United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 19-1091 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

ROBERTO MENDOZA-SÁNCHEZ, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 

[Hon. Joseph A. DiClerico, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Torruella, Boudin, and Kayatta, 

 Circuit Judges. 

Christine DeMaso, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for 

appellant. 

Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom 

Scott W. Murray, United States Attorney, was on brief, for 

appellee. 

June 30, 2020 
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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Roberto 

Mendoza-Sánchez ("Mendoza"), a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to 

one count of reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(a). Prior to sentencing, and in the wake of the Supreme 

Court's decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018),1

Mendoza moved to withdraw his plea and dismiss the indictment, 

believing that the removal order underlying his conviction for 

reentering after deportation had been rendered null and void. 

According to Mendoza, the immigration court lacked jurisdiction to 

issue the removal order in the first place because his notice to 

appear -- the document served on a noncitizen and filed with the 

immigration court that initiates removal proceedings -- did not 

specify the date or time of the removal hearing. The district 

court denied the motion, finding that Mendoza did not satisfy any 

of the prerequisites set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) for 

collaterally attacking the removal order during the criminal 

proceedings, and it sentenced Mendoza to time served. Mendoza now 

1 In Pereira, the Supreme Court held that the stop-time rule, 

which governs the length of an alien's continuous physical presence 

in the United States for the purpose of an application for 

cancellation of removal, applies once "the alien is served a notice 

to appear under [8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)]." 138 S. Ct. at 2110. It 

concluded that a notice to appear "that does not inform a 

noncitizen when and where to appear for removal proceedings is not 

a 'notice to appear under section 1229(a)' and therefore does not 

trigger the stop-time rule." Id. 
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appeals this denial. He contends that: (1) the immigration court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider his removal because the notice to 

appear served on him did not include the date and time of the 

hearing; and (2) if the immigration court lacked jurisdiction, 

then for that reason he need not satisfy the requirements of 

section 1326(d) in order to successfully challenge in this 

subsequent criminal proceeding the order resulting in his removal. 

Because we conclude that the immigration court did not lack 

jurisdiction, we reject Mendoza's appeal without needing to 

consider whether he would need to satisfy section 1326(d) if he 

could show that the immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his 

removal. 

I.

Mendoza is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 2003 and 

2009, he was arrested for being unlawfully present in the United 

States and was granted voluntary departure to Mexico on both 

occasions. Mendoza returned to the United States without approval 

later in 2009. 

On May 7, 2014, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

("ICE") agents arrested Mendoza in New Hampshire. The next day, 

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") personally served 

Mendoza with a notice to appear, which informed him that he was 

being charged with removability based on his unlawful presence in 
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the United States and directed him to appear before an immigration 

judge in Boston at an unspecified date and time. On May 28, 2014, 

the immigration court issued a notice of hearing, which directed 

Mendoza to appear in the Boston immigration court in seven days 

-- on June 4, 2014, at 8:00 a.m. -- for his removal proceeding. 

According to annotations on the document, personal service was 

made by delivery to Mendoza's attorney or representative and to 

DHS. However, the name of his attorney on the document was 

inexplicably crossed out. At the hearing, Mendoza requested 

voluntary departure, but the immigration judge ordered him removed 

to Mexico. Mendoza subsequently waived any appeal. Ultimately, 

he was deported on June 26, 2014. 

Years later, on November 28, 2017, New Hampshire State 

Police conducted a stop of a commercial vehicle. Mendoza was the 

driver. He admitted to the state trooper that he did not have a 

driver's license, that he was unlawfully present in the United 

States, and that he had been previously deported. After 

confirming his identity, ICE arrested Mendoza.

II. 

On December 13, 2017, a grand jury sitting in the 

U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire returned a 

one-count indictment charging Mendoza with reentry after 
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deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Mendoza pleaded 

guilty to the offense on May 31, 2018.

While Mendoza awaited sentencing, the Supreme Court 

decided Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2105. As a result, Mendoza filed 

a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss the indictment, 

contending that, under Pereira, the notice to appear in his 

underlying immigration case was defective because it failed to 

include the date and time of the removal hearing and, consequently, 

that defect "deprive[d] the immigration court of jurisdiction to 

issue [the removal order]." In Mendoza's view, because the 2014 

removal was invalid, he was legally innocent of reentry after 

deportation. 

The district court denied Mendoza's motion, rejecting 

his argument that the immigration court lacked subject-matter 

jurisdiction in 2014.2 It further concluded that, in any event, 

Mendoza had to satisfy the requirements set forth in 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1326(d) in order to challenge the validity of the underlying 

removal order during his criminal case, which Mendoza had failed 

2 The district court aptly noted that there was a split among the 

lower courts on whether removal orders entered after a defective 

notice to appear under Pereira had been served were void for lack 

of subject-matter jurisdiction and that, at the time, no court of 

appeals had addressed the issue. 
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to do. Thus, the court held that Mendoza could not withdraw his 

guilty plea or challenge the indictment. This appeal ensued. 

III. 

Our review of a district court's denial of a 

plea-withdrawal motion is for abuse of discretion. United States 

v. Caramadre, 807 F.3d 359, 367 (1st Cir. 2015). To make that 

assessment, we consider "the strength of the reasons offered in 

support of the motion," keeping in mind that a defendant may 

withdraw his plea so long as he shows that there is "a fair and 

just reason" for requesting the withdrawal. United States v. 

Powell, 925 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2018); see United States v. 

González-Arias, 946 F.3d 17, 28 (1st Cir. 2019). "In determining 

whether the defendant offered such a 'fair and just reason,'" we 

review the district court's legal conclusions de novo. Powell, 

925 F.3d at 4 (citing United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58, 69 (1st 

Cir. 2013)). 

Similarly, "[w]hen reviewing the trial court's denial of 

a motion to dismiss an indictment, we review questions of law de 

novo." United States v. Doe, 741 F.3d 217, 226 (1st Cir. 2013) 

(citing United States v. López-Matías, 522 F.3d 150, 153 (1st Cir. 

2008)). Any factual findings made by the district court are 

reviewed for clear error, and its "ultimate ruling" for abuse of 

discretion. Id. 
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IV. 

Mendoza's overarching reason for requesting the 

withdrawal of his guilty plea is that, in his view, the immigration 

court's 2014 removal order -- upon which his reentry after 

deportation conviction is premised -- is invalid because the 

immigration court lacked jurisdiction over his removal 

proceedings. His theory rests on the contention that the notice 

to appear that initiated his removal proceedings in 2014 was 

defective because it did not contain the date or time of his 

removal hearing. Mendoza avers that the inclusion of that 

information was required both by statute, see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229(a)(1), and by the Supreme Court's decision in Pereira. 

Because his removal is a "nullity," his argument goes, it cannot 

support his conviction, and he is innocent of that offense. Thus, 

he contends that the district court erred in not allowing him to 

withdraw his guilty plea.

We have already squarely rejected the contention that 

the omission of the initial hearing date and time in a notice to 

appear deprives the immigration court of jurisdiction over a 

removal proceeding. See Goncalves Pontes v. Barr, 938 F.3d 1 (1st 

Cir. 2019); see also Arévalo v. Barr, 950 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 

2020); Ferreira v. Barr, 939 F.3d 44, 45 (1st Cir. 2019). We held 

in Goncalves Pontes that the jurisdiction of an immigration court 
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is governed by agency regulation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a), not 

by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) -- the statute upon which Mendoza relies -- 

and that the regulations do not concern the written notice 

contemplated in that statute. See 938 F.3d at 3-4, 6. While 

section 1229(a) governs the information that must be provided to 

noncitizens about their impending removal hearings -- i.e., "the 

'time' and 'place,' that would enable them 'to appear' at the 

removal hearing in the first place," id. at 6 (quoting Pereira, 

138 S. Ct. at 2115) -- the regulations "set forth the process by 

which the immigration court obtains jurisdiction over a removal 

proceeding," id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14). And the regulations 

do not require that the time and place of the initial hearing be 

included in the notice to appear in order to commence removal 

proceedings. Id. at 4. Thus, we concluded that an undated notice 

to appear that complies with the regulations is effective to confer 

jurisdiction upon the immigration court. Id. at 7. 

In this case, there is no suggestion that Mendoza's 

notice to appear did not comply with the regulations. Therefore, 

pursuant to our holding in Goncalves Pontes, Mendoza's 

jurisdictional quarrel is unavailing. 

However, Mendoza resists this conclusion by arguing that 

our holding in Goncalves Pontes depends on the proper service of 

a notice of hearing that "cures" an undated notice to appear. 
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Because he was not properly or timely served with the notice of 

hearing, he says, the defect in the notice to appear was not cured, 

and thus, this "two-step process" did not vest the immigration 

court with jurisdiction. 

Contrary to Mendoza's contention, we did not tie our 

holding in Goncalves Pontes to a successful service of a notice of 

hearing.3 In fact, we held -- without mentioning service of a 

notice of hearing -- that other documents, such as a notice of 

referral to an immigration judge and a notice of intention to 

rescind and request for hearing by an alien, see 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.13, are charging documents that "establish the immigration 

court's jurisdiction over a case, commencing removal proceedings 

against an alien without resort to a Notice to Appear." 

Goncalves Pontes, 938 F.3d at 6-7. We merely added at the end of 

the opinion, as a "coda" -- meaning in addition to what we had 

previously expressed -- that the Board of Immigration Appeals (the 

"BIA") had "likewise concluded that [a notice to appear] that is 

served without specification of the time and place of the initial 

3 This is not to say that Mendoza could not have successfully 

objected to the timing of his removal hearing due to inadequate or 

untimely service of notice. He made no such argument, and instead 

waived his right to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals 

from the decision of the immigration court. Nor, for that matter, 

does he contend that he can satisfy the requirements of 

section 1326. 
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hearing may be sufficient to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on 

an immigration court in removal proceedings." Id. at 7 (emphasis 

added) (citing In re Bermúdez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441, 447 (BIA 

2018)). And in Bermúdez-Cota, the BIA "clarified its view" that 

a notice to appear "'vests an Immigration Judge with jurisdiction 

over the removal proceedings' when a notice of hearing is sent to 

the alien in advance of those proceedings." Id. (quoting 

Bermúdez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 447). We simply concluded from 

this that the agency's interpretation of its regulations was 

"entitled to great deference." Id. (quoting Sidell v. Comm'r., 

225 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2000)). Notably, we clarified in a 

footnote that we did not decide the question of whether a two-step 

process could satisfy the time and date requirements of the statute 

at issue in Pereira. Id. at 7 n.2. Moreover, we have confirmed 

the holding in Goncalves Pontes that jurisdiction vests with the 

issuance of a notice to appear that complies with the regulations 

in subsequent cases without resorting to an inquiry into whether 

service of a notice of hearing was appropriate or was even made. 

See, e.g., Ferreira, 939 F.3d at 45. Therefore, even if neither 

Mendoza nor his counsel was served with the notice of hearing, as 

Mendoza avers, that does not defeat the application of 

Goncalves Pontes's holding, which confirms that the immigration 

court had jurisdiction over his removal. 
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Next, Mendoza attempts to circumvent Goncalves Pontes's 

holding by arguing that it was wrongly decided. But the law of 

the circuit doctrine dooms this claim, as we are "bound by prior 

panel decisions that are closely on point," United States v. Wurie, 

867 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting San Juan Cable LLC v. 

P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010)), "absent any 

intervening authority," Mass. Delivery Ass'n v. Healey, 821 F.3d 

187, 192 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Mouscardy, 722 

F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2013)). Mendoza does not suggest that there 

is any such authority, nor does he "offer[] a sound reason for 

believing that the [Goncalves Pontes] panel would change its 

collective mind," Wurie, 867 F.3d at 34. Hence, Goncalves Pontes 

controls our decision here, and Mendoza's jurisdictional argument 

fails, and since he does not otherwise argue that he can satisfy 

the requirements of section 1326(d) for collaterally challenging 

his removal order in this subsequent criminal proceeding, his 

appeal fails. 

V. 

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's denial 

of Mendoza's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and dismiss the 

indictment is affirmed. 

Affirmed.