Docket No. 99293. 

IN THE 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 

 CLAUDE BROOKS, JR., Appellee. 

Opinion filed May 18, 2006.

JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion. 

Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Freeman, McMorrow, 

Fitzgerald, Kilbride, Garman, and Karmeier concurred in the 

judgment and opinion. 

OPINION
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Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, 

defendant, Claude Brooks, Jr., was convicted of the predatory 

criminal sexual assault of his eight-year-old stepdaughter. After 

the appellate court affirmed his conviction, defendant filed a 

pro se petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 

ILCS 5/122B1 et seq. (West 2002)) as well as a motion for DNA 

testing pursuant to section 116B3 of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/116B3 (West 2002)). The 

circuit court summarily dismissed defendant=s postconviction 

petition as frivolous and lacking merit and denied the motion for 

DNA testing. The appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in 

part, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. We 

granted the State=s petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 

315) and now affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of 

the appellate court. 

Background 

At defendant=s trial, the victim, L.N., testified that in 1997 

she lived with her mother, brother, and defendant. On the 

evening of October 17, 1997, she was at the family=s apartment 

alone with defendant. Before going to bed, L.N. took a bath 

and put on her two-piece pajamas. She then went into the 

dining room and lay down on a cot to watch television. 

Defendant, who was sitting in a chair near L.N.=s room, 

approached her and pulled down her pajama pants. Then, 

defendant pulled down his pants and climbed on top of L.N. 

L.N. testified that defendant=s Aprivate part@ touched her 

Aprivate part.@ L.N. testified that defendant was Apumping@ on 

her and Agoing in and out@ of her for about five minutes when 

her mother walked into the dining room. Defendant jumped up 

and pulled up his pants. 

L.N. further testified that one morning, several days before 

her birthday, defendant entered the bedroom L.N. shared with 

her brother. Defendant woke her up and took off her pajamas. 

Defendant then disrobed and climbed on top of L.N. L.N. stated 

that defendant put his Aprivate part@ inside her Aprivate part@

and started Apumping@ her. L.N. testified that after a few 

minutes, something came out of defendant=s private part. L.N.=s 

brother was asleep at the time. L.N. did not shout or scream 
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when defendant was on top of her because she was afraid that 

he would hurt her. On October 19, 1997, L.N. went with her 

mother to the hospital and told doctors what had occurred 

between defendant and her. During cross-examination, L.N. 

admitted that she could not recall the dates of these events 

without her mother=s help. 

L.N.=s mother, LaDell, testified that she was married to 

defendant and lived with him and her two children at the time of 

the incidents in question. On October 17, 1997, LaDell left the 

apartment at about 8 p.m. At that time, defendant was in the 

master bedroom, and L.N. was taking a bath. L.N.=s brother 

was spending the night at a friend=s house. LaDell returned to 

the apartment around 45 minutes later and discovered 

defendant on top of L.N. The child=s legs were up in the air, 

and defendant was positioned between her legs. LaDell 

screamed for the defendant to get away from L.N. LaDell took 

her daughter into the master bedroom and asked L.N. whether 

this was the first time defendant had engaged in such behavior. 

L.N. responded in the negative. That night, LaDell slept in a 

chair by L.N.=s bedroom. LaDell could not call police because 

the family did not have a telephone in the apartment. LaDell did 

not leave the apartment until two days later when her best 

friend came to the apartment to pick her up. LaDell took L.N. 

with her. LaDell told her friend what had occurred, and they 

drove to the police station. 

LaDell admitted to using crack cocaine after she had 

witnessed the incident between defendant and L.N. She further 

admitted that she had left the apartment to purchase cocaine to 

use with defendant. 

Dr. Gail Allen, an assistant professor of pediatrics at the 

University of Chicago Children=s Hospital, testified that on 

October 19, 1997, she was assigned to the emergency room 

where L.N. was admitted. Dr. Allen conducted an evaluation of 

L.N. for sexual assault. In a preliminary interview, L.N. told Dr. 

Allen that after she took a bath, defendant Abegan feeling on@

her. L.N. stated that she pushed defendant away, but that he 

returned and Astarted doing it to@ her. However, L.N. told Dr. 

Allen that she had not been vaginally penetrated at that time, 

but she had been in the past. 
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Dr. Allen performed a general physical examination of L.N., 

which revealed the presence of Awhitish@ or Ayellowish@

secretions just outside of L.N.=s vagina. Although L.N.=s hymen 

was intact, Dr. Allen found it significant that during her 

examination, she discovered the development of Awhitish@ scar 

tissue on the right side of L.N.=s hymen. Such a finding is 

consistent with chronic abuse. Dr. Allen collected physical 

evidence for analysis and recommended that L.N. be admitted 

to the chronic care facility of the hospital. 

On cross-examination, Dr. Allen admitted that she was 

unable to find any acute evidence of sexual abuse aside from 

the abnormal secretions. She explained that the term Aacute@

referred to evidence of sexual abuse occurring within 72 hours 

after the alleged incident. 

The parties stipulated that Jennifer Shultz, a forensic 

scientist, received the vaginal swabs taken from L.N. and 

determined that they contained semen. The parties further 

stipulated that Amy Rehemstrom, a forensic scientist, 

compared the DNA from defendant=s blood samples to the 

DNA from the vaginal swabs and determined that no 

conclusion could be drawn as to the source of the semen. 

Defendant=s sole witness was Sergeant Kenneth Burke, a 

youth investigator for the Chicago police department. Burke 

had observed, on October 20, 1997, a victim-sensitive 

interview of L.N. at the hospital. He described L.N. as being 

very alert and articulate. He recalled L.N. telling the social 

worker that defendant Akept messing@ with her and that he 

touched her private part while she was in the bathtub. L.N. 

denied that defendant touched her with his private part. 

The circuit court found defendant guilty. Although the court 

acknowledged the chronological inconsistencies in L.N.=s 

testimony, he found her description of the events to be 

credible. The court also found LaDell=s testimony credible as 

well despite her admitted use of cocaine. The court found the 

medical evidence of scar tissue to L.N.=s hymen to be 

consistent with sexual abuse and that the presence of semen 

suggested some contact. The court sentenced defendant to 22 

years= imprisonment. 
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The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding 

defendant=s insufficiency of the evidence argument to be 

unpersuasive. People v. Brooks, No. 1B00B1176 (2002) 

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

 Defendant thereafter sought postconviction relief. To that 

end, he filed a petition in which he asserted that his trial 

attorney was ineffective for failing to call two witnesses, 

defendant=s mother and his brother. Defendant alleged in his 

petition that their trial testimony would have called into question 

LaDell=s credibility. Defendant also alleged that his appellate 

counsel, who was also his trial counsel, was ineffective for 

failing to raise his own ineffectiveness on direct appeal. 

Defendant=s petition was supported by affidavits from both his 

mother and his brother. After reviewing the affidavits, the circuit 

court summarily dismissed the petition as being without merit. 

Defendant also filed with his postconviction petition a pro se

motion to compel polymerase chain reaction DNA testing (PCR 

DNA testing) of the vaginal swab taken from L.N. This motion 

was made pursuant to section 116B3 of the Code of Criminal 

Procedure (725 ILCS 5/116B3 (West 2002)). The circuit court 

denied the motion. 

Defendant appealed. The appellate court reversed the 

circuit court=s summary dismissal of the postconviction petition 

because it found that the circuit court rendered the order more 

than 90 days after the date the petition was filed and docketed, 

in contravention of section 122B2.1 of the Post-Conviction 

Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122B2.1 (West 2002)). No. 1B03B0586 

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). With 

respect to defendant=s request for new DNA testing, the 

appellate court affirmed the circuit court=s denial of the request, 

holding that defendant did not establish, as required under the 

statute, that the vaginal swab was not subjected to PCR DNA 

testing at the time of trial. Other pertinent facts will be 

discussed within the body of the analysis. 

Analysis 

I 
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The State assigns error to the appellate court=s conclusion 

that the circuit court=s order of summary dismissal was void 

because it was rendered more than 90 days after the date the 

petition was filed and docketed. The State argues that the 

docketing requirement of section 122B2.1 of the PostConviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122B2.1 (West 2002)) is 

fulfilled on the date when the clerk of the court places it on the 

docket call of a trial judge with the authority to rule on it. 

Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the requirement is 

satisfied when the clerk of the court receives the petition. 

The issue, as framed by the parties, involves the 

interpretation of a statute, which is a question of law that we 

review de novo. People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 172 (2003). 

This court=s primary objective when undertaking to interpret a 

statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, and the 

most reliable indicator of that intent is the language of the 

statute. People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (2004); People v. 

Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 497 (2003). 

Section 122B1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) 

provides that a postconviction proceeding Ashall be 

commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the 

conviction took place a petition *** verified by affidavit.@ 725 

ILCS 5/122B1(b) (West 2002). This same section also states 

that the Aclerk shall docket the petition for consideration by the 

court pursuant to Section 122B2.1 upon his or her receipt 

thereof and bring the same promptly to the attention of the 

court.@ 725 ILCS 5/122B1(b) (West 2002). Section 122B2.1 

provides: 

A(a) Within 90 days after the filing and docketing of 

each petition, the court shall examine such petition and 

enter an order thereon pursuant to this Section. 

* * * 

(b) If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this 

Section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed 

for further consideration in accordance with Sections 

122B4 through 122B6.@ 725 ILCS 5/122B2.1 (West 

2004). 
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This court has previously recognized that the time requirement 

contained in section 122B2.1(a) is mandatory, not directory, 

and that a trial court=s noncompliance with the time 

requirement renders any summary dismissal void. People v. 

Porter, 122 Ill. 2d 64, 86 (1988). 

In this case, the record reveals that defendant placed his 

petition in the institutional mail at Centralia Correctional Center 

on September 9, 2002. The notice of filing accompanying 

defendant=s petition was stamped AReceived@ by the clerk of 

the circuit court, criminal division, on September 13, 2002. That 

same notice of filing was also stamped AFiled@ by Dorothy 

Brown, clerk of circuit court, on September 20, 2002. 

Defendant=s actual pro se petition was stamped AFiled@ by 

Dorothy Brown, clerk of circuit court, on September 20, 2002. 

On that same date, the clerk=s office entered the following 

notation on the Ahalf-sheet@ of the case, numbered 97 CR 

29342B01: A9/20/02 Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Filed 

Hearing Date Set: 9/30/02.@ The half-sheet notation reveals 

that the case was assigned to Judge Dernbach from Judge 

Wood on September 30, 2002. Judge Dernbach summarily 

dismissed the case on December 18, 2002. 

As noted above, the Act requires that within 90 days Aafter 

the filing and docketing@ of the petition, the circuit court shall 

examine the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122B2.1(a) (West 2002). In 

this case, the parties focus on the meaning of the word 

Adocketing.@ Defendant maintains, as did the appellate court, 

that the plain language of the Act establishes that the 90-day 

review period begins to run when a postconviction petition is 

received by the clerk of the circuit court, which in this case was 

on September 13, 2002. The State contends that the 90-day 

review period begins to run when the clerk of the court places 

the case on the call of a judge with authority to rule on it, which 

in this case was on September 30, 2002, the day on which the 

case was placed on the call of Judge Dernbach. Thus, the 

parties give different meanings to the word Adocketing@ as it is 

used in section 122B2.1(a) of the Act. 

The Act does not define the word Adocketing.@ As such, we 

must interpret it, and in so doing, we must give the word its 

plain, ordinary, and popularly understood meaning. Carver v. 
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Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 507 (2003). When a 

term used by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, it is not 

necessary to resort to other aids of construction. Michigan 

Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 

(2000). According to Black=s Law Dictionary, the word Adocket,@

when used in its verb form, means Ato make a brief entry in the 

docket of the proceedings and filings in a court case *** to 

abstract and enter in a book *** or to schedule (a case) for trial 

or some other event.@ Black=s Law Dictionary 517 (8th ed. 

2004). The standard dictionary meaning of the verb Adocket@ is 

Ato make a brief abstract of (a legal matter) and inscribe it in a 

list.@ Webster=s Third New International Dictionary 666 (1993). 

Clearly, then, the verb Adocket@connotes more than the mere 

act of receiving the petition, as defendant suggests. To 

Adocket@ requires that the cause be entered in an official 

record. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the word Adocket@

entails that the case be placed on a specific call of a judge, as 

the State maintains. The plain meaning of the word connotes 

that the cause is entered on the court=s official docket for 

further proceedings. The record here reveals that defendant=s 

postconviction petition was Adocketed@ within the commonly 

understood meaning of the word on September 20, 2002, when 

the clerk of the court entered the petition into the case file and 

set it for a hearing. Thus, in this case, the clock began to run 

for purposes of the time requirement contained in section 

122B2.1 on September 20, 2002. 

In view of the above, we cannot agree with the appellate 

court that the summary order of dismissal entered by the circuit 

court was void. The circuit court entered the summary 

dismissal order on December 18, 2002, and the petition was 

docketed on September 20, 2002. As such, the circuit court=s 

ruling occurred within the statutory time span allowed in section 

122B2.1. The appellate court=s conclusion to the contrary was 

erroneous. 

II 

In a request for cross-relief, defendant contends that the 

appellate court erred in affirming the circuit court=s denial of his 

motion for DNA testing pursuant to section 116B3 of the Code 
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of Civil Procedure. In his motion to allow DNA testing, 

defendant had stated that none of the DNA material collected 

from him Awas subjected to test [sic] requested. Now 

[defendant] request [sic] forensic (PCR DNA) testing.@ The 

defendant had also stated that AThe DNA technology available 

today was not available at the time of trial.@ The circuit court 

denied the motion. The appellate court rejected defendant=s 

claim of error on the grounds that defendant could not show 

that his evidentiary sample had not been previously subjected 

to PCR DNA testing at the time of his trial. No. 1B03B0568 

(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

In this court, defendant maintains that he made his prima 

facie case as required by section 116B3 by asserting that 

identity was at issue at the trial; that the vaginal swab was not 

subject to testing at the time of the trial; and that the evidence 

to be tested had been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to 

establish that it had not been substituted, tampered with, 

replaced, or altered in any material respect. 

Section 116B3 of the Code provides: 

A(a) A defendant may make a motion before the trial 

court that entered the judgment of conviction in his or 

her case for the performance of fingerprint or forensic 

DNA testing on evidence that was secured in relation to 

the trial which resulted in his or her conviction, but 

which was not subject to the testing which is now 

requested because the technology for the testing was 

not available at the time of trial. *** 

(b) The defendant must present a prima facie case 

that: 

(1) identity was the issue in the trial which 

resulted in his or her conviction; and 

(2) the evidence to be tested has been subject to 

a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has 

not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or 

altered in any material aspect. 

(c) The trial court shall allow the testing under 

reasonable conditions designed to protect the State=s 
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interests in the integrity of the evidence and the testing 

process upon a determination that: 

(1) the result of the testing has the scientific 

potential to produce new, noncumulative evidence 

materially relevant to the defendant=s assertion of 

actual innocence; [and] 

(2) the testing requested employs a scientific 

method generally accepted within the relevant 

scientific community.@ (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 

5/116B3 (West 2002). 

The denial of a request made pursuant to section 116B3 is 

subject to de novo review upon appeal. People v. Shum, 207 

Ill. 2d 47, 65 (2003). 

We agree with the appellate court=s conclusion that to have 

granted defendant=s request for retesting under these 

circumstances would have been contrary to both the express 

language of the statute and the intent of the legislature. The 

plain language of subsection (a) of section 116B3 requires that 

a defendant show (i) that the evidence in question was not 

subject to the requested test at the time of the trial and, (ii) that 

the reason it was not subject to testing is because the 

technology for the requested test was unavailable at the time of 

defendant=s trial. People v. Lamming, 358 Ill. App. 3d 1153, 

1156 (2005), quoting People v. Franks, 323 Ill. App. 3d 660, 

662 (2001); People v. Price, 345 Ill. App. 3d 129 (2003). In his 

motion, defendant requested PCR DNA testing. The record 

indicates that the circuit court ordered the genetic samples 

collected from the victim tested for DNA analysis on November 

8, 1999. Defendant=s trial took place in January 2000. At the 

time of defendant=s trial, the technology for PCR DNA testing 

was available and the method itself was recognized by the 

judiciary nationwide, including Illinois. See People v. Pope, 284 

Ill. App. 3d 695, 703-05 (1996) (noting that PCR testing 

accepted by the scientific community and collecting cases); 

see also United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th 

Cir. 1996) (concluding that courts in the Eighth Circuit can take 

judicial notice of the general reliability of PCR DNA testing); 

Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434, 440 (Alaska App. 1995) 

(holding that there is little question concerning the scientific 
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acceptance of the theory underlying PCR DNA testing); State 

v. Brown 949 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Mo. App. 1997) (same); Wood 

v. State, 959 P.2d 1 (Okla. 1998); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 

240 Va. 78, 393 S.E.2d 609 (1990). Thus, if the requested test 

was not done on the genetic samples collected from the victim, 

the reason it was not done was not because the technology for 

the testing was unavailable at the time of defendant=s trial. 

However, that is the only reason the statute allows for granting 

a request. We hold that the circuit court did not err in denying 

defendant=s request. 

Conclusion 

In light of the foregoing, we reverse that portion of the 

appellate court=s judgment which held the circuit court=s 

summary dismissal of defendant=s postconviction petition void. 

Consequently, we remand the matter to the appellate court in 

order for it to consider the remainder of defendant=s appellate 

challenges to the circuit court=s summary dismissal of his 

postconviction petition. We affirm the appellate court=s 

judgment in all other respects. 

Appellate court judgment affirmed 

 in part and reversed in part; 

 cause remanded.