IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

August 16, 2022 Session

JEFFREY LEE SELF v. JENNIFER DAWN SELF

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Bradley County

No. 2019-CV-161 Jerri S. Bryant, Chancellor

No. E2021-01130-COA-R3-CV

In this divorce action the husband raises multiple issues on appeal concerning, inter alia,

the factual accuracy of the trial court’s judgment; the trial court’s grant of divorce to the 

wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct; the trial court’s equitable 

distribution of the marital property, including the trial court’s one-time award to the wife 

of $50,000 as part of the distribution; the trial court’s findings concerning the husband’s 

income, expenses, and ability to work; and the trial court’s award to the wife of $3,000 in 

attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. The husband has not directly raised an issue 

regarding the trial court’s award to the wife of $850 monthly as alimony in futuro. We

determine that with the exception of one issue related to the trial court’s miscalculation of 

the marriage’s duration, which we deem to have been harmless error, the husband has 

waived all issues by failing to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 

24(b)-(c) and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 7. We accordingly affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. Deeming this to be a frivolous appeal, we grant the wife’s request for 

reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal and post-judgment interest on the trial court’s 

alimony awards. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY, C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Kent T. Jones, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeffrey Lee Self.

Amy D. Campbell, Cleveland, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jennifer Dawn Self.

12/01/2022
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OPINION

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Jeffery Lee Self (“Husband”), filed a complaint for divorce against 

the defendant, Jennifer Dawn Self (“Wife”), on April 24, 2019. Although the trial court 

found in its September 2021 final order that the parties had been married for eighteen 

years, it is undisputed that the parties were married in October 2006, approximately 

fifteen years before entry of the final order. No children were born of the marriage. Wife 

had two children from a prior relationship who were adults by the time of the instant 

divorce proceedings. In his complaint, Husband averred that the parties had been 

separated since September 2017. He alleged “grounds of inappropriate marital conduct 

or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-101(11), 

(14) (2021). As to inappropriate marital conduct, Husband alleged that Wife collected 

disability but did not contribute “to the general household or expenses” and that she 

allowed her adult children to live in the marital residence without making any 

contribution to household expenses.

 

Attaching a proposed marital dissolution agreement to his complaint, Husband 

proposed that he would file a quitclaim deed transferring his interest in the marital 

residence, located on Davis Curbow Road in Old Fort, Tennessee (“the Marital 

Residence”), to Wife while she would assume all debt related to the Marital Residence. 

He also proposed that Wife would keep a 1976 Evinrude boat and a 1966 Chevrolet C-10,

which he averred were left at the Marital Residence, while he would keep a blue 1982 

Chevrolet truck. Husband anticipated in his proposed agreement that the parties would 

agree upon the division of all personal property and did not specify further. 

Wife filed an answer to the complaint and a counter-complaint for divorce on June 

5, 2019. Denying the substantive allegations against her, Wife alleged grounds against 

Husband of irreconcilable differences or, alternatively, inappropriate marital conduct or 

“such indignities to [Wife’s] person as to render [Wife’s] position intolerable” pursuant 

to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-101(12) (2021). Wife averred that the parties 

owned “various assets, including but not limited to, real property, various items of 

personal property, vehicles, accounts . . . .” She requested that in the absence of an 

agreement, the trial court would equitably divide the marital estate and award to her 

alimony “in whatever form and for whatever duration” deemed appropriate, as well as 

attorney’s fees.

Wife concomitantly filed a “Motion for Exclusive Use of the Home, Allocation of 

Marital Debts, Temporary Alimony, to Set Mediation and to Set Trial.” In this motion, 

she averred, inter alia, that she was disabled due to the aftermath of esophageal cancer,
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which caused her to need “a feeding tube to supplement her nutrition and a variety of 

medications every month.” Wife acknowledged that most of her medical needs were 

covered through TennCare but stated that some medical expenses arose each month that 

were not necessarily covered. Wife also acknowledged limited financial assistance from 

her father and her adult son. She attached an affidavit of income and expenses, reflecting 

monthly disability income in the amount of $771 and monthly expenses between $1,049 

and $1,199. Wife requested that the trial court enter an order directing Husband to pay 

the mortgage payment on the Marital Residence. In seeking exclusive use of the Marital 

Residence, Wife alleged that the parties’ September 2017 separation had been prompted 

by Husband’s “sending sexually inappropriate messages” to Wife’s daughter, who was 

eighteen years of age at the time.

 

Husband filed an answer to the counter-complaint on June 17, 2019, denying 

Wife’s allegations as to grounds other than irreconcilable differences. He requested that 

the trial court dismiss Wife’s counter-complaint and adopt and incorporate his proposed 

marital dissolution agreement into a divorce decree. Husband did not present an affidavit 

of income and expenses to the trial court at any time during the pendency of the divorce. 

At trial, Husband presented a form 1040 federal income tax return for 2020, reflecting 

that he had earned gross wages in the amount of $40,913 and stating his occupation as an 

“Automotive Technician.”

 

In a report filed on November 12, 2019, a mediator indicated that the parties had 

participated in mediation but had not reached any agreement. In response to Wife’s 

discovery requests, Husband filed a motion for a protective order on April 15, 2020, 

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 26.03, averring that several of Wife’s 

requests related to his contact with other women subsequent to the separation and to his 

communication with any unrelated man or woman were overly burdensome and intrusive. 

On the next day, Husband filed a motion to compel Wife to answer his interrogatories 

and produce requested documents, along with a motion to deem requests for admissions 

admitted, averring that Wife had not responded to discovery requests promulgated in

February 2020.

 

In an agreed order entered on July 8, 2020, the trial court directed Wife to respond 

to discovery requests within ten days and to pay Husband’s counsel $300 in attorney’s 

fees incurred in filing the motions to compel. Wife subsequently filed a motion for an 

extension of time in which to respond, and Husband then filed a motion for sanctions, 

pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37, and a motion to quash Wife’s 

extension request. Husband also requested, inter alia, a default judgment and attorney’s 

fees. Following a hearing on all pending motions, the trial court entered an “Order 

Compelling Discovery and Sanction” on October 6, 2020, compelling Wife to answer 

discovery requests within seven days and to pay a total of $800, inclusive of the $300 
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previously ordered, to Husband’s counsel for attorney’s fees incurred in pursuing 

discovery. Husband subsequently filed a motion for sanctions on February 16, 2021, 

averring that although Wife had responded to discovery requests, she had not answered 

all interrogatories or produced all requested documents. Husband again requested a 

default judgment and attorney’s fees.

 

The trial court conducted a bench trial over the span of two days on February 23, 

2021, and August 16, 2021. In addition to the parties’ respective testimonies, the trial 

court heard testimony from Chad Chism, who testified on behalf of Wife concerning 

various items of the parties’ property. However, no transcript or statement of the 

evidence is in the record on appeal. 

 

The trial court entered a final order on September 1, 2021, dismissing Husband’s 

complaint upon finding that he had “alleged no grounds for divorce other than 

irreconcilable differences” and that “he did not prove any grounds for divorce.” The 

court granted a divorce to Wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. 

Although the court found that Husband had “gotten and disposed of most of the parties’ 

assets,” the court did not in its order expressly explain what constituted Husband’s 

inappropriate conduct.

The trial court distributed the marital estate, “refer[ring] to the Master Asset List 

which was entered into evidence as Exhibit 1 and the completeness and accuracy of 

which was sworn to by both parties under oath.” The master asset list, a copy of which 

was attached to the final order, included Wife’s valuations of various items of property 

but reflected only limited valuations from Husband. On the master asset list, Husband 

stipulated to Wife’s valuation of the Marital Residence, and although he offered values 

for some items, he stated, “Do not have,” by many other items. The court found Mr. 

Chism and Wife to be credible in their respective testimonies concerning “the existence 

of certain items of property that Husband simply said ‘did not exist.’” The court also 

found that no proof had been offered regarding some items on the master asset list and 

therefore made no award of those items; among these were the Evinrude boat and the 

1966 Chevrolet truck mentioned by Husband in his proposed marital dissolution 

agreement, two “project trucks,” a second set of tools, a Muzzle Loader Nikon scope, and 

miscellaneous power tools.

As to separate property, the trial court found that the master bedroom furniture and 

Wife’s personal clothing, accessories, and jewelry were Wife’s separate property. The 

court likewise found that Husband’s personal clothing and accessories were his separate 

property. The court specifically found that the value of the separate property was 

undisputed.
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The trial court awarded to Wife the Marital Residence, adopting the parties’ 

stipulated value in the amount of $64,000. The court also divided specific items on the 

master asset list between the parties, awarding some items to Husband at the valuations 

proffered by Wife despite Husband’s statements that he did not have the items. After 

dividing the individual assets between the parties, the trial court concluded that “based 

upon the division of assets listed above and in taking account for the debt related to the 

assets, the Wife is receiving $54,850.00 . . . worth of property, and Husband is receiving 

over $200,000.00 . . . worth of property.” The trial court then ordered Husband to pay 

$50,000 to Wife as part of the equitable division of the marital estate. 

Making further findings of fact related to alimony, the trial court awarded to Wife 

$850 as monthly alimony in futuro and $3,000 in attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. 

The court specifically found that Wife was “economically disadvantaged because of the 

divorce” and was “unable to work” due to her health. Although Husband had not 

provided an income and expense statement, the court determined that “based upon the 

proof offered,” Husband had “the ability to make $40,000.00” per year. In awarding 

alimony, the court also emphasized its finding that Husband had “gotten and disposed of 

most of the parties’ assets,” and the court expressly considered fault as a factor favoring 

Wife. Husband timely appealed.

II. Issues Presented

On appeal, Husband presents nineteen issues, which we have consolidated and 

restated as follows: 

1. Whether the trial court erred by finding as a ground for divorce that 

Husband had committed inappropriate marital conduct.

2. Whether the trial court erred by declining to find that Wife was 

guilty of inappropriate marital conduct based on her alleged 

relationship with a paramour.

3. Whether the trial court’s final order was factually correct and 

supported by the evidence.

A. Whether the trial court erred in finding Mr. Chism to be a

credible witness, particularly concerning his testimony that 

Husband was in Burgess Falls State Park in a 1965 truck.
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B. Whether the trial court erred by not making a finding that it 

had been four years since the parties had lived as a married 

couple.

C. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the parties had 

been married for eighteen years.

D. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Husband owned 

(1) hunting bows, (2) a crossbow, (3) an eighteen-foot 

pontoon boat with trailer, (4) a 1988 Chevrolet truck, (5) a 

1999 Dodge Ram truck, (6) a 1978/1979 Chevrolet step-side 

truck, (7) a 2008 Chevrolet Avalanche, and (8) work tools 

valued at $30,000 to $50,000.

E. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Husband had 

taken the parties’ deep freezer or aquarium or broken the 

parties’ aquarium.

F. Whether the trial court erred in declining to find that Wife 

had falsely testified that an Evinrude boat had “existed.”

G. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Husband had 

purchased or stolen a four-wheeler.

4. Whether the trial court erred in its valuation of the parties’ 

lawnmower, weed eaters, chainsaws, and log splitter.

5. Whether the trial court failed to explain the basis for the $50,000 it 

directed Husband to pay to Wife as part of the distribution of the 

marital estate and the $3,000 the court directed Husband to pay to 

Wife for attorney’s fees. 

6. Whether the trial court erred by finding that Husband was capable of 

earning $40,000 annually, was not precluded from working due to 

issues with his back, and thereby had the ability to pay alimony.

7. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Husband had not 

accurately provided the court with his income and expenses.

Wife has raised three additional issues, which we have reordered and restated slightly as 

follows:
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8. Whether Husband’s issues should be “denied” because in the 

absence of a trial transcript, he failed to file a statement of the 

evidence, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c), 

necessitating a presumption that the trial court’s final order was 

supported by the evidence.

9. Whether Husband has waived his issues on appeal by failing to 

comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a) and 

Tennessee Court of Appeals Rules 6 and 7.

10. Whether Husband’s appeal is frivolous such that Wife should be 

awarded interest on the trial court’s alimony award plus costs and 

reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 27-1-122.

III. Standard of Review

In a case involving the proper classification and distribution of assets incident to a 

divorce, our Supreme Court has explained the applicable standard of appellate review as 

follows:

This Court gives great weight to the decisions of the trial court in 

dividing marital assets and “we are disinclined to disturb the trial court’s 

decision unless the distribution lacks proper evidentiary support or results 

in some error of law or misapplication of statutory requirements and 

procedures.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1996). As such, when dealing with the trial court’s findings of fact, we 

review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness, and we must 

honor those findings unless there is evidence which preponderates to the 

contrary. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 

S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993). Because trial courts are in a far better position 

than this Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, the weight, faith, 

and credit to be given witnesses’ testimony lies in the first instance with the 

trial court. Roberts v. Roberts, 827 S.W.2d 788, 795 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

1991). Consequently, where issues of credibility and weight of testimony 

are involved, this Court will accord considerable deference to the trial 

court’s factual findings. In re M.L.P., 228 S.W.3d 139, 143 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2007) (citing Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., 984 

S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999)). The trial court’s conclusions of law, 
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however, are accorded no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. 

Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 744-45 (Tenn. 2002).

Keyt v. Keyt, 244 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tenn. 2007). See Manis v. Manis, 49 S.W.3d 295, 

306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that appellate courts reviewing a distribution of 

marital property “ordinarily defer to the trial judge’s decision unless it is inconsistent 

with the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) or is not supported by a preponderance 

of the evidence.”).

Regarding spousal support, our Supreme Court has “repeatedly . . . observ[ed] that 

trial courts have broad discretion to determine whether spousal support is needed and, if 

so, the nature, amount, and duration of the award.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 

99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). The High Court has further explained:

[A] trial court’s decision regarding spousal support is factually driven and 

involves the careful balancing of many factors. Kinard v. Kinard, 986 

S.W.2d 220, 235 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); see also Burlew [v. Burlew], 40 

S.W.3d [465,] 470 [(Tenn. 2004)]; Robertson v. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d 337, 

340-41 (Tenn. 2002). As a result, “[a]ppellate courts are generally 

disinclined to second-guess a trial judge’s spousal support decision.” 

Kinard, 986 S.W.2d at 234. Rather, “[t]he role of an appellate court in 

reviewing an award of spousal support is to determine whether the trial 

court applied the correct legal standard and reached a decision that is not 

clearly unreasonable.” Broadbent v. Broadbent, 211 S.W.3d 216, 220 

(Tenn. 2006). Appellate courts decline to second-guess a trial court’s 

decision absent an abuse of discretion. Robertson, 76 S.W.3d at 343. An 

abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice by 

applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the 

case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on 

reasoning that causes an injustice. Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 

S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011); Henderson v. SAIA, Inc., 318 S.W.3d 328, 

335 (Tenn. 2010). This standard does not permit an appellate court to 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but “‘reflects an awareness 

that the decision being reviewed involved a choice among several 

acceptable alternatives,’ and thus ‘envisions a less rigorous review of the 

lower court’s decision and a decreased likelihood that the decision will be 

reversed on appeal.’” Henderson, 318 S.W.3d at 335 (quoting Lee 

Medical, Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010)).

Consequently, when reviewing a discretionary decision by the trial court, 

such as an alimony determination, the appellate court should presume that 

the decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most 
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favorable to the decision. Wright, 337 S.W.3d at 176; Henderson, 318 

S.W.3d at 335.

Id. at 105-06 (footnotes omitted).

As to our review of the trial court’s decision concerning attorney’s fees in a 

divorce action, this Court has stated:

Our review of an award of attorney’s fees is guided by the principle that 

“‘the allowance of attorney’s fees is largely in the discretion of the trial 

court, and the appellate court will not interfere except upon a clear showing 

of abuse of that discretion.’” Mimms v. Mimms, 234 S.W.3d 634, 641 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Taylor v. Fezell, 158 S.W.3d 352, 359 

(Tenn. 2005)). “Reversal of the trial court’s decision [regarding] attorney 

fees at the trial level should occur ‘only when the trial court applies an 

incorrect legal standard, reaches a decision that is illogical, bases its 

decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or employs 

reasoning that causes an injustice to the complaining party.’” Church v. 

Church, 346 S.W.3d 474, 487 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010).

Hernandez v. Hernandez, No. E2012-02056-COA-R3-CV, 2013 WL 5436752, at *8 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2013).

IV. Sufficiency of Record and Husband’s Brief

As a threshold matter, we address Wife’s issues concerning what she posits is 

Husband’s lack of compliance with Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(c) and 

27(a) and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rules 6 and 7. Wife contends that Husband’s 

issues on appeal should be “denied” because in the absence of a trial transcript, he failed 

to file a statement of the evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 

24(c). Wife further contends that Husband’s issues related to the trial court’s marital 

property distribution should be deemed waived because he submitted a copy of the 

master asset list, which was presented as a stipulated exhibit at trial and attached to the 

trial court’s final order, in place of the table required by Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 

7. Wife also asserts that Husband has waived his issues on appeal by presenting 

insufficient argument and citations to authority as required by Tennessee Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 27(a) and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6. Upon thorough 

review of the record presented to us, we conclude that Husband has waived his issues on 

appeal by failing to provide this Court with a sufficient trial record, pursuant to 

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b)-(c), to facilitate review of his issues, as 

well as by failing to present a complete table of property and debts considered by the trial 
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court, pursuant to Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 7, to facilitate review of his issues 

related to property distribution.

Acting through appellate counsel separate from his trial counsel, Husband filed his 

notice of appeal and subsequently filed a notice that no transcript was available to be 

filed. He did not file a statement of the evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 24(c). The record on appeal consists solely of a volume of technical 

record and three exhibits, namely the master asset list, Wife’s affidavit of income and 

expenses, and Husband’s 2020 federal income tax return.

1

 

Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b) provides in relevant part that it is the 

appellant’s duty to prepare “a transcript of such part of the evidence or proceedings as is 

necessary to convey a fair, accurate and complete account of what transpired with respect 

to those issues that are the bases of appeal.” Furthermore, Tennessee Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 24(c) states that where a transcript is not available or affordable, “the appellant 

shall prepare a statement of the evidence,” which “should convey a fair, accurate and 

complete account of what transpired with respect to those issues that are the bases of 

appeal.” In this matter, Husband has not provided this Court with a trial transcript or a

statement of the evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. 

It is well settled that in cases where no transcript or statement of the evidence is 

filed, the appellate court is required to presume that the record, had it been properly 

preserved, would have supported the action of the trial court. See Fayne v. Vincent, 301 

S.W.3d 162, 169-70 (Tenn. 2009) (“[W]hen an issue of sufficiency of the evidence is 

raised on appeal, we must presume, in the absence of a record of the proceedings, that the 

transcript or statement of the evidence, had it been included in the record, would have 

contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual conclusions.”); Reinhardt 

v. Neal, 241 S.W.3d 472, 477 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that in the absence of a 

transcript or statement of the evidence, the appellate court had to presume that the 

evidence supported the trial court’s findings and ultimate conclusion that there was a 

failure of proof); Sherrod v. Wix, 849 S.W.2d 780, 783 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (“This 

court cannot review the facts de novo without an appellate record containing the facts, 

and therefore, we must assume that the record, had it been preserved, would have 

contained sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings.”). Furthermore, 

 

1 Husband claims that the trial court failed to consider a Facebook post, purportedly showing Wife with 

her boyfriend’s arm around her, that Husband had attached to his “Response to Wife’s Motion for 

Spousal Support.” He has included the Facebook post as “Exhibit 1” to his appellate brief. However, no 

pleading with the exact title of “Response to Wife’s Motion for Spousal Support” is in the record, and the 

Facebook post is not in the record at all. Because the post is not part of the record on appeal, we may not 

consider it. See, e.g., Jennings v. Sewell-Allen Piggly Wiggly, 173 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2005) (“This 

attachment [to an appellate brief] . . . does not serve to supplement the record on appeal.”).
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this Court has held that “the burden is . . . on the appellant to provide the Court with a 

transcript of the evidence or a statement of the evidence . . . .” Outdoor Mgmt., LLC v. 

Thomas, 249 S.W.3d 368, 377 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (noting the “conclusive 

presumption that there was sufficient evidence before the trial court to support its 

judgment” if no transcript or statement of the evidence is submitted).

Husband’s issues raised on appeal involve the factual accuracy of the trial court’s 

judgment, including credibility determinations, and the court’s factual findings regarding 

the statutory grounds for divorce; the valuation, existence, and disbursement of specific 

items of marital property; and Husband’s income, expenses, and ability to maintain 

employment. Husband’s issues also involve the trial court’s ultimate distribution of 

marital property based on these factual findings, including the court’s order that Husband 

make a one-time $50,000 payment to Wife as part of an equitable distribution of marital 

property and the court’s award to Wife of $3,000 for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido. 

Husband cites various evidentiary rules and urges this Court to determine that the trial 

court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to 

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“In all actions 

tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and shall state 

separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.”). At 

the outset, we note that upon careful review of the trial court’s final judgment, we 

determine that the court made sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in 

compliance with Rule 52.01. 

With one exception, all of Husband’s issues require that this Court review the 

evidence presented at trial, which in this case necessitates review of a transcript or 

statement of the evidence. The exception is Husband’s challenge to the factual accuracy 

of the trial court’s order based on the court’s finding that the parties had been married for 

eighteen years at the time of the final judgment. The October 2006 date of the marriage 

was included in Husband’s complaint and is undisputed. Accordingly, the parties had 

been married for nearly fifteen years at the time of the September 2021 final judgment. 

The trial court appears to have miscalculated by adding approximately three years to the 

total duration of the marriage up to the time of the divorce decree. We note that “the 

duration of a marriage may be measured by ‘the actual dates of marriage,’ wedding date 

to divorce decree, or by the period of time from marriage to separation.” Stearns-Smith v. 

Smith, No. M2017-01902-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 3453360, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 

31, 2019) (quoting Montgomery v. Silberman, No. M2009-00853-COA-R3-CV, 2009 

WL 4113669, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2009)). Therefore, although the trial 

court undisputedly erred in adding three years to the duration of the marriage, the court 

did act within its discretion when it measured the duration up to the time of the divorce 

decree rather than the parties’ separation as Husband urges.
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Husband cites this miscalculation in support of a heading in his appellate brief 

entitled, “There Was No Evidence That Appellant Had a Relationship With Another 

Woman Until After the Husband and Wife Were Separated.” He then states, with no 

citation to the record, that Husband testified “that he did not have a relationship with 

another woman until after [the parties] were separated.” It is unclear, however, what 

finding made by the trial court, other than the duration of the marriage, Husband is 

challenging here. In a subsequent argument section, Husband again asserts that “there 

was no testimony or evidence on the part of [Wife] or her witness, Chad Chism, that 

[Husband] committed adultery when the couple was not separated.” Other than in an 

issue statement, Husband does not make a connection between this argument and the 

ground for divorce found by the trial court of inappropriate marital conduct. Moreover, 

the trial court made no finding in its final order regarding any extramarital relationship. 

The statutory ground for divorce of adultery, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-101(3) (2021),

was not alleged by Wife or found by the court. 

The trial court did consider what it found to be Husband’s fault in the dissolution 

of the marriage as one factor in the court’s decision to award spousal support to Wife. 

See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(11) (2021).2Immediately preceding its finding that 

 

2 The version of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-121(i) (2021) in effect at the time of the complaint’s 

filing (prior to March 2022) provided the following statutory factors to be considered when determining 

whether spousal support should be awarded:

(1) The relative earning capacity, obligations, needs, and financial resources of each 

party, including income from pension, profit sharing or retirement plans and all 

other sources;

(2) The relative education and training of each party, the ability and opportunity of 

each party to secure such education and training, and the necessity of a party to 

secure further education and training to improve such party’s earnings capacity to 

a reasonable level;

(3) The duration of the marriage;

(4) The age and mental condition of each party;

(5) The physical condition of each party, including, but not limited to, physical 

disability or incapacity due to a chronic debilitating disease;

(6) The extent to which it would be undesirable for a party to seek employment 

outside the home, because such party will be custodian of a minor child of the 

marriage;

(7) The separate assets of each party, both real and personal, tangible and intangible;

(8) The provisions made with regard to the marital property, as defined in § 36-4-

121;

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

(10) The extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible 

contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and 

tangible and intangible contributions by a party to the education, training or

increased earning power of the other party;
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Husband’s fault was a factor, the court stated that Husband had “gotten and disposed of 

most of the parties’ assets” but did not reference any finding of adultery. We note that 

the sole alimony award raised as an issue by Husband is the $3,000 in alimony in solido

granted to Wife as attorney’s fees. Although Husband has challenged the trial court’s 

factual finding that he had the ability to earn $40,000 per year, Husband has not 

specifically raised an issue regarding the $850 in monthly alimony in futuro awarded to 

Wife. See Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b) (“Review generally will extend only to those issues 

presented for review.”). The duration of the marriage is one factor to be considered in a 

spousal support analysis. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i)(3) (2021). However, we 

find the difference between fifteen years and eighteen years as the duration of the 

marriage to be nominal in this case. Given that the trial court made no finding regarding 

adultery and given the nominal difference between a fifteen-year versus eighteen-year 

duration, we determine the trial court’s error in stating the duration of the marriage to 

have been harmless.

As noted above, review of all other issues raised by Husband would require this 

Court to review a transcript or statement of the evidence. Ergo, in the absence of a 

transcript or statement of the evidence, this Court must presume that the evidence 

supported the trial court’s findings. See Fayne, 301 S.W.3d at 169-70. Additionally, 

Husband has failed to include in his appellate brief a table meeting the requirements of 

Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 7, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) In any domestic relations appeal in which either party takes issue 

with the classification of property or debt or with the manner in 

which the trial court divided or allocated the marital property or 

debt, the brief of the party raising the issue shall contain, in the 

statement of facts or in an appendix, a table in a form substantially 

similar to the form attached hereto. This table shall list all property 

and debts considered by the trial court, including: (1) all separate 

property, (2) all marital property, and (3) all separate and marital 

debts.

(b) Each entry in the table must include a citation to the record where 

each party’s evidence regarding the classification or valuation of the 

property or debt can be found and a citation to the record where the 

trial court’s decision regarding the classification, valuation, division, 

or allocation of the property or debt can be found.

 

(11) The relative fault of the parties, in cases where the court, in its discretion, deems 

it appropriate to do so; and

(12) Such other factors, including the tax consequences to each party, as are necessary 

to consider the equities between the parties.
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(c) If counsel disagrees with any entry in the opposing counsel’s table, 

counsel must include in his or her brief, or in a reply brief if the 

issue was raised by opposing counsel after counsel filed his or her 

initial brief, a similar table containing counsel’s version of the facts.

As this Court has explained:

[I]t is essential that the parties comply with Rule 7 in order to aid this Court 

in reviewing the trial court’s decision. The table required by Rule 7, allows 

this Court to easily and correctly determine the valuation and distribution of 

the marital estate as ordered by the trial court. Further, the Rule 7 table, 

allows this Court to ascertain the contentions of each party as to the correct 

valuations and proper distribution, as well as the evidence in the record 

which the party believes supports its contention. Consequently, a table, in 

full compliance with Rule 7, is vital as this Court must consider the entire

distribution of property in order to determine whether the trial court erred. 

Moreover, this Court is under no duty to minutely search the record for 

evidence that the trial court’s valuations may be incorrect or that the 

distribution may be improper.

Kanski v. Kanski, No. M2017-01913-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 5435402, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Oct. 29, 2018) (quoting Harden v. Harden, No. M2009-01302-COA-R3-CV, 2010 

WL 2612688, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2010)) (internal citations in Harden omitted 

in Kanski).

In the instant action, after Husband filed his principal brief, Wife filed a motion to 

dismiss the appeal because Husband had failed to include a Rule 7 table. In an order 

entered on May 3, 2022, this Court denied Wife’s motion to dismiss “without prejudice to 

[Wife’s] ability to raise any and all issues and arguments raised in the motion in her brief 

on appeal.” Husband then filed an amended principal brief with a motion requesting that 

this Court accept the amended brief, which this Court did in an order entered on May 10, 

2022. In the amended brief, Husband has attached a copy of the master asset list that was 

presented at trial as an exhibit and attached to the trial court’s final order. In her 

responsive brief, Wife has raised her issues concerning the deficiency of Husband’s brief 

and argued, inter alia, that Husband’s attachment of the master asset list to his brief does

not constitute a proper Rule 7 table. Husband did not file a reply brief.

The master asset list does not meet all of the requirements of a Rule 7 table, an 

example format of which is included in the rule. The master asset list contains only 

limited valuations offered by Husband and does not contain the trial court’s valuations or 
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any information concerning the parties’ debts. In a similar situation in which the 

appellant husband attempted to comply with Rule 7 by attaching “a reproduction of the 

trial court’s division of property, and the amended joint statement of assets and liabilities 

filed by the parties,” this Court held that “[i]n order to comply with Rule 7, a party must 

do more than simply reproduce the findings of the trial court.” Sullivan v. Sullivan, No. 

M2018-01776-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 4899760, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2019). 

As the Sullivan Court elucidated:

[O]ur role is to analyze whether the overall division of the marital estate 

was equitable. In order for us to properly complete this role, it is 

unequivocally essential for a litigant to include proper citations to the 

record for all proposed values of the marital estate.

Id. at *15. 

As with the husband in Sullivan, Husband in this case has “failed to include 

citations to the record wherein evidence was presented regarding the classifications, 

valuations, and division of the property.” Id. Although this Court may “suspend the 

requirements of Rule 7 for ‘good cause,’” Kanski, 2018 WL 5435402, at *6 (quoting

Hopwood v. Hopwood, No. M2015-01010-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 3537467, at *7 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. June 23, 2016)) (in turn quoting Tenn. R. Ct. App. 1(b)), we discern no good 

cause for such a suspension in this case. See, e.g., Kanski, 2018 WL 5435402 at *6 

(finding “no such cause under the facts of this case” to suspend Rule 7 requirements). 

Furthermore, Husband argues on appeal against many of the valuations contained 

in the master asset list, “the completeness and accuracy of which was sworn to by both 

parties under oath,” according to the trial court. The record contains no indication that 

Husband raised any objection to the master asset list’s presentation as a stipulated exhibit. 

When questioned during oral argument regarding how this Court would be able to 

determine if any objection were made at trial to the master asset list, Husband’s appellate 

counsel acknowledged that “[t]here’s no way.” See Emory v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of 

Educ., 514 S.W.3d 129, 146 (Tenn. 2017) (“[E]ven in cases where error might exist, a 

litigant will not be permitted to raise questions and issues on appeal that have not first 

been presented to the trial court.” (quoting In re Billing & Collection Tariffs of S. Cent. 

Bell, 779 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)). In the absence of a transcript or 

statement of the evidence, we must presume that the trial court properly accepted the 

master asset list as a stipulated exhibit. See, e,g., Kramer v. Kramer, No. E2018-00736-

COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 1239867, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2019) (“Inasmuch as 

we have no proper transcript or statement of the evidence, we must presume that there 

was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings.”). 
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We conclude that with the exception of his issue concerning the factual accuracy 

of the trial court’s finding regarding the duration of the marriage, Husband has waived all 

of his issues on appeal through failure to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate

Procedure 24(b)-(c) and, specifically as to issues of property distribution, his failure to 

comply with Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 7. We further conclude that the trial 

court’s three-year miscalculation of the duration of the parties’ marriage constituted 

harmless error.3

V. Damages for Frivolous Appeal

As the sole remaining issue, Wife contends that Husband’s appeal is frivolous 

such that she should be awarded interest on the trial court’s alimony award plus costs and 

reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-1-122

(2017), which provides:

When it appears to any reviewing court that the appeal from any court of 

record was frivolous or taken solely for delay, the court may, either upon 

motion of a party or of its own motion, award just damages against the 

appellant, which may include but need not be limited to, costs, interest on 

the judgment, and expenses incurred by the appellee as a result of the 

appeal.

 

As this Court has previously explained regarding frivolous appeals:

Parties should not be forced to bear the cost and vexation of baseless 

appeals. Accordingly, in 1975, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122 to enable appellate courts to award damages 

against parties whose appeals are frivolous or are brought solely for the 

 

3 Wife has also argued that Husband failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 

27(a)(7) and Tennessee Court of Appeals Rule 6 by including insufficient citations to the record and to 

authorities. Rule 27(a) provides the components that must be included in an appellant’s brief, and 

subsection (a)(7)(A) specifically requires that the brief must include:

An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of argument, setting forth: (A) the 

contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, 

including the reasons why the contentions require appellate relief, with citations to the 

authorities and appropriate references to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) 

relied on . . . . 

Rule 6(a) of this Court’s rules contains a similar requirement. Having determined that Husband has 

waived his issues pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b)-(c) and Tennessee Court of 

Appeals Rule 7, we further determine that Wife’s argument concerning insufficient citations is 

pretermitted as moot.
- 17 -

purpose of delay. Determining whether to award these damages is a 

discretionary decision.

A frivolous appeal is one that is devoid of merit or one that has no 

reasonable chance of succeeding.

Young v. Barrow, 130 S.W.3d 59, 66-67 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (internal citations 

omitted).

In this case, Husband has waived nearly all of his issues by failing to present this 

Court with a record sufficient for review and has failed to present a proper Rule 7 table 

despite having been granted the opportunity to file an amended brief after Wife pointed 

out the omission in her appellate motion. In relation to the one issue upon which 

Husband successfully pointed out the trial court’s error in calculating the duration of the 

marriage, Husband failed to present a cogent argument that such error could be 

considered prejudicial to him. We therefore agree with Wife that this appeal was 

frivolous. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, No. E2021-00034-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 

3702084, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2021) (deeming the appeal frivolous when the 

appellant relied on facts and documents not in the record and presented a brief failing to 

comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure); Terrazzano v. Terrazano, No. 

M2019-00400-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 6320354, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2019) 

(deeming the appeal frivolous when the appellant “failed to present this court with a 

record showing that she [was] entitled to any relief whatsoever”). We grant Wife’s 

request for an award of reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal and post-judgment interest 

on the awards of $850 in monthly alimony in futuro and $3,000 in alimony in solido.

VI. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We grant

Wife’s request for attorney’s fees on appeal and post-judgment interest on the alimony 

awards of $850 in monthly alimony in futuro and $3,000 in alimony in solido. We 

remand for determination of the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by Wife 

on appeal, calculation of post-judgment interest on the alimony awards pursuant to 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 47-14-121 (2013), enforcement of the judgment, and 

collection of costs below. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, Jeffrey Lee Self.

s/ Thomas R. Frierson, II____________ 

THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, JUDGE