NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IN RE: TREETOP DEVELOPMENT, LLC, DEBTOR

TREETOP DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 24

- 2740
D.C. No. 2:24

- cv
- 1965

- FWS

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sheri Bluebond , Bankruptcy Judge , Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 9, 2024

Pasadena , California

Before: IKUTA, FRIEDLAND, and LEE, Circuit Judges

. The City of Los Angeles appeals the bankruptcy court’s partial grant of
summary adjudication , after we granted the City’s petition for a direct appeal to

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3. 

# FILED

SEP 24 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 24

- 2740

this court under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)

. We review de novo, In re Caneva , 550
F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2008) , and we reverse

. Under California law, “if a property owner has performed substantial work
and incurred substantial liabilities in good faith reliance upon a permit issued by
the government, he acquires a vested right to complete construction in accordance

with the terms o f the permit.” Avco Cmty. Devs., Inc. v. S. Coast Reg’l Com m’n , 17 Cal. 3d 785, 791 (1976). This doctrine prevents the government from changing
the law to “prohibit construction authorized by the permit upon which he relied.”

I d. “ But it is well estab lished that the rights which may ‘vest’ through reliance on
a government permit are no greater than those specifically granted by the permit

itself.” Santa Monica Pines, Ltd. v. Rent Control Bd. , 35 Cal. 3d 858, 866 (1984).
Where the permit contains a limiting condition, the vested right is limited by that

condition. See Russ Bldg. P’ship v. City & C nty

. of San Francisco , 44 Cal. 3d 839,

8 5 3

– 5 4 (1988) . To hold otherwise “would give [plaintiffs] greater rights than
those granted by their permits.” Id. at 854 (quotation marks omitted).

Here, Treetop’s main house and guest house permits expressly state that
“[t]his permit expires two years after the date of the permit issuance.” To the
extent Treetop had a vested right to construct its project u nder the legal regime in
place at the time th e permits were gra nted , that right was limited by the expiration

dates of its permits

. See S. Lake Tahoe Prop. Owners Grp. v. City of S outh Lake3 24

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Tahoe , 310 Cal. Rptr. 3d 9, 21 (Ct. App. 2023) (“ Any vested rights the members
may have had in their permits were limited by their permits’ terms and conditions,
including the one

- year expiration dates. ”) ; Hobbs v. City of Pac ific Grove , 301 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 274 , 286 (Ct. App. 2022) ( similar ). Treetop does not dispute that it never

obtained an extension

. I ts main house and guest house permits therefore expired
by the end of their two

- year term s on March 19, 2020 , and March 16, 2020,
respecti vely , before the City’s pan demic tolling order went into effect

.
Pardee Constr uction Co. v. California Coastal Com mission , 157 Cal. Rptr.
184 (Ct. App. 1979), is not to the contrary

. Pardee addressed a specific statutory

scheme that provided an express exemption for vested rights holders without
regard to the expiration of the underlying building permit

. See id. at 186

– 88. No

such statute is applicable here.
Treetop does not raise an equitable estoppel argument separate from its
vested rights theory on appeal. Because the vested rights theory Treetop

e xclusively relie s upon is unavai ling, we need not r each any of the City’s

arguments about altern ative grounds for reversal

.
REVERSE D and REMAND ED

.