ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Matthew J. McGovern Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana 

 

 James B. Martin 

 Monika Prekopa Talbot 

 Deputy Attorneys General 

 Indianapolis, Indiana 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

In the 

Indiana Supreme Court _________________________________ 

No. 82S01-1704-CR-191 

MARIO WATKINS, 

 Appellant (Defendant),

 

v. 

STATE OF INDIANA, 

Appellee (Plaintiff). 

 

_________________________________ 

Appeal from the Vanderburgh Circuit Court, No. 82C01-1412-F2-5337 

The Honorable Kelli E. Fink, Magistrate 

_________________________________ 

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 82A01-1510-CR-1624 

_________________________________ 

October 18, 2017 

Rush, Chief Justice. 

 Evansville police executed a search warrant at Mario Watkins’s home with a flash-bang 

grenade, battering ram, and a dozen heavily armed SWAT officers. Once inside, they found 

cocaine, marijuana, and a gun. Watkins argues that the intrusive entry violated the Indiana 

Constitution and that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause under the Federal 

Constitution. 
2

 For the state constitutional analysis, we apply our well-established Litchfield test and hold 

that Evansville police did not act unreasonably under the totality of the circumstances. And for the 

federal analysis, we uphold the search warrant because its supporting affidavit shows a substantial 

basis for finding probable cause. We therefore affirm the trial court. 

Facts and Procedural History 

A long-time confidential informant saw Mario Watkins in his Evansville home with a gun, 

cocaine, and marijuana. After receiving this tip, Evansville police got a search warrant, surveilled 

the house, and decided to send in the SWAT team. The team met to plan the warrant execution, 

taking into account the layout of the house, Watkins’s violent criminal history, and the danger 

posed by four adults with narcotics and a gun. 

 Soon after, twelve SWAT officers arrived at Watkins’s house in an armored vehicle. One 

officer bashed in the front door with a battering ram while another announced the team’s presence 

over a loudspeaker. A third officer’s job was to use a flash-bang grenade—a diversionary device 

that emits a loud noise and bright flash of light—to distract anyone inside. Following standard 

safety precautions, he did a “quick peek” into the front room to see whether the grenade was 

appropriate, then deployed it six inches inside the door.1

 He did not know that a nine-month-old 

boy was lying under a blanket in a playpen in that room. 

 Officers discovered the child moments after the grenade went off, and took him outside. 

They then found four adults—including Watkins—in the rest of the house. When they arrested 

Watkins, he told them that everything in the house was his. 

Searching the house, officers found a plate with crack cocaine residue, digital scales, 4.2 

grams of crack cocaine, 706 grams of marijuana, 35 hydrocodone pills, 21 alprazolam pills, 25 

oxycodone pills, $263 in cash, and a .40 caliber Hi-Point handgun. 

 The State charged Watkins with multiple felonies. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing 

that the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause under the Fourth Amendment and that 

 

1

 The trial record indicates that police deployed a second flash-bang grenade through the kitchen window, 

but Watkins’s arguments at the suppression hearing and on appeal mention only the one deployed at the 

front door. 
3

its execution violated the search-and-seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court denied the motion. 

The trial court then severed the unlawful possession of a firearm charge, and the remaining 

counts went to trial. The jury deadlocked on a neglect of a dependent charge, but found Watkins 

guilty of possession of a schedule II controlled substance as a lesser-included Class A 

misdemeanor, possession of cocaine as a Level 6 felony, possession of a schedule IV controlled 

substance as a lesser-included Class A misdemeanor, possession of marijuana as a lesser-included 

Class B misdemeanor, and maintaining a common nuisance as a Level 6 felony. 

Watkins appealed, arguing that the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that the search warrant execution was unreasonable 

under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. A split panel of the Court of Appeals 

reversed. The majority found the search unreasonable under Article 1, Section 11’s Litchfield test 

because “the extent of law enforcement needs for a military-style assault was low and the degree 

of intrusion was unreasonably high.” Watkins v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1092, 1102 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

Judge May dissented, as she would have found the search reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances. Id. at 1102 (May, J., dissenting). 

The State petitioned for transfer, which we granted—thus vacating the Court of Appeals 

opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). 

Standard of Review 

Watkins challenges the constitutionality of the warrant execution only under Article 1, 

Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution—an issue that we review de novo. Zanders v. State, 73 

N.E.3d 178, 181 (Ind. 2017). 

 He then challenges the sufficiency of the search warrant affidavit only under the Fourth 

Amendment. We likewise review de novo the trial court’s paper-record decision upholding the 

issuance of a search warrant. Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 98 (Ind. 1997). But we give “great 

deference” to the prior judge’s initial, underlying probable cause finding—affirming if a 

“substantial basis” supported it and resolving doubtful cases in favor of upholding the warrant. Id. 

at 98–99 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236–39 (1983)). 
4

Discussion and Decision

I. Police Did Not Execute This Search Warrant Unreasonably Under Article 1, Section 

11 of the Indiana Constitution. 

The parties agree that the method of executing a search warrant triggers our State 

Constitution’s protections, but they dispute the proper test for determining whether that method is 

reasonable. We hold that the totality-of-the-circumstances Litchfield test—a test applied hundreds 

of times in our courts—remains well-suited to assess reasonableness under Article 1, Section 11. 

See Simons v. Simons, 566 N.E.2d 551, 557 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!”). 

Applying that test here, we find that the search warrant execution was not unreasonable. 

A. The Litchfield test governs the reasonableness of search warrant executions. 

Our Indiana Constitution safeguards the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. As 

the parties agree, a search warrant’s execution is axiomatically a “search,” so it triggers Section 

11’s protection. See Lacey v. State, 946 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Ind. 2011). 

The SWAT team’s search of Watkins’s home, then, must live up to our Constitution’s 

expectations—it must not be “unreasonable.” The parties disagree on how to determine 

reasonableness. Watkins asks us to stick with the totality-of-the-circumstances test we established 

in Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359–61 (Ind. 2005). The State argues that Litchfield 

shouldn’t apply to search warrant executions and proposes a new test: search warrant executions 

should be unreasonable only if “no reasonable officer” would execute a search that way. 

We agree with Watkins that the Litchfield test remains well-suited to assess the 

reasonableness of search warrant executions, making any new test unnecessary. This totality-ofthe-circumstances test is our “faithful stand-by” to determine reasonableness under our 

Constitution, Zanders, 73 N.E.3d at 186, and is appropriate for a range of contexts, see Garcia v. 

State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2016). As we held in Litchfield itself, the test applies broadly to 

“a governmental search.” 824 N.E.2d at 359. Indeed, Litchfield governs the reasonableness of 

searches incident to arrest, Garcia, 47 N.E.3d at 1199; traffic stops, Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 

362, 368 (Ind. 2014); vehicle searches, State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 2010); trash 

searches, Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 269 (Ind. 2008); and protective sweeps, Weddle v. 
5

State, 989 N.E.2d 371, 378 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. In short, its application is 

comprehensive. 

Home searches are no different; we apply the Litchfield test “[t]o determine whether a 

residential entry violated Article 1, Section 11.” Lacey, 946 N.E.2d at 550. Litchfield accordingly 

governs both warrantless home entries, Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 940–41 (Ind. 2006), and 

the execution of arrest warrants at a home, Duran v. State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 19 (Ind. 2010). And in 

Lacey, we held that no-knock search warrants do not require prior judicial authorization because 

they are governed by the Litchfield test based on the “circumstances at the time the warrant was 

served.” 946 N.E.2d at 550, 552–53. In line with Lacey, the Court of Appeals—both here and in 

its recent Ware opinion—applied Litchfield to search warrants. Ware v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1109, 

1113–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied; Watkins, 67 N.E.3d at 1102. This totality-of-thecircumstances test thus governs the reasonableness of search warrant executions. 

Even if our precedent did not cement Litchfield’s application here, we would still reject the 

State’s “no reasonable officer” test. As we recently recognized, our Constitution grants homes its 

“highest protection.” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1002 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Moran v. State, 

644 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. 1994)). We cannot dial down that protection by isolating search warrant 

executions with a special, less protective test. In fact, the Litchfield test is well-suited for all 

searches—including warrant executions—because it looks to the totality of the circumstances. 

Finally, the State’s rationale for its test—that courts should not second-guess officers—

implies that judges should defer to police when analyzing an Article 1, Section 11 claim. True, we 

refrain from “unrealistic second-guessing,” especially when “police are acting in a swiftly 

developing situation.” Browder v. State, 77 N.E.3d 1209, 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied 

(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)). But a reasonableness analysis under 

Article 1, Section 11 must account for more than police officers’ judgment calls; it is a multifaceted determination that ultimately belongs to judges. See Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 

(Ind. 1995). So we turn now to that analysis, applying our totality-of-the-circumstances Litchfield 

test. 

B. This search warrant was not executed unreasonably under the totality of the circumstances. 

Under the Litchfield test, we assess reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances, 

balancing “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the 
6

degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, 

and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1002 (quoting Litchfield, 

824 N.E.2d at 361). 

1. The degree of police suspicion. 

Watkins argues that police suspicion was low because little to no evidence showed that 

drugs were in his house. But this argument is misplaced because a valid warrant means that police 

had probable cause to believe that Watkins’s home contained evidence of a crime. See Duran, 930 

N.E.2d at 18; Membres, 889 N.E.2d at 275. 

Evansville police also strongly suspected that executing the search warrant would be 

dangerous. They heard about the gun and drugs in the house from a reliable confidential informant 

who had worked for them “extensively” for sixteen to eighteen months, leading to dozens of arrests 

and convictions. Officers bolstered this suspicion by watching the house before executing the 

search warrant, which led them to notice activity consistent with active drug dealing: “short term 

traffic” to the house and Watkins pulling a small plastic bag from under a trash can behind the 

house. In short, not only did police have a valid warrant, they also corroborated the informant’s 

tip before sending in the SWAT team. 

2. The degree of intrusion. 

Watkins argues, the State admits, and indeed any reasonable person would agree, that the 

degree of intrusion was high. The SWAT team bashed in the front door with a battering ram less 

than fifteen seconds after pulling up in an armored vehicle. Less than three seconds after that, 

police deployed a flash-bang grenade into a room occupied only by a nine-month-old infant. A 

small army of officers carrying assault rifles then stormed the house, while others watched through 

windows and the front door. 

Despite this aggressive entry, police moderated the intrusion. The officer deploying the 

flash-bang grenade did a “quick peek” inside to check for people or smells (that could indicate 

flammable materials or explosive methamphetamine) that would make a flash-bang dangerous.2

 

2

 Watkins argues that the video of the search shows that there was no “quick peek.” But the video does not 

“indisputably contradict” the officer’s testimony that he did one. See Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 699–

700 (Ind. 2017). The officer also testified that his view was much wider than what the camera captured 

because the camera was mounted directly on top of his head. 
7

Because he couldn’t see the entire room, he took the additional precaution of setting off the grenade 

in the threshold—only six inches inside the door. So while the degree of intrusion was high, police 

carefully tailored their tactics. 

3. The extent of law enforcement needs. 

Watkins also argues that law enforcement needs were low, downplaying the officers’ 

knowledge that the house harbored cocaine, marijuana, four adults, and a gun. But guns and illegal 

drugs are a dangerous combination. See Polk v. State, 683 N.E.2d 567, 571 (Ind. 1997) (noting the 

“violent and dangerous criminal milieu created by drug dealing and possession”). While that 

combination is not enough to justify intrusive searches per se (Litchfield is, after all, a totality-ofthe-circumstances test), it certainly increases law enforcement needs. This case was no exception. 

The gun was not hidden or locked in a safe; the informant saw Watkins carrying it. Add Watkins’s 

criminal history—including drug crimes, robbery, and burglary—and the law enforcement needs 

were strong. 

4. Balancing the totality of the circumstances. 

 Under the totality of the circumstances, this search was not unreasonable. Officers 

strategically protected themselves while searching a house that they strongly suspected had 

cocaine, marijuana, and a suspect with a gun and violent criminal history. The search was intrusive; 

we cannot describe the use of a battering ram, flash bang grenade, and SWAT team any other way. 

But our constitutional analysis balances that invasiveness with police safety and other law 

enforcement needs. Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 786 (Ind. 2001). The significant intrusion 

here did not outweigh the even more significant police interests. 

Watkins cites several Seventh Circuit civil damages cases to argue that this search was 

unreasonable. See, e.g., Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2010); Molina v. 

Cooper, 325 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2003). These cases do not control for two reasons. First, they 

analyze reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, while Watkins’s challenge here rests solely 

on Article 1, Section 11. See Carpenter, 18 N.E.3d at 1001 (“Although Indiana’s Section 11 and 

the Federal Fourth Amendment are textually identical, they are analytically distinct.”). Second, 

their analysis zooms in on flash-bang grenades—something incompatible with our totality-of-thecircumstances test. 
8

Even if we did apply the Seventh Circuit’s flash-bang grenade jurisprudence, though, this 

search was likely not unreasonable. In Bender, the court found the use of flash-bang grenades 

unreasonable because police blindly threw them into an apartment without any threat of violence 

to anyone but the resident himself. 600 F.3d at 785–86. And in Molina, the court found their use 

reasonable because police believed that someone in the house had a violent criminal record and 

access to weapons. 325 F.3d at 973. This case is much more like Molina than Bender: police knew 

that Watkins was in the home and that he had a violent criminal history and a gun. And unlike in 

Bender, police took the precautions of a “quick peek” and setting the flash-bang just inside the 

doorway instead of blindly lobbing it into the room. 

 But make no mistake: flash-bang grenades should be the exception in search warrant 

executions. Their extraordinary degree of intrusion will in many cases make a search 

constitutionally unreasonable. See Watkins, 67 N.E.3d at 1104 (May, J., dissenting). And we have 

serious concerns about officers here setting off a flash-bang grenade when the only person in the 

room was a nine-month-old. Ultimately though, this search warrant execution—under Litchfield’s 

totality-of-the-circumstances test—did not violate our Constitution’s search-and-seizure 

protections. 

II. A Substantial Basis Supports Probable Cause for the Search Warrant Under the 

Fourth Amendment. 

Watkins challenges the search warrant affidavit’s sufficiency only under the Fourth 

Amendment. As a reviewing court, our duty “is simply to ensure that [there was] a substantial 

basis” for finding probable cause. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). We owe “great 

deference” to the initial probable-cause determination, and will not invalidate warrants by 

interpreting probable cause affidavits “in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.” 

Id. at 236. 

Evansville police applied for a warrant on December 17, 2014. The probable cause affidavit 

read in part, 

Within 48 hours of December 16, 2014, a credible and reliable 

confidential informant (hereinafter “CI”) observed more than ten 

(10) grams of crack cocaine inside of 314 W. Illinois St., Evansville, 

IN. Your Affiant met with CI and had CI direct him to the residence 

in your Affiant’s vehicle. . . . 
9

During surveillance on 314 W. Illinois St., Evansville, Indiana in the 

early morning hours of December 17, 2014, Detectives came to 

determine that at least one (1) resident of 314 W. Illinois St., 

Evansville, IN is Mario Watkins. . . . 

With respect to CI’s credibility and reliability: CI has been working 

with Detectives with the Evansville Vanderburgh County Joint Drug 

Task Force for over one (1) year. The information provided by CI 

has led to the arrest of numerous [] individuals involved in narcotics 

activity. The arrests made on the information provided by CI have 

resulted in convictions on both the federal and state level[s]. CI has 

provided information that has been utilized on judicially issued 

search warrants. Information provided by CI has led to the seizure 

of multiple pounds of narcotics in the Evansville, Vanderburgh 

County, Indiana area. 

 Watkins argues that this affidavit is insufficient under Walker v. State, 829 N.E.2d 591 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied, and Merritt v. State, 803 N.E.2d 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In 

those cases, the Court of Appeals rejected affidavits because they tied illegal drugs to a person

who was selling them but not to the place to be searched. Walker, 829 N.E.2d at 595–96; Merritt, 

803 N.E.2d at 260–61. In both cases, the affidavit alleged only that “an unidentified black male” 

had been seen at the place to be searched with what appeared to be illegal drugs. Id. Without facts 

showing that the unidentified person with the drugs frequented, lived at, or stored drugs at the 

place to be searched, there was no probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime would be 

found there. Id. 

 We agree with Watkins that affidavits must show probable cause that contraband or 

evidence is at the place to be searched, but we disagree that this one failed to do so. Instead of 

tying contraband to a perhaps-transient person—as the affidavits in Walker and Merritt did—this 

affidavit tied contraband to Watkins’s exact home address. It also included a reliable confidential 

informant’s observation of crack cocaine within the past three days at the place to be searched. 

The affidavit thus provided a substantial basis for finding that the “particular place contains 

evidence of a crime.” Membres, 889 N.E.2d at 275 (emphasis added). In other words, the warrant 

was based on a “practical, commonsense decision” that there was “a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime” would be found in Watkins’s house. Query v. State, 745 N.E.2d 

769, 771 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). Watkins has not overcome the warrant’s 

presumption of validity, see Brock v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1236, 1239 (Ind. 1989), so we affirm. 
10

Conclusion 

 The Litchfield test continues to serve us well, so we decline the State’s invitation to replace 

it with an unprecedented “no reasonable officer” test for search warrant executions. Under the 

totality of the circumstances, the search warrant execution at Watkins’s house did not violate 

Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. And the search warrant affidavit survives our 

deferential Fourth Amendment review because it provided a substantial basis for the probable 

cause finding. We therefore affirm the trial court. 

David, Massa, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur.