Assessment of Community Planning for

Mass Transit: Volume 2—Atlanta Case

Study

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-253680
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMEN T

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director

Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Direcfor

URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority

Walter J. Bierwagen

Arnalgamated Transit Union

. Robert A. Burco

Oregon DOT

Jeanne J. Fox

Joinf Center for

Political Studies

Lawrence A. Goldmuntz

Economics and Science Planning

Dorn McGrath

George Washington Llniversiiy

Bernard M. Oliver

Hewlett-Packard Corporaficm

Simon Reich

Gibbs and Hill

Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr.

Princefon Uniuersify

Frederick P. Salvucci

Massachusetts DOT

Stewart F. Taylor

Sanders and Thomas, Inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF

Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager

Mary E. Ames Larry L. Jenney

V. Rodger Digilio Bev Johnson

Thomas E. Hirsch, 111 Teri Miles

CONTRACTORS

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.

.,.

111
PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Atlanta, Georgia

metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by the Office of

Technology Assessment to provide an information base for an overall

assessment of community planning for mass transit.

The findings of the overall study are reported in the summary

document, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit, which forms the

first volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request of

the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of its

Transportation Subcommittee.

The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’s

Transportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by the

OTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owings

and Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for the

study. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible points

of view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.

v
INTRODUCTION

This report assesses how one of nine major

United States metropolitan areas made its decisions

about the development or modernization of rail

transit.

The assessment of the nine cities attempts to

identify the factors that help communities, facing

critical technological choices, make wise decisions

that are consistent with local and national goals for

transit. The study investigates the following issues:

● Are there major barriers to communication

and cooperation among governmental

agencies involved in transit planning and

operating ? Do these barriers interfere with

making sound decisions?

● Do transit decisions reflect the combined

interests of all major , public groups, including citizen organizations, trade unions,

the business community, and others ?

● Does the planning process provide enough

information about the advantages and

disadvantages of alternative courses of

action to provide a solid basis for making

decisions ?

● Does the availability or lack of financing, or

the conditions under which financing has

been provided, unnecessarily limit the

range of options that are considered?

The ultimate purpose of the work has been to

cast light on those prospective changes in national

transit policy and administrative programs which

might improve, in different ways and to different

extents, the way communities plan mass transit

systems. The nine cities were selected to represent

the full range of issues that arise at different stages

in the overall process of planning and developing a

transit system.

San Francisco, for example, has the first regional

rail system built in decades, while Denver is

planning an automated system, and voters in

Seattle have twice said “no” to rail transit funding

proposals.

The assessment of transit planning in each of the

nine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into an

evolving social process. Consequently, the study

results more closely resemble historical analysis

than classical technology assessment.

This study employs a set of evaluation guidelines

to orient the investigation in the nine metropolitan

areas and to provide the basis for comparative

judgments about them. The guidelines were

derived from issues identified during preliminary

visits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federal

requirements for transit planning, and an investigation via the literature into the state-of-theart in the field.

The evaluation guidelines cover major topics

which were investigated during the case assessment process. They deal with the character of the

institutional arrangements and the conduct of the

technical planning process.

GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Some of the most significant influences on

transit planning are exerted by the organizations

responsible for conducting the planning and

making the decisions. Three guidelines were used

to evaluate the institutional arrangements in the

nine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

Agencies responsible for various aspects of

transit decisionmaking should cooperate

effectively in a clearly designated “forum”.

The participants in this forum should have

properly designated decisionmaking

authority, and the public should have

formal channels for holding decisionmakers accountable for their actions.

Citizens should participate in the transit

planning process from its beginning and

should have open lines of communication

with decision makers.

vii
GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The technical planning process provides the

information that public officials and their constituents draw upon in making plans and decisions.

Four guidelines were used to assess the technical

planning process in the nine metropolitan areas:

Broad, explicit goals and objectives should

guide technical planning and decisionmaking.

A range of realistic alternative solutions

should be developed.

The evaluation of these alternatives should

give balanced consideration to a full range

of goals and objectives.

A practical and flexible plan for financing

and implementation should be developed:

During visits to each of the nine metropolitan

areas, the study team interviewed the principal

representative of the transportation planning

institution and other main participants in the local

planning process. The visits were supplemented by

interviews with UMTA officials in Washington.

Pertinent documents-official plans, reports,

studies, and other material—were reviewed in each

case.

The information thus collected was used in

compiling a history of the transit planning process

in each case area, organized around key decisions

such as the decision to study transit, the selection of

a particular transit system, and public ratification

of the decision to pay for and build the system. The

main political, institutional, financial and technical

characteristics affecting the conduct of the planning process were then assessed in light of the

evaluation guidelines.

The same set of guidelines used in assessing each

case metropolitan area was employed in making a

generalized evaluation of the metropolitan experience. The results of the generalized evaluation

are summarized in the report, An Assessment of

Community Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Report,

issued by the Office of Technology Assessment in

February 1976.
CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . . . ● . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Existing Passenger Transportation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Transportation Planning Institutions ...l 000..00 ....0 0 8

CRITICAL HISTORY OF TRANSIT PLANNING AND

DECISIONMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Decision to Study Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Decision to Creates Regional Transit Authority . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Decision to Reject the Rail Rapid Transit

Proposal in 1968 . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . ● . . . 1 6

Decision to Approve the Rapid Rail Transit

Proposal in 1971 ............ . 18

Progress Toward Implementing the Rapid

Transit Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT PLANNING PROCESS . . . 23

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNING AND

DECISIONMAKING PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Technical Planning Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

6’7-377 O - 76 - 2
Summary and Highlights

Artist’s sketch of the MARTA transit vehicle

● The original impetus behind Atlanta’s

rapid transit system came from

downtown-oriented business interests

and forward-looking regional planners.

Planners believed a transit system would

relieve highway congestion and help

shape future growth. Businessmen saw

transit as a way to reinforce Atlanta’s bid

to become the regional center of the

Southeast.

. Thus, from the beginning support for

transit was derived from the desire to

promote Atlanta’s growth. This fact led to

a sophisticated appreciation of the

relationship of transit to land use planning, and to a tradition of cooperation

between transportation and land use

planners.

● Atlanta’s forum for transportation planning, the Atlanta Regional Commission

(ARC), institutionalizes this pattern of

cooperation by bringing regional land use

planning and transportation planning

under a single organizational roof. The

ARC structure allows the responsibilities

of the various agencies to be clearly

delineated while encouraging integration

of land use and transportation planning.

● Atlanta’s transit planning history reflects

little overt rivalry between the region’s

two modal agencies, Metropolitan Atlanta

Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) and the

Georgia Department of Transportation

(GDOT, the highway-planning agency).

However, underlying the appearance of

cooperation has been a tendency for the

two modal agencies to negotiate

decisions out of public view.

• On the other hand, the Metropolitan

Atlanta Transit Overview Committee,

created by the Georgia State Assembly to

monitor MARTA’s activities, brings a

degree of public accountability and

visibility to the Atlanta process.

1
. Although originally transit decisionmaking was dominated by business

interests, MARTA had made significant

improvements in involving citizens in the

planning process by 1971, when the

decisive protransit referendum was held.

Since then, as the plan becomes reality,

more complaints are heard from affected

citizens.

. The quality of the technical work in

Atlanta is generally regarded as having

been excellent for its time. Yet, the

information often came too early or too

late to be optimally useful in guiding

decisionmaking.

● In addition, political considerations influenced the information made available

to the public and decisionmakers. The

only rigorous evaluation of transportation

alternatives in Atlanta concluded that a

predominantly bus transit system would

attract as much patronage as the proposed rail system—and at less cost. In the end

these findings were modified due to the

political inadvisability of serving only part

of the community with rail while offering

less desirable express bus service to other

parts of the region.

. When the transit bond issue was passed in

1971, local supporters were relying on the

Federal Government to finance twothirds of the cost of the entire system.

Since then, the estimated cost of constructing the system has grown from $1.3

billion to over $2 billion while the Federal

share for capital assistance has risen to 80

percent. When UMTA recently pledged

$800 million–10 percent of its total

capital budget—to support the MARTA

system, some transit advocates felt

shortchanged because the sum will buy

only 13.7 miles of rapid transit.
Metropolitan Settingl

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Since 1950 Atlanta has become the major

economic and cultural center in the southeastern

United States. During this period the city has

experienced unprecedented expansion in downtown construction. Atlanta’s ambitious campaign

to become a city of international importance

coupled with its downtown orientation helped

stimulate interest in a rapid rail transit system.

Although the Atlanta metropolitan area is

growing fast, it remains a city with a relatively low

population density (3,775 and 560 persons per

square mile in the center city and suburban ring

respectively—see Figure 2). Most of the population

gain over the past decade has occurred in Atlanta’s

suburban ring. The center city comprised 47.9

percent of the area’s population in 1960; but by

1970 this percentage had dropped to 35.7 percent.

Evidence of dispersal of population centers is

provided by the addition of 10 counties to the

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area after 1970

census data were processed. 2 The increase in the

number of work trips to and within Atlanta’s

suburbs is another indicator of suburbanization

(see Figure 3).

Although the suburbs have grown faster,

Atlanta’s center city has remained stable and in

some ways has gained vigor. Downtown real estate

values grew as middle- and high-rise offices rose on

Peachtree Street. The population of the center city

gained 1.8 percent between 1960 and 1970, and

density also increased. Likewise, the number of

work trips to center city destinations increased

slightly. In comparison, in many other older U.S.

metropolitan areas center city population and

employment dropped during the same period.

I See Figure 1, center fold.

2 The 10 counties added to the AtIan ta SMSA after 19i’o are

Cherokee, Butts, Henry, Forsyth, Fayette, Douglas, Newton,

Rockdale, Paulding, and Walton. The earlier boundaries

included s counties: Fulton, De Kalb, Clayton, Gwinnett, and

Cobb.

EXISTING PASSENGER

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

As in many cities of relatively low density,

Atlanta’s highway network is more fully developed

than its transit system. The circumferential loop,

Interstate 285, is augmented by radial interstate

highways intersecting in Atlanta’s central business

district. Interstate 20 crosses the region east to

west. The northeast to southwest corridor is

served by Interstate 85 and the northwest to

southeast corridor by Interstate 75. The latter two

routes merge to parallel the Peachtree Ridge

through central Atlanta, Citizen action over the

past few years has halted further expansion of the

freeway system, but the existing network is one of

the best developed of any major city on the eastern

seaboard.

Until 1972 Atlanta was served by a private

company, the Atlanta Transit System (ATS).

Principally a bus operation, ATS had a reputation as

one of the best-managed transit companies during

the 1960’s. Trolley coaches ran until 1963.

Patronage held relatively steady during the 1960’s

but took a downward turn at the end of the decade

(see Figure 4). During the same period the

percentage of work trips carried by public transit

fell 20.4 percent, while the portion using

automobiles rose by 84 percent (see Figure 3). By

1971, with ridership at its lowest point ever and

fares at their highest, public takeover was proposed.

In 1971 Atlanta voters authorized a three-point

program of transit improvements. The program

hinged on a pledge of Federal capital assistance for

transferring ATS ownership to the Metropolitan

Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), for

purchasing new buses, and for constructing a rapid

rail system, A short-range package promised new

routes and other service improvements in the bus

transit system. Transit fares were lowered from 40

cents to 15 cents. A long-range 50-mile rapid rail

transit system was augmented by 14 miles of

exclusive busways (see Figure 5). A l-cent hike in

the sales tax was authorized to provide the local

share of support for the program. Final design is

3
LAND AREA (1970)

(square miles)

Center City 131. 5

Suburban Ring 1,597. 5

Entire SMSA 1,728. 0

POPULATION

Suburban Cente r

Ring Cit y

1960 529,733 487,455

197 0 893,74 3 496,42 1

DENSITY

(population/square mile)

Suburban Cente r

Ring Cit y

1960 332 3,707

POPULATION

Percent Change 1960-1970

+68.7%

Suburban Cente r

Ring Cit y

1970 560 3,775

FIGURE 2: ATLANTA METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS

Source : Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974 .

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (o r

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent countie s

or other political divisions tha t

with the central area .

The ten new counties added to the

included in these figures .

4

are economically and socially integrated

Atlanta SMSA since the 1970 census are not
WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION

28%

25%

1960 1970

Center City to Suburban Ring

Suburban Ring to Center City

Beginning and Ending in Suburban Ring

Beginning and Ending in Center City

WORK TRIP MODE

1960 3% 1970

FIGURE 3: ATLANTA SMSA TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS

Suburban Ring

Center City

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent counties

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area.

5
——

VEHICLE MILES OPERATED

(millions of miles )

+16.1 +16.8’+19.4 +24.6

peak Year= 1974 (24.6 million miles)

LOW Year= 1961 (15.9 million miles )

1960 1965 1970 197 4

REVENUE PASSENGERS

(millions of Passengers )

Peak Year= 1974 (56.0 million riders )

Low Year = 1971 (44.4 million riders )

NET OPERATING REVENUE

(millions of dollars )

peak year= 1965 ($818,578)

LOW year= 1974 (-$17,003,983)

+53.4 +51.1 +48.3 +56.o

+0.8 2

1960 1965 1970 197 4

FIGURE 4: ATLANTA TRANSIT OPERATIONS 1960-1974’

Source : Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

IAtlanta Transit System; Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority,

Data not available for 1972 .

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (or

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent countie s

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrated

with the central area .

6
/

/

I i

FIGURE 5 : ATLANTA - ADOPTED RAPID RAIL SYSTEM

\

Source: Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority

;7-371 O - 76 - 3
underway on a portion of the rail system, and ning and programming in the region. i ARC is

formal groundbreaking took place in February essentially a merger of the Atlanta Region

1975. Metropolitan Planning Commission, the

Metropolitan Area Council of Health Agencies, and

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING the Atlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS),

the organization originally created to coordinate

INSTITUTIONS transportation planning in the region.

The transportation planning relationships

TABLE I.—Federal Assistance to Atlanta Transit Programs between the modal agencies (the transit authority

From F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975 MARTA and the Georgia DOT) and ARC are

institutionalized in the Atlanta Region TransportaType of Assistance Federal Share Total Costs tion Planning Program (ARTPP) that was adopted

Capital Grants . . . . . . . . . . . $239,809,000 $621,360,000 in 1971. Under the ARTPP agreement, transportaTechnical Studies . . . . . . . . 9,066,000 14,401,000 tion policymaking is handled by an ARC subcomTOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . $248,875,000 $635,761,000 mittee called Transportation Policy Subcommittee,

Source Urban Mass Transportation Adminlstratlon

The institutional setting for planning rapid

transit in the Atlanta metropolitan region

traditionally has fostered cooperation between

transportation planners and regional comprehensive planners. The relatively close relationship is

reflected in the complex organizational structure

that coordinates transportation planning with

other regional planning functions in Atlanta.

which includes representatives from ARC, MARTA, GDOT, and (since 1971) each jurisdiction

participating in the ARC. Technical issues are

decided by the Technical Coordinating Committee

(TCC), which is made up of the chief technical staff

persons from the participating bodies. The

Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) reports

to the Transportation Policy Subcommittee (TPS).

TPS technically is a subcommittee of ARC’s

Community Development Planning Liaison Committee, which is one of ARC’s three principal

committees. 5

The ARC board theoretically has final review

TABLE 2.—Federally Recognized Agencies over TPS policy decisions. In practice most disDesignation Agency

agreements are arbitrated within TPS itself. ARC’s

staff has been directly involved in overseeing and

A-95 Atlanta Regional Commission

MPO Atlanta Regional Commission

coordinating work the city and MARTA are doing

on environmental impact analysis and station area

impact studies.

Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC)

The Atlanta Regional Commission was created in

1971 by an act of the State legislature. Seven of the

region’s counties currently participate in ARC.

Modeled after the Metropolitan Council in

Minneapolis-St. Paul, ARC is the Federal grant

review agency from the regions and the agency

charged with coordinating all transportaion plan-

~ The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and the

Federal Highway Administration require Governors to

designate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) in each

area to carry out the “continuing, comprehensive transportation

planning process . . . carried out cooperatively. . .“ (the “3-C”

process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and

the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974.

According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published in

September 1974, MPO’S must prepare or endorse (1) a longrange general transportation plan, including a separate plan for

improvements in management of the existing transportation

system; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called the

transportation improvement program (TIP), to implement

portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planning

prospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work

j Circular A-95 of the Offices of Management and Budget programs.

requires one agency in each region to be empowered to review ‘ 5 ARC members are assigned to one of the three “liaison”

all proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region. committees: Health and Social Services Planning Liaison

Circular A-9.5 replaced Circular A-82, which was created to Committee, Governmental Services Liaison Committee, and

implement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Community Development Planning Liaison Committee. Each

Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 3301). committee has staff support.

8
Metropolitan Atlanta

Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA)

The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit

Authority is the principal transit operator in the

region and the body charged with the design,

engineering, and construction of the rapid transit

system. MARTA was created by an act of the

Georgia General Assembly in 1965 to perform a

range of tasks:

The authority shall exist for purposes of

planning, designing, leasing (as lessee),

purchasing, acquiring, holding, owning, constructing, improving, equipping, financing,

maintaining and administering a rapid transit

system within the metropolitan area, and

operating same, or contracting therefor, or

leasing (as lessor) the same for operation by

private parties.

Four counties and the City of Atlanta participate

in MARTA: Fulton, De Kalb, Clayton, and

Gwinnett. Clayton and Gwinnett voted not to take

part in MARTA’s transit development program

authorized in 1971.

City of Atlanta

The City of Atlanta also is a major actor on the

regional scene. Formally, it participates in the

process through its membership on the ARC and

MARTA boards and through the ARTPP process.

The city also has created a special MARTA Liaison

Office to coordinate and expedite city actions on

MARTA plans and construction activities, and its

Department of City Planning is working on Station

Area Impact Studies with ARC, MARTA, and local

community organizations.

Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT)

On the State level, the Georgia Department of

Transportation plays a major role in Atlanta’s

transit planning activities. Formerly called the

State Highway Department, GDOT was involved

heavily in the AATS program before it was

incorporated into ARC. GDOT maintains a special

branch for planning and programing in Atlanta

metropolitan area.

The Georgia Department of Transportation was

established in November 1972. It is governed by the

State Transportation Board. A Mass Transportation and Aeronautics Division was established to

deal with questions of mass transit and gradually is

taking on a more active role.

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit

Overview Committee (MARTOC)

The Georgia General Assembly created the

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Overview

Committee in June 1973. MARTOC oversees the

fiscal operations of both the bus and rapid transit

activities of MARTA. The overview committee,

which was inspired by the example of the Office of

the Legislative Analyst in California, serves as an

ombudsman for the public as well as an instrument

of the General Assembly.

9
Critical History of

Transit Planning and Decisionmaking

The following history covers the decisionmaking

process for Atlanta’s rapid transit system from its

beginnings in post-World War II highway needs

studies to the present day. The discussion is

organized around five major phases of the planning

and decisionmaking process: (1) early interest in

rapid transit, culminating in the decision of the

State legislature to create the Metropolitan Atlanta

Transit Study Commission in 1962; (2) efforts

leading to the establishment in 1965 of a regional

transit planning, construction, and operating

agency; (3) initial transit system planning and the

defeat of the rapid rail proposal in the referendum

of 1968; (4) subsequent replanning and the

approval of the 61-mile rapid rail-busway system in

1971; (5) the period since 1971 of system design,

neighborhood impact study, and financial decisionmaking. The historical narrative is intended to

provide a framework for the discussions that follow

of the institutional structure and technical process.

The history is summarized in a chronological listing

in the following section (see page 23).

DECISION TO STUDY TRANSIT

Early support for rapid rail transit in Atlanta

grew out of a creative alliance between regional

planners and downtown civic and business leaders.

The first official mention of the need for rapid

transit came in a series of regional planning reports

in the 1950’s. The idea caught on with a core group

of businessmen interested in establishing downtown Atlanta as a commercial center of national

and even international importance. They were able

to persuade the State legislature to sponsor the

first full-scale transit planning study in 1962.6

The Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC)7

began to explore the idea of rapid transit in two

reports it prepared in 1950 and 1954. The first,

entitled Up Ahead, was a regional plan that

envisioned a freeway system with a loop around the

city. The second was an update called NOW for

Tomorrow. Although both reports dealt primarily

with freeways, they mentioned the long-range

need for rapid transit.

MPC took another, closer look at the regional

highway network after 1954. In two reports, Access

to Central Atlanta and Crosstown and Bypass Expressways,

MPC analyzed the existing and projected capacity

of the highway network and concluded that

increased highway construction alone would not be

adequate to meet transportation needs. The

reports suggested that rapid transit was needed to

solve the problem and that work to plan a system

should begin immediately.

MPC’S recommendations were not welcomed by

the Georgia State Highway Department. The

highway agency believed highways could be an

adequate solution and therefore disputed the MPC

conclusions. The highway planners also had a stake

in protecting their highway appropriations from

the possibility of encroachment by transit builders.

However, the argument between the highway and

transit factions never developed into a public battle

in Atlanta the way it did in Washington, D. C.,

whose early transit planning occurred during the

same years. The MPC reports instead lay the

groundwork for subsequent steps in the transit

planning process.

The movement behind rapid transit began to

gather momentum in 1960. Three reports were

published in 1960 and 1961 dealing directly with

the subject of rapid transit.

b A particularly valuable source of information about and T The Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) was Atlan -

analysis of the evolution of MARTA and early transit planning ta’s regional planning agency at that time. MPC had a twoin Atlanta is provided by Julian Rodney Johnson’s “MARTA: The county scope. Its successor, the Atlanta Region Metropolitan

Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Authority, a Brief History,” Planning Commission, was created in 1970 and had a fiveHistory Honors Paper, Emory University, Atlanta, 1970. county membership.

1 1
Two of the reports were products of the ne R ich would later become chairman of the MA w

Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commis- - board .

sion (ARMPC). One of them was a general 

discussion called “What You Should Know About 

Rapid Transit” (September 1960). The other report 

was an element of the first Atlanta area regional 

comprehensive plan. . This second report, Atlanta 

Region comprehensive Plan: Rapid Transit, was issued in 

June 1961. It called for 60 miles of high-speed rapid 

rail transit serving five counties at a roughly 

estimated cost of between $200 million and $215 

million .

The central assumptions in the ARMPC plan 

illustrate the close connection the planners drew 

between the regional pattern of land use and rapid 

transit. Transit was viewed as a means for shaping 

and planning the future of the region. It would 

foster the vitality of the central business district 

and Atlanta’s continued health as a regional center 

in the southeast.

The third report during this period preceded 

publication of the other two and was more effective 

in spearheading the civic campaign for rapid transit. 

This document was called Rapid Atlanta. It was 

published not by a public agency but by Atlanta 

Transit System the city’s privately owned bus ,

company. Prepared by Simpson and Curtin, an 

engineering consultant firm from Philadelphia, 

Rapid Byways proposed a $59 million first phase of a 

rapid transit system. Theproposal called for 16 .

miles of rapid rail using existing rail rights-of-way 

and a downtown conveyor-type, second-level 

distribution system. The recommendations strongly influenced the Planning Commission’s 1961 

proposal .

The effectiveness of Rapid Atlanta was due in large 

part to its roots in the business community. With 

the publication of Rapid Atlanta in 1960, Atlanta’s 

core of civic-minded businessmen took the lead in 

organizing support for rapid transit. The individual 

behind the Rapid Atlanta plan was Robert Somerville, president of the Atlanta Transit System. 

Somerville was also a member of the Atlanta 

Chamber of Commerce. In early 1961 the new 

The Chamber worked in close coordination w

the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning C

mission (ARMPC). ARMPC sent speakers to l

civi c organization and busines s group s s

throughout the region during 1961. A frequ

speaker was Glenn Bennett, who had been na

executive director of the newly reorganiz e

Commission in 1960. Bennett was a tireless

influential supporter of the transit idea and h

important posts on all the pre-MARTA organ i

bodies. The real action, however, occurred outs

the politically and financially weak regional

ning agency.

Two events heralded the evolution of politi

support for rapid transit in 1961. 1n July, At

Mayor Willia Hartsfield appointed a four m -

member aldermanic steering committee to gu

rapid transit policy. This committee formed

nucleus of a group of committees from the vari

jurisdictions in the region which, with ARM

began to lobby members of the Georgia Ge n

Assembly to look favorably on rapid transit.

efforts solidified in November 1961 when Go

nor Ernest Vandiver held a regional conferenc e

civic and elected leaders.

The conference participants resolved to estab

a regional Rapid Transit Steering Commi t

comprised of the chairmen of the five cou n

commissions, the Mayor of Atlanta, and Atl

aldermanic steering committee. The explicit p

pose of the organization was to promote t

enactment of mutually acceptable legislation in

1962 session of the Georgia General Assem b

The lobbying bore fruit in March 1962 when

legislature created the Metropolitan Atlanta T

sit Study Commission to begin full-scale tech

planning for a transit system. Actually, this

represented a compromise from the goal of t

Chamber to see legislation authorizing a reg

transit authori ty approved in 1962. The fa c

behind this development are discussed in the n

section .

president of the Chamber of Commerce, Ivan 

Allen, named a rapid transit steering committee to DECISION TO CREATE A 

begin pushing for transit. The committee was REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITY

headed by Richard Rich, a former Chamber 

president, and its membership included Robert Seeking legislative approval for a regional tr

Somerville. Allen himself would continue his role agency was a logical first step for Atlanta’s tr

in transit promotion as Mayor of Atlanta, a post he 

held from early 1962 through the end of the decade. 8 Johnson, op. cit.

12
advocates. Under the Georgia State Constitution, a

constitutional amendment was necessary before a

regional transit agency could be established. The

transit supporters wanted to take a legislatively

ratified blueprint for a transit agency to the polls so

the region could pursue transit planning immediately. Although planning did begin on

schedule in 1962, the 3-year delay in putting

MARTA together meant no action could be taken

to implement the first plan. By the time MARTA

came into being in 1966, the technical planning

essentially had to begin over again.

Before they could unite behind a transit agency

plan in late 1961 and early 1962, the members of the

Rapid Transit Steering Committee had to resolve

the touchy question of representation—how

should the positions on the agency’s board be

divided among the participating local governments.

Atlanta, particularly lame-duck Mayor Hartsfield,

wanted more control than the outlying counties

were willing to part with. The referendum

language that finally passed the General Assembly

and went to the polls in November 1962 did not

specify the composition of the agency. It merely laid

out in general terms the nature of the powers—

taxing, eminent domain, expenditure of public

funds and the like—that the State would be

permitted to delegate to a lesser jurisdiction for the

purpose of transit planning and implementation.

In spite of attempts to solidfy support for the

enabling amendment, the measure met defeat at

the polls. The referendum was put to the statewide

electorate. Most analysts agree the issue failed to

win the support of rural voters who mistakenly

thought they were committing themselves to pay

for a transit system for Atlanta. Opposition was

voiced also by the trucking industry in defense of

highway funds. The timing of the referendum also

was an issue. State constitutional amendments

could be placed before the electorate only every 2

years. Transit promoters thought a delay until

1964 would be undesirable. Furthermore, they

wanted to make certain Atlanta would be qualified

to receive the new Federal capital assistance for

transit improvements that was being debated in the

U.S. Congress in 1962. As it turned out, the UMTA

bill did not pass Congress that year.

After the referendum defeat, the transit supporters in Atlanta immediately began preparing for

1964, when the transit enabling amendment next

would be eligible for the ballot. Within weeks of the

referendum vote the Metropolitan Atlanta Transit

Study Commission resolved to form the organization that came to be known as the Rapid Transit

Committee of 100. The Committee’s members and

its 12-person executive committee were appointed

from the public by city and county executives. It

was conceived as a strategy for financing and

publicizing the rapid transit campaign. A full-time

public relations staff was hired and a consultant

engaged to advise it. Local governments agreed to

finance the actual referendum campaign. The

committee’s executive body included ex-Governor

Vandiver as chairman and Planning Commission

director Glenn Bennett as secretary. Atlanta

Transit System president Robert Somerville also

was a member. In the secretarial post Glenn

Bennett helped coordinate the civic campaign for

transit with the efforts of his regional planning

council. The role was familiar to him. Bennett had

served as secretary to the Metropolitan Atlanta

Transit Study Commission, and he would perform

the same function for MARTA in 1966.

In March 1963 the Metropolitan Atlanta Transit

Study Commission was dissolved. Soon afterward

a second group was created by the legislature called

the Georgia State Study Commission. Its IIperson membership included eight State senators

and three citizens, among whom were Atlanta

Mayor Ivan Allen and ex-Governor Vandiver. The

Study Commission reviewed and approved its

predecessor’s transit plan. It also helped the

Chamber of Commerce and the other Atlanta

transit supporters convince the entire Georgia

delegation to the U.S. Congress to support the

UMTA legislation, which finally was enacted in

1964.

The extensive campaigning by regional and local

groups led to approval of the second transit

enabling referendum in the fall of 1964. Arguments

in favor of the measure cited the need to qualify for

the limited Federal funds that the new UMTA act

would make available and the opportunity for each

jurisdiction to withdraw before a transit program

would be implemented. Instead of being presented

as a statewide issue as in 1962, the proposition

appeared on the ballots of only five metropolitan

Atlanta counties in 1964. Approval from each

county was necessary. It came, but barely. The

margin was a slim 403 votes in Cobb County.

The passage of the referendum set the stage in

the General Assembly for legislation to create a

regional transit authority. As in 1962, the major

issues were representation on the governing board

13
——

1

..”.” .”...”.

. .. . . . .

.#”. . . . . .

. . .. . . . .

. .. . . . . .. . . . .

. . . . . .

\
l-l20

-1-i m2

..4

15
and the powers local jursidictions would be willing

to give up to the new agency of government. A

compromise was reached in which the City of

Atlanta relinquished some control on the board but

could remain the dominating presence. The agency

could sell bonds and operate a transit system but

had neither taxing authority nor the power of

eminent domain. Under these terms the Assembly

approved the MARTA bill in March 1966.

Another referendum was required for counties

to ratify participation in the new agency. The

Committee of 100 was reconstituted to help the

Planning Commission and the Chamber of Commerce with promotion. Voters were reassured that

joining MARTA would not entail a long-term

financial obligation. The MARTA charter required

counties to hold public referenda before they could

levy a tax to support a MARTA project. Four

counties — De Kalb, Fulton, Clayton and

Gwinnett–voted to participate in MARTA. Cobb

County was the only jurisdiction to bow out.

The reasons for Cobb county’s negative vote in

this referendum, as in its 1964 predecessor,

foreshadowed some of the objections that would

defeat the proposed rapid rail system in 1968.

Recent migrants to Cobb County from the city

feared that rapid transit would hasten the movement of city blacks into the suburbs. The rural

populace expressed a general unwillingness to

contribute to a system they felt would not benefit

them directly. In addition, there was an ideological

conservative objection to what was judged to be

excessive governmental spending. g

To summarize, three characteristics of the

campaign to create MARTA help illuminate

subsequent aspects of the transit planning process

in Atlanta. First, the need for Federal aid was

always in view. The availability of Federal financing

is still an issue today. Second, the same nucleus of

civic and political leaders shepherded the MARTA

proposition from beginning to end. Their support

continued to be an important factor in Atlanta’s

transit planning. Finally, the opposition to MARTA

voiced during the mid-60’s hinted at problems the

transit plan would encounter at the polls in 1968.

DECISION TO REJECT THE RAIL

Rapid Transi t

After MARTA

turn its attention

q Johnson, op. cit.

16

was

once

Proposal in 196 8

established, Atlanta could

more to technical planning.

In short order the consultants updated the 1962

plan and adopted a 40-mile system to present at the

polls in 1968. However, adverse study findings in

addition to shortcomings in MARTA’s campaign

led to defeat of the MARTA proposal. This section

details the events leading up to that defeat.10

The first task MARTA faced after it was

established was a review of the plan developed in

1962 for the Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study

Commission. The Commission had hired the firm

of Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade and Douglas

(PBQD) on the basis of its work for the New York

subway system and, in San Francisco, for BART.

PBQD prepared a detailed engineering study

proposing a 66-mile five-county rapid rail system

projected to cost $292 million, The Stanford

Research Institute, also involved in BART planning, followed this study with an implementation

strategy.

In 1967 MARTA, working as before through the

staff of the Planning Commission, hired Parsons,

. Brinkerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel to update the 1962

study in light of the Planning Commission’s new

population and employment forecasts. The PB-T-B

consortium had first joined forces as the principal

engineering consultants for BART; their work for

MARTA was supported by a financial analysis

prepared by Hammer, Greene, Siler, Inc., Few

significant changes were made in the alinement and

extent of the 1962 transit plan. The most important

difference between the 1962 and 1967 proposals

was cost. The 1967 report proposed a 54-mile fourcounty system, 12 miles shorter than its

predecessor but some $190 million more expensive.

The addition of an Ii-mile segment in Cobb

County (which was beyond MARTA’s jurisdiction)

would have raised the total to over half a billion

dollars.

Conservative fears about the cost of the transit

proposal were behind a report called Rapid Busways

that challenged the ARMPC/MARTA plan. The

report was commissioned by Robert Somerville

of Atlanta Transit System (ATS) and prepared by

Simpson & Curtin, the same consultants who

developed the ATS 1960 plan, Rapid Atlanta. Rapid

Busways called for a 32-mile network of exclusive

busways, at a projected cost of $52 million, as an

“interim” approach to Atlanta’s transit needs.

10 For a detai]ed analysis of these events and the 1’%8 bond

vote, see Transportation Politics in Atlanta: The Mass Transit Bond

Re/ermdutn O( 1968, Matthew Coogan et. al., Cambridge, Mass.

1970.
——

Busways were to be built on existing railroad

rights-of-way in a number of MARTA corridors.

Although the report did project that the busways

could be converted to rapid rail, it built a case for

busways as a permanent solution. Some observers

speculate that ATS was guarding its own interests

in two ways: by asserting the superior service

characteristics of busways versus a predominantly

rail system, and by arguing for action that would

increase its assets in preparation for the inevitable

takeover of the private bus company by MARTA.

Regardless of the motives behind the report Rapid

Busways initiated a substantial controversy. MARTA rejected its conclusions after a hasty 3-week

review. 1n December 1967 a faction of the Board of

Aldermen led by conservative Everett Millikin

called for a comparative study to lay the issue to

rest. Soon afterward, the policy committee of the

Atlanta Area Transportation Study, made up of the

Georgia State Highway Department, the Atlanta

Region Metropolitan Planning Agency, and MARTA, decided to study busways in the context of

preparing a balanced, long-range transportation

plan for the region.

Pressure from the Urban Mass Transportation

Administration (UMTA) was another factor contributing to the decision to begin the multimodal

review. One of UMTA’S guidelines for capital grant

applicants required transit proposals to be part of

long-range, areawide transportation planning

covering both transit and highways. The Atlanta

Area Transportation Study (AATS) theoretically

was responsible for highway-transit coordination,

but in fact AATS dealt primarily with highways

while MARTA focused exclusively on transit.

To meet the UMTA requirement and to resolve

the busway-rail controversy, the AATS policy

committee hired Alan M. Voorhees & Associates in

February 1968. The Voorhees recommendations

were not ready in time for the 1968 referendum,

although a preliminary report stated that the

annual costs of a rapid rail system and a busways

system were not much different. The incomplete

status of the Voorhees study was a major plank in

the campaign by MARTA critics to defeat the 1968

transit proposal in the referendum.

In the meantime MARTA had published another

study, a major analysis of the effects on Iand use of

the creation of a rapid transit system. This study,

called The impact of Rapid Transit on Metropolitan Atlanta,

analyzed the system’s effects on community

facilities, the low-income population, displacement

of families and businesses, and the existing

metropolitan circulation system. The report, the

first UMTA-sponsored study of its type, was

prepared by Eric Hill Associates of Atlanta and

Winston-Salem, N. C., and was released in March

1968.

The transit impact report listed ways MARTA

could use its power to bring about a major

improvement in the environment of Atlanta. It

recommended undertaking a broad analysis of the

system’s benefits, the preparation of development

plans for each of the stations, and close coordination of the rapid transit system planning with the

city’s urban renewal program. The report also

suggested extending the system to serve lowincome neighborhoods. The impact study laid the

groundwork for the station area development

impact studies and plans that began after 1971.

As work progressed on the impact study and the

Voorhees transportation study, MARTA took

steps toward selecting a system to bring to public

referendum. After the Atlant a Region

Metropolitan Planning Commission transmitted

the 1967 64-mile system to MARTA, the transit

agency chose a 44-mile portion for preliminary

engineering. Subsequently, in light of public

hearings, the plan was modified and a 40.3-mile

system adopted.

The report outlining this 40-mile system was not

published until September 1968. At that time, the

decision on whether or not to go to the polls was

further complicated by a last-minute revision of the

financing plan, adjusting cost estimates upward

according to a more conservative inflation estimate. This revision combined with disagreements

between Atlanta and suburban jurisdictions over

apportionment of the costs to delay the formal

decision to take the transit proposal to the voters

until the beginning of October—little more than a

month before election day.

The defeat of the MARTA bond issue by a

narrow margin in 1968 involved complex reactions

of different political groups. One important

element was the decision by local transit unions and

labor leaders in general to campaign against

MARTA’s proposal because it did not cite collective

bargaining provisions included in Federal law. In

addition, there were other political problems with

other groups. Conservatives called the plan fiscally

irresponsible. Opposition to the use of the property

tax was strong among lower-income as well as

17
suburban homeowners. Voters in outlying jurisdictions felt that the City of Atlanta would get the

lion’s share of the benefits from the system.

Atlanta’s black community complained it had not

been involved in the planning and would not

receive adequate service. Some analysts also argue

that local officials from the metropolitan area were

not adequately involved and that the publicity

campaign for transit was handled poorly.

The fragmentation of support in City Hall and

the Chamber of Commerce had been perhaps the

most telling harbinger of the defeat to come.

Robert Sommerfield had been solidly behind

Atlanta’s transit plans prior to commissioning Rapid

Busways. The dispute created by this report, and the

unfinished status of the Voorhees study that was

designed to resolve that dispute, raised doubts

among some public officials who had once been

strong supporters. Alderman Everett Millikin was a

member of the early Rapid Transit Steering

Committee, but he vigorously opposed the transit

proposal in 1968 and financed an advertising

campaign against it. 11 Perhaps the most critical loss

was Ivan Allen, Atlanta’s mayor and one of the

initiators of rapid transit planning in Atlanta. Allen

did not directly oppose the referendum proposition,

but his campaigning was unenthusiastic.

MARTA had fared poorly in the General

Assembly during this same period. A bill containing

a number of amendments to the MARTA Act was

tabled in 1967 on the strength of opposition from

Fulton County and Atlanta delegates. This “omnibus bill” would have granted to MARTA the

power of eminent domain and a range of additional

advantages. The bill’s foes argued chiefly that

MARTA had not included local governments in

drafting the proposals.

In trying to rectify this shortcoming in 1968,

MARTA found it could not gain Alderman

Millikin’s support for the omnibus legislation until

the eminent domain clause had been withdrawn.

Negotiation proved futile; in the end Governor

Lester Maddox vetoed the bill on the grounds that

it was fiscally irresponsible.

The fact that there was a debate at all in the

General Assembly was more important than the

arguments that were raised. The publicity helped

reinforce the doubts that were already being heard

I I Mil]lkin was a retired oil company executive, and critics

alleged his anti MARTA campaign was financed by oil money.

closer to home and, indirectly, contributed to the

defeat of the MARTA proposals in referendum.

DECISION TO APPROVE THE

RAPID RAIL TRANSIT PROPOSAL

IN 1971

Between 1968 and 1971 MARTA applied some of

the lessons of the first referendum failure.

Changes in the planning process and the transit

program combined with changes in the political

context in Atlanta to lead to victory when the

transit issue was returned for a new referendum

vote in November 1971.

In an important step, MARTA enlisted the

support of labor by amending the MARTA

legislation with collective bargaining provisions. In

addition, Atlanta’s Mayor Massell appointed the

chairman of the central labor council to be vice

chairman of the MARTA board. The conciliations

to labor were an important factor in the success of

the transit proposal in the 1971 election.

Another significant factor was the strong

campaign MARTA mounted to draw both blacks

and public officials into the planning process after

1968. A third black was appointed to MARTA’s

board in 1971, when the replanning program began

in earnest. The black representation on the

MARTA Citizen Advisory Council also was

increased. MARTA conducted special meetings for

officials from participating governments. A series

of public meetings and hearings also were held to

determine community needs and expectations.

Some observers have argued that the involvement

of citizens and local officials was more cosmetic

than substantive, although the meetings did lead to

modifications in the proposed system. The new

approach achieved MARTA’s goal—it helped swing

black communities and suburban officials to

support of the rapid rail proposal.

MARTA also agreed to improve transit service to

black neighborhoods. The Voorhees study for the

Atlanta Area Transportation Study concluded that

service should be provided to Model Cities housing

at Perry Homes via the Proctor Creek spur off the

west line. (The Proctor Creek route had first been

officially proposed by the impact study in 1968. )

The Voorhees cost analysis showed that express

bus in the east-west and Proctor Creek corridors

would provide equivalent service at a total price

somewhat less than rapid rail. However, bus

18
service was widely regarded by the public to be

second rate. In the face of charges that it would be

providing second-class service for second-class

citizens—the blacks and poor—MARTA made a

political decision to go to rail in the east-west

corridor.l2 PB-T-B’s preliminary engineering

studies showed that express bus costs would match

rail if greater right-of-way and construction

standards were assumed. This language was

incorporated in the final Voorhees report published

‘ in January 1971.

The best selling points in the transit package

presented to voters in 1971 were not the rapid rail

proposals. The plan called for short-range bus

service improvements in addition to the long-range

rapid rail scheme. Instead of the unpopular

property tax, a sales tax was to be used for

financing the local contribution toward the cost of

implementing the plan. One of the key provisions

in these efforts to get black support for the system

despite the regressive character of the sales tax

was to peg the fares of the bus system at 15 cents

for 7 years. 13

The 15-cent fare illustrates better than any other

part of MARTA’s 1971 transit package the

changing balance of power within Atlanta’s

political community. The election of 1969 installed

the first mayor in decades who was not part of

Atlanta’s business-oriented power structure. Sam

Massell, the new mayor, was Jewish, and his vicemayor, Maynard Jackson, was a black. Masse{l’s

predecessor, Ivan Allen, had been an important

figure in the transit effort since his days as

chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and his

subsequent election to mayor in 1961. As a

businessman, Allen had strengthened the base of

support for transit by building ties with the

business leaders. At the same time, his position

among the power elite was reflected in a transit

program that alienated the blacks and inner city

Atlantans. The new liberal leadership in 1971

backed a transit improvement program tailored to

benefit lower-income communities as well as

suburban commuters and shoppers, who were the

main concerns of the businessmen. As a result, a

new list of community organizations joined the

I z The prator “Street line remained a busway proposal until

after the 1968 referendum, when public pressure succeeded in

convincing MARTA to change to rail.

13 Theplan permitted fares to be raised 5 cents per year to a

X)-cent maximum after 7 years. In 1981 the sales tax would drop

to % cent, and fares would be set at a rate that would cover half

of the operating expenses.

traditional civic groups—the Chamber of Commerce, Central Atlanta Progress, and other

business/civic organizations—in support of a rapid

rail system for Atlanta.

The plan MARTA sent to the polls in November

1971 showed 56.2 miles of rapid rail routes in four

counties and 14,4 miles of dual lane busway. Voters

in Clayton and Gwinnett counties defeated the

proposition soundly. They may have been reacting

to the fact that only 9 miles of the rapid rail transit

would have served these two suburban counties.

Affluent De Kalb County voted in favor. In Fulton

County a recount showed the margin of approval to

be a bare 400 votes.l4 It was a narrowly won

victory. Had either Fulton or De Kalb county

turned the proposition down, the rail transit plan

would have been doomed.

The 1971 vote of support represented a triumph

for Atlanta city interests. In fact, the way the

ballots were tabulated favored the city vote. In 1968

the returns from Fulton and De Kalb counties were

counted in three groups: residents of the city

proper, residents of Fulton County outside the city,

and residents of De Kalb County outside the city. In

1971 the tabulation followed county lines only, and

the city vote was counted in the totals for Fulton

and De Kalb counties. This accounting allowed yes

votes from Atlanta proper, most of which is in

Fulton County, to be tabulated against no votes

from the suburban part of Fulton County. As it

turned out, the change in the tabulation procedure

may have been the key to the transit victory.

Residents of the older parts of Fulton County

outside the center city opposed the issue, while the

strongest support came from the city itself.l5

14 Results of the 1971 transit referendum in Atlanta (prior to

the Fulton County recount, which narrowed the margin of

victory to 400 votes):

Percent

County Yes No Yes

Fulton . . . . . . . . . . 55,736 53,725 51

De Kalb . . . . . . . . 39,441 36,100 52

Clayton . . . . . . . . . 3,300 11,147 23

Gwinnett . . . . . . . 2,500 9,506 21

Source: Malcolm Getz, The Incidence of Urban Transit in Atlanta,

UMTA-sponsored urban transportation and urban affairs

project, Atlanta University School of Business Administration,

1973.

I5 Ibid., p. 32.

19
PROGRESS

TOWARD IMPLEMENTING

THE RAPID TRANSIT PLAN

After citizens voted approval in the 1971

referendum, MARTA turned its attention to

readying the transit system for construction. In the

course of this period of final design, MARTA has

experienced a variety of problems, most of which

are related to finances and to acceptance of the

system plans at the neighborhood level.

Many of the issues have been addressed by the

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Overview

Committee (MARTOC). MARTOC was created by

the Georgia General Assembly in June 1973 to

monitor MARTA’s fiscal activities. The joint

legislative committee has sponsored legislation

considered to be in MARTA’s interest and thus is

an active participant in MARTA matters as well as a

relatively objective observer.

The most critical issue facing MARTA involved

obtaining the Federal share for construction of the

rail transit system. Since the referendum, the

construction cost has risen from $1.3 billion to over

$2 billion as a result of delays and costly additions to

the system made since the 1971 vote. The expected

figure for Federal assistance has risen with the rise

in the estimated cost and as the ceiling on the

Federal share went from 66-2/3 percent to 80

percent.

As of now, Atlanta has received $2OO million

from UMTA and in May 1975 was promised an

additional $600 million. Although this represents

over 10 percent of the total UMTA budget for

capital assistance, it is considerably less than the

full Federal support Atlanta has counted on since

the earliest days of planning, an assumption based

on alleged promises from John Volpe while he was

Secretary of Transportation. Therefore, many

Atlantans have been surprised and distressed at the

$800 million ceiling UMTA has now set; this is

enough money to build only 13.7 miles of the

proposed 54-mile system approved in referendum

in 1971 (assuming an 80 percent Federal-local share

ratio). An additional disappointment came on the

heels of UMTA’S first announcement when the

Federal agency turned down MARTA’s request for

an extra $200 million to add 4.7 miles to the 13,7-

mile segment.

Publicly MARTA has welcomed the smaller level

of Federal aid, saying that half a loaf is better than

none (13.7 miles is slightly more than half the

length of the 26-mile system MARTA previously

had identified as a core system). MARTA figures

that 10 percent of the total UMTA assistance to

U.S. cities is a fairly hefty share, even if it will buy

only 13.7 miles of rapid transit. However, reaction

in Atlanta has been strong. One publisher whose

papers strongly supported MARTA in the 1971

referendum said, “I am just discouraged by the

slowness and the increased cost. I think a referendum on MARTA today would fail 2 to 1. I feel guilty

because [my newspapers] supported MARTA. We

would still support it, but we would not take the

leading position we did.”l6

MARTA’s financial woes are compounded by the

weakness of its local financing. The revenues from

the 1 percent sales tax in the last fiscal year rose less

than 1 percent, whereas MARTA had budgeted for

a 10 percent increase. And MARTA has hinted that

it might be forced to raise the 15-cent bus fare.

MARTA’s general manager Alan Kiepper said, “If

we are faced with a situation where we have to

make a choice between reducing service and raising

the fare, it would seem to me that the only choice

would be to raise the fare. ”17

In the meantime, MARTA has been making

progress toward construction. Land has been

acquired and construction has been scheduled

along much of the east-west corridor between

Hightower and Avondale. The plans have received

a mixed welcome at the neighborhood level. After

the referendum MARTA commissioned an assessment of the environmental impact of the rail transit

system. Following this step MARTA, the Atlanta

Regional Commission (ARC),lS and the City of

Atlanta began to collaborate on a procedure for

making station area development plans. The

station area planning process has been more

successful at some sites than at others. In some

areas citizens have taken MARTA to court to

demand environmental impact reviews where

station plans have been changed since the referendum.

MARTA hopes to have service on the east line of

the rapid rail system by 1979. However, MARTA

still faces severe problems ahead as it tries to match

inelastic Federal funds with spiraling costs. One

current dispute centers around the length of time

‘“ “Atlanta’s Transit Trauma,” Business Week, August 18,1975.

1P [bid+

la In 1971 the Atlanta Regional Commission was created to

replace the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission.

20
—

that transit construction will disrupt traffic on the closed to business. This issue has not been resolved.

main business street, Peachtree Street. MARTA MARTA points out that its proposed method is the

always has planned to use a “cut-and-cover” cheapest available, while some elements of the

method of construction. There has been an uproar, business community predict widespread bankrupthowever, since the business community found that cy of downtown businesses unless an expensive

some sections of Peachtree Street would not be tunneling technique is used instead of cut-andcovered for up to 2-1/22 years, and therefore would be cover construction.

21
Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

1950 Atlanta’s Metropolitan Planning Commission published Up Ahead, a regional

plan that recognized a need for transit in

the long range.

1954 An update of the 1950 Metropolitan

Planning Commission plan called NOW@

Tomorrow noted the need for rapid transit

“within a few years. ”

1959 The Metropolitan Planning Commission

published t wo expressway policy

reports, “Access to Central Atlanta” and

“Crosstown and Bypass Expressway s,”

recommending that transit planning

start immediately.

1960 In August, Atlanta’s private transit

company, the Atlanta Transit System,

released Rapid Ailanta, proposing a $59

million 16-mile rapid transit system on

existing rail rights-of-way. Downtown

distribution would be provided with a

“carveyor” conveyor-type, second-level

system. A self-supporting transit

authority was proposed to build and own

thes system, with Atlanta Transit System

contracted as operations manager.

In September, the Atlanta Region

Metropolitan Planning Commission (a

five-county agency that replaced the

Metropolitan Planning Commission in

1960) issued a discussion report, What

You Should Know About Rapid Transit. Forty

community meetings followed asking

for public input in developing the

forthcoming transit plan, due one year

later.

1961 In June , the Atlant a Region

Metropolitan Planning Commission

published the Atlanta Region Comprehensive

Plan—Rapid Transit, calling for a 60-mile,

32-station, $215 million system. The

plan recommended creation of a regional

transit authority.

A regional conference of civic and

elected leaders hosted b y Georgi a

Governor Ernest Vandiver in November

created a regional Rapid Transit Steering Committee to pursue transitenabling legislation in the Georgia

General Assembly,

1962 In April, the legislature created the

Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study

Commission (MATSC) to undertake a

study program to report the need,

advisability, and economic feasibility of

rapid mass transportation of passengers.

MATSC hired Parsons, Brinckerhoff,

Quade and Douglas to plan.

In November, an amendment to the

State constitution to allow the Georgia

legislature to delegate transit planning

and operating authority to cities and

counties was defeated in a statewide

referendum.

In December, MATSC published its

report, A Plan and Program of Rapid Transit

for the Atlanta Metropolitan Region. T h e

report recommended a 66-mile, fivecount y rail system at a cost of

$292,000,000.

1963 In January, Atlanta’s transit leaders

formed the Rapid Transit Committee of

100 to undertake a full-scale public

relations campaign promoting rapid

transit.

In March, the Georgia legislature

created the Georgia State Study Commission on Rapid Transit to work on

behalf of rapid transit for Atlanta after

the Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study

Commission disbanded.

1964 In November, an amendment to the

State constitution enabling Atlanta to

plan and operate mass transit w a s

approved in referendum. Unlike the

1962 situation when a statewide

referendum was held, in 1964 the issue

was submitted to Atlanta region voters

only.

1965 In March, the Metropolitan Atlanta

Rapid Transit Authority Act passed the

23
1966

1967

1968

Georgia State legislature. The MARTA

Act created a regional authority but gave

no powers of taxation or eminent domain.

In June, local referenda were held to

ratify participation in MARTA. Fulton,

De Kalb, Clayton and Gwinnett Counties voted to participate in MARTA; only

Cobb County elected to stay out.

MARTA, created by Georgia legislature

in March 1965, began operating i n

January.

In May, the Atlanta Transit System

under president Robert Somerville

issued a report recommending a 32-mile

network of exclusive busways to provide

“interim” transit service until completion of rail transit construction. MARTA rejected the proposal after a hasty 3-

week review.

Also that spring the General Assembly

defeated a set of legislative amendments

to the MARTA Act that would have

eased financing of the system.

In September, the Atlanta Region

Metropolitan Planning Commission, on

behalf of MARTA, published an update

of the 1962 rail transit plan called Rapid

Transit for Metropolitan Atlanta. The author

was the consortium Pars ons,

Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel. The plan

recommended a 54-mile, four-county

rail system plus an n-mile future

extension into Cobb County at a total

cost of $421 million.

In January, the newly reconstituted

Policy Committee of the Atlanta Area

Transportation Study hired Alan M.

Voorhees & Associates to develop a

comprehensive, long-range regional

transportation plan. The study was

intended to resolve the busway versus

rail controversy generated by the Rapid

Busways proposal. It was also designed to

comply with UMTA requirements.

In March, the Atlanta Region

Metropolitan Planning Commission

published The Impactvzpacf of Rapid Transit on

Atalnta, The UMTA-sponsored study

analyzed the effects the rapid transit

proposal would have on land use.

In April, an amendment to simplify and

strengthen the MARTA Act passed the

Georgia General Assembly 150 to 51 and

was vetoed by Governor Lester G.

Maddox.

In November, MARTA presented a

40.3-mile, four-county $750 million

transit proposal to Atlanta region

voters, over 55 percent of whom voted

no.

1969 In April, the Voorhees team submitted

its recommendations to the Policy

Committee of the AATS, the organization originally created to coordinate

transportation planning in the region.

The draft plan called for a $475 million

package consisting of 10 miles of rapid

rail, 54 miles of busways, new expressways, and street improvements.

1n May, the AATS Policy Committee

designated the Voorhees report as the

guide for all agencies to use in developing priorities and implementation plans,

and requested MARTA and the State

Highway Department to take the lead in

initiating studies that would enable the

AATS Policy Committee to reach

decisions on priorities, implementation,

and financing.

In August, the MARTA board adopted a

2-year work program that included

further work on the Voorhees report,

refinement of an adopted system in the

same detail as the 1968 plan, a new

financial plan, and a public information

program.

In October, MARTA completed a study

on the possible use of existing railroad

tracks for interim commuter service.

The study found that, while the concept

was technically possible, the many grade

crossings, side-tracks, existing train

schedules, slow speeds, and high

operating costs ruled out any such

interim service.

1970 In January, the AATS Policy Committee

rejected the Voorhees study proposal to

put busways in the east-west corridor.

In October, MARTA formally declared

its intention to acquire the Atlanta

24
1971

Transit System as early as possible

under terms to be mutually negotiated.

In January, the final Voorhees report,

Development and Evaluation of a Recommended

‘Transportation System for the Atalnta Region,

was published. The report said both rail

and bus could provide the needed service

on the east-west line; they would attract

equal ridership; and fixed costs for bus

would equal those for rail if three bus

lanes were built in accordance with

MARTA engineering standards.

In March, Governor Jimmy Carter

signed three transit bills passed by the

General Assembly. One bill amended

the Georgia sales tax law to permit a

local sales and use tax for rapid transit

purposes; a second bill authorized a 1

percent local sales and use tax in

metropolitan Atlanta for rapid transit

purposes; and the third bill modified and

clarified certain provisions in the

original MARTA Act.

In August, MARTA adopted a rapid

transit proposal outlined in the Parsons,

Brinckerhoff-Tudor- Bechtel report

called Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit

Plan published in September. The plan

proposed 56 miles of rapid rail, 14 miles

of busways, and 1,530 route miles of

surface bus operations at a total cost of

$1.3 billion.

In the November referendum, De Kalb

and Fulton county voters authorized a 1-

cent increase in the sales tax to implement the transit plan and to make

improvements in the highway system.

The key selling point was the provision

to reduce bus fares from 40 cents to 15

cents.

1972 1n February, MARTA purchased the

Atlanta Transit System for $12. 8

million.

In March, the City of Atlanta adopted a

set of goals, policies, and development

objectives for MARTA station areas.

In November, MARTA released a draft

Environmental Impact Statement

assessing the transit system. MARTA

claims the EIS process, the first for an

UMTA project, delayed its schedule by 1

year.

1973 In May, the City of Atlanta Planning

Department published the Urban

Framework Concept Plan, which laid forth

the process the city would follow in

station area development planning.

In June, the Georgia General Assembly

created the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid

Transit Overview Committee.

1974 MARTA continued final design on core

portions of the rail system.

1975 Groundbreaking took place in February.

In May, UMTA offered $600 million

contract authority to MARTA for a 6-

year period, pending Congressional

approval in appropriations hearings.

Because this sum (plus $2OO million in

earlier capital grants) will build only 13.7

miles of rapid rail, MARTA requested an

additional $2OO million. In June UMTA

denied the request.

25
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Atlanta has taken important steps toward

creating an effective institutional structure for

regional transportation planning. 19 The tradition

of control by a business elite has given way to a

more responsive approach to government. A

regional planning agency has been given the means

to coordinate all modes of transportation planning

with regional comprehensive planning. Local

jurisdictions are plugged into transportation/land

use planning through studies of the development

impact of future transit stations. A special institution in the legislature allows Atlanta State transit

planning to be monitored from a statewide

perspective. The most important shortcoming in

Atlanta’s institutional arrangement is that the

modal agencies (MARTA and GDOT) negotiate

decisions primarily within the forum of the

transportation subcommittee of the regional

planning agency, out of the public view.

Forum for Decisionmaking

The adequacy of the decisionmaking forum has

improved significantly over the 15-year period of

transit planning in Atlanta. In the beginning,

transit decisionmaking took place outside official

channels because there were none. Since then a

comparatively well-integrated regional forum has

been created. Rivalry between modal agencies has

diminished considerably in recent years. Perhaps

most importantly, transit planning in Atlanta is still

distinguished by the relatively close relationship

between regional comprehensive planning and

transportation planning.

In the early 1960’s Georgia State law forbade any

local or regional public agency to finance transit

studies without an enabling amendment to the

State constitution. (The transit plan produced by

the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning ComAssessment of the Planning and

Decisionmaking Process

19 Frank C. Colcord, Jr, and Steven M. Polan have published a

careful analysis of Atlanta’s institutional arrangements for

transportation planning in Urban Transportation Decisionmaking:

Atlanfa Case Study, U.S. Department of Transportation,

September 1974.

mission was authorized because it was an element

of the regional comprehensive plan. 20) The stage

was thus set in the beginning for private sector

organizations to dominate the planning process.

After local officials, their supporters from

downtown Atlanta civic ”groups, and the Atlanta

Regional Metropolitan Planning Commission

decided to pursue transit seriously, the decisionmaking forum for several years was fragmented

between the State legislature, ARMPC, and the

civic leaders. The Metropolitan Atlanta Transit

Study Commission reported to the legislature but

turned over technical responsibilities to ARMPC. A

number of special organizationszl were created to

bring together the public and private leaders who

were taking an active interest in transit.

The establishment of MARTA was an important

step toward informed regional decisionmaking.

Technical planning functions were still handled by

ARMPC, but MARTA’s board of representatives

from jurisdictions in the region had final say on

policy. The agency could receive and dispense

funds, although it was not empowered with taxing

authority or the right of eminent domain.

MARTA provided a transit decisionmaking

forum, but an effective comprehensive transportation planning institution still was lacking. The

Atlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS) was

created in 1965 to take responsibility for coordinating the transportation planning in the region,

but it concentrated on highway work. Its funds

came from the State Highway Department (SHD).

After MARTA came on the scene, the AATS Policy

Committee was reconstituted to include MARTA

as well as representatives from regional jurisdictions, SHD, and ARMPC. The Policy Committee’s

mission to improve cooperation and coordination

among the organizations responsible for transportation planning, however, was only partially

successful.

zo Atlanta Region Comprehen$lveplan: Rapid Transit, Atlanta Region

Metropolitan Planning Commission, June 1961.

21 Joint Steering Committee, 1961; committee of 100, 1962 .

27
SHD and MARTA continued to make decisions

outside the new forum. For example, in 1968

MARTA decided to test the transit proposal at the

polls before the Policy Committee’s review (the

Voorhees study) of regional transportation planning was complete. ARMPC lacked the, stature to

assume its logical role as arbiter in such matters.

ARMPC was run by appointed businessmen, had

no regional budget, and never attained credibility y as

a power to be reckoned with,

The new regional organization created by the

General Assembly in 1971 was designed to provide

a truly multimodal forum for transportation

policymaking. The Atlanta Regional Commission is

designated the 3-C organization and the A-95

review agency in the region. 22 To date ARC has

functioned fairly well as a comprehensive regional

planning body with responsibility for transportation.

Nevertheless, critics have noted ARC’s shortcomings. First, there is considerable competition

within ARC for the power to make transportation

decisions. The procedure for shaping transportation policy was established in a tripartite (MARTA,

GDOT, ARC) agreement at the time the AATS was

terminated and ARC established. The process,

called the Atlanta Region Transportation Planning

Program (ARTPP), was recently amended to

include Atlanta’s mayor and the commission

chairmen of the seven ARC counties. Its embodiment is the Transportation Policy Subcommittee

(TPS) of ARC. In theory all policy decisions are

made in this subcommittee and subjected to review

by the Community Development Planning Liaison

Committee, one of the three subject area committees to which ARC board members are assigned.23 Members of the transportation subgroup of

the Community Development Planning Citizen

Advisory Council also review TPS recommendations. The ARC Board of Commissioners gives a

final review and is designated to arbitrate when the

recommendations of the subgroups disagree.

In practice the TPS, not ARC, has provided the

forum for most policymaking. Disagreements are

usually worked out in TPS rather than at the ARC

board level. The Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) Action Plan lends legitimacy to this

practice by stating that TPS has ultimate decisionmaking authority.

22 See footnotes 3, 4 p. 8.

23 The others are Health and %cia] Services planning Liaison

Committee and Governmental Services Liaison Committee.

ARC’s board reviews the annual transportation

work program and sets priorities among its

elements. To date MARTA and GDOT have not

strictly followed the priorities ARC had set. One

reason ARC does not dominate may be that it still

has not published its updated regional development

guide. (The plan was due in summer 1975.) The

guide is expected to provide a rationale for priority

ordering and, once priorities are drawn up, a logic

for enforcing them.

Another more important explanation for ARC’s

back-seat role is the tradition of mutual

backscratching that is well established in Atlanta

transportation politics. MARTA usually has supported GDOT’S (and predecessor SDH’S) highway

initiatives, just as the highway organizations have

stood behind transit. No dispute between the two

modal agencies has surfaced as a major public issue,

in spite of internal policy and technical disputes

over the years. ARC usually goes along with both

MARTA and GDOT, and neither of the latter

agencies tends to welcome ARC suggestions for

change when they do come.

In practice, the ARC-ARTPP process has

operated smoothly. The ARC agency is legislatively

mandated, financed by regional levy, and is

generally a more credible institution than its

predecessor. Although modal biases have shown up

in decisionmaking from time to time, the structure

offers the distinct advantage of bringing transportation decisionmaking under the same roof as land

use planning. ARC has taken the lead in development planning around future rail transit stations.

Theoretically, the ARC board will begin measuring

transportation proposals against land use goals as

soon as the regional development guide is completed. The most significant—and potentially

debilitating—limit to ARC’s power to control land

use development is its lack of authority to review

local zoning regulations.

Accountability of Decisionmakers

Over the years the individuals responsible for

transit decisionmaking in Atlanta have become

more directly accountable for their actions. Few of

the early transit decisionmakers in Atlanta officially represented the region’s citizens. The situation

began to change in the 1960’s, and since 1971 the

institutional structure has involved decision makers

whose authority to make decisions on behalf of a

particular group of citizens is comparatively clearly

designated,

28
Nevertheless, two major issues involving accountability are inherent in Atlanta’s institutional

framework for transit decisionmaking. First,

although decision making bodies are structured to

encourage a regional point of view, individuals tend

to represent the narrower political interests of the

constituent jurisdictions. Second, because many

decisions are negotiated in the Transportation

Policy Subcommittee of the ARC, the process tends

to be removed from the public view.

The business and civic leaders who led the drive

for transit during the early 1960’s were not directly

accountable for their decisions. They were acting as

private citizens. The Rapid Transit Steering

Committee, whose members were officials of the

area’s political subdivisions, was the first organization to operate with clearly delegated authority and

a degree of accountability. Members of the

Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study Commission

also bore a clearly described responsibility to the

public by virtue of their appointment by local

officials. Members of the ARMPC board were

appointed businessmen; the ARMPC staff provided

most of that agency’s transit leadership.

Fair representation has been an issue in Atlanta

transit planning since the beginning. Debate most

often has focused on the appropriate composition

of the regional transit authority. MARTA’s ten

board members are appointed by local officials.

Office holders were ruled ineligible in order to

minimize the influence of local politics on decisionmaking. Nevertheless, each member comes from

and is associated with a particular county or the city

of Atlanta. The State legislature, through the

MARTA Overview Committee (MARTOC), is

currently giving consideration to the advantages

and disadvantages of a directly elected board, but

no action is expected to be taken in the near term.

MARTOC is behind a movement to increase the

representation from De Kalb County on MARTA’s

board. At present six board members represent the

city of Atlanta’s interest—the four members

appointed by the Mayor plus the two from Fulton

County. De Kalb County accounts for 40 percent of

MARTA’s sales tax revenues but is represented by

only two board members. Options that have been

suggested for changing the balance include adding

new De Kalb representatives to the board and

replacing the existing delegates from Clayton and

Gwinnett Counties with De Kalb representatives.

Clayton and Gwinnett citizens voted against

financing the MARTA rail system in the 1971

referendum and therefore do not participate in the

transit improvement program; yet they retain

voting representation on the MARTA board. The

State legislature approved a compromise measure

during the 1975 session to add one more De Kalb

representative to the board. The bill was vetoed by

the Governor on a technicality, but MARTOC

expects the issue to arise again in 1976.

MARTOC itself adds a degree of accountability

to the transit planning process in Atlanta. It is a

joint committee of State senators and representatives with a staff. In theory, MARTOC functions

more as a watchdog for the public interest than as a

body of officials directly accountable to Atlanta

citizens. The enabling legislation requires only 4 of

the 14 voting legislators that sit on MARTOC to be

from the area of MARTA jurisdiction. However, all

11 of the appointed committee members~~ were

chosen from among Atlanta area legislators due to

political considerations.

MARTOC has exercised its ombudsman function in several ways. As noted, MARTOC is

concerned with the accountability of the MARTA

board. MARTOC also is monitoring the degree to

which MARTA follows the advice of its consultants

rather than its staff. MARTOC wants to keep the

reins tight on PB-T-B to prevent further cost

overruns and other difficulties. MARTOC’S concern has increased since the turnover in the

MARTA board in November 1974. The old board

tended to follow staff recommendations. The new

board hopes to take a more active role in order to

increase its responsiveness to the public. In early

1975 the board voted to side with PB-T-B against

the MARTA staff on the critical issue of the

automated train control system. The staff

recommended semiautomation that could be

upgraded to full automation when a large enough

portion of the system was on line to justify the

considerable extra cost. PB-T-B, developers of the

control system, argued for full automation from

the beginning. Although the board went on record

in favor of the PB-T-B system, the recent decision

to build a 13.7-mile trunk system instead of 26

miles inspired a change of heart. In June 1975 the

board reversed itself and approved a

semiautomated system for the initial rail segment.

24 The Governor appoints six members, the president of the

senate appoints three, and the speaker of the house appoints two

members; the remaining three members are chairmen of three

committees, The lieutenant governor and the speaker of the

house are ex officio members of MARTOC.

29
The structure of the ARC also gives rise to

important accountability issues. The fact that most

disagreements are worked out in the Transportation Policy Subcommittee of the ARC means that

many important policy decisions take place behind

the scenes. In addition, the fact that all members of

the ARC’s board of commissioners are either

county and city officials or private citizens appointed by the elected officials jeopardizes the

ARC’s goal of offering a regional perspective. For in

practice many of the board members bear allegiance

to the jurisdictions that appoint them rather than

to the regions as a whole. Therefore, to the extent

that the transit policy is shaped in the ARC

Transportation Policy Subcommittee, it is the

product of decisionmakers with local and modeoriented interests.

Public Involvement

The effectiveness of citizen participation has

figured as a prominent issue in Atlanta transit

planning since the preparations for the 1968

referendum. MARTA’s failure to bring the public

into the decisionmaking process except in a

perfunctionary way was cited as a major reason for

the defeat of the transit issue in 1968. Conversely,

much of the credit for the 1971 success was

attributed to MARTA’s vigorous community

relations campaign. Since 1971, however, a number

of citizen groups have been expressing dissatisfaction with aspects of the MARTA program for

public participation.

The dominating role of civic leaders in pre-1970

Atlanta transit planning does not imply involvement of the general public. To the contrary, most of

the protransit interests were businessmen with a

concern for upgrading Atlanta’s business district.

They were not transit consumers. 25

Planners waited until 1968 to initiate a formal

process of citizen involvement. Even then there

was no vehicle for citizen input provided by the

ARMPC. MARTA had begun an informal public

information and education program shortly after

the agency was created in 1966. The approach used

a monthly newsletter, slide shows, and speeches,

25 They were in fact highway consumers. Transit was the key

to strengthening downtown, but transit ranked second place

below highways in the Chamber of Commerce’s list of priority

civic projects in 1960. Antihighway citizen activists have

commented scathingly that the business community seemed to

want transit service for their maids and uncontested new

freeways for their own travel.

but it reached an audience composed mostly of

businessmen, civic leaders, and public figures—not

the general public. MARTA scheduled the formal

public hearings required by its enabling legislation

to occur at the end of the planning process, after

preliminary engineering had been done and the

plans had been presented to local jurisdictions.

Twelve hearings were held in April and May of

1968. Citizen testimony at one of the hearings led

to reconsideration of a route alternative and to an

additional hearing on the segment in question. The

opinions expressed resulted in a number of minor

changes in the proposed system. However, no

major changes, such as were recommended in the

transit impact study, came about as a result of the

hearings. Many blacks in particular were angered

by being solicited for their views at such a late date.

The black community had been expressing

growing dissatisfaction with the transit proposal as

the 1968 election approached. Their complaints

centered on their lack of involvement throughout

the planning process and on the inadequate service

to poor black neighborhoods. Blacks voiced disapproval as early as 1966, when the Summit

Leadership Conference threatened to oppose

MARTA unless service to black communities was

improved. In spring 1968, after the transit impact

study had been published, the Summit Leadership

Conference reiterated its threat of nonsupport.

Other criticisms were aimed at MARTA’s minority

hiring practices and the lack of representation on

MARTA’s board. (There was one black on the

board at the time, a banker.) In October 1968 a

number of black civic organizations, including the

Summit Leadership Conference and the NAACP,

jointed in public opposition to the transit proposal,

arguing that their requests for changes had been

ignored. Their constituencies agreed, and the

MARTA issue was defeated in every precinct that

had a black majority.

By 1971 MARTA had made significant improvements in its approach to public participation.

A total of three blacks sat on the board. A minority

hiring program had added blacks to the MARTA

staff. The 60-person Citizens’ Transportation

Advisory Council mandated by law included 24

blacks, and MARTA staff periodically met with the

council. As the year progressed MARTA began a

wide-reaching community information campaign

that included a great number of public forums and

neighborhood meetings. A black public relations

firm was hired to run the campaign. Overall,

30
MARTA’s more sensitive attitude toward blacks

and the urban poor community in general—

reflected in route and station changes, the shortterm bus program, and the 15-cent fare as well as in

progress within the citizen participation process—

was an important ingredient in MARTA’s success

at the polls in 1971. The need to get support from

this segment of the public is widely cited as the

reason MARTA elected to keep rail service on the

east-west corridor and to extend a link to the Perry

Homes development.

Since 197 1 MARTA’s standing wit h

neighborhood groups has lowered. Citizens who

once gave hearty support to transit raise complaints as detailed plans are made to build in their

neighborhoods. The situation is ironic, since

MARTA appears to have grown increasingly

responsive to local groups as the implementation

process advances.

The Impact Council is one of the organized

citizen groups bringing such charges. The Council,

based at Atlanta University, acts as a citizens’

advocate and referral service on questions of

relocation. The Impact Council has been accused of

being more concerned with confrontation with

MARTA than with resolution of conflicts, but it

acts as a forum for the low-income black community to voice its concerns.

Most of the controversy involves station area

development. ARC has delegated responsibility for

station area planning to local jurisdictions. In some

areas the process has been well received to date, but

it is being challenged in other areas. The Ashby

Street Station on the west line is an example of a

successful planning effort. A local politician with a

grass roots constituency was the catalyst for a

genuinely participatory process there. The drama

that has unfolded around the Decatur Street

Station illustrates a less happy situation. The

Decatur “charrette”26 of approximately 2 years ago

was heralded as a successful application of a

pioneering technique for melding consensus from

the diverse group of individuals concerned with the

fate of the Decatur Station and its neighborhood.

Now the Decatur plan is tied up in three lawsuits

26 T’he ~harrette technique brings people Witti a wide range of

interests together in a marathon session to iron out differences.

Artist’s sketch of MARTA’s Grant Street station

31
centering around the allegations that the city

arranged for the charrette to be held in closed

session and that it did not include residents and

merchants whose homes and businesses will be

taken.

This and other experiences have sullied MARTA’s reputation for encouraging effective citizen

involvement. In addition, Atlanta citizens have

become concerned with the adequacy of the public

liaison at ARC and other forums. ARC established

a Citizen Transportation Advisory Task Force to

channel public comments on transportation issues.

The mechanism proved inadequate. The Task Force

had been comprised of 30 citizens chosen by local

officials. Some were establishment businessmen,

others were neighborhood activists appointed for

their interest in transportation issues; the two

factions could not work well together. They were

constrained by ARC from addressing some

matters. The Task Force has been replaced by three

a d v i so ry councils covering different “

transportation-related subjects. Participants are

appointed on the basis of a demonstrated interest in

the issues to be addressed by each council.

TECHNICAL PLANNING WORK

The quality of the technical planning work in

Atlanta is generally regarded as having been

excellent for its time. Yet more often than not it

came too early or too late to be optimally useful in

guiding decisionmaking. The 1961 ARMP C

planz~—an exception to this generalization—did

help persuade policy makers decide to plan seriously

for transit. The technical study that resulted, 28

however, came 6 years before the decision was

made to implement a transit plan. The referendum

vote in 1968 was held before the Voorhees

alternatives study had reported conclusively

whether rail was best. Ironically, when the

technical and political processes finally coordinated

in 1971, the technical information showed too little

difference between the principal alternatives to be a

persuasive factor in decisionmaking. In part this

ambiguity was created out of political necessity.

Goals and Objectives

Atlanta began planning its transit system before

formal goal-setting had become a conventional step

in planning. Nevertheless, a number of goals were

articulated from the beginning and were drawn

upon to justify decisions if not to make them.

The fundamental goal in Atlanta transit planning

has been the desire to reduce traffic overload on

highways in the region. In addition, Atlanta’s

transit planners have embraced the objectives of

channeling regional growth and enhancing the

center city. The 1961 ARMPC study and its

predecessors in the 1950’s touched on all these

points. By 1971 the summary version of the

officially approved plan cites the same objectives—

and adds explicit mention of the objective of

improving mobility for transit dependents.

Since 1968 both MARTA and AATS have been

able to direct their transportation planning efforts

in light of a set of regional development goals.

ARMPC adopted a list of goals in April 1968. Both

MARTA and AATS have acknowledged their

allegiance to several of these goals:29

● Encouragement of new growth that fits

local and regional plans;

● Conservation of established areas;

● Clustering of new growth to avoid incompatible uses; and

● Encouragement of a balanced transportation system, allowing appropriate levels of

accessibility y.

The AATS/Voorhees study process between 1968

and 1971 was performed in light of a series of

“implicit” objectives, according to the final report. so

The AATS work was partially supported by

MARTA and undertook the most rigorous evaluation of transit proposals in the region. The AATS

objectives were listed as:

• Serving the transit dependent;

• Providing a good highway system to all

parts of the region within constraints of

cost and community cohesion;

27 At/n ?Itfl Rfgjon Comprehension Plan: Rapid Transit, Atlanta Region

Metropolitan P]anning Commission, June 1961. IQ See AATS, Del,p[oprncflt and Evaluation of a Recommmfai

28 A p/fl ?I U?IL/ pro~ratn of Rapid Transit for the Atlanta Metropolitan Transportation System for the Atlanta Region, 197 1; MARTA Draft

l<r~lotl, Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study Commission (Par- Respotlse—Guidelines for Capita/ Granl Se/e(tion, 7972.

sons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas), December 1962. JO AATS, /Jelle/oprnent and Eualualion, OP. cit.

32
● Providing an alternative to the private

automobile in order to reduce congestion

and give access to the CBD; and

● Focusing highway and transit access to

encourage development centers at

transportation “nodes. ”

Neither AATS nor MARTA developed a formal

procedure for using goals to assist in decisionmaking. The choices among alternatives were made

on the basis of which alternative produced greatest

patronage at least total cost rather than on whether

it would achieve particular goals. Indirectly,

however, the goals were incorporated in the

decisionmaking process. Highest patronage would

come from areas designated as growth centers, and

both routes and stations were planned to serve as

many of these centers as feasible.

The twin goals of reducing congestion and

controlling growth also have come into play in the

station area planning process. The City of Atlanta

adopted a node growth/neighborhood preservation

development policy in 1972. The city’s policies

included the following:

●

●

●

●

These

Make maximum use of rapid transit to

promote mobility and reduce congestion;

Encourage multipurpose activity centers

used day and night and discourage strip

commercial development;

Improve the urban environment through

urban design; and

Prohibit new industrial or commercial

development near stations serving lowand medium-density residentia1

neighborhoods.

policies have guided the city planning

department as it creates station area development

plans.

Development and Evaluation of Alternatives

Until 1968 alternatives analysis in Atlanta transit

planning was grounded more in public debate than

in technical process. A conventional alternatives

analysis was not published until 1971. That

evaluation was sufficiently competent technically

to compensate for the shortcomings of the past,

although its findings were too ambiguous to guide

decisionmaking clearly.

No formal testing of alternative transit systems

was incorporated in ATS Rapid Atlanta or ARMPC

Rapid Transit plans in 1961. The MATSC plan in

1962 briefly investigated improved bus service

concepts and the use of commuter rail but rejected

these options in favor of rapid rail. The first serious

look at an alternative concept occurred when ATS

commissioned its own transit study in 1967.

That study, Rapid Busways, called for exclusive

busways along existing rail rights-of-way as an

interim solution to Atlanta’s transit needs. The

report stated that about half of the guideways it

proposed would later be converted to rail as part of

the MARTA system. Yet the study also showed

that express buses on exclusive rights-of-way could

serve more people equally fast or faster than the

proposed rail system. With this and similar

statements Rapid Busways made a good enough case

for building only busways—instead of rail—to

interest several public groups in the idea. Thus the

debate on alternatives began.

Support for the busways concept came from

fiscal conservatives such as Alderman Millikin and

a number of people in the Chamber of Commerce.

An incipient rail versus highway controversy

became an underlying issue, however. Robert

Somerville, architect of Rapid Busways and head of

the Atlanta Transit System bus company, had

critized MARTA for opposing a balanced transportation approach. MARTA allegedly had not given

thoughtful attention to feeder buses; a map in the

MARTA public relations document Rapid Transit

Now showed feeder bus routes where no streets

existed. MARTA also demonstrated an apparent

protransit bias by dismissing the Rapid Busways idea

after a hasty 3-week review.

The Busways report was a contributing factor in

the decision to commission the AATS comprehensive transportation study in 1967. consultant Alan

M. Voorhees & Associates undertook a thorough

evaluation of alternative system concepts that was

not completed by the time of the 1968 referendum

vote. This fact created the impression that MARTA

was asking for public commitment to a plan that

was not finished, and it thus helped bring the

MARTA proposal to defeat.

The Voorhees/AATS 1971 final report called

Development and Evaluation of a Recommended Transportation System for fhe Atlanta Region described the results

of comparative evaluation of five basic transportation systems: (1) an expanded bus system using

existing highways; (2) the 66-mile MARTA system

presented in spring 1968; (3) a 31-mile system of

33
exclusive busways like the one proposed in Rapid

Busways; (4) a 66-mile system using rail only in the

north-south corridor and express bus elsewhere;

(5) a 65-mile busway system. These comprise a

relatively broad range of alternatives for that time.

None of the light rail or priority bus lane

approaches that are popular today, however, were

treated by the Voorhees study. Their absence is

understandable. The streetcar era had passed too

recently for light rail to be taken seriously. And at

that time no precedent existed for giving buses

priority over cars on the same right-of-way; the

idea simply was not considered practical. 31

Political considerations did not enter the

Voorhees process of selecting and evaluating

alternatives, but they did influence the way

MARTA used the Voorhees findings. The results

of the Voorhees evaluation were first published in

1969. 32 That report recommended 54 miles of

busway and 10 miles of rapid rail. The AATS Policy

Committee designated the Voorhees report as the

guide for all agencies to use in developing priorities

and implementation plans. Meanwhile MARTA

asked for further work from Voorhees before

publishing the final report. Although MARTA

hoped rail would look better this time, Voorhees

continued to recommend busways for the eastwest corridor in the draft of its final report. The

draft was not widely circulated, and UMTA refers

to it as the “suppressed report.”

Although the draft was not in fact suppressed, its

recommendations were changed allegedly under

pressure from MARTA. The final text was more

ambiguous on the bus-rail issue. MARTA argued

busways need a third “breakdown” lane for safety

reasons. The cost of the extra lane inflated the

Voorhees’ busway figures to more nearly approximate rail costs. The language of the Voorhees

report was amended to say that both bus and rail

could provide needed service on the east-west line;

that buses would attract the same ridership as rail

at a somewhat lower cost; but that the cost would

be the same if greater construction and safety

31 SeVera ] members of the UMTA staff who were reviewing

the technical process in Atlanta grew curious about the priority

bus alternative. Using the Voorhees numbers, they adjusted the

assumptions and got a rough estimate that total operating costs

on the east-west corridor would have been 50 percent less if

priority bus lanes had been substituted for the exclusive busway

proposal.

32 5UMmflrY ~~ Hig A/lght$: Recommended Transportation program, ALM_I

M. Voorhees & Associates, Inc., April 1969.

standards were adhered to for buses as shown in

the MARTA/PB-T-B preliminary engineering

report. Most observers agree the changes were

motivated by political necessity. The black communities along the east-west line would not have

supported a plan that offered them “second-class”

bus service while giving whites “first-class” rail

service.

MARTA drew heavily on the Voorhees alternatives evaluation when it applied for its first

capital grant from UMTA.JJ In its application

MARTA offered two reasons for its decision to

drop its east-west busway concept. First, it pointed

out that the Technical Coordinating Committee of

ARC-ARTPPJQ had voted against busways and for

rail in April 1970 because of restrictions to longrange service expansion and the technical problems

incumbent in locating a large underground busway

transfer in downtown Atlanta’s narrow “gulch. ”

Second, MARTA explained that an all-rail trunk

system (with busway feeders) was judged to be

better than a mixed rail-bus concept because it (1)

would require fewer transfers and hence would be

“more functional and desirable’’ 35; (2) would attract

more patronage largely because of the transfer

issue; and (3) was slightly less expensive per

passenger. MARTA also presented as rejected

alternatives a 1969 commuter rail study 36 and a

1971 analysis of the “no-build” alternative. 37 The

alternatives package thus was relatively comprehensive and the comparative evaluation

relatively convincing.

Following a November 1971 MARTA board

resolution, MARTA (with ARC and representatives from local governments) undertook an

environmental assessment of the already adopted

system. The procedure followed requirements of

the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 and

therefore presented and evaluated alternatives to

the proposed system at points where it was found

33 see Draft Response-G Uidelines for capttal Grant Selection,

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, September

1972.

34 The Technical Coordinating Committee is comprised of

technical staff representatives from ARC, MARTA, and DOT

and should not be confused with its policymaking counterpart,

the Transportation Policy Subcommittee.

35 MARTA Dra)t Response, op. cit., p. 96.

36 prejlmlnary study Of Commufer Railroad Feasibility for Atlanta

A4etropolitan Region, MARTA, 1969.

37 Benefits to the Atlanta Metropolitan Area from the Proposed Regional

Transportation Program, prepared for MARTA by Development

Research Associates, December 1971.

34
to threaten significant environmental disruption.

In fact, most alternatives discussed were

recapitulations of the Voorhees alternatives

analysis. The study identified few major environmental problems serious enough to call for

devising new alternatives. Severe problems were

found at only seven points of intrusion in areas of

ecological value, and MARTA agreed to route

changes at four of these points and to put lines

underground in two other parks. With almost twothirds of the system following existing railroad

rights-of-way, the proposal was judged to threaten

little damage to neighborhoods and community

services or to historic sites. The environmental

assessment did not challenge the overall plan and

did not evaluate alternative route configurations or

modes of transportation.

Financing and Implementation

Financing issues have influenced Atlanta’s

transit planning at several critical points since 1960.

Chief among these issues have been (1) the

difficulty of obtaining Federal capital assistance in

recent years, (2) setbacks in guaranteeing the local

share, and (3) escalating construction cost estimates. The net effect of these obstacles has been

to scale down the first phase transit system to a

skeletal 13.7 miles.

The Atlanta system will be the first major new

rapid rail transit project to come on line with the aid

of UMTA funds. Since the beginning of transit

planning in Atlanta, the expectation of Federal

money, and the difficulty in getting it, have

influenced decision making.

As early as 1961 the ARMPCplan mentioned the

Federal transit funding policies that were under

consideration at that time. It compared the existing

situation to the period shortly before enactment of

the 1956 interstate highway legislation and stated

that an “early policy breakthrough toward a similar

FederaI transit financing program is a distinct

possibility.” These statements were coupled with

the assertion that the proposed system would

require Federal and possibly State aid.

The hope of obtaining Federal aid continued to

affect Atlanta’s transit policy planning. One of the

reasons for seeking the transit-enabling constitutional amendment in 1962 was to prepare the

way for qualifying for the new Federal-aid program

that was debated by Congress that year. The Urban

Mass Transportation Assistance bill was defeated,

and so was the State amendment. The need to

qualify for Federal aid was offered again as a reason

for backing the transit amendment when it came up

for consideration in 1964. This time the Federal

program was a reality, enacted into law with a

lobbying boost from Atlanta that converted the

entire Georgia delegation on Capitol Hill to the side

of transit. Voters in Atlanta were urged to support

the enabling proposition so Atlanta could get in on

the ground level when the limited new Federal

money was parceled out.

Even without UMTA aid, Atlanta made good use

of the Federal funds that could be obtained, The

Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study Commission

in 1962 was supported by a HUD 701 grant—the

only planning grant money at the time that was

being used for transit purposes. Later, Atlanta

lobbied to have a technical studies program

appended to UMTA in 1965. Congress obliged, and

the next year MARTA received UMTA’S first

technical studies grant.

The most direct effect of Federal financing policy

on the MARTA system has been and will continue

to be exerted through the UMTA capital grants

program. During the tenure of former DOT

Secretary John Volpe, MARTA alleges it received

assurances that UMTA would pay its full share of

the system’s cost. In early 1974 DOT began publicly

backing away from its earlier position by

suggesting it would not provide all the money

MARTA wanted when MARTA asked for it.

The MARTA Overview Committee (MARTOC)

of the Georgia State assembly launched an

investigation to clarify the situation. MARTOC

collected evidence of “solemn and repeated

assurances from high officials in the Federal

Government” 38 that MARTA could expect Federal

capital assistance. Such “firm Federal commitments” guided MARTA’s prereferendum

promises and helped encourage local support. 39

In April 1975 UMTA put the issue to rest for the

present, by committing $600 million out of its

capital grant discretionary fund to the Atlanta

system in the form of contract authority, pending

Congressional approval of annual appropriations.

38 ReportO( the MARTAOverclieu> Committee, December 19Y4, P.

17.

s~ In, 1968, the lack of ~ firm Federal commitment t. the

MARTA system was one of the main issues raised by MARTA

critics in the successful campaign to defeat the transit measure

in referendum.

35
The $600 million plus $2OO million in capital grants

already given to MARTA totaled more than 10

percent of UMTA’S discretionary capital grants

program over the duration of the present legislation. 4o However, the offer falls $2OO million short

of the amount MARTA feels—and UMTA agrees—

is necessary to build a well-functioning core

system. With the 20 percent local share added, the

UMTA funds will build only 13.7 miles of rapid

transit. 41

In late June 1975 UMTA rejected MARTA’s

formal request for the additional $2OO million. The

agency offered “no prejudice” status to local money

used for construction beyond the 13.7-mile trunk

segment. If Congress were to provide new

authorization, MARTA could ask for a new capital

grant and, if UMTA approved the application, could

credit the already-spent local funds toward the local

share of the new grant. In turning down MARTA’s

request for a larger commitment, UMTA stressed

its intention to put no more money into the 13.7-

mile segment under any circumstances. MARTA

will be forced to pay for any cost escalations

(beyond the 8 percent inflation factor built into its

estimates) with local resources.

Mustering these local resources has been MARTA’s second major financing issue. Proposed

money-raising mechanisms had an important

impact on popular support in 1968 and 1971.

Problems did not disappear after the 1971 referendum established a revenue source, however, and

local financing questions are as critical today as

ever.

Atlanta transit planners in the beginning aimed

at a financing procedure that would assess the local

contribution on a regional basis rather than depend

only on contributions from jurisdictions. Early

versions of MARTA legislation would have given

the transit authority taxing power. Conservative

politics prevailed, and MARTA got bonding

authority. The local jurisdictions would participate

by making a rapid transit contract to produce a

given amount over a period of a year or longer. If

the local contributions required a tax, they would

have to hold a public referendum.

~0 Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974.

4 I At 13.7 ml]es the north-south route can extend ordy as far

north as the North Station; MARTA claims that extending the

north route 4.7 miles to Lenox Station would improve

patronage.

The 1968 referendum was technically a vote to

approve a 35-year contract between each participating jurisdiction and MARTA. The contracts

committed each jurisdiction to raise the property

tax in order to pay off bonds that would be issued to

finance transit construction. Several of the key

factors in the failure of the referendum measure

were related to financial considerations. First, the

property tax increase was unpopular. Second, the

nature of the referendum (authorization of a

contract rather than a direct approval of a bond

issue) required the total price over the 35-year

period, including interest plus principal, to appear

on the ballot. Usually voters are shown only the

face value of the bonds, and the true cost of the

system is thought to have dissuaded some of the

voters. In addition, the insecurity about the Federal

contribution played a role, as mentioned.

The relatively good showing of the transit issue

in the 1971 referendum was aided by an important

change in the financial plan. The sales tax was

substituted for the property tax. Also, additional

benefits—the bus improvement program and the

15-cent fare—were added to the rapid transit

system to make the price more palatable.

Today MARTA is having difficulty meeting its

1971 promises with the revenue generated by the 1

percent sales tax increase approved in 1971. There

are several causes for this problem. A large

portion—over 40 percent—of the sales tax fund is

being used to defer operating deficits. MARTA’s

ledgers reflect the nationwide picture of greatly

increasing gaps between operating revenue and

costs. As farebox returns dropped, a greater

proportion of the sales tax than expected had to be

diverted to pay the operating bills.

To protect the sales tax fund, the MARTA

Overview Committee (MARTOC) sponsored

legislation placing a ceiling of 50 percent on the

amount of sales tax revenue that can be spent for

operations. The measure was enacted in 1974. With

operating deficits rising at an alarming rate in

Atlanta as elsewhere, the 50 percent lid has created

a ticklish problem. The operating expenditures are

not yet bumping the ceiling; but at 40-44 percent

monthly, they are claiming a growing portion of the

sales tax revenues. The only alternative source of

funding, if the ceiling is reached, is to increase fares.

It is considered unlikely that the 50 percent limit

itself would be lifted, because the legislature wants

to guarantee a means for raising the local share of

future project costs. The option of hiking fares,

36
however, would go against MARTA’s referendum

promise to keep fares at 15 cents. MARTOC has

reminded MARTA of its simultaneous commitment to implement both short-term and longrange transit improvements. Due to shortage of

funds, portions of the short-range plan still have

not been put into effect. Resolving this conflict is

one of MARTA’s most pressing responsibilities.

The recession also has played a role in the

financial situation in Atlanta. Sales tax revenues

grew only 1 percent last year, during which time

MARTA had planned for a 10 percent rise. The

situation is attributed to a decline in consumer

purchasing, although the matter is being investigated by MARTOC.

The most important reason for MARTA’s

financial difficulties involves the unexpected

increases in the cost of completing the long-range

rapid transit system. The cost of the 60-miie system

was pegged at $1.3 billion in 1971; it is now

estimated to exceed $2 billion. MARTA says delays

in the implementation schedule have caused the

cost escalation. Federal requirements for an

environmental impact assessment allegedly

delayed MARTA’s timetable over a year. Expensive

additions to the system

in cost.

Regardless of the

allegations, delay and

calations comprise the

also contributed

accuracy of

to the hike

MARTA’s

the consequent cost esthird major financial issue

that has affected the transit decision making. In this

case, the impact has not yet fully been felt. The

extra cost itself is a factor in trimming the initial

system to 13.7’ miles; UMTA’S $800 million would

build many more miles if costs had stayed at the

1971 level.

More importantly, the combination of delay and

additional cost may force reconsideration of the

remainder of the adopted system. The 1971 vote

approved the 1 percent sales tax financing for a 10-

year period. In order to guarantee a local share over

the 6-year period of UMTA participation that will

begin now, MARTA will have to either return to

the polls for an extension of the sales tax, persuade

the State to increase its contribution, or raise the

1.5-cent fare. UMTA says it will not come to the

rescue. If UMTA policy holds, and if funds are not

forthcoming on the State or local level, the Atlanta

transit system will look far different from the way

it was originally envisioned.

37
Summary Case Assessment

The purpose of this section is to summarize the

transit planning and decisionmaking process in the

Atlanta region in light of the guidelines listed in the

Introduction to the case assessments. The summary, therefore, is divided into two parts: (1)

Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2)

Assessment of the Technical Planning Work.

1. ASSESSMENT OF THE

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Ž Forum for Decisionmaking.—The Atlanta

Regional Commission (ARC) and the

Atlanta Region Transportation Planning

Program (ARTPP), both created in 1971,

provide a relatively well-integrated

decisionmaking forum. Under the auspices

of the ARC, land use planning can be

closely coordinated with transportation

planning. However, the tendency of the

modal agencies (MARTA and Georgia

DOT) to negotiate agreements in ARC’s

Transportation Policy Subcommittee,

below the ARC board level, creates a

degree of confusion over where decisionmaking really occurs.

. Accountability of Decisionmakers.—The

ARC and MARTA commissioners responsible for transportation planning in Atlanta

in theory are directly accountable to the

public through the county governments in

which they serve or that appoint them. In

practice, local interests at times supersede a

regional perspective, although the system

functions well on the whole. The decisionmaking forum is given a wider perspective

by the legislative oversight committee, the

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Overview Committee (MARTOC). To the

extent decisions are made in the Transportation Policy Subcommittee, they tend to

be removed from public view.

. Public involvement.—In the wake of an

extensive community relations campaign,

Atlanta citizens felt they were provided

adequate opportunity to contribute to the

transit program that was approved in

public referendum in 1971. In contrast,

insufficient public participation was one of

the principal reasons for the defeat of the

1968 transit proposal. Since 1971 ,

however, as the plan becomes reality, more

complaints are heard from affected

citizens.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THE TECHNICAL

PLANNING PROCESS

● Goals and Objectives.—Atlanta began

planning its transit system before formal

goal-setting had become a conventional

step in planning. Nevertheless, the objective of reducing traffic congestion and

shaping future growth has guided transit

planning from the beginning. In more

recent years officially formulated goals

have been used to guide station area

development planning.

. Development of Alternatives.-The first

rigorous look at alternatives came with the

AATS Voorhees study after MARTA’s

first transit proposal failed in the referendum of 1968. While the Voorhees team

identified an impressive array of alternative rail-bus combinations, it ignored

options that were not considered practical

at the time, such as priority bus lanes.

. Evaluation of Alternatives.—The

Voorhees evaluation appeared technically

competent, but its pro-busway conclusions

were modified to respect the political need

to offer rail service in all rapid transit

corridors.

. Financing and Implementation.—From

the beginning, transit plans in Atlanta

were drawn up with an assumption of

Federal aid, and the lack of firm commitment from UMTA has been a recurrent

issue. Other problems have been the

difficulty in obtaining the local share and

escalating construction cost estimates,

38

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 0- 67’-377