Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 11 / Thursday, January 18, 2007 / Notices 2333 

Issued in Washington, DC, on January 10, 

2007. 

Carla Mauney, 

FAA Information Collection Clearance 

Officer, Strategy and Investment Analysis 

Division, AIO–20. 

[FR Doc. 07–152 Filed 1–17–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Railroad Administration 

Safety Advisory 2007–01 

AGENCY: Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; 

Safety in Yards; Behavior of Employees 

On or About Tracks; and Point 

Protection. 

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety 

Advisory 2007–01, which addresses the 

safety of shoving or pushing movements 

in yards, including those involving 

remote control locomotives. This 

advisory also addresses the behavior of 

employees on or about tracks. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Alan H. Nagler, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont 

Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590, 

telephone (202–493–6049 or 202–493–

6052); Edward Pritchard, Director, 

Office of Safety Assurance and 

Compliance, Office of Safety, FRA, 1120 

Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 

20590, telephone (202–493–6300). 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although 

the overall safety of railroad operations 

has improved in recent years, a recent 

fatal accident involving a carman struck 

by a remote control yard movement 

while he was backing a pickup truck 

onto an in-yard private railroad grade 

crossing (yard crossing) highlights the 

need to review current railroad 

procedures and practices. 

Results of Preliminary Investigation 

The following discussion of the 

circumstances surrounding a fatal 

accident that occurred on December 14, 

2006, is based on FRA’s preliminary 

investigation. The accident is still under 

investigation by FRA and local 

authorities. The causes and contributing 

factors, if any, have not yet been 

established; therefore, nothing in this 

Safety Advisory should be construed as 

placing blame or responsibility for the 

accident on the acts or omissions of any 

person or entity. 

The fatal accident occurred in 

Manlius, New York, a suburb of 

Syracuse, in CSX Transportation, Inc.’s 

(CSX) DeWitt Yard at about 5:25 p.m. on 

December 14, 2006. The victim was a 

54-year-old carman with about 30 years 

of railroad service. While backing a 

pickup truck onto a yard crossing, he 

was struck by a yard movement of 

railroad cars shoved by a remote control 

locomotive. The remote control operator 

(RCO) aligned a track switch, initiated 

the yard movement by remote control, 

and was driven to the East End 

Yardmasters Tower by another CSX 

employee while the yard movement was 

underway. 

The RCO stated that as he was riding 

to the East End Yardmasters Tower, he 

made a visual determination that the 

track (including the track at the two 

yard crossings over which the 

movement traversed) was clear of 

equipment or other obstructions. The 

yard movement was not conducted in 

an activated remote control zone. 

During the approximately 1⁄4-mile 

shoving movement, the leading end of 

the movement was not under 

continuous observation by the RCO. The 

route traversed included both the yard 

crossing on which the accident occurred 

and a second, paved yard crossing. 

The leading end of the yard 

movement, which is the end that struck 

the carman’s pickup truck, consisted of 

six empty flat cars. Due to its low 

profile, the approach of an empty flat 

car is less perceptible than the approach 

of other rolling stock, e.g., box car, tank 

car, locomotive. This was exacerbated 

by darkness, as the sun had set 

approximately 1 hour before the 

accident. 

Upon impact, the carman’s truck was 

shoved for about 444 feet whereupon it 

flipped onto its roof and was 

additionally shoved approximately 490 

feet. Immediately after the accident, the 

truck was observed with its backup 

lights illuminated and its backup alarm 

sounding, indicating that the carman 

had backed onto the crossing ahead of 

the yard movement. 

The RCO stated that he stopped the 

yard movement when he noticed a 

strange white light at the leading end of 

the yard movement and heard a radio 

transmission to stop the yard 

movement. The preliminary 

investigation disclosed that upon 

impact, the carman in the pickup truck 

transmitted his urgent plea on the 

mechanical department radio channel to 

stop the movement. That transmission 

was heard by the yardmaster because he 

could monitor the mechanical 

department channel in the yard office. 

Within seconds, the yardmaster 

observed the carman’s truck being 

shoved and radioed the RCO to stop. 

Because the carman and the RCO were 

utilizing different radio channels, the 

carman was unable to contact the RCO 

directly. The yard movement finally 

came to rest about 1,490 feet from where 

the movement was initiated and 934 feet 

from where it struck the carman’s truck. 

The autopsy determined that the cause 

of death was due to injuries sustained 

when the truck overturned while being 

shoved by the yard movement. Postaccident testing of the carman’s urine 

specimen revealed the presence of 

marijuana metabolite (THCA) at low 

levels. Neither the parent drug (THC) 

nor the marijuana metabolite was 

detected in the blood at the established 

cutoff point. Since the marijuana 

metabolite was not active and the parent 

drug was not reported in the blood, 

these findings do not provide scientific 

evidence that would support any 

conclusion regarding possible 

impairment of the carman’s faculties. 

This is particularly the case since death 

occurred shortly after the impact, and 

marijuana constituents remain stable in 

these fluids for long periods after 

metabolism ceases. 

Safety Issues 

CSX’s General and Operating 

Equipment Rule R15 (published in CSX 

System Bulletin 001 of October 1, 2006, 

under Instructions Governing Remote 

Control Locomotive Operation) states, in 

relevant part, that 

[P]oint protection must be provided when 

cars, platform or engines are being moved 

and conditions require. A crewmember must 

take a position on the lead equipment to see 

that the track ahead is clear, or be ahead of 

the movement. When an RCO operator is 

providing point protection, that operator 

should be the primary operator when 

practicable. 

CSX rules do not define the term ‘‘point 

protection.’’ Although the RCO was 

ahead of the movement as permitted by 

CSX rule, he did not observe the 

collision and initiated a brake 

application only after hearing a radio 

transmission from the yardmaster. 

The preliminary investigation 

indicates that the RCO controlled the 

yard movement while riding in a 

moving motor vehicle. CSX General and 

Operating Equipment Rule R8 states, in 

relevant part, that ‘‘[an] RCL [remote 

control locomotive] crew member will 

not operate an RCL * * * while riding 

in a moving motor vehicle or other 

machinery that is not connected to their 

consist.’’ This rule goes further than 

FRA’s published guidelines for the 

operation of remote control locomotives, 

which states, in relevant part: ‘‘[W]hen 

operating an RCL, the RCO should not 

operate any other type of machinery [66 

FR 10340, 10344 (Feb. 14, 2001) (Notice 


pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
2334 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 11 / Thursday, January 18, 2007 / Notices 

of Safety Advisory 2001–01)].’’ Both 

CSX Rule R8 and FRA guidelines were 

intended to address the lack of 

situational awareness that a person may 

experience when ‘‘multitasking’’—in 

this case, focusing on a moving train 

while at the same time operating or 

riding in a moving vehicle. 

Although Federal regulations do not 

currently prohibit shoving movements 

conducted in the manner described by 

the preliminary findings of this 

accident, FRA is contemplating the 

regulation of shoving movements as 

addressed in a recently published FRA 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 

‘‘Railroad Operating Rules: Program of 

Operational Tests and Inspections; 

Railroad Operating Practices: Handling 

Equipment, Switches and Derails [71 FR 

60372, 60410 (October 12, 2006)].’’ In 

the NPRM, FRA stated that it proposes: 

A requirement that the employee providing 

point protection visually determine, for the 

duration of the shoving or pushing 

movement, that the track is clear within the 

range of vision for the complete distance to 

be shoved or pushed. Shoving accidents 

often occur because a train crew makes a 

shoving movement without determining that 

the track is clear in the direction of 

movement. This proposed paragraph would 

address this problem by requiring an 

operating rule that keeps a qualified 

employee observing the track to make sure it 

is clear and remains clear [71 FR 60393]. 

In this instance, the RCO apparently 

made an initial determination that the 

track was clear, but was not in a 

position to determine that the track 

would remain clear of conflicting 

mechanical department vehicles. (See 

71 FR at 60409 defining ‘‘track is 

clear.’’) Although FRA has proposed 

requirements for shoving movements, it 

has not made any decisions as to the 

contents of a final rule in that 

proceeding, and thus the proposal is not 

now, and may not in the future become, 

a regulatory requirement. Railroads, 

however, are encouraged to consider 

FRA’s proposed rule and this incident 

as they review their operating rules. 

The investigation of this accident also 

raised questions regarding the visibility 

of the rail car leading the shoving 

movement. As stated earlier, the lead 

car was a low-profile, empty flat car 

followed by five more empty flat cars. 

The first freight car of significant height 

was the seventh car from the lead, a box 

car. It is possible that the carman did 

not see the low-profile cars in the 

darkness. Although FRA does have 

regulations pertaining to reflectorization 

of freight cars, there are no Federal rules 

regarding illumination within rail yards, 

at yard crossings, or on the leading 

point of a movement. 

The following CSX rules may apply to 

this accident: 

CSX Safe Way, Effective January 1, 2006 at 

GS–10. On or About Tracks; When working 

on or about tracks: * * * Be alert for and 

keep clear of the movement of cars, 

locomotives, or equipment at any time, in 

either direction, on any track. * * * Stop 

and look in both directions before making 

any of the following movements: Fouling or 

crossing a track. 

SJP C–177 (Rev 3/99) Safe Procedure for 

Backing Vehicle Driver Only: 

Step 4. Always look behind you before 

backing. If you are not sure get out and look 

again. 

Step 5. Avoid backing when possible, pull 

thru if you can, or make a circle wide 

enough. 

Operating rule 103: When cars are shoved 

and conditions require, a trainman must take 

a conspicuous position on the leading car. At 

night, the trainman must display a white 

light. 

Recommended Action 

In light of the above discussion and in 

an effort to maintain safety in the 

Nation’s rail yards, FRA recommends 

that railroads: 

(1) Assess their current rules 

addressing safety at yard crossings, 

including rules governing shoving and 

pushing movements and backing motor 

vehicles; 

(2) Review, or amend as necessary, 

their point protection rules to clarify 

that the person protecting the point 

visually determine, for the duration of 

the shoving or pushing movement, that 

the track is clear either within the 

person’s range of vision or for the 

complete distance the equipment is to 

be shoved or pushed, or that other 

safeguards are observed to prevent 

critical incidents involving shoving 

movements. FRA notes that continuous 

observation cannot be accomplished if 

the person is also attempting to 

accomplish other tasks that cause the 

person to divert attention from 

providing point protection; 

(3) Review their point protection rules 

and their importance with all relevant 

employees; 

(4) Review their current rules 

pertaining to employee behavior on or 

about tracks with particular emphasis in 

yards with all relevant employees; 

(5) Address the ability of employees 

to call for assistance in emergency 

situations through the use of common 

emergency radio frequencies, or by 

other means; and 

(6) Assess the conspicuity of flat cars 

and other equipment with low profiles 

and consider measures available to 

increase their visibility when they are 

the lead car in a shoving movement, 

especially at yard crossings. 

Failure of industry members to take 

action consistent with the preceding 

recommendations or to take other 

actions to ensure yard safety may result 

in FRA pursuing other corrective 

measures under its rail safety authority. 

FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 

2007–01, issue additional safety 

advisories, or take other appropriate 

action necessary to ensure the highest 

level of safety on the Nation’s railroads. 

Issued in Washington, DC, on January 11, 

2007. 

Joseph H. Boardman, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. E7–594 Filed 1–17–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Maritime Administration 

[Docket No. MARAD–2007–26848] 

Information Collection Available for 

Public Comments and 

Recommendations 

ACTION: Notice and request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: In accordance with the 

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this 

notice announces the Maritime 

Administration’s (MARAD’s) intention 

to request approval for three years of a 

new information collection. 

DATES: Comments should be submitted 

on or before March 19, 2007. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Richard Walker, Maritime 

Administration, MAR–810, 400 Seventh 

St., SW.,Washington, DC 20590. 

Telephone: 202–366–8888, Fax: 202–

366–6988; or E-Mail: 

Richard.walker@dot.gov. Copies of this 

collection also can be obtained from that 

office. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Title of Collection: Marine Port and 

Terminal Infrastructure Data. 

Type of Request: New Collection. 

OMB Control Number: 2133-New. 

Form Numbers: Marine Terminal 

Operator Survey (Unnumbered), Marine 

Port Survey (Unnumbered), and Marine 

Terminal Company Survey 

(Unnumbered). 

Expiration Date of Approval: Three 

years from date of approval by the 

Office of Management and Budget. 

Summary of Collection Information: 

The Port and Terminal Infrastructure 

Data Collection Survey will provide 

MARAD with key U.S. marine terminal 

data to enable the agency to provide 

timely information to determine the 

present level of system performance and 

future requirements. 


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