alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People *ex rel.*Frederick Heffernan *v.*John McClave *et al.*

*(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department,*

*Filed January 24, 1890.)*

Municipal Corporations—Police—Removal.

A decision of the commissioners of police removing an officer upon conflicting evidence cannot be interfered with by an appellate court.

*J. M. Tierney,*for relator; *J. J. Deldny,*for resp’t

Per Curiam.

The commissioners no doubt considered properly the evidence given to sustain the charge made against the relator and which involved a contradiction between him and the roundsman who reported him and who was called to sustain the charge.

The commissioners having considered the evidence and having found against the relator, we do not understand that we can interfere with it according to the rules established by the court of last resort

For these reasons the proceedings of the commissioners should be affirmed and the writ dismissed.

Yan Brunt, P. J., Brady and Daniels, JJ., concur.
**AD Economic Evaluation**



### Docket No . FAA - 2013 - 0525 Directorate ID : 20 11 - SW - 063 - AD Helicopter Model: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 206L , L - 1 L - 3, and L - 4 Helicopters Number of Helicopters (U.S. Operators): 6 88 Helicopters in the US Registry . Reason : The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of a main rotor blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. Costs : Parts per Helicopter $ Labor per Helicopter ( 2.5 work-hour s x 

### $ 8 5 /workhour to measure the spar and reidentify the blade) $ 213 Other (Explain) According to Bell’s service information, some of the costs may be under warranty. Total Cost per Helicopter $ 213 Total US Fleet Cost $ 146,544 Executive Order 12866 : Could the AD be considered a “significant regulatory action?” Yes ( ) No (  ) DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures : Is the AD significant? Yes ( ) Explain Below No (  ) Regulatory Flexibility Act : Will the AD have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities? Yes ( ) No (  ) Project Engineer : Sharon Miles
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 11** 
**- 6701** 

JOSE MORA ,
Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.
SUHASINI N. SHAH, Doctor; NANCY PENDERGRASS, Bureau of Prisons Petersburg Medium Dietician; M. DUPREE; MIGUEL A. CINTRON, Dr, Medical Department

– FCC Coleman; JORGE PASTRANA, Warden ,
Defendants

- Appellees

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk

. Raymond A. Jackson , District Judge. ( 2:08

- cv
- 00635

- RAJ

- DEM )

Submit ted : October 18, 2011 Decided: October 21, 2011

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DIAZ , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Jose Mora, Appellant Pro Se. Lawrence Richard Leonard, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virgi nia; Dorinda Parkola Burton, POOLE MAHONEY, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:

Jose Mora appeals the district court's order denying
relief on his complaint , which th e district court properly

construed as one filed pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics , 403 U.S. 388 (1971). We

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court ’s order

. See Mora v.

Shah , No. 2:08

- cv
- 00635

- RAJ

- DEM ( E. D. Va. March 31, 2011 ). We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 14**  **- 6558** 

DENNIS M. WILLIAMS , Petitioner

- Appellant ,
v. PAT CHAVIS; ALVIN KELLER , Respondents

- Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh
. James C. Fox , Senior District Judge. ( 5:12

- hc

- 02235

- F )

Submitted : June 19, 2014 Decided: June 23, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by un published per curiam opinion
. Dennis W. Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, III, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Dennis M. Williams seeks to appeal the district court’s order denyin g relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ( 2012 ) petition and he has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis
. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. Se e 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (A) (2012) . A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “ a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. ” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012)
. When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner sati sfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller

- El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336

- 38 ( 2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack , 529 U.S. at 484

- 85. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williams has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny Williams’ application to proceed in forma pauperis, deny a certificate of appealability , and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal3 contentions are adequately presented in the materials before th is court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
1

The Honorable Warren K. Urbom, United States District Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-2525

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of Nebraska.

*

Terrell E. Newman, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: January 7, 2003

 Filed: January 15, 2003

___________

Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Terrell Newman pleaded guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of a mixture

or substance containing methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1), and to forfeiture of drug proceeds, under 21 U.S.C. § 853. The district court1

sentenced Newman to 120 months imprisonment and 4 years supervised release. On

appeal, counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California,

368 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the government had orally agreed Newman’s
-2-

criminal history would be Category IV and he would receive a 100-month prison

sentence, and that the district court erred in not granting a downward departure. We

affirm.

Newman’s first argument is belied by the record. He did not object to the facts

underlying his Category V criminal history as determined in the presentence report.

See United States v. Beatty, 9 F.3d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1993) (district court may accept

as true all unobjected-to factual statements in PSR). The written plea agreement

made no reference to an agreed-upon criminal history category, and clearly stated that

no agreements had been entered into other than those set forth in the document and

that none would be entered into except by written agreement of the parties. See

United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1996) (plea agreement

is governed by ordinary contract principles). Further, at the plea hearing Newman

affirmed that the written plea agreement set out all the terms, conditions, and

promises he had made with the government. See Nguyen v. United States, 114 F.3d

699, 703 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s representations during plea-taking carry strong

presumption of verity). 

As for the second point, at sentencing the district court heard argument on

Newman’s downward-departure motion, reviewed the applicable facts set out in the

presentence report, and declined to depart. Given that the district court was aware of

its authority to depart, its discretionary refusal to do so is unreviewable. See United

States v. Orozco-Rodriguez, 220 F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir. 2000).

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75

(1988), we find no other nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw.
-3-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
**Exhibit 3.2**

**CERTIFICATE OF AMENDMENT OF**

**AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF**

**DAYSTAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.**

**DAYSTAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.**, a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “Corporation”),hereby certifies that: 

**FIRST:** The name of the Corporation is **DAYSTARTECHNOLOGIES, INC.**

**SECOND:** The date on which the Certificate of Incorporation ofthe Corporation was originally filed with the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware is February 19, 1997. 

**THIRD:** The Board of Directors of the Corporation, acting in accordance with the provisions of Sections 141 and 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware, adopted resolutions amending itsCertificate of Incorporation as follows: 

Article 4.1 shall be amended and restated to read in its entirety as follows: 

“4.1 *Authorized Shares.*The Corporation is authorized to issue two classes of stock to be designated, respectively, “common stock”and “preferred stock.” The total number of shares which the Corporation is authorized to issue is one hundred twenty three million shares (123,000,000) shares, one hundred twenty million (120,000,000) shares of which shall becommon stock, $.01 par value per share, and three million (3,000,000) shares of which shall be preferred stock, $.01 par value per share. 

**FOURTH:** Thereafter pursuant to a resolution of the Board of Directors, this Certificate of Amendment was submitted to the stockholders of the Corporation for their approval, and was duly adopted in accordance withthe provisions of Section 242 of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware. 

**IN WITNESSWHEREOF, DAYSTAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.** has caused this Certificate of Amendment to be signed by its Chief Executive Officer this 8th day of October, 2008. 

 

**DAYSTAR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.**
By: /s/ Stephan DeLuca Stephan DeLuca, Chief Executive Officer
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Bridget M. McCormack

,

Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Elizabeth T. Clement

Megan K. Cavanagh

Elizabeth M. Welch

,

Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

April 2 1 , 2021 

# Order

Clerk April 2 1 , 2021

1628 86 ( 1 05 )

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

SC: 16 28 86

v COA: 3 4 8 659

Genesee CC: 15

- 037634

- FC

KEONTE RASHAAD SADLER

,

Defendant

- Appellant

.

_________ _____________________________ /

On order of the C hief Justice , the motion of defendant

- appellant to waive filing fees

is GRANTED as to this case only

.
1



# United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 20

- 1 400

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,

Appell ant ,

v.

JOSEPH BAPTISTE,

Defendant, A ppell ee

.

No. 20

- 1401

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appell ant ,

v.

ROGER RICHARD BONCY,

Defendant, Appell ee

.

ERRATA SHEET

The opinion of this Court, issued on August 9, 2021, is
amended as follows:

On page 10, the last line of footnote 3, add a closing quotation mark after the period

On page 20, line 14, change "in preceding" to "in the preceding"
(Reap. Dec. 10171)

#### W. J. Byrnes & Co. of N.Y., Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 759672.

(Decided February 15, 1962)

*Barnes, Richardson & Colburn*for the plaintiff.

*William, S. Orrielc, Jr.,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

MollisoN, Judge:

Counsel for the parties have submitted the above-enumerated appeal for reappraisement for decision upon a stipulation reading as follows:

> 1. That the merchandise and the issues involved in the above-entitled appeal for reappraisement are the same in all material respects as those involved in *United States*v. *Gitkin Co.,*A.R.D. 132, and that the record in the cited case may be incorporated in the record herein.

> 2. That at the time of exportation of the merchandise involved herein, the prices at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of exportation in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, for exportation to the United States, including the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature and all other costs, charges and expenses incidental to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States, were the appraised values less the amounts described on the invoices under the heading “actual charges”, plus the amount of the item described on the invoices as “bale and packing charges”; and that on or about the said time of exportation, such or similar merchandise was not freely offered for sale to all purchasers for home consumption in the country of exportation.

> 3. That the above-entitled appeal may be submitted on this stipulation, the same being limited to the merchandise and the issues described hereinabove and abandoned in all other respects.

On tbe agreed facts, I find export value, as defined in section 402(d), Tariff Act of 1930, as it existed prior to tbe amendment thereof by tbe Customs Simplification Act of 1956, to be tbe proper basis for tbe determination of tbe values of tbe merchandise involved in this appeal and that such values were tbe appraised values, less the amounts described on tbe invoices under tbe heading “actual charges,” plus the amount of tbe item described on the invoices as “bale and. packing charges.”

Judgment will issue accordingly.
No. 50119.

#### Protests 14198-K, etc., of G. J. Kluyskens et al. (Baltimore, etc.).

Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

Following the authorites cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8759 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8759

  To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to allow certain payments 
    made by public service employees to qualify for public service 
                   repayment, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 14, 2024

 Mr. Foster (for himself, Mr. Fitzpatrick, Mr. Garcia of Illinois, Mr. 
Nadler, Ms. Kuster, Mr. Bishop of Georgia, Ms. Clarke of New York, and 
    Ms. Lee of California) introduced the following bill; which was 
        referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Higher Education Act of 1965 to allow certain payments 
    made by public service employees to qualify for public service 
                   repayment, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Public Service Loan Forgiveness 
Inclusion Act of 2024''.

SEC. 2. QUALIFYING PAYMENTS.

    (a) In General.--Section 455(m) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 
(20 U.S.C. 1087e(m)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (1)(A) by inserting ``subject to paragraph 
        (5),'' before ``has made''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following:
            ``(5) First 60 monthly payments.--
                    ``(A) In general.--For the purpose of meeting the 
                requirement under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1), 
                the first 60 monthly payments may be payments under a 
                repayment plan under subsection (d)(1) or (g).
                    ``(B) Applicability.--This paragraph shall apply to 
                borrowers who on or after the date of the enactment of 
                this paragraph have made less than 120 monthly payments 
                under paragraph (1)(A).''.
    (b) Notification to Borrowers.--Not later than 180 days after the 
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Education shall--
            (1) inform each borrower of a loan made under part D of 
        title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087a 
        et seq.) of--
                    (A) paragraph (5) of section 455(m) of the Higher 
                Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1087e(m)), as amended 
                by this Act; and
                    (B) the effect of such paragraph on loan 
                cancellation under such section 455(m) (20 U.S.C. 
                1087e(m)); and
            (2) provide information to such borrowers on how to change 
        repayment plans.
                                 <all>
```
Case Wo. 5,400.

#### GIBSON v. RICHARDS.

[See Case No. 5,399.]
(Reap. Dec. 9284)

#### Curt L. Sterner Co. *v.*United States

Entry No. 26990.

(Decided December 29, 1958)

Plaintiff not represented by counsel.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant,

Lawrence, Judge:

When this appeal for a reappraisement was called for hearing, there was no appearance on behalf of plaintiff.

An examination of the official record discloses no reason for disturbing the presumptively correct value for the merchandise found by the appraiser.

I, therefore, find and hold the proper dutiable value of the merchandise covered by this appeal to be the value found by the appraiser.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
AMENDMENT NO. 1 TO REGISTRATION RIGHTS AGREEMENT

     This  Amendment No. 1 to Registration Rights Agreement (the "Amendment") is
made  and  entered  into  as  of the ____ day of November, 2000, by and Telscape
International,  a Texas corporation (the "Company"), and the Purchasers (as such
term  is defined in that certain Registration Rights Agreement, dated as of June
2, 2000, by and between the Company and the Purchasers (the "Registration Rights
Agreement").

     WHEREAS,  the  Company  and  the  Purchasers  entered into the Registration
Rights  Agreement;  and

     WHEREAS,  the  Company  and  the  Purchasers wish to amend the terms of the
Registration  Rights  Agreement  as  described  herein;

     NOW,  THEREFORE,  in  consideration  of  the  mutual promises, benefits and
covenants  herein  contained,  the  Company  and  the Purchasers hereby agree as
follows:

     1.     Unless  otherwise  defined,  all capitalized terms used herein shall
have  the  meaning  ascribed  to them in the Registration Rights Agreement.  All
references  to  Section  herein  shall be to Sections of the Registration Rights
Agreement.

     2.     The  first  sentence  of Section 2.1(a) shall be amended read in its
entirety  as  follows:

     (a)     Subject to the provisions set forth in Article 5, the Company shall
file,  on or before the date that is 90 days following the first issuance of the
Company's  Class  G Senior Preferred Stock, par value $0.001 per share, with the
Commission  a registration statement under the Securities Act on Form S-3 or any
appropriate  form  (or  any  successor  form)  pursuant  to  Rule  415 under the
Securities  Act.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment No. 1as
of  the  date  first  above  written.

                               TELCAPE  INTERNATIONAL,  INC.


                               By: _____________________________
                               Name: ___________________________
                               Title: __________________________


                               INVESTORS:


<PAGE>
                               SANDLER CAPITAL PARTNERS IV, L.P.


                               By: _____________________________
                                   David  C.  Lee
                                   Managing  Director

                               SANDLER CAPITAL PARTNERS IV FTE, L.P.


                               By: _____________________________
                                   David  C.  Lee
                                   Managing  Director


                               OGER  PENSAT  HOLDINGS,  LTD.

                               By: _____________________________
                               Name: ___________________________
                               Title: __________________________



                              CPP  LLC

                               By: _____________________________
                               Name: ___________________________
                               Title: __________________________


<PAGE>
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v. JIMMY KELLY BURKS, Seaman Apprentice, U. S. Navy, Appellant

6 USCMA 169, 19 CMR 295

No. 6744

Decided July 15, 1955

*Captain Daniel B. Hunter,*USMC, was on the brief for Appellant, Accused.

*Commander Lewis N. Evans,*USN, was on the brief for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam:

The issue before us in the present appeal has to do with the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the court-martial’s finding that the accused’s desertion was terminated by apprehension. Prosecution Exhibit 2, an extract copy of an entry in Burks’ service record, recites that he was “Apprehended by FBI and released to civil authorities in Mai’ked Tree, Arkansas 22 December 1954 to await naval guards from this activity.”

This entry was made in accordance

with an official duty imposed by Naval directives and is admissible in evidence. United States v. Coates, 2 USCMA 625, 10 CMR 123. Furthermore, we have recently decided expressly that an official record of this nature suffices to support a court-martial’s finding of apprehension. United States v. Simone, 6 USCMA 146, 19 CMR 272; United States v. Lugo, 6 USCMA 151, 19 CMR 277. Accordingly, the findings and sentence, as approved by the convening authority and a board of review, must be, and hereby are, affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v GLENN F. MOREHEAD, Seaman, U. S. Navy, Appellant

17 USCMA 366, 38 CMR 164

No. 20,752

January 26, 1968

*367
      *Lieutenant Peter F. Vaira,*USNR, was on the pleadings for Appellant, Accused.

*Captain R. S. Gasiorowski,*USMCR, was on the pleadings for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam:

Tried by special court-martial,. the accused pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, larceny in violation of Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 121, 10 USC § 921. He was sentenced to bad-conduct discharge, confinement at hard labor for six months, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for a like period, and reduction. Intermediate appellate authorities affirmed.

At the trial, it appears evidence was adduced that Morehead “had been accused or tried or at least there was evidence that he had had problems of being a shop lifter at one time.” In addition, trial counsel noted accused’s last evaluation “said that he must be reminded of his personal appearence [sic] and he does not get along with petty officers.” There were no instructions to disregard these matters. Prejudicial error was, therefore, committed. See United States v Rodriguez, 17 USCMA 54, 37 CMR 318; United States v Baskin, 17 USCMA 315, 38 CMR 113; and United States v Averette, 17 USCMA 319, 38 CMR 117.

The petition for review is granted, and the decision of the board of review is reversed. The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy. The board of review may reassess the sentence to purge the prejudice, or order a rehearing thereon.