J-S56023-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

YAQUAN GERALD WILLIAMS

Appellant No. 796 MDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order April 9, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0001092-2009

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2015

Yaquan Gerald Williams (“Appellant”), appeals from the order 

dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

On September 21, 2010, a jury found Appellant guilty of murder in the 

first degree,1firearms not to be carried without a license,2and delivery of a 

controlled substance – cocaine.3 On September 30, 2010, the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, and 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1).

3 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
J-S56023-15

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consecutive sentences of 1 to 2 years’ incarceration for the firearms not to 

be carried without a license conviction and 2 to 4 years’ incarceration on the 

delivery of a controlled substance conviction. Appellant appealed. This 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on August 2, 2011,4and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of 

appeal on January 19, 2012.

On October 5, 2012, Appellant filed the instant timely PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court held evidentiary hearings on August 12, 2014 and October 

9, 2014, and denied the PCRA petition on April 9, 2015. Appellant timely 

appealed on May 7, 2015. Also on May 7, 2015, the PCRA court filed a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that adopted the April 9, 2015 order as the court’s 

1925(a) opinion.5

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:6

I. [Whether] Appellant was denied his rights under Article 1 § 9 

[of] the Constitution of Pennsylvania and the Sixth Amendment 

to the Constitution of America to effective assistance of counsel 

in that trial counsel failed to investigate, interview and call to 

testify at trial an eyewitness to the crime[?]

____________________________________________

4 See Commonwealth v. Williams, 1664 MDA 2010, August 2, 2011 

(unpublished memorandum).

5

The PCRA court did not order, and Appellant did not file, a statement of 

matters complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

6 We note that, with the exception of the additional seventh issue alleging 

Appellant was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of prior counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, these claims mirror exactly Appellant’s claims raised in his 

PCRA petition.
J-S56023-15

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II. [Whether c]ounsel was constitutionally ineffective under the 

Sixth Amendment for eliciting prejudicial testimony from a 

detective about the detective’s personal opinion of the 

truthfulness of another witness’ testimony. In that the 

detective[’]s opinion of the witness’ credibility supplanted the 

fact finder’s determination, [Appellant’s] Fourteenth Amendment 

rights were violated[?]

III. [Whether d]irect appeal[] counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective under the Sixth Amendment for raising a claim 

challenging the trial court’s denial of the motions to suppress 

and then failing to brief said issue, thereby waiving it[?]

IV. [Whether c]ounsel was constitutionally ineffective under the 

Sixth Amendment for failing to preserve and properly argue a 

hearsay objection to testimony that Ms. Aguilera called people 

and told them that Ms. Johnson was [a] snitch[?]

V. [Whether c]ounsel was constitutionally ineffective under the 

Sixth Amendment for opening the door to prejudicial testimony 

from a Commonwealth witness[?]

VI. [Whether c]ounsel was constitutionally ineffective under the 

Sixth Amendment for failing to object [to] questions to an 

eyewitness that confused and misle[]d the jury concerning the 

reliability of the witness’ identification of the perpetrator[?]

VII. [Whether t]he [c]umulative [i]mpact of [c]ounsel’s 

ineffectiveness entitles Appellant to relief[?]

Appellant’s Brief, pp. 2-3.

Our standard of review from the denial of post-conviction relief “is 

limited to examining whether the court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238 (Pa.Super.2011) (citing Commonwealth v. 

Morales, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa.1997)).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Dennis E. 
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Reinaker, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The PCRA court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. See PCRA Court Opinion and Order, dated April 9, 2015, pp. 2-

13 (finding: (1) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to call eyewitness 

where Appellant failed to prove proposed witness’s willingness to testify at 

trial, or that absence of such testimony prejudiced Appellant where court 

found witness’s testimony at PCRA hearing incredible; (2) trial counsel was 

not ineffective for eliciting testimony from detective regarding his personal 

opinion as to truthfulness of another witness where detective commented on 

witness’s truthfulness at time of interview, not trial, trial counsel had 

strategic reason for not objecting to detective’s testimony, and trial court 

properly instructed jury regarding detective’s testimony; (3) appellate 

counsel was not ineffective for raising but failing to brief meritless 

suppression issue on direct appeal; (4) trial counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to object to alleged hearsay testimony where trial court had ruled 

pre-trial that testimony would be admissible; (5) trial counsel was not 

ineffective for opening door to prejudicial testimony of Commonwealth 

witness where questioning was strategically reasonable to support defense 

contention police determined Appellant was the shooter and then attempted 

to garner evidence to support their theory of the crime; (6) trial counsel was 

not ineffective for failing to object to certain questions posed to eyewitness 

where counsel objected, trial court instructed prosecutor to rephrase 

question, prosecutor did rephrase question, and Appellant failed to prove 
J-S56023-15

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prejudice from counsel’s failure to further object). Accordingly, we affirm on 

the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.

Order affirmed.

Judge Shogan joins in the memorandum.

Judge Platt concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/2/2015
/ 

Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief will be Denied •. 

.. , ' •• I • • . '., ' • • 

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mislead the jury; and (6) Appellate Counsel was ineffective for waiving a claim that challenged 

the; Trial Court's denial of a moti on to suppress .. The Court finds that the Defendant's Amended -. 

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} Commonwealth's questioning during cross-examination ofan eyewitness that con:thsed and 

) 

Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the \ 

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of counsel when he opened the door to prejudicial testimony from a Commonwealth witness; (5) ) 

regarding what the victim told the detective; ( 4) his Trial Counsel provided ineffective asslstance / . . 

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ineffective when he elicited testimo1,1y from. a detective about the detective's personahJpiniop-uf 

the truthfulness of another witness' testimony; (3) his Trial Counsel provided ineffective · 

assistance of counsel when hk. failed to raise a hearsay objection to the detective's testimony 

) 

investigate; interview and call to testify at trial an eyewitness to the crime; (2) Trial Counsel was 

• • ~ • , .• ·• • • ; I ' • ,, 

) 

) 

) 

) Conviction Collateral Relief. The Defendant argues that he is entitled to post conviction relief 

) on six grounds: (1) his Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to 

) 

The Defendant, Yaquan Gerald Williams, has filed an Amended Motion for Post- ) 

-----------------······· . 

) 

) 

OPINION AND ORDER 

BY: REINAKER, .T. 

April 9, 2015 

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v. No. 1092-2009 

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) YAQUAN GERALD WILLIAMS 

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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLV ANI~ 

CRIMINAL . 

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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §2501(a). 

218 Pa.C.S.A. §6106(a)(l). 

3 35 P.S. §780 .. J 13(a)(30). 

following standards apply to the determination of ineffectiveness issues. 

Discussion 

submitted their briefs, and the matter is ready for decision. 

2012 and the PCRA Court held evidentiary hearings on August 12, 2014 and October 9, 2014. 

At the conclusion of the hearings, the Court ordered both parties to file briefs. Both parties have 

The Defendant filed a timely Motion for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief on October 5, 

with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania which was denied on January 19, 2012. 

August 2, 2011. On August 10, 2011 the Defendant next filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on 

On February 3; 2011 the Defendant, through Appellate Counsel, filed an appeal to the 

be served consecutively with his life imprisonment for murder charge. 

) nor more than four ( 4) years incarceration for delivery of a controlled substance, which were to --··-··· _ ···-·········· 

(1) no more than two (2) years incarceration for possession of firearms, and not less than two (2) 

imprisonment without the possibility ofparole for murder in the first degree, not less than one 

and one count of delivery of cocaine. 3 On September 30, 2010, he was sentenced to life 

homicide - murder in the first degree, 1 one count of firearms not to be carried without a license,2 

On September 21, 20 IO a jury found the Defendant guilty of one count of criminal 

Procedural and Factual Background 

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counsel knew of, or should have known of the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was 

''(l) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) 

1108-09 (Pa. 2012) established that the petitioner must prove: 

assistance for failure to call a witness, the Court in Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 

) 

Counsel failed to call Keenan Woods as a witness. In order to prove a claim of ineffective _) 

Counsel's failure to call an eyewitness to the incident as a witness at trial. Specifically, Trial 

) 

) The Defendant's first ineffective assistance of counsel claim addresses his Trial 

counsel for failure to call eyewitness is meritless, 

) 1. The Defendant's assertion that his Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of 

) 

) 

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hindsight comparison of the chosen strategy and other alternatives. Id. ) 

Commonwealth v. Miller, 819 A.2d 504, 517 (Pa.2002). Such a claim cannot succeed through a 

chosen had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate the defendant's interest. 

concerned, counsel's assistance is generally deemed constitutionally effective if the course 

657, 662 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1998). Additionally, to be eligible for relief, the petitioner must ~th 

plead and prove his case. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9543(a). Where matters of strategy and tactics are 

) 

) 

) 

_) 

) 

first two requirements of the ineffective assistance standard. Commonwealth v. Neal, 713 A.2d 

Defendant must establish that there was a resulting prejudice regardless if his claim satisfies the 

performance caused him prejudice. Commonwealth v. Miller, 746 A.2d 592 (Pa. 2000). The 

arguable merit; (2) counsel's performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) counsel's 

on an ineffectiveness claim, the Defendant must demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of 

ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 839 A.2d 245, 248 (Pa. 2003). Therefore, to prevail ) 

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The law presumes that counsel was effective and the Defendant has the burden of proving ) .. 

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stated that he attempted to call the police to inform them that someone else was the shooter. 

Detective. (N.T.PCRA 24-25). The witness also testified that he wrote a letter to his attorney and 

witness testified that he realized who the real shooter was two days after speaking with the 

did not think it was the Defendant. (N.T .PCRA 34). However, during the PCRA hearing the 

the Assistant District Attorney the general description of the shooter and never mentioned that he 

the Commonwealth and against the Defendant at trial. Prior to trial, the witness discussed with 

The witness's testimony is not credible because-the witness was scheduled to testify for 

) shot the victim and it was not the Defendant. (N.T.PCRA 14-16, 24-25). 

) 

addition, the witness stated that two days after speaking with the Detective, he recognized who 

) 

detailed description of the shooter. (See Commonwealth Exhibit #1, N.T.PCRA 22-24). In ) 

) 2011, two years after the murder, he wrote a notarized declaration, in which he provided a J 

not the shooter's identity. (N.T.PCRA at 20-21). Then the witness testified that on October 4, 

was and attempted to contact Detective Nickel to explain that he could provide a description but 

testified that he wrote a letter to his attorney in which he stated he did not know who the shooter 

murder. (Notes of Testimony from PCRA (hereinafter '~N.T.PCRAn at 13-14)). Later the witness 

the witness testified that he spoke with Detective Nickel during an interview a week after the 

............... -- ....... --------------------- 

was not credible based on the testimony provided during the PCRA hearing. During the hearing, 

caused prejudice to the Defendant and denied him a fair trial. The Court finds that the witness 

witness was also willing to testify for the defense and that the absence of the witness' testimony 

as a witness and Trial Counsel knew of the witness. The Defendant did not prove that the 

Here, the Defendant was able to satisfy the first two elements because Mr. Woods existed 

prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial ... " ) 

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willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of trial testimony of the witness was so \. 

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claim is without merit 

him as a witness. (N.T. PCRA 47,50). Trial Counsel also stated that it was his typical practice to 

look into potential witnesses if a client provides their name. (N.T.PCRA 57). Therefore, this 

the witness testify. Trial Counsel testified that he did interview the witness and chose not to call 

It is a credible strategic decision for the Trial Counsel to make the decision not to have 

testimony is not credible, the Defendant fails to prove how he was prejudiced. 

eyewitnesses who gave similar descriptions of the shooter. Since the rest of Mr. Woods' 

shooter, the witness's testimony would actually have been supported _at trial by other 

identify a shooter as a specific person, but would have provided general descriptions of the 

was so prejudicial that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Since the witness was not able to 

Commonwealth. The Defendant also fails to prove how the absence of the witness's testimony I 

defense if they had called him but the witness was also planning on testifying for the 

because during the PCRA hearing the witness only stated that he would have testified for the 

Next, the Defendant did not prove that the witness was willing to testify for the defense ) 

) 

) 

) 

33). ) 

explain why he decided to make a notarized statement two years after the trial. (N.T.PCRA 31- 

statement but later stated during cross-examination that he did not attempt to contact the police 

to tell them they arrested the wrong person. (N.T.PCRA 16, 30). In addition, the witness failed to 

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testimony was also not credible when he stated that he tried to contact the Detective to clarify his ) 

and at this recent meeting, the witness agreed with his previous statements. The witness's 

witness on June 6, 2014 and reviewed the witness's statement that he gave on February 3, 2009 

if he left him a voicemail. (N. T.PCRA 94). The Detective further testified that he met with the 

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(N.T.PCRA 30). Detective testified that he never received a call and would have called him back ' . ) 

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denied the Defense's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The Defendant's Trial Counsel filed an 

The Defendant asserts that his Appeals Counsel failed to file an appeal after the Trial Court _) 

brief the issue is meritless. 

3. · Defendant's claim that his Appeal Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a claim and 

other witness's testimony. (See N.T.T. 981-83). Therefore, the claim is meritless. ) 

) 

instructions specifically explained that the jury should not merely believe a law enforcement 

officer's testimony because of his position and it should be evaluated the same way as every 

) 

instructions on how to assess the credibility of a witness during the jury instructions. The 

helpful to the Commonwealth." (N.T.PCRA at 54-55). The jury also received appropriate 

you're trying to keep something out of evidence, then the jury may believe the evidence is ) 

) 

) 

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Defendant's Trial Counsel testified during the PCRA hearing that "if the jury seems to think \ ) 

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decision to not object and that the failure to object caused the Defendant prejudice. The 

) In addition, the Defendant fails to prove that Trial Counsel lacked reasonable basis for his 

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opinion. 

Detective Nickel was commenting on the witness' truthfulness during the time of police ) 

) __ gμestioning, not the witness' truthfulness at the tdal. The jJ.U:Y- had the ability to determine_the___ .. ..... ,, .... y·· ---------· 

) credibility of Mr. Pinnock when he provided his testimony at trial and not rely on the Detective's 

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was telling the truth while giving his statement to the police. The claim is meritless since ) 

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counsel for eliciting testimony from Detective Nickel that the Detective believed Mr. Pinnock 

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The Defendant's next claim addresses his Trial Counsel's ineffective assistance of \ 

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elicited testimony from the Detective is meritless . 

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2. The Defendant's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel after bis Trial Counsel .i 

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the Defendant as part of an investigative detention. 

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.. H. 34-38). However, the Sergeant also had reasonable suspicion to stop 

witnessed two motor vehicle code violations, which provide reasonable suspicion and proper ) 

Commonwes1lth v. Jackson, 698 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa; 1997)). The Sergeant also testified that he 

officer had reasonable suspicion. (Commonwealth v. Cook, 735 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa. 1999) (citing 

inferences drawn from those facts in light of the officer's experience" in determining whether the 

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These facts satisfy the officer's need to "point to specific and articulable facts and reasonable 

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away from the location of the incident an hour after the incident occurred. (N.S.H. 14-15, 17-18). \ 

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Sergeant was informed by fellow officers that the Defendant used a black Honda with Delaware 

registration plates and was frequently in the area and the Defendant was in fact found four blocks ) 

was found four blocks away from the location of the incident. (N.S.H. 14-15). In addition, the 

victim and the police were aware that the victim was an informant. (N.S.H. 7-14). The Defendant 

} -·· - . ·····-. ··;~ene of the incident and then left in order to search for the Defendant, who was identified by the 

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) The Defendant failed to prove that the claim has arguable merit and his Appellate Counsel 

) provided ineffective assistance of counsel. During the Suppression Hearing Sergeant Jarrad 

) 

·) Berkihiser provided testimony that he had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant and also 

) had probable cause to arrest the Def end ant. (Notes of Suppression Hearing, hereinafter "N. S .H." 

) 

) at 7-14). The Sergeant had reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant after he arrived on the 

denying the Suppression Motion but failed to brief the issue and it was therefore waived. 

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A.mended Motion to Suppress on October 9, 2009 to challenge the legality of the vehicle stop of 

the Defendant. The Defendant's Appellate Counsel raised the issue that the Trial Court erred in 

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full consultation with the defendant and the topic of whether to appeal is on the list. However, 

_;· 

Narducci looks at the ABA Standard 4-5.2 and lists decisions that are made by counsel after a 

course pursued by counsel does not have a significant potential for success. The Court in 

e en ant asserts that a strategy will not be considered legally reasonable if the alternative 

Narducci, 18 F.Supp.2d ~81 (E.D.Pa. 1997). Narducci involves ABA Standard 4-5.2 and the 

strategic if Counsel fails to consult with his client or the decision is unsound according to U.S. v. 

client's best interest. Defendant also asserted that Counsel's decisions will not be considered 

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waiving the issue and his Appellate Counsel was not objectively reasonable or acting in the ' / 

the Defendant. Therefore, the issue was waived and the Defendant was unaware of the impact of 

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appeal, Counsel failed to discuss the reasoning behind his decision to not pursue the case with 

The Defendant asserts ·that while Counsel has the ultimate decision to raise the issues on \ 

} 

) something that has some chance of success on appeal." (N.T.PCRA. 66). 

Appellate Counsel continued to explain that "I think it's a stronger presentation to raise 

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claims that have some arguable merit; give yourself a chance to be heard." (N.T.PCRA 65). 

issue because he did not "think that's effective advocacy. I think your best chance is to raise 

PCRA 65-66). Specifically, Appellate Counsel asserted that he did not raise the suppression 

create a stronger impression with the Superior Court regarding the validity of the case. (N. T . 

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Appellate Counsel's tactics were to raise only the claims that have a chance at success in order to 

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because he thought it was frivolous and ridiculous and, therefore, lacked merit. (N.T.PCRA 65). ) 

During the PCRA hearing, Appellate Counsel testified that he chose not to pursue the claim ) 

as the Defendant asserts, but rather was the result of a search wan·ant. 

search warrant for the search of the black Honda. The search was not a search incident to arrest ) 

The Defendant also raised the issue of whether there was sufficient probable cause in the 

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Pa.R.Evid. 803 and 804 apply. 

she would be killed. The Defendant also stated that none of the hearsay exceptions under 

matter asserted, that Ms. Johnson feared the defendant and she was aware that if she "snitched" 

etective was repeating a statement made by Ms. Johnson in order to establish the truth of the 

Defendant asserts that the testimony. is classic hearsay under Pa.RBvid, 801 because the 

her, (N. T.T. 62-63). The Defendant's Trial Counsel did not object during this testimony. The 

heard that she was snitching and that if she was snitching to the police; then he was going to kill 

Ms. Johnson informed him that the Defendant called her and told her that he, the Defendant, 

mention any testimony regarding Ms. Aguilera. During the Trial, Detective Nauman testified that 

a hearsay objection regarding Ms. Aguilera's testimony but the body of the argument does 'not 

the Defendant's heading in his PCRA discusses Counsel's failure to preserve and properly argue 

Nauman's testimony, which contained possible hearsay. The Commonwealth makes note that 

The Defendant's next claim addresses his Trial Counsel's failure to object to Detective 

also meritless, 

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' . 4. The Defendant's claim that Trial Counsel's failure to object toDetective's testimony is 

for not pursuing the claim and the Defendant failed to show that prejudice would have occurred. 

Therefore; this claim is meritless as his Appellate Counsel had a reasonable strategic basis 

discovering the critical evidence of the gun that were used to convict him. 

on the facts determined bythe Trial Court regarding the validity of the search warrants and 

prejudice. There is no indication that the outcome of the appeal would have been different based 

18 F.Supp.2d at 493-94. Here, the Defendant failed to demonstrate that the claim caused him 

Narducci contains a second prong where the Petitioner must prove prejudice occurred as a result. 

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opening the door to prejudicial testimony by Officer Halstead. During cross-examination the · 

The Defendant asserts that his Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for 

witness. 

Amendment for opening the door to prejudicial testimony from a Commonwealth 

5, The Defendant's Trial Counsel was not constitutional]y ineffective under the Sixth 

not the truth of the matter asserted. (N.T. 9/14/10 at 37). Therefore, the claim is meritless. 

because the Trial Court ensured that the testimony would be offered as proof of motive only and 

assistance of counsel by failing to object to the testimony and there was no prejudice caused 

In addition, the Defendant failed to prove that Trial Counsel provided ineffective 

permitted and an objection to this testimony would lack arguable merit. 

admitted at trial." Therefore, the testimony that was introduced by the Commonwealth was 

prior contact with Mary Johnson, including testimony regarding alleged controlled substance 

transactions between the two as well as discussions regarding possible sales of firearms, shall be 

) _- _. ~~-~rted but rather to show motive, intent, state ofmind, __ and the history of this case. This Court 

issued its ruling on May 24, 2010 ordering that "evidence regarding Defendant's relationship and 

therefore admissible as non-hearsay because it is not offered to show the truth of the matter 

Defendant's motive, malice, intent, knowledge, and plan. The Conunonwealth asserts that it is 

contact with Ms. Johnson as related by Ms. Johnson to other individuals, to show the 

19, 2010. The Commonwealth requested that evidence of Defendant's relationship and prior 

Intent to Introduce Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrong or Acts and a hearing was held on April ) 

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and previously ruled upon by the Court. On March 3~ 2010 the Commonwealth filed a Notice of ) 

However, the Commonwealth asserted that the matter was discussed in pre-trial motions \- . 

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shooting. Mr. Pinnock testified that he saw who was in the area and identified the shooter as 

examination. Mr. Pinnock provided testimony regarding who was in the area at the time of the 

counsel for failing to object to a question the Prosecution posed to Mr. Pinnock during direct 

to object to questions to an eyewitness. 

6. Trial Counsel was not constitutionally ineffective under the Sixth Amendment for failing 

that Trial Counsel lacked reasonable basis in bringing the claim and that it caused him prejudice. 

(N.T.T. 580). Therefore, the testimony ~hat Officer Halstead provided would have been brought 

out by Ms. Turner's testimony as well. This claim must fail because the Defendant fails to show 

that she originally told Officer Halstead a different version of the events because she was scared. 

he admitted to shooting Ms. Johnson to Mr. Morant and Ms. Turner. Ms. Turner herself stated 

was not prejudicial. The Defendant was elso-identifled by Ms. Johnson and Mr. Middleton, and 

have a tactical reason for opening the door and attempted to withdraw the question, the testimony 

she was scared. (N.T.T. 112). However, even though it may appear that the Trial Counsel did not 

testimony from a witness, Ms. Turner, after she testified she gave conflicting testimony because -···· .... 

Counsel did not open the door. The Defendant believes that Trial Counsel elicited prejudicial . 

The Defendant also asserts that the outcome of the trial would have been different if Trial 

shooter and then attempted to garner evidence to support the theory. 

officer because he was pursuing the theory that the police determined that the Defendant was the 

and cross-examination demonstrates that Trial Counsel had a reasonable basis for questioning the 

only took the version of events that pleased the Officer. Trial Counsel's questioning during direct 

Defendant's Trial Counsel alluded to the fact that Officer Halstead questioned Ms. Turner and ) 

The Defendant's final claim asserts that his Trial Counsel provided ineffective assistance of 

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after the Commonwealth attempted to use a non-testifying co-defendant' swords against a 

(Pa. 1996), which also discusses prosecutorial misconduct but for violation of the Bruton rule, 

trial proceedings. The Defendant also references Commonwealth v. Miles, 681 A.2d 1295, 1301 

· establishes the prosecutorial misconduct for calling a sequestered witness after he sat through 

(Pa. 1994) in support of asking who the person resembled as misleading the jury but Pierce . 

questions is meritless. The Defendant references Commonwealth v. Pierce, 645 A.2d 189, 197 

question was objectionable as the Defendant believes and failing to object to the more specified 

the Court never sustained Trial Counsel's objection, he.would not have been aware that the 

Mr. Pinnock.who the person resembled in terms of clothing, build and stature. (N.T. 497). Since 

question more specific. (N.T.496-97). The ADA complied with the Court's request and asked 

The Court did not sustain the objection but instead directed the ADA to make his 

it. (N.T. PCRA 55-56). 

Commonwealth ask an eyewitness if the defendant resembled someone, but he probably did hear 

PCRA at 56). In addition, Trial Counsel did state that he didn'tknow if he heard the 

inherently different from asking him if this is the same person who committed the crime." CN:.T. 

·------- ·-=----------·-·-· - . 

"asking an eyewitness if the defendant looks like the person who committed the crime is 

) . ... . . . .. ·-·· .. ·-·· -·-· ·------- 

and stature (N.T.T. 497). During the PCRA hearing, Trial Counsel testified that he believed that 

497). The prosecution next asked Mr. Pinnock who the person resembled in terms of clothing 

) 

) 

overruled the objection but directed the Prosecution to make his question more specific. (N.T.T. 

was. not relevant or material. However, Trial Counsel objected to the question but the Court 

· The fact that the Prosecution asked whether the Petitioner resembled the person he saw that night 

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) 

) 

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"Of all those people, who does that person most resemble?" (N. T.T. 496-97) was objectionable. 

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wearing dark clothing. (N.T.T. 493-95). The Defendant argues that the prosecution's question: 

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Accordingly, I enter the following: 

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Morant 547-50, and Ms. Turner 577-79). Therefore, the claim is meritless. 

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admitted that he shot the victim. (N.T.T Mr. Middleton 445-48,.460, Ms. Johnson 240-41, Mr. ) 

) 

) __ _ __ _ _ ~~~_emblance of the Defendant to show that the Defendant was the shooter. Two other witnes.s.es . ··-· ····- . 

were able. to identify the Defendant as the shooter and two witnesses testified that the Defendant 

different. There was sufficient evidence besides the witness' testimony regarding the 

) 

been sustained and found improper and inadmissible, the outcome of the trial would have been 

) 

) 

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how he was prejudiced by the testimony. The Defendant is unable to show if the objection had ) 

\ In addition, even if the Trial Counsel was found lneffective.fhe Defendant fails to show ) 

Counsel for failure to object to the ADA's question .. ) 

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concern prosecutorial misconduct when the Defendant is asserting ineffective assistance of Trial 

defendant. The Court therefore notes that while the Defendant addresses these cases, they 

\.· 

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14 ., ., 

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· Amber L. Czerniakowski, Esquire 

Teri B. Himebaugh, Esquire 

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ATTEST: - 

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DENNISE. REINAKER 

PRESIDENT JUDGE 

April 9, 2015 

IIIDENNIS AEINAKER 

PRE&· JUDGE 

BY THE COURT: 

DENIED. 

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' . ). Conviction Collateral Relief filed October 5, 2012~ it is hereby ordered that the petition is 

. - ---· - ·--·--~=-=-==-=--o:--:--::-:--~--.:--:--T:""'"'"'.'~:C---:,------c:----:----:c---c----:---:-=---:--:---,;:---:::------· --- AND NOW, this 9th day of April, 2015 after a hearing on the Amended Petition for Post- 

-, 

). 

) 

ORDER 

YAQUANGERALD WILLIAMS 

v. No. 1092-2009 

) COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

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IN THE COURT OF COMM:ON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL 

' . 

J '. !\. 

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