Air Force Academy (USAFA) to ensure

consistency in pre- and postcommission education. In Rawlings's

view, existing officer-education levels and the number of PME

graduates were still grossly deficient. Boardmembers believed that

producing a well-educated officer should be "a long term

development of highpriority." In addition, all officers should have

at least a baccalaureate degree, the board said.

"2

4
post-Sputnik (October 1957) call for more engineers and scientists.

In this setting, the technical problems accompanying the Air

Force's change from bombers to missiles became a key concern

of the Power board, the eighth major Air Force conference

addressing educational requirements . Chaired in November 1959

by GenThomas S . Power, then commander inchiefofthe Strategic

Air Command (SAC), this board felt that expanded and

better-tailored engineering and scientific studies were important

Air Force goals . Yet, significantly, the board also encouraged

broad service experience and a solid education in general military

principles. Its members noted that strengthening operational units

and enhancing technical skills were necessary activities, but they

quickly added that the Air Force is "not overemphasizing the

liberal arts and social sciences." Rather, the Air Force "might not

be making enough effort in these fields." The board's report also

reflected continuing concern over faculty quality and urged that

both broad and specialized education be integrated over an

officer's entire career. It agreed that all officers needed

baccalaureate degrees but disagreed with the Rawlings board's

recommendation that AU run the USAF Academy.

13

In 1961 Headquarters USAF in Washington, D.C., directed the

AFERB to determine the needs of Air Force PME. In turn, the

board appointed a task group, which began work in January 1962

and submitted a final report in July 1963 (subsequently amended

in December 1963 at the behest of Headquarters USAF). 14 The

report defined PME and identified its objectives :

[PME is] the systematic acquisition oftheoretical and applied knowledge

which is of particular significance to the profession of arms. It involves

the acquisition of knowledge, skills and attitudes which are requisite to

military professionalism and which form the core of understandings

which must be common to all officers, regardless of the specialized

activities in which they may be engaged . . . . It is directed to the officer's

5
ofPME. The report also described aprofessional Air Force officer

an expert in the profession of arms, particularly as pertains to aerospace

power. He understands the nature of war and is proficient in the art of

waging it under any condition . He is a leader of men in both peace and

war, and he is accomplished in utilizing his knowledge and skills in

organizing and managing resources. . . .

He participates in specialized education, as well as specialized training,

and he employs this continuing preparation, in conjunction with

professional military education, in order to be able to assume greater

responsibilities as he progresses in his military career.

The professional Air Force officer recognizes that he must continually

expand his knowledge and understanding of the art of wards

Significantly, the task group felt that the 1958 DOD

Reorganization Act directly affected perceived PME needs by

fostering increased emphasis on joint operations and interservice

cooperation. 16 The task group's report of 1963 had an impact on

the Air Force PME system as significant as that ofthe 1946 Gerow

board: the schools' curricula soon changed, and key portions of

the report evolved into a revised Air Force Manual (AFM) 53-1

(later Air Force Regulation [AFR] 53-8), USAF Officer

Professional Military Education System.

Although a key document, the report of the AFERB task group

did not address all aspects of PME. From 1961-64 study groups

produced at least 32 other distinct assessments of Air Force PME,

ranging from occupying the time of SAC's missile launch control

officers to enhancing the English skills of students at Air

Command and Staff College (ACSC, formerly ACSS) and

Squadron Officer School (SOS). 17 Most of these studies were

descriptive rather than analytical, but some had very specific

complaints and recommendations . One internal AU study, for

example, noted that the PME system was producing officers who

6
period 1963-73 . This plan sought to provide an outline and

rationale for PME goals and attempted to integrate the latter's

requirements with those ofspecial education and graduate studies.

The plan recommended an increase in the quota ofstudents taking

PME in residence and the completion ofPME as aprerequisite for

promotion to appropriate grades. 19 Furthermore, it formally

shifted the emphasis away from educating only regularly

commissioned officers, sought to require a baccalaureate degree

as a prerequisite for commissioning, and hoped to make the PME

curriculum more flexible and to raise faculty quality. The BOV

heartily endorsed the plan.

20

Vietnam War Phase, 1965-74

The advent ofthe war in Southeast Asia (SEA) brought the third

phase to a close. This conflictthe second of two "military

emergencies," as the Board of Visitors termed the Korean and

Vietnam wars-also prompted a 50-percent decline in resident

attendance at AU, distracted observers from significant PME

analysis, and slowed thepace ofAir Force PME studies. However,

various agencies still made a number ofcritiques and assessments,

the most significant of which was an Officer Education Study,

completed by the Office ofthe Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Manpower in July 1966. This three-volume report extensively

reviewed officer education policies for all the services and

addressed baccalaureate requirements, graduate education, and

both the pre- and postcommissioning needs of officerPME. PME

itself was considered in four levels: entry (precommissioning) and

first, second, and third professional (corresponding to AU's SOS,

ACSC, and AWC, respectively) 21

The Officer Education Study concluded that among all officers,

those in the Air Force valued PME the least, especially compared,

7
objective criteria for determining the length ofPME courses, and

the inclusion of true electives for resident education at the

intermediate and senior levels. Although a valuable and

comprehensive study, the report's impact on the services' PME

systems appears inretrospect to have been small, possibly because

of the military focus on the war in Southeast Asia.

Toward the end of the conflict, a routine review of Air Force

PME unintentionally affirmed certain conclusions made by the

Officer Education Study. In 1973 Maj Gen Lawrence S. Lightner

headed a board to assess curriculum and faculty activities at Air

University . This board concluded that the role of history in Air

Force military education should be downplayed infavor ofgeneral

current events, that lectures should be improved and made the

central part of the educational experience, and that the faculty

should not be given time for independent research or study.

These suggestions affected Air Force PME programs throughout

the 1970s.

Post-Vietnam War Phase, 1974-79

The end of the war brought a renewed interest in PME from a

variety of quarters, as shown by a sudden surge in the number of

internal studies and external criticisms of all the services' PME

programs 23 The criticism was not new, butbecause of the general

disenchantmentwiththe military at the time, it proved particularly

biting and at least prompted senior Air Force leaders to take note.

The 1975 DOD Committee on Excellence in Education (called

the Clements committee after its chairman, Deputy Secretary of

Defense William Clements) attempted to set the stage forpostwar

education and training. The committee's conclusions, published in

two reports, were directive in nature and were signed by the

secretaries ofthe Army,Navy, andAirForce. The first report stated

8
, 

g

have a common core curricula, including study of the DOD

decision-making process, formulation of national security polic ,

management skills, and national and international environment .

s

The intermediate (or staff-level) service schools should focus

midlevel officer education on "the achievement of professional

competence and expertise in the command doctrine, staff and

operations of their particular Service ." 26 Finally, since faculty

quality had noticeably deteriorated during the war, new faculty

candidates at both the intermediate and senior levels should meet

a screening board prior to selection. 27 For AWC, the committee's

suggestions led to increased emphasis on research and electives

tailored more to student experience. ACSC, meanwhile, was to

increase the number of air warfare studies and emphasize specific

war-fighting concerns ofthe Air Force. Both schools should teach

the information and skills necessary in mastering the positions to

which students would be assigned upon graduation. 28 Military

thinking on PME retained this general position well into the 1980s.

Defense Resurgence Phase, 1980-87

As the Air Force entered the 1980s, questions about effectively

educating officers for war remained unanswered, despite all the

previous commentary. For a while, the Air Force mixed broad and

specialized education by placing AU under Air Training

Command (1979-83) . Air Force-sponsored reviews or inspections

frequently praised AU and its school curricula and programs, but

dissatisfaction with the results ofthe war inSoutheast Asia and the

Desert One rescue attempt in Iran (1980) prompted many people

to seriously question the quality of PME. Symptomatic of this

concern in the Air Force were Project Warrior (1982), which

encouraged officers to pursue their own professional reading and

9
PME programs were truly doing their job.

Two studies had a strong effect on Air Force PME during this

phase. Sponsored by AU in February 1980, the Officer PME Study

dealt with what should be taught to Air Force officers . It stressed

the need for more strategic planning in the curricula, especially at

ACSC, andlamented the fact that specified knowledge levels were

not prerequisites for resident professional education.29 Five years

later, at the behest ofSecretary ofthe Air Force Verne Orr, the Air

Force conducted the PMEFaculty Enhancement study. As the title

suggests, the study group members concerned themselves with a

single issue : the qualifications and effectiveness ofthe AUfaculty.

The study addressed faculty recruitment, training, education,

evaluation, and image. Its two most important recommendations

called for a better civilian-military mix at ACSC and AWC and a

reduction in the number of so-called plowbacks, PME graduates

held over to be instructors on the schools' faculty. 30 The lonf-term

effects of both of these studies still await further analysis.

Summary

The studies outlined in this chapter reflect the types of

assessments made ofAir University and its mission between 1946

and 1987. Eachstudy oranalysis during this periodgarnered awide

range ofresponses; in the main, however, concerns about faculty,

curricula, and other fundamental questionsrecurredwith annoying

regularity . Much of the confusion stemmed from the fact that the

Air Force has been vague about its purpose for PME. Chapter 2

addresses in detail how Air University's charter has evolved since

1946 and theeffect this evolution has had onPME school curricula .

10
y 

service schools originally included Air War College (AWC) for colonels and

lieutenant colonels, AirCommand and StaffSchool (ACSS) formajors, andAir

Tactical School (ATS) forjunior officers . ACSS became Air Command and

Staff College (ACSC) in 1954. ATS became Squadron Officer Course (SOC)

in 1950 and operated as a subdivision of ACSS/ACSC until becoming the

independent Squadron Officer School (SOS) in 1959.

2. Forward thinking and great teachers (see note 4) were key buzzwords of

the period. See FirstReport ofthe Board ofVisitors (Maxwell Field, Ala. : Air

University, Spring 1946), 11, 20 (hereafter, BOV 1) ; see also Proceedings of

the EducationalAdvisory Staff Conference, July 11-12,1947 (Maxwell Field,

Ala. : Air University, 1947), 12. The first educational conferences on

administration and structure ofthe new Army Air Forces (AAF) School took

place in 1946. See Report of the Army Air Forces Educational Conference

(Maxwell Field, Ala. : Army Air Forces School, 18-20 February 1946); and

Report of (Second) AAF Educational Conference (Maxwell Field, Ala. : Air

University, 20-22 August 1946).

3. BOV 2 (1947) : 19; BOV 3 (January 1948): 33. For example, in 1947 all

18,000 officers were supposed to attend AirTactical School at some point. The

school, whichconducted four classes peryear, was able tohandle only 700-750

students per class. By 1953 ATS had to deal with the "management and

development of 23,600 regular and 60,000 reserve career Air Force officers ."

See Report ofthe University System Board, vol. 3 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

University, l September 1953), tab M, 1.

Correspondence courses andanofficial AirForce reading program still exist.

The Extension Course Institute at GunterAFB, Alabama, manages the former,

parroting the curriculum ofthe threemajorPMEschools . The initial reading list

was titled "A Guide for Professional Reading by Air Force Officers,"

unpublished but circulated inJune 1947. It became a formal AirForcepamphlet

(variously numbered), ultimately covering 12 major subject areas and having

over 300titles by the early 1960s. In 1963 the AU Historical Division assumed

management ofthelist. It languished there until 1972, when the AU curriculum

office reduced it to asmall handout with 25 titles. Now titled theAir University

Suggested Professional Reading Guide (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University,

1990), it is still in use, updated every other year or so.

4. BOV 2 (1947) :29-30,51-55.

5. BOV 1(1946):12.

6. Report of the USAF Military Education Board on the Professional

Education System for USAF Officers (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University,

11
stocasoStudy Sees, o8 (ae, aUesty,

December 1968), 34-36; and Lt Gen Walter E. Todd, commander, Air

University, to Air Force Combat Command Staff, Headquarters USAF, letter,

subject: Sixteenth Report ofthe Board of Visitors, 20 June 1960, 2 (filed with

BOV 16 [19601).

7. BOV 3 (January 1948): 4; BOV 7 (1951): 8. Only during academicyear

1951-1952 did AWCrun two five-month courses . At all other times the course

has been 10 months in length.

8. Ralph W. Tyler,Analysis ofthe Purpose, Pattern, Scope, andStructure of

the Officer Education Program ofAir University, Project no. 505-040-0003

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Officer Education Research Laboratory, May 1955), 6,

138. Tylerwryly noted, "rbe purpose of[this] report will not have been served

if it is merely filed" (page 2).

9. A Report to the Commanding General, Air University, ofan Educational

Survey of the Air Command and Staff School (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

University HumanResources Research Institute, l September 1949), 9,16, 37.

DrOrleans was aprofessor ofeducation at CityCollege, NewYork, anddirector

of research and evaluation for the college's Committee on Coordination of

Teacher Education. The AU commander asked him to analyze and evaluate the

educational program at ACSS in light of the ACSS mission . However, Orleans

recognized that his conclusions were relevantto education at AUas awhole and

affected all three schools . In particular, he noted (1) that there was too much

stress on keeping pace with new developments and not enough on substantive

education and (2) that "the education ofAir Force officers should be considered

a continuous process" (pages 15,17ff.) .

10. See reports of the BOV from 1952-1957, passim. BOV 12 (1956) is

typical and well reflects the general problems of this period. With regard to

faculty manning, ACSC appeared to be hardest hit: average tours were as short

as 15 months. See BOV 5 (1949) :4-5.

11. Between 1946 and 1987, various groups prepared 16 major reports on

Air Force PME: AAF Educational Conferences (February and August 1946),

Educational Advisory Staff Conference (1947), Fairchild board (1950),

University System board (1953), Rawlings board (1956), Carmichael study

(1958),Powerboard (1959), Qualitative Educational Requirements Symposium

(1960), Educational Requirements Board Task Group (1962-1963), Officer

Education Study (1966), Lightner board (1973), Task Group Alpha (1974),

Clements committee reports(1975-1976), Officer PME Study (1980), and the

PME Faculty Enhancement Study (1985). These reports were in addition to

those of the annual Board ofVisitors and the AU 10-year plan (1963-1973, cf.

12
than training, that it sets up to instruct its members in its principles, ideals, and

broad understandings" (page 5).

13. Report of the USAF Educational Conference, 17 November 1'959

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : AirUniversity, December 1959),1-12. These references

are tothe executive summary, which is well cross-referenced to the body ofthe

report.

14. In 1959 AU acquired the Air Force Educational Requirements Board

(AFERB), governed by AFR 53-26, Air Force Educational Requirements

Board, 12 December 1958. This standing board was headed by a majorgeneral

who reported directly to the AU commander. Its primary purpose was to ensure

a balance between officers' college degrees and their corresponding AirForce

specialty codes (AFSC), but the board was occasionally used for ad hoc

assessments-the function of the group mentioned here. This group was

chartered to "identify and describe qualitative educational requirements for (1)

specializedprofessional education [and] (2) professional military education."

It veryquickly focused solely onPME. See Air ForceEducational Requirements

Board, Report on Professional Military Education, vol. l (Maxwell AFB, Ala.:

AirUniversity, 10 July 1963),1-1 (hereafter, task group report).

15. Ibid., 3-2, 3-3. The report also includes the definition, philosophy, and

objectives of PME (pages 3-3 to 3-9; see also chapter 2 of this study). The

AFERB Task Group conducted an exhaustive study; it carefully reviewed all

previous major studies and Board of Visitors reports and outlined PME

deficiencies (pages 2-4 to 2-13).

16. The AFERB Task Group stressed the importance ofknowing one's own

service first but added that such knowledge should facilitate senior leadership

inan increasinglyjoint environment. According to the group, "The intent ofthe

Reorganization Actof 1958 and subsequent changes [as well as] the manyrecent

decisions concerning strategy and major weapon systems by the OSD [Office

ofthe Secretary ofDefense] and many other such actions, clearly illustrate the

thrust toward further centralization, standardization, unification, planning and

control at higher levels" (task groupreport, 1A:13-14). Thus, PMEmustpartly

"be of a broadening military nature, designed to help prepare officers to plan

for, employ weapons, andperform necessary supporting actionsinjoint, unified

or combined conditions" (page 13).

17. Good summaries of these studies, as well as most significant PME

assessments made between 1946 and the early 1980s, are found in two

unpublished documents available in the Air University Library: Maj Glen A.

Kendrick, "Annotated Bibliography of Research on the USAF Professional

Military Education (PME) System," Report no. 1300-80 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. :

13
(DCS/Education), to Maj Gen Charles H. Pottenger, vice commander, Air

University, letter, subject : Stricture of the Professional Military Education

System, 26April 1963,3-4 . The attachmenttothis letter was anad hoc,in-house

study entitled "Factors Involved in Determining the Appropriate Structure of

the Professional Military Education System."

19. See Air University DCS/Education, Air University Plan for the

Development ofAirForceProfessional Education, 1963-1973 (Maxwell AFB,

Ala. : Air University, March 1963), 1, 18 (hereafter, AU 10-year plan). In

addition to PME, this document covered general and specialized education,

student selection, language training, research, curriculum, methodologies, and

more. Its objective for PME was "to raise the professional military educational

level of the Officer Corps to the extent that 100 per cent will have military

education appropriate to their ranks" (page 8). The 18th Board of Visitors,

chaired by Dr Gordon Sproul, University ofCalifornia, requested that the plan

be developed. This board was concerned aboutthe quality ofPME and split into

two groups . One assessed the general Air Force PME program, and the other

addressed the question of conducting pure research at AU. The former group

recommended that a 10-year plan be developed. BOV 18 (1962): 5.

20. AU 10-year plan, 11-12,16, 24, 50-51. The reports ofthe 19th and 20th

Boards of Visitors endorsed the AU plan. Both BOVs particularly liked the

increased school quotas . BOV 19 (1963): 7; BOV 20 (1964) : 5.

21 . Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Officer

Education Study, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C. : Department of Defense, July

1966). For adiscussion ofPME, see vol. 2:136-86, 297-355.

22. Maj Gen Lawrence S. Lightner, Review of Air War College and Air

Command andStaffCollege (MaxwellAFB,Ala. : Air University, March 1973),

12,19-20,32 .

23. The most significant formal studies wereReportofthe Task Study Group

Alpha (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, 29 June 1974); DOD Committee

onExcellenceinEducation,TheIntermediate LevelStaffColleges : Conclusions

and Initiatives (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1 December

1976) (hereafter, Clements committee, IISC); DOD Committee on Excellence

in Education, The Senior Service Colleges : Conclusions and Initiatives

(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 5 June 1975) (hereafter,

Clements committee, SSC); and USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,

Report of a Study on Officer PME Policy (Washington, D.C. : Government

Printing Office, March 1976). Fora typical criticism from a nonmilitary source,

see Maureen Mylander, "Graduate School for the Generals," Washington

Monthly, October 1974,42-52.

14
9-10.

29. OfficerPMEStudy (MaxwellAFB, Ala. : AirUniversity, February 1980),

16, 30, 114-15; and Officer PME Study, atch 1, Supporting Documents

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : AirUniversity, February 1980),14-5.

30. Air UniversityTask Force andBlueRibbon Committee onAirUniversity

Faculty Improvement,PMEFacultyEnhancement : CombinedReport(Maxwell

AFB, Ala. : Air University, February-March 1985), 3, 5-7,16.

31. The latest iteration in the long history ofcommentary on Air University

is the report of the House Armed Services Committee, Panel on Military

Education, chaired by Rep Ike Skelton . Focusing on the service schools'

capability to give officers a perspective on joint operations, many ofits views

coincide with those of earlier studies. The Skelton committee report, however,

wasnot releaseduntil April 1989 andthus is outside the purview ofthis history.

15

outoo

y 

Doctrine for Air Force Officers

Before examining specific criticism of PME faculty, curricula,

and teaching methods, one must understand the purpose or

doctrinal basis ofPME in orderto evaluate the validity ofcriticism

directed against it. However, the Air Force has had difficulty in

formulating a clear-cut purpose for PME, a situation reflected by

questions that have dogged the system since its inception . Should

PME, for example, be oriented toward broad or specialized

education? Should it concentrate on the entire spectrum ofnational

security issues or exclusively on militaryperhaps just air

power-issues? The historical record indicates that the Air Force

has not answeredthese questions completely . Indeed, the AirForce

is not even sure what an officer is . As we have seen in chapter 1,

a formal definition of Air Force officership exists, but it is very

broad and basically unworkable from the standpoint of designing

effective PME curricula. Consequently, the perceived purpose of

PME has undergone constant change.

Purpose of Air Force Professional

Military Education

One may observe an evolutionary process at work as various

individuals and study groups sought to clarify PME's raison d'etre,

as originally conceived . The impetus for change was also fueled

by controversy over the scope of education provided by PME.

17
for education at AU, succinctly e

pessed ts docte to te 

Board of Visitors in July 1946 and again in November 1947:

" The purpose of the armed forces and the Air Force is to

preserve the peace.

" The ultimate utility of air power is to force enemy surrender

by direct, sustained strikes against vital centers .

" AU must orient all instruction on the future, pursue forward

thinking, and resist conservatism. Officers must be molded with

the "ability and capability for fundamental, original thought."

" AU is to pursue two educational objectives : (1) provide

techniques and tools to command and (2) guide future, objective

thinking.

" AU is to foster global thinking, using polar maps.

" AU is to foster continuous study and developmental thinking

in science and technology.

" AU is to find and develop great teacher types for its faculty

and to improve liaison with non-Air Force schools .

" AU is to continually reassess and update AU education

programs and, by implication, Air Force educational needs.

" AUis to assist in the revival of an active air defense doctrine.

The goal of Gen Muir S . Fairchild, General Schlatter, and others

was to provide commanders with a "broad knowledge of the

economic, political, and international setting" of national

problems. This objective could be achieved only "by starting early

and continuing through life a general study ofmen and affairs that

is both deep and comprehensive."2 Most observers throughout the

period clearly supported this position and felt that Air Force

officers needed career-long, if not lifelong, education . For

example, the Orleans report (1949) stressed that the education of

officers should be a continuous process. Similarly, the Rawlings

board (1956) urged that the long-term development of a

18
The Board of Visitors strongly recommended the inclusion of

PME in officers' career plans and suggested that the Air Force

Institute of Technology (AFIT) train technicians and that AU

provide education in the social sciences to planners and staff

officers

.

The board added a blunt caveat: Although the lack of a

good technical education might limit the ability of Air Force

officers to exploit future possibilities, the lack of a good general

education would adversely affect the quality of their leadership

over the long term.5 Most importantly, then, AU should "reduce

the influence of prejudice . . . develop a natural urge to

inquisitiveness [and] weed out . . . the narrow facts of technology

in favor of broader principles ."6 Failure to encourage a broad

educational perspective for Air Force leaders could have dire

consequences for national security:

It is quite clear that our national security becomes ever more dependent

on the minds of men rather than their brute strength. Particularly is this

evident in the United States Air Force which is faced with periodic crises

and realignments of power politics as well as tremendous technological

advances that constantly modify its mission, its capabilities, and its

operations. Accordingly,the importance ofAir Universitytothe Air Force

and tothe nation annually becomes morevital. . . . It is essential that every

effort be made to maintain and enhance academic vitality for it is one of

the keys to the enormous advantages of gaining the future first 7

Unfortunately, the idea of promoting intellectual vitality in an

academic setting is difficult to sell within the military. As

Frederick H. Hartmann noted in the mid-1970s, a basic criticism

of all US war colleges is that they "are not taken seriously enough

by the senior uniformed and civilian defense personnel.

,8

1 9
pp

increase the officer's ability to think creatively, solve problems in alogical

and systematic manner, prepare military studies and plans, and make

clear, meaningful, and logical oral and written presentations . Further,

PMEprograms must develop leadership attributes and create the desire

forindividual self-improvement. The accomplishment ofthose purposes

is the goal of Air Force professional military education. Air University

must provide the means to meet the PME goal through the resident and

non-resident courses of instruction, research, and publication of articles

and documentary studies.

In 1975 Lt Gen F. Michael Rogers, AU commander, wanted tc

ensure that the Air Force Education Requirements Boar(

understood that the Air Force's advanced academic degre(

program allowed student officers "to gain specific expertisc

required by a specific position." On the other hand, he noted tha

PMEprovided"aprogressive program of education to enhance thf

professional competence of the students by broadening thei

perspectives and preparing them to assume responsibilities a

higher levels of command and staff duties ." 1° Later that yea

General Rogers reiterated hisbelief inthe expansive nature ofPMI

in an article for Air University Review: "To make sure that th4

officer's knowledge beyond his specialty is not limited, as oftel

happens in other professions, PME imparts attitude, knowledge

and skills on the art of warfare and national security to al

officers ."11

The 1976 Report of a Study on Officer PME Policy by the Ai

Force deputy chief of staff for personnel stated that PME is

the acquisition oftheoretical and applied knowledge ofthe profession of

arms, including the knowledge, skills, and attitudes requisite to military

professionalism which form the core of understanding common to all

officers. It also includes that specific knowledge of military arts and

sciences and command and staffexpertise requiredin peace andwar. For

the Air Force, PME focuses on the theory and application of aerospace

power.

12

20
y g 

The knowledge acquired through the deliberate study of the employment

ofairpower is important. This accumulated knowledge in the application

ofairpower is a factor in determining the readinessof the force to conduct

combat operations. Therefore, as the number of officers educated in the

profession of arms increases, the quality and readiness of the Air Force

as a whole increases. The logical outcome of this approach is that all

officers should complete all levels ofPME in residence. However, since

all officers cannot do so and since some are not well qualified, PME

should be reserved for those with the greatest potential and promise for

higher level appointments .

13

Broad versus Specialized Education

In 1975 the Clements committee stressed the importance of a

broad education for military officers . Thewar colleges were to be

"wellsprings of professional thought, through which officers can

develop and expand their technical and professional military

expertise."14 Toward this end, the war colleges should have a

common core curriculum and a tailored electives program. More

importantly, mission-specific subjects (aerospace warfare for the

Air War College) should "constitute approximately one-third of

the total.

,15 Thecore curriculum might change from time to time

(e .g ., it could include subjects only marginally connected to

national defense), but the committee recommended consistency in

the study of aerospace warfare's

historical basis, fundamental principles, current ramifications,

relationship to associated fields, andfuture implications-toincludethose

for strategy and tactics [for the purpose of developing an] executive

mind-set : a frame of reference which recognizes complexity and

uncertainty in issues but provides the perspective to work through them

to find solutions. [This perspective would] reinforce the effort of each

college to strengthen its position as a recognized and respected center of

intellectual excellence to which professional officers are attracted for

study, andto whichscholars are attracted to teach and conduct research .

16

21
probably ensured that the latter would predominate. The armed

forces prefer specialized instruction; broad education is so unusual

to them that they often have trouble recognizing it. This problem

is at least partially responsible for the difficulty that Air University

and Air Training Command (ATC) have in sorting out their

respective roles and missions. Indeed, AU was even assigned to

ATC as a subordinate organization from 1979-83. It goes without

saying that the services' inability to make this distinction has

drawn much criticism .

In 1984 Professor I . B. Holley, Jr. (a retired major general in the

Air Reserve), ofDuke University wrote a personal letter to Lt Gen

Thomas C. Richards, AU commander, that attempted to resolve

this dilemma by arguing that AWC should accomplish its mission

"to prepare selected officers for future assignment in senior staff

and command positions" through broad rather than specialized

education. He defined the former as "instruction for the cultivation

of the mind, enlarging a student's understanding by opening new

vistas and by sharpening his skills inprocessinginformation . "Like

John Henry Newman, Holley advocated a liberal education for the

thinking man. According to Holley, "The principle objective ofan

Air War College education should be to prepare students to define

problems in an environment ofcomplexity and uncertainty, to seek

and to comprehend a range of alternative solutions, and to perfect

the analytical skills needed to reach preferred solutions." Thus,

tinkering with the curriculum will not make a difference, but

offering a course of study that helps students develop their ability

to think will make a considerable difference .

17

Lt Gen William R. Richardson, commander of the US Army

Training and Doctrine Command, expressed similar sentiments

when he delivered the Kermit Roosevelt Lecture in England that

same year. Richardson noted that between the world wars, men

like Gen George C. Marshall and Gen Omar N. Bradley profitably

used their time to study and to teach. Undoubtedly, their diligence

22
strategy and military history was an embellishment rather than theproper

focus ofmilitary education.

Atstaffcolleges andwarcolleges,coursesin tactics, strategy andplanning

were pushed aside by courses on management, political science and

psychology.

The consequences of these trends have been twofold. First, insufficient

attention has been given to the intangible human qualities so critical in

war. Second, officers have wrongly been taught,that technology is more

important on the battlefield than tactics.

But the crux of the problem [in Vietnam] was that our schools were not

teaching officers how to think, plan and decide.

Today we must emphasize howto think rather than what to think. l8

The services have not been completely obtuse about the

difference between broad and specialized education, at least on the

theoretical level . Such is not the case in practice, however,

especially when budgets have been tight . For example, in 1976

when a proposal threatened to reduce the time spent at ACSC to

five months, Lt Gen Kenneth L. Tallman (Air Force chief of staff

for personnel) wrote to Gen David C. Jones (Air Force chief of

staff) that "the five-month course would [have to] focus more

narrowly on developing staff skills applicable at MAJCOM or

higher level ." 19 A year later, a staff summary sheet noted that

whereas the current [10-month] ACSC program aims to prepare officers

broadly for roles as staff action officers, mid-level supervisors, and

mall-unit commanders, the main focus ofthe 5-month course would be

on the action officer role . Coverage of supervisor and commander

responsibility would be reduced sharply, though not eliminated.2°

The controversy continued into 1978 . In April ofthat year, Vice

Adm Patrick J. Hannifin sent a memorandum to the secretary of

defense that argued against initiatives to reduce the course length

ofthe staff colleges to 22 weeks. He wrote that the Joint Chiefs of

23
in staff procedures and broad political principles but lacking a deep and

thorough understanding of the tactical and strategic application of the

military forces associated with their parent Service. The fact that US

doctrine, both tactical and strategic, is up to date, known and understood

by the US officer corps, and tested in exercises and war games is directly

attributable to the professional military education system 21

Interestingly, though, ACSC had recently added

100-hour"specialty tracks" tailored tothe student's next assignment. The

specialty track instruction is designed to reduce or eliminate the time

required forstudents to transition to the responsibilities andrequirements

oftheir nextjob assignment22

Typical ofthe trend toward specialized education were remarks

by the 1980 Officer PME Study:

The USAF Occupational Measurement Center is administering an Air

Force-wide occupational survey to determine leadership, managerial, and

communicative tasks performed by officers at various phases in their

career. This project is designed primarily to helpvalidate and revise the

curricula of all Air Force officer PME Schools .2

Such activities were commonplace, despite the fact that only four

years before, aReport ofa Study on Officer PME Policy by the Air

Force's deputy chief of staff for personnel noted that

in military matters, PME performs a broadening function. It prepares

officers for a variety of roles in complex organizations, not to perform

specific jobs. . . . It is alsoinappropriate to determine PME requirements

by specific positions.

Obviously, the scope of PME was the subject of considerable

contention. Indeed, somepeople-such as BrigGenJohnE. Ralph,

former commandant of SOS-found themselves torn between the

two choices:

24
issues . While we in the military cannot neglect the great issues, neither

can we dwell on them at the expense offunctional proficiency. A meager,

irrelevant or vague education in the area of combat employment will

diminish military effectiveness . There is no alternative, no substitute for

professional proficiency.

It does not seem very likely that the military will collapse and fail the

nation because of its marginal knowledge of social issues . It is far more

likely that themilitary will falter and fail thenation because ofits inability

to meet demands of combat.

I believe that the general thrust of Air Force professional education,

particularly for the junior officer, experienced a phase which was too

esoteric, too anxious to treat the officer as if he were on the threshold of

a career breakthrough to the National Security Council, too ready to

stimulate his expectations and dilute his interest in combat itself, its

history, its technical evolution, and its leadership demands. Education for

combat roles is not available in any other setting . I think it important for

young officers to be conversant with the great issues, to be fluent

spokesmen for their personal and professional interests. It is wrong,

however, to give this ancillary aspect ofprofessional life such emphasis

that it feeds later frustration and impatience.

Thus, the Air Force's perception of the purpose of PME is

nebulous at best. Air University, however, felt somewhat more

confident about the nature of its mission, by virtue of having a

written charter. Nevertheless, that charter was subject to

considerable change.

Air University's Professional

Military Education Charter

The ideas that led to the creation of Air University's PME

charter antedate the school itself. This study assumes that the

original charter was in place on 3 September 1946, the date when

the first Air Force PME classes opened. The charter has continued

25
Original Charter

AFR 53-8, USAF Officer Professional Military Education

System, defines PME as "the systematic acquisition of theoretical

and applied knowledge of the profession of arms."27 The roots of

this definition and the perceived role ofPME date back to the Air

Service School, which was formed in 1920 at Langley Field,

Virginia. The school's name was changed to the Air Corps Tactical

School (ACTS) six years later, and in 1931 it moved to Maxwell

Field, Alabama. There, ACTS faculty continued to develop

concepts and doctrines of air power and imparted that knowledge

to the Army Air Forces officer corps. The military buildup that

preceded World War II led to the closing of ACTS on 29 June

1940. However, its graduates and faculty went on to demonstrate

the value of the principles of air power that were developed at the

school.

As World War H drew to a close, the Army began to consider

the kind ofpostwar military education system that best suited its

purposes. Following a number ofstudies and memoranda, the War

Department issued an order on 19 November 1945 to establish the

Army Air Forces School at Maxwell Field21 The original tasking

was later incorporated into Army Air Forces Regulation (AAFR)

20-61, Organization, AAF School, dated 4 January 1946, which

directed the AAF School to conduct three major courses of study:

AAF Tactical Course, AAF Command and Staff Course, and Air

War Course.

29 On the recommendation of the Gerow board, the

AAF School was redesignated Air University and its three

divisions renamed the Air Tactical School, the Air Command and

Staff School, and the Air War College, effective 12 March 1946 so

AAFR 20-61 reflected this change in a revision dated 5 April

1946.31 Furthermore, the revision said that AU would "be

responsible for continuous study of the AAF educational and

training system for officers, to insure a progressive system, that all

26
which it was responsible and avague direction to continue to study

the Air Force educational system.

33 Thus, the founders of AUhad

little direction to help them build a PME program.

Informal Guidance

However, less formal guidance in the form of memoranda,

letters, and speeches was available to the leaders ofAirUniversity.

In amemorandum for the president of the Army Air Forces Board,

dated 9 August 1945, Maj Gen Donald Wilson--commander of

the AAF Proving Ground Command at Eglin Field, Florida, and a

former teacher and theorist at ACTS-directed the board to

conduct "a first priority study" aimed at establishing an AAF

postwar school system. General Wilson's memo included several

assumptions:

The basic concept for all instruction shall be to develop initiative and

resourcefulness. Education shall begin with aspecialty. Personnel shall,

in general, continue with that specialty until elimination from the service

or selection for greater responsibilities which will be assigned to those

persons who demonstrate the fundamental characteristics of good

judgment, initiative, common sense, and the over-all ability to evaluate a

problem and effect the best solution. 3a

Similarly, a memorandum of 8 November 1945 from Maj Gen

C. C. Chauncey, deputy chief of the Air Staff, concerning AU

administrative matters, included aphilosophy of instruction :

Initially andin the future,traditionalism, rigidity ofthought anddoctrines,

andthe formalizationofinstructionmust be carefully avoided. The whole

effort ofinstruction must be to prepare students for future wars and not

for past wars.

35

Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, deputy commander of AAF, echoed this

sentiment in a memorandum of 20 December 1945 for General

27
Other types of correspondence augmented the information

found in the above memoranda. In a letter dated 27 March 1946 to

various leaders of civilian colleges requesting their participation

on the Air University Board of Visitors, Gen Carl A. Spaatz,

commanding general of AAF, outlined his concept of AU's PME

charter:

Thepurpose ofthe institution is to provide postgraduate education forAir

Force officers in order to improve their professional capabilities and

knowledge, to widen their vision and to insure forward-thinking and

adequate leadership for Air Forces, both in peace and war.

37

Later that year, General Spaatz wrote General Fairchild,

recommending "a prominent place in the curricula of our AAF

Schools for specific courses and general instruction in the

fundamentals of good usage in speaking and writing English." He

elaborated on his concern about the communications skills of

officers :

I am certain that your experience, like my own, must haveimpressed you

with the very serious shortcomings ofmany ofour officers in intelligible

self-expression, both oral and written. While ability to think clearly,

logically, and soundly needs no defense or selling in taking its proper

place, the incalculable value of its essential corollary, ready ability to

express oneself, is unfortunately not so generally appreciated .

38

Similarly, some of the correspondence of AU's first leaders

sheds light on the nature of the school's charter. In a letter of 13

February 1946 to Maj Gen Orvil A. Anderson, fast commandant

of Air War College, General Fairchild wrote,

I have given considerable thought to the organization and method of

instruction in this institution . I am convinced that it should be run on the

model ofthe old Army War College, that is, by the seminar or committee

method of instruction. I believe this method of instruction is peculiarly

adapted to the high level of subject matter which this institution will be

28
get together any body of instructors who could instruct these people by

the dogmatic lecture method, andthat they must work out the answers to

the problems presented to them more or less on their own.

39

Further, General Fairchild's letter of welcome to the first class

of incoming student officers pointed out that

our mission calls for the discarding of traditionalism and rigidity of

thought and doctri e. Our whole thinking must be fresh, original, and

oriented on the future . The dividing line here between teaching and

learning will be nebulous indeed. The maximum contribution of every

one of us is demanded, to the end that the Air University may produce a

corpsofofficers and establish a system ofconceptsanddoctrine adequate

to the needs of the Army Air Forces in fulfilling its obligations to our

nation.4°

General Fairchild reiterated these points in his welcoming

remarks to AU's first students by reminding them that "this is not

apost-war school system-it is apre-warschool system!" He went

on to describe the educational requirements of the officer "who

would seek to plan for and direct the activities of the global Air

Force of the future" :

Not only must he be thoroughly trained and grounded in the factual

knowledge and technical skills of his profession; he must be so truly

educated as to develop the ability to deal with problems, the solution of

which involves thinking that goes beyond the manipulation of learned

techniques or the use ofprior formulations orpractice .

Thus the Air University will seek most earnestly to develop in students

the power to solve problems by well ordered, resourceful and original

thought, rather than merely to train them in information and the routine

performance oftechniques.

1

Also speaking on this occasion, General Schlatter outlined

"certain basic doctrines to guide the various schools and colleges

and the academic staff" Specifically, he mentioned that

29
designed to guide future thought in the Air Forces . All officers must

acquire skill in the facility of oral and written self-expression. . . . We

conceive it to be the high and noble goal of the Air University to educate

and to aid in producing the planners and future leaders ofthe USAF.42

No single document combined all of these ideas into a formal

statement designed toguide AUin the implementationofAir Force

PME. Based on the evidence cited above, one might conjecture

that such a document would have directed AUto educate Air Force

officers to (1) think, (2) lead, (3) systematically solve problems,

(4) plan and prepare for future events, (5) express themselves

clearly, and (6) develop resourcefulness, initiative, and judgment.

Changes in Air University Regulations

The original regulation directing the establishment of AU was

AAFR 20-61, Organization, AAF School, first published on 4

January 1946. Over the next 40 years, the regulation was changed

or renumbered more than two dozen times, with the latest version

following AU's return to major command status in 1983 (AFR

23-52, Organization and Mission-Field, Air University, 23 May

1985). In all, 23 documents have directed AU's mission. 43 These

regulatory changes, however, have had relatively little effect on

AU's PME charter, although some have attempted to clarify the

purpose of PME at Air University.

For example, the 8 May 1950 revision of AFR 23-3,

Organization--Air Command and Air Forces, Air University,

indicated that "the mission of the Air University is to provide

professional military education to prepare officers for command

of large Air Force units, wings, groups, and squadrons, and for

staff duties appropriate to those command positions."44 Thus, this

version of the regulation was the first to provide an explicit

statement of what PME was supposed to accomplish. Similarly,

30
knowledge of the profession of armsand differentiating it from

graduate education and professional continuing education.

6

Defining Air University's Goals for

Professional Military Education

The most important, yet most difficult, step in developing any

educational system is establishing goals for that system. As the

saying goes, "If you don't know where you are going, how will

you know when you have arrived?" From the beginning, the Air

Force system of PME should have been designed to imbue Air

Force officers with specific, well-defined traits .

The report of the Air Force Educational Requirements Board

Task Group noted on 10 July 1963 that Air Force PME lacked this

type offorward-looking perspective . Although AU's leaders took

issue with some of AFERB's recommendations, they agreed that

AU should have "a comprehensive description of the professional

Air Force officer and a definition and a philosophy of PME." 47

Thus, they endorsedAFERB's description ofthe Air Force officer,

as well as its definition and objectives for PME.

The Air Force implemented the task group's recommendations

by publishing AFM 53-1, United States Air Force Officer

Professional Military Education System, on 5 May 1966. This was

an important document and is worth quoting at length. First, the

manual's foreword addressed the very areas with which AFERB

was concerned:

This manualprovides the basicreference authority and description ofthe

responsibilities forthe Professional Military Education (PME)system for

USAF commissioned officers . It describes the professional Air Force

officer, defines Professional Military Education, states the Air Force

philosophy ofmilitary education, outlines PME objectives, describes the

31
ygy p

de corps, ethical behavior, and skill and knowledge,',49 the manual

then described the type of officer who would meet these standards :

The professional Air Force officer is the aerospace expert of the nation's

fighting forces. He understands the nature of war and is proficient in the

art ofwaging it under any level of conflict. He is a leader of men in both

peace and war, and he is accomplished in utilizing his knowledge and

skills in organizing and managing resources .

He combines military bearing and self-confidence with loyalty, integrity,

self-discipline, versatility and adaptability. His ethics and conduct are

based upon the idea of service above self.

He communicates effectively and works efficiently with people at all

levels from all walks of life. He participates in specialized education as

well as specialized training, and he uses the knowledge gained in

conjunction with professional military education, in order to assume

greaterresponsibilities as he progresses in his military career.

The professional Air Force officer recognizes that he must continually

expand his knowledge and understanding ofthe art ofwar. He recognizes

his responsibilities to the Nation, both as a citizen and a military officer.

He thus seeks to maintain those high intellectual, ethical and physical

standards requisite to a corps of professional officers which merits the

trust and respect of the society which it serves. The professional officer

never forgets that in a democratic society his role is always that of a

subordinate to legally constituted political authority.s

o

Having described the goal of PME in terms of its finished

product-the Air Force officer-AFM 53-1 then identified the

attributes ofPME:

Professional military education is the systematic acquisition oftheoretical

and applied knowledge which is of particular significance to the

profession of arms. It involves the acquisition of knowledge, skills and

attitudes which are requisite to military professionalism, and which form

the core of understanding which must be common to all officers,

regardless of service or of the specialized activities in which they are

engaged.

32
them. i

The manual also delved into a more expansive philosophy of

military education that underlay Air Force PME:

The Air Force must maintain a corps of officers whose dedication to the

nation's defense places country, duty, and honor above self, whose

knowledge ofwarand the military arts and sciences is sought and acquired

toupholding thenationalpurpose andthe nation's goals, andwhose expert

and spirited leadership will instill the virtues of fidelity, loyalty, bravery

and sacrifice in its followers. Responsibility for the development of a

corps of officers with these characteristics must be shared by Air

University.

Professional military education is concerned with military

professionalism forall officers, whatever their specialties, their grades,or

the duration of their commitment to the Air Force. . . . Specialized

knowledge can be acquired from many sources, including civilian

institutions, whereas military education is the unique responsibility ofthe

military establishment .

Each level of professional military education should provide the

opportunity for students to gain the knowledge, understanding, attitudes,

and skills needed forperformance ofduty in the next several years after

graduation. Certain fundamentals are applicable to an entire career.

Professional military education should be conductedin an atmosphere of

academic freedom . . . ofindividual inquiry, of critical thinking, and of

research relevant to the nation's military affairs . It should concern itself

with principles, concepts, ideas, and with applications. Students should

be intellectually challenged to the utmost oftheir abilities sz

This philosophy was to be implemented by a number of

objectives designed "to enhance the professional military

competence of Air Force officers."53 Thus, the Air Force should

provide educational programs which will increase the officer's ability to

think creatively, to solve military problems in a logical and systematic

manner, to apply thetechniques ofindividual research, toprepare military

33
defense, stimulate development of leadership attributes and the

determination to use them continuously and expertly, and encourage the

establishment and pursuit ofgoals for self-improvement5

Last, on a more concrete level, AFM53-1 identified the subjects

to be taught at Air Force PME schools:

The nature ofwar, its causes, its tactics and strategies; and how military

forces, particularly aerospace forces, are developed, sustained, and

employed throughout the entire spectrum ofuses of military power. . . .

The political, economic, technological, and psychological factors which

influence our national security and international relations. . . . The

fundamental principles and concepts ofleadership and management . . .

The organization, mission, and doctrine of the US armed forces,

particularly aerospace forces; andhow they areemployed, includingjoint

and combined operations . . . . The doctrine, strategies, tactics,

organizations, capabilities, and limitations ofthe armed forces of allied

and potential enemy nations. . . . National and international security

organizations Ss

The manual was a major milestone in thinking about Air Force

ME, but within a decade much of the intellectual impetus had

been lost . In 1976 AFM 53-1 became AFR 53-8, incorporating

several significant changes. Specifically, the new document

deleted the description of an Air Force officer; shortened the

definition of PME ("the systematic acquisition of theoretical and

appliedknowledge of the profession of arms");56 emphasized that

aerospace power is an integral part ofthe philosophy of Air Force

PME ("The prime purpose of Air Force professional military

education is to develop experts in aerospace power, whichmakes

Air University PME schools unique among professional

institutions") ; and, rather surprisingly, deleted the manual's

statement that "students should be intellectually challenged and

motivated to the utmost oftheir abilities.

57 The latest revision to

the regulation (24 October 1986) makes no significant changes to

the 1976 version.

34
AU is still simply tasked to teach officers to (1) think creatively,

(2) lead effectively, (3) solve military problems, (4) prepare

military plans and studies, (5) express themselves clearly, (6)

develop qualities of loyalty, integrity, courage, and sacrifice, and

(7) uphold national purposes and goals. The schools at AU

implement the task with curricula designed to increase

understanding ofwar (its causes, doctrine, strategies, and tactics),

military forces (their development, sustainment, and employment), national security (organization and decision-making

processes), and international relations.

School Curricula and Mission Statements

Like the definition, goals, and purpose of PME, the curriculum

and mission of AU's schools-Air War College, Air Command

and Staff College, and Squadron Officer School-underwent

distinct changes.

58 Indeed, an examination of each school's

curriculum and mission statement reveals that changes in the

former were directly related to changes in the latter. Furthermore,

alterations in mission statements were driven by both internal

factors (e.g., new theories ofprofessional education) and external

factors (e.g., world events) . In fact, these changes are distinct

enough to justify a division of each school's curriculum

development into stages (see tables 1-3). Certainly, the

evolutionary nature of the PME curriculum is a logical subject for

inquiry because the Air Force invests a great deal oftime and effort

and commits substantial resources to reviewing curricula and

making appropriate changes. However, some questions remain as

to whether AUis changing the right subject areas andwhether such

change is advancing the mission of its schools .

59

3 5
of attention (both good and bad) concerning the way the Air Force

conducts its PME programs. Over time, AWC's mission

statements have changed, each version reflecting varying degrees

of educational maturation and the influence of external events

(table 1) . The college's first classes were small (55 students in

1946, 160 in 1952), and the faculty educated the students in broad

aspects of air power and prepared them to command and employ

large Air Force units .6° Gradually, emphasis shifted to preparing

these officers for high command and staff duty; consequently, by

the mid-1960s military strategy and national security policy

became prominent elements of the curriculum. 1 Of course,

aerospace power remained a consistent theme throughout. The

latest AWC mission statements complement current Air Force

policy that promotes war-fighting and war-winning capabilities by

seeking to prepare leaders to "develop, maintain and lead the

aerospace component . . . to deter conflict and achieve victory in

the event of war.' ,62

TABLE 1

Evolution of Air War College Curricula

Stage Mission Curriculum Phase

Statement Years

1 1946 Version 1946-52 Initial

2 Rewritten 1947 1952-60 Evolving Cold War

Statement

3 1959 Version 1960-64 Heightened Cold War

4 1965 Version 1964-71 Southeast Asia Conflict

5 1965 Version 1971-76 Post-Southeast

Retained Asia Period

6 1976 Version 1976-78 Transition Period

7 1978 Version 1978-86 ManagementApproach

8 1986Version 1986-88 War-Fighting Approach

36
instructors encouraged student research and presented international and strategic issues from a broaderperspective .

63 By the

early sixties, the curriculum was split between international

relations (33 percent), national security policy (35 percent), and

military and national strategy (30 percent). The advent, in 1961,

of a program that allowed AWCstudents to earn a master's degree

from George Washington University curtailed AWC's own

program of independent student research for a while. This

reduction did not reflect aloss ofenthusiasm for research atAWC;

students simply had less time to conduct it. Furthermore, a flying

program of 170 hours occupied over 10 percent of the total

curriculum for rated students.

The growing conflict in Southeast Asia drastically reduced the

number ofstudents attending AUin residence . Attendance at AWC

dropped from 285 per year in the mid sixties to fewer than 150 by

the late sixties. Of the latter number, only 66 were Air Force

officers (during the same period, ACSC went from 600 to 300

students, and SOS dropped from 830 to 380 students per class) 6s

This reduction in personnel presumably had an adverse effect on

faculty and staff as well. AU programs did not return to normal

operating levels until the early 1970s. From the standpoint of

curriculum changes, AWC placed greater emphasis on defense

resource management and leadership, began offering elective

courses and a Professional Studies Program (PSP), and required

more independent study and research (termination of the

time-consuming flying program in 1971 made this change

possible) 66

As AWC emerged from the turmoil of SEA in the 1970s, the

school made an effort to reshape and redefine its approach to

advanced academics. For instance, the curriculum of the

mid-1970s contained four evenly balanced areas that, in

combination, constituted almost half the program of study. These

were leadership and management (10 percent), national security

37
PSP) filled out the remainder. 67 Thus, AWC was particularly

attractive to serious students looking for the opportunity and time

to do some in-depth research.

By the early 1980s, emphasis on independent study and research

had lessened a bit (to 30 percent), as the curriculum reflected a

growing interest in joint and combined warfare, doctrine and

strategy, and future issues such as space. ('8 These changes were

the product ofa conscious effort by AWCfaculty and staff to keep

the curriculum current and meaningful. Whether these latest

changes are truly challenging and beneficial for the students

remains tobe seen, but the curriculum-onpaper at leastappears

solid.69

Air Command and Staff College

From its inception, Air Command and Staff College has

prepared selected intermediate-level career officers for duty on

various staffs . However, ACSC's purpose has not always been

clear-even to AU leaders. For example, in a letter of 17

November 1976 to General Tallman (Air Force deputy chief of

staff for personnel), Lt Gen Raymond B . Furlong (AU

commander) said he had finally decided that

the primary role ofthe commandandstaff graduate is that ofthe facilitator.

Whereas the war college graduate is educated primarily as an executive

decision maker and the squadron officer course aims at the operator, the

facilitator is the staff officer, mid-level manager, or operational unit

commander. Using this focus, webuilda 10-monthcurriculum to develop

(1) common staffskills, (2) specific managerial and leadership skills, and

(3) functional specialist skills related to broad career areas. To

complement these specific areas, we added essential professional

information onthe AirForce, the defense establishment, and the nation.

38
AWC].The length of time spent at ACSC, as well as the makeup

of its curriculum and student body, is a function of the school's

purpose . If the school exists to educate students in the

"fundamentals of command and staff work," Kelly urged that the

course be shortened to five months andthat the students enter with

about seven, rather than nine, years ofpriorservice. These changes

would not require revisions in the curriculum if students were

required to complete the ACSC correspondence course before

beginning the residence course. However, Kelly continued,

if thepurpose ofACSCis toprovide anin-depth studyofessential subjects

to a hand-picked elite, this purpose would be better served by rolling

ACSC into the AWC. This would provide for a two year assignment to

Air University, vice two one year assignments, with a resultant savings

in PCS costs [and] disruptionofmembers' lives 71

Some critics have argued that the ACSC curriculum is too much

like AWC's. Others, however, point out that this similarity is

acceptable because the schools have different emphases. Besides,

for many students, ACSC will be their final PME program in

residence. Moreover, the perspectives and interests of officers at

the senior service school should be considerably different from

those of field grade officers at the intermediate service school.

Such concerns are onlypartially reflected inthe evolution ofthe

ACSC mission over the past four decades (table 2). Early mission

statements indicate that the school was interested primarily in

preparing its students for command and tasks associated with

"wings and higher units."72 By the mid-1950s, the 10-month

school had grown to its present enrollment of 600 students, had

expanded its mission, and soughtto improve its students' "abilities

to execute the command and staff tasks required to implement air

strategy and Air Force missions; and to contribute to the

development of air doctrine, strategy and tactics."73

3 9
time doing independent study and research. In the late 1970s, such

statements declared that ACSC students would "enhance their

value to the Air Force . . . conduct student and faculty research of

value [and] make available significant products ofthis research."74

Consequently, ACSC students oftentimes carried heavier

academic work loads than did AWC students .

TABLE 2

Evolution of Air Command and

Staff College Curricula

Stage Mission Curriculum Phase

Statement Years

1 1946 Version 1946-50 Initial

2 1949 Version 1950-54 Specialized

(Five-Month Field

Officers Course)

3 1956 Version 1954-63 Evolving Cold War

4 1962 Version 1963-69 Early Southeast

Asia Conflict

5 1969 Version 1969-75 Late Southeast

Asia Conflict

6 1975 Version 1975-77 Transition Period

7 1978 Version 1977-80 Management Approach

8 1981 Version 1980-88 Professional Leadership

The evolution of curricula that accompanied these changes in

mission statements has been a smooth process. After a major

curriculum reorganization in the early 1960s, three general subject

areas emerged for the academic portion of the program: military

employment (44 percent), military management (40 percent), and

international conflict (including national security problems and

40
subsued ude

)

During the period of reduced enrollment occasioned by the

Vietnam War in the late 1960s, ACSC's objectives were to instill

"professional competence and preparation and growth" in the few

students in residence . Although military environment (10 percent),

management (15 percent), and employment (22 percent) took up

almost halfofthe curriculum's 1,600 hours, independent work and

related areas were growing in importance. For instance, in 1969

independent study (and flying), research preparation, and electives

accounted for 26 percent, 12 percent, and 4 percent, respectively,

of the curriculum 76

As the United States withdrew from the SoutheastAsia conflict

in the mid-1970s, the ACSC curriculum moved into the areas of

leadership and management, emphasizing four general subject

areas: communication and research (7 percent), command and

management (18 percent), aerospace policy and planning factors

(5 percent), and military employment (17 percent). The remaining

areas were independent study, electives, and anew subphase called

commandant's options

During the eighties, ACSClike AWC and SOS-altered its

curriculum to produce professional leaders knowledgeable in the

areas of war fighting and joint operations . Thus, the curriculum

emphasized warfare studies, including force employment,

strategy, and doctrine phases as well as command, leadership, and

resource management. 8

Evidently, all ofthechanges to ACSC'smission and curriculum

have not had an adverse effect on the school's ability to fulfill its

role as the Air Force's intermediate professional school for

officers. Rather, the adaptability of ACSC's mission and course of

study has allowed Air Force officers to benefit from contemporary

theories of education and prepare themselves for service in a

constantly changing environment.

41
y()

p

of SOS, described the school in terms of its importance to young

officers :

The basic thrust of the curriculum and spirit of the school is toward a

socialization process [emphasis added] . We want the junior officerto see

and understand his military role so that he can either reject it at this early

point in time, or relate to it and use it as a basis for professional

development throughout the rest ofhis career.

79

In his 1984 memorandum to the secretary of the Air Force, J.

Michael Kelly agreed with General Ralph's assessment: "We view

SOS as a broadener/motivator from which most company grade

officers could and should benefit, and we try to send as many

nffinPrc to it ac wP nnccihly ran "8U

TABLE 3

Evolution of Squadron Officer School Curricula

Stage Mission Course Curriculum Phase

Statement Length Years

1 1951 Version 8 Weeks 1950-52 Initial Squadron Officer

Course (SOC)

2 1953 Version 10 Weeks 1952-59 Expanding SOC

3 1962 Version 14 Weeks 1959-65 Independent SOS

4 1965 Version 14 Weeks 1965-71 Southeast Asia Conflict

5 1971 Version 14 Weeks 1971-73 Post-Southeast Asia

Period

6 Similar to 11 Weeks 1973-80 Professional

1971 Version Growth

7 1980 Version 8+ Weeks 1980-88 Support of Combat

Operations

42
developing war-fighting skills that began in the early 1980s, SOS

sought to have its students "better perform and value their roles in

conduct and support of combat operations and other USAF

missions."s2

Despite changes in the length ofthe course of study at SOS over

the years (variouslyeight,nine, 10,14, eight andone-half, and now

seven weeks), the substance ofthe school's curriculum remained

stable 83 Once the SOS faculty and staff decided upon a basic

curriculum, the school stayed with it . For years, SOS covered five

general areas: (1) communicative skills (speaking and writing

accordingto Air Force style), (2) Air Forceleadership, (3) national

power and international relations, (4) management, and (5) forces

and employment. The curriculum also accommodated field

activities (e.g ., team sports and Project X, a leadership testing

laboratory) as well as independent study and research. SOS later

reduced the number ofgeneral areas to four but covered the same

subject matter.

84

The proportion of the curriculum occupied by these areas has

changed over time, however. Air Force leadership grew from 18

percent to 40 percent, as of 1987. Communicative skills have

averaged about 18 percent and forces and employment slightly

less. Officership (formerly command-staff team or management)

has comprised about 9to 10percentofthe curriculum. Independent

study and research have lost ground, slipping from 22 percent in

the early 1960s to 1 percent at present. Despite the latter trend,

SOS appears to be maintaining a full, beneficial program. 5

Thus, the Air Force has continually reevaluated and refined its

purpose for providing officers with professional military

education. Charged with implementing a system of PME, Air

University is also subjected to considerable scrutiny by parties who

seek to determine whether AU is fulfilling its mandate. This type

of criticism, addressed in the next chapter, is both inevitable and

43
1. FirstReport oftheBoardofVisitors (Maxwell Field, Ala. : AirUniversity,

Spring 1946), 22-23 (hereafter, BOV 1) ; BOV 3 (January 1948): 33-34.

General Schlatter also stated that AU "proposed to educate officers to develop

fundamental powers of thought, meanwhile providing them with the tools of

their professions." Proceedings of the EducationalAdvisory StaffConference,

July 11-12,1947 (Maxwell Field, Ala. : AirUniversity, 1947),12-13 .

2. BOV 1(1946):53.

3. A Report to the Commanding General, Air University, of an Educational

Survey at the Air Command and Staff School (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

University HumanResources ResearchInstitute, l September 1949),15 ; Report

ofthe USAF EducationalRequirements Conference (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

University, 8 November 1956),65; and Dr R. Gordon Hoxie, "Observations on

the Education Programs of the United States Air Force," Paper for Air Force

chief ofstaff, 2 July 1964, 2. The Hoxie study is informal and unpublished. It

is available in the documents section of the Air University Library, Maxwell

AFB, Ala., call no. M-43106-U. Hoxie performed his study as a mobilization

assigneeworking forthe AirForce chiefofstaff. He later added, "It is axiomatic

and a basic truth that the very future of a military force is dependent upon its

professional education; fora young force it is vital" (page 8).

4. BOV 19 (1963) : 5. By this time SOS, ACSC, and AWC were all located

at Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

5. BOV 2 (1947) :4-6; see also note 37.

6. Ibid., 51, 54, 65.

7. BOV 12 (1956) : 3.

8. Frederick H. Hartmann, "The WarColleges in Perspective,"in The System

for Educating Military Officers in the U.S ., ed. Lawrence J. Korb, International

Studies Occasional Paper no. 9 (Pittsburgh, Pa. : International Studies

Association, 1976),132.

9. Air University Objective Plan (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, 15

May 1967),3-6.

10. Memorandumforrecord,Col BondyH. Holcombe, assistant deputychief

of staff for education, Air University, subject: AU/CC's Concern Regarding

16-17 December 1974 Minutes ofthe AFERB,19 March 1975.

11. Lt Gen F. Michael Rogers, "Why Professional Military Education?" Air

University Review 26, no. 5 (July-August 1975): 6-7.

44
14. DOD Committee on Excellence in Education, The Senior Service

Colleges : ConclusionsandInitiatives (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing

Office, 5 June 1975), 2.

15. Ibid., 3-6.

16. Ibid., 5.

17. Maj Gen 1 . B. Holley, Jr., USAFR, Retired, to Lt Gen Thomas C.

Richards, AU commander, letter, subject : Suggestions for Strengthening theAir

War College Course, 5 September 1984, 1-2 .

18. Lt Gen William R. Richardson, "Officer Training and Education,"

Military Review, October 1984, 26-28, 33.

19. Lt Gen Kenneth L. Tallman, deputy chief of staff for personnel, US Air

Force, to Gen David C. Jones, chiefofstaff, US Air Force, letter, subject :-ACSC

Curriculum Length, 2 December 1976, 3.

20. Maj Gen C. G. Cleveland, director ofpersonnel programs, US Air Force,

Staff Summary Sheet, Alternative Officer PME Programs, 22 October 1977.

21. Memorandum, Vice Adm Patrick J. Hannifin, director, Joint Staff, to the

secretary of defense [Harold Brown], subject: Professional Development

Education, 3 April 1978, 2.

22. Ibid., appendix B, 16.

23. OfficerPMEStudy (MaxwellAFB, Ala. : AirUniversity, February 1980),

30.

24. Report ofa Study on Officer PME Policy, 17.

25. Brig Gen John E. Ralph, "Professional Identity in a Plural World: The

Focus of Junior Officer Education in the United States Air Force," in Korb,

96-97,100 .

26. This section examines the scope and subsequent modifications to the

charterthat tasked AU toconduct PME. Because our primary sources-tasking

documents-provided little information about the Air Force's plans for PME,

we also consulted letters, speeches, and articles to obtain a more complete

picture ofAU's system of officer education.

27. AFR 53-8, USAF Officer Professional Military Education System, 24

October 1986, 6.

28. Adjutant general to commanding generals, Army Air Forces; Army Air

Forces Center, Army Air Forces Training Command; commandant, Army Air

Forces School, letter, subject : Assignment and Establishment of Army Air

Forces Schools, 19 November 1945.

29. AAFR 20-61, Organization, AAFSchool, 4 January 1946, 1 .

30. General Order no. 11, Redesignation oftheArmyAir Forces School and

Establishment of Certain Other Army Air Forces Schools and Activities, 15

March 1946, 1 .

45
the school authority to recommend that AAF officers take courses not underthe

control ofAAF (para. 2.b . and 2.c.) . Further, a revisiondated 3 June 1946 made

AU responsible for the AAF Special Staff School as well as for training AAF

officers to be instructors at non-AAF schools, reviewing and preparing

publications on AAF basic doctrine, evaluating tactics, and making

recommendations to the AAF commanding general on various topics (page 1) .

32. AAFR 20-61, 5 April 1946, para. 2.d.

33. AAFR 20-61, 3 June 1946, 1 .

34. Memorandum, Maj Gen Donald Wilson, commander, AAF Proving

Ground Command, to the president, AAF Board, subject: Army Air Forces

Postwar School System, 9 August 1945. The AAF Board was formed during

World WarIt and assigned to develop tactics, techniques, doctrine, andmilitary

requirements for the Army Air Forces . See Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,

Doctrine : Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960, vol. 1

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, December 1989),138-42 .

35. Memorandum, Maj Gen C. C. Chauncey, deputy chief, Air Staff, to Maj

Gen David Schlatter, acting commandant, AAF School, subject: Directive

Regarding Army Air Forces School, 8 November 1945.

36. Memorandum, Lt Gen Ira C. Eaker, deputy commander, Army Air

Forces, to Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild, commandant, Army Air Forces School,

20 December 1945 .

37. Gen Carl A. Spaatz, commanding general, Army Air Forces, to Dr

Clarence A. Dykstra, provost, University of California, letter, subject :

Participation on the AU Board of Visitors, 27 March 1946 (same letter sent to

12 other university administrators).

38. GenCarl A. Spaatz, commanding general, Army Air Forces, toMaj Gen

Muir S. Fairchild, commanding general, Air University, letter, subject :

Individual Self-Expression, 3 June 1946; 1st ind., Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild,

commanding general, Air University, to commanding general, Army Air

Forces, 3 June 1946.

39. Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild, commandant, Army Air Forces School, to

Maj Gen Orvil A. Anderson, commandant, AirWar College, letter, subject: Air

University Faculty, 13 February 1946.

40. Maj Gen Muir S. Fairchild, commanding general, Air University, to

incoming officers, letter, n.d .

41. George N. Dubina, Dedication and Significant Events, 1946-1971, Air

University Historical Division Study Series, no. 36 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

University, December 1971),36-37 .

46
October 1946; AAFR 20-61A (Supplement), 19 December 1947; AFR 23-3,

Organization-Air Commands and Air Forces, Air University, 4 April 1949;

AFR 23-3A, 13 May 1949; AFR 23-3,8 May 1950; AFR 23-3,3 August 1951;

AFR 23-3A, 3 April 1952; AFR 23-3B, 3 December 1952; AFR 23-3,

Organization-Field, Air University, 19 October 1954; AFR 23-3, 1 July 1959;

AFR 23-3,31 August 1960; AFR 23-3,9 March 1961; AFR 23-3, Organization

and Mission-Field, Air University, 13 June 1963; AFR 23-3, 3 March 1966;

AFR 23-3,18 July 1968, and change 1, 20 December 1968; AFR 23-3, 1 May

1973; AFR 23-3, 29 April 1974; AFR 23-3, 30 November 1977; AFR 23-6,

Organization and Mission-Field, Air Training Command, 20 June 1979; and

AFR 23-52, Organization andMission-Field, Air University, 23 May 1985.

44. AFR 23-3, 8 May 1950, 1 .

45. AFR 23-3,13 June 1963, 1, para. l .b .

46. AFR 23-52, 1, para. La.

47. Lt Gen Troup Miller, Jr., commander, Air University, to Headquarters

USAF/AFPDP, letter, subject: Report of the Educational Requirements Board

on Professional Military Education, 30 August 1963, atch, 1 . Attachment is

entitled "Air University Position [on] Report ofthe Educational Requirements

Board on Professional Military Education ."

48. AFM 53-1, United States Air Force Officer Professional Military

Education System, 5 May 1966, i .

49. Ibid ., 1, para. 1-2.d.

50. Ibid ., 2, para. 1-4.a. through d.

51. Ibid., 3, para. 2-2.

52. Ibid., 4, para. 2-3.

53. Ibid., 5, para. 2-4.

54. Ibid., 5, para. 2-4.e. and f.

55. Ibid., 5, para. 2-4.g . through 1 .

56. AFR 53-8, 19 April 1976, 2-1, para. 2-1 .

57. Ibid., para. 2-2 .a., 2-3 .a .

58. Robert W. Schmidt, Air University History, Twenty-Fifth (Silver)

Anniversary Command Edition-History of the Air War College 1946-1971

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, 1 February 1971), 33; Capt Michael F.

Burke, Air University History, Twenty-Fifth (Silver) Anniversary Command

Edition-History ofthe Air Command and Staff College 1946-1971 (Maxwell

AFB, Ala. : Air University, 1 February 1971), 34-36.

59. Schmidt, 33; Burke, 34-36. Information about these changes came from

sources such as each school's annual curriculum and annual mission

statement-usually in the school's catalog. These documents were published

47
catalogs and manuals are produced at AirUniversity, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

60. Air University Catalog 1946-1947 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : AirUniversity,

1946), 52 (hereafter, AU Catalog, academic year specified); AWC Curriculum

Summary 1952-53 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air War College, 1951), 1 .

61. AU Catalog 1965-1966, 8.

62. AU Catalog 1986-1987, 11.

63. Schmidt, 12-15; AU Catalog 1946-1947, 53; AU Catalog 1947-1948,

34-36.

64. War College Orientation and Curriculum Catalog 1961-1962 (Maxwell

AFB, Ala. : Air War College, 1951), 7, 11.

65. AU Catalog 1968-1969, 7, 17, 27.

66. SeeAUCatalog1967-1968,10; AUCatalog1971-1972,10; AU Catalog

1972-1973,10.

67. AU Catalog 1977-1978, 7.

68. AU Catalog 1982-1983, 6.

69. AU Catalog 1986-1987,25-26.

70. Lt Gen Raymond B. Furlong, commander, Air University, to Lt Gen

Kenneth L. Tallman, deputy chief ofstaff for personnel, US Air Force, letter,

17 November 1976.

71. Memorandum, J. Michael Kelly, deputy assistant secretary of the Air

Force for manpower, resources, and military personnel, to the secretary of the

Air Force [Verne Orr], subject: Officer Professional Military Education Course

Length and Curriculum, 17 October 1984.

72. Burke, 6.

73. CSC Curriculum Class 1953 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Command and Staff

Course, 1952), iii-iv.

74. AU Catalog 1979-1980,14 .

75. Burke, 42-43 .

76. AU Catalog 1969-1970,19-21 .

77. AU Catalog 1975-1976,19-22 .

78. AU Catalog 1986-1987,42 .

79. Ralph, 101 .

80. Quoted in Kelly memorandum, 1-2.

81 . AU Catalog 1970-1971, 34.

82. AU Catalog 1980-1981, 21.

83 . AU Catalog 1965-1966, 43; AU Catalog 1973-1974, 37; AU Catalog

198"981,21.

84. AU Catalog 1965-1966, 45; Col Russell V. Ritchey, Years ofthe Tiger,

ed. Maj Rolland F. Clarkson, Maj Joel W. Sills, and Capt Martin J. Costellic

48
49

Commentary on Air University, 1946-87

Since 1946 various interested parties have evaluated the

professional military education programs of Air University . These

groups include the AU Board of Visitors, Air Force educational

conferences, Air Force ad hoc committees, and miscellaneous

groups outside the Air Force. Specifically, they have assessed

AU's faculty, curricula, research, teaching methods, student

selection procedures, and budget support. Although study groups

have commented on some of these areas across the entire history

of AU, their remarks on other topics-such as budget supportwere restricted to only short periods of AU history . For

convenience, then, this chapterdivides the commentary onAUinto

two periods: 1946-67 and 1968-87.

Commentary, 1946-67

During AU's formative years, reviewers directed their attention

toward fundamental matters that would affect the university's

ability to fulfill its mission. They were particularly interested in

the people-the faculty-who would instruct the select group of

officers in attendance . Also at issue, however, were questions of

curriculum, educational and teaching philosophy, the role of

research, graduate qualifications, and funding .

Faculty

The first leaders of Air University realized that the quality of

the Air Force's future leaders depended on the nature of the

education they received at Air University . Naturally, that

51
educational system, in turn, depended on the attitude and support

ofthe Air Force's senior leadership.

Air University's success hinged onits finding and keeping good

faculty and encouraging their professional development. For

example, the BOV strongly recommended that AU recruit a

permanent nucleus of thinkers who would "set a pattern of

imaginative thought and constant questioning that will insure

against stagnation."' Gen Muir S . Fairchild, writing in 1946 to Maj

Gen Orvil A. Anderson, AWC's commandant, noted that AU

needed relatively few instructors, but those few should be "pretty

well rounded and experienced." Unfortunately, Fairchild

continued, because "everybody else will want [these people] for

almost any job, it is oing to be like pulling teeth to get the sort of

men you will want."

Indeed, faculty recruitment and retention have beenproblematic

since AU's inception . In particular, faculty members' length of

tour has been the subject of considerable commentary. The initial

plan called for rotating one-third ofthe faculty after a standard tour

ofthree years. 3 Interestingly, theBOV thought that three years was

too short, but AUhad trouble retaining faculty even for this length

of time. In 1949, for example, the average tour length at the Air

Tactical School was 15 months; at Air Command and Staff School

it was two and one-half years . Three-year tours did not become

routine at Air War College until 1952 and at ACSS until 1953. 5

By 1951 the BOV's comment on this problem had become

predictable: "[The board] reiterated its usual recommendationthat

more stability and length of service of the faculty would be

prerequisite to the success ofAir University .

,6

AUmade several attempts to rectify this matter. One proposed

solution was the use of "plowbacks," graduates retained as

instructors . The thinking was that, qualitatively, they represented

the upper echelon of Air Force officers. Administratively,

extending their tours was simpler than reassigning personnel from

another station. AU hoped to ease its faculty acquisition problems

52
fact, plowbacks were the "chief problem" at Squadron Officer

Course (SOC) in 1954. 8 Thus, in 1958 the board recommended

that AU reduce the number of plowbacks on the faculty and assure

that at least one-third were nonplowbacks. 9

AU also tried selective manning but withmixed results . 10Thus,

the recruitment problem tended to compound itself. a s AU

continued to have difficulty in attracting good faculty members,

an appointment to AU became less appealing. Indeed, by 1959

knowledge of poor promotions among the AWC and ACSC

faculties was widespread." Headquarters AU recognized the

problem, urging that "the merits of highly effective and

outstanding AU instructors be given greater attention by

promotion boards.

"12 Unfortunately, the attention ofthe corporate

Air Force lay elsewhere.

In addition to recuitment, another area of concern was the

academic standing of the faculty . Specifically, the BOV felt that

"the basic danger of a military educational institution lies in the

inevitable tendency to become doctrinaire" and that AU could

avoid such stagnation by procuring faculty members who were

well educated and receptive to multiple views.

13 As one report

noted,

Since prestige of the schools hinges primarily on the capabilities and

reputations of their teachers, the faculties should be upgraded in every

way to the maximum extent . The greatest need for upgrading lies in the

area ofacademic accomplishment.

14

The BOV felt that AWC should be the embodiment of this ideal

and that its faculty should influence both AU and the Air Force

generally .

15

Nevertheless, in 1963 the BOV was still urging that the AU

faculty's formal education be upgraded. Even less encouraging, a

study conducted the following year noted that "the educational

level of the faculty of both the Air Command and Staff College

53
Curriculum, Educational Philosophy, and

Teaching Methods

Despite the BOV's warning, AU's schools became increasingly

doctrinaire and specialized.

17 No doubt the situation was

exacerbated by the faculty's short tours as well as nebulous

definitions of PME and of the Air Force officer, together with a

lack of official guidance on the educational philosophy or

objectives of PME, as previously discussed .

18 But AU was still

obligated to provide its officers with a "broader grasp of military

and national problems." 19

Some of the early criticisms of AU reveal much about the

situation there by stating what AU's curriculum and philosophy

were not. For example, in 1949 the Orleans report called for

explicit mission statements, as well as a functional curriculum, and

recommended that evaluations "measure reasoning, evaluation,

interpretation, ability to make decisions, and other higher mental

processes. . . . The measurement of information as such [should]

be taboo.

,20

Similarly, by 1956 the Rawlings board was complaining that

officers came to AU inadequately prepared (few had even

baccalaureate degrees) and that the AU schools failed to produce

truly educated officers in sufficient numbers (the Air Force was

short 1,800 AWC graduates) 21 "The distinguishing mark of a

profession," Rawlings insisted, "is a system of education, rather

than training, that it sets up to instruct its members in its principles,

ideals, and broad understandings."22

A 1955 study conducted by Ralph W. Tyler under contract to

the Officer Education Research Laboratory at Maxwell AFB,

Alabama, anticipated this sentiment. Tyler noted that since the Air

Force is indeed a profession, it relies on "the intelligent application

of . . . general principles" and, therefore, cannot resort to

54
understanding of relevant general principles, skill in the application of

these principles in the solution of new problems, an understanding of

relevant ethical considerations, and the ability to use relevant ethical

principles in making decisions.

3

Tyler further noted that the Air Force needed a clear educational

philosophy : "Education is an activity with apurpose. . . . To choose

the most important goals from among all the possible ones, it is

necessary to apply a clear and consistent philosophy of officer

education in the Air Force."24 Having no philosophy would affect

everything from curricula and concepts of career development to

officers' valuation ofPME.

Finally, commentators addressed AU's teaching methods. The

Orleans report favored simulations, noting that "the closer the

learning situation approaches reality, the less the loss of the

learning in applying it to a new situation."25 The BOV, however,

advocated the use ofseminars, although problems with the number

and quality of faculty diminished the effectiveness ofthis method

of instruction .

26 The board tended to downplay the use of guest

speakers, although it recognized the value of their off-the-record

comments. 27 Further, because the board insisted that an

atmosphere of academic freedom was essential for the free

exchange ofideas and for nurturing the ability to think, it decried

the practice of burdening students with trivial assignments that

detracted from this environment28

The BOV also reviewed AU's efforts to educate officers who

were unable to attend AU in residence . Most BOVs supported the

liberal use of extension courses for "all officers who seek

advancement," recognizing that they were in line with the broad

educational aims of Air University .29 However, the board

cautioned that correspondence courses were not apanacea because

they could not duplicate the residence curriculum, especially in

terms of depth of instruction . Furthermore, some correspondence

courses were unreasonably long. For example, during the first 10

55
Research

In the late 1940s, General Fairchild had high hopes for his

schools, noting that

[Air War College] is the one place in the Air Forces where people have

time to think and where it is their solejob to think. Therefore, it seems to

me that the progress of the Air War College will not only permeate and

dominate the instruction in the lower schools, but also should, in all

likelihood, influence the whole thought ofthe AAF.31

The 1946 BOV agreed, seeing great promise in the new university

in general and AWC in particular. However, it cautioned that

[Air Force] doctrine may become so fixed, even when labeled

"progressive," that it becomes a question of adopting heroic measure in

order to keep up with technological advance. Self-satisfaction and

self-assurance will be the constant hazards 32

The BOV's fears were realized in 1949 when the Orleans report

complained that AU put too much emphasis on keeping pace with

new developments and not enough on substantive education.

Furthermore, the 1951 BOV criticized AWC for giving short shrift

to broad subjects and effective "independence and initiative" in

thinking. This slight resulted in rote-style learning and a lapse in

significant doctrinal research. The latter problem persisted into

1963: "The Board has the impression that the Air Force, being the

youngest of the three services, has more difficulty than senior

services in developing and presenting clear-cut views on new

doctrine."35

AU has always sought to be an "Air Force doctrinal,

educational, andresearch center. "36 But encouraging truly free and

innovative thinking proved difficult . The 1962 BOV tried to

account for this problem by concluding that the unique needs of

56
research involved 

discussion of social, political, and cultural

problems," the board noted that no system existed for verifying

that research with civilian scholars in the social sciences, as was

inplace at ART for verifying scientific or technical research. The

board recommended that AU improve its contacts with civilian

universities to ensure the accuracy and effectiveness ofits analyses

and assessments.

37

Thus, the 1963 BOV applauded AU's 10-year plan (1963-73)

to institutionalize research and expand doctrinal studies.

38 To

further those aims, the board encouraged AU to assign a "small

group ofbrilliant scholars" to do meaningful research and develop

doctrine:

For instructional and planning purposes as well as for the benefit of the

total defense effort, the Board observes a need for clear, long-range

thinking on such matters as doctrine and the role ofthe Air Force and its

programs in relationship to the other defense agencies. A cadre of

highly-qualified research scholars-civilian and military-assigned to

Air University on along-term basis, could conduct research inthese areas

as needed and provide the necessary stimulus for careful, thorough,

long-range consideration ofbasicquestions underlying future policy and

doctrinal decisions.

Student Selection Procedures

In 1949 the Orleans report noted that selecting and training

future Air Force leaders was the primary mission of professional

Air Force officers4° AU's role was central to this process. BOV

assessments added that AU's schools should use entrance exams

to screen applicants and thereby refine the process ofselecting the

best and most promising officers for attendance .

41 Furthermore,

Gen David Schlatter declared that

57
Despite these lofty intentions and a general perception that PME

schools were doing a good job, dissatisfaction developed in some

quarters ofthe AirForce over the quality ofAUgraduates. Officers

reportedly had difficulty in clearly stating Air Force positions and

coping with "crash projects. "At Headquarters USAF, research and

staff work by AU graduates were consistently incomplete as well

as poorly written or briefed . Moreover, briefers lacked a

satisfactory breadth or depth of knowledge on their topics43 Yet,

one study reported that

opinion surveys ofmajor commands and senior Air Force officers tend to

support the present programs ofthe professional military schools . . . . . he

majority of alumni and students express favorable opinions about the

present professional military schools and their programs

These sentiments were well documented: 80 percent ofthe 1960

AWC class gave the school high ratings for utility and quality, and

75 percent of the 1961 ACSC class said the curricula met their

needs "adequately or extremely well." Similarly, approval ratings

ofselected aspects ofSOS from Class 61-Aranged from 67 percent

to 86 percent. Additionally, surveys ofAir Force major commands

(MAJCOM) and senior Air Force officers in 1962 showed that the

curricula of schools were more or less in line with the perceived

need of the "real Air Force."45 Nevertheless, the Air Force chief

of staff maintained that Air Staff officers could not competently

perform their work. A closer look at the surveys revealed that

Air Force officers were only vaguely aware of the intent or value

ofPME.47

Evidently, AU's efforts to seek the best students were thwarted

by a general feeling, noted by the AFERB Task Group, that PME

did not contribute significantly to the career development of

officers . That is, no clear correlation existed between PME and

evaluations, PME and promotions, PME and select job

58
attend or attended too late for their education to be optimally

useful. As one observerput it, the best officers sought assignments

that met more "immediate demands upon their talents ." as

Funding

Aspointed out in chapter 2, AU's educational mission remained

essentially the same throughout its history, but at times the costs

of providing PME seemed prohibitive . This issue was most

significant during the 1960s. Following the launch of Sputnik in

October 1957 and the subsequent advent of missile technologies

and sophisticated weapons systems, the US military struggled to

stay ahead of increasingly rapid political, economic, military, and

social changes.49 A national symposium on educational needs

sponsored by the AFERB in 1960 stated its current position on

PME:

We are trying to produce officers who will grow throughout all of their

years ofservice, who will stay ahead ofchange, who will make change.

There must be no waste and no confusion. Our professional education

program costs many millions of dollars each year. . . . But we must have

an educated officer corps, however much it costs, [emphasis added] if the

facilities and equipment in which the nation has invested billions are to

be used effectively .

so

AU has lived with the prospect of having its programs

shortchanged ever since the economic cutbacks that followed

World War II . The second BOV (1947) cautioned that the Air

Force should carefully discriminate between appropriate cuts for

wartime needs and dangerous cuts in postwar needs (i .e .,

education) sl Similarly, the fourth BOV (June 1948) felt that a

good AU was not a luxury: "Neither the Air Force nor the nation

can afford less than a complete fulfillment of the Air University

'

52 mission.' The boards insisted that cutting back at AUwould be

59
parsimonious funding hurt the university and reflected its low

priority withthe AirStaff. Moneyproblemspersisted, despite pleas

by numerous observers on AU's behalf. As the 19th BOV (1963)

plaintively noted, in light of the Soviet Union's acceleration of its

own educational programs, the Air Force's failure to respond in

53 kind was especially disturbing . I

Commentary, 1968-87

Many ofthe same problems andissues peculiarto the first period

of AU's history carried over into the second period. However,

emphasis shifted from AU funding, which stabilized during the

1970s at around 1 percent of the annual Air Force budget, to

making PME relevant to the workaday world of the "real Air

Force." High-technology, rapid changes, and the substantial costs

of systems and operations had a significant effect on the way Air

Force officers perceived their service . Because ofthe Air Force's

concern with managing its business and operating effectively

within the defense and government bureaucracy, the service often

overlooked the need to educate officers as professional war

fighters. Critics in the last two decades narrowed their focus to

faculty qualifications, curriculum content, and teaching methods .

The questions about AU's mission and success also became much

more public.

Faculty

Although General Fairchild once remarked that perhaps the best

AU could hope for was to make do with the best faculty it was

likely to have, other parties had higher hopes. 4 In 1968 the BOV

supported efforts to improve the academic qualifications of the

faculty, reasoning that

6 0
teacg eatosps betee, ote oe ad, oedgeabe 

imaginative instructors and, on the other hand, students who have

confidence in their instructors and who are continuously motivated to

evaluate their subjects and to think in innovative ways ss

In 1972 the BOV recommended that AU consider "a flexible

policy of faculty composition, emphasizing ability, ideas, and

dynamism rather than rank in selecting service personnel for the

faculty of the Air War College ."56 However, only four years later

the BOV recommended that most of the faculty be plowbacks

because "the new emphasis on `specific mission training' requires

faculty who know the Air Force mission, its technical uniqueness

and its strategic and tactical policies and capabilities . . . . [Thus]

the faculty and students are drawn closer together and the program

is enriched by the 'first-hand' impressions of erstwhile students

who become faculty ."57 But by 1978 the BOV had broadened its

perspective:

Continuing efforts should be made to underscore the desirability ofa tour

ofduty on the AWC faculty, specifically in terms offuture promotability .

Only in this way will outstanding officers of exceptional intellectual

ability be attracted to AWC; only in this way can AWC become a center

for scholarly research and creative thought in the field of aerospace

warfare . It should be a primary goal of AWC that at any point in time it

count within its faculty a number of the most creative and thoughtful

mindsin the Air Forcewhose research and scholarly activities with regard

to aerospace warfare are of recognized importance to the United States

Air Force.

58

This concern with recruiting and maintaining a capable

instructional staff was typical ofBOV commentary throughout the

period and may be found in the report of the most recent board

included in this study: "The [1987] BOV believes faculty

improvement to be among the most important steps in the current

effort to further enhance the quality of AWC programs and urges

continuing steadfast support in this area by Air Staff and other Air

Force leadership .

"59 Although most commentators agreed that AU

61
peers.

Responding to the FY 77 Appropriation Bill Conference Report

ofthe House andSenateArmed Services Committees, the assistant

secretary of defense for manpower and reserve affairs noted in his

Review ofFaculty Mix at the US Service Academies and the Senior

andIntermediate Colleges that civilian guest lecturers customarily

provided a diversity of attitudes, perspectives, and opinions. But

he added that guest lecturers should only supplement the resident

military and civilian faculties of the staff colleges and war

colleges6° Similarly, Amos A. Jordan and William J . Taylor, Jr .,

lamented the war colleges' "overreliance on guest lectures, which

forces the students into a largely passive role."61 Maureen

Mylander was even more critical, claiming that the military

faculties of the war colleges were "primarily administrators and

discussion leaders with scant knowledge of subjects they

`teach' . . . . As a result, students claim they learn more from one

another than from lecturers. This has its advantages, but, more

often than not, discussion descends to the level of lowest common

denominator.',62 Likewise, the 1975 Clements committee stated

that "it is the capability of the resident faculty [not peer learning

and guest lecturers] which determines the level of excellence

achieved in the educational process."63

The assistant secretary's review also recommended that the

preponderance of PME faculties be composed of well-qualified

officers :

Because of the predominantly military emphasis of these courses, most

ofthe resident teaching faculty should be professional officers, qualified

both by military experience and academic training. Since these courses

(especially at the senior colleges) deal extensively with such matters as

the national policy process, economic policy, systems analysis, strategic

thought and international affairs, they could benefit from a leavening in

their faculties of civilians both from the academic world and from such

places as the Department of Defense, State Department, Central

Intelligence Agency, or similar agencies . . . .

62
popotoooces tgpootopoteta

Officers who have taught at the service academies (especially those with

the Ph.D) offer a special resource which should not be overlooked in

selecting military faculty6

Faced with the reality of entrenched Air Force practices,

attitudes, and personnel policies, however, these idealistic goals

did not fare well. Writing to Gen David C. Jones, Air Force chief

of staff, on 17 June 1977, Lt Gen Raymond B . Furlong, AU

commander, took a more practical approach. Believing that "a

major limiting factor in the continued improvement of the Air War

College is the quality of the faculty and in particular substantive

mastery by those in charge of major areas of instruction," Furlong

requested Jones's permission to hire four AWC and three ACSC

professors from the ranks ofrecently retired senior officers .

65 Four

months later, an action memorandum to the secretary of the Air

Force proposed that two-thirds of the AWC and ACSC faculties

be civilians and that a significant number of the civilians be retired

officers . This proposal sought to "save [the Air Force] active duty

manpower spaces, save money, and improve the quality of

education." The memorandum also argued that by using a civilian

faculty, the Air Force could avoid problems involving credentials,

selection procedures, teaching ability, and personnel policies that

were typical of a military faculty.

6

Theodore J. Crackel, however, was among those commentators

who opposed a majority civilian faculty, maintaining that "no

military establishment has ever retained its vitality after

surrendering its intellectual destiny to those in mufti." Indeed, he

went so far as to propose a uniformed career track in education:

With the creation ofmilitary education specialties within the services, the

nation might one day be able to turn to the services again for intellectual

expertise in areas that fall naturally within the military realmlike

strategy, tactics, military history, and military geography-rather than

turning, as now, to scholars from think tanks and academia, whose

63
Perhaps the most significant study of AUs faculty problems,

though, favored an undetermined mixture ofmilitary and civilian

instructors . This study was aresponse to Secretary of the Air Force

Verne Orr's challenge to Lt Gen Thomas Richards, AU's

commander, "to provide the best program at the three major and

distinct Air University officer PME schools." a Noting that the

development of a fully capable faculty could not occur without the

support ofthe secretary ofthe Air Force, the chiefof staff, four-star

generals, and the personnel community, the report recommended

the following makeup: "[1] short-term military faculty brought in

from the operational Air Force; [2] military officers . . . dedicated

to professional military education; [3] distinguished visiting

civilian faculty; and [4] civilian subject matter experts .

"69 Looking

to the future, the study's task force was especially interested in

cultivating the second category of military faculty:

[They must] combine the highest level of academic and professional

military expertise with gifted teaching ability . The Air Force must take

bold and perhaps radical steps to produce these people . They must be

identified long before they become eligible tojointhe faculty. Some must

be sent to ART forAir Force sponsored degree programs to develop their

academic competency. They must be tracked throughout their careers . It

will take years to develop this cadre; some will eventually become

permanent military faculty on the model of the West Point permanent

associate professors. . . . These are people who make a commitment upon

joining the faculty to servethe remainder oftheir careerat Air University,

and in return the Air Force must make a commitment to retain them in

such a career field .

70

Curricula

Commentators on AU have been just as concerned with the

university's curricula as they have with its faculty. Most of the

pejorativecommentary on curricula has come from outside the Air

Force, while favorable reviews are more typical of Air Force

observers. For example, the Officer PME Study of 1980 stated that

64
Current PME curricula are considered to satisfy nearly all known

requirements for subject matter coverage and learning outcomes .

However, frequent tinkering with the curricula (based on BOV

recommendations, surveys of PME graduates and their

commanders, and a variety of conferences and studies) implied

that even internal commentators were not completely satisfied .

At its more abstract levels, criticism of curricula has dealt with

therelative merits ofbroadversus specialized education, discussed

earlier . At the more concrete level, this criticism addresses core

curricula as opposed to individually tailored curricula, breadth

versus depth of study, and the types of subjects covered by the

curricula. At all levels, AUhas shared the limelight with other US

service schools.

Core versus Individually Tailored Curricula. The preference

for a core curriculum rather than one based on individually tailored

subjects and electives (or vice versa) has varied over time and

among the different service schools. As is the case with teaching

methods (lectures, seminars, case studies, war gaming, etc.), no

optimum mix of curricula exists. Indeed, Frederick H. Hartmann

stated that to prefer one mix over another is merely a value

judgment; students will profit or not, regardless of the mix 72 In

1980 the BOV recommended a balanced mix:

The BOV reviewers endorse the basic plan of core curriculum

complemented by an array of elective courses and buttressed by

opportunities for developing and demonstrating individual initiative

through writing and research as well as opportunities for interacting with

influential outside speakers and civilian leaders .

In the early 1970s, the Naval War College, "dissatisfied at the

lack of depth in a core curriculum which shared the student's time

with other methods and areas of learning, concentrated the

student's efforts on a rigorous common core, with only relatively

minor emphasis elsewhere.

"74 This change was part of Vice Adm

StansfieldTurner's reform, which even eliminated "the associated

65
academic efforts."75 (A decade later, however, the three major

areas of the core curriculum--defense economics and decision

making, policy and strategy, and naval operations-were

augmented by some 45 electives 76 )

The Army War College traditionally followed a core

curriculum, but after 1966 it "moved slowly .toward providing

some specialized course work within the overall program of

producing a generalist." 77 In the mid-1970s, Maj Gen Franklin M.

Davis, Jr., commandant ofthe college, departed from the usual core

curriculum and instituted one tailored to the needs of individual

students. General Davis believed that the curriculum

must challenge, in a genuine and compelling way, each officer . . . . [And

it] must provide multiple opportunity for the individual to take study

initiatives, to firmly grasp curriculum opportunities, and, above all, and

this is the key point, I think, the curriculum must exploit the professional

success the individual student has already demonstrated .78

By exploiting the potential ofelectives and an individually tailored

curriculum, the Army War College sought to meet the needs of

both generalist and specialist .

79

AWCand ACSC have made similar changes. For example, "in

the early 1950s the intermediate PME level included several

special staff courses for officers in logistics, comptrollership,

intelligence, communications, and electronics, as well as a field

officers' course principally for operations officers ."s° At AWCin

1968,

an elective program was introduced to offer concurrent courses in

communicative and mathematical skills plus a few selected disciplines

designed to broaden student backgrounds and to assist them in becoming

articulate advocates of aerospace power. This original elective program

included five voluntary communicative, language, and mathematical skill

courses plus a requirement for each student to complete one of eight

special electives that included such diverse subjects as lessons learned in

combat, quantitative analysis, and area studies. I

66
PME subjects of special interest and need.

,82 In the late 1970s,

ACSC "provided opportunities for students destined forpersonnel

and comptroller assignments to attend and receive full credit for

the Professional Personnel Management and Professional Military

Comptroller courses."83 A holdover from the specialized ACSC

courses of the 1950s, this program was perhaps more properly

related to the generalist-versus-specialist issue rather than an

example of an individually tailored curriculum.

The 1975 Clements committee directed that "the curriculum of

the [war] colleges should contain a portion which permits each

individual officer to tailor his academic experience to hisparticular

background and his Service career." These electives were to "be

confined to topics which fall within the specific mission-field

[aerospace warfare] of the college [and] involve thorough and

rigorous examination of the subject matter." 84 The committee,

however, did not recommend that the curricula be completely

tailored for each student ; after all, it opposed "cooperative degree

programs that are not integral parts of Senior Service College

curricula, or that include prior and subsequent activities not

directly related to the Service College experience." 85

Finally, the minutes of the MAJCOM Commanders PME

Conference of 14-15 January 1980 noted that "the conferees were

impressedwith the TIP [Tailored Instruction Program-atACSC] ;

however, some conferees suggested that the ACSC core program

is not responsive to command requirements because warfare

education is not provided in adequate depth." TIP included

"courses on strategic plans and operations as well as theater

operations" but shortchanged chemical and electronic warfare.

Evidently, then, few service schools remained satisfied with their

curricula ; consequently, they made frequent changes in an effort

to find the right mix of core, elective, and tailored subjects.

Breadth or Depth. Criticism, especially by outsiders, of the

extent to which PME schools cover their subject matter is a

function of the perceived purpose of the schools. Therefore,

67
object is to transform specialists into generalists and to expose

them, however briefly, to the complicated range of factors

affecting top-level decisions, the war colleges do a good job."

However, she continues, "first-rate leadership in the military calls

not only for good tacticians or technical experts but also for

intelligent strategists or thinkers to take a long-range view of

developments and operations ." She also noted that the war colleges

do not expect their students to absorb the vast quantity and range

of material presented to them but merely to "sift out what interests

them and ignore the rest ." Thus, she argues that the colleges fail

to create climates conducive to thinking: "The schools permit their

charges to range over vast expanses ofsubject matter but keep the

herd moving so fast that there is scanttime for intellectual grazing.

The danger of this approach is that it creates an unjustified

sensation of expertise ."87 Similarly, Edward Katzenbach wrote

that "breadth of view as an educational objective is so overriding

that it virtually precludes depth of view." 8g Williamson Murray

was even more critical . He observed that by trying to cover

everything a future flag officer may need toknow, the war colleges

covered nothing in depth. Alternatively, he favored a war college

curriculum whichwould"concentrate ontwo or three subject areas

in order to give officers sufficient depth and understanding to

continue their professional education in those areas after they

return to their careers." s9

The alleged shallowness of the PME curricula is of equal

concern to military commentators . For example, Lt Gen R. G.

Gard, Jr., president ofNational Defense University, recommended

that the commandants of the National War College and the

Industrial College of the Armed Forces "reduce our coverage in

favor of more rigorous treatment of what we expect the student to

learn ."9°

Course Content. Although the content of the SOS curriculum

has received little adverse criticism, few commentators have been

able to agree on appropriate course material for the staff colleges

68
ofwhether PME should concentrate on military matters or include

such disciplines as domestic and international politics, economics,

and so forth . Because of the variety of opinions on this issue, we

can expect the content of PME courses to continue to change.

Indeed, the 1971 Air University Ad Hoc Committee on Cost

Reduction touted AU's "dynamic professional education

curriculum; one that is broadly structured on the firm foundation

of experience, but is specifically responsive to the changing needs

and objectives ofthe Air Force."91

The committee was especially impressed with the advice on

curriculum that AUreceived from the MAJCOMs and Air Staff:

Each year major commands and the Air Staff review PME curricula to

assure they are responsive to current Air Force needs. The increase in

subject matter recommended for inclusion in PME as a result of these

recurring reviews has been so great that a selective process has been

required to assure that only material most responsive to Air Force needs

is,is presented within the time limitations imposed by present PME course

In the final curriculum construction process for each academic

year, PME staffs and faculties and anAirUniversityBoard ofCurriculum

review structure and refine each curriculum.

In addition to their own judgements basedupon extensive experience, the

faculties and staffs of the PME schools have and are continuously

gathering data from such sources as: students and alumni ; military and

civilian experts in specific fields; supervisors of Air Force officers; key

senior Air Force officers; major governmental and military agencies;

civilian industry and research agencies; con9es and universities; andAir

Force boards, committees, and task groups .

Even the BOV could not decide on who should influence the

curricula . In 1974 it recommended "a more intensive and

systematic method whereby the major air commands might

influence more directly the pattern ofthe curriculum ."93 Two years

later, however, the board urged "that curriculum development be

largely the jurisdiction of the Air University faculty and

administration ."94

69
y y g

"to operate within the confines of a body of established doctrine

[whereas] war colleges should be the locus ofthe development and

analysis ofdoctrine itself.

,95 Similarly, Murray stated that because

the war colleges were unwilling "to place war and strategy at the

heart of their curricula," they failed to understand "the complex

interplay between strategy, operational realities, policy, and the

popularwill."96More precisely, John M. Collins remarked that the

staff colleges "properly emphasize tactics, doctrine, and logistic

support far more than defense strategy." On the other hand, he

charged that the war colleges fail to formulate or even adequately

teach strategybecause their faculties are not up to the task, toolittle

time is devoted to the subject, and courses stress "what to do far

more than how to do it ."9

Likewise, Rear Adm Henry E. Eccles stated that "if we are

successfully to educate officers for high command, we must

understand fundamental military theory and use it as aguide in the

development and conduct ofany war study curricula." He opposed

using the war colleges as "preparatory schools forPentagon duty,"

where officers learn staff skills and study "political science,

international policy, organization and law." Eccles felt that such a

plan would detract from the study of military power and would

leave the armed forces unprepared "to provide creative leadership

in professional military knowledge."98

Commanders of the various service schools also voiced their

opinions about the content of PME courses. According to Admiral

Turner ofthe Naval War College (NWC), the nation's war colleges

must adopt intellectually demanding curricula that widen their

students' horizons and allow them to place strategic and

operational issues in context . Otherwise, the military's senior

officer corps will not be prepared for "the large military and

strategic issues that confront America in the late twentieth

century." 99 Accordingly, NWC's rigorous academic program

required students to solve problems in logistics, employment, and

tactics, and to "study . . . strategy through historical cases rather

70
Capt Alfred T. Mahan, by World War I "the technical and

operational imperatives of the new Navy" had supplanted the

historical approach. Thus, professional and technical training

predominated at NWC until Turner revamped the curriculum in

1972. The admiral's mission was to enhance the "professional

capabilities of [NWC] students to make sound decisions in both

command and management" and cultivate "logical reasoning

capacity" rather than an "encyclopedic knowledge in multiple

fields." lol Air University's Lightner board of 1973, however,

questioned the effectiveness of Turner's emphasis on history,

maintaining that a study of international relations or world

environment would be just as effective if not more so.

102

Like the Naval War College, the Army Command and General

Staff College ofthe early 1980s emphasized tactics, planning, and

the communicative arts :

In the core curriculum, all students will continue to receive tactical

fundamentals, procedures and the concepts of military operations. But

combat arms officers and certain combat support officers will be required

to take additional tactics courses .

[Instruction in planning will teach officers to understand] the diverse and

complex requirements for deployment of Army forces to contingency

areas, air and sea movementplanning, the design ofappropriate forces for

a given scenario, and the priority and sequencing of Army force

deployments to a theater of operations.

[Courses in communication will train] the student to approach a problem

systematicaly, seekout thefacts, analyze theissuesandreason toalogical

conclusion.

103

Some commentators took issue with this emphasis on "purely

military matters ." For example, to charges such as "the [war]

colleges spend too much time on broad national security matters,"

John McCaughey responded that war is apolitical act, that war can

only be fully understood in its context.' °' Similarly, besides being

"a true expert in the conduct of military operations," the military

71
of the utility, or disutility, of military force within the context of

the assumed domestic and international environment .

"105

Acknowledging that few officers will have to deal with war on

such a lofty plain, McCaughey concluded that

maybe what we really need to produce at the [Army War] college are

people who understand how to get along with the other services as

planners and operators, people who can deal with the State Department

whenthey'redealing with politics in someunpleasant part oftheworld. l°6

To some extent, the content of a PME curriculum depends upon

who is analyzing that curriculum. Maj Gen DeWitt Smith of the

Army War College remarked that"this college is nota trade school,

dealing with techniques . . . nor is it aimed only at preparing its

graduates for their next assignments . Neither is it a graduate

institution in international affairs, important as that field is, and its

focus is not solely on national security policymaking ." 107 In

actuality, however, some of the subjects taught in war colleges

during the early 1980s included

national purpose, national strategy, force planning and resource

management, theater operations, war gaming, management techniques,

domestic issues, domestic priorities, ethics, law, minorities, media, the

evolution of military strategy, international trends and issues, regional

U.S . interests, risk, [and] leadership . 108

The diversity of subjects actually taught suggests the lack of

consensus over the proper substance of PME courses and gives us

a good idea ofhow revolutionary Admiral Turner's changes were.

Changes in Air Force PME courses proceeded from

recommendations of various groups and individuals. Forexample,

a memorandum from Maj Gen Robert Ginsburgh, director of

USAF information, to Gen George S . Brown, Air Force chief of

staff, in December 1973 stated that "the Senior Service Schools

have generally put too little emphasis on the military side and too

much emphasis on 'get-rich quick' survey-type approaches to

72
SOS, ACSC, AWC could help ourofficer corps by doing more work with

them onthe conceptualand philosophical underpinnings ofthe reason for

our existence as a separate Service : Airpoweris different andis dominant .

If time for such work must come out of present curricula, in my opinion

the surveys of international relations, politics and economics could be

shortened.

I believe that the Air University should not only put greater stress on

military aspects, but specifically on airpower. The study of airpower

should be the keystone of the professional military education at Air

University. Thestudies should not be limitedtoairpower, but the student's

focus should be airpower. He should understandhow airpower affects and

is affected by the otherinstruments ofmilitary power and by the political,

economic and sociological factors . l°9

Lt Gen F. Michael Rogers, AUcommander, replied that "Air Force

principles, concepts and doctrine for the development and

employment of aerospace forces are central themes in all of our

PME schools." 11°

After succeeding General Rogers as AU commander, Gen

Raymond Furlong directed the commandants of AWC and ACSC

to change their curricula:

A change in the curriculum for AWC in the next academic year [will]

expand on the use of airpower. I expect that we can do a better job in this

area in ACSC as well.

The object of this shift in AU emphasis is to increase the value of AU

education to its professional students and the Air Force and to make

substantive contributions to our knowledge of airpower and its

application. I expect an increased emphasis to be placed on thorough

research, analysis, and creative thinking .

lit

Further, Furlong directed the colleges to cover tactical air; airlift ;

conventional bombing operations by the Strategic Air Command;

strategic forces; theater communications; historical and

comparative theater air organization ; joint and combined

operations ; and Soviet doctrine and capabilities. He even

suggested presenting the subjects from a historical perspective .

112

73
On 6 October 1976, General Furlong briefed the Corona West

Conference that

the art of war is the province of AWC [and that] Air War College has

shifted its emphasis from national security and grand strategy toward

employment with a heavy emphasis on air power. . . . The perspective for

employment is that of the theater air commander-a level that we view

as demanding both strategy and tactics and one which requires a broad

knowledge of tactical missions and decisions on all components of such

aforce. Europe is the theater ofprimary attention.

)14

Two years later the 1978 BOV noted that the AWC should

"provide opportunities to research, analyze, and discuss current

doctrine as well as new ideas pertaining to the management and

employment of airpower." 115

The effect on ACSC's curriculum was essentially the same

since, for years, it has closely resembled AWC's. The justification

for the similarity is that, since ACSC is the last PME for most

officers, they should benefit from a more advanced curriculum,

especially because so many of them come to ACSC with

experience. Nevertheless, from time to time "corrections" are

made. For example, a review of the Alpha Group report stated in

1974 that

the staff review group agrees that ACSC is terminal for many officers;

however, it does not think that fact should be a major consideration in

curriculum planning. The major consideration is to prepare officers for

typical assignments within five to six years after graduation. rr6

Although the 1975 BOV did not explicitly oppose this view, it did

note that

this shift [preparing majors and lieutenant colonels forthe next five to six

years oftheir careers] has entailed certain sacrifices, particularly in those

areas of the curriculum originally designed to provide officers with an

understanding of the broad dimensions of international relations and

national policy formation. . . . Transitional problems of student morale

74
Although commentators have disagreed over the particulars of

course content and the goals ofPME, most ofthem would probably

concur with Katzenbach's assessment that

to date the trend in the warcolleges has been to discussnational problems,

hopefully tying these in some way to military problems. This should be

reversed . Military problems should be central to the discussion, due

reference made to the pressures, political, economic, andtechnical, which

prescribe the peripheries within which solutions must, or can, or cannot

be found. rrs

Nonresident Professional Military Education

To compensate for changes in curricula at AU schools, some

commentators have advocated an expanded use of nonresident

courses . For instance, the group who reviewed the report of the

Alpha Group, mentioned previously, proposed that an

ACSC nonresident program could be established as a mandatory

requirement for promotion to lieutenant colonel or as a prerequisite to

resident attendance at AirWarCollege. It wouldbe principally a seminar

program with acorrespondence program available to officers who could

not attend the seminars . It is also suggested that the seminar program

involve an arrangementwhere officers could attend two to four hours per

week during normal duty hours!19

The review group noted, however, that this proposal, based on a

Royal Air Force program, "would probably be unenforceable and

therefore of questionable worth. Past attempts to require officers

not selected forresident PME to complete courses by nonresident

programs have not met with success." 120 Unsurprisingly, then, in

a memorandum to Secretary ofDefense Harold Brown on 3 April

1978, Vice Adm Patrick J. Hannifin, who was making the

consolidated Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation against

initiatives to reduce the course length of the staff colleges to 22

75
The best officers-those whoshould attend in residence-are usually the

busiest. They tend to hold key positions and be involved in important

projects requiring long hours. The Services do not consider it equitable or

feasible to establish and adhere to a rigid prerequisite that such officers

complete an off-duty nonresident professional military education

program in order to attend the resident school .

121

Furthermore, the 1980 Air Force Officer PMEStudy rejected the

concept of nonresident PME as a prerequisite for officers selected

to attend AWC and ACSC in residence . The study concluded that

the program was impractical because it would require early

selection to allow candidates enough time to complete it before

beginning the resident school. Furthermore, the study considered

the program inequitable because it placed "better" officers in the

most demandingjobs at a disadvantage . 122 Nevertheless, the 1987

BOV, facing an austere budget, recommended that

the present [ACSC] curricula should be reviewed to determine which

areas might lend themselves to instruction in the Associate Program. The

Resident Program, although shortened, might provide opportunities for

students to spend more in-depth time in the resident-essential instructorled curricular areas. Again, asufficient amount ofmaterial would have to

be acceptedin the firstprogram to permit the second program to occur.

123

Similar proposals have targeted the SOS curriculum . For

example, the 1980 Vice Commanders PME Conference stated that

SOSshouldbereviewed with the objective ofreducingits length to permit

resident attendance by a larger percentage of junior officers . The Study

Group shouldinvestigate the development ofa"hybrid" correspondence/

resident course in which advanced preparatory materials would be

completedin the field priorto resident attendance . Some portion of SOS

might be taught at base level to help decrease the time spent in

residence. 24

Similarly, the 1981 BOV recommended that "appropriate parts of

the [SOS] curriculum [be made] available to potential students

prior to their attending SOS ." 125 The 1985 BOV also

76
as well as some shortening of both programs." 126

Thus, one may explain such change as a pragmatic response to

a changing environment or as the result of the Air Force's failure

to decide on the purpose of PME. In general, internal critics seem

to favor the former explanation and external critics the latter .

Teaching Methods

Teaching methods used by AWC and ACSC that have come

under the scrutiny of commentators include the lecture and

seminar, as well as independent study and research. Criticism of

SOS's methods is almost wholly confined to the practice of

teaching leadership, especially by using competitive team sports.

Lectures and Seminars. Civilian commentators tend to

criticize auditorium-size lectures, especially those delivered by

guest speakers. They maintain that such lectures, even those

conducted by permanent faculty, are essentially passive because

there is little opportunity for student participation . Guest speakers

compound the problem because their subjects may or may not

support lesson objectives and probably don't complement each

other. Furthermore, these speakers, who are senior-level military

and civilian officials rather than academicians, seldom have an

effective teaching style . Nevertheless, the Lightner board held that

the distinguished lecturer program should remain the nucleus of the core

curriculum . The lecture method employed by Air War College as

presently supplemented by reading selections, question and answer

discussion periods, and general discussion seminars, should rightfully be

considered a balanced learning experience. l r

The board did note, however, that "since 1970 it has been AWC

policy to de-emphasize formal lectures in favor of methodologies

requiring active student participation, as in individual problem

solving situations and war gaming exercises ." 128 But the 1976

77
BOV, though, moved away from this position:

Consideration might well be given to how to reduce the time spent in this

mode [lecture] and increase the time spent in seminars, which are

perceived by both the students and the [BOV AWC] subcommittee as

more educationally rewarding, and in research, which the board seems to

view as more valuable than the students do.

130

Not everyone, however, agreed that seminars were valuable,

particularly those led by plowbacks and students. Although

General Fairchild envisioned seminars as good environments for

problem solving,131 commentators observed that they can easily

degenerate into bull sessions-exchanges of ignorance,

misinformation, or irrelevant material. Furthermore, the seminar

too often becomes a"haven forthe unpreparedboth students and

faculty. The seminar must be carefully supervised to assure its

quality, and the seminar leader must be exceedingly intelligent,

well-informed and adept in holding the interests of

participants .

"132

Independent Study or Research. Admiral Eccles believed in

research. He felt that war colleges should not only understand and

teach the fundamentals of military theory, but also develop new

strategic, logistical, and tactical concepts and theories.

133

Similarly, the 1983 BOV indicated that ACSC's "Research Project

is central to the educational experience provided the officers who

are destined to be the future leaders of the U.S . Air Force. [The

research project] is the largest single component in the curriculum

and it should continue to be."I3a However, commentators have

pointed out that PME schools reserve too little time for students

and faculty to pursue independent study, as well as read, think, and

reflect.

131 Indeed, the 1973 Lightner board commented that an Air

Force directive requiring

faculty members [to] be active researchers and contributors to

professional military knowledge is impractical and inconsistent with

78
Cosequety, te 5 Ceets cottee dected acoege

commandants to develop research programs that would be suitable

for a large portion of the faculty . 137

Insofar as AWC and ACSC students are concerned, research

programs designed for them were meant to promote "selfimprovement and professional growth [although] the emphasis has

shifted to producing studies which contribute to the solution of

current Air Force problems."138 Some students, however,

suggested that this time be spent for other purposes:

While time is available inthe schedule for individual study and reflective

contemplation, more opportunity should be provided for intellectual

synthesis of the conceptions generated by discussion and lecture and the

pragmatic command experiences which the students almost without

exception have themselves undergone.

139

Although a number of students abuse such "free" time, proponents

of the concept argued that the advantages gained by those who use

the time profitably would outweigh thedisadvantages ofthose who

waste it .

Research, whether by faculty or student, has three groups of

advocates: (1) those who are concerned with research as an

exercise in thinking (recognizing and defining a problem;

gathering relevant data; synthesizing solutions; presenting, selling,

and defending those solutions); (2) those who believe that the war

colleges should, like other centers of higher education, contribute

to knowledge in their areas ofexpertise; and (3) those who believe

that students should do relevant research on current Air Force

problems. Accordingly, the 1971 BOV wanted to know whether

AWC student research activities were

aimed at the educational development of the student, not at the solution

ofproblems for the Air Force [or whether they were] aimed at increasing

his knowledge or at developing his problem-solving and writing ability.

The objective stated in AU Reg. 23-16 seems to emphasize the former

79
Unable to find an answer, the board recommended that AUspecify

the purpose of student research. In short, like so many other

variables associated with PME, the issue of whether student or

faculty research is a proper activity of staff colleges and war

colleges remains unresolved.

Leadership at Squadron Officer School. The SOS curriculum

is designed almost exclusively to prepare officers as military

leaders . Because both ACSC and AWC assume that their students

have already mastered leadership skills, their curricula emphasize

different areas. General criticism of AU also reflects this

distinction. That is, outside commentators, concerned with the

broadknowledge and abilities ofAir force officers rather thantheir

leadership skills, confine their criticism to the war colleges,

occasionally mentioning the' staff colleges. Most criticism of SOS,

on the other hand, comes from insiders, and there has not been

much of that . In fact, most observers have complimented SOS

programs. The 1978 BOV, for example, commented that "changes

in the programs should be made only when clear deficiencies have

been discovered and when the means of improvement are

available . It is too good to be tampered with." The same board,

however, did question "the efficacy of the sports program" as a

method for teaching leadership.

141

Indeed, the utility of team sports at SOS is a prime point of

contention among commentators . For example, the Vice

Commanders PME Conference of January 1980 stated that the

competitive team sports program "should not be presented under

the `guise' of leadership," but the Officer PME Study of February

1980 contains a long defense of team sports as a means of

developing leaders at SOS-142 In 1980 the BOV noted that the

purpose of SOS's Leadership Skills Program "is to make the

students more aware of their leadership skills and then give them

the opportunities to further develop these skills ." 143 The 1986

BOVelaborated on this idea:

8 0
element of being an effective officer. The SOS approach appears to be

one of nurturing the development of leadership by exposure to problem

situations involving team play from which character ties ofleadershipthough in many cases unquantifiable-will evolve . In reading much of

the material presented, one primary characteristic of leadership, as

defined by SOS, appears to be efficiency .

The contention that leadership can be taught does not have universal

acceptance. However, in terms defined by SOS in providing opportunities

through 1) problem solving situations, 2) exposure to historical case

examples, 3) communication skills, 4) knowledge ofthe employment of

the Air Force, and 5) athletic competition, it appears that this mission is

properly handled . . . .

[Furthermore,] SOS should : (a) consider a realignment of its emphasis

upon problem solving in its search for leadership, (b) investigate the

possible use of the examples from reading materials of current business

leaders as well as world and revolutionary leaders who obtain the

following of their masses, (c) examine the possibility of greater focus

upon the techniques of identifying leadership qualities .

144

Commentators have no argument with SOS's objective of

improving its students' leadership skills ; rather, they simply

question whether leadership can be taught at all and, if so, whether

the sports field is the proper place to teach it .

Criticism of Criticisms

The task of AU's principal commentators-quantifying

objectives for education and assessing AU's performance in that

regard-is difficult because education is a field that is by nature

subjective, often esoteric, and frequently only as good as the last

observer's opinion. Nevertheless, their commentary-both

favorable and unfavorable-was usually cogent and helped AU

evaluate the performance of its schools .

8 1
Board of Visitors is probably the most important. Other study

groups perform essentially ad hoc assessments, in that they are

limited to the amount of information they can absorb within the

time limits of a single conference. Although the depth and quality

of its reports vary, the BOV has established a continuity of

assessment overthe life ofthe university . Boardmembers typically

serve for three years, their terms frequently overlapping those of

predecessors and successors. Consequently, the board is in a

unique positionto advise on organizational difficulties, curriculum

orientation, and specific school problems.

145

During the first four decades of its existence, the board advised

AU on such matters as facilities upgrades, accreditation, doctrinal

development, faculty quality and composition, utility of

correspondence courses, student evaluations, assignment and

selection procedures, and so forth . 146 Much of its commentary, as

we have seen, involved specific recommendations and criticism of

the schools' performance. Not all comments, however, were

negative. For example, the board endorsed the schools' use of

seminars and their "systematic exercises in speaking and

writing . "

147

The board also applauded each school's successes, praising

AWCinparticular duringthe early andmid-1950s as a goodschool

with a good program that ensured high intellectual quality and

honest study of controversial issues. 1 In 1954 the board praised

AWC for its faculty and staff, student selection procedures, and

mature approach to curriculum changes. During the same year, the

BOV strongly endorsed AU's basic educational philosophy and

the quality of thinkers it produced, especially those from the Air

War College Post-Graduate Study Group.

149

"Impressed by the general interest and enthusiasm of both staff

members and students," the board alsohadpraise forACSC (which

included SOC until 1955) during this period .

150 Although

problems with faculty tenure and student quality persisted,

stabilized three-year tours (by 1953) and attempts at selective

82
ecet yeas

Despite Air Force efforts to exercise "continuous care that the

selection of faculty and student personnel . . . is of the highest

quality," 153 problems in recruiting enough capable faculty

members intensified after 1958 . 1 54 Consequently, faculty prestige

suffered well into the 1960s.

155 However, the board was still

"greatly impressed with the quality ofthinking and competence in

expression of the students." 156 But not until 1967 did the board

again rate the AWC faculty superior, and-even then-it

encouraged the faculty to keep improving.

l57

Air Force Educational Requirements

Board Task Group

In 1963 the Air Force Educational Requirements Board Task

Group issued an articulate, comprehensive report on Air Force

PME. Requested by the AUcommander, the report did not please

everyone in the AU community. Moreover, the report prompted

an Air Staff-directed "correction," published as volume lA on 20

December 1963 .

In August 1963 Lt Gen Troup Miller, Jr ., AUcommander, who

had been on General Fairchild's staff in 1946, forwarded to

Headquarters USAF/AFPDP (Personnel) the corporate AU

response to the report. In this letter the general noted two "major

inadequacies," chief of which was the group's methodology . He

charged that the group failed to use "detailed investigations in the

field that the ERB [Educational Requirements Board] had utilized

in its previous assignments ." General Miller wanted to see

thorough surveys ofofficers and supervisors in all services, studies

ofgraduate requirements, assessments of officer performance, and

determinations of the competency levels needed by faculty in

various subjects. Instead, Miller noted that the group relied on "the

best judgements of the individuals making the study [a process]

83
The second inadequacy involved PME deficiencies cited by the

report . General Miller argued that "many of these deficiencies are

unsupported by evidence in the three volumes of the Report, and

some are actually contradicted by evidence readily available

elsewhere."ls9 For instance, AU had not "felt a lack of Hq USAF

guidance." Although the university received no official Air Force

statements on the philosophy or objectives ofPME, notto mention

a definition of PME, this situation neither prevented AU from

doing its job nor hindered higher headquarters' interest in things

like school curricula.

160

Because he thought the group's methodology and assessments

were flawed, General Miller disagreed with the report's proposal

to provide curriculum guidance and make radical changes in AU's

PME structure.

161 Instead, AU felt that it had sufficient control

over curricula to achieve its educational objectives.

162 General

Miller's letter hastened to add, though, that AU "does not disagree

with the objectives established by the ERB; it simply feels that

their validity cannot be assured by the procedures followed.

,163

Despite his objections, General Miller agreed in principle with

the report's proposal to define PME and establish objectives, as

well as publish an Air Force manual on PME. Furthermore, his

letter made clear that AU concurred with the report's assessment

of faculty competence, student selection procedures, graduate

assignments, extension courses, and the Air Force's long-term

view of PME. 164

Self-Development

Finally, some commentators had a persuasively optimistic view

of the way AU conducted PME. For example, in his thesis on

executive development in the Air Force, F. L. Giannarelli wrote in

1960 that

84
and the resources for achieving the objectives are generouslyprovided. It

is also concluded that the methods andprocedures usedare consistent with

stated Air Force policies .

65

Although Giannarelli acknowledged a problem in attracting

"talented young men to make an officer career," he was convinced

that the Air Force had an outstanding, modern, completely

integrated officer education system "more extensive than for any

comparable group of civilian executives ." Indeed, he maintained

that the Air Force system of PME was constrained only by the

motivations ofAUstudents. That is, the systemprovides the proper

climate for individual development, but officers must "attend to

[their] own self-development and actively plan . . . to avail

[themselves] of every opportunity to increase . . . professional

ability ."166 Despite criticisms of Air Force PME, the system has

proven to be viable; therefore, it is up to each officer to take

advantage ofthe opportunities that PME provides.

Notes

1 . ThirdReport ofthe BoardofVisitors (Maxwell Field, Ala. : AirUniversity,

5 January 1948), 4, 22 (hereafter, BOV3); see also BOV 1 (1946) : 57-62.

2. Maj Gen MuirS. Fairchild, commandant, Army AirForces School, to Maj

Gen Orvil A. Anderson, commandant, Air War College, letter, subject: Air

University Faculty, 13 February 1946, 2-3. Fairchild preferred "the model of

the old Army War College" that used seminars and limited the number of

lectures . "Utilizing this method," he wrote, "will permit the number of

instructors permanently assignedtotheAirWarCollege tobe heldat a relatively

low level" (page 2). Presumably by limiting the demands on the faculty, more

top-quality instructors would be attracted to AU.

3. BOV 2 (1947) :29-30; BOV 3 (January 1948):22.

4. BOV 1 (1946) : 57-58. The board recommended a minimum tour of four

years; good instructors could extend their tours for an additional year after

spending one ortwo years back in operations. Furthermore, instructors were to

be graduates ofthe schools where they taught. Eventually, the board members

became adamant: failure to stabilize instructor tours threatened the long-range

success ofthe Air Force. See BOV 5 (1949) : 4-5.

85
8. BOV 10 (1954) : 6.

9. BOV 14 (1958) : 4.

10. BOV 13 (1957) :5; BOV 15 (1959) :7.

11 . BOV 15 (1959) : 5, 7; BOV 16 (1960) : 5-7.

12. Lt GenWalter E. Todd, commander, AirUniversity,toAirForce Combat

Command Staff, Headquarters USAF, letter, subject: Sixteenth Report of the

Board ofVisitors, 20 June 1960, 6 (filed with BOV 16 [1960]).

13. BOV 3 (January 1948): 5. AU began fishing for formal accreditation in

1949-1950 but discarded the idea during the 1960s.

14. Col Ralph W. Keller et al., "Report ofthe Air University Committee on

the Academic Levels of the Faculties of the Professional Military Schools"

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, 1 March 1963),12-13 (AU Library call

no. 358.0771 A298rc) . Keller made a strong, eloquent appeal for enhancing the

academic qualifications ofthe AU faculty, noting that even at Air Force Reserve

Officer Training Corps almost all the faculty had college degrees . The report

recommended the following distribution of degrees for AU faculty :

School Baccalaureates Masters Doctorates

SOS 45% 45% 10%

ACSC 20% 45% 35%

AWC - 20% 80%

15. BOV 3 (January 1948): 27.

16. BOV 19 (1963): 6; and Dr R. Gordon Hoxie, "Observations on the

Education Programs ofthe United States Air Force," Paper for Air Force chief

of staff, 2 July 1964, 12 (AU Library call no. M-43106-U). Rather than a

comprehensive staff evaluation, Hoxie's study was one man's opinion and

observation, based on briefings and conferences with senior officers at

Headquarters USAF and Headquarters Air University.

17. BOV 6 (1950) : 8-10. The boards recognized a distinction between

area-specific instruction in a more procedural or rote sense, as opposed to

teaching broader topics and allowing for reflective thinking . The first Board of

Visitors noted that the distinction "implied that all [educational] courses will

seek to develop in students the power to solve problems by well ordered,

resourceful andoriginal thought, rather than merely to train them in information

and the routine performance of techniques." BOV 1(1946) : 48.

18. Air Force Educational Requirements Board, Report on Professional

Military Education, vol. 1 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, 10 July 1963),

2-4 (hereafter, task group report) .

19. BOV 6 (1950) : 4.

86
(hereafter, Orleans report) .

21. Report of the USAF Educational Requirements Conference (Maxwell

AFB, Ala. : Air University, 8 November 1956), 65.

22. Ibid ., 5; see also Orleans report, 17ff.

23. Ralph W. Tyler, Analysis ofthe Purpose, Pattern, Scope, and Structure

of the Officer Education Program of Air University, Project no. 505-040-0003

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Officer Education Research Laboratory, May 1955),

42-43.

24. Ibid ., 4, 6.

25. Orleans report, 19.

26. BOV 3 (January 1948):5; BOV 7 (1951): 11 . See BOV 14 (1958) :4, for

some key problems . The board recommended seminars ofeight to 10 students.

See also BOV 15 (1959) : 3.

27. BOV 5 (1949) : 24.

28. See BOV 3 (January 1948): 4-6; BOV 4 (June 1948): 6; and BOV 7

(1951) :8,11.

29. The one exception was the 11th BOV (1955), which advised

discontinuing the AWC correspondence course . However, the board changed

its mind the following year. See BOV 11 (1955) : 11, and BOV 12 (1956): 5;

Orleans report, 16, 27.

30. BOV 15 (1959) :4-5.

31 . BOV 2 (1947) : 54.

32. BOV 1 (1946) :50.

33. Orleans report, 17ff.

34. BOV 7 (1951): 11 .

35. BOV 19 (1963) : 3.

36. BOV 8 (1952): 26.

37. BOV 18 (1962):5-7.

38. BOV 19 (1963) : 7-8; see also task group report, 2-4.

39. BOV 19 (1963) : 7.

40. Orleans report, 20.

41. BOV 5 (1949) : 7; BOV 6 (1950) : 23. The board cited as examples the

Army General Classification Test and the General Survey Test, which were

already in use at ACSS.

42. BOV 1(1946): 20.

43. Col Ralph W. Keller, Air Force deputy chief of staff for education, to

Maj Gen Charles H. Pottenger, vice commander, Air University, attachment to

letter, subject : Factors Involved in Determining the Appropriate Structure ofthe

Professional Military Education System, 26 April 1963, 3-4.

44. Ibid ., 4.

45 . Ibid ., tab A.

87
(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, December 1959), 7; see also task group

report, 2-4 to 2-8 . The 1958 Carmichael report reflected the same concern more

directly. Although primarily interested in training programs involving missile

weapons systems, the Carmichael board members trenchantly commented that

the Air Force must reaffirm both student and permanent party manpower

allocations for AirForce schools : "Education and training activities are of such

importance to the future ofthe Air Force that any arbitrarily imposed manpower

limitations or lack of support of approved courses on the part of major

commands can have severe deleterious effects of a long-range nature." See Maj

Gen Richard H. Cannichael, Report of Education and Training Conference

Maxwell Air Force Base, 21-23 May 1958 (Washington, D.C. : Department of

the Air Force, 1 August 1958), 53-54. Similarly, six years later Dr Hoxie

remarked that "the day to day urgencies of the other major commands have

reduced the sense of importance of the Air University." Hoxie, 8.

49. Report ofSymposium onLong RangeAirForce Qualitative Educational

Requirements (Washington, D.C. : Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare, 17-18 October 1960),7. This report contains an interesting description

of how AU and the Air Staffdetermine AirForce educational requirements, as

well as a summary ofthe functions and operation of AFERB. It also identifies

10 major career areas of particular interest to the Air Force: aerospace

operations, administration (a broad potpourri of skills), security, intelligence,

electronics, materiel (logistics), civil engineering, comptroller tasks, research,

and weapons development (pages 5-8).

50. Ibid., 5.

51. BOV 2 (1947): 6.

52. BOV 4 (June 1948):12.

53. BOV 19 (1963) : 7.

54. Fairchild letter.

55. BOV 24 (1968) : 8.

56. BOV 28 (1972): 2.

57. BOV 32 (1976): 5.

58. BOV 34 (1978): 4.

59. BOV 43 (1987) : 3.

60. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve

Affairs, Review ofFaculty Mix at the U.S . Service Academies and the Senior

andIntermediate Colleges (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 16

March 1977), 32.

61. Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Military Man in

Academia," TheAnnals ofthe American Academy, March 1973, 138-39.

62. Maureen Mylander, "Graduate School for the Generals," Washington

Monthly, October 1974,47-48.

88
Intermediate Level Staff Colleges: Conclusions and Initiatives (Washington,

D.C. : GovernmentPrinting Office, l December 1976),6-7(hereafter, Clements

committee, ILSC).

64. Review ofFaculty Mix, 32, 38.

65. Lt GenRaymond B. Furlong, commander, Air University, to GenDavid

C. Jones, chiefofstaff, US Air Force, letter, subject: AU Faculty, 17 June 1977,

1-2.

66. Memorandum, J. Michael Kelly, deputy assistant secretary of the Air

Force for manpower, resources, and military personnel, to secretary ofthe Air

Force [Verne Orr], subject: Officer Professional Military Education Faculty, 17

October 1984,1-2.

67. Theodore J . Crackel, "On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels,"

Public Interest, Summer 1984,29-30.

68. AirUniversity TaskForce and BlueRibbon Committee onAir University

Faculty Improvement, PMEFacultyEnhancement: CombinedReport (Maxwell

AFB, Ala. : Air University, February-March 1985), 1 .

69. Ibid., 3, 7.

70. Ibid., 16.

71. OfficerPMEStudy (MaxwellAFB, Ala. : AirUniversity, February 1980),

16.

72. Frederick H. Hartmann, "The War Colleges in Perspective," in The

System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S ., ed. Lawrence J. Korb,

International Studies Occasional Paper no. 9 (Pittsburgh, Pa. : International

Studies Association, 1976), 131 .

73. BOV 36 (1980) : 3. Possibly, the BOVwas unable to agree on an optimal

approach and merely chose to endorse the existing AWC curriculum.

74. Hartmann, 131 .

75. Quoted in Brooke Nihart, "Intellectual Wasteland . . . or Challenge?"

Armed Forces Journal, March 1973, 26.

76. Lt Comdr John E. Jackson, "Naval War College : The Right Stuff?" US

Naval Institute Proceedings, April 1983, 72-73.

77. Maj Robert A. Doughty, "The Command and General Staff College in

Transition, 1946-1976," Study Project (Fort Leavenworth, Kans. : Army

Command and General Staff College, l l June 1976), 127 .

78. Maj Gen Franklin M. Davis, Jr ., "The Dilemma of the Senior Service

Colleges-A Commentary," in Korb,110-11 .

79. Doughty, 129.

80. Kenneth J. Groves, "Air University and the Professional Education

System," Air University Review 26, no. 5 (July-August 1975): 14.

89
82Ibid ., 6465.

83. Air University Director of Education, AUIED Orientation Program for

AU/CC (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, June 1979),5 .

84. Clements committee, SSC, 6. Writing about the staff colleges, "the

Committee was most impressed by those elective programs which supported

student officer specialities, and were oriented distinctly towardmission-specific

subjects." Clements committee, ILSC, 9.

85. Clements committee, SSC, 16. Regarding cooperative degree programs

at the staff colleges, "the Committee desires that students attending the Staff

Colleges only participate in cooperative degree programs that appropriately

support officer career specialties, and/or subspecialties, with emphasis on

shortage disciplines within the Services." Clements committee, ILSC,12.

86. Officer PME Study, atch 1, Supporting Documents (Maxwell AFB,Ala. :

AirUniversity, February 1980), 14-5.

87. Mylander, 45-48.

88. EdwardL. Katzenbach, Jr., "TheDemotion ofProfessionalism at the War

Colleges," US Naval Institute Proceedings, March 1965, 36.

89. Williamson Murray, "Grading the War Colleges," National Interest,

Winter 1986-1987,13.

90. Lt Gen R. G. Gard, Jr., president, National Defense University, to the

commandants of the National War College and the Industrial College of the

Armed Forces, letter, subject: Curriculum Development, Academic Year

1977-1978, 7 February 1987,2.

91. Air University Deputy Chief of Staff for Education, Report of the Air

University Ad Hoc Committee on Cost Reduction in Professional Military

Education (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, January 1971),6 .

92. Ibid., 5-6, J-6.

93. BOV 30 (1974) : 2.

94. BOV 32 (1976) :5.

95. Katzenbach, 38.

96. Murray, 13-14.

97. John M. Collins, U.S . Defense Planning: A Critique (Boulder, Colo. :

Westview Press, 1982),136,139-42.

98. Rear Adm Henry E. Eccles, "Military Theory and Education; The Need

for and Nature Of," Naval War College Review, February 1969, 74, 78.

99. Murray, 13.

100 . Nihart, 26.

101 . Richard Megaree, "History and Military Education," Naval War

College Review, September 1978, 9-13.

102 . Lightner board, 12, 32.

90
Model,Defense Week, 23 June 1980, 7-8.

105 . Donald F. Bletz, "The Modem Major General," in Korb, 12.

106. McCaughey, 8.

107 . Quoted in ibid ., 6.

108 . Ibid., 7.

109 . Maj Gen Robert N. Ginsburgh, director of information, US Air Force,

to Gen George S. Brown, chief of staff, US Air Force, letter, subject: PME

Courses, 10 December 1973.

110 . Lt Gen F. Michael Rogers, commander, AirUniversity, to Gen George

S. Brown, chiefofstaff, US Air Force, letter, subject: PME Courses, 30 January

1974,1.

111 . Lt Gen Raymond B. Furlong, commander, Air University, to Air

University addressees, letter, subject : Improving the Quality of PME

(AWC/ACSC),15 October 1975.

112 . Ibid., 4.

113 . Clements committee, SSC, 5-6. Although the committee was not so

specific with regard to the staff colleges, it did note that ACSC "should take

immediate steps to increase the proportion of its curriculum devoted to air

warfare ." Clements committee, ILSC, 10.

114. Lt Gen Raymond B. Furlong, briefing, Corona West, 6 October 1976,

6.

115 . BOV 34 (1978) : 4.

116. Air University Deputy Chiefof Staff for Education, StaffReview ofthe

Report of Task Study Group Alpha (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, 30

August 1974), 10.

117 . BOV 31 (1975): 12-13.

118 . Katzenbach, 39-40.

119. StaffReview, 20.

120. Ibid., 22-23.

121 . Memorandum, Vice Adm Patrick J. Hannifin, director, Joint Staff, to

the secretary of defense [Harold Brown], subject : Professional Development

Education, 3 April 1978, appendix B, 21.

122. OfficerPME Study, 114-15.

123. BOV 43 (1987): 6.

124. Minutes ofthe Air Force Vice Commanders PME Conference, 14-15

June 1980,14-3.

125 . BOV 37 (1981): 10.

126. BOV 41 (1985): 17; see also Maj Henry L. Lavender, "A Case for

Expanding the United States Air Force Officer Professional Military Education

System through Correspondence Instruction," Research Study (Maxwell AFB,

91
128 . Ibid., 56.

129 . BOV 32 (1976) : 5.

130 . BOV 39 (1983) : 2.

131 . Fairchild letter, 1 .

132 . BOV 32 (1976) : 5.

133. Eccles, 78.

134. BOV 39 (1983) : 11-12.

135. Murray, 13, 16, 18-19.

136. Lightner board, 19.

137. Clements committee, SSC,11-12.

138.1 ightner board, 65.

139. BOV 37 (1981) :4.

140. BOV 27 (1971) : 5.

141. BOV 34 (1978) : 11, 13-14.

142. Vice Commanders PME Conference, 14-3; OfficerPME Study, 80-86.

143. BOV 36 (1980) : 26-27.

144. BOV 42 (1986) : 11, 13.

145 . See, forexample, George N. Dubina,Air University Board ofVisitors:

ABriefAnalyticalHistory,1946-1968, AirUniversity Historical DivisionStudy

Series, no. 28 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, December 1968), 25.

146 . Ibid., 7-12. These pages summarize therecommendations forthe period

19401968.

147 . BOV 3 (January 1948): 23.

148 . Ibid., 27; BOV 6 (1950) : 8-10; BOV9 (1953) : 9.

149 . BOV 10 (1954) :24. The Post-Graduate Study Group included a small

number of exceptional AWC graduates who remained at AU for an additional

two-year tour to conduct doctrinal studies . The group began work on 21 July

1952 under the direction ofDrEugene M. Emme, but-despite encouragement

from the BOV to continue-it disbanded in 1954. The group's functions were

transferred tothe AWC EvaluationStaffand the AWC Studies Group, the latter

primarily responsible forpublishing the best AWC research efforts. See Robert

Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine : A History ofBasic Thinking in the

United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University,

1971),200-201 .

150 . BOV 8 (1952) : 8.

151. BOV 9 (1953): 7; BOV 13 (1957): 5.

152 . BOV 14 (1958) :6.

153 . BOV 13 (1957) :4.

154 . Regarding AWC, see BOV 12 (1956) : 4-5, and BOV 14 (1958) : 4;

regarding ACSS, see BOV 16 (1960) : 6-7.

155 . BOV 15 (1959) : 7; BOV 19 (1963) : 6.

92
on Professional Military Education, 30 August 1963, atch, 2. The attachment is

entitled "Air University Position [on] Report of the Educational Requirements

Board on Professional Military Education." This attachment, too, has a separate

attachment.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid ., l.

161. Ibid., 4-8, 15. The report proposed a two-school system that retained

SOS andcombinedAWCandACSC. Joint service schools wouldprovide senior

education. The report of the task group shows three Air Force PME levels as

part of the proposed "Ultimate Professional Military Education System."

General Miller complained about the original report's proposal of two levels

supported by correspondence courses. At Air Staffbehest, the report added a

third level. Task group report, vol. 1A:12.

162. Miller letter, atch to atch, 4.

163 . Miller letter, atch,15 .

164. Ibid., 3, 8-9,14-15 ; Miller letter, atch to atch, 1-4.

165 . Flourenz Lenin Giannarelli, "An Analysis ofExecutive Development

in the United States Air Force" (Master's thesis, Ohio State University, 1960),

110.

166. Ibid ., 111-13, 115 . Note that Giannarelli's view was not generally

shared by other commentators .

93

y

Education for Air Force Officers

Theory exists . . . to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more

accurately, to guide him in his self-education . . . to provide a thinking

man with a frame of reference for the movements he has been trained to

carry out.

-Carl von Clausewitz

The authors have reserved this final chapter to reflect on the

evidence presented in the preceding chapters. We offer our views

in the spirit of improving the Air Force system of professional

military education for officers.

Professional Military Education and

Its Environment

Since 1946 Air Force PME programs have sought to provide the

education necessary to help produce an officer corps capable of

devising sound, creative solutions to military problems. To some

degree, this effort has succeeded . However, the evidence reviewed

here indicates that much ofthe thinking on classic military subjects

such as strategy and operational art has long since been abdicated

to various civilian institutions .' The paucity of writings from Air

Force authors in these areas suggests that many officers may lack

an appreciation and understanding ofthe art ofwar. Because ofthe

United States' position as the world's predominant economic and

military power, this lapse has been affordable . Until now, we have

relied on superior equipment and technical skill to deter or

95
advantage over its allies, friends, and potential enemies. 2 Modern

world complexities demand that we produce senior military

leadership capable of clearly perceiving the realities of

political-military affairs. This leadership should also be able to

articulate ideas that are both visionary and compellingvisionary

in the sense of being able to anticipate problems and recognize

circumstances, and compelling in the sense ofbeing able to make

people understand the needs ofthe modern military. Presently, Air

Force PME schools insist that their programs develop these

abilities . Certainly, the schools' curricula have moved in the right

direction, especially in recent years. But the episodic nature ofthe

current system, coupled with heavy demands on Air Force people

for currency and competency in specialized duties, limits the

ability and motivation of officers to participate in PME.

Consequently, the development of their professional knowledge

and their judgment of the art of war both suffer.

Professional Military Education's Foundation:

Defining the Officer Corps

PME forAir Force officers shouldnot be an end in itself. Rather,

it should be a means to cultivate the skills and potential of the

officer corps, develop senior leadership, and enhancetheAir Force

contribution to national defense . Thus, what PME aims to do and

how it aims to do it depend on an understanding of the Air Force's

expectations of its officers. Unfortunately, no adequate definition

of the Air Force officer exists, notwithstanding the attempts of

various regulations . Consequently, we have no viable foundation

for devising an effective PME program . Perhaps, writing the

definition of an Air Force officer is unrealistic . Today's complex

world may demand several definitions, each specifying different

levels of education and experience. Ideally, officers begin their

96
proficient in their specialties, but also must gain a deeper and

broader understanding ofhow and why (andwhen) ourinstruments

ofmilitary power are to be employed. This is the province ofPME.

Any definition ofan Air Force officer, therefore, should convey a

sense of both particularity and expansiveness .

In the past, major decisions about PME were not always based

upon a cogent, reasoned assessment of Air Force needs. Should

the Air Force stress education that is broad and comprehensive or

specialized and procedural? Does the Air Force want-or

need-officers who are conversant in broad issues of national

security or those who confine themselves to purely "military" (and

frequently only technical) issues? No crisis has yet demanded

complete answers to these questions . Thoughtful officers and

civilian observers have voiced their ideas and concerns. But there

has been no significant institutional attempt (with the possible

exception of that of the Educational Requirements Board Task

Group of 1962-63) to approach PME systematically and

comprehensively . For the most part, the numerous boards and

studies have succeeded only in asking similar questions-and

making similar recommendations-over and over again.

Despite the absence of workable definitions or a useful

philosophy of education, the Air Force and AU have been able to

formulate general goals for PME: to prepare officers for future

responsibilities by teaching them to think creatively and express

themselves clearly; to lead effectively ; to solve military problems;

to prepare military plans and studies; to develop qualities of

loyalty, integrity, courage, and sacrifice; and to achieve national

goals through an increased understanding ofwar, military forces,

national security, and international relations. These are noble

intentions and are generally representative ofAir Force objectives .

But the operational imperative of maintaining a high state of

combat readiness and the management drive for efficient use of

resources have interfered with their full realization. Consequently,

the Air Force sometimes appears to subordinate the value of a

97
Successes and Failures

PME should help officers become good leaders-and

followers-in a changing politico-economic-military

environment. As professionals, Air Force officers need to

understand the art ofwar and be able to apply what they know. The

most common complaint ofthe last 40 years' worth ofPME studies

addressed the system's failure to produce officers with a deep

understanding of their profession. Inculcating this knowledge

should be a primary task of PME. With it, officers can progress to

higher levels of application, analysis, and synthesis . Without it,

they canmaster factual material but still be poorlyprepared for the

challenges of senior leadership.

Although both AWC and ACSC nominally adhere to stated

goals, the system in practice demands a relatively low level of

intellectual achievement from students. The residentcurricula start

at square one, teaching basic concepts. Although the curricula may

be demanding, students assimilate large amounts of diverse

information rather than develop critical analytical skills . Because

the schools require no common standard of knowledge of their

entering students, the curricula necessarily include much

introductory material. Unfortunately, this approach leaves little

time for in-depth study and the development of higher intellectual

ability. The fact that the program is not particularly challenging

may account for many officers' belief that the chiefvalue ofPME

is to enhance promotability rather than build professional

competence and understanding .

The Air Force has produced a number of skilled, articulate

leaders during its existence as a separate military service. But a

close study ofthe history of Air Force education does not support

the proposition that PME is responsible for this achievement .

Granted, Air Force PME exposes officers to a wide variety of

98
curricula simply do not require officers to think deeply and

critically about issues affecting their profession . PME institutions

have not developed a reputation as hotbeds of new ideas . On the

contrary, critics regard them as defenders of the status quo or

bastions of esoteric theory having little relevance to the "real"

world of military operations . The schools devote scant attention to

the art of war, although, in fairness, we must note that Air

University recognizes this deficiency and is trying to correct it .

Because of the changing national and international

environment, AU must be more responsive to constructive

criticism that addresses several major areas, chief among them the

adequacy of AWC and ACSC faculties. (The SOS faculty is

generally considered adequate to meet that school's goals and

objectives .) Most faculty members have been recent graduates of

the schools-thus they are peers of their students-have little

teaching experience, and serve for only afew years. Consequently,

they are unlikely to have the academic credentials, subject-matter

expertise, or instructional skills necessary to be effective in the

classroom. Civilian universities allow graduate students to teach,

but they do not permit them to dominate the educational process .

As we have seen, critics blame AU's faculty for the schools'

passive educational methods and the neglect of more effective

learning techniques. Although AU has attempted to upgrade its

faculty by employing civilians and retired officers, the Air Force

career system has thus far inhibited significant improvement. The

relatively poor promotion statistics for the AU faculty, although

they certainly aggravate the problem, are symptomatic rather than

causative .

Critics also target AU's procedures for selecting students to

attend the intermediate and senior PME schools in residence .

Selection-ultimately, designation-to attend is based on the

criteria of promotion and nomination boards-that is, on

performance-oriented evaluations ofthe officers' potential to serve

99
require varying levels of knowledge. Thus, AU's curricula

accommodate this diversity with breadth rather than depth.

Because nonresident PME courses are facsimiles of the resident

courses, they do not contribute to building a common foundation

which would permit the resident curricula to begin with more

intellectually demanding studies. Therefore, if the intermediate

and senior schools are to have advanced, graduate-level curricula,

AUmust find a way to ensure that entering students are adequately

prepared for a more rigorous program.

Recommendations

We have said that many officers perceive PME as a means to

promotion rather than a way to enhance professional

competence-witness the high number of officers who formerly

enrolled in nonresident PME courses well before they needed to

and the corresponding surge of course completions prior to

promotion boards. (Recent policy changes no longer allow early

nonresident enrollment.) The perception remains that selection for

intermediate or senior schools is good but that actual attendance

confers no particular benefit. Real changes must go further than

simply makingcurricula more rigorous and relevant. The Air Force

should revamp its policies for officer evaluation, promotion, and

assignment . In short, it must reassess its valuation of PME. But

before such changes can occur, we need to specify the objectives

ofthe PME system as they apply at each level ofan officer's career.

Quality education is not a quick fix; it requires long-term

investment. Thus, three principles apply: First, education should

be open-ended rather than short-term, recurring, and constrained

by resident or nonresident courses (however good they may be).

Second, PME must prepare officers for each phase of their careers

and match their current level of professional development. Third,

100
need to educate all officers to a level consistent with their career

goals, achievements, and abilities .

PME cannot, and should not, compete with the education that

prepares officers for their areas of specialization . PME's mission

and focus are broader . Although Air Force officers should know

their specialty thoroughly, they should also know the basics : the

workings of the several parts of the Air Force, the history of air

power and its contribution to the art ofwar, and the role of the Air

Force and its sister services in providing national military power.

Furthermore, officers should constantly expand their general

knowledge of military strategy, doctrine, and force employment.

They must develop the ability to think critically about these topics .

Further, they should be able to anticipate the problems of their

profession and then solve them. Ideally, PME should develop these

abilities .

We should not think of PME as an arbitrary requirement to be

completed and checked off in our records. True professional

education requires a career-long commitment to learning. In the

past we have measured officers' career potential based upon their

accomplishments. In the future we need to temper this traditional

view by paying more attention to intellectual ability. We should

not wait until officers are obviously destined for eagles or stars

before we prompt them to study the profession of arms. More

importantly, officers should not participate in PME solely in

anticipation ofbeing colonels and generals, and especially not as

ameans ofbeing promoted. Otherreasons are more immediate and

legitimate than those. Throughout their careers, officers can profit

from understanding their profession and from thinking critically .

Rather than instruct officers to become specialists, professional

military education should address the matter of why various

specialties are important.

Thus, the Air Force has a responsibility to make PME just as

important to officers as their areas of specialization . Toward that

101
related instructional modules phased to particular career levels.

Moreover, these modules would be flexible enough to allow

officers to keep working at their Air Force jobs. Even if these

officers never attend a resident school, this baseline knowledge

would not be wasted. It would be useful, indeed essential, in

helping them fulfill their responsibility to understand the

environment in which they presently live and one day may fight .

After basic instruction becomes the province of the nonresident

program, the resident schools could concentrate on refining an

officer's ability to synthesize and articulate ideas. SOS, for

example, would still teachofficership andleadership butalso could

offer an introduction to critical thinking. Because ACSC and AWC

must instruct officers in the application of air power in the modern

world, their curricula should be structured accordingly. However,

the course ofstudy should not neglect the full spectrum ofmilitary

activities, including the essential roles ofnaval and ground forces .

Furthermore, as in SOS, the schools' teaching methods should

challenge and develop their students' ability to think critically .

Finally, the Air Force needs broad, comprehensive education as

well as specialized education . Not every second lieutenant

becomes chief of staff; not every rated officer commands a flying

wing. Each kind of education can produce effective leaders, but

the ultimate aim of professional military education must be to

encourage and nurture those officers who can absorb and master

the art ofwar in its broadest sense. Not everyone has this ambition,

nor should the Air Force expect them to. In the interests ofnational

security, however, the Air Force's future senior leadership must

come from its PME graduates .

102
g

however. Whereas past changes to the PME system have been

minor, the current world situation suggests a need for major

alterations in the way we think of and prepare for warin realms

as seemingly diverse as space operations and low-intensity

conflict. We simply cannot afford the luxury of intellectual

complacency . As General Fairchild said on the day that Air

University opened for business, "This is not a post-war school

system-it is a pre-war school system!" His words are as relevant

now as they were then.

Education is too crucial to be neglected. The Air Force must

rethink its PME system and foster an environment that provides

for career-long educational opportunities. But the Air Force and

Air University cannot and should not do it all . Our baseline

assumption is that as Air Force officers, each ofus must recognize

the intrinsic value of knowing more than just the specialized,

technical task we are assigned. Once we accept the truth of that

injunction, we can legitimately call ourselves military

professionals .

Notes

1. See Richard D. Besley, The Need for Military Officers as Strategic

Thinkers (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University, April 1972), 9-24; and Col

Robert E. Huyser, "Strategy forthe Nuclear Forces ofthe United States," Thesis

no. 2276 (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air War College, April 1963), 11 .

2. See, for example, Commission on Integrated Long-Tenn Strategy,

Discriminate Deterrence: Report ofthe Commission on Integrated Long-Term

Strategy (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, January 1988), 9,

12-18.

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Faculty, 17 June 1977. AU/ED no. 25A164

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Meehan, John T., director of evaluation and research, to Air University director ofplans . Letter.

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114
Thompson, Jack, to the dean of the faculty and the commandant of the Air War College. Letter.

Subject : The Unfulfilled Potential of the Air War College, 4 March 1987. AUCADRF/RI no .

22K.

Todd, Lt Gen Walter E, commander, Air University, to Air Force Combat Command Staff,

Headquarters USAF. Letter. Subject: Sixteenth Report of the Board of Visitors, 20 June 1960 .

Filed with BOV 16 (1960) .

Memoranda

Army War College/Academics (AWCA). Draft Memorandum. Subject: Academic Year 1989

Curriculum Guidance, n .d. AUCADRWno. 22K.

ArmyWar College/SA (AWCSA). Memorandum to distribution . Subject: USAWCStatistical Data

AY 89,2 September 1987. AUCADRE/RIno. 22K.

Chauncey, Maj Gen C. C, deputy chief of Air Staff. Memorandum to Maj Gen David Schlatter,

acting commandant, AAF School. Subject: Directive Regarding Army Air Forces School, 8

November 1945. AUCADR$/RIno. 22K.

Eaker, Lt Gen Ira C, deputy commander, Army Air Forces. Memorandum to Maj Gen Muir S.

Fairchild, commandant, AAF School, 20 December 1945 . AUCADRE/RI no. 22K.

Hannifin, Vice Adm Patrick J, director, Joint Staff. Memorandum to the secretary of defense

[Harold Brown]. Subject Professional Development Education, 3 April 1978. AU/ED no.

25A-173.

Holcombe, Col Bondy H., assistant deputy chief of staff for education, Air University .

Memorandum. Subject AU/CC's Concern Regarding 16-17 December 1974 Minutes of the

AFERB, 19March 1975. AU/EDno. 25A-168(5).

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Memorandum to distribution. Subject : Joint Professional Military Education

Policy Document, 23 March 1984. AUCADRE/RI no. 22K.

Kelly, J. Michael, deputy assistant secretary of the Air Force for manpower, resources, and military

personnel . Memorandumto secretary ofthe Air Force [Verne Orr] . Subject Officer Professional

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Professional Military Education Faculty, 17 October 1984 . AUCADRF4RIno. 22K.

115
Sua, GeGodo,yCoad 

g

Subject: Academic Year 1988-1989 Planning Guidance for the US Army Command and

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AAFR 20-61 . Organization,AAFSchool, 4 January 1946.

. Organization, Air University, 5 April 1946; 3 June 1946; 10 October 1946;

and Supplement 20-61 A, 19 December 1947 .

ACSCR 53-2. Resident Curriculum Development andManagement, 4 May 1987 .

ACSCR53-7. Student Evaluation, 20July 1987.

ACSCR 53-8 . Curriculum Evaluation System, 24 August 1987.

ACSCR 53-9 . Resident Faculty andStaffEvaluation, 22September 1986 .

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AFM 50-62. HandbookforAirForceInstructors, January 1984 .

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1949 ; 8 May 1950 ; 3 August 1951 ; 3 April 1952; 3 December 1952.

116
AFR 30-1 .AirForce Standards, May 1983 .

AFR30-30 . Standards ofConduct, June 1983 .

AFR 35-1 . Military Personnel Classification Policy, May 1986.

AFR35-54 . Rank, Precedence andCommand, September 1981 .

AFR36-10 . Officer Evaluations, October 1982 .

AFR36-19 . AdvancedAcademicDegree (AAD)Management System, March 1983 .

AFR36-20 . OficerAssignments, October 1985 .

AFR36-23 . Officer Career Development, March 1985.

AFR50-5 . USAFFormalSchools, December 1987.

AFR50-8 . Policy andGuidancefor Instructional System Development, August 1984 .

AFR50-11 . Management ofTraining Systems, August 1984 .

AFR50-12 . Extension Course Program, April 1986.

AFR50-31 . MoralLeadership, October 1969.

AFR50-38 . Field Evaluation ofEducation and Training Programs, March 1986.

AFR50-44 . TheMilitary Training Standard System, July 1986.

AFR50-54 . Field Training Detachment Program, February 1976.

AFR 53-1 . Air Force Commissioning Education, November 1987 .

AFR53-7 . USAFProfessional Continuing Education Program (Short Courses), September 1982 .

AFR 53-8. USAF Officer Professional Military Education System, 19 April 1976; 16 December

1980; 24 October 1986.

AFR53-11 . Air Force Institute of Technology, January 1982.

AFR53-26. AirForce Educational Requirements Board, 12 December 1958.

AFR53-27 . USAFOfficer Training School, August 1986 .

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117
AUR2313 

UestyCeteoeospaceocte,eseac,adducato,ac8

AUR 27-5 . Air University Long-Range Planning, 20 August 1986 .

AUR 30-5 . Academic Rank, 9July 1985.

AUR 30-6 . Guest Speakers, 11 August 1986 .

AUR 36-1 . Extended Appointment of Faculty Members, 27January 1986.

AUR 36-2 . Colonel Assignments to Air University and Extensionsfor Colonels, 7 May 1985.

AUR 50-1 . Faculty DevelopmentlEnrichment andEvaluation, 16 December 1985 .

AUR 53-13 . AirUniversity Program Review andEvaluation, 15 June 1987.

AUR 53-14 . ProgramAdvisory Groups, 15 October 1987 .

Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth PAM351-1, Schools, United StatesArmy Command

and General Staff College, 17 November 1986 . AUCADRE/RI no. 22K.

SOSR36-1 . Staff andFaculty Selection andAssignment, 29 May 1987 .

SOSR50-1 . Student Probation, 5June 1987 .

118
(y oces) Coad 

Materiel Command: 4

and Staff Course: 26 Air Service School: 26

AAF(Army Air Forces) Proving Air Staff. 69

Ground Command: 27 AirTactical School (ATS): 3, 26, 52

AAF (Army Air Forces) Tactical AirTraining Command(ATC): 9,22

Course: 26 Air University Ad Hoc Committee

Air Commandand Staff College on Cost Reduction: 69

(ACSC) Air University Board ofCurriculum:

curricula and instruction: 10, 24, 69

35,39,41,58,66-67,73-74, Air University Board ofVisitors

76-77,80,102 (BOV): 3, 7,18-19, 28, 51-57,

faculty: 52-53, 63, 99 59-61,65,74,76,78-82

general: 6, 37, 39-40, 75-76, 79, Air University Objective Plan: 20

82 Air University Regulation 23-16: 79

goals and missions : 35, 38, Air University Review : 20

40-41,98 Air WarCollege (AWC)

Air Command and StaffSchool curricula and instruction: 21, 29,

(ACSS): 3-4,6,26,52 35,37-41,56,66,73-74,77,

Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS): 80,102

26-27 faculty: 10, 53-54, 61, 63, 83, 99

AirForce Educational Requirements general: 3, 26, 28, 37, 52, 58,

Board (AFERB) Task Group: 4-6, 75-76,78-79,82

20,31,58-59,83-84,97 goals and missions: 22, 35-36,

AirForce Institute ofTechnology 98

(AFM: 19,57 Air WarCollege Post-Graduate

AirForce Manual (AFM)53-1, Study Group: 82

USAF Officer Professional Air WarCourse: 26

Military Education System: 6, Alpha Group: 74-75

31-32,34 Anderson, Orvil A. : 28, 52

AirForce Regulation (AFR) 23-3, Army Air Forces (AAF): 3,28

Organization-Air Command and Army Air Forces Regulation

AirForces, Air University : 30 (AAFR) 20-61, Organization,

AirForce Regulation (AIR) 23-52, AAF School: 26,30

Organization and Mission-Field, Army Commandand General Staff

Air University : 30-31, 35 College: 71

Air Force Regulation (AFR) 53-8, Army WarCollege: 28, 66, 72

USAF Ofcer Professional

Military Education System: 6, 26, Bletz, Donald F. : 72

34-35 Boards

Air Institute ofTechnology: 1, 3 Army AirForces: 27

119
Bradley, Omar N. : 22

Brown, George S. : 72 Industrial College of the Armed

Brown, Harold: 75 Forces: 68

Chauncey, C. C. : 27 Joint Chiefs ofStaff(JCS): 23-24,

Clausewitz, Carl von: 95 75

Clements committee: 8, 21-22, 62, Joint Flag Officer Warfighting

67, 74, 79 Course: 10

Clements, William : 8 Jones, David C. : 23, 63

Cold war: 36,40 Jordan, Amos A. : 62

Collins, John M. : 70

Corona West Conference: 74 Katzenbach, Edward: 68, 70,75

Crackel, Theodore J .: 63 Kelly, J. Michael : 39,42

Korean War: 3-4,7

Davis, Franklin M., Jr. : 66

Department of Defense (DOD) Langley Field, Virginia : 26

Reorganization Act: 5-6 Lightner, Lawrence S. : 8

Desert One: 9 Luce, Stephen B. : 71

DOD (Department of Defense)

Committee on Excellence in Mahan, Alfred T. : 71

Education: 8 MAJCOMs (major commands): 23,

Duke University: 22 58-59,67,69

Marshall, George C. : 22

Eaker, Ira C. : 27 Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama:

Eccles, Henry E. : 70, 78 54

Eghn Field, Florida: 27 Maxwell Field, Alabama: 26

McCaughey, John: 71-72

Fairchild, Muir S. : 2-3,18, 28-29, Megaree, Richard: 71

52, 56,60, 78, 83,103 Miller, Trou , Jr. : 83, 84

Furlong, Raymond B.: 38, 63, 73-74 Murray, Williamson: 68,70

Mylander, Maureen: 62,68

Gard, R. G., Jr. : 68

George WashingtonUniversity: 37, National Defense University: 68

66 National War College : 68

Gerow, Leonard T. : 2 Naval War College (NWC): 65,

Giannarelli, F. L.: 84-85 70-71

Ginsburgh, Robert: 72-73 Newman, JohnHenry: 22

120
Orleans, Jacob S. : 4 53,82

Orleans report: 4, 18, 54-57 Squadron Officer School (SOS)

Orr, Verne:10, 39, 64 curricula and instruction: 39,

41-42, 58, 73, 76-77, 80,102

PME Faculty Enhancement study: 10 faculty : 43, 99

Power, Thomas S. : 5 general: 6, 24, 37

Professional Military Comptroller goals and missions: 35, 42-43,

course : 67 81

Professional personnel management Strategic Air Command (SAC): 5, 6,

course : 67 73

Professional Studies Program (PSP):

37-38 Tailored Instruction Program (TIP):

Project Warrior: 9 67

Project X: 43 Tallman, Kenneth L. : 23,38

Taylor, William J., Jr. : 62

Ralph, John E. : 24,42 Turner, Stansfield: 65--66,70-72

Rawlings, E. W. : 4 Tyler, Ralph W. : 4,54

Reportofa Study on Officer PME

Policy : 20,24 US Air Force Academy (USAFA): 4

Richardson, William R. : 22 US Army Training and Doctrine

Richards, Thomas C. : 22,64 Command (I'RADOC): 22

Rogers, F. Michael: 20, 73

Royal Air Force: 75 Vietnam: 23, 41

Schlatter, David M. : 2,18, 29,57 West Point: 64

Smith, DeWitt: 72 Wilson, Donald: 27

121