THIRD DIVISION                                                  November 20, 1996No. 1-95-0524CAROLE J. KATZ, individually, and on behalf of         )    Appeal from thea class of similarly situated individuals,             )    Circuit Court of                                             )    Cook County.          Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,  )                                             )               v.                            )                                             )WESTLAWN CEMETERY ASSOCIATION, INC.,         )a corporation, individually and on behalf of all others     )similarly situated; ACACIA PARK CEMETERY AND )MAUSOLEUM CORPORATION; MOUNT AUBURN          )MEMORIAL PARK, INC.; CHAPEL HILL GARDENS     )(SOUTH); CHAPEL HILL GARDENS (WEST);         )CLARENDON HILLS CEMETERY; CONCORDIA          )CEMETERY; EDEN CEMETERY;  ELM LAWN CEMETERY; )ELMWOOD CEMETERY AND MAUSOLEUM COMPANY; )GRACELAND CEMETERY AND CREMATORIUM;          )IRVING PARK CEMETERY; MEMORIAL PARK          )CEMETERY; LINCOLN CEMETERY; MONTROSE         )CEMETERY CO.; MT. EMBLEM CEMETERY; MOUNT     )GREENWOOD CEMETERY ASSOCIATION; MOUNT        )HOPE CEMETERY ASSOCIATION, INC.; OAK HILL    )CEMETERY; OAK WOODS CEMETERY ASSOCIATION;    )RIDGEWOOD CEMETERY CO.; ROSEHILL CEMETERY    )CO.; SHALOM MEMORIAL PARK; RANDHILL PARK     )CEMETERY ASSOCIATION, INC; WOODLAWN          )CEMETERY OF CHICAGO, INC.; BEVERLY CEMETERY; )EVERGREEN CEMETERY & MAUSOLEUM; and          )CEMETERIES ASSOCIATION OF GREATER CHICAGO,   )INC., a corporation,                              )    Honorable                                             )    Dorothy Kinnaird,          Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.  )    Judge Presiding.     PRESIDING JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:     Plaintiff Carole J. Katz, individually, and on behalf of a class of similarlysituated individuals, filed this class action against defendants, Westlawn CemeteryAssociation, Inc., on behalf of all others similarly situated, Acacia Park Cemetery andMausoleum Corporation, Mount Auburn Memorial Park, Inc., Chapel Hill Gardens(South), Chapel Hill Gardens (West), Clarendon Hills Cemetery, Concordia Cemetery,Eden Cemetery,  Elm Lawn Cemetery, Elmwood Cemetery and Mausoleum Company,Graceland Cemetery and Crematorium, Irving Park Cemetery, Memorial ParkCemetery, Lincoln Cemetery, Montrose Cemetery Co., Mt. Emblem Cemetery, MountGreenwood Cemetery Association, Mount Hope Cemetery Association, Inc., Oak HillCemetery, Oak Woods Cemetery Association, Ridgewood Cemetery Co., RosehillCemetery Co., Shalom Memorial Park, Randhill Park Cemetery Association, Inc.,Woodlawn Cemetery of Chicago, Inc., Beverly Cemetery, Evergreen Cemetery &Mausoleum, and Cemeteries Association of Greater Chicago, Inc., a corporation.  Inher fifth amended complaint, Katz alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress(count I), tortious interference with property rights (count II), breach of contract(count III) and civil conspiracy (count IV).  On January 6, 1995, the trial courtgranted defendants' motion to completely dismiss the complaint under sections 2-615and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 1994); it isfrom this order that plaintiff appeals to this court pursuant to section 6 of article VIof the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, � 6) and Supreme Court Rule 301(155 Ill. 2d R. 301).  Defendants cross-appeal from the same order pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 303(a)(3) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(3)).     For the reasons which follow, we affirm.                            FACTUAL BACKGROUND     The genesis of this action is a labor strike by Chicago-area gravediggers,represented by their union, Local Union 106, Service Employees International Union,AFL-CIO, against the 27 defendant cemeteries and the subsequent lockout of strikersby defendants.  On December 19, 1991, after contract renewal negotiations betweendefendants, represented by their collective bargaining agent, the CemeteriesAssociation of Greater Chicago, Inc. (hereinafter the "Association") and the unionbroke down, the union went on strike against four defendant cemeteries: BeverlyCemetery, Oak Hill Cemetery, Lincoln Cemetery and Memorial Park Cemetery.  Inresponse, defendants locked out their union employees.  Consequently, burials in theordinary course of business ceased.     On January 3, 1992, Mrs. Rose Michaels, plaintiff's mother and an OrthodoxJew, passed away.  In 1973, Mrs. Michaels and her husband had purchased burialplots at Westlawn Cemetery.  Orthodox Jewish religious tradition requires burial ofthe dead within 24 hours of death.  During the lockout, plaintiff requested that hermother be buried at Westlawn Cemetery, which Westlawn allegedly refused to do dueto the lockout.  Consequently, plaintiff's family was unable to bury Mrs. Michaels inkeeping with Orthodox Jewish tradition.  The instant litigation followed.                        ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW     On appeal, plaintiff posits that: (1) the trial court erred in holding that she didnot have standing to sue the alleged co-conspirators for tortious acts that resulted inher alleged injury; (2) the trial court erred in holding that her allegations of civilconspiracy were not stated with sufficient specificity; (3) the trial court erred inholding that her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was time-barred;and (4) the trial court erred in holding that her claim for intentional infliction ofemotional distress and tortious interference with property rights were preempted bythe National Labor Relations Act.                                  OPINION     From the outset of their briefs, defendants argue that all plaintiff's claims arepreempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. � 151 et seq.(1988)).  We note that plaintiff has not appealed from the trial court's ruling that herbreach of contract claim in count III was preempted and, therefore, we find the issuehas been waived.  See Jordan v. Civil Service Commission, 246 Ill. App. 3d 1047(1993).  Accordingly, we express no opinion herein as to the viability of such a claim. Nevertheless we agree with defendants that the NLRA preempted plaintiff's tortclaims in counts I, II and IV and, thus, on de novo review affirm the judgment of thecircuit court.     The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that theFederal Constitution, Federal statutes and treaties "shall be the supreme Law of theLand; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in theConstitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."  U.S. Const. art.VI, cl. 2.  Thus, the Supremacy Clause forbids State encroachment on areas regulatedby Congress, whether Congress' mandate is "explicitly stated in the statute'slanguage or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."  Jones v. Rath PackingCo., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 51 L. Ed. 2d 604, 97 S. Ct. 1305 (1977).  The NLRA, as an actof Congress, is the supreme law of the land and necessarily preempts any conflictingState law.  Amalgamated Association of Street, Electrical Railway & Motor CoachEmployees of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 95L. Ed 364, 71 S. Ct. 359 (1951).     The NLRA reflects a congressional intent to create a national, uniform bodyof law regulating labor relations.  New York Telephone Co. v. New York StateDepartment of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 59 L. Ed. 553, 99 S. Ct. 1328 (1979); Cannon v.Edgar, 33 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 1994).  The NLRA protects from State interference alabor union's right to strike an employer and withhold the labor of its members.  29U.S.C. �� 158, 159 (1988); National Labor Relations Board v. Drivers, Chauffeurs,Helpers Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 4 L. Ed. 2d 710, 80 S. Ct. 706 (1960). The NLRA similarly protects an employer's use of both defensive (National LaborRelations Board v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 1 L. Ed. 2d 676,77 S. Ct. 643 (1957)) and offensive (American Ship Building Co. v. National LaborRelations Board, 380 U.S. 300, 13 L. Ed. 2d 855, 85 S. Ct. 955 (1965)) lockouts as aproper economic weapon, whereby the employer may withhold employment either toresist its employees' demands or to gain concessions from them.  29 U.S.C. � 158(d)(1988); National Labor Relations Board v. Truck Drivers Local No. 449, 353 U.S. at92-93.     The Supreme Court has enunciated two preemption doctrines invalidatingState laws that interfere with the NLRA's goals.  First, under San Diego BuildingTrades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 3 L. Ed. 2d 775, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959) (theGarmon doctrine), and its progeny state that State laws may not interfere withconduct regulated or even arguably regulated by NLRA, including collectivebargaining.  Building & Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders &Contractors of Massachusetts/Rhode Island, Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 122 L. Ed. 2d 565, 113S. Ct. 1190 (1993).  The second doctrine, created in Lodge 76, InternationalAssociation of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment RelationsCommission, 427 U.S. 132, 49 L. Ed. 2d 396, 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976) (the Machinistsdoctrine), holds that State laws may not interfere with the balance of power betweenunions and employers established by Federal Law, including those areas thatCongress left under the control of the free play of economic forces.  Building &Construction Trades Council, 507 U.S. 218, 122 L. Ed. 2d 565, 113 S. Ct. 1190.  Weagree with the circuit court that under either of these two doctrines, plaintiff's claimsin counts I, II and IV were preempted by the NLRA.     In Garmon, an employer brought suit against a union seeking an injunctionand damages after the union picketed the employer's place of business.  The picketingwas designed to compel the employer to execute a labor contract by exerting pressureon the employer's customers and suppliers.  The supreme court of California affirmedthe State trial court's judgment awarding the employer compensatory damages basedon State tort law.     The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that where the activitiesa State purports to regulate are even arguably within the ambit of the NLRA, Statejurisdiction must yield in order to prevent the potential frustration of nationalpurposes.  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.  The Supreme Court noted that State law ispreempted whether a State has acted through "laws of broad general application" or"laws specifically directed towards the governance of industrial relations."  Garmon,359 U.S. at 244.  Illinois courts have consistently recognized and applied the Garmondoctrine.  See e.g., People v. Federal Tool & Plastics, 62 Ill. 2d 549 (1975); NDKCorporation v. Local 1550, 128 Ill. App. 3d 207 (1984).     The Garmon court created two narrow exceptions to its holding, finding thatthe NLRA does not preempt State remedies: (1) where the activity regulated was "amerely peripheral concern" to the Federal labor laws, or (2) where the regulatedconduct "touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, inthe absence of compelling congressional direction, [it] could not [be] infer[red] thatCongress had deprived the States of the power to act."  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.     The Garmon court found that the first exception did not apply becausepicketing is specifically protected by section 7 of the NLRA and, therefore, is not anactivity of "merely peripheral concern" to the NLRA.  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245-47. Similarly, the Supreme Court found that the second exception did not apply becausethe case did not involve a State interest deeply rooted in local feeling andresponsibility such as the "maintenance of domestic peace" in the face of "conductmarked by violence and imminent threats to public order."  Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247.     In case sub judice, plaintiff concedes that her claims, arising from a lockoutprotected by the NLRA, are "arguably subject to the jurisdiction of the" NationalLabor Relations Board, but contends that her claims are not preempted because theyarise from "interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility."  Thus, plaintiffasserts that "[i]t is hard to imagine anything more deeply rooted in local feeling andresponsibility than burying the dead in accordance with religious and social customs." We disagree.     In Cannon v. Edgar, 33 F. 3d 880 (7th Cir. 1994), the Seventh Circuit directlyrejected plaintiff's contention.  In Cannon, the Federal appeals court invalidated theBurial Rights Act (820 ILCS 130/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)), an act which was passedby the General Assembly in direct response to the labor dispute that is the subjectof this litigation, which required cemeteries and gravediggers to negotiate for theestablishment of a pool of workers designated to perform religiously required burialsduring labor disputes.  The Seventh Circuit found the Burial Rights Act waspreempted by the NLRA because it was "an invasion by a state into the collectivebargaining process."  Cannon, 33 F. 3d at 884-86.     In so holding, the Cannon court found that the Burial Rights Act was notsubject to either of the two Garmon exceptions:          "As to the first Garmon exception, the Burial Rights Act is          not concerned with something peripheral to the NLRA.           Indeed, performing burials, including burials during the          course of a labor dispute, is the very subject that the          cemeteries and the gravediggers negotiate about in the          collective bargaining process.          And as to the second Garmon exception, there is nothing          deeply rooted in local feeling that would allow Illinois to          encroach on the process of collective bargaining in the          manner directed by the Burial Rights Act.  The interment          of deceased persons is something common to every          community in the United States.  The interment of the          smaller category at issue here (particular religious groups)          is not something deeply rooted in local feeling ***."  33 F.          3d at 885.     Plaintiff submits that the Cannon court found the Garmon exceptionsinapplicable because that case involved a civil statute rather than State criminal ortort law.  We believe that argument misses the point.  What is important here is thefact that plaintiff's allegations are inextricably linked to the labor dispute such thather claims would not exist but for that dispute.     In her fifth amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that because Westlawn andthe other cemeteries did not perform interments as a result of the labor dispute thatipso facto they committed the various torts.  This is not the law.  In addition, plaintiffalleges defendants' joint lockout of the union members to be a civil conspiracy;however, this is an activity clearly protected by NLRA.  Nowhere does plaintiff allegethat any agent or employee of Westlawn Cemetery battered, insulted, defamed orcommitted any other tortious and/or criminal acts against her personally thattraditionally would fall into the second Garmon exception.  See e.g., Keehr v.Consolidated Freightways of Delaware, Inc., 825 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffunion employee can sue his employer for defaming his wife's chastity).  Accordingly,we find that none of plaintiff's tort claims fall within the exceptions to the Garmondoctrine.  Therefore, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's complaint.     Alternatively, we find plaintiff's causes of action are preempted under theMachinists doctrine.  In Machinists, the Supreme Court recognized that activities areprotected by Federal labor law not only where they are specifically regulated by theNLRA, but also where the activity involves a "permissible economic weapon" thatCongress intended to be unrestricted by any governmental power.  Machinists, 427U.S. at 141.  Because the NLRA seeks to leave disputes between management andlabor to the "free play of economic forces" without State interference, any State causeof action that affects the balance of economic weapons available to labor andmanagement is preempted.  Cannon, 33 F. 3d at 885.     A union's right to strike and an employer's right to lockout are among the mostsignificant of economic weapons.  In Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of LosAngeles, 475 U.S. 608, 89 L. Ed. 2d 616, 106 S. Ct. 1395 (1986), the Supreme Courtexplained, "Congress left some forms of economic pressure unregulated, while itbanned others.  States are therefore prohibited from imposing additional restrictionson economic weapons of self-help, such as strikes or lockouts *** unless suchrestrictions presumably were contemplated by Congress."  475 U. S. at 614-16.  Thedistrict court opinion in Cannon noted that the Machinists doctrine forbids the Statesfrom even "indirectly imposing additional burdens on economic weapons such asstrikes and lockouts."  Cannon v. Edgar, 825 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (N.D. Ill. 1993),affirmed, 33 F. 3d 880 (7th Cir. 1994).     In United Steelworkers of America v. Bishop, 598 F. 2d 408 (5th Cir. 1979), aunion struck and picketed a metals fabrication plant which was consequently unableto complete delivery of an order of steel to a customer.  The customer filed a replevinaction seeking delivery of the steel.  After the district court required the factory todeliver the goods, the union argued on appeal that the district court lackedjurisdiction over the matter as it arose from a labor dispute.  The Fifth Circuitapplied Machinists and agreed that there was no jurisdiction to order the employerto release the steel and held that the district court had erroneously disarmed thelabor union of a significant economic weapon and altered the bargaining stance ofmanagement and the union.  United Steelworkers, 598 F. 2d at 415.  In the case subjudice, plaintiff's lawsuit is attempting to do exactly what the customer in UnitedSteelworkers tried to do - use a State common law action to inject herself into a labordispute and in the process deny both the union and the cemeteries of significanteconomic weapons, the power to strike and the power to lockout.  This isimpermissible.  Thus, we hold no error was committed by the circuit court indismissing plaintiff's cause under the Machinists doctrine.     In light of our disposition of plaintiff's appeal we need not reach the issuesraised by defendants in their cross-appeal which were argued in the alternative hadwe reached a different disposition of plaintiff's appeal.     In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit of Cook County is affirmedin toto.     CERDA and GALLAGHER, JJ., concur.