ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

PREFACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Notes . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

1 THE ARAB AIR WARFARE EXPERIENCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The First Arab-Israeli War-1947-49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Lessons-1948 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Suez War-29 October-7 November 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Lessons-1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 6

The Six-Day War-1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7

Lessons-1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The October War-1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 12

Lessons-1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 14

Wrap-up The Arab Wars. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

2 BACKGROUNDS OF THE IQAF AND IIAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

The Iraqi Air Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Wartime Combat Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Political Influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Organization and Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

The Iranian Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 23

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

3 REASONS FOR THE WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

The Reasons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

iii
Performance-The IQAF and IIAF in

Strategic Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Doctrinal Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Offensive Counterair Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

The Iraqi Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

The Iranian Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Support for Ground Forces-Close Air Support/

Interdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Command and Control-Different Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The Role of Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Strategic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Cultural Factors Impacting Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Airpower Approaches. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Principles of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Cultural Factors Impacting Military Operations. . . . . . . . . . . 78

Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

iv
Air Force Station, Virginia ; squadron and wing intelligence officer duties with the

45th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Bergstrom AFB, Texas, and the 366th

Tactical Fighter Wing, Da Nang Air Base, Vietnam; and as a targeteer at Seventh Air

Force headquarters, Saigon, Vietnam. The son of aUS Air Force chiefmaster sergeant,

Major Bergquist was born in Idaho and raised in Hawaii, Delaware, and Texas. He

received his BA in geography and his commission through the Reserve Officer

Training Corps (ROTC) at the University of Texas in 1968 . He received his MA in

Middle East studies from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, in

1978 . Major Bergquist is also an honor graduate of the Defense Language Institute

in the Arabic language and a graduate of the Air Command and Staff College, class

of 1982 .

y pg, , 

using their airpower assets in ways contrary to our expectations . Most notably, it

seemed that both sides seemed content not to use their airpower and relied instead on

ground forces for most combat operations . This report examines the air war between

Iran and Iraq, but rather than attempt simply to lay out what happened in the war, it

attempts to discern why Iran and Iraq used their airpower as they did. The results of

this study do not call into question any basic US Air Force airpower approaches, but

they do highlight significant considerations that affect the use of airpower by Third

World nations .

Although the analysis and conclusions in this study are the responsibility of the

author alone, it could not have been written without the generous assistance ofmany

individuals . Special thanks must go to Maj Gen John Marks for nominating me to

write this report and especially to the men of the Regional Estimates Division,

AF/IN-Majs Harry Colestock, Rick UHeureux, and David Prevost-for ably taking

up the slackduring my absence from that organization . I must also mention my thanks

to the members of the Airpower Research Institute for their guidance, insight, and

good humor. Mostnotably, I must thankCol Kenneth J. Alnwick, LtCol DonBaucom,

Maj George Orr, Capt Brian Cioli, and Capt Harbert Jones. John Schenk and Dot

McCluskie kept me from egregious errors of syntax, grammar, and organization. But

no matter how much guidance, direction, or inspiration went into this study, it could

not have seen the light of day without the untiring efforts of those indefatigable

decipherers of my indescribable scrawlings-Jo Ann Perdue, Edna Davis, Marcia

Williams, and Connie Smith.

RON BERGQUIST

iii

not seem to be progressing in a rational

manner. The failure of both sides to use

their air forces in support of ground advances [was] inexplicable to western military

sources." I By the end of the year, "the Iraqi-Iranian warbegan to resemble a grappling

match between the slow and the disorganized . . . military observers were entertained

by the ineptitude of the combatants ."2 And now, two years later, the Iraqis have been

forced to withdraw from virtually all occupied territory by a combination of Iranian

infantry and artillery attacks. As it turned out, Iranian airpower was not the impetus

behind Iranian advances nor was Iraqi airpower any barrier to them.

The Iran-Iraq war has been a unique Third World conflict-two countries with

large, relatively untested military forces ; well equipped with the best Western and

Soviet arms; slugging it out in isolation over an extended period . And one of the most

puzzling of its unique characteristics has been the relatively ineffectual use of

airpower displayed by both sides. US airmen have been mystified about the conduct

of the air war. They have not understood why some seemingly irrational things have

been done while other obviously vital things have not. Herein lies the problem and

the reason forthis report . In observing air warfare in the Third World, military analysts

tend to make certain, often unconscious, assumptions about the logic behind the

employment of airpower. These assumptions are based on our own historical

experiences in four wars and are reinforced to a considerable degree by the successes

of the Israeli Air Force against Arab air forces . Our institutional memory and

perception holds that ours is a rational, sensible way to employ airpower to achieve

military and national ends . Analysts tend to assume that any airpowerpractitioner will

recognize the essential elements of a situation and will react in a "rational" manner,

given his capabilities and limitations. They are not convinced that general rules for

airpower employment are not essentially universal. But as one American analyst

noted:

We had a tendency to see the Israeli-Egyptian war as setting the pattern for future Third

World conflicts . We discover today that Iraq and Iran are not Israel and Egypt, and that

a war between countries like this can be much more chaotic and dangerous than we

thought. ;

ix
the initial stage of conflict. Chapter 5 attempts to flesh out the question of why the air

war went as it did in light of the comments in the preceding two chapters. The last

chapter contains some conclusions on air operations between Iran and Iraq, and what

Western observers may learn from them.

For convenience throughout this paper, the Iraqi Air Force is referred to as the

IQAF and the Iranian Air Force as the IIAF-Imperial Iranian Air Force before the

1979 revolution, Islamic Iranian Air Force after it . While transliteration ofArabic and

Persian personal and place names will not follow any single academic convention, it

does follow a general guideline of being recognizable, familiar, pronounceable, and

consistent .

NOTES

I . Drew Middleton, "Iran-Iraq Impasse : Ground War Stalls. Yet Neither Side Exploits Air Power." New

York Times (hereafter referred to as NYT). 6 October 1980 . A 14.

2 Harvey Sicherman . "Iraq and Iran at War: The Search for Security." Orbis 14 (Winter 1981) : 713 .

3 Geoffrey Kemp, quoted in Phillipe Rondot . "Iran-Iraq ` War Evaluated by French Journalist," Paris

Defense Nationale in French, June 1981 . 79-95, in Joint Publications Research Service Near EastlNorth

African Report (hereafter referred to as JPRS). no. 2357 . I July 1981 : 20

X
having only fired in anger during periodic border problems with Iraq . More recently,

however, they had used tactical airpower along with ground forces to assist the sultan

of Oman in counterinsurgency operations in Dhofar, the western portion of Oman. In

contrast, the IQAF had experienced combat operations during wars with Israel in

1948, 1967, and 1973 . It had also operated extensively during the long running

Kurdish insurgency that ended in 1975 . And, of course, it had also engaged in periodic

attacks along the Iranian border.

The Arabs, most notably the frontline states-Egypt, Syria, andJordan-have had

30 years of lessons about airpower drilled into them by theirexperience against Israel .

As this study will later show, some of these lessons also filtered into Iraqi and Iranian

thinking. Many studies have been done on the Arab-Israeli wars, and the lessons about

the use of airpower have been exhaustively argued-especially after the Six-Day War

in 1967 and the October War in 1973 . The great majority of these studies, however.

discuss these lessons from the US or Israel perspective. Very few lay out the lessons

absorbed by the losing side in these conflicts. While some lessons apply equally to

both sides, it can be argued (and this study will do so) that the Arabs learned lessons

that were, in some ways, quite different from those we learned. Legitimate arguments

can be made that some of the lessons the Arabs have drawn are unrealistic and do not

reflect rational thinking, at least from a Western perspective, butthat is not the point.

The point is that Arab military men perceive these things to be true insofar as they

represent lessons they have learned, for them, their perception is theirreality. Because

the United States and the Arabs often read from totally different sheets of music.

Americans sometimes misread Arab actions.

While the rest of this chapter discusses air operations in the various Middle East

conflicts from 1948 to 1973, it will not attempt to merely lay out the facts. Rather it

will try to describe the wars from the Arab perspective so as to glean what lessons the

Arabs-and, in some cases, the interested onlookers, the Iranians-took away from

these encounters . The way things happened in the 1980-81 air war will make more

'sense if we have a sense of how the Arabs saw the results of their previous airpower

efforts.

1
The Syrians, French trained, had a few T-6 Harvards which could have been used as

light bombers,4 but they took little part in the air combat . 5

During the firstphase ofthe war, from November 1947-before the actual partition

of Palestine-to summer 1948, just after the declaration of the new State of Israel,

the Arabs had unchallenged air superiority. The fledgling Israeli Air Force (IAF) had

no comparable aircraft with which to compete. Syria and Iraq were responsible for

operations north ofTel Aviv, while Egypt was responsible for the area from Tel Aviv

south.Despite their unchallenged control of the air, the Arab air forces achieved no

significant results. For example, almost daily Egyptian air raids on Tel Aviv were of

nuisance value only, and Arab air forces were of almost no use to the disparate and

disorganized Arab ground units. This was to continue throughout . Arab airpower was

not an important factor and had little influence upon the ultimate outcome of any

military operations .

Things changed for the Arabs over the summer of 1948. The IAF, which started

with 19 light auxiliary-type aircraft, got its first combat aircraft in May of that year.

On the 29th, four Messerschmitts arrived from Czechoslovakia and more began to

arrive daily. On 14July, three B- 17s which had been smuggled out of the United States

arrived in Israel, having bombed Cairo en route. Soon they were making almost daily

bombing runs on Arab positions. In August, the IAF received some P-51 Mustangs

and Spitfires, further increasing their qualitative and now quantitative edge over the

Arab air forces . 8 By the armistice, the IAF had 205 aircraft.9 Additionally, throughout

the year, Israel received foreign volunteers for its air force. In all, 700 volunteers

arrived. Some were not Jewish, but most were World War II combat veterans and a

number were fighter pilots with outstanding combat records.

10

By September, the situation in the air had been reversed. In early summer, Arab

flyers were still able to strafe Israeli positions with impunity. By late summer,

however, the Iraqis had ceased operating in the north since they were unable to

compete with the Messerschmitts by day and did not have any bombers for night

operations . The Israelis, now possessing enough aircraft to begin to think about real

airpower objectives, prepared in late fall to have the IAF support a ground offensive.

IAF objectives were : (1) destroy the Arab air forces ; (2) hit Arab tactical targets; (3)

support Israeli ground forces ; and (4) hit Arab strategic targets, notably Damascus

2
war reflected their performance during the war. For the Arabs, the most significant

result of the war was political-the subsequent radicalization of Arab politics .

Searching for the reasons for the loss ofArab Palestine, many fixed the blame on Arab

leaders. The prime minister of Iraq was forced to resign, the emir of Transjordan was

assassinated, the Syrian government began its sorry succession of military coups, and

the royal dynasty in Egypt was ousted by army officers . But the most salient fact

concerning airpower from the Arab viewpoint was that airpower, in their hands, was

not very effective in achieving their military goals while Israeli control of the air in

the later stages ofthe warwas not the decisive cause for theirdefeat . The Arabs showed

no sign they felt the air force could be a decisive military weapon . They seemed

inclined to consider it useful mostly as a defensive weapon. Consequently, Arab

offensive sorties were not much more than harassment missions. One lesson that was

absorbed, however, was defensively oriented . They had learned there was a need to

be able to control the air over their troops in the relatively coverless Middle Eastern

topography. They could see that the army, the most importantelement oftheir military

structure, could be demoralized, if not necessarily defeated by aerial bombardment.

Egyptian troops-including future President Gamal Abdel Nasser-surrounded in

the Falluja pocket in southern Israel were bombed almost daily by Israeli B-17s.

Despite the severe hardshipsthe troops experiencedfromthe bombings, the Egyptians

held out until the armistice.

12

Despite their overtly offensive aims in the 1948 war-destruction of the Jewish

state in Palestine-the Arabs did not seem to see the offensive potential in their air

forces . They did not seek out the enemy air force and they quit the area of combat

when the enemy air force challenged them. They could see adefensive role for the

air forces, protecting their own troops from bombardment, but they still did not see

bombardment as decisive . They had yet to experience, however, the effects of

unopposed bombardment on troops forced to retreat long distances over the desert .

That lesson was yet to come.

The Suez War-29 October-7 November 1956

One of the results of the 1948 war was, as previously noted, the overthrow of the

Egyptian monarchy. The Free Officers, a group of military men led by Lt Col Gamal

3
overt support of Algerian rebels seeking the end of French rule in that country. His

support was both moral in the form of strident rhetoric and physical in the providing

ofarms for the rebels . Atop all this was the continued mutual hostility between Egypt

and Israel . While much of Nasser's anti-Israeli rhetoric was designed primarily to

secure Egyptian leadership of an Arab world where verbal overbidding is necessary

for political success, Israel prudently noted several actual manifestations of

malevolence, such as Egypt's refusal to allow Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal

and its closure of the Strait of Tiran-two actions that damaged the Israeli economy.

Moreover, the 1955 arms deal with Czechoslovakia, which would gain Egypt 86

MiG-15s and 39 II-28s as well as tanks, guns, antiaircraft artillery (AAA), and other

weapons, was a situation that Tel Aviv viewed as a direct, if future-oriented, threat to

the safety of the Jewish state .

13 Thus by 1956, three states had reasons to wish the

end of Colonel Nasser and they jointly planned to see it happen.

Israel had in 1955 begun planning an operation, later named Operation Kadesh,

to seize control ofthe Strait ofTiran . By July 1956Israeli government haddecided

that the state ofIsraeli-Arab relations was intolerable and gave tentative approval for

war. Coincidental in timing, but unrelated to Israeli planning, Great Britain had

decided that it too would use military force in Egypt. The final straw for London was

Egypt's 26July 1956 nationalization ofthe Suez Canal. In early August, British Prime

Minister Robert Anthony Eden decided to use force to restore the canal to its `'rightful

owners," the (British) Suez Canal Corporation . France-for its own aforementioned

reasonsjoined Britain, and planning for ajoint military operation began. In October,

Israel was invited to join in the assault.

14 The final plan envisaged an Israeli attack

into the Sinai, ostensibly as retaliation for fedayeen guerrilla raids, followed by an

Anglo-French ultimatum that both sides disengage, each moving to a line 10 miles

east and west of the canal while British and French troops occupied the canal to

"protect" it. If Nasser refused the ultimatum, they would force their way in .

15 The

Anglo-French operation was called Musketeer.

From the beginning, elimination or neutralization of the EAF was a first priority

for both Musketeer and Kadesh planners. While Israel felt it could probably handle

the EAF had Israel gone alone on Operation Kadesh, it would not join in the

Anglo-French assault unless Israel proper was protected from Egyptian retaliatory

bombing.

16 As French Gen Andre Beaufre put it, Israel wanted the surest form of air

4
To deal with this air force, the allies had at their disposal 200 Royal Navy fighters

off three carriers, 50 French Navy fighters off two carriers, nine squadrons of RAF

bombers (120 aircraft in all), four squadrons of RAF fighter-bombers (100 aircraft),

and four French fighter-bomber wings (77 F-84s and 25 Mystere IVs). The IAF had

155 more aircraft (including 9 Mysteres, 25 Ouragans, 25 Meteors, 29 P-5 Is, 16

Mosquitos, 20 T-6 Harvards, 16 C-47s, and 2 B-17s) . 20 The IAF was to assist the

Kadesh forces while the French and British were to destroy the EAF. The revised

Musketeer plan envisaged three phases for the Suez operation. Phase one was a

36-hour destruction of the EAF. Phase two was a 10-14 day, round-the-clock air

offensive to disrupt the Egyptian economy, communications and transportation

network, and army along with a psychological campaign to cripple Egyptian civilian

morale-the "aero-psychological campaign." Phase three was the occupation of the

canal area.

21

The Israeli invasion began in the afternoon of 29 October. Britain and France

delivered their ultimatum to Cairo and to Tel Aviv as part of the plan to appear as an

honest broker on 30 October. When Nasser, as anticipated, rejected it, Musketeer

began. At 1900 hours, 31 October, RAF Canberras and Valiants, operating at high

altitude and using flares for illumination, dropped both contact and delayed-action

bombs on four Egyptian airfields . As Egypt had no early warning system, the RAF

encountered no EAF opposition. The night attack with small payloads, however, was

not markedly successful in destroying the EAR Early morning reconnaissance on 1

November showed potted runways and fires, but few damaged planes. The EAF, in

fact, had managed to save some airframes . Russian and Czech pilots flew some Il-28s

and MiG-15s to Saudi and Syrian safe havens . Twenty more 11-28s were flown south

to Luxor. But allied air forces soon finished up the EAF. Later on the same day,French

and British aircraft, operating from both Cyprus and off the carriers, made low-level

passes on EAF planes at 12 airfields, using mostly rockets and cannons . By the end

of the day, very accurate gunnery had destroyed 260 or so Egyptian planes on the

ground at a cost of 7 allied planes lost to moderate antiaircraft fire or accident. Ofthe

4911-28s that caused so much concern to Israel, only the 20 at Luxor remained (and

those too were destroyed on the 2d by French F-84s operating out of Israel). Though

the EAF was to fly a few sorties every day for the rest ofthe war, its isolated strafing

5
Whether the EAF, or other regional observers, learned any lessons from the 1956

experience is again an open question. For the majority of the Egyptian populace and

the Arab world, the memory ofthe crushing military defeat was erased by the euphoria

over Egypt's political victory. Under United States pressure, France and Great Britain

were forced to leave the Suez Canal and to concede its sovereignty to Egypt; and

Israel was forced to return to the 1949 armistice borders, returning the Sinai to Egypt.

Some facets of the air operations, however, must have been noted.

Unlike 1948, Egypt in 1956 possessed enough airframes to pose a potentially

effective threat to would-be enemies. Yet, that potential was eliminated by enemy

airpower utilizing the principle of surprise to destroy the EAF on the ground . At one

swoop, the enemy had ensured their air supremacy, thus leaving Egypt and its armies

almost -without defenses from air attack . Enemy aircraft, attacking first, completely

took the employment initiative away from the EAF, forcing it into a reactive mode

(and an extremely limited mode at that). Even though the French and British destroyed

the EAF, Israel obviously realized that airpower used in afirst strike, offensive mode

was the way to defend its homeland from attack or its troops from interference from

the air. But there was no sign Egyptian airmen viewed airpower in the same offensive

light. Allied airpower first attacked Egyptian air assets . On the other hand, Egyptian

aircraft, wherever they operated, acted to defend airspace or to defend their own

soldiers by striking at enemy troops .

23 No allied aircraft were attacked at their home

bases.

Another fact that had to be noted was the vulnerability of aircraft on the ground.

Most of the EAF's losses were to strafing or rocket fire . The desirability ofrevetments

or hardened shelters was obvious . The EAF did have one answer for vulnerability of

their planes on the ground; they flew them out to safe havens beyond the battle area

(though Luxor later turned out not to be so safe) .

But the poor EAF response to these lessons, further developed in the next section,

was to hurt them in 1967. They had clear warning . Moshe Dayan published his diary

in Hebrew in 1965 and in English in 1966. In it he stated that the EAF must be

destroyed on the ground for an Israeli invasion to succeed .

24

In reviewing the events of late 1956, one lesson that had to penetrate into Egyptian

thinking was the recognition that troops in the desert, without some sort ofair defense,

are highly vulnerable to air attack . Israel's answer to this situation was offensive

6
years of its life as the pressures were building that would lead to the violent and bitter

1958 revolution . But in 1956, Iraq was allied with Britain in the Baghdad Pact and

the bulk of the IQAF was composed ofBritish-supplied Vampire and Venom fighters .

Iraq, like Britain, was in an anomalous situation with regards to Israel. Iraq moved

troops to Jordan to help that state fend off potential Israeli attacks . Should Israel have

hit at Jordan as well as Egypt, Britain would have to sort out its alliances before

proceeding since England would have been Israel's ally in the Sinai but her enemy

on the Jordanian border.

26

In Iran, the IIAF was still in a formative stage . The shah was still working to

consolidate his control in the aftermath of the 1951-53 Mohammed Mossadegh era .

Development of his military as a bulwark of his throne was a high-priority task for

the shah. But the IIAF in 1956 wasjust beginning to receive its first combat aircraft,

75 F-84s that would arrive from 1956 to 1958. 2

The Six-Day War-1967

Eleven years later, the Arab air forces, especially the Egyptian, had not adequately

reacted to the lessons of 1956. A partial reason was that the EAF was still living in a

fool's paradise-thinking defensively, planning for retaliation, and expecting that it

could pick the time and place for combat. To a large extent, the EAF's posture was a

reflection of Nasser's own feeling about the situation. Egypt's defensive orientation

was noted in 1956 when, despite its verbal hostility to Israel and the West, it felt itself

the innocent, assaulted by external enemies . The year 1967 was muchthe same. Israel

may well have decided to act in reaction to Arab threats because it could not risk that

they might actually try to carry them out. But for all his bombast, Nasser clearly did

notanticipate launching an attack. In the Arab game ofverbal one-upmanship, Nasser

went, in May 1967, beyond his previously stated objective of deterring Israeli

aggression to state his intention of settling the Palestinian question (by force,

implicitly). Yet he was clearly thinking he could pull off another 1956 and gain his

ends through political, not military, means. He clearly expected that if war came,

Egypt would not start it . He did say on 27 May, "The battle against Israel will be a

general one, and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel." Yet he preceded that

statement with, "If Israel embarks on an aggression against Syria or Egypt, the

7
The military situation in the Six-Day War can be concisely stated-led by its air

force, the Israelis crushed the Arabs. Some of the important reasons for the IAF

success were: (1) maximum surprise allowed the IAF to hit the bulk of Arab aircraft

while they were still on the ground, (2) excellent target intelligence which both located

Arab aircraft and identified the most advantageous time to strike them, (3) low-level

attack runs for accuracy (shades of 1956), and (4) the IAF's rapid aircraft turnaround

capability. The EAF was wiped out again; according to the 1973 EAF commander,

Hosni Mubarak, the EAF lost over 90 percent of its aircraft in the first day or so and,

even more important, most ofits meager supply of pilots .

30 As the Egyptian Air Force

was being destroyed on the morning of 5 June, the other Arab air forces attempted

some small, half-hearted, and poorly coordinated retaliatory raids on Israel . They

caused minimal damage, but Israel's return strikes did not. The Royal Jordanian Air

Force was eliminated on the ground during turnarounds . The Syrian Air Force was

next taken out and lastly the Iraqi Air Force was damaged by a strike at H-3 airfield,

the closest Iraqi airfield toIsrael . 3l The Royal Saudi Air Force was not hit . The Saudis

apparently learned early what was happening to the EAF, recognized the futility of

the situation, and elected not to enter into a hopeless encounter with the IAE32 In all,

the IAF struck 25 of 26 Arab air bases on 5 June, effectively eliminating the Arab air

forces and freeing Israeli ground forces from air attacks .

33

Without air cover, Arab armies were again easy target for Israeli air. The Egyptian

commander in chief made the same decision on 6 June 1967 as he had made in 1956;

he ordered the Egyptian army to withdraw from the Sinai to behind the Suez Canal.

34

Egyptian soldiers in 1967 suffered the same fate they had in 1956, only worse. Israeli

air, generally unopposed by the EAF, wrecked the disorganized Egyptian columns

moving west. On the other front, Israeli air was even more important . The Jordanian

army on the WestBank fought well, but without air defense, its columns were smashed

and its positions were pummeled. When Israeli ground forces found themselves in a

tight spot, they could call on air support to bail them out ; the Jordanians could not.

The situation was much the same for Syrian forces on the Golan Heights . Despite

undeniable heroics by Israeli army men, there is serious doubt whether or not the

Syrians could have been dislodged without heavy Israeli air attacks . The IAF flew

more ground attack sorties against Syrian forces in the Golan Heights than against all

8
The defeat was a shattering experience for all Arabs. Despite efforts to explain it

away, or refer to it as only a °setback."'7the reality of defeat hit hard . Whereas the

19-18 and 1956 losses had, in the main. affected only small portions of the Arab

nation-military officers,forexample-the 1967 defeat affected all Arabs Moreover,

the emotional and political impact of this crushing defeat was enormous since it

struck at the very heart of Arab values and Arab self-image .Israel played on this

factor by successfully publicizing the war as a test between the JeNvish David and the

Arab Goliath. both to gain Western support for Israel and to cause Israel's enemies to

question themselves The impact \vas enough to jolt Muslim Arabs into a

soul-searching introversion to find a reason for the defeat. In many ways, 1967 marked

the beginning of the most recent Muslim revival period as many Muslims. unwilling

or incapable of accepting Israeli military and organizational superiority. sawthedefeat

as God's retribution for their having strayed from the proper Islamic path .

But many Arabs, in their reaction to defeat . found psychic refuge in refusing to

admit it had happened. King Hussein said, "We are not defeated. Adefeated man is

one whose morale has been broken . Our morale has not been weakened ." -to An Arab

summit two months after the war outlined the principles of Arab relations with

victorious Israel-no war no peace. no recognition or negotiations with Israel . The

losers of the war refused to admit their conqueror existed.

Lessons-1967

But Arab leaders did. of course, recognize that they had been humiliated and they

began to face up to the task ofanalyzing the reasons The most important lesson was

that Israeli strength was real, and the Arabs could not trifle with Israel : if Arab lands

and honor were to be regained, they would have to be regained with blood. Postwar

Egyptian analyses decided that the Arab military defeat was caused by a general

misconduct of operations, the lack of sufficient Arab planning and coordination . the

effect of Israel's surprise air attack, and poor intelligence estimates.

41

Egypt, especially, undertook to rectify its miserable conduct of military operations

by creating a new army made up of new Arabs . The old leaders \ere

removed-Commander in Chief Atner \N as jailed when he supposedly tried a coup.

9
, pg pgyppg

staff was selected and charged with devising a plan that took into account the real

strengths and limitations of both the Israelis and the Arabs, one which would lead to

a restitution of Arab honor and, hopefully, victory. Egyptian officers took the lead,

but coordination with Syria was maintained and facilitated by the leaders of the two

states . To preserve secrecy, all other Arab states were left uninfonned . 44

All three frontline Arab states-Egypt, Syria, and Jordan-recognized Israel's

ability to win total control of the air at the outset of any hostilities . This meant Arab

armies would have to face Israel's combined air-ground team with no help from their

own air. As previously noted, air was a major reason for Israeli success on the Syrian

and Jordanian fronts in 1967 . The EAF saw that its failure to appreciate the damage

the French and British had done to its unprotected aircraft in 1956 had led the EAF

to suffer the same fate at Israel's hand in 1967 . Therefore, an extensive program to

disperse their aircraft and harden their shelters was begun. 45

At first, however, the EAF was so totally preoccupied with the idea of preventing

a repeat of Israel's 1967 preemptive strike that all its thoughts were concentrated on

how to neutralize the IAF by gaining air superiority.

46 But the Egyptians gradually

came to recognize that Arab air forces were years behind the IAF in capability and

were unlikely to catch up in the foreseeable future . This is the fourth aspect of their

1967 lesson-they realistically looked at themselves, admitted their shortcomings,

and began to plan on the basis of realistic estimates concerning their own and their

enemy's capabilities . For Egypt, this led to two lessons. First, the EAF would not be

used beyond its capabilities, it would not challenge the IAF, and it would be used

mostly for defense. Second, since the EAFcould not compete, achievement of air

superiority was unattainable . But the ground forces needed protection from Israeli air.

The Arab answer was to seek local air control instead of air superiority, to seek to

control the air over their forces using a dense air defense net rather than to throw their

air force away in a hopeless attempt to destroy the IAF.

Gen Saad Shazly, Egypt's chief of staff in the 1973 war, listed his reasons for

needing an air force. They were to provide, in this order: (1) air cover, (2) close air

support, (3) reconnaissance, and (4) interdiction or deep strike .

47 He felt that the

EAF's weakness was so fundamental that it should not be brought into direct conflict

with the IAF if at all possible . The EAF was to be used in a calculated and cautious

10
pp

ground support where required but would not be squandered in combat with the IAF.

The EAF would not be tasked with winning air superiority over the Sinai .

51 The

Egyptian Air Defense Command was thus organized as a separate service in 1968,

and it was to have the role ofgiving the army ameasure ofprotection .

52 These lessons

were borne out in the War of Attrition (1969-70) . Egyptian (and Soviet) attempts to

compete with the IAF in air-to-air combat resulted in nothing but losses .

53

Thus, the Arabs reversed the commonly accepted role of airpower. While Israel

was quite certain the Arabs would have to try to gain air superiority in order to make

a successful ground assault, Egypt and Syria decided that their armies would move

under an air defense umbrella that would hopefully inflict enough damage on the IAF

that it would either be forced to refrain from attacking them or be forced out of

optimum attack envelopes . Knowing they could not duplicate Israel's 1967 feat, their

plans maximized their advantages and minimized the IAF's. Their ground forces

would remain inside their air defense umbrella. Their air forces would be preserved

as a strategic reserve to impose caution on the enemy, to step into possible breaches

of their air defense system, or to exploit the situation after the air defense system

weakened the enemy air force .

54

Having placed their air forces firmly behind their armies, Egypt and Syria were

ready militarily in 1973. But the Egyptians had one more item in their arsenal, an item

which Iraq would lack in 1980-81 and which would lead Baghdad into a morass .

Egypt had a well-thought-out political strategy which directed its military strategy. In

its war with Iran, Iraq's political, and hence its military, strategy was not so well

thought out .

The Egyptian leadership, in conscious orinnate understanding of Clausewitz, had

political goals and strategies for which their military strategies were expressly

tailored. Mohamed Heikal noted in TheRoad to Ramadan that it was a vital necessity

in alimited warto have a political strategy ready totake over when the fighting ceases.

Their political strategy would direct the military phase ofthe conflict and would also

direct the negotiating phase which was to follow. It was as vital to have a strategy for

conflict termination as it was to have one for conflict initiation .

55 The Egyptian

leadership knew Israel did not respect them militarily, and the rest of the world

likewise did not take them seriously. Therefore, the Egyptians reasoned that Israel

II
So it was to be war in 1973. But, on this occasion. Israel for the first time was

forced to react to Arab strategic initiative rather than the other way around . For Egypt,

any gain meant victory since Egyptian leaders knew if the war was violent enough to

bring superpower intervention . neither superpowerwould allow its client to lose . With

lessons born of their crushing defeats, the Arabs developed an airpower doctrine

accurately reflecting their abilities . Arab airpower was to support their armies and

their armies were to regain Arab dignity .

The October War-1973

The war to restore Arab dignity began on 6 October 1973 with Egyptian airstrikes

on Israeli positions in the Sinai . The October War thus began in much the same manner

as had the 1956 and 1967 wars-with a surprise air attack . But there were to be two

startling differences. First, in 1973, the Arab side took the initiative, forcing Israel to

react to it rather than the other way around . Second, the airstrikes were not designed

as a way to attain air superiority as had been the case in 1956 and 1967. Instead, their

attacks were carved out as the leading edge of the main thrust which was to be an

infantry attack . Air superiority was not the goal of the attacks nor was it necessary for

success in the overall concept of operations for the attackers.

The Egyptian attack was the opening salvo in a war they planned to be limited,

both in scope and duration . 6The Egyptian planning staff had developed their concept

in full recognition of Israeli strengths . Commander in Chief Ismail listed them as : air

superiority (note that he concedes this to the IAF at the start), technological skill,

efficient training, and reliance on quick aid from the United States . Israeli

disadvantages in Ismail's view were: long lines ofcommunication, limited manpower

that could not accept heavy losses, an economy that could not afford a long war, and

the "wanton evil of conceit" (to Ismail, the refusal to respect its enemies).

57

Conceding, as they did, the fact that the IAF wouldhave air superiority, the opening

EAF airstrike was to be ahit-and-run operation . The Egyptians felt they had no chance

ofachieving a repetition ofIsrael's success in 1967. The IAF was always on alert with

its aircraft dispersed on many airfields . Israel also had a very capable air defense

system. Finally, most of the IAF was beyond Egyptian reach due to the short range

12
p

positions, radar sites, andcommunications installations in support of the army assault;

(2) to compel the IAF to spread its efforts over two sectors and on as broad a front as

possible within each sector, thus reducing its ability to inflict damage; (3) to utilize

air as part ofthe overall air defense, air control philosophy ; and (4) to support ground

operations, but staying within their own air defense umbrellaexcept in emergencies .

The results of the implementation of this philosophy were mixed. According to

Palit, the pre-H-hour airstrikes in the Sinai were believed to be effective .

61 Twelve or

more targets were hit-gun concentrations, command and control communications

nodes, radar sites, airfields, and Hawk batteries-with enough success that the

planned second strike was called off.

62 Conversely, Israeli Army General Adan later

wrote he was surprised at how ineffective the Egyptian strikes were. He implied the

reason the planned second wave did not materialize was that the IAF had shot down

68 out ofthe 190 to 240 (depending on whose account you believe) attackers .

63 The

truth is probably somewhere in between-the attacks were not expected to be

crushing, rather they were only to delay Israeli responses. Thus, Egyptian planners,

who did not want to expose their air forces to the I AF any more than necessary, could

well have concluded that the first wave had done sufficient damage and resulted in

enough losses.

But the key fact for the Arab side in the 1973 air war was not their mediocre

offensive showing, but their defensive. Much has been written since 1973 on the

supposed lessons of the war concerning the strengths and limitations of the offense

versus the defense . A variant of this theme-the aircraft versus missile

debate-continues today without a clear winner. But for the Arabs, one fact is

incontrovertible-their concept of air control through heavy use of surface-to-air

missiles (SAMs) caused severe IAF losses and forced the IAF to change its fighting

style . On the Suez front, the air defense barrier proved very effective . In the course

of the first afternoon, at least 10 IAF planes were downed. In this high-threat

environment, the IAF aircraft found themselves forced either to higher-than-optimum

altitudes for ground support or out of the area entirely.

64 On the Golan front the IAF

also fared poorly, losing even more aircraft to Syrian air defense forces on the first

day .

65 During Israeli counterattacks on the Suez front on 8-10 October, the IAF was

held at bay by Egyptian air defense while Israeli tanks took a beating. 6 General Adan

noted that it was not until 12 October that the skies were safe enough for the IAF that

13
g

their air control through air defense concept only kept them from being defeated, it

did not bring them to victory. * Pakistani Gen S. A. el-Edroos succinctly summed up

the Arab air forces' dilemma. To him, the October War illustrated the inherent

offensive capability of an air force and the potential defensive capability of an

effective airdefense system . But the Arabs only used one-halftheequation, they relied

on their air defense as a Maginot Line in the sky. The inevitable result was that when

the air defense systems were breached by a combination of Israeli ground and air

forces, the IAF mauled the Arab air forces . To el-Edroos, the severely restricted

strategic and tactical roles assigned to the Arab air forces were faulty in that they

placed an essentially offensive arm into a defensive "straitjacket" with negative results

all around.

70 In fact, the Arab response-once the air defense wall was

breached-was ineffective . Arab airmen were aggressive ; but once forced to operate

outside their narrowly restricted defensive role, they suffered greatly. Palit noted the

suicidal efforts of the Syrian Air Force to salvage what they could on the Golan

Heights .

71 Most of the EAF sorties were flown, and most of its losses were suffered,

in the final days of the war when the umbrella had been breached. Brave as they were,

Egyptian pilots suffered their losses without materially affecting the situation in the

air or on the ground 72

But despite this, the Arab perception of success remained unshaken. They

concluded that ground-based missiles can stop both tanks and aircraft.

73 More

important for the Arab psyche, however, was their ability to hold their own against

an Israeli force that had advertised itself and was generally perceived as invincible .

Lessons-1973

So, what lessons did they draw from the war? First, as previously described, they

felt they had pioneered a concept of air control in which the weaker party would use

ground-based air defense to support an offensive while holding their air forces back

as a strategic reserve . Second, this air control concept depended on tremendous

amounts of SAMs-as they fired them in salvos in order to get as high a probability

*Of course, this is all mere argumentation anyway. Israel, from our perspective, clearly won the military battles, but the Arabs say

they planned only not to lose and thus won the political war. There is something to this argument, as theIsraeli settlers who recently had

to leave the Sinai can attest

1 4
objectives must be closely coordinated with political realities in order to achieve

success. Such realities, however, may be obvious only to the Arab decisionmaking

elite where decisions may well reflect their perceptions more than they do objective

reality.

Wrap-up-TheArab Wars

Even though they achieved a measure of success in 1973, the 1967 war was still

the most important war for the Arab countries . They found reasons in 1948 and 1956

to explain away their losses, but the 1967 defeat was so stark that they, for the first

time, really had to examine themselves.

In large measure, it was the Egyptians who did the best job . Unlike Syria and Iraq,

which have been beset with chronic coups, Egypt has had relative stability at the top

since 1952. Thus a professional officer corps has developed more in Egypt than in

the other two countries . Jordan has a very professional officer corps too, but it is so

poor in both fiscal and manpower resources that it cannot be a major player.

Planning for 1973, the Egyptians were able to assess forthrightly their weaknesses

and to devise a plan that could camouflage them even as it hit hard at enemy

vulnerabilities. Syrian planners were a poor second cousin to the Egyptians in this

effort, and the Iraqis were completely out of the picture. The problem for the Syrians

and Iraqis is that they may have learned the lessons of 1973 only partly. Syria, which

gained little but self-respect in 1973, was slower than Egypt to agree to a cease-fire .

Iraq, which gained nothing other than casualties, refused to agree to a cease-fire and,

in a show of pique, withdrew its forces from the confrontation lines . There is reason

to believe that the combination of less than totally professional military leadership at

the top (a phenomenon of endemic political instability) and a slightly unrealistic

appreciation of their abilities could have left both Syria and Iraq more in a pre-1967

mode of thinking than in a pre-1973. They thinkthey won in 1973, but they may well

have not looked too closely at what that war "won" for them .

1 5
5 . "Arab Air Power, Part Four." Air International 13 (September 1977) : 149.

6. Lorch. 228 .

7. O'Ballance. Arab-Israeli it'ar.1948 . 123 .

8. Lorch. 230 . 315 . 362 .

9. Zees Schiff. "The Israeli Air Force ." Air Force Maga=ine 59. no . 8 (August 1976) : 32.

10 Lorch, 317 . 364 .

11 . Ibid . . 362, 363 .

12 Ibid . . 434 .

13 Col Trevor N. Dupuy (US ArmN- Ret.) . Elusive l ictor.w The Arab-Israeli It ars .1947-197-1 (New

York : Harper & Row. Publishers . Inc . . 1978) . 132-34 : and SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute) . The Arms Trade vi-ith the Third Itorld (New York: Humanities Press . 1971) .520.838-39

14 Dupuy. 136-I3 . 

15 . Anthom Nutting . NoEndofaLesson : The Stors of Sue= (New York Clarkson N. Potter, Inc ., 1967) .

115-16.

16 . Ibid . 80 .102.

17 . Andre Beaufre . The Sue- Erpe&tio» 1956. translated by Richard Bam (New York : Frederick A.

Praeger. Inc .. 1969) . 67 .

18 . Dupuy. 312 .

19 . Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Posyell, Sae- : The Double Itar (London : Hamish Hamilton . 1979) .91 .

20. Dupu) . 212-14 .

1 . Kennett Love . Sue- : The Twice-Fought ttar (New York : McGraw-Hill . 1969 ).-358 .

22 . Lose . 536-28 : Nutting, 126-37 : Fulick and Podell . 109-1-t . 120-21 : Robert Henriques A Hundred

Hours to Sue- : .-1n Account of Israel's Campaign in the Sinai Peninsula (New York : Viking Press, 1957) .

153 .

23. Lose. 508-9: Henriques . 153 .

24. Love. 4-33 .

25. SIPRI . 522.

26. Nutting, 84-87 .

27. SIPRL 840

28. Amos. 57-62.

29 Jon D. Glassman. Arms for the Arabs : The Soviet Union and liar in the Middle East (Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press. 1975).45 .

30 . Amos. 294 .

31 . Dupuy. 247 : StefanGeisenheyner. "The Arab Air Forces : Wil l T'he\ Try Again'"Air Force Maga=ine

51 (July 1968) : 47-38 .

32 . Amos. 296.

33 . Dupuy. 247 .

34 .Ibid.. 267

35 . Ibid. . 295-96 .311 : Edgar O' Ballance . The Third Arah-Israeli liar (Hamden. Conn. : Archon Books .

1972). 216-20. 257 : Amos.67-68 .

36. Dupuy. 335 .

1 6
) 

7576.

-35 . Amos. 81 : Geisenheyner. -37 : Mohamed Heikal. The Road to Ranutdan (Nes+ York : Ballantine

Books . 1976) .-35 .

-36 . Heikal . 169 .

-17 . Lt Gen Saad el-Shazly. The Crossing of the Sue- (San Francisco: American Mideast Research .

1980) . 18.

-18 . Ibid ., 25 .

49 . Ibid .. 82 .

50 . Amos. 85.

51 . Pal it. 123 .

52 . "Arab Air Power. Part One." AirInternational 13 (June 1977) : 29-1 .

53 . Amos. 93 : Palit. 25 .

5-3 . Amos. 1-17 . 156 . 175 : tiadav Safran . "Trial be Ordeal : The Yom Kippur War. October 1973 ."

International Security 2, no . 2 (Fall 1977) 135-36 .

55 . Heikal . 265 . .

56 . Ibid .. 263 .

57 . Edgar O'Ballance . No l'ictor-No lanquished: The Yom Kippur It ar (San Rafael . Calif. : Presidio

Press . 1978) .34 .

58 . Glassman . 70 .

59 . Amos. 156: O'Ballance . No l lctor No I anquishetL 282 .

60 . Palit. 153.

61 . Ibid .. 153 .

62 . O'Ballance . No l ictor: No lanquished, 69

63 . Avraham (Bren) Adan.On the Banks of the Sae- (San Rafael. Calif. : Presidio Press. 1980) . 81 .

64 . O'Ballance . No l ictor: No l anquished. 86

65 . Ibid .. 128

66 . Safran, 52

67 . Adan. 38-1 .

68 . Palit. 87 : O'Ballance . No Victor, No l anquished, 134.

69. Shazly, 231 .

70. Brig S . A. el-Edroos . The Hashemite Arah Arnnt 1908-1979: An Appreciation and Analysis o f

Miliranw Operations (Amman, Jordan : The Publishing Committee and Fakenham . Norfolk . United

Kingdom: Fakenham Press . Ltd. . 1980) . 53-1-36.

71 . Palit . 156-57 .

72 . Martin van Crevald . "Military Lessons of the Yom Kippur War: Historical Perspectives" in

Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies . The Washington Papers . vol. 3 . no.

24 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications . 1975): 52 .

73 . Amos. op. ci t . . 212 .

1 7

The history of the Iraqi armed forces closely parallels the history of the modern

Iraqi state since the armed forces have been a decisive force in the making and

breaking of governments of that state. The area of Iraq (or Mesopotamia, the area of

the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) has been described through Arab history as difficult

to govern . I It has always been a mosaic of antagonistic ethnic, religious, linguistic,

and ideological groups . Prior to World War 1, it had for centuries been ruled by the

Ottoman Empire as the buffer between the Ottomans and the Persian Empire. The

present-day state was a gerrymandered creation constructed for European imperial

interests in the aftermath of World War I . Britain acquired. it as a mandate chiefly to

protect Imperial lines of communication to India. 2 

Although Iraqis had served in the Ottoman armies, the first Iraqi army was created

in 1921 . The Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) is the oldest Arab air force. It was established in

1931 as the Iraqi army's air arm and was equipped with five light aircraft to increase

army effectiveness against dissident tribesmen. This legacy of support for the army

and concentration on internal security still continues. Until 1955, the IQAF was

virtually an appendage of the RAF; its development was guided by the RAFand its

aircraft were British. With Iraq's entry into the Baghdad Pact in that year, British

control lessened and then ceased after the 1958 revolution which ousted the monarchy

which Britain had created in 1920 to rule with, Iraq . Nonetheless, RAF aircraft

remained based at Habbaniyah until 1959. 5

In conjunction with the anti-imperialist aspect of the July 1958 revolution and in

imitation of Nasser's example in Egypt, Iraq turned to the Soviet Union for military

supplies The first Soviet aircraft (MiG-17s and II-28s) arrived 27 November 1958 6

Though Soviet aid has continued to the present time, Soviet influence has waxed and

waned as successive Baghdad governments have perceived a confluence or

divergence of Soviet and Iraqi interests. Iraq moved closer to the Soviet Union after

1967 when it seemed to be the only way to counter Israeli strength and closer also in

other periods such as when Iraqi forces engaged in open warfare with Kurdish

immigrants and when a confident Iran pressured Baghdad over border issues-both

circumstances which ceased in 1975 .The period from 1972 to 1975 marked the only

extended period of broad and substantive cooperation between Baghdad and Moscow.

19
France . seeking to acquire Mirages which had proved so successful in the Six-Day

War. Although unsuccessful at that time . Iraq persevered and gained a French

connection in 1977 with the purchase of60 Mirage F- Is . the first of which arrived in

Iraq in early 1981 .

11

Distrusting Soviet attempts to spread communist ideology among IQAF trainees .

Baghdad also turned to India for training assistance . Iraqi pilots had received some

training in India before the 1958 revolution . During the late 1960s and early 1970x.

the Indian Air Force took over the training previously managed by the Soviets. Indian

Air Force personnel were reputedly seconded to the IQAF to provide both flying and

technical training. Despite the fluctuating nature of external ties. the IQAF remained 

very influenced by the RAF in its structure and traditions . 1 2

Wartime Combat Experience

IQAF combat experience has been limited when compared to the Egyptian and

Syrian Air Forces . Iraq has always been a peripheral actor in the Arab-Israeli conflict .

usually engaging the Israelis in a haphazard and uncoordinated fashion only after

hostilities have begun. Iraqi air activity in 1948 was very limited and in 1956 was

restricted to deployment of a few units to Jordan as a show of support. Iraq's 1967

experience included one abortive IQAF bomber raid on Israel (only one Tu-16 out of

four made it to the target area where it hit the wrong target . caused little damage. and

was shot down on egress) and one Israeli retaliatoryraid on H-3 airfield in far western

Iraq which destroyed 24 IQAF fighters . Israeli reports. however. credited the Iraqis

with beingtCC the most aggressive of Arab pilots and said they had downed several

13 Israelis in air-to-air combat. - The Iraqi army suffered . like other Arab armies in the

Six-Day War. from Israeli air attack . An Iraqi column moving into Jordan was

pounded for a dayby Israeli aircraft . causing numerous casualties . The badly shattered

unit never went into action .

14

IQAF units operated on both the Suez and Golan fronts in the 1973 war and again

Iraqi pilots received good marks for their performance. An Iraqi Hunter squadron

Iraq's currein i Fall 1982,e ncenvnem is controlled h, tlie HLh ,d-B,r ddt ul- .9ntl,i ,il-l,luintki or the :\rah Soeiah>t Renai-ann"

Paris It is referred to as tlie Baath Pam in shortened tonn

20
The fact could not have been lost on the Iraqis, however. that pressing the attack

in an arena where the enemy enjoyed air superiority is eventually a losing

proposition.

Two Iraqi squadronsjoined later by an additional two squadrons-engaged in

operations on the Syrian front where Iraq and Syria had an incredible lack of unity of

effort and coordination. Like their army units on the Golan front, IQAF units were

thrown into the fight as soon as they arrived . Some aircraft were lost to Syrian air

defenses as some identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems (supposedly Su-7 systems,

but more likely Hunters) reportedly were not integrated into the Syrian system .

17

While they had a poor concept of operations and next to no coordination with their

allies, the Iraqis showed again that they would fight . But their valor was essentially

wasted because of their organizational inadequacies .

Political Influences

The impact ofIraqi domestic politics on the IQAF cannot be overstated . In October

1932, Iraq was the first Arab state to gain independence and was thereafter admitted

to the League of Nations . In October 1936, Iraq had its first military coup, and the

IQAF was an integral part of it . The leaders of this coup took power but were

assassinated by other military men within a year. On six occasions between 1936 and

1941, military officer groups were decisive factors in deposing or appointing prime

ministers either through the threat ofor the actual use of force . Through 1968, Iraq

had seen a dozen military coups including the most important one, the 1958 revolution

that turned the Irag9 government from a pro-Western monarchy into a radical .

Pan-Arabist regime .

Involvement in domestic politics has hurt Iraqi military professionalism. Majid

Khadduri, a prominent Middle Eastern scholar, put it well when he noted that when

the military becomes interested in politics, "actions as a soldier will always be

subservient to politics ." 20 Early in its existence, the Iraqi military realized it could be

the ultimate power broker in the state andconsequently political intrigue becamemore

important to the officer corps than military professionalism. The Iraqi army's abject

failure in fighting against British troops in 1941 was a result of five years ofpolitical

21
morale had not yet recovered from these purges .Although the present government

has held on since 1968, purges have continued-for instance 300 officers were purged

after a 1970 coup attempt.

25 The air force has played a major part in these upheavals .

The first Baathist coup in February 1963 was led by a group ofair force officers based

at Habbaniyah. Air force aircraft bombed the Defense Ministry building in Baghdad

until General Qassem surrendered.

26 The Baathists were then ousted within the year.

In 1965, the air force failed in a second coup attempt.

27 Each time, more "disloyal"

officers were weeded out. A military coup attempt backed by the Iraqi Communist

Party in 1978 led to another extensive purge ofthe high command, and the IQAF was

put under close Baath Party control .

28

The current Baathist regime seems to have learned the lesson oftoo much military

involvement. The Baath leadership is dominated by its civilian wing that has put the

Baathist stamp on the military, especially the air force . Much of the top Baath

leadership comes from the town of Tikrit, and many of the 1963 coup plotters were

Tikriti military men.

29 Since 1933, the IQAF has had its own college as a source of

officers . In 1971, the college was moved from Rashid (a Baghdadsuburb) to Tikrit, 30

an obvious effort to get air force cadets away from the political setting of the capital

and into the home of Baath leadership where a watchful eye could be kept on them.

The Baath has not neglected follow-on professional military education . The course

at the National Defense College was developed, according to its dean,

for the purpose of training and preparing the vanguard leaders and the elements who will

be candidates for positions of leadership in the [Baaatl Party, in the army, and in the

sensitive state offices, with the most advanced and modern knowledge and studies on

the revolutionary [read Baath] view of the concept of the job of national defense .i1

Loyalty to the Baath regime, not necessarily professional ability, is the prerequisite

for advancement in the IQAF and military.

22
changed. While the IQAF may not be effective at supporting the army and may not

be called on very often in this role, its subservient position is a reflection of Iraqi

opinion that the army is the decisive military arm .

As the war with Iran opened, this was the IQAF's order of battle . In the air defense

role, the IQAF operated the radar and aircraft portions of the system while the army

operated the SAMs (unlike in Egypt where the ground-based Air Defense Command

is a separate service). Ten thousand of the 38,000 IQAF personnel were dedicated to

the air defense mission.

33 Each interceptor squadron was deployed at a separate base

for defense of a specific target . Their five interceptor squadrons had limited

all-weather capability and were all equipped with MiG-21s. In the ground support

role, the IQAF provided aircraft for close air support and strike roles and, to a limited

extent, for air superiority over the immediate battlefield .

34 In 1980, the IQAF had 12

ground attack squadrons-4 equippedwith MiG-2313s, 3 with Su-713s, 4with Su-20s,

and I with Hawker Hunters. Additionally, the IQAF had two bomber squadrons

equipped with Tu-22s and II-28s respectively-though the latter were probably

inoperable-and two transport squadrons whose primary aircraft were 11-76s and

An-12s. The 1 I helicopter squadrons included attack helicopters like Soviet Mi-8s

and Mi-24s as well as western European-designed and -built Alouettes, Pumas,

Gazelles, and Super Frelons.

35

Thus, the IQAF's mission was essentially supportive and defensive. Against Israel,

the IQAF was prepared to support frontline Arab states . Against Iran, the IQAF

remained fairly defensive, recognizing that its aircraft with their shorter ranges and

smaller payloads were at a disadvantage when compared to Iran's F-4 and F-5 fleet

which were also augmented by an aerial refueling capability.

The Iranian Air Force

The Islamic Iranian Air Force of 1980 did not have the long historical tradition of

the IQAF. In a real sense, it was mostly a product of former President Richard M.

Nixon's 1972 decision to allow the shah to buy whatever he wanted from US defense

contractors. ; Before that time, the IIAF had been a relatively small affair with its

most sophisticated aircraft being 129 F-5A/B fighters provided in the late 1960s and

23
One way to resist these pressures was to seek out the assistance of a third party who

would help Iran modernize its armed forces . The first foreign advisers arrived in Iran

in 1809 . By 1845, Iran was sending a few military men to Europe for study.

Throughout the rest of the nineteenth century, Iran sought military advisory assistance

from Italy, France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia . The first modernized formation that

took root in the Iranian military was the Russian-advised Persian Cossack Brigade.

Formed in 1879, it had by 1896 become an imperial guard for the shahs of the Qajar

dynasty 3XIn February 1921, Reza Khan, head of the Cossack Brigade, overthrew the

government in a coup d'etat . In 1925, he deposed the Qajars and became the first of

the two Pahlavi shahs.

39 The close tie between the military and the Pahlavi shah was

born .

Reza Khans son, Mohammed Reza, became the shah during World War II when

the allies forced his pro-German father to abdicate . The new shah began immediately

after the war to try to build up the Iranian armed forces, a quite illogical step since the

Soviet Union occupied the northern part of Iran and there was a genuine threat of a

total Soviet takeover . The Iran-US military tie began at that time .

40 A US military

advisory mission to the Iranian gendarmerie had been established in 1942 . The

following year, one was established with the Iranian army as well . In 1947, the United

States began to extend credit to the then nearly destitute Iran so that it could buy US

war surplus equipment. This evolved through the 1950s into a mutual defense

assistance program through which the United States provided grant military aid to the

Iranian armed forces . During the period of grant aid, the shah generally tried to gain

more military aid than the United States thought necessary or prudent.

41

It was

obvious that the shah thought Iran needed more equipment. In his 1961 autobiography

Missiun,jor My Countrv, he pointed out Iran's vital position as a bulwark against

Soviet expansion. He also mentioned Iraq's large military and noted: "Our armed

forces-and especially our air force-are weak and suffer from lack of the most

modern equipment." He noted the IIAF, at that time, was "a small air force designed

mainly for providing support for our ground forces in limited actions." 4"

As Iran's increasing oil revenues gave the shah the ability to buy the arms he

wanted,the picture changed. After Britain withdrew from the Gulf in 1971, the Nixon

Doctrine envisioned Iran and' Saudi Arabia-the "twin pillars"-tilling the power

24
Although the shah tried from 1973 on to proceed with vast expansion and

modernization programs for all the services, the IIAF was the most favored service .

It received the largest share of defense modernization expenditures and had less

trouble than the other services in finding and retaining qualified personnel. From 1970

to 1977, the IIAF increased in numbers of personnel from 17,000 to 100,000 and in

numbers of combat aircraft from 175 to 341 . But such growth was not without

problems . Sophisticated aircraft came into the inventory faster than air and ground

crews could be trained. So much equipment was bought so fast that the American side

of the exchange could not adequately account for all the transactions . Most of the

critics of the US-Iranian arms relationship seemed to focus on the size of the shah's

purchasing in relation to Iran's threat. They felt he could never have enough to hold

off the Soviets, but he was buying far more than he needed to defend Iran from any

regional enemies.

43 The shah, however, recognized that Iran needed a strong air force

to serve as a deterrent to Iraqi ambitions . To protect Iran from air attacks on valuable

targets, the shah bought aircraft and air defense equipment to both protect Iran and to

give it at least a comparable capability to retaliate . The IIAF was the deterrent . 4 By

1978, however, Iran had an "awesome potential in terms of airpower." 45 In addition

to the quantities of aircraft bought, the quality of the systems meant the IIAF was

overwhelmingly the most powerful regional air force . Although the IIAF had no real

combat experience, US Air Force training-both in the United States and inside

Iran-was probably realistic enough to make up for some of the combat experience

shortcomings. The IQAF did not have much to show for all its experience in combat,

while the IIAF was receiving the benefit of US Air Force experiences against Soviet

systems . The shah had hoped the IIAF would have been among the finest in the world

by 1982. 46

But the IIAF under the shah, was not a pure, independent military organization.

Various students of Iranian politics noted that the shah's concern with the security of

his crown led him to exercise "leadership by distrust ." 47 The IIAF was one of the

various groupings inside Iranian politics that the shah manipulated ; everything

centered on him and he balanced one group off against the other. There was, for

example, no joint service planning.

48 The shah, as supreme commander of Iran's

military forces, exercised direct operational control over the services . The IIAF

commander, like the other service chiefs, reported directly to the shah; the minister

25
on Shahrokhi Air Base in Hamadan in June 1980 brought about another sweeping

purge. Many IIAF personnel were shot orjailed for suspected or real complicity in

the coup attempt, and the purge of personnel whose ultimate loyalty was suspect

continued at a faster pace. Iraq's attack forced the abol Hasan Bani-Sadr government

to free some pilots from prison so that they could fly missions in defense of their

country (and their jailers as well) .

51

While the turbulence continued in the command and personnel structure through

the summer of 1980, the IIAF aircraft force structure remained potent at the time of

the Iraqi attack . The IIAF had 77 F-14As for the air defense role, though their ability

to use the Phoenix missile was questionable. The backbone of the force was its 166 

F-4Ds and Es. All the F-4Es had leading edge slats for increased maneuverability,

some were capable of firing the Maverick air-to-ground missile, and others had an

electro-optical target identification system . The 166 F-5Es and Fs were quite capable

ground attack fighters and effective good weather interceptors. Additionally, the IIAF

had KC-707 tankers for aerial refueling, Boeing 747s and 707s for strategic airlift,

and C-130s for tactical airlift.

52 Despite the political turmoil, the IIAF in late 1980

was still a force not to be trifled with.

NOTES

1 . Majid Khadduri, Arab Contemporaries : The Role of Personalities in Politics (Baltimore : Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1973), 31 .

2. R. D. McLaurin, Mohammed Mughisuddin, and Abraham R. Wagner, Foreign Policy Making in the

Middle East: Domestic Influences on Policy in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, andSyria (New York : Praeger, 1977),

108 ; Mark Heller, "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British Influence," Armed

Forces and Society 4 (November 1977) : 77 .

3 . "Arab Air Power, Part Two," Air International 13 (July 1977) : 7 ; Harvey H. Smith et al ., Area

HandbookforIraq (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1969), 340-41 .

4 . "Arab Air Power, Part Two," 8 .

5 . SIPRI, 556.

6. Ibid .

7 . Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq Since 1968, Rand Note N-1524-AF prepared for the

US Air Force, (Santa Monica, Calif : Rand, July 1980), 30, 38 .

8. Ibid ., v-vi.

26
y j

1970), 15-16,35 .

19 . Majid Khadduri, Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of Ideas and Ideals in Politics

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 134 .

20. Ibid ., 141 .

21 . Be'eri, 39 .

22. Phebe A. Marr, "The Political Elite in Iraq," Political Elites in the Middle East, ed . George

Lenczowski (Washington, D.C . : American Enterprise Institute, 1975), 116

23 . Heller, 84 .

24. O'Ballance, Third Arab-Israeli War, 179 .

25. Fukuyama, 31 .

26 O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt, 96-97.

27 Ibid., 130. 

28 Anthony H. Cordesman, "Lessons of the Iran-Iraq War: The First Round," ArmedForces Journal

International 119 (April 1982): 42 .

29 . John F. Devlin, The Ba'th Party: A History from Its Origins to 1966 (Stanford, Calif. : Hoover

Institution Press, 1976), 233 .

30 . Nyrop, 243 .

31 . Ibid., 244.

32 . Smith, 342.

33 . The Military Balance 1980-1981 (London The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980),

43 (hereafter referred to as IISS 80-81) .

34. "Arab Air Power, Part Two;" 8-9.

35 . IISS 80-81, 42 .

36. Yonah Alexander and Allan Nanes, eds., The United States and Iran : A Documentary History;

(Frederick, Md. : University Publications of America, 1980), 405-6 .

37. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, US Military Sales

to Iran, 94th Cong., 2d sess ., Staff Report, July 1976, 30 .

38. J . C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics : The Military Dimension (New York: Praeger, 1969), 40-41 .

39. Nikki R. Keddie, Iran : Religion, Politics and Society (Totowa, N.J .: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1980),

213 .

40 . House, Committee on International Relations, United States Arms Sales to the Persian Gulf, 94th

Cong., Ist sess ., January 1976, Study Mission Report Pursuant to H. Res . 315, January 1976, 115-64 .

41 . Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience andIran (New York : Oxford

University Press, 1980), 38.

42 . Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for my Country (New York : McGraw-Hill Book Co.,

1961),309-16.

43 . Extensive discussion of this period can be found in Theodore Moran, "Iranian Defense Expenditures

and the Social Crisis," International Security 3, no. 3 (Winter 1978-1979) 178-92; Stephanie Neuman,

"Security, Military Expenditures and Socioeconomic Development: Reflections on Iran;" Orbis 22, no. 3

27
(y p

Publishers. Inc ., 1980) . 281 .

50 . See also James A. Bill . "Iran and the Crisis of '78 ." ForeignAffairs 52 . no. 2 (Winter 1978-1979) :

323-42 : Bill . ThePolitics of1ran : Groups . Classes. andModerni-ation (Columbus . Ohio : Charles E. Merrill

Publishing Co. . 1972) : House . Committee on International Relations, United States Arms Policies in the

Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past. Present. and Future . 95th Cong. . I st sess . December 1977 . Staff

Survey Mission Report Pursuant to H. Res. 313. 123-24 .

51 . "War Developments ." Aviation Reek and Space Technology 113 (hereafter referred to as AWST)

(20 October 1980) : 31 .

52. House. United States Anns Sales to the Persian Gulf. 28-31 : IISS 80-81 .42 .

28
in a 1981 interview. Indeed they were. The shah had taken 

p

policeman of the Gulf; and with purchases of huge quantities of American weapons,

he had the military force to back up his stance . The Imperial armed forces had flexed

their muscle in April 1969 when the shah decided to alter the status quo on the

Shatt-al-Arab, the river that forms the lower border between Iran and Iraq . Imperial

Iranian Navy gunboats and IIAF fighters escorted Iranian shipping up the

Shatt-al-Arab to back up the shah's unilateral abrogation of a 1937 treaty that had

given sovereignty of the river to Iraq . Iraq felt it could not, at that time, take on the

shah ; and six years later, the Baathist government was forced to publicly concede that

Iraq was not the sole owner of the Shatt-al-Arab . The 1975 Algiers Accords gave both

countriesequal ownership of the river. ; While photographs of the signing show smiles

all around, there was considerable doubt that Iraqi strongman Saddam Husayn's joy

over the treaty was genuine. The collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty must have felt like

sweet revenge to Husayn and the Baath leadership .

Iraq and Iran experienced acooperative modus riven& from 1975 to 1979, and

Baghdad had every reason to expect it would continue as the revolutionary Iranian

regime sorted out its internal problems. Events during the summer of 1979 ended this

period of reconciliation . Iraq, concerned that Iranian Kurdish insurrection against the

Tehran regime might spill over the border and spark renewed Iraqi Kurdish problems,

carried out some intimidation-style military operations along the border in Kurdistan,

including some IQAF bombing of villages just inside Iran . Iran's response was not

only condemnation of the raids but also to accuse Baghdad of oppressing its Shia*

Muslim citizens

Iraq's Baathist leaders must have known problems with Iran were inevitable . They

knew that they already had three strikes against them with Khomeini, and as a favor

to the shah, in 1978 they kicked him out of Iraq where he had lived as an exile for 14

years. Second, the Shias in Iraq were definite second-class citizens . Andthird, Baath

Party ideology was determinedly secular, relegating Islam to the status of a private

choice of conscience ; a historical and cultural influence rather than , total,

all-encompassing way of life as Khomeini saw it. s In stark contrast to Khoiaeini's

"Without getting into theological differences. i t is most important to recognize that Shia Islam is the official state religion of Iran.

Taoof themost imponant Shin religious sites . however. are inside Iraq About 55 percentof Iraqi citizens are Shia Muslims. butthe Iraqi

government historicaliy has been dominatedby Sunni Muslims.

29
give aid and encouragement to autonomy-seeking Iranian Arabsresiding in the Iranian

oil province of Khuzistan . Shortly thereafter, a wave of sabotage incidents occurred. 8

In October, the mutual antipathy increased when Iraq, which had already reopened

the Abu Musa-Tunbs wound, resurfaced aneven more serious one-the Shatt-al-Arab

issue . In the same statement, Iraq also voiced support for autonomy-seeking Iranian

minorities, a direct threat to the integrity of any Iranian state-Islamic Republic or

otherwise. 9 Iranian invective concentrated on religion, with Iranian clergymen openly

inciting Iraqi Shiites to overthrow their Baathist (and Sunni) rulers.

On I April 1980; a would-be assassin threw a grenade at Iraq's Deputy Premier

Tariq Aziz in Baghdad. Iraq claimed the assailant, who waskilled, was an Iranian and

accused Tehran ofsponsoring terrorist groups inside Iraq . Baghdad took the incident

as an opportunity to clean up a few of its own problems and to inflict a few more on

Tehran by forcing thousands of persons of Iranian origin out of Iraq and across the

Iranian border.

10 (The expulsions were a ritualistic way for Baghdad to show

displeasure with Tehran . Between one-half and 1 million Iranian Shias have lived in

Iraq for generations. Calling their action the deportation of illegal aliens, Iraqi

authorities had expelled 20,000 in 1969 in reaction to the shah's aforementioned

abrogation of the 1937 Shatt-al-Arab treaty and had deported 60,000 more in 1971

after the shah had seized AbuMusaand the Tunbs.) I I By this time, the leaders ofboth

countries were calling for the other's overthrow. KhomeinipredictedtheBaath regime

would be "thrown into the dustbin of history." Husayn said Khomeini was "another

shah" disguised in a turban and that Iran was governed by a bunch of dictators who

should be replaced.

12

In late August and early September, border clashes-which had been intermittent

for some time-began to intensify . Keyhan, a Tehran newspaper, warned on 25

August that Iraqi aircraft were preparing to attack western Iranian provinces .

13 On 6

September,: Keyhan reported 48 hours of fierce fighting along the central border

region. I4 Fighting seemed to be going on in an area from Qasr-e Shinn south to

Mehran, a strip that hadbeen in contention for years. Both Baghdad and Tehran began

tobroadcast exaggerated claims of success. Iraq claimed to have "liberated" first 76,

then 210, square kilometers ofdisputed territory.

15 Almost daily, Tehran radio began

to report heavy fighting, often including the use of helicopters on both sides. IIAF

30
gained its border objectives, was now preparing for Iranian counterattacks. 1

Continuation of the increasingly nasty and expensive border clashes appeared likely.

On the 22d, however, Iranian President Bani-Sadr said over Tehran radio that

"Saddam Husayn today tried to imitate [sic] Moshe Dayan to attack our airports ." 20

The Reasons

What had impelled Iraq to take this action? Why did it launch a war on Iran, a

country with three times Iraq's population and almost four times its size? That

Baghdad was provoked is beyond doubt, but what reasoning lay behind what now,

two years later, looks like a tragically flawed decision?

Early in the conflict, a Pakistani observer gave us an apt insight when he said that

the war had gotten the better of sound reason and professional judgment and had

become a vendetta; that it had become less a war than a mass suicide with no hope of

salvage 21

It is doubtful that we shall ever know Baghdad's exact calculation or precise goals

for launching its assault on Iran. The leadership in Baghdad may well have had only

a hazy idea of its original goals; but as problem has succeeded problem, regime

survival has become the toppriority. It appears, however, that there were three general

attitudes that motivated Baghdad to use the military option. First, Iraq saw itself as

the emergent power in the Persian Gulf area. Second, the Iraqi leadership was

nurturing some past grievances against Tehran and could see theopportunity to avenge

them. And third, the Islamic regime of Ayatollah Khomeini was presenting a definite

ideological challenge to the rulers in Baghdad. Self-preservation, above all, is vital to

any group of leaders .

For years, Iraq had a reputation as theodd-man out, the archradical, the rejectionist,

the fomenter of revolution ; but by 1980, it acquired a hew-found respectability. Its

economy was thriving . The nationalization of the Iraqi oil industry in 1972 had given

the government direct control over that vital source of income, one that became

increasingly valuable as the Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

enforced its price structure during the 1970s. The amount ofmoney devoted to public

expenditures increased as the Baath government sought to modernize, but not at the

frenetic pace of the shah's Iran . The amount of money in Iraqi private hands had

31
After personally overseeing the execution of 21 of the top governmental leadership

and cowing other potential rivals, Husayn felt secure . So secure, in fact, that he

allowed Iraq to hold elections for a rubber-stamp assembly. This was patently

designed to burnish the image of Baath control. He also made an attempt to develop

a personality cult makingpublicized tours all through the country and appearing often

on television and at parties all over the country.

23 Meanwhile, Baghdad had kept its

chronic Kurdish problems under control through a combination of moves including

force, relocation, and economic incentives . In short, there existed in Baghdad in the

summerof 1980 a confident Baath leadership, fairly certain it would not fall to a coup.

With aprosperous economy and afairly secure power base as a backdrop, Iraq had

begun by 1978 to move out of its isolation in the Arab world. Arab disenchantment

with the Camp David Treaty opened the door for Iraq to try for a leadership role in

the Arab world-as part ofthe millenia-old rivalry between the Nile RiverValley and

Mesopotamia. To help achieve this goal, the radical revolutionary Baathists suddenly

adopted a moderate, live-and-let-live public face . The Baghdad Summit meeting, held

in November 1978 to determine an Arab strategy to cope with Egypt's move toward

peace, illuminated the willingness of conservative and moderate Arab states to accept

Baathist Iraq into their fold . Baghdad dropped its wild-man attitudes and became the

champion of the status quo. Iraq and Saddam Husayn's growing regional and

international stature culminated when Baghdad was chosen as the site of the 1982

Non-Aligned Conference with Husayn becoming president-elect of the Non-Aligned

Movement . This was quite an accomplishment for a man who in 1959 was an

unsuccessful political assassin, digging a bullet out of his leg as he fled in a getaway

car.

The year 1979 also marked the exit of Iraq's chief rival for Gulf supremacy-the

Pahlavi dynasty in Iran . The shah's demise left a leadership vacuum in the Gulf.

Irritated as they were by the shah's pretensions, the Arabian Peninsula states hadbeen

able to live with him as he had generally been a force for royal stability . The erratic,

follow-on government in Tehran guaranteed to be a destabilizing influence, much like

Iraq had been in the past. With Iran stewing, Iraq had only to appear moderate to look

attractive . Putting on its moderate face, Baghdad boldly offered to take up the mantle

of Gulf leadership. By the summer of 1980, Baghdad felt secure as-in its eyes at

32
swinging its way. Iran

s armed forces were mostly American equipped and trained;

but with Iran holding American diplomats hostage, Washington was unlikely to do

anything to help the Iranian military should it need it . Iran's military disintegration

was widely advertised . The Indian journal Strategic Analysis in June 1980 reported

Iranian military morale was extremely low-especially in the IIAF-manpower was

being cut by over 50 percent, and billions ofdollars' worth of equipment was useless

due to parts shortages.

25 A Pakistani observer noted that anyone who got his

information from the Western press would have concluded that Iraq had military

superiority.

26 The Iraqis were probably also getting this information from "official"

sources since they reportedly had informal contacts with European and US

intelligence services .

27 Baghdad was also getting information from Iranian exile

groups that doubtlessly were informing the Iraqis that their failed coup at Shahrokhi

Air Base in June had caused another wave of executions and purges, further

weakening the IIAE28 The exiles, too, were probably assuring Baghdad that the

Iranian people were just waiting for outside assistance so they would rise up and

overthrow the Islamic Republic . Mention of the Islamic Republic brings up the third,

and probably most vital, reason-the ideological challenge of Khomeini to the

Baathist regime.

Iraq is a notoriously difficult country to govern . While Iraqi society is rent with

the normal cleavages extant in all Middle Eastern countries (urban-rural,

modern-traditional, etc.), themost significant ones are along ethnic and religious lines.

Twenty percent of Iraq's population consists of Sunni Muslim Kurd, a group not

particularly fond of the central government. Fifty to 55 percent is Shia Muslim Arab,

while 5 percent is non-Muslim or other non-Arab. The remaining 20 or so percent is

Sunni Muslim Arab. This last group is the dominant force in Iraq ; it runs the

government and the economy. The largest element of the population, the Shia

community, is more or less excluded from these two areas. Also, they are, in general,

more traditional and are thus disposed to listen to Shia mullahs for guidance who, in

turn, look to Iran for guidance.

29 In contrast, the secular Arabism of the Baath (which

was originally formulated to attract both Christian and Muslim Arabs) is an attempt

to unify Arabs along ideological lines rather than allowing them to be divided along

religious ones. Thus, Iran's calls for Islamic revolution are a direct ideological

challenge to secular Baath Arabism just as Radio Tehran's castigation of Saddam

33
respectable in the worlds eyes. Baghdad calculated that neither Washington nor

Moscow, for different reasons, would mind Khomeini's demise and neither was likely

to step in to save him. Undoubtedly, none ofthe Arab states Iraq wished to lead would

mind the removal of the Khomeini threat . In the final analysis, Iraq had some

grievances with Iran, but they did not necessarily mean war. But Iraq was in 1980 still

in the process of stepping out ofthe shadows ofpolitical isolation . It was at the point

where it could step up to Gulf, as well as Arab and Third World, leadership . Iraq,

therefore, had to put down this ideological challenge and in September 1980 the odds

looked good for Baghdad. The Iraqi military would undertake a nice little war that a

weakened Iranian military could not effectively counter with the result that

Khomeini's house ofcards would collapse, and Saddam Husayn would be the savior

of Arab royalists and republicans alike . Ignoring Iran's provocations, the ambitions

of Iraq's leaders would remain stillborn .

NOTES

1. Fred Halliday, "Interviews-Bath Command: `Initially We Were Happy to See the Fall of the Shah',"

MERIP Reports 97, June 1981, 19-21 .

2. Robert D. Tomasek, "The Resolution of Major Controversies between Iran and Iraq," World Affairs

139, no. 3 (Winter 1976-1977) : 206-14 .

3 . "Iran-Iraq: Treaty on International Borders and Good Neighborly Relations," International Legal

Materials 14 (September 1975) : 1133-38 .

4. See the "Chronology" section of the Middle East Journal, vols. 32-34 .

5 . Kamel S. AbuJabar, The Arab BathSocialist Party: History, Ideology, andOrganization (Syracuse,

N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966), vii, 129 .

6. Wayne Morrison, "Iraq : Little Islam, Much Modernism," Asiaxveek 6 (19 September 1980): 30 .

7 . R. S. Thapar, "Iran-Iraq Border Confrontation," Strategic Analysis 3, no . 5 (August 1979) : 193 .

8 . For example, the Middle East Journal "Chronology" shows : 7 July 1979-explosion damages two

pipelines to Abadan refinery; 30 September 1979-microwavestation blown up in southwest Iran; 3October

1979--bomb on atrain near Khorramshahr; 6October 1979-pipeline explosion near Ahwaz; 19 December

1979-pipeline explosion near Dezful.

9. R. S. Thapar, "Iran-Iraq Conflict," Strategic Analysis 4, no. 2 (May 1980) : 66.

10. "Armies of Iran and Iraq Go on Alert as Baghdad Expels 7,000 Iranians," Wall Street Journal

(hereafter referred to as WSJ), 8 April 1980, 3.

11 . Tomasek, 211-12.

34
19 . Werner Wiskari, "Iraq Said to Gain Its Border Aims in Iran Conflict," NYT, 20 September 1980, 1 .

20 . "Bani-Sadr Speech," FBIS-SAS-80, Tehran radio broadcast in Persian dated 1525 GMT, 22

September 1980 .

21 . Brig Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, "The Gulf Warof Attrition," Defence Journal (Karachi, Pakistan) 6,

no . 10 (1980) : 1-10; Siddiqi, "The Gulf's Wanton War," Defence Journal (Karachi, Pakistan) 6, no . 11

(1980) 1-10.

22 . Joe Stork, "Iraq and the War in the Gulf;" MERIP Reports 97, June 1981, 3-18; Basil al-Bustany,

"Iraq: Economic Developments ;" AEI Foreign Pofic.v and Defense Review 2 (1980): 38-44.

23 . Claudia Wright, "Iraq-New Power in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs 58 (Winter 1979-1980) :

257-77; Wright, "The Strong Men of the Arab World," Maclean's 93 (30June 1980):26-27 ; Bill Paul, "Who

is Real Hussein-the Genial Jekyll or Hideous Hyde?" WS.1, 13 June 1980, I .

24 . Bill Paul, "Iraq's Ambitions: Baghdad Seeks to Use Oil to Gain Influence, Shed Its Radical Image,"

WSJ, 4June 1980,1 ; AdeedI . Dawisha, "Iraq: The West's Opportunity,"Foreign Policy,Winter 1980-1981,

143.

25 . Sreedhar, "State of Iranian Armed Forces," Strategic Analysis 4, no 3 (June 1980): 107-11 .

26 . M. B. Naqvi, "Strategic Overview of the Iran-Iraq War," Defence Journal(Karachi, Pakistan) 6, no .

10 (1980) : 11-20.

27 . Stork, 4.

28 . ClaudiaWright, "Implications ofthe Iran-Iraq War," Foreign4ffairs59 (Winter 1980-1981) :279-80.

29 . Phebe Marr, "Iraq: Sociopolitical Developments,"AE1Foreign Polic.vandDefenseRerieti 2(1980) :

33-36; Dawisha, "Opportunity," 143.

30 . Dawisha, "Iraq and the Arab World: The Gulf War and After," The World Today 37, no . 5 (May

1981):190; Alien B . S. Taal,"Wars and Religion," Nem, Zealarrd International RerieK, 6 (March-April 1981):

30 .

35

1980 

p

Husayn's ; Saddam had never accepted as final the 1975 Algiers Accords, and,

therefore, the countdown for war could be said to have started with the signing of

those Accords. Getting more specific, however, he stated :

The actual decision to launch a Nrnitecl lauthor's emphasis) cvar against Iran Aas taken

in August 1979 . just after Saddam Husayn had taken over power from President Hassan

al-Baler The actual preparation was left to the Army command. butthe timing N as to be

set by the Revolutionary Command Council. ]

The Iraqis began in early September with forays into the Qasr-e Shirin area and

the central border area near Mehran. Iranian opposition, probably only border guards

or gendarmerie, did not seem too potent . Emboldened by these modest successes and

judging the Iranian military too debilitated by two years of turmoil to offer much of

a defense, the Iraqi leadership decided to send its units into Khuzistan, anticipating a

welcome from Iranian Arabs and a rapid collapse of Iranian resistance .

The Iraqi advance into Khuzistan was apparently based on an old plan that had

existed for over 30 years. Drafted in 1950 with extensive British assistance, this plan

envisioned an Iraqi invasion designed to force Tehran to concede Iraqi claims over

the Shatt-a[-Arab and disputed border regions. The plan called for besieging rather

than assaulting cities and strong points and foresaw Iraqi occupation of Khuzistan.

This accomplished, Baghdad would conduct negotiations from aposition of strength .`

The plan reportedly had been updated over the years, no doubt to take into

consideration the vastly improved Iranian military capability since the early 1950s.

But it took only l l days of fighting for Baghdad to realize it had made a ghastly

mistake. The Khuzistani Arabs had not rallied to Iraq's banner of Arabism, Iranian

regulars and paramilitary units continued to fight (albeit in a disorganized manner),

and the IIAF--contrary to Iraqi expectations-had begun a strategic bombing

campaign aimed at the centerpiece of Iraq's economy, its oil industry. As one observer

noted, the Iranians had shown themselves little concerned with materialistic

considerations .; Iraq's reaction was to stop overall offensive operations, declare the

37
appropriately, he felt compelled to deny Iraqi forces had stopped their attack . Neatly

couching his terms, he said Iraqi forces had reached their targets, which had been

designated to them by the political command, adding "We do not want to reach

Tehran." 5

The Iraqi leadership had given up. The Iraqi military, for all its flaws, would not

try to win. The remainder of the war would be a continuous saga ofIran pursuing one

goal-expulsion of the invaders and political victory. Meanwhile Baghdad, forbidden

by Tehran to wriggle off the hook, would:

1 . Alternate between threats and offers of conciliation .

2. Periodically try to tighten the screws on Iran, making Iran hurt at little cost to

Iraq.

3. Try to reduce strong points bypassed in its initial advance and try to eliminate

stubborn Iranian salients .

4. Attempt to bleed isolated Iran by attempting to form defensive walls on which

the Iranian military waves would hopefully break themselves .

5 . Endeavor to outlast Iran at least cost in manpower to itself .

What Iraq would not do was face up to the fact that a military victory was the only

way out of the impasse, a solution involving risky and costly offensives . The Iraqi

leadership chose to forgo the offensive and tried instead, much like the United

States against North Vietnam, to up the ante by making Iran hurt enough so that it

would have no other choice but to negotiate.

Though we may never know the specifics of Iraqi decisionmaking, it appears that

Saddam Husayn, seeking a way out of this impasse, would alternately direct the IQAF

to hit a few strategic targets and then back off, hoping the incremental damage would

convince Tehran to let him off the hook. Like Lyndon Johnson and Ho Chi Minh in

the 1960s, Saddam Husayn and Ayatollah Khomeini were fighting two different wars .

Until Iran's late summer 1982 invasion of Iraq, Husayn's was a limited one in which

he voluntarily restricted himself in order to seek limited aims. Khomeini's was total

in which Iran used all its available resources wherever and whenever it could,

conserved them where necessary, but never lost sight ofthe objective-to destroy the

Iraqi regime .

3 8
I . "Too Hot to Handle," The Middle East 73 (November 1980) :10-11 .

2 Richard Hal loran, "British, in 1950, Helped Map Iraqi Invasion of Iran," NYT,16 October 1980, A15.

The subject of this plan is also mentioned in Col J . J. Haggerty, "The Seeds of Qadisizah [sic]-The

Iraqi-Iranian War," Army Quarterly and Defence Journal 111, no. 1 (January 1981) : 40-41 . Haggerty's

reference is made without footnotes and since he is a British author writing in a British publication, his

comments about the plan have a ring of credibility to them. However, the timing ofhis and Halloran's report

and the striking similarity in phrasing between the two articles leads one to the suspicion Haggerty got his

information directly from the New York Times rather than directly from British sources .

3 . Barry Rubin, "Iraq's Attack on Iran May Mean Less Than the Reasons Behind It," Journal of

Commerce, 2 December 1980, 4 . 

4. Iraqi Armed Forces General Command Announcement Number 57 (hereafter referred to as AFGC,

followed by the number), Daily Report, Middle East and Africa (Washington, D.C : Foreign Broadcast

Information Service) (hereafter referred to as FBIS-MEA-year-number), vol. 5, no . 194, 3 October 1980 .

Baghdad radio broadcast in Arabic at 1738 GMT, 2October 1980.

5 . "Defense Minister Holds Conference on Military Operations," FBIS-MEA-80-195, Iraqi News

Agency (INA) in Arabic at 2150 GMT, 4October 1980.

39

Iranian offensives involve only a matter of afew kilometers movement on a long, but

shallow, front. This lack ofsignificant movement, combined with the hyperbolic and

apocalyptic style ofthe two contenders' daily "victory" claims, has tended to deaden

the senses and makes an understanding ofthe air war very difficult.

This study will, therefore, disregard the chronology of claims and counterclaims

and will instead attempt to analyze the air war through three general subject areas.

The first subject area incorporates the relationship of air forces to national

objectives-what is the primary use for the Iraqi and Iranian Air Forces? The second

subject area is a discussion of the importance of attrition to the two air forces . The

third subject area is a discussion of the general airpower doctrines used by both air

forces, often unconsciously expressed more through their actions (or lack of same)

than through any known publications . The link between air force roles, attrition, and

national objectives will be covered in the final chapter.

Deterrence-The Primary Role for Air Forces

Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air

Force, lists nine basic US Air Force operational missions : strategic aerospace offense,

space operations, strategic aerospace defense, airlift, close air support, air interdiction,

counterair operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, and special operations . I

Eliminating space operations, the remaining eight categories are an adequate

description of missions required for both the IQAF and IIAF. The manner in which

the US Air Force and the IQAF/IIAF carry out these missions may be different in

style, but the essence of the missions is the same in kind . The most important mission

for all three air forces-US Air Force, IQAF, IIAF-is strategic offensive.

For instance, AFM 1-1 states:

Strategic aerospace offensive forces serve primarily as a deterrent to nuclear war. Avital

part of deterrence is the credibility communicated by political will and forces in being.

To preserve an attack capability, these forces must be able to survive an enemy attack

and make successful retaliatory strikes. -

41
But there is confusion here. In both countries, but especially in Iraq, the army is

perceived as the decisive and most important military arm for two reasons. First, the

concept that strategic bombing can destroy an enemy's capability and will to fight is

not necessarily accepted, thus the army with its inherent ability to physically occupy

enemy territory is perceived as the decisive military ann. Thus, air force missions are

subordinated to army needs.* Second, the army has the internal political role of

maintaining civil control, again through occupation. Because of this aspect of their

mission, army commanders have more political, hence bureaucratic, clout. Therefore,

in the relationship between the army and the air force, it is the army's needs which

come first ; the air force, for its part, must support these needs through its airlift, close

air support, air interdiction, reconnaissance, and counterair capabilities . Western

observers who saw this relationship were thus mystified when the IQAF especially

did not seem to be supporting its ground forces . The Economist was puzzled by the

lack of activity by "an air force whose main role was supposed to be close support of

the ground forces ." 3 An informed and insightful airpower professional, T. R. Milton,

felt in January 1981 that there was "little evidence that either side is using its air forces

for any objective purpose, whether air superiority, close air support, or planned

interdiction . "4

Such observations were correct if one assumes the primary mission of the

respective air forces was to help their armies gain victory. But for the combatants, the

primary benefit oftheir air forces was not the objectives that could be gained through

the use ofaircraft but the destruction that could be avoided through thedeterrent posed

by the possession of aircraft.

To help better clarify the use of airpower by Iraq and Iran, a review ofsome basic

US ideas about airpower seems appropriate . AFM 1-1 again:

The medium of aerospace provides an environment that allows unlimited horizontal and

vertical movement for warfare systems.The freedom of operation permitted in aerospace

allows our forces to exploit the characteristics of range, speed, and maneuverability.

These characteristics enable the direct application of power against all elements of an

enemy's military resources to a degree not possible by other forces .5

* Unfortunately for the countries involved, coordination between armies and air forces is lacking . and the potential for an air-ground

team remains just that-a potential .

42
g, g,

they offer destruction and punishment, and here is where conceptions about

airpower diverge.

FormostWestern observers, the air warbetween Iranand Iraq is generally a tactical

air war, fought with tactical aircraft-F-4s, F-5s, Sukhois, and MiG-23s-delivering

conventional ordnance. The respective combatants are organized as tactical air forces .

The International Institute for Strategic Studies tends to regard nuclear capability as

the characteristic distinguishing strategic fromtactical forces . Doing so, it credits only

the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China with strategic forces .

Middle Eastern air forces are listed as if they are strictly tactical, having a variety of

interceptor and ground attack squadrons. Parenthetically, Iraq additionally has two

bomber squadrons. 7Aviation Week noted on 6 October 1980 that airstrikes were at a

level well below the limit ofboth sides' ability, but mistakenly felt that their "tactical

airpower is being used to support the primary offensive and defensive efforts on the

ground."sThus, Western observers, thinking of Iran's and Iraq's air forces as purely

tactical, would find "the lack of sustained application ofIraq's [in this case] airpower

is one of the more puzzling aspects of the war." 9

But it is less puzzling if one views the respective air forces in a strategic context.

Both sides have strategic assets which they do not wantdestroyed, that is oil . But their

oil cannot be defended adequately since it lies so close to the enemy and since it is a

very soft targetrefineries and storage areas can be heavily damagedby strafing, and

tanker captains are loath to risk their ships if there is a serious prospect they may be

attacked. Since neither side can defend its strategic assets, both must deter the other

from striking them. Then, following very neatly our own description of strategic

offensive forces, both the IQAF and the IIAF serve primarily as a deterrent to the

other's ability to strike at strategic targets . Since a vital part ofdeterrence is credibility

communicated by political will and forces inbeing, both sides must make the other

aware that it has the forces (here the long-range striking forces-the air forces)

capable ofinflicting serious strategic damage as well as the determination to use them.

To preserve this capability, the air forces must be able to survive enemy attacks and

to make successful retaliatory attacks .

In the recent past, Middle Eastern air forces have been used as deterrents. In the

Arab-Israeli confrontation, the thing Israel did not want to see attacked or destroyed

43
Destruction of Egypts deterrent, its air force, in 1956 and 1967 led to the destruction

of the Egyptian army in both cases. Egypt's answer in 1973 was different from that

of Israel in 1967. The EAF could not destroy Israel's deterrent, the IAF, but an

integrated ground-based air defense system could (hopefully) neutralize it while the

EAF protected rear areas from attack . Israeli deterrence failed in 1973 because Egypt

decided its credibility could be lessened through ground-based air defense which

would eviscerate its forces-the IAF.

The Iran-Iraq war is the first Middle East war between the "haves" of the region .

People and armies, to be sure, are important, but the vital strategic asset forboth sides,

the resource both did not want to see destroyed, was the oil industry One could make 

the case that for Iran's revolutionary leaders, theirmost vital asset was their revolution .

But as they had proved to themselves that the shah's military could not destroy the

psychic force oftheir revolution, they felt the same would be true for the Iraqi military.

Thus their vital strategic asset, as it was for Iraq and as it was for the shah, was the

material fuel for the revolution, the income derived from oil . In the Iran-Iraq context,

the IIAF was Iran's deterrent to Iraqi attack. But Iranian deterrence failed . It failed

because the credibility of its force-the IIAF-was suspect in Iraqi eyes. Without

force, Iranian deterrence lacked persuasiveness to Iraqi decisionmakers .

Not that Baghdad had any doubt about Tehran's intentions or will . Iran's Abadan

refinery, the largest in the world, lies right on the Shatt-al-Arab where it is extremely

vulnerable to any type of military action . In 1972, Iran warned Iraq that any attack on

Abadan would trigger massive air attacks against Iraqi oil fields at Kirkuk and

Mosul.

10 The Tehran daily Keyhan warned on 25 August 1980 that "an air attack by

Iraq will be met with . . . the destruction of Iraq's sensitive and strategic military

positions ." I I But in Iraqi eyes, the credibility of that threat was weak. As previously

mentioned, Baghdad assessed in late 1980 that Iranian military capability, especially

the IIAF, was weak and probably figured any retaliatory strikes could be easily

handled by what looked to be a formidable-though untested-network of SA-2s,

SA-3s, and interceptors .

Given the disjointed command and control arrangements in the IIAF in late

September 1980, it is likely that Iran would have retaliated for Iraq's invasion by

striking Iraqi oil facilities whether or not Iraq struck Iranian oil facilities . But in initial

ground movements on 23 September, Iraqi artillery rounds began hitting the Abadan

44
successful . One witness noted initial strikes on a Basrapetrochemical complex missed

the main plant and hit support facilities instead.

14 And F-4s trying to hit an oil refinery

south of Baghdad missed the refinery by three-quarters of a mile .

15 But IIAF attacks

on strategic targets were immediate, fairly large scale, and continued for several

weeks. It is entirely probable that had the IIAF response early in the war been less

massive or intense and had it not continued daily despite its losses, then the Iraqi

leadership would have directed the IQAF to destroy the Iranian oil industry . (Their

capability may have been lacking, but they would have been directed to make the

attempt.) As it was, the IIAF response restored the credibility of the Iranian deterrent,

and the attacks on strategic targets became part of a retaliatory cycle. The strikes on -

oil facilities were not irrational ; they were no designed so much as a means of

destroying the facilities in order to reduce the enemy's ability to fight as they were

merely a means of punishing the enemy, of persuading him to cease hitting friendly

oil targets.

Spokesmen for both sides were explicit in stating the reasons for the attacks on

strategictargets. Iranian Defense Minister Fakuri on 23 September noted that the IIAF

first hit airfields and then embarked on retaliatory attacks on strategic positions. 16 The

Iraqi Defense Minister two days later referred to Iraqi strategic strikes also as

retaliation and stated that if Iran bombed acivilian area or oil facilities, Iraq would

do likewise. He blamed Iran for starting the strategic bombing phase, an act which

forced Iraq to retaliate, thus escalating the war.

17 The strategic exchange took on the

aspect of a blood feud with both sides retaliating, expecting the other to be the first

to back off. On 6October, an Iraqi Armed Forces General Command communique

stated that IQAF bombing of Tehran on that day had been done "to make Tehran

understand it should not hit civilian targets." 19 Retaliation and punishment were still

the byword in December when Iranian officials explained that stepped-up IIAF

operations against oil targets were in retaliation for IQAF raids on Iranian oil

installations, 19 and Tehran radio's Arabic service noted that the Iranian effort to

destroy Iraq's oil exporting terminal at the head of the Gulf was strictly for

punishment, "dealing . . . an economic blow to the Iraqi regime ." 20

But even though strategic deterrence had so conspicuously failed in the fall of

1980, it was still amajor concern for both countries' futures. Both had shown the other

they had the will and the abilityto inflict punishment, if not totally destroy each other's

45
of these planes created a deterrent to the other side's use of his planes. The planes

could not objectively win the conflict, but they could inflict punishment only,

however, so long as they existed . Using them to inflict higher levels of punishment,

and losing them in the attempt, would only invite future retaliatory attacks for which

there would be only a weak, if not nonexistent, response . Thus, it was not surprising

when Saddam Husayn told the Iraqi National Assembly on 4 Novemberthat he would

not allow the Western media to force him to use up his air force .

We will not use our airforce. We will keep it Two years hence our air force will still be

in a position to pound Bani-Sadr and his collaborators ."

Performance-The IQAF and IIAF

in Strategic Strikes

We have a problem evaluating the performance of both air forces in the strategic

role since the goal ofboth seemed to be to induce the otherto accept a mutual cessation

ofstrategic attacks It is difficult to use bombingaccuracy as a measure, since it varied

so . We already notedthe IIAFhadearly in the warmissed targets at BasraandBaghdad

quite badly, but the IQAF raid on Tehran on the first day of the war was hardly an

example to follow as it resulted in only light damage andtwo Iranians killed.

24 Despite

a number ofIQAF attacks, local residents at Tabriz reported the city unscathed in late

September, and an attempt in October to bomb the Tabriz refinery was reported to

have missed that fairly large and obvious target entirely .

25 On other occasions,

attacking aircraft were very accurate. In early October, Western observers noted direct

hits on the key Dawrah power plant at Baghdad, and IIAF attack aircraft caused

considerable damage to oil pumping facilities in Kirkuk and a cement plant at

Mosul. 26

Effectiveness, however, can be used as a measure . Neither air force caused enough

damage to the enemy to force him out of the war, but both did cause enough to force

him to reduce his punishment attacks . IIAF attacks around Kirkuk caused Iraq to

declare force majeure on 27 September and cease pumpin_g oil through its pipelines

which ran through Syria and Turkey to the Mediterranean . 2 These pipelines were not

46
caused only more damage but did not significantly affect Irans oil lifeline . Irans late

November "destruction" of Iraq's offshore oil loading platforms at Mina al-Bakr and

Khor al-Amaya was answered by a resumption of IQAF raids on Kharg Island and

Bandar-e Khomeini . But the destruction of the platforms was more or less a payback

for the "destruction" of the Abadan refine, and the retaliatory raids on Kharg caused

little damage and scared off few tankers.

So airstrikes on strategic targets by the two air forces were effective in restoring a

situation of mutual deterrence but were not effective in forcing a decision . Why? One

reason is they both used too few aircraft in their strikes. Observers never saw more

than six aircraft in a single attack. ;I Only three IQAF aircraft hit Tehran in theopening

attacks; only two IIAF planes were noted the next day in an attack on Baghdad; in

another IIAF attack on Baghdad, two planes bombed while two covered for them.

32

By contrast, Israel in 1967 used 120 aircraft in its attacks on the Egyptian Air Force.

Three waves of 40 planes each struck at Egyptian bases; then, refueled and reanned,

came back for a second attack for a total of 240 attack sorties.; The Israeli strategic

attacks hit like a load of bricks, the Iranian and Iraqi attacks like pebbles.

Both sides also appeared to have a problem with unexploded ordnance.

34 The

unexploded munitions problem may have been caused by both pilots and load crews.

The pilots may have delivered their weapons well outside optimum parameters, but

many of the weapons dropped on Iraqi targets, for instance, did not explode because

they had been improperly fused and primed.

35 Part of the IIAF problem stemmed

from the fact that load crews during the days ofthe shah hadto be as politically reliable

as theaircrews and were thus thoroughly checked out by the shah's internal security

organization. After the revolution, anyone so thoroughly checked out and trusted by

the shah's regime was immediately suspect under the revolutionary regime .

In all, the IIAF probably achieved better results than the IQAF. Despite its

organizational problems, the IIAF carried Iran's fight to Iraq in the crucial early days

of the war and, in doing so, let Baghdad know it could not expect an inexpensive

victory. Overall, the IIAF hit harder than the IQAF. They seemed to put more effort

into their offensive operations, and they probably caused more damage-especially

in the northern oil areas around Kirkuk. US-trained Iranian aircrews seemed more

aggressive and more willing to take risks than "their Iraqi counterparts . IIAF aircraft

were certainly better. The F-4 especially could carry a heavier ordnance load to longer

47
it must remain credible to remain a deterrent. Since credibility is a function of both

will and forces inbeing, then air forces must be kept inbeing. They must be kept

inbeing by being able to survive an enemy attack . This can be done by hardening the

airfield, sheltering the aircraft, and having a robust airdefense network. They can also

be survivable if they are safehavened, as was the case with the Egyptian Air Force in

195637 and the IQAF in 1980 . 38 But surviving enemy attacks is only part of the

equation ; anairforce must survive its own attacks . There is a perceptual critical mass,

a number of airframes and aircrews, below which the credibility of a deterrent

evaporates . Enemy attacks reduce the size of the deterrent somewhat, but in this

particular : war the most severe losses for both sides seem to have occurred during

offensive operations . The more the IQAF or IIAF presses the attack, the more planes

and crews they lose through enemyresponses, accident, or sheer usage, and the closer

they fall toward that critical mass below which they do not want to drop. How is that

critical mass defined? Is it an objective number, a subjective feel, or a perception of

enemyperceptions? The answer is not readily apparent . Perhaps it: does not even come

under conscious consideration by IQAF and IIAF planners, but it is there!

One thing that makes the attrition problem all the more acute is the fact that Iran

and Iraq, like most Third World countries, are, in essence, clients, supplicants ofthose

industrialized states that produce aircraft . Leaders in nations whose defense industries

produce aircraft know they have a more or less steady supply of replacement aircraft .

No matter how long the production lead time, both Soviet and Western military

planners know there will be a replacement for MiGs and F-168 lost in combat. On a

smaller scale, while Argentine Air Force leaders must be uneasy about replacements

for Mirages and A-4s lost in the Falklands: they know there will be replacements for

Pucara aircraft lost to British gunners because the Pucara is produced in Argentina.

In prior Middle Eastern wars, Israeli decisionmakers knew that links with the United

States were so strong that replacement aircraft would be forthcoming should Israel

really need them. Hence, Israel knew it had replacements even if they were not built

by Israeli industry .

In these three cases, military and political decisionmakers have a much higher

threshold of attrition pain than do those decisionmakers in a state that has neither

industry nor reliable industrial friends. Military objectives can be pursued with more

determination, and a higher level of airframe (but not necessarily aircrew) losses can

48
had noted that Israel, heavily anned as it was, had needed a massive US airlift of arms

during the 1973 war to continue the fight on Israeli terms. He, therefore, sought to

purchase as much equipment as quickly as possible in order to reduce Iran's

dependence on arms suppliers should a shooting war ever break out. He also bought

a fonnidable strategic airlift capacity-707s and 747s-to further reduce Iranian

dependence on arms suppliers. Iran, he planned, would not have to depend on a sole

source of weaponry ; Iran would possess a huge stockpile of equipment to fight,

including transport aircraft to deliver arms purchased from foreign sellers or

armament manufacturers.

39 Iraq's leadership saw the problem in a similar light.

Saddam Husayn in a 1975 speech stated : "We believe that no country with serious 

problems which relies on importing its weapons can claim to be absolutely

independent.

"40 Consequently, Iraq, too, had built up a strategic airlift fleet,

possessing 12 I1-76/Candid transports in 1980.

By 1980, both countries had alarge amount of equipment, but neither had a secure,

large-scale source of resupply. Unlike Israel or Egypt and Syria in 1973, Iran and Iraq

in 1980 had no friends. Iran, holding American diplomats prisoner, was an

international pariah . Iraq had over the years alienated its major supplier, the USSR,

and Moscow had the opportunity in 1980-81 to take the high road of "neutrality,"

withholding major deliveries from Baghdad and teaching the Iraqis a lesson about the

limits a supplier can impose upon a buyer.

41 Iraq could and did turn to other Western

suppliers, like the French, but the Iraqi military had enough problems conducting a

war without introducing new systems that would only further tax its logistics base .

So the essential attrition problem remained. Both sides were losing aircraft and

inexorably reducing their strategic deterrents . Both sought out other supplies and

suppliers to ameliorate the problem, but neither could depend upon having a secure

enough source to ensure a continuing balance between losses and replacements . The

need to reduce their losses thus led both sides to limit the use of their aircraft in

high-threat environments .

The number and intensity of attacks on strategic (oil and industrial) targets began

to decline about 8 October, having fairly well petered out as a daily occurrence by the

end of the month. Through November and December, IIAF aircraft kept up random

attacks on Iraqi oil targets, chiefly in the north around Mosul and Kirkuk. IQAF

strategic attacks followed a similar pattern, slacking off to almost none by 1

49
raids into northern Iraq-small scale, hit-and-run efforts seemingly designed to

advertise a capability and to inflict some measure of punishment while limiting

exposure to defenses and thereby holding down attrition . The increased numbers of

interdiction attacks launched by both air forces after the first few weeks of the war

was a reflection of both doctrinal and attrition needs. The incredible Iranian Joint

General Staff Announcement Number 82 on 28 September stated that :

Nowthat IIAF pilots have, and will destroy military targets [sic], inside Iraq, they have

commenced their severe counterattack on enemy units which have infiltrated our dear

country.4'-

This statement was both a reflection of having run through most of the preplanned

missions left over from prerevolutionary days and a recognition that continuance

of those kinds of missions into high-threat areas would reduce the IIAF to

impotence . Accordingly, both sides began to seek out interdiction-type targets in

less heavily defended areas.

All attrition is not, however, the same. Dr Williamson Murray, a former research

associate at the Air University's Airpower Research Institute, in his study ofLuftwaffe

operations during World War II postulated three different types of

attrition-offensive, response, and imposed . Offensive attrition are those calculated

losses caused by one's own initiative that one is willing to suffer in an effort to achieve

a gain through the offensive use of airpower. Offensive attrition is that which the

Israeli Air Force had to accept in 1973 when it took high losses in its effort to knock

out Syrian SA-6s on the Golan front.

43 The IIAF suffered offensive attrition when it

struck back hard at Iraqi strategic targets on 23 September 1980, losing a good number

of aircraft (67 by Iraq's probably overoptimistic claim). IQAF losses during attacks

in Tehran, including at least two Tu-22s in October,44 were similarly caused by Iraqi

initiative .

Conversely, response attrition is that caused by enemy initiative, the losses you

suffer by either being destroyed on the ground or by defending yourself from enemy

attack . The Egyptian Air Force losses in 1956 and 1967 were classic examples of

response attrition, though the EAF was given little opportunity to respond . In 1973,

50
Finally, imposed attrition is that which is forced upon you by thedemands of the

situation . As such, it is an outgrowth of both offensive and response attrition . But

while one can avoid the first two types ofattrition-by exercising no initiative in the

first case or not contesting the issue in the second-imposed attrition cannot be

avoided . When it became apparent to Egypt in 1973 that the Israeli Suez Canal

crossing at Deversoir threatened the existence of the Egyptian Third Army and

perhaps the entire Egyptian army, the EAF was thrown into the fray for the first time

in a desperate attempt to salvage the situation . Most of the losses the EAF suffered

occurred in this effort . But the EAFcould do nothing else than to try to save the army,

regardless of the long odds it faced. The attrition the EAF suffered was imposed on

it ; it could not be avoided .

Neither the IIAF nor the IQAF was ever really forced into such a position . The

IIAF, especially, seemed to feel that the offensive attrition it suffered was high enough

to cause the IQAFto back off on the pressure . The IQAF was not willing orwas unable

to bear the offensive attrition cost required to impose crushing losses on either the

IIAF or Iran itself. The same was true of the IIAF. Attrition through offensive action

was too high to sustain, so lower threat missions became the norm regardless of their

minimal impact on the course of the war. For both air forces, and especially for the

IQAF, the gains achievable through airpoweroutweighed the perceived loss ofpower

that accompanied the attrition of their aircraft. Palpable losses that could not be

quickly replaced weighed more on Iraqi and Iranian decisionmakers than did

theoretical gains that might be achieved. Victory in the war, if it was to be achieved,

would be gained by the army. The air force would assist the army if it did not cost too

much in attrition of aircraft assets .

Performance-The IQAF and

IIAF in Strategic Defense

Although defenses inside Iran and Iraq inflicted enough attrition upon enemy air

forces to cause the respective national leaderships to abandon strategic bombing as a

major part of their war effort, the overall defensive performance on both sides was

51
defensive problem was compounded, however, by geographic realities. Iraqi strategic

targets all lay relatively close to the Iranian border where the topography is very

mountainous. This allowed IIAF strike aircraft to fly low through Iranian mountain

passes, popping out into Iraqi radar coverage only after having already crossed the

border. IIAF run-ins to targets were often a matter of only a few minutes after border

crossing .

The ability of the IIAF, flying low and fast, to arrive unhindered over Iraqi cities

led some to conclude that the entire Iraqi defensive command and control structure

had either collapsed or was extremely incompetent.

46 While the Iraqi defensive

system undoubtedly had severe shortcomings, this appears to be too harsh ajudgment .

French reporters in Baghdad routinely heard warnings of impending attacks well

before Iranian aircraft appeared over the city.

47 It appears a major reason Iranian

aircraft were able to get to their target relatively unmolested was the Iraqi defensive

setup. It appeared that the Iraqis had made those areas which were well equipped with

air defense weapons into virtual free-fire zones. Thus, any aircraft over areas like

Baghdad, Basra, and possibly Kirkuk were assumed to be hostile and free game for

Iraqi gunners. The IQAF would not attempt an intercept in these areas due to the

inability ofIraqi ground air defenses to discriminate between friend or foe. The IQAF

apparently, therefore, flew combat air patrols (CAPS) over certain areas that did not

have ground-based air defenses and would only intercept Iranian penetrators when

the Iranians came inside the IQAF CAP area. While this system limited IQAF

flexibility to cope with IIAF intruders and allowed IIAF pilots to face only one

defensive problem at a time, the Iraqis were probably sensible to adopt it . In their

enthusiasm, Iraqi gunners reportedly downed one of their own II-7b transports over

Baghdad on the first day of the war.

48

Iraq's defensive problems were also compounded by the high-expenditure rate of

SAMs and AAA rounds . Western observers in Baghdad and Basra noted SAMs and

artillery rounds all over the sky during Iranian raidsearly in the war, raids that probably

comprised two to, at most, four aircraft . 9 A British reporter who arrived in Baghdad

two weeks into the war noted, "The rain of spent shells even interrupted tennis on the

British Embassy lawn." 5O The resultant rapid depletion of ammunition stocks that

Iraq's suppliers were not refilling obviously became acomplicating factor for Iraqi

air defense planners .

52
were in such a bad state of readiness. Iranian combat reports claimed about equal

numbers of Iraqi losses caused by AAA and by Iranian fighters . While most of the

AAA claims were near the battlefront, a number were also claimed in the Kharg

Island-Bushehr area, indicating Iranian concern with the defense of this terminal .

Most of the interception claims were in areas behind the front lines, indicating IIAF

aircraft on airborne alert had been vectored to intercept Iraqi intruders. One of its most

important roles appeared to be as an airborne early warning platform, detecting

intruders with its AWG-9 radar and informing other aircraft who then tried for the

interception .

.53 F- 14s apparently did not get too close to the fight for some time as it

was not until March 1981 that Iraqi dispatches mentioned any F-14 encounters .

Iraqi leaders seemed very displeased with Iraqi defensive performances and

seemed inclined to blame their Soviet-supplied equipment rather than acknowledge

their own structural problems. Although undoubtedly Soviet equipment has its

shortcomings, the relatively poor Iraqi performance cannot be totally laid at the feet

of the Soviet Union. At any rate, the Iraqis began to seek out French equipment to

supplement and/or replace the Soviet equipment with which they were displeased .

Baghdad approached the French in late 1980 with requests to buy Crotale and Roland

surface-to-air missile systems to augment their depleted Soviet SAM arsenal.

54 The

Iraqis were also displeased with Soviet air-to-air missiles . Pakistani technicians were

reported to have helped the Iraqis modify some MiG-21 s to carry the French-made

Magic air-to-air missile. The Iraqis claimed to have used a MiG-21 so equipped to

down an F-14.55 Additionally, in early 1981 the Iraqis received the first of their 1977

order of 36 Mirage F-Is . 56 This move to French equipment was due not only to real

problems with Soviet equipment but also to politics and expedience . Politically,

Baghdad wanted more than one arms supplier so Iraqi actions could not be as easily

manipulated by a sole seller. And since the French seemed willing to sell to a

combatant while the Soviets were not, the move appeared quite logical. New

equipment, however, would not alter Iraq's geographical realities on the Iranian front

nor would it improve Iraqi reaction time, as the Israelis were to` demonstrate so

dramatically when they destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactors at Tawaitha in June 1981 .

53
Iran and Iraq-and by extension most of the other Middle East states-seem to

have fundamentally different ideas than does the US Air Force about the importance,

utility, and role of air forces . US Air Force ideas have been codified in basic doctrine

that has evolved over a period of 60-odd years. And it has been an evolutionary

process. At times, visionary ideas and thinkers have outpaced aviation technology; at

others, technology has increased capabilities faster than the development ofthe ideas

on how to best use the newer capabilities . In the evolution ofUS Air Force doctrine,

the basic belief that "aerospace forces are unique and can be decisive in warfare," 57

coupled with World War II experience, led US Air Forcedoctrine away from linking

airpower with ground forces to a position where there was a measure of equality

between air and ground forces . The air forces were to be independent of army control

though their joint cooperation was a must. (FM 100-20, CommandandEmployment

ofAir Power, declared in 1943 that air superiority was a requirement for (successful

landoperations.) 58 To repeat, for the . US Air Force, it has been anevolutionary process.

In the period preceding World War II, airpowerthinkers developed concepts that were

to be tried in the fire of that war. One of the results of that trial by fire was an

independent US Air Force. It has since become an article offaith that airpower is the

decisive element in war when the air war is conducted in a proper manner.

59

The key to the development of US Air Force doctrine was its long-term growth in

concert with emerging technology and an expanding experience base from which to

draw lessons . Such has not been the case for the IQAFand IIAE As previously noted,

both air forces are fairly new creations in which near state-of-the-art aviation

technology has been force-fed to a human resource base barely able to cope with the

pressures of modernity.

Although the IQAF dates from the early 1930s, it remained almost fully under

British control through 1955. The radical shift after 1958 to Soviet weapons brought

in a new group of advisers, a different language, and different styles. This influence

was subsequently modified over the next two decades by successive periods ofclose,

then frosty, Moscow-Baghdad relations . By 1980, the IQAF possessed a mixture of

Soviet, Czech, British, and French aircraftand hadbeen influencedby British, Soviet,

andIndian instructors . Furthermore, Iraqi airmen had only limited combatexperience,

and none of it was at a level ofcommand which required coordination and operation

54
The IIAF situation was at once both similar to and different from that ofIraq . The

IIAF was a newer creation than the IQAF, receiving its first combat aircraft only in

1956. The 1970s was aperiod ofexplosive growth for the IIAF as the force structure,

composed offirst-rate American aircraft, increased rapidly . The need to find somehow

the necessary manpower to operate the equipment was a pressing priority. (A 1976

study estimated that the IIAF would have to increase personnel levels by over 50

percent by 1981 to operate all the systems expected in the inventory by that date .)61

But at least the aircraft, and hence the foreign assistance, all came from one

source-the United States . By the end of the shah's era, the IIAF had no written

doctrine, but the close US Air Force-IIAF ties over the preceding years had resulted

in many IIAF officers internalizing aspects of US Air Force doctrine . According to a

US Air Force officer intimately familiar with the command echelons of the Imperial

Iranian Air Force, IIAF commanders, to the extent they even recognized a needfor

doctrine, tended to use ours. 2 IIAF planners, often schooled in US Air Force

professional military education schools, attempted to correct this shortcoming by

injecting doctrinal ideas into the "concept of operations" sections of contingency

plans. As previously mentioned, the IIAF tried to gain a separate identity; but, like

the IQAF, was never really free from close political control by national leaders more

concerned with their own security than with national defense or institutional

professionalism. Before 1978, the shah's influence was paramount; in 1980, the

mullahs kept close rein on the IIAF lest it become a tool for opposition elements.

In 1980 and 1981, any doctrinal impulses held by either the IQAF or IIAF (about

how best to prosecute the war) were definitely constrained by the political needs of

the regimes in Baghdad and Tehran . IQAF and IIAF actions during the war, however,

displayed their operational attitudes, and possibly their nascent doctrine, about the

uses ofairpower. The nextsections ofthis study will examine how these two air forces

approachedthe basic tactical airpower tasks, noting the divergence between their and

our beliefs .

55
to most American airpower practitioners that all other military operations

will suffer unacceptable hardships without air superiority beingfirst attained . It is also

equally obvious, but not so often expressed, that if ground operations, for example,

can be carried out with a lack of air superiority, then there's less reason for exclusive

US Air Force control of Air Force assets . These same factors also may be apparent to

Iraqi and Iranian airforce leaders, but they are notso readily obvious totheir respective

national military and political chiefs.

The Iraqi Attack

The Iraqis had learned one airpower lesson from previous Middle Eastern

wars-the necessity ofthe first strike . The first strike had been decisive in 1956 and

1967. In 1973, the first strike had not been decisive in achieving air superiority, but

it had helped the Arab attack gain enough momentum to gain key ground, especially

onthe Suez front. In 1980, the Iraqis werein an ambiguous situation. Their assessment

of Iranian military weakness indicated they had a window of opportunity through

which they could launch a successful attack . But they had little real faith in their

equipment . Like the Egyptians in 1973,65 the Iraqis knew their Soviet-supplied

aircraft were no match for Iran's US-supplied aircraft . Their planes had short ranges,

making deep strikes difficult and giving Iran in-country sanctuaries ; they had

mediocre avionics; and they had no capacity to carry advanced munitions . Atop all

this, Iranian pilots had, quoting Saddam Husayn, "received training from the most

experienced Americans.

"66 The Iraqi decision to launch the attack, therefore, had to

rest on the assessment that despite the IQAF's equipment shortcomings, it could

succeed against a revolution-wracked IIAE

But success for Iraq, like Egypt in 1973, did not necessarily mean air superiority.

AFM 2-1, Tactical Air- Operations--Counter-Air Close Air Support, and Air

Interdiction, states control of the air may vary along a spectrum ranging from total

friendly control to total enemy control .

67 It also states that offensive action is

necessary to gain friendly control as defensive action surrenders initiative to the

enemy. 6 The Iraqis, like the Egyptians, saw it differently. Rather than strive for total

air superiority, they would be content with localized air control. Rather than seek out

and destroy the enemy air force, they would surrender the initiative but try to destroy

56
Sinai in 1973 . Like the Egyptians in 1973, the Iraqis knew they had little chance to

destroy the IIAF. Iranian aircraft were mostly held in hardened shelters, and several

major airfields were either at the ragged edge of IQAF fighter capabilities or beyond

it entirely . Iraq's 22 September counterair attacks were, therefore, to be like Egypt's

1973 attacks-hit-and-run affairs to disrupt potential IIAF reactions to Iraqi ground

forces that were preparing to invade early the following morning. If the attacks

persuaded the Iranians not to fight, well and good; if they only hampered IIAFability

to interfere with Iraqi ground forces, then they were successful .

On the afternoon of 22 September 1980, the Iraqis expanded the border conflict .

Iraqi aircraft, on apparent counterair missions, struck at 10 Iranian airfields, including

Mehrabad Air Base at Tehran and bases at Shiraz, Bushehr, Dezful, Ahwaz, and

Omidiyeh .71 Damage was relatively light due to several possible factors including

that IIAF aircraft were not parked in the open, the strike forces apparently attacked

in only one wave with relatively light ordnance (due to aircraft capability and range

problems), or that the Iraqis suffered from extremely poor prestrike intelligence . The

Egyptians in 1973 had the benefit of Soviet satellites 72 and MiG-25 reconnaissance

photos73 of Israeli dispositions in the Sinai. With this information, they had been able

to pinpoint their targets for their first strike . Iraq probably did not have this advantage

since in 1980 relations between Baghdad and Moscow had been strained for over two

years.

The airstrike on Mehrabad displayed the Iraqi problems. While making a shallow

right-hand turn to correct this, they released their bombs (a number of which did not

explode), thus spraying them all over the area with some bombs landing outside the

base perimeter. The resultant pattern made it difficult for the Iranians to determine the

Blinders'actual targets. Twobombs caused the only damage. One hit a loaded KC-707

tanker and the other hit a ramp in front of Iran Aircraft Industries wherean F-4 awaiting

overhaul was destroyed. Bombs that hit the runways caused very shallow craters that

were easily repaired . Rows of unprotected civil and military transports remained

unscathed. What appeared to be poor IQAF airmanship and poor target intelligence

combined to produce little significant damage to the IIAF Iraqi intelligence about en

route defenses, however, appeared adequate since the Blinder attack came as a

complete surprise, and it was unopposed.

57
counterair strikes apparently became much more random affairs. Since air superiority

was viewed as desirable but not essential, Iraqi decisionmakers felt no need to

continue an offensive counterair campaign even though the IIAF had not been

neutralized. By then, too, Iraqi leaders were facing another problem-IIAF strikes

against strategic targets inside Iraq .

The Iraqi offensive counterair effort lasted less than a week and can be judged a

total failure. The damage the IQAF inflicted on the IIAF was minimal and did not

severely darnage IIAF retaliatory capabilities . But the Iraqis saw their air force

primarily as a deterrent force--official Iraqi announcements, in fact, referred to the

22 September attacks as "a deterrent blow." 76 While exact IQAF losses in the first 

week are not known, they were high enough to convince the Iraqis that IQAF

airframes could he more productively used . The counterair mission would be carried

out through defensive measures .

The Iranian Response

The original Iranian approach to the air superiority question was very similar to

the one espoused by the US Air Force. Contingency plans, drafted before the

revolution, envisaged IIAF actions in an air war with Iraq starting with a strong

counterair effort. The initial IIAF reaction followed the existing plans as IIAF aircraft

struck back at two Iraqi air bases on 22 September.

77 But the plans envisage attacks

on Iraqi airfields to be undertaken by large strike packages with F-14s providing top

cover, F-4s providing defense suppression, and F-4 and F-5 bombers carrying both

cratering and area-denial munitions. Further exacerbating the situation for the

attackers was the fact that they lacked good current intelligence about target defenses

and did not have defense suppression support, as a result, the IIAF suffered heavily.

IIAF offensive counterair missions continued only through the fourth day of the war,

then stopped.

The IIAF command element in Tehran, hampered as it was by civilian suspicion

and by the loss of most of'its prerevo lutionary leadership, still seemed to sense quite

quickly that its counterair effort was counterproductive. As it sought to regain

openttional control (CliSCLISSe(i in a future section) from the air bases which were

operating autonomously, they began to issue frag orders directing attacks on Iraqi

58
dissuade the Iraqis from bombing Iranian targets.

The counterair mission had been tried by both sides, then abandoned. Neither put

a full weight of effort into it and both achieved what one could have expected-next

to nothing. From the doctrinal point of view, the reasons for the counterair fiasco

appear different for the two air forces . The IQAF appears not to believe in offensive

counterair. It made a half-hearted, fill-in-the-square attempt at it. The IQAFapparently

believed in and preferred attrition inflicted through defensive counterair and

ground-based air defense as the way to reduce enemy air capabilities . In contrast, the

IIAF seemed , to believe in the need for offensive counterair but found that pilot

shortages and heavy losses forced it to abandon this mission. If a depleted IIAF was

to have an effect on the war, it would have to be in another role-and that role, at first,

was to inflict punishing strategic strikes .

Support for Ground Forces-Close Air Support/Interdiction

After the IQAF and IIAF both tackled their strategic missions, they then had to

address theirprimary tactical mission-support forground forces . Since, in both Iran

and Iraq, the army is the most important military arm, airforce support for the ground

forces is an important task, and the approach to it taken by the IIAF and IQAF differs

little from US Air Force doctrine, with one major exception. While both sides talk

about close air support (CAS) for their ground forces, in reality neither air force really

carried out the CAS role except in extremely dire situations. One of the lessons the

Iraqis had drawn from the 1973 war was that CAS was likely to be too costly in terms

of attrition for the results gained . They had noted the losses suffered by the Israeli Air

Force on the Suez front when trying to perform the CAS role in the teeth of the

integrated Egyptian air defense system . They had also suffered severe losses of their

own, tangling with the Israeli Air Force over the Golan Heights as they tried to support

Iraqi armored units being chewed up on the ground .

So in 1980, the IQAF did not perform the CAS role in support ofIraqi army units

moving into Iran. The lack of IQAF activity near the front consistently surprised

Western reporters up until the time they were forbidden to coverthebattle area .

80 The

IQAF seemed doctrinally to have attached a low priority to CAS. From a doctrinal

standpoint, IQAF leaders seem to have decided, on the basis ofthe 1973 experience,

59
system should have been suspect enough for the Iraqis to have at least tried to fly

against it. Two possible reasons exist for the IQAF's apparent disinterest in CAS. First,

Iraqi air-ground coordination may have been quite weak and the IQAF may have

decided to forgo CAS rather than contend with trigger-happy Iraqi antiaircraft

gunnery, as well as with whatever Iranian air defenses that might have existed. And

second, the IQAF, over the years since 1973, doctrinally may have dropped CAS from

a priority air force mission to one to be flown only in desperate circumstances .

The Iranians talked about CAS, both before and during the conflict, but they too

flew very few CAS missions . But themissions the direct air support centers (DASCs)

coordinated included very little true CAS Iranian planners had decided that the 

Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan wars had shown that CAS was likely to be too costly

when flown in the face of a sophisticated air defense network . And, like the Iraqis,

the Iranians had decided before the revolution that enemy possession of sophisticated

air defense equipment implied enemy proficiency with that equipment; this

assumption of proficiency was apparently never seriously tested . By 1980, the IIAF

had developed a program of army support referred to as CAS, but that, in actuality,

more resembled battlefield area interdiction (BAI). IIAF aircraft would be detailed

through the DASCs to army units, but they would not strike close to the zone of

confrontation between the armies . Instead, they would operate in enemy-held areas

behind that zone, opposite their assigned army units . IIAF fighters thus did a lot of

strafing and rocketing of targets of opportunity along the roads leading to the battle

areas . While such attacks ranged as far into Iraq as the Al `Amarah area on the

Khuzistan front, they generally occurred near the border on the central front from

Mehran to Qasr-e Shirin . g2

Under these circumstances, both Iran and Iraq increasingly turned the CAS role

over to helicopters . Attack helicopters were first reported on the battlefield in early

October 1980 and soon became a regular feature in Iranian and Iraqi reports . Iranian

Cobra helicopter gunships armed with tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided

(TOW) antitank missiles apparently had considerable success against Iraqi armored

units that at times advanced without any air cover. A French reporter noted three

Cobrastaking turns attacking an Iraqi column near Abadanin mid-October 1980. The

Cobras apparently faced no Iraqi antiaircraft fire .

83 By November, however, Iraqi use

60
Although they neglected close air support, both the IQAF and IIAF flew a good

number of interdiction sorties. Early in the war, the IQAF began striking at Iran's

transportation infrastructure, hitting anumber ofbridges, railroads, and roads. IQAF

fighters also struck at depots, troop positions, and armor and vehicle concentrations,

but never seemed to strike at Iranian reinforcements moving toward the battle area.

Iraqi interdiction efforts were at their highest levels during the first 45 days of the war,

then tapered off. Except for increased numbers of interdiction sorties in

mid-December 1980 and around the area of Iran's ill-fated Susangerd counterattack

in January 1981, the IQAF interdiction effort wound down through the spring and

summer of 1981 to random and periodic missions, generally in areas close to the battle

areas.

87

Although the IIAF continued ahigher level of effort for a longer period of time,

the IIAF interdiction effort generally paralleled that of the IQAF. Iranian interdiction

sorties remained fairly constant through mid-January 1981 but declined thereafter.

They picked up again in April and Maybut were carried out against only a few areas

ona daily basis, whereas their effort in late 1980 had been more intensive and spread

over a greater area both inside Iraq as well as near the battle areas.

IIAF interdiction aircraft struck most often along the roads inside Iraq in an area

centered on AI `Amarah, Iraq-an area generally parallel to the Iranian border from

Dezful to Abadan. IIAF aircraft struck at Iraqi garrisons inside Iraq-at apparently

poorly protected depots, ammunition dumps, and vehicle concentrations-and

against Iraqi units moving along the roads toward Iran . Early in the war, American

reporters watched the IIAF, flying singly and in two-plane sorties, cause considerable

havoc on Iraqi positions. On 30 September, 12 miles west of Ahwaz, they watched

two F-4s destroy an Iraqi ammunition dump.

88 Much ofthe Iranian interdiction effort

was similar to that of the Iraqis-aircraft on armed reconnaissance struck at targets

of opportunity. An American reporter, traveling in a car along the Iraqi side of the

Shatt-al-Arab, became a target when an IIAF F-4 flying along the road at 100 feet

noted his taxi . The pilot banked the aircraft into a 360-degree turn and attempted to

bomb the taxi on the second pass .

89

Overall, the interdiction effort, by both air forces, seemed to be characterized by

a lot of armed reconnaissance and strafing, with somewhat less effort put into hitting

preplanned targets. From the targets they hit and the description given by theirpublic

61
between Khorramshahr and Bandar

e Khomeini . The planes rockets blew up an

entire string of liquified petroleum gas (LPG) cars .

90

The IIAF,by contrast, seemedtohave better target intelligence . Contingency target

folders, built before the revolution, had target materials derived from RF-4E

photoreconnaissance sorties carried outoverIraq at least until 197591 During the war,

the IIAF leadership apparently had the advantage of at least decent tactical

photoreconnaissance from Iran's one RF-4E squadron. Early in the war, an F-4 was

downed while attacking Iraqi units along the road from the border to Khorramshahr.

An Iraqi commander noted, "We found detailed maps of the area in theairplane with

our positions clearly earmarked on it.

°92

An assessment of both air forces' support to ground forces must conclude that

neither were vital to success ordefeat nor were they particularly effective. Neither air

force used fixed-wing assets in a true CAS role, preferring instead to leave that role

to attack helicopters that were used regularly but not in large numbers. In the

interdiction role, both sides caused considerable damage but did not appear to have

much effect on the course of the ground battles . The IIAF probably achieved the

greater level of damage due to better tactical reconnaissance, better munitions, and

more overall effort put into the interdiction role . But in the ground support role, as in

all other offensive roles, both the IQAF and IIAF soon backed away from a continued

effort as losses began to mount and airpower to both sides seemed less and less the

key to victory . Nevertheless, both still reasoned that it could be used to avoid defeat.

Command andControl-Different Approaches

"Centralized control, decentralized execution ." This is the American airman's

creed on how best to use airpower. It is enshrined in AFM 1-1, which states :

The principles of centralized control ; decentralized execution ; and coordinated effort,

common doctrine, and cooperation are unique to aerospace power. Theyare fundamental

to the success of our operations.

93

62
Tomore than a generation of American airmen, this is the only sensible way to employ

airpower; any other approaches seem either illogical or incomprehensible. The fact

that Iran and Iraq do, in fact, employ their airpower in their own style makes their

actions puzzling to many informed US observers .

During the days of the shah, the IIAF worked under a centralized control and

centralized execution concept. The shah was the center of all control mechanisms. He

was more than a titular commander in chief since he was usually in direct personal

control of operations 94 Consequently, IIAF officers at their units were rarely given

the opportunity to execute orders on their own; they were told how they would do

things . Long exposure to this system reduced initiative through the command officer

corps and resulted, in the late 1970s, in an IIAF command structure that inhibited

independent action without detailed guidance from above.

After the revolution, command arrangements in the IIAF changed dramatically.

Officers, because of their close identification with the shah, were not trusted by the

new regime . Until the outbreak of war, they were used as advisers-not commanders .

Effective, if nebulous, control over IIAF activities now was in the hands of either local

mullahs or revolutionary committees .

The dramatic changes that had occurred to the IIAF between 1978 and 1980 and

the experiences of the war gave the IIAF the opportunity to break out of the

overcentralized mode of operation, but it is questionable whether it has done so . More

likely, the IIAF has reverted to its previous style of excessive centralization as the

mullahs in Tehran have assumed the shah's concern with security and do not want to

allow any growth of independent power centers which may oppose their control. One

indication that the new Iranian political leadership was determined to keep the regular

military under its thumb was a 16 October 1980 announcement that required all

statements about the war, including those released on military affairs by thejoint staff,

from that date forward go first through the propaganda committee of the

mullah-dominated Supreme Defense Council. 5 But an even more telling indicator

was the purging of the IIAF that took place in the late summer of 1981 after Iran's

elected president, Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, felt compelled by events to flee the country.

That he did so in an IIAF transport caused the regime remaining in Tehran to remove

politically suspect elements from their air force while the country was in the midst of

63
patrols over Iraq seemed content to bore holes in the sky ratherthan to seek out readily

available IIAF targets 97 Since late 1980 (when the Iraqi military effectively ceased

offensive operations) through mid-1982, the IQAF (or the political leadership that

controls it) has seemed content generally to not engage in combat as long as the IIAF

does the same.

NOTES

l . Air Force Manual (AFM) 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 14

February 1979 .

2. Ibid. . 2-7.

3. "Why Aren't the Iraqis Going for the Artery'?" The Economist 277, no . 7154 (11 October 1980):

44.

4. T. R. Milton, "Where the Cauldron Boiled Over," AirForce Maga-ine 64, no . 1 (January 1981):99.

5. AFM 1-1, 14 February 1979 .3-2 .

6. Ibid., 3-3 and 3-4.

7. IISS 80-81, 42-43.

8. "Iranian/Iraqi Air Strikes Appear at 'Limited' Level;" AWST 113 (6 October 1980): 20.

9. Robert Bailey, "Iraq Covets Opponents' Weaponry," MEED 24, no . 43 (24 October 1980): 7.

10. Tomasek, 209.

11 . FBIS-SAS-80, 25 August 1980, Tehran newspaper KeOwn in Persian.

12. John Kifner, "Iranian Jets Said to Damage Several Oil Plants," NYT, 3 October 1980, A10:

"Shipments of Oil to Mediterranean Stoppedby Iraqis," WS1, 29 September 1980, 2: "Damage to Iran, Iraq

Oil Facilities Feared Extensive," WS1, 8 October 1980, 2.

13 . Robert D. Hershey, Jr., "Iraq HaltsExport of Its Oil as Result of Damage by Iran," NYT, 27 September

1980,1 .

14. David Bird, "3 Americans Feared Dead in Air Raid on Iraqi Plant," NYT, 25 September 1980, A 13 .

15 . Kifner, "Baghdad Says Its Troops Capture Khorramshahr and Cut a Rail Line," NYT, 26 September

1980 .1 .

16. "Fakud on Air Force Operations," FBIS-SAS-80, Tehran radio broadcast in Persian at 2104 GMT,

23 September 1980.

17 . "Defense Minister Reports an Iraqi-Iranian Dispute," FBIS-MEA-80-189, INA in Arabic at 1310

GMT, 25 September 1980

18 . AFGC61, FBIS-MEA-8(J-196, INA in Arabic at 1545 GMT, 6 October 1980.

19. "AFP: Bombing of Iraqi Oil Facilities to Continue," FBIS-SAS-811-243, Agence France Presse (AFP)

in English at 1744 GMT, 15 December 1980 .

64
NYT30 September 1980, 1 : Terry Povey, "Fighting to a Stalemate," The Middle East 74 (December 1980):

27 .

26 . Henry Tanner, "Khomeini Dismisses Truce Offer, Vowing a Fight 'To the End' ;' NYT I October

1980, 1 ; Kifner, "Iranian Jets," NYT, 3 October 1980.

27 . "Shipments," WS.1, 29 September 1980.

28 . Marvine Howe. "Iraqis Resume Pumping of Oil by Pipeline Across Turkey," NYT, 21 November

1980,A14 .

29 "Iranians Bomb Damin Iraq's Kurd Area," NYT, 22 November 1980,4 .

30 "Navy Commander on Gulf Islands, War with Iraq," FBIS-SAS-80-242, Tehran radio broadcast in

Arabic at 1855 GMT, 13 December 1980.

31 . Drew Middleton, "Factor in Iraqi Push : Iranian Exiles' Aid," NYT, 27 September 1980, 4.

32. "IranianiIragi Air Strikes;" AWST, 6 October 1980 .

33 . Dupuy, 245-46.

34. "Unexploded Ordnance Warning," FBIS-SAS-80, Tehran radio broadcast in Persian at 1735 GMT,

22 September 1980; "Civil Defense Instructions to Citizens," FBIS-MEA-80-187, Baghdad radio broadcast

in Arabic at 0807 GMT, 23 September 1980 : "Tariq Aziz Speaks on Economy, Reagan, USSR Stand,"

FBIS-MEA-80-224, Parisal-Mustagbal in Arabic, 15 November 1980 .

35 . O'Ballance, "The Iraqi-Iranian War: The First Round," Parameters 11, no . I (March 1981): 58 .

36 . "MiG-23 Draws Iraqi Complaints," Strategy Week 6, no . 41 (13-19 October 1980): 4.

37 . See chapter 1, section on Lesson-1956

38 . Richard Halloran, "Iraq Said to Send Planes to Foreign Havens," NYT, 3 October 1980, A10;

"Spokesman Denies Israeli Radio Allegation on Iraqi Planes," FBIS-MEA-80-188, Amman, Jordan radio

broadcast in Arabic at 1600 GMT, 23 September 1980 ; Walter S. Mossberg, "N . Korea, Syria Are Helping

Iran, US Sources Say," WSJ, 9 October 1980A.

39 . Robert Graham,Iran : The Illusion ofPoser (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), 179 and ff.

40 . Saddam Hussein, Social andForeign Affairs in Iraq, trans. by Khalid Kishtainy (London: Croom

Helm, Ltd., 1979), 92 .

41 . Tanner, "Jordan Acts to Aid Iraq with Supplies for War with Iran," NYT, 7 October 1980, 1 .

42 . "Iranian Armed Forces Joint General Staff Announcement No. 82," FBIS-SAS-80, Tehran radio

broadcast in Persian at 1030 GMT, 28 September 1980 (hereafter referred to as JGS, followed by the

number).

43 . Insight Team of the London Sundae Times, The YomKippur War (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday &

Co., Inc., 1974), 200-4.

44 . Eric Rouleau, "Interview with Bani-Sadr (no date)," FBIS-SAS-80-197, Paris LeMonde in French,

8 October 1980; Drew Middleton, "Air War's Emerging Role," NYT, 9 October 1980, A16 .

45 . Drew Middleton, "Factor in Iraqi Push," NYT.

46 "Iraqi Tank Guns Stop Missile Helicopters," AWST 113 (24 November 1980): 66 .

47 "AFP : Iranian AF Bombs Baghdad," FBIS-MEA-80-191, Paris AFP in English at 1038 GMT, 30

September 1980; "Iranian Planes Bomb Baghdad Outskirts 14 October," FBIS-MEA-80-201, Paris AFP in

65
50. Fairhall, 5.

51 . "Iraqi Tank Guns," AWST 113 (24 November 1980): 66; Halloran, "Iranians' Effectiveness in

Fighting Iraq is Astonishing U.S . Military Analysts," NYT, 15 October 1980, A14

52 . Drew Middleton, "Tactics in Gulf War," NYT, 19 October 1980, 12 .

53 . "Iran Using F-14 in 'Mini-AWACS' Role," Aeros7ra(e DailY 105, no. 30 (14 October 1980): 236;

"Iraq Using US AWACS Link : Iran Uses F-14," Strategy Week 6, no. 42 (2()-26 October 1980): 5.

54 . "Iraqi SAMs," Strategy Week 7, no . 2 (19-25 January 1981): 1 ; "Iraq Asks France for Crotale,"

International Del~nse Intelligence Newsletter (DMS), 3 November 1980, 2; "Iraqis Negotiating Rapier

Buy'?" International D~finse Intelligence Newsletter (DMS), 22 December 1980, 3; "Iraqi Want Roland,"

/ntc rnatiorral D~li"n.se liitelli,gerre-c" New.sletter (DMS), 30 March 1981,3 ; "Air Forceto Have Franco-German

SAMMissiles," FBIS-MEA-81-1143, Paris LeMonde in French, 3 March 1981 .

55 . "French Missiles Adapted to Soviet Aircraft," FBIS-MEA-81-(165, Paris LeMonde in French, 28

April 1981 ; "MiG-25s Equipped with Magic Missiles'?" International Dense Newsletter (DMS), 8 June

1981,3 .

56 . Frank J . Prime, "France Confirms Reports It Has Handed Over 4 Mirage Jets to Iraqis," NYT, 2

February 1981, A6.

57 . AFM 1-l, 14 February 1979, para . 1-7.

58 . Ibid ., para . 6-4.

59 . Examples of this belief can be found in Gen William W. Momyer, Airlrower in Three Wars

(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, January 1978); and in the series of articles by Drew

Middleton in the New, York Timesduring late 1980 and 1981 .

60 . See chapter on IQAF history.

61 . Senate, US Militan' .Sales to Iran, 25 .

62 . Personal interview with former chief of Air Section/ ARMISH-MAAG Iran .

63 . Momyer, 1 11 .

64 . AFM 1-1, 14 February 1979, 2-15 .

65 . See Shazly, 19, 273.

66 . "President Id al-Adha Message to People, Armed Forces," FBIS-MEA-811-2()4, Baghdad radio

broadcast in Arabic at 2115 GMT, 8 October 1980.

67 . AFM 2-1, 2 May 1969, para . 5-2

68 . Ibid ., para. 5-4.

69 . "Non-Iranian Aircraft Thought to Have Attacked Iraq," FBIS-MEA-8(1-192, London Ash-Sharq

al-Awsat in Arabic, 30 September 1980.

70. AFM 2-1, 2 May 1969, para . 4-2.

71 . Kifner, "Iraqi Planes Strike 10 Airfields in Iran : Oil Area Imperiled," NYT, 23 September 1980, 1 .

72 . Shazly, 115, 127.

73 . Ibid ., 158, 274.

74. Iraqi and Iranian claims in FBIS .

75 . "Khamene'i Comments (via announcer)," FBIS-SAS-80, Tehran radio broadcast in Arabic at 0800

GMT, 23 September 1980 .

66
84 . "Iraqi Tank GUnS Stop Missile Helicopters." AWST 113 (24 November 1980) 66 .

85 . According to Iraqi claims as reported by h73IS.

86 . JGS 480, hB/S-SAS-S'/-0S0, Tehran radio broadcast in Persian at 2(130 GMT. 24 April 1981

87 . Described in their daily battle statements as reported by /-BIS.

88 . Kifner. "Attacking Iraqi Troops ."

89 . David 1gnatius, "Vignettes of War: Phantom and Taxi : Suspicion in Basra." WS.1, 3 October 1980 .

I .

90 . Jacques Meral, "AFP Correspondent Describes Kluvestan Fighting." FB/S-SAS-80-195 . Paris AFP

in English ill 1925 GMT. 4 October 1980.

91 . Personal interview with fimnerchiefof Air Section/ ARMISH-MAAG.

92 . YOUSsef M. Ibrahim. "Iraq and Iran Battle for Key Cities : AWar of Attrition Appears Likely ." NYT.

4 October 1980. 1 . 

93 . AFM I-1 . 14 February 1976. para . 5-3, 94 : Graham 170.

95 . "Statemenl on News Coordination ." FBIS-SA.S-r80-211.3, Tehran radio broadcast in Persian at 1030

GMT. 16 October 1980 .

96 . "Actin-, Air Force Chiel on Changes in AF." hBIS-SA.S-SI-I50. Tehran radio broadcast in Persian

at 1(130 GMT. 12 AIr-,USI 1981 .

97 . "Intelli-,mice Limited." ARST 113 (13 October 198(1) 24 .

67

in the fall of 

y , q 

pg

from the minds of many US airmen who, if they cared any longer, usually felt that

the war could have been won in the air had the antagonists only used the correct

strategies and tactics . But did US Air Force observers recognize the role of airpower

in this war?

In previous chapters of this study, we looked at the historical backgrounds of the

two air forces which participated in this war. We noted Iraqi participation in the Arab

wars with Israel, and we postulated that IQAF behavior in the war with Iran was

conditioned in part by the airpower lessons the Arab states had taken from their

experiences against the IAF. We also noted that a historical involvement in domestic

politics had undermined IQAF professionalism . On the other side, we noted that the

IIAF was, in reality, a quite new, untested organization in 1980. It was forced into

combat with most of its top command layer having been thrust only recently into

positions of major responsibility. We looked at IQAF and IIAF combat behavior and

deduced that while both air forces are subordinate to their respective armies in their

organizational hierarchies, their most important mission, in reality, is not the direct

support of ground forces . Rather, the most important mission for both air forces is to

deter the enemy from escalating the conflict in strategic terms. Both air forces,

therefore, were used primarily to keep the war limited in scope and intensity. When

deterrence is the primary air force role, the maintenance of that deterrent capability

(and hence, credibility) becomes all important . Thus attrition becomes a vital

consideration ; the losses incurred as a by-product ofoffensive initiative cause the air

forces to willingly give up offensive initiative and replace it with a

conservative-even stylized and ritualistic-defensive posture.

This chapter concludes the study on the use of airpower in the Iran-Iraq war by

discussing three topic areas . First, it discusses the role that airpower played as a part

ofthe military instrument wielded by the political leaderships in Baghdad and Tehran ;

it notes the power that political considerations had over military needs. Second,

acceptingthesepolitical strictures, this study deduces the Iraqi and Iranian approaches

to airpower within the general context ofthese strictures . This is done by looking at

how IQAF and IIAF behavior contrasts with US Air Force principles of war.

Comments are also presented on the impact that cultural influences have on military

69
most, American airmen (this author was definitely included in the majority) have

looked at this particular war pretty much as a military affair. Such groups wanted to

view the Iran-Iraq war as the military execution of national objectives as established

by the respective political leaderships. In such a situation, prosecution of the war fell

to the military forces who sought to accomplish those objectives through the

application of military power. Moreover, we wanted to understand Iranian and Iraqi

airoperations as driven by military necessities, unfettered by constant civilian political

tinkering. But as we saw in chapter 3, the Iraqi military, at least, was used within very

tight political constraints; and when initial estimates proved erroneous, the Iraqi

military was told, in essence, "Don't try to win the war; just hang on, and don't lose

it while we try to figure a way out of this mess." This situation makes any real

understanding of the Iraqi (and to some extent the Iranian since Iran reacted to Iraqi

moves) way of air war problematic. Given a different scenario, both sides may well

act in a different manner. It must be truthfully said, however, that adifferent manner

may yield no better results than did their style in this war.

Strategic Considerations

The employment of airpower is only one aspect of the use of military force, and

military force is only one aspect of the total strategic equation . Total strategy entails

far more than pure military strategy . For instance, one of the most important strategic

considerations-for Iraq more so than for Iran-was the need to keep the conflict

limited in violence, area, andparticipants . If Iran collapsed afterIraq's first application

of military power, then total victory was attainable . But if Iran did not collapse after

Iraq's initial application ofmilitary power, then an attempt to gain total victory would

jeopardize Iraq's strategic objectives . One thing Iraq did not want to happen was to

have the superpowers enter the arena because their interests appeared threatened. If

Iraq had the capability to grinddown Iran and Iran began over time to crumble, began

to lose its territorial integrity, then the Soviet Union would invoke its 1921 treaty with

Iran as a pretext to step in and to take effective control of this major Middle Eastern

state. 2 Such a move would not be in the long-term interests of Baghdad.

Therefore, Iraq military action had to be limited if it became apparent that the

Islamic regime was not a house of cards, ripe for destruction. The war had to be won

70
worlds oilfrom its obviously capable and untrustworthy stewards . Paranoid feelings

along these lines were easily fed by articles which had appeared in the West since

1973 suggesting the necessity for the West to straighten out the oil mess. And would

the Soviets want to watch that happen without dividing the spoils? In such a situation,

the combatants put unstated, but consensual, limits on their military actions. Military

operations became as important for what they are-signals-as for what they may

accomplish . Western observers could see it happening, but did not want to admit it.

T. R. Milton stated the common feeling in a January 1981 article in Air Force

Magazine when he said, "Unlikely though it may be, the thought occurs that the Iraqis

are trying the sort of air warfare-whatever did we call it: giving signals?-that our

politicians devised in the 1960s." 4

When Iran eased off on the strategic punishment strikes, Iraq did the same.

Strategic attacks from November 1980 on took on a ritualistic quality; Iran

"destroyed" Iraq's offshore loading platforms at Mina al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya on

a number of occasions after it first "destroyed" them at the end of November 1980 .

Iraq answered with ineffectual attacks on Kharg Island, sometimes hitting nothing,

sometimes noncritical storage areas, but never tankers taking on oil, an act that would

have shut down Iran's export operation. Similarly, Iraq's oil exports via pipeline

through Turkey were generally free from disruption afterreopening in late 1980. Iran's

attacks on Kuwaiti custom posts on the Iraqi border were obvious signals that there

were limits to how overtthe other Arab states could make their aid to Iraq . The IIAF's

April 1981 raid on H-3 airfield in farwestern Iraq also could not have gone unnoticed

by other Arab governments who could find themselves within range of a refueled

IIAF F-4.

For Iraq, the "efficient, rational" use of its military instrument (even if that

instrument could be used efficiently, a fact that has not yet been demonstrated) had

to be subservient to perceived political needs. Despite the actual or potential

capabilities of the various air forces, the observations ofClausewitz bore out.

7 1
That, however, does not imply that the political aim is a tyrant . It must adapt itself to its

chosen means, a process which can radically change it ; yet the political aim remains the

first consideration. Policy, then, will permeate all military operations, and, insofar as

their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them .6

Cultural Factors Impacting Strategy

The Iraqi strategic problem was compounded by several cultural factors, factors

which Baghdad obviously (and perhaps fatally) undervalued. One of the most

important factors was Iranian morale . While Iraq appeared to possess equal orperhaps

even superior stocks ofmilitary hardware, it did not have an answerfor Iranian morale

and Iranian willingness to sacrifice men and materiel in order to gain victory.

Clausewitz, who noted the relationship between military operations and overall

strategies, also noted that military hardware alone is not all that matters.

. . . the moral elements are among the most important in war. . . . [The principal elements

are] the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their

patriotic spirit . The relative value of each cannot be universally established; it is hard

enough to discuss their potential, and even more difficult to weigh them against each

other. The wisest course is not to underrate any of them-a temptation to which human

judgment, being fickle, often succumbs .%

It would appear that the Iraqis undervalued the impact of belief and will in the

equation of war. They seemed to place higher values on military hardware and

assume that, properly used (though their usage could hardly be considered

exemplary), their equipment could destroy enough enemy equipment and allow

occupation of enough land to force either a government collapse or a desire for a

settlement.

A second Iranian-imposed factor, Iran's revolutionary ethic, also set back Iraqi

plans . The revolution, for all its excesses, was a watershed in Iranian politics, and the

72
In the past, occupation of territories, important cities, or vital areas signified an

opponent's defeat. But in the 20th century, waris no longer a struggle between two armed

forces ; it is a struggle between peoples moved by strong ideological currents androoted

beliefs . These conflicts do not end when a number of villages, cities, or territories are

occupied. Fighting does not stop unless the will of the opponent is shattered or bled to

death, or unless intervention by other states puts an end to the fighting . This new type of

war has new characteristics . Revolutionary forces may ignore the value of the land and

strengthen popular resistance and morale . Given the will to fight, they may prolong the

war until the enemy is tired of fighting and is convinced of the futility of settling the

conflict by force of arms .9 

A third Iranian-imposed factor was the religious issue. As noted earlier, secular

Baathist Iraq was already on the defensive in an argument with an aggressive enemy

fired by religious zeal. Often in Muslim history, one group of Muslims would war on

another group, claiming they were apostates .

10 The same was true in this conflict,

Tehran couched its rhetoric in terms of believers (Iranians) fighting unbelievers

(Baathist Iraqis) . Such a situation complicated Iraqi hopes for a termination of

hostilities . In a fight where one side thinks they are fighting for Islam, cessation of

hostilities can only come with a victory for the Islamic side . Shia Islam, especially,

holds negotiations with "infidels" in particularly poor esteem . In such a situation, Iraqi

offers of cease-fires and negotiations were bound to be ignored by Tehran ; victory

was the only acceptable outcome for the Iranian religious leadership . Muslim

jurisprudence, however, allows hostilities to cease without an Islamic victory, but only

when asuperiorforce (or force majeure) imposes a settlement . I I In all previous major

Middle Eastern wars, force majeure in the guise of the United States and the Soviet

Union was necessary to compel an end to hostilities .

12 Baghdad did not want

superpower intrusion into the region, and the superpowers were content to let Iran

and Iraq batter each other senseless as long as their spat did not threaten Western or

Soviet interests . Thus Iraqwas stuck with a war it could not or would not win against

an enemy that could accept only victory or force majeure imposition of a

settlementboth anathema to Baghdad.

73
Egypt. For them, the essence of victory is occupation, physical possession of real

estate . Because the army is the only force capable of occupying territory, the army

becomes the decisive military arm. The air force can help the army compel the enemy

to give up real estate, but it cannot do it alone. The air force can be decisive but only

aspart ofanoverall military effort in which the army is the most important component.

But while this appears to be the Iraqi idea about airpower's role in achieving a

decisive conclusion to conflict, the Iraqis never seemed to get to a point ofdecision.

Rather, they seemed willing (and now in 1982 as Iranian forces have invaded Iraqi

soil, seemingly remain willing) to limit airpower's role in the conflict to a point short

ofdecisiveness. In this interim, or limited, military mode that does not foresee decisive

military operations, the IQAF's most vital role is to keep the conflict limited by

deterring Iran from expanding the boundaries of the conflict either in terms of

geography or in terms of levels of destruction . Since the inherent capabilities of any

air force allow it to dojust that-expand the physical or qualitative boundaries of a

conflict-then the IQAF's deterrent role is aimed primarily at the IIAE

The Iranian approach is a bit more difficult to pin down. Iranian military thinking

is undergoing a period of uncertainty, and doctrinal ideas about airpower are just now

evolving out of prior training history, out of a still unstable revolutionary situation,

and out of a measure ofcombat success in Iran's first major war in memory. The old

line ofthe Iranian Air Force and military is gone. The backbone of its structure is the

lieutenants, captains, and few field grade officers who, for a variety ofreasons, have

avoided purges and persecution and have, again for a number of causes, chosen not

to leave the service and/or their country. They are flying or directing US war planes

and most of them received at least their basic flying training in the United States .

Some obviously have internalized US Air Force tactics (how to avoid SAMs for

instance), but how much US Air Force doctrine were they exposed to and how much

did they internalize? It is likely that they will depend, to a large extent, on their

experiences in the war with Iraq. What do these experiences tell them? First, they may

have saved Iranfrom defeat in the early days of the war. Second, Iran, however, was

successful in expelling the Iraqi invaders without any significant air support. And

74
losses begin to mount. And if both sides try to avoid offensive attrition, then both can

also avoid defensive attrition since they come under attack less often. And if the war

remains limited enough so that neither side fears complete collapse, then imposed

attrition is never imposed. The end result is that air forces remain inbeing to serve as

deterrents . This need for deterrents means it is more important to keep an air force in

existence for its deterrent value than it is to use that same air force in combat where

losses are inevitable . Such use and, therefore, such losses not only reduce its actual

capability but can also reduce its deterrent value (if losses are great) and thus might

tempt an enemy to test its credibility by attacking. Hence, by using this line of

reasoning, it is more important to have an air force and not use it than it is to use it

and possibly lose it .

Principles of War

One can also discuss general Iraqi and Iranian tendencies by looking at how they

acted in regard to what we consider principles of war. AFM I-1 lists eleven of them.

l. Objective

Did the IQAF know its military objective? Did the Iraqi political command know

its military and political objectives'? These questions are hard to answer. It does appear

that Baghdad's overarching objective was to bring down the Khomeini regime, but

whether that objective was translated into reasonable or realistic military objectives

is questionable . The Economist offered what appeared to be a reasonable goal : "Iraq's

basic military aim is, or should be if it has one, to bring the Iranian armed forces

grinding to a halt by cutting off the flow of oil." 13 But it seems more likely that

Baghdad changed its objective in the midst of the war from a definition of "victory"

to a "peace with honor." This political objective did not seem easily translatable into

military objectives .

Tehran knew, and still knows, its objective-total victory which will occur when

the Baathist regime in Baghdad is removed. Command and control problems early in

the war hampered the 11AF from focusing on its military objectives and later, as it

became evident that the war would not be won in the air, the IIAF's main contribution

75
River against Khorramshahr. There is no doubt the Iraqi ground forces would have

appreciated some effective interdiction support, but IQAF activity appeared spotty

and none too preemptive. (In fact, reported IQAF activity in the summer 1982 Iranian

invasion seemed concentrated on attacks outside the battle zone . The IQAF hit towns

and economic targets in apparent strategic attacks designed to'compel Iran to limit

the war. The IQAF showed little offensive spirit in support of Iraqi ground forces .)

Overall, the IQAF seemed more intent on maintaining a defensive mentality. This

predilection for the defensive is, in part, conditioned by IQAF

equipment-short-range, light payload attack aircraft and a preponderance of

interceptors in their fighter force.

The IIAF, as long as it can maintain a minimum number of aircraft and crews, will

remain a more capable offensive force whose long-range, heavy payload F-4s have

both an aerial refueling capability and sophisticated offensive armament like

Maverick air-to-ground missiles . The IIAF carried the war to Iraq in the early days,

but attrition caused it to back off. The IIAF seemed to have the will for the offensive

but was forced away from it by attrition; in contrast, the IQAF did not seem to have

the will and backed off because the IIAF did.

3. Mass

This was the one principle of war that both sides absolutely, consistently

disregarded Neither air force ever massed its forces: rather both sides constantly

piecemealed them At no time were there more than six or so aircraft in a single attack ;

very few times did there occur a rapid follow-on attack . Moreover, nowhere did either

side mass its forces to overwhelm target defenses . A lot of aircraft were seen but never

a lot of aircraft at one time . Such repetitious, small attacks achieved very little other

than reparable damage . Iran claimed in December 1980 that Kharg Island had been

hit by repeated raids, but little damage had occurred .' Each attack involved only a

few planes, carrying only a few bombs, and they always faced target defenses . Iran's

constant one- and two-plane F-S raids into northern Iraq achieved the same sort of

resultsa little damage but nothing catastrophic . Neither air force ever massed its

forces into a fist that could deliver a knockout prmch or even a tel line body blow. Both

76
of force but did not show too much grasp ofthe corollary, "no less ."

5. Surprise

The IQAF certainly started with surprise on 22 September 1980, but its failure to

use mass to maintain the offensive negated the effectiveness of its surprise. Both air

forces used surprise when they flew so low that air defense systems seemed unable

to track them. The IQAF penetrated successfully all the way to Tehran each time it

tried. The IIAF was equally successful in penetrating to Baghdad. Iran's raid on H-3

airfields in western Iraq was certainly a surprise to the IQAF. But again, the failure to

mass enough aircraft for the attack reduced it to an example of good IIAF planning

that resulted in a tap-on-the-shoulder gesture in terms ofconcrete results.

6. Security

It is hard to comment on this principle other than to say that the consistent ability

ofboth air forces to get to their targets with minimal interference would indicate the

enemy was not able to seize on a security lapse to lay in wait.

7. Unity ofEffort

For the US Air Force, unity of effort means central control of air assets in order to

best employ them to gain overall success. Both Iran and Iraq showed very little unity

of effort; they generally dissipated the potential effectiveness of the air-ground team

by having the air forces when they were needed . For example, the IQAF was

noticeably absent when Iraqi ground forces were invading Iran . A major reason for

this lack of aerial support may be structural ; both air forces seem to believe that air

defense assets in army hands are equally lethal to foe and friend alike .

8. Maneuver

Again, the US Air Force considers maneuver as a way to maintain the initiative .

Maintenance of the initiative does not, however, seem to be a high priority for the

IQAF or IIAF. It is entirely probable that individual pilots used maneuver as a way

ofmaintaining initiative in air-to-air combat, but the fact that IQAF and IIAF CAPs

seemed willing to orbit practically in sight of each other without initiating combat

77
sides seemed to recognize their structural limitations and took pains not to compound

their problems by complicating their operations .

10. Timing and Tempo

Unlike the US Air Force, which uses timing and tempo to double its efforts in order

to overwhelm a slower adversary, both the Iraqis and Iranians appeared incapable of

(or indifferent to) keeping up a quick pace across the spectrum of missions . In fact,

their attack missions took on a cyclical look as each reacted to the other rather than

forcing the issue.

11 . Defensive

Like economy of force and simplicity, they tended to overdo this principle since

they seemed to prefer to sit back and fend off blows; they did not seem to accept the

fact that "defense alone won't win." But perhaps that view brings us full cycle ; they

do not seem to expect their air forces to win the "bear, they only expect them to help

avoid losing it.

Cultural Factors Impacting Military Operations

In this conflict, the Iraqi military effort especially seemed hampered by several

factors . One of the most important factors that limited Baghdad's ability to pursue

this war to a successful conclusion was that Iraqi military professionalism suffered

from too much politicization ofthe officer corps. As noted in chapter 2, this has been

a disabling fact of life for the IQAF, but it has also hurt most all Arab military

organizations in the period since World War II . Pakistani author S . A. el-Edroos

succinctly captured the essence of the Iraqi (and Arab) problem .

[There are] cogent reasons for the apparent lack of leadership and professionalism in the

Arab officer cadre. The political upheavals which plagued the Arab world in the

tumultuous post-war years siphoned off large segments of the professional officer cadre

to the disabling field of politics . . . the professional quality of the Arab armies suffered

78
concentrated their efforts on fashioning the IAF into the effective and efficient

instrument of war it proved to be . 1

s

,

The Israelis have come to grips with the realities and conditions of modern'Middle

Eastern warfare, but it seems that some Arab militaries (the Iraqi, for example) have

remained mired in outdated patterns of behavior. The author does not want to put

undue stress on this aspect, but it appears that some of the ageless Bedouin style of

warfare has continued to the present day in the subconscious mind of Arab soldiers

where it affects their military performance . The military style (if not the equipment)

ofthe Bedouin ofthe Arabian desert has remained fairly unchanged for thousands of

years-one anthropologist refers to it as "a mechanism of ecological adaptation ." 19

The style of the desert Bedouin raiders is based on a surprise attack followed by a

quick retreat to evade pursuit or capture . The early Muslim warriors used this style in

their conquest ofthe area now known as Iraq . Raiders outofthe desert fell upon settled

communities, plundered them, then retreated into the desert with their booty. Where

settlements were defended, the raiders menaced the livelihood of the settlement by

carrying off livestock and threatening destruction of crops. In very few cases did the

attackers ever choose to assault a settlement or a strong point ; in most cases, the

settlements capitulated to the attackers' demands which were usually not too

exorbitant .

20 Raids such as these remained a fact of life for Iraq up to the 1930s.21

Parallels to this style ofwarfare can be noted in the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-81, some

thirteen and a half centuries after the original Muslim conquest ofIraq . IQAF air raids

had in them the surprise attack, the quick retreat quality of the Bedouin raids. Iraqi

threats to destroy Iranian oil and populated areas in Khuzistan remind one of Bedouin

threats to destroy crops, and the Iraqi preference for static artillery exchanges over

closing with the enemy in the cities of Khuzistan reminds one of the Bedouin

preference for threats instead of pitched battle as a means of forcing capitulation .

But the early Muslims had two distinct elements in their armies . One was the

Bedouin raiders, the cavalry-mobile and swift but unreliable in a contested battle .

The other was the townsmen. Lacking the ability or skills to be mobile raiders, they

were more suited for stubborn defense . The Prophet Mohammad used these attributes

in his victory at the Battle of Badr in 624 A.D . His forces (mostly townsmen) took

79
changed dramatically over the ages since the dawn of Islam, but it appears to this

author that some of the old Arab ways of warfare have continued over time in the

subconscious of Arab leaders . Comparing Iraqi actions in 1980-81 with Arab actions

in the seventh century A.D., one can note parallels that explain (at least in part) some

Iraqi actions in the war with Iran .

The war, this author believed, would be won in theair. LikeotherAmerican airmen,

conditioned by experiences within the US Air Force structure, I felt the Iraqis could

use their airpower to knock Iran right out of the war. Airpower, used in a sensible 

fashion, could eliminate all that tiresome slogging through the mud of Khuzistan . A

strong counterair effort could gain air superiority and dedicated interdiction of

pipelines and pumping stations leading to Kharg Island could bankrupt Tehran. Iraq,

with rich friends and large bank accounts, could easily wait out Iranian efforts to hurt

its oil industry. I did not want to see anything other than a military operation.

But now, recognizing the war was not won in the air and recognizing there were

limits and constraints that conditioned the employment of airpower in this conflict,

are there any lessons we can draw from this war? I feel there are some lessons that

can be learned, but they are not like those of the 1973 war; they are not the dramatic

tactical developments that are testable against our own doctrine and tactics . Theresults

of the Iran-Iraq air war do not seriously challenge our own beliefs about the efficacy

of airpower. Neither air force held to the offensive, but the offensive still seems the

key to victory in this war as well as in any foreseeable conflict . True, each side tried

to use its air force to avoid defeat, but that is a static effort . In the end, it was Iranian

infantry offensive operations that drove Iraqi invaders out. The Iraqi ground forces

could well have stayed or advanced had the IQAF eliminated the IIAF threat by use

of fighter sweeps, for example, and followed up with interdiction efforts against

Iranian rear areas which would have then been devoid of effective air cover. But the

IQAF did not, and thus the Iraqi army had to withdraw .

The IIAF and IQAFtendencies toward defensive/deterrent operations indicate that

should US Air Force elements everhave to operate in this area with them as enemies,

80
How could this affect US Air Force operations? First, if the US Air Force could

achieve a 1967-type elimination of their air assets, then by all means this should be a

top priority. But if a 1967 appears just out of our reach, then the US Air Force might

want to hit them hard enough so that they hold back to preserve their airframes, but

not so hard that we drive them to desperation . The US Air Force could effectively

remove them from the battle without forcing them into an imposed attrition situation .

Short ofimposed attrition, they would be willing to avoid confrontation if they could

remain somewhat intact . Forcing them to the wall would make them more stalwart

in their resistance (even if they proved to be foolishly brave as was the Egyptian Air

Force in 1973 when the Israeli threat to the Third Army forced it to fly missions it 

would have preferred to avoid).

With the IQAF or IIAF as allies during military operations in this arena, their

tendencies would make them useful to an air campaign but only in limited aspects .

More so than the Iranians, the Iraqis (and by extension other Arabs) would look with

disfavor on US Air Force attempts to push them into an offensive role . They would

be much more inclined to accept the defensive-or covering-role, thereby freeing

more US Air Force assets for the offensive role . Even though their ability in either

the offensive or defensive role may be limited and even though their aircraft may be

well suited for an offensive role, they would prefer the defensive role and mission .

But what about the US Air Force as an institution? Does this war and our

understanding of it tell us anything about the US Air F'orce's ability to carry out

national objectives when the military objective may find itself hemmed in and limited

by external political considerations? Will the United States be forced in the future to

act within political constraints as was the IQAF? It is hard to imagine that in this day

of improved command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities, the political

leadership of any nation would not use that capability and try to direct military

operations regardless of military objectives . One principal problem in assessing the

use of airpower in the Iran-Iraq war seems to stem from the fact that often there is a

tendency to view military problems as just that-pure, pristine military problems .

And the necessity for military professionalism would not wish it otherwise. But

perhaps in this growing environment of tighter central control over all aspects of

national power-including military power-the US Air Force would do well to

81
in which they are engaged and the realities of the political imperatives. This will

require Air Force leaders to be willing to admit to political leadership that sometimes

the US Air Force will be in a "can't-do" situation. Political and military leaderships

together will have to recognize Clausewitz's observation that the choice of the military

instrument inevitably will force change on the political objective. That change need

not be drastic, but the recognition that change will be made needs to be understood .

Political limits are a necessity, but military leaders must be ready to frankly admit it

when such limits reduce the chances for success. Needed will be honest, clear

recognition of the necessity for overall political direction, and conversely, honest,

clear explanation of military capabilities within the bounds of such direction. Then, 

relying on air doctrine tempered with a sound appreciation of the situation, ail -power

can achieve its potential as a decisive element of modern warfare-at virtually any

level of intensity.

NOTES

1 . Middleton, "Iran-Iraq Impasse." NYT, 6 October 1980, A14.

2. See comments on this treaty in Rouhollah K . Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Polic Y 1941-197 . A Study

of Foreign Police in Moderni-ing Nations (Charlottesville : University Press of Virginia. 1975). 33-3-1 .

30()-l, for example.

3. Robert Bailey, "The War," MEED 24, no . 42 (17 October 198()) : 15

4. Milton, "Cauldron," 99 .

5. Carl von Clausewitz,On War, edited andtranslated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton .

N.J . : Princeton University Press, 1976). 87 .

6. Ibid.

7. "Iran's November Offensive Discussed," IPRS Near EastlNorth Aliica Report, 18 February 1981,

52. (Article in Paris newspaper Al-Watan Al-'Arabi in Arabic, no. 253, elated 18-24 December 1981 .

entitled "Iraqi Vigilance Aborts Blind 'Attack of Millions'.")

8 Clausewitz, 184-86.

9 Lt Col al-Haytham al-Ayoubi, Middle East Crucible : Studies ore the Arab-Israeli War of October

1973, edited by Nasser H. Aruri (Wilmette, Ill . : The Medina University Press International . 1975), 85 . A

contemporary reference about the same aspect is found in Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Qualified Victory for

Iraqis: Iran War in Low Gear," NYT, 10 December 1980, A13, in which an Arab diplomat in Baghdad

was quoted as saying : "It really does not matter to Khomeini if the country's economy is run clown, or if

his army is wiped out . . . or even if half the country is occupied ."

82
14 . BernardGwertzman, "Iran Is Said to Be Receiving Arms and Medicines from North Korea,"NYT,

9 October 1980, 1 ; Mossberg, "N . Korea, Syria Is Helping Iran, US Sources Say," W.5.1,9 October 1980,

4.

15 . "Navy Commanderon Gulf Islands, War with Iraq," FBIS-SAS-80-242 .

16. "Intelligence Limited," AWST 113 (13 October) : 24 .

17 . el-Edroos, 422.

18. Ibid ., 424.

19. Louise E. Sweet, "Camel Raiding of North Arabian Bedouin: A Mechanism of Ecological

Adaptation," in Peoples and Cultures ofthe Middle East. Volume 1: Cultural Depth and Diversite, edited

by Louise E. Sweet (Garden City, N.Y. Natural History Press, 1970), 165-289.

20. D. R. Hill, "The Role of theCamel andthe Horsein the Early Arab Conquests," in War Technologv,

and Society in the Middle East, edited by V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (London: Oxford University Press,

1975), 33-43.

21 . Glubb.

22 . Maj Gen Mohammad Gamal el-Din Mahfouz, "Lessons from the Great Battle of Badr," Islamic

Defence Review 6, no . I (1981) : 9-21 .

83

CAS close air support

	command, C3 control, and communications

DASC direct air support center

EAF Egyptian Air Force

Fedayeen literally "self-sacrificer," refers to Arab guerrillas

Hawk Homing-All-the-Way-Killer (US SAM)

IIAF Iranian Air Force

IQAF Iraqi Air Force

IAF Israeli Air Force 

IFF identification, friend or foe

LPG liquified petroleum gas

MAP Military Assistance Program

Mullah Muslim (usually Shia) religious leader

OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

RAF Royal Air Force

ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps

SAM surface-to-air missile

TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided

Transjordan the name of the state of Jordan prior to 1948

US United States

USAF United States Air Force

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

85

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