[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-12459

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

GREGORY PARSLEY, DDS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GREAT-WEST LIFE AND ANNUITY INSURANCE CO., 

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-60800-AHS

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12459

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Gregory Parsley, proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of his civil complaint for breach of contract as 

time-barred. After review, we affirm. 

I. Background

On April 16, 2022, Parsley, through counsel, filed a civil 

complaint against Great-West Life and Annuity Insurance 

Company (“Great-West”) in Florida state court. The complaint 

alleged the following. Great-West serviced disability insurance 

policies, including Parsley’s policy. Parsley’s disability policy was 

intended “to compensate [Parsley] on a monthly basis should he 

suffer a total disability due to injuries or sickness.” On July 19, 2013, 

Parsley filed a claim for benefits with Great-West asserting that he 

was disabled due to end-stage kidney failure. After Great-West 

denied the claim, Parsley appealed; Great-West denied the appeal 

on March 1, 2014. Parsley then filed a second appeal, which 

Great-West denied on November 19, 2014.1 Almost five years 

later, Parsley filed a third appeal, which was denied on March 7, 

1 Parsley alleged that neither the March or the November 2014 denial was 

designated as a “final denial or decision.” 

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2019.2 Parsley then waited over three years before filing the 

underlying complaint in Florida state court. 

Parsley alleged that under the insurance contract

Great-West owed him monthly payments and interest from 

“August 2011 and going forward to age 65” because it failed to 

honor its obligations under the terms of the contract. He asserted 

that Great-West breached the implied contractual covenant of 

good faith, fair dealing, and commercial reasonableness. Parsley 

sought judgment awarding all contract benefits plus interest, costs, 

and attorney’s fees. 

Parsley attached a copy of the insurance policy to the 

complaint. In relevant part, the policy provided that if an insured 

disagreed with Great-West’s benefit determination, the insured 

could appeal the decision by sending a notice of appeal along with 

certain other information to Great-West. Great-West would then 

notify the insured of its “written final decision . . . within 60 days of 

[Great-West’s] receipt” of the insured’s appeal. Furthermore, the 

policy prohibited the insured from instituting any legal action 

“(1) prior to the date of [Great-West’s] final decision on the appeal; 

nor (2) more than three years after the date of the Company’s final 

decision on the appeal.” Finally, the policy contained a choice-of2 In his complaint, Parsley alleged that the third appeal was denied on April 15, 

2019, but in his response to the motion to dismiss, he conceded that the third 

appeal was in fact denied on March 7, 2019. He also acknowledged that he 

had a fourth appeal that was denied on April 15, 2019. 

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law provision, providing that all policy-related disputes between 

the insured and Great-West were governed by Illinois law.

Great-West removed the case to federal court on the basis 

of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Great-West then 

moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the claim was time-barred by the 

policy’s language that prohibited an insured from initiating a legal 

action “more than three years after the date of the Company’s final 

decision on the appeal.” Great-West asserted that it issued its final 

decision on March 31, 2014 when it denied Parsley’s first appeal.3 

Therefore, pursuant to the policy’s terms, Parsley had until March 

31, 2017, to initiate legal action, and his April 1, 2022, complaint 

came too late. Moreover, Great-West asserted that even if the 

limitations period ran from the date of Great-West’s denials of the 

second appeal on November 19, 2014, or the third appeal on March 

7, 2019, the suit was still time-barred. 

In support of its motion to dismiss, Great-West attached the 

denial letters it sent Parsley on March 31, 2014, November 19, 2014, 

and March 7, 2019. The March 2014 letter explained that it had 

“reviewed [Parsley’s] entire claim file as well as Great-West’s 

3 In response to Parsley’s contention that the March 2014 letter denying 

Parsley’s first appeal and the subsequent November 2014 letter denying the 

second appeal were not formally designated as a “final denial or decision,” 

Great-West argued that nothing in the policy required Great-West’s letters to 

include such language. Furthermore, Great-West argued that nothing in the 

letters indicated that Parsley’s claim remained open or that Great-West was 

going to continue investigating the claim. 

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22-12459 Opinion of the Court 5

administrative records under the ADA Income Protection Plan in 

order to address the current status of [Parsley’s] coverage and 

provide a comprehensive response to [his] appeal for disability 

income benefits.” Great-West then explained that Parsley’s 

coverage under the policy ended on July 1, 2011, on the day he 

“became unemployed following closure of the dental offices in 

which [he] worked.” And because his coverage terminated July 1, 

2011, “there [were] no benefits available for total disability 

commencing December 2011. . . . As such, Great-West has no 

alternative but to maintain its denial of benefits on the grounds that 

no coverage was in effect at the time total disability 

commenced. . . . ” 

The November 2014 letter stated that Great-West had 

reviewed Parsley’s appeal “dated October 30, 2014,” along with the 

new evidence he submitted, but its determination “remain[ed] 

unchanged.” Great-West explained that it “[had] no alternative but 

to maintain [its] denial of benefits based on the fact there was no 

coverage in effect at the time [Parsley’s] total disability 

commenced, whether that was August, September or December of 

2011.” 

The third letter dated March 7, 2019, was directed to 

Parsley’s counsel. It provided that Great-West had reviewed a 

letter from Parsley’s counsel “dated February 11, 2019, along with 

attachments referencing [Parsley’s] prior medical treatment,” but 

Great-West “respectfully decline[d] to re-open the claim.” 

Additionally, in this letter, Great-West provided a detailed 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12459

background of Parsley’s claim, including that “Great-West issued a 

final decision in response to [Parsley’s] appeal in a letter dated 

November 19, 2014.” 

Parsley, through counsel, opposed Great-West’s motion to 

dismiss. He acknowledged that Great-West denied his third appeal 

on March 7, 2019, and he conceded that his claim was subject to 

“the 3-year statute of limitation” in the policy. Nevertheless, he 

argued that the limitations period ran from a fourth letter he 

received on April 15, 2019. He maintained that “it [was] improper 

to attempt to resolve the statute of limitations issue without the 

benefit of additional discovery” and that the issue of which of the 

letters constituted Great-West’s final decision was “a matter to be 

clarified with discovery and potentially expert witness testimony 

regarding finality and what is common in the industry.” Parsley 

attached the April 15, 2019, letter to his response. Like the previous 

letter, this one was addressed to Parsley’s counsel, and stated that 

Great-West had received counsel’s “correspondence dated April 8, 

2019” but it 

remain[ed] convinced that the final decision reached 

regarding Dr. Parsley’s claim was correct and that the 

time limitation language [Great-West] previously 

referenced [did] not require [it] to entertain 

previously made or new arguments made more than 

three years after what was plainly a final decision 

which Dr. Parsley and Great-West have both treated 

as such. 

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Great-West, in turn, argued that the court should dismiss 

the complaint as time-barred because the face of the complaint and 

documents incorporated by reference made clear that Parsley’s 

lawsuit was untimely.4 It maintained that each of the three letters 

it submitted were central to Parsley’s claim and affirmed that 

Great-West issued its final decision more than three years prior to 

the instant lawsuit, and that no additional discovery was necessary 

in order to determine finality.5

Upon review, the district court granted Great-West’s 

motion to dismiss, concluding that Parsley’s complaint was timebarred. The district court determined that the November 2014 

letter and the March 2019 letter made “clear that the actual final 

decision on [Parsley’s] appeal occurred no later than November 19, 

2014.”6 In support, the district court highlighted that the 

4 Great-West noted that Parsley did not dispute that the district court could 

consider the letters it attached to its motion to dismiss. 

5 Moreover, Great-West contended that, at a minimum, Parsley was on notice 

via the March 7, 2019, letter that Great-West’s decision was final and, at a 

minimum, Parsley should have filed his lawsuit within three years of that date. 

6 The court noted that, at the motion to dismiss stage, it could consider 

documents attached to a motion to dismiss if the attached documents were

“central to the plaintiff’s claim and . . . undisputed, meaning [their] 

authenticity [was] not challenged.” See Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (“[T]he court may consider a document attached to a motion to 

dismiss without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if the 

attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed.”). 

Although Parsley did not oppose the district court’s consideration of the letters 

submitted by Great-West and did not challenge their authenticity, “in an 

abundance of caution,” the district court decided that it would “only consider 

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12459

November 2014 letter stated that Great-West’s “determinations 

regarding the termination of Parsley’s coverage . . . remained 

unchanged” and Great-West had “no alternative but to maintain 

[its] denial of benefits based on the fact that there was no coverage 

in effect at the time [Parsley’s] total disability commenced.” The 

district court explained that this unambiguous language 

demonstrated that the letter constituted a final decision “because it 

definitively denie[d] the appeal and [gave] no indication that there 

[would] be further consideration of the appeal.” Furthermore, the 

district court explained that, under Illinois law, an insured’s 

repeated requests for modification of a prior final decision do not 

toll the limitation period. In other word’s Parsley’s contentions 

that each letter from Great-West in response to his repeated 

requests for Great-West to reconsider its decision constituted a 

new final decision from which the limitations period ran anew 

failed. Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint as 

time-barred. Parsley, proceeding pro se, filed a timely appeal of the 

dismissal. 

II. Discussion

Liberally construing Parsley’s briefs,7 he argues that the 

district court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred 

those pieces of correspondence both referenced in [Parsley’s] Complaint and 

attached in the [motion to dismiss]”—i.e., the November 2014 denial letter and 

the March 2019 denial letter. 

7 We note that Parsley does not cite any case law or legal authority in his briefs. 

This fact alone provides a basis for us to affirm the district court because he 

effectively abandoned his claims. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 

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22-12459 Opinion of the Court 9

because the April 2019 letter initiated the running of the limitation 

period, and it “was the first time Great-West used the term final 

decision.”8 He also notes that Great-West never told him to not 

“send any more appeals” in the prior denial letters.9 

F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have long held that an appellant abandons 

a claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises it in a 

perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority.”); Singh v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that “an 

appellant’s brief must include an argument containing appellant’s contentions 

and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the 

record on which the appellant relies,” and that “simply stating that an issue 

exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of 

that issue and precludes our considering the issue on appeal”); see also GJR 

Invs., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(explaining that although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a court 

may not “serve as de facto counsel for a party” or “rewrite an otherwise 

deficient pleading in order to sustain an action”), overruled on other grounds as 

recognized in Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, 

we set aside the abandonment issue and address the claims that Parsley 

preserved for appeal.

8 This assertion is belied by the record. In its March 7, 2019, letter Great-West 

stated that it “issued a final decision in response to [Parsley’s] appeal in a letter 

dated November 19, 2014.” 

9 Parsley also argues for the first time that the three-year limitation period in 

the policy does not apply to him because he was “never informed of its 

existence” and “never received a booklet” concerning the policy, despite his 

requests for one over the years. Rather, he maintains that the applicable 

statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim under Illinois law is 10 

years. On the other hand, he also asserts for the first time in his reply brief 

that he was unaware that Illinois law governed the policy. However, in the 

district court proceedings, Parsley expressly conceded in his counseled 

response to the motion to dismiss that Illinois law governed the issues in this 

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-12459

We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to 

dismiss, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and 

construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hill v. 

White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). 

“Illinois law recognizes limitation periods as valid 

contractual provisions in an insurance contract.” Am. Access Cas. 

Co. v. Tutson, 948 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). Here, 

Parsley’s policy, which he attached to his complaint, established a 

three-year limitation period from the date of Great-West’s “final 

decision on the appeal.” Parsley does not dispute that he received 

a letter in November 2014 denying his appeal. Rather, he argued 

below that the letter did not represent a final decision, in large part 

because it did not contain the words “final decision” and because 

no one told him to stop filing appeals. We disagree. 

Even assuming arguendo that we accepted Parsley’s 

argument that he did not understand that the November 2014 

letter was Great-West’s final decision on his appeal, his complaint 

case and that the applicable statute of limitations was three years. Thus, he 

failed to preserve for appeal any challenge to the applicability of Illinois law or 

the three-year statute of limitations period. See Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 

1572 (11th Cir. 1994) (providing that “an issue not raised in the district court 

and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this Court”). 

Consequently, we do not address these issues. 

Additionally, Parsley disputes the merits of Great-West’s decision to 

deny his disability claim and its conclusion that he did not have effective 

coverage. The merits of Great-West’s decision to deny Parsley’s disability 

claim was not an issue before the district court, and, therefore, is not properly 

before us.

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22-12459 Opinion of the Court 11

was still time-barred. Specifically, in its March 7, 2019, letter, 

Great-West expressly stated that it had “issued a final decision in 

response to [Parsley’s] appeal in a letter dated November 19, 2014.” 

Thus, there can be no debate that, at the latest, Parsley knew that 

there had been a “final decision” in his case as of March 7, 2019, 

triggering the three-year limitation period.10 And even if the threeyear limitation period ran from the March 7, 2019, letter, Parsley’s 

complaint filed on April 1, 2022, was outside that three-year 

window. 

To the extent that Parsley’s arguments suggested that the 

appeal was not final because Great-West continued to accept his 

letters seeking reconsideration and respond to them in 2019, his 

claim fails under Illinois law. Specifically, Illinois statute § 143.1 

governs the tolling of contractual limitation periods like the one 

here. Am. Access Cas. Co., 948 N.E.2d at 312; see also 215 Ill. Comp. 

Stat. 5/143.1. Section 143.1 provides that when, as here, an 

insurance policy “contains a provision limiting the period within 

which the insured may bring suit, the running of such period is 

tolled from the date proof of loss is filed, in whatever form is 

required by the policy, until the date the claim is denied in whole 

or in part.” 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/143.1. In Vala v. Pac. Ins. Co., the

plaintiff made a similar claim to that of Parsley, and argued that his 

policy’s one-year limitation period was tolled while the insurance 

10 In light of the notification in the March 7, 2019, letter that Great-West’s 

decision was final, we need not decide whether the March and November 2014 

letters were final decisions. 

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12 Opinion of the Court 22-12459

company reinvestigated his claim following the initial denial, and, 

therefore, his complaint was timely filed. 695 N.E.2d 581, 582–83

(1998). The Appellate Court of Illinois rejected this argument and 

held that, under § 143.1, unless the insurance company rescinds its 

denial of the claim, “[t]he period of time between [the insured’s]

receipt of [the insurance company’s] denial and the reaffirmation 

of [the company’s] denial does not constitute time that can be 

tolled.” Id. at 584. Rather, tolling of the limitations period ceases 

“upon the date of the original (and never rescinded) denial

pursuant to [§] 143.1.” Id. Thus, under § 143.1 and Vala, GreatWest’s continued acceptance of Parsley’s requests for 

reconsideration did not otherwise toll the applicable three-year 

limitation period, which began to run on November 19, 2014,

when Great-West denied Parsley’s appeal. 

Accordingly, for the above reasons, the district court did not 

err in dismissing Parsley’s complaint as time-barred. 

AFFIRMED. 

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