United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman, Committee on

the Budget, House of Representatives

September 1996 AIR FORCE

BOMBERS

Options to Retire or

Restructure the Force

Would Reduce Planned

Spending

G O A

years

1921 - 1996

GAO/NSIAD-96-192

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-260149 

September 30, 1996

The Honorable John R. Kasich

Chairman, Committee on the Budget

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This report discusses the basis for the Department of Defense’s bomber force requirements and

options for reducing planned spending on bombers. The information in this report should be

useful to your Committee in its deliberations on future budget levels for the Department of

Defense.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees; the

Secretaries of Defense and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget.

Copies will also be made available to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me on (202) 512-3504. Major

contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.

Sincerely yours,

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose Although bombers currently in the force were initially designed and

procured primarily to meet nuclear war-fighting requirements, since the

end of the Cold War the Department of Defense (DOD) has placed

increased emphasis on the role of bombers in future conventional

conflicts. In recent years, the Congress has expressed numerous concerns

about the size and capabilities of the planned bomber force and the

long-term affordability of DOD’s plans to maintain and modernize airpower

assets, including the bomber force. In response to a request from the

Chairman of the House Budget Committee, GAO assessed (1) the basis for

DOD’s bomber force requirements, including an analysis of recent DOD and

Air Force studies supporting the planned force structure; (2) the Air

Force’s progress in implementing the new conventional concept of

operations for using bombers; and (3) the costs to keep bombers in the

force and enhance their conventional capabilities. As part of this work,

GAO also identified and assessed the potential cost savings and effects on

military capability of four alternatives for reducing bomber costs,

including retiring or reducing the B-1B force, and examined information

related to the issue of procuring additional B-2s.

Background The U.S. bomber force consists of B-2s, B-1Bs, and B-52Hs. DOD plans to

retain all three bombers well into the next century. Development and

production of the B-2 bomber, which relies on stealth technologies to

enhance its survivability, is scheduled to be completed in 2000. B-1B

bombers entered the force between 1986 and 1988 but have experienced

numerous problems over the past decade, particularly with regard to

defensive avionics. The last B-52H entered the force in 1962. The Air Force

has upgraded the B-52H force over the years and, on the basis of

engineering studies, estimates that the B-52H will be structurally sound

until about 2030.

The end of the Cold War has permitted the United States to reduce the

number of bombers significantly from a total of about 360 bombers in

1989. Since 1990, DOD and the Air Force have conducted four major studies

of heavy bomber requirements that have helped shape DOD’s planned

bomber force—the Nuclear Posture Review, the Bottom-Up Review, the

Air Force’s Bomber Roadmap, and the congressionally mandated 1995 DOD

Heavy Bomber Force Study. Largely on the basis of these studies, DOD

plans to retain 187 bombers in its inventory through the early part of the

next century compared with the current inventory of 202 (as shown in

table 1).

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

Table 1: Current and Planned

Inventory of Bombers Current inventory 1996 Planned inventory 2001

Total inventorya

Operational

aircraftb Total inventory

Operational

aircraft

B-2 13 6 21 16

B-1B 95 60 95 82

B-52H 94 56 71 56

Total 202 122 187 154

a“Total inventory” includes aircraft funded for flying, test and maintenance backup aircraft, and

aircraft held in reserve for later use.

b“Operational aircraft” includes only aircraft funded for flying.

Source: Department of the Air Force.

B-2s and B-52Hs will be available for either conventional or nuclear

missions, while B-1B bombers will have a conventional role only. In

contrast with its practice during the Cold War, the Air Force has placed

some B-1Bs and B-52Hs in the Air National Guard and the Air Force

Reserves. Also, the Air Force has placed 27 B-1Bs in reconstitution reserve

status for the next few years until B-1Bs are upgraded to deliver additional

conventional weapons. These aircraft are rotated through the flight

schedule and maintained, but the units that operate them do not receive

funding for aircrews or flying hours. Therefore, the Air Force would not

have sufficient numbers of crews to operate them during wartime. Once

the B-1Bs are upgraded, the Air Force plans to reduce the number of B-1B

reconstitution reserve aircraft by establishing two additional squadrons of

operational B-1Bs and funding additional crews. This will increase the

number of operational aircraft from 60 to 82.

In 1992, the Air Force determined that the conventional capabilities of its

bombers were not sufficient to destroy critical ground targets during the

initial stages of a conventional conflict. Therefore, the Air Force

developed a plan to provide the bomber force with the capability to drop

additional unguided gravity weapons and precision-guided munitions.

These enhancements are scheduled to be completed in 2008. According to

the Air Force, bombers are unique in that they can attack targets anywhere

in the world from bases in the United States and can carry large quantities

of weapons.

In recent years, DOD and the Congress have debated whether to buy

additional B-2s beyond those already funded. The Congress made available

$493 million in fiscal year 1996 that DOD plans to use to convert the first

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

B-2 test aircraft into an operational bomber, providing a total of 21 B-2s.

DOD’s position is that procuring additional B-2s is not cost-effective

compared with other alternatives, such as procuring additional

precision-guided munitions and upgrading the B-1B.

Results in Brief Senior DOD officials, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

have stated that DOD cannot afford all of the services’ stated requirements

and that difficult decisions must be made on which investment programs

to cancel so that DOD can develop and implement a long-term, sustainable

recapitalization plan. GAO’s analysis shows that the services have ample

capabilities to attack targets that are likely to be assigned to bombers and

plan to expand their capabilities over the next several years, including

improvements to the B-1Bs. While DOD needs a level of redundancy to

provide commanders in chief with a safety margin and flexibility, it may

not need to upgrade its capabilities to the extent currently planned. GAO’s

analysis shows that DOD has not made a compelling case that it needs to

retain and upgrade 187 bombers to support future war-fighting

requirements. While there are a number of ways to reduce capabilities to

strike ground targets, a smaller bomber force may be one option to reduce

overlap that would result in an acceptable loss to DOD’s overall

war-fighting capability.1

 In light of the significant cost savings that could

be achieved, reducing the size of DOD’s planned bomber force may be a

sound decision that would help provide DOD with a source of funds to

recapitalize its forces.

DOD and Air Force studies of conventional bomber requirements have

significant limitations in their approach and methodology and, in some

cases, include questionable assumptions that may overstate DOD’s need for

bombers. None of the studies have examined the cost-effectiveness of

bombers versus other alternatives such as fighter aircraft and sea- and

ground-based missiles, even though DOD has concluded that it currently

has sufficient capabilities to attack ground targets associated with two

major regional conflicts and plans to invest billions of dollars over the

next 20 years to improve these capabilities. Also, commanders in chief

currently would use significantly fewer bombers than the Bottom-Up

Review cites as necessary for a major regional conflict. In response to a

Roles and Missions Commission conclusion that DOD may have greater

quantities of strike aircraft and other deep attack weapons systems than

its needs, DOD has initiated a Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study that is

1

Other options to reduce ground attack capabilities include reducing the number of land- or sea-based

tactical aircraft and missiles.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

expected to address some of the shortcomings of prior studies and could

identify opportunities to reduce some of the services’ extensive and

overlapping capabilities, including bombers.

The Air Force faces numerous challenges in implementing its new

operational concept for using bombers in conventional conflicts. Testing

of the B-2 has identified deficiencies in key areas, such as low

observability. Moreover, Air Force plans to upgrade the B-1B’s defensive

avionics suite, which will be critical if the B-1B is to operate during the

early days of a conventional war, have undergone significant change since

1992 and have not yet been finalized. In addition, the Air Force has not

resolved issues affecting the bombers’ ability to deploy to and operate

from overseas locations. Specifically, the Air Force has not ensured that

(1) the B-1B fleet can achieve and sustain a 75-percent mission capable

rate, (2) bomber units have sufficient personnel to sustain expected

wartime sortie rates, and (3) bombers have adequate spares to sustain

operations until an air supply bridge is established.

For fiscal years 1996 through 2001, DOD has budgeted about $17 billion to

modernize and operate its heavy bomber force. Because DOD’s plans to

modernize combat airpower may be prohibitively expensive, DOD is

seeking ways to reduce costs. With this in mind, GAO has identified four

options to reduce or restructure the bomber force that would achieve cost

savings while retaining extensive aggregate airpower capabilities. The

option to retire the B-1B force would save about $5.9 billion in budget

authority for fiscal years 1997 to 2001.2

 This option would decrease DOD’s

inventory of long-range airpower assets and increase U.S. forces’

dependency on other capabilities and therefore the risk that some targets

might not be hit as quickly as desired. However, it is plausible to expect

that the targets could be hit by other aircraft and missiles in light of

(1) analyses by GAO and the Commission on Roles and Missions that

indicate that DOD may have more than ample ground-attack capability and

(2) analyses that most targets in a two major conflict scenario would be

within the range of other forward-based tactical aviation assets and

missiles. Another option is to place 24 more B-1Bs in the Air National

Guard, which would result in a 50/50 active/reserve ratio when attrition

and backup aircraft are excluded, would preserve the capabilities of the

planned bomber force but would save about $70 million in budget

authority over the same 5-year period.

2

The Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost savings for GAO’s four options.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

Although not part of DOD’s plan, both DOD and the Congress have

considered the need for additional B-2s in recent years. Substantial future

costs could be avoided if the size of the B-2 force is capped at 21 aircraft

as DOD currently plans. Additional B-2 procurements would exacerbate

DOD’s efforts to develop and implement a long-term recapitalization plan.

Principal Findings

DOD Has Not

Adequately Supported

Its Stated

Requirements for

Using Bombers in

Conventional

Conflicts

GAO believes that DOD has not demonstrated convincingly that it needs to

retain and upgrade 187 bombers to meet war-fighting requirements in light

of (1) the limitations of three key DOD and Air Force studies that helped

determine requirements for using bombers in conventional conflicts,

(2) unified commanders in chief plans for using bombers, and (3) GAO’s

analysis of DOD’s aggregate ground-attack capabilities. According to DOD,

less than half of DOD’s planned bomber force—66 B-52Hs and 20 B-2s—will

be needed for the nuclear role.

Studies Shaping

Requirements Have

Significant Limitations

DOD’s decision to keep 187 bombers in the force, a significantly larger

number than required to meet nuclear requirements, was shaped largely by

the conclusions of the Bottom-Up Review, the Air Force’s Bomber

Roadmap, and the 1995 DOD Heavy Bomber Force Study, and reflects DOD’s

view that long-range bombers are needed primarily to supplement the

conventional capabilities of other ground-attack assets such as Air Force

and Navy tactical fighters and missiles.

These three studies have significant limitations in their methodology and,

in some cases, rely on questionable assumptions that may overstate DOD’s

requirements for bombers. None of the studies addresses the Commission

on Roles and Missions concern that DOD may have more ground-attack

capability than it needs when the contributions of all the services’ weapon

systems are considered. Moreover, the studies did not examine whether

other less costly alternatives exist to accomplish conventional missions

that would likely be assigned to bombers. DOD’s Bottom-Up Review

concluded in late 1993 that 100 bombers were needed for a major regional

conflict and up to 184 bombers should be maintained in the inventory.

However, this review did not model a range of bomber force sizes and did

not examine whether precision-guided munitions expected to enter the

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

inventory after 1999 could potentially reduce requirements for fighters and

bombers. In addition, the Air Force’s Bomber Roadmap, which established

a requirement for 210 bombers, assumed that (1) other assets such as

tactical aircraft and cruise missiles would play a limited role during the

initial phases of a major regional conflict, thereby requiring that bombers

strike all of the time-critical targets during the first 5 days and (2) some

bombers would need to be withheld for a nuclear contingency. Both of

these assumptions are inconsistent with DOD planning guidance.

The DOD Heavy Bomber Force Study, completed in May 1995, is the most

comprehensive of the DOD and Air Force studies to date. The study

assumed that each of the services plays a major role in responding to

major regional conflicts, modeled various scenarios and bomber forces

sizes, and examined how changes in key assumptions such as shorter

warning time and limited tactical aircraft availability would affect the need

for bombers during the early stages of a campaign. Under all of the

scenarios examined, including one option for a smaller bomber force

based on retiring the B-1B force, modeling showed that the United States

would win two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. Aircraft

attrition in these scenarios varied depending on the number and types of

bombers modeled. However, this study did not examine whether fighters

or long-range missiles could accomplish the mission more cost-effectively

than bombers.

Unified Commands See

Limited Role for Bombers

Although Unified Command officials agreed that bombers would be

valuable in future conflicts, they expect to use significantly fewer than the

100 bombers cited by the Bottom-Up Review and endorsed by the other

studies. Commanders in chief might choose to include more bombers in

their plans once they are upgraded. However, none of the commanders in

chief expressed concern that the smaller number of bombers included in

current war plans is a limiting factor that would adversely affect the

outcome of a future conflict.

When viewed in the aggregate, the services have numerous, overlapping

ways to attack ground targets in major regional conflicts. Planned

modernization programs over the next two decades will further add to

already substantial capabilities, leading to questions about whether DOD

needs or can afford all of its planned capabilities. Commanders in chief

routinely apportion more than 100 percent of the targets to the services to

provide a margin of safety and ensure flexibility. Moreover, our analysis of

DOD’s Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements database for two major

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

regional conflicts and Air Force modeling of the air campaign for two

major regional conflicts indicated that almost all of the bombers’ planned

targets could be destroyed by other aircraft and missiles.3

In response to a May 1995 recommendation of the Commission on Roles

and Missions, DOD has initiated a Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study to

determine the appropriate number and mix of deep attack capabilities. GAO

agrees that this study is needed. As a result of GAO’s review of the services’

overlapping interdiction capabilities, GAO recommended in May 1996 that

(1) DOD should routinely review service modernization proposals based on

how they will enhance DOD’s current aggregate capabilities and (2) such

analyses should serve as the basis for deciding funding priorities.4

 In a

subsequent testimony, GAO concluded that such assessments should

(1) assess total joint war-fighting requirements; (2) inventory aggregate

service capabilities, including the full range of available assets;

(3) compare aggregate capabilities with joint requirements to identify

excesses or deficiencies; (4) assess the relative merits of retiring

alternative assets, reducing procurement quantities, or canceling

acquisition programs where excesses exist or where substantial payoff is

not clear; and (5) determine the most cost-effective means to satisfy

deficiencies.5

Significant Challenges

Remain in

Implementing Air

Force Operational

Concept for Bombers

The Air Force’s ability to implement its conventional concept of

operations for bombers depends on its ability to successfully complete its

bomber modernization program and ensure that bombers have the ability

to operate for sustained periods at overseas locations. Demonstrating

these capabilities poses a significant challenge for the B-2 and the B-1B,

both of which were originally designed with limited conventional

capabilities and deployment requirements.

Delays in the B-2 testing program due to late aircraft deliveries and

problems in integrating software create the potential that further

deficiencies that are operationally important or costly to correct could be

identified. After 15 years of development and evolving mission

requirements, the Air Force has yet to demonstrate that the B-2 will meet

3

The Air Force Studies and Analyses Agency modeling of the two major regional conflict scenario was

provided as input into the Joint Chiefs of Staff Nimble Dancer II wargame.

4

U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).

5

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196, June 27, 1996).

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

some of its most important mission requirements. For example, the Air

Force completed radar signature flight testing for the block 30 B-2 in

March 1996 and characterized test results as generally good. However, in

some cases the radar signatures did not meet planned essential

employment capabilities. The Air Force is analyzing signatures that did not

meet requirements to determine whether further design and testing is

needed.6

 As of April 1996, the Air Force had completed about 75 percent of

the flight testing. Given the amount of flight testing that remains, the Air

Force may not be able to meet its planned flight testing completion date of

July 1, 1997.

DOD also must equip the B-1B with additional munitions and upgrade its

defensive avionics system and computers. Air Force plans to upgrade the

B-1B’s computers and defensive avionics suite, which will be critical if the

B-1B is to operate as planned during the early days of a war, have

undergone significant change since 1992. Although the Air Force considers

its most recent plans for upgrading the defensive avionics system to be

low to moderate risk, the details of the upgrades have yet to be decided.

Moreover, the Air Force will need to maintain a rigorous commitment to

testing to ensure that the defensive avionics system works as planned and

that the computer upgrades are adequately funded so that the computers

can support the B-1B’s conventional requirements.

Significant challenges also remain to demonstrate that the B-2 and the

B-1B will be able to deploy to, and operate from, overseas locations for

extended periods of time at expected sortie rates. Although the Air Force

demonstrated during a 6-month operational readiness test that one

squadron of B-1Bs could exceed the required 75-percent mission capable

rate if properly funded, the Air Force has not demonstrated that the

overall B-1B force can achieve and sustain this rate. The Air Force cannot

meet its war-fighting requirement to support all B-1B and B-52H bombers

allocated to war-fighting commanders in chief because of personnel

shortages in some occupational specialties such as bomb assembly and

bomb loading. Moreover, the Air Force plans to fund less expensive 14-day

mobility readiness spares packages for B-1 and B-2 units instead of the

30-day package required for B-52Hs and most fighter units.

6

The B-2 contractor will deliver B-2s in three configurations referred to as blocks 10, 20, and 30. The

block 10 aircraft provides the Air Force with a training aircraft with limited combat capability.

Subsequent blocks will provide improved capabilities.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

Costs to Modernize

and Sustain Bomber

Force Are Significant

DOD’s Fiscal Year 1997 Future Years Defense Program includes about 

$17 billion for bombers for the period 1996-2001. DOD plans to spend 

$6.3 billion, or about 37 percent, of these programmed funds for

investment, and $10.7 billion, or 63 percent, for operations and support

costs. The total cost to modernize DOD’s heavy bomber force is likely to

exceed $7 billion by 2008, when B-1B upgrades are completed. This total

includes $6.3 billion in modernization funds included in DOD’s Fiscal Year

1997 Future Years Defense Program, and an additional $800 million

beyond 2001 to complete B-1B modifications. The Air Force is studying

options to upgrade the B-2 force beyond the block 30 configuration which,

if approved, would require additional modernization funds.

The B-1B force will account for the largest portion of future bomber

operations and support costs. However, the B-2 will be the most costly

aircraft to operate on a per aircraft basis, costing more than three times as

much as the B-1B and more than four times as much as the B-52H.

Options for Reducing

Bomber Costs

Because DOD faces a significant funding challenge to support and

recapitalize its planned force, GAO identified four options to reduce

bomber costs, and, in the context of these options, assessed the need for

additional B-2s. These options are retiring the B-1B force, retiring 27 B-1Bs

in reconstitution reserve, placing more B-1Bs in the Air National Guard,

and keeping 6 B-1Bs at their current location rather than moving them to

another location as planned. In identifying ways to reduce the cost of the

bomber force, GAO focused its analysis on B-1B alternatives because DOD

has concluded that the B-1B is no longer needed for the nuclear mission

and costly upgrades planned for the B-1B will add to DOD’s already

formidable ground-attack capabilities. All four options would allow DOD to

reduce costs while maintaining extensive conventional ground-attack

capabilities and a capable nuclear force. Retiring or reducing the number

of B-1Bs will achieve the greatest cost savings. Placing more B-1Bs in the

National Guard or reversing the Air Force’s plan to move six B-1Bs from

Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota to Mountain Home Air Force

Base in Idaho would achieve lower cost savings because they do not

reduce the number of bombers in the planned force. Although GAO’s

options focused on DOD’s planned bomber force, substantial future costs

could be avoided if the size of the B-2 force were capped at 21 aircraft as

DOD currently plans. The cost of procuring 20 additional B-2s, the number

proposed by the contractor and most often debated, would more than

offset the potential savings associated with implementing one or more of

GAO’s options for reducing bomber costs.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

Options’ Opportunities for

Cost Savings and Effects

on Military Capability

Differ

Retiring the B-1B would save about $5.9 billion in budget authority for

fiscal years 1997 to 2001, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

Retiring the 27 B-1Bs that are in reconstitution reserve would save about

$450 million in budget authority over the same 5 years. Retiring or

reducing the B-1B force would not result in a significant decrease in DOD’s

existing capabilities because the B-1B currently lacks an effective

defensive avionics system and is capable of delivering few types of

conventional weapons. Reducing the B-1B force would reduce the

commanders in chief’s ability to attack some targets as quickly as desired

and would reduce DOD’s long-range capabilities. However, these risks may

be acceptable given the level of redundancy already planned in the

commanders in chief’s target allocation process, and the capabilities of

existing assets and other planned improvements. The loss of long-range

capability associated with retiring the B-1B would have the greatest impact

in scenarios in which Air Force tactical aircraft are assumed to have no

access or limited access to bases in theater. However, the United States

has agreements with many nations to facilitate access to overseas bases in

times of crisis. Also, B-2s and B-52Hs will still be available for missions

that require long-range and heavy payload capabilities.

Placing 24 additional B-1Bs in the Air National Guard would save

approximately $70 million in budget authority for fiscal years 1997 to 2001

because these units have fewer full-time personnel and are less costly to

operate. According to Air Force officials, the reserve components’ limited

experience with bombers is a key reason the Air Force has not placed

more bombers in the reserves. GAO examined placing 24 more B-1Bs in the

Air National Guard because it would achieve a 50/50 active/reserve ratio

when attrition and backup aircraft are excluded and the Air Force has

placed 50 percent or more of some refueling and air mobility assets in the

reserve component.

The Air Force would save about $40 million in military construction costs

if it reversed its decision to move B-1Bs currently located at Ellsworth Air

Force Base, South Dakota, to Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho.

Although based at Ellsworth, this squadron is currently assigned to a

composite wing at Mountain Home consisting of several types of aircraft,

including F-15s and F-16s and routinely trains with the wing but does not

participate in day-to-day wing operations. According to Air Force officials,

collocation of the bombers with the wing will result in enhanced training.

However, GAO has previously reported that the Air Force has not

demonstrated the benefits of peacetime collocation of different types of

aircraft.

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Additional B-2s Would

Exacerbate DOD’s Efforts

to Develop and Implement

a Long-Term

Recapitalization Plan

Although funding for additional B-2s is not included in DOD’s plan, DOD and

the Congress have considered the need to procure additional B-2s in

recent years. DOD has concluded that additional B-2s are not needed to

meet future nuclear war-fighting requirements, particularly in view of the

nuclear weapons carrying capability limit included in the Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty II. Also, DOD’s 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study, which

used defense planning assumptions, found that 20 additional B-2s had little

effect on the outcome of a conventional conflict and are not needed to

implement the two major regional conflict strategy. Most studies that

support buying additional B-2s assume that DOD would have little warning

time and limited availability of tactical aircraft to respond to future

conventional conflicts. Both assumptions are inconsistent with current

defense planning assumptions.

Substantial future costs could be avoided if the size of the current B-2

force is capped at 21 aircraft as DOD currently plans. Cost estimates to

procure and operate an additional 20 B-2s range from $18.7 billion to

$27 billion over 25 years. These additional costs would hinder DOD’s efforts

to develop and implement an affordable long-term recapitalization plan

unless offsetting cuts in other programs were realized.

Recommendations DOD’s ongoing Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study is designed to determine

the most cost-effective mix of systems needed for the deep attack mission.

Given the challenges of long-term recapitalization of the force, GAO

recommends that the Secretary of Defense consider options to retire or

reduce the B-1B force as part of this study. Regarding the other two B-1B

options, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force assess the

potential to place more bombers in the reserve component and reexamine

the decision to relocate six B-1B bombers to Mountain Home Air Force

Base.

Bombers that remain in the force will need to be able to deploy and

sustain operations at overseas locations to meet commander in chief

requirements. Therefore, GAO also recommends that the Secretary of

Defense require the Secretary of the Air Force to (1) provide an

assessment of the risk resulting from shortfalls in meeting requirements

for mobility readiness spares packages and providing personnel needed to

support conventional operations, including the impact of the shortfalls on

the Air Force’s ability to meet commander in chief requirements for

bombers and (2) prepare plans and time frames to eliminate these

shortfalls or mitigate the risks associated with them.

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

Agency Comments

and GAO’s Evaluation

In written comments (see app. II) on a draft of this report, DOD partially

concurred with three of the recommendations and did not concur with

one. DOD partially concurred with GAO’s recommendation to include

options to retire or reduce the B-1B force in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix

Study but disagreed with some of GAO’s analysis supporting the

recommendation. DOD stated that GAO used the Nimble Dancer wargame to

support conclusions on bomber effectiveness but that Nimble Dancer was

not intended to provide specific information about weapon system

effectiveness. GAO agrees and did not use the Nimble Dancer wargame to

analyze weapon effectiveness. Rather, GAO used Air Force modeling of the

air campaign for two major regional conflicts, which was provided to the

Joint Staff as input to Nimble Dancer, to show that targets assigned to the

B-1B are not unique to the B-1B.

DOD’s comments also state that GAO implied that future precision munitions

will be such a large force multiplier that they justify retiring the B-1B now.

DOD acknowledges, however, that precision munitions are a fundamental

enhancement to combat effectiveness. GAO believes that the capabilities of

precision munitions should be considered in making force structure

decisions and notes that the President, in redirecting the Deep Attack

Weapons Mix Study in February 1996, highlighted the potential that the

increasing capabilities of weapons could allow some consolidation of the

aircraft, ships, and missiles that will deliver these weapons. GAO believes

that DOD may be able to avoid unnecessarily expending significant funds to

improve ground-attack capabilities that DOD already considers sufficient.

Although DOD’s comments state that options to retire or reduce the B-1B

force will be included in the study, DOD officials noted at an exit

conference that the list of options has not been finalized and time

constraints may require DOD to reduce the number of options currently on

the list. Consequently, GAO is still including a recommendation.

DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that the Secretary of the

Air Force provide the Secretary of Defense with an assessment of the risk

resulting from shortfalls in the B-2 and the B-1B mobility readiness spares

packages and personnel needed to support conventional operations. DOD

agreed that there is a personnel shortfall and is currently evaluating

several options to address it. DOD did not agree that there is a shortfall in

the mobility readiness spares packages for the B-2 and the B-1B and

indicated that, after detailed review and analysis, it decided that a 14-day

versus a 30-day package is appropriate for the B-2 and the B-1B based on

logistics initiatives. During GAO’s review, Air Combat Command and Air

Force headquarters officials consistently stated that the decision to fund a

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Executive Summary

14-day package was budget driven and that they were concerned that it

would not be sufficient. DOD and Air Force officials did not provide

documentation that logistics initiatives were the basis for its decision.

Therefore, GAO still believes that further analysis is needed to assess the

risk associated with 14-day mobility readiness spares packages.

DOD did not agree with the recommendation that the Secretary of the Air

Force assess the potential to place more bombers in the reserve

component and reexamine the decision to relocate six B-1Bs to Mountain

Home Air Force Base. DOD stated that the bombers’ mission of striking

targets on the first days of a conflict would stress reserve units’ capacity to

respond within timely constraints, due to call-up and mobilization

requirements. However, in response to congressional inquiries about the

initial assignment of bombers to reserves, the Air Force stated that there

would be no loss of war-fighting capability with such assignments.

Similarly, RAND reported in 1993 that the Air Force reserve components

train to readiness standards similar to those for active units. GAO still

believes that placing additional B-1Bs in the reserves warrants

consideration and could result in significant annual recurring savings.

With respect to moving bombers to Mountain Home Air Force Base, GAO

believes that DOD has not demonstrated that the benefits associated with

the composite wing concept outweigh the increased cost to maintain small

numbers of dissimilar aircraft at the same location compared with

traditional basing concepts. In light of the construction costs that will be

incurred and the constraints that will affect B-1B operations and

maintenance for several years after the move, GAO still believes the move

should be reconsidered.

DOD also provided GAO with technical comments on the report and where

appropriate, GAO changed and updated information in the report.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

20

Types of Bombers in DOD’s Inventory 20

Planned Changes in Bomber Force Structure 21

B-52H’s and B-2’s Nuclear Role 23

Air Force’s Conventional Concept of Operations for Bombers 24

Additional Investment in Bombers Spurred by Bomber Concept

of Operations

25

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 27

Chapter 2 

DOD Has Not

Adequately Supported

Stated Requirements

for Bombers

30

Nuclear Mission Will Require Less Than Half of DOD’s Planned

Bomber Force

31

Studies’ Limitations May Have Caused DOD to Overstate Bomber

Requirements

31

Services Have Numerous Ways to Attack Ground Targets 36

DOD Is Assessing Deep Attack Requirements for All Services 40

Conclusions 40

Chapter 3 

Significant Challenges

Remain to Implement

Air Force’s

Operational Concept

for Bombers

42

Bomber Modernization Efforts Face Technical and Schedule

Challenges

42

B-1B Has Experienced Operational Readiness Problems 47

Difficulties Supporting Bombers at Forward Operating Locations 48

Conclusions 50

Recommendations 51

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 51

Chapter 4 

Costs to Operate and

Modernize the

Planned Bomber

Force Are Significant

and Will Increase

53

Operations and Support Costs Will Grow 53

Costs to Modernize the Heavy Bomber Force 56

Conclusions 58

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Contents

Chapter 5 

Options for Reducing

Bomber Costs

59

Restructuring or Reducing the Bomber Force Would Generate

Savings

59

Options Differ in Terms of Opportunities for Cost Savings and

Effects on Military Capability

60

Option 1: Retire DOD’s B-1B Force 61

Option 2: Retire 27 B-1Bs in Reconstitution Reserve 64

Option 3: Place Additional B-1Bs in the Air National Guard 66

Option 4: Consolidate Basing of Active B-1B Bombers 68

Additional B-2s Would Exacerbate DOD’s Efforts to Develop and

Implement a Long-Term Recapitalization Plan

70

Conclusions 73

Recommendations 74

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 74

Appendixes Appendix I: Description of Bomber Munitions 78

Appendix II: Comments From the Department of Defense 81

Appendix III: Major Contributors to This Report 86

Related GAO Products 87

Tables Table 1: Current and Planned Inventory of Bombers 3

Table 1.1: Current and Planned Bomber Force 22

Table 1.2: Bomber Capability to Carry Conventional Munitions 26

Table 2.1: Air Force Bomber Roadmap Requirements 33

Table 2.2: Bomber Force Structure Alternatives Assessed in the

Heavy Bomber Force Study

35

Table 2.3: Other DOD Assets Used to Interdict Enemy Ground

Targets

37

Table 2.4: Number of Target Types Assigned to Bombers and

Number of These Targets Also Assigned to Other Air Force

Aircraft in 2002

39

Table 3.1: Initial Air Force Projections of Additional Personnel

Needed to Meet Conventional Wartime Bomber Deployment

Requirements

50

Table 4.1: Fiscal Year 1997 FYDP Funding for Heavy Bombers 53

Table 4.2: B-1B Investments 57

Table 5.1: Five-Year Cost Savings of Four Options 61

Table 5.2: Multiple Ways to Hit B-1B’s Most Frequent Target

During the First 7 Days of a Conflict

62

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Contents

Table 5.3: Budget Savings for Retiring the Air Force’s 95 B-1B

Bombers

64

Table 5.4: Budget Savings for Retiring 27 B-1B Reconstitution

Reserve Aircraft

65

Table 5.5: Budget Savings for Placing 24 More B-1Bs in the Air

National Guard

67

Table 5.6: Budget Savings For Reversing the Air Force’s Decision

to Move Six B-1Bs to Mountain Home Air Force Base

70

Figures Figure 1.1: Future Locations of Bomber Forces 23

Figure 1.2: Planned Bomber Employment Based on Threat 25

Figure 2.1: CINC’s Total Apportioned Percentages for Selected

Targets in One Major Regional Conflict

38

Figure 3.1: Conventional Mission Upgrade Program Schedule 45

Figure 4.1: Comparison of Average Annual Operations and

Support Costs by Bomber Type

55

Figure 4.2: Annual Operations and Support Costs per Bomber in

2007

56

Figure 5.1: Twenty-Five Year Life Cycle Cost Estimates for 20

Additional B-2s

71

Abbreviations

AGM Air-to-Ground Guided Missile

BUR Bottom-Up Review

CINC commander in chief

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

FYDP Future Years Defense Program

IDA Institute for Defense Analysis

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

WCMD Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

At the height of the Cold War, the United States envisioned a force of over

400 heavy bombers to deter against the Soviet nuclear threat and to be

prepared to launch long-range nuclear strikes. The end of the Cold War,

marked by the breakup of the Soviet Union and negotiation of strategic

arms limitations treaties, drastically reduced requirements for long-range

bombers and resulted in a shift of the bombers’ primary role from nuclear

to conventional missions. Since the early 1990s, Department of Defense

(DOD) and the Air Force have reduced the size of the bomber force, begun

to implement a new concept of operations to use bombers in conventional

conflicts, and embarked on a program to upgrade the bombers’

conventional capabilities.

Types of Bombers in

DOD’s Inventory

The U.S. heavy bomber force consists of B-2s, B-1Bs, and B-52Hs. DOD

plans to retain all three types of bombers well into the 21st century. Each

type has a unique history that has been shaped in part by significant

congressional interest in bomber issues. We have issued numerous reports

on bomber issues in response to congressional concerns; these reports are

listed at the end of this report.

In 1978, DOD began to design the B-2 as a stealthy bomber to penetrate

enemy defenses for both nuclear and conventional missions. The B-2 is a

two-crew aircraft that incorporates stealth (low-observable) technologies

to enhance survivability. In 1981, the Air Force planned to buy 132 B-2

aircraft, but the 1994 Defense Authorization Act limited the procurement

to 20 aircraft with a cost ceiling of $28.968 billion in fiscal year 1981

constant dollars. The 1996 Defense Authorization Act removed this cost

ceiling, and the Congress made available an additional $493 million that

will be used to convert the first B-2 test aircraft into an operational B-2.

Today, 21 aircraft are planned at a cost of about $45 billion in then-year

dollars. The first B-2 was delivered in 1989, and the last block 30 aircraft is

scheduled to be completed in 2000. The contractor will deliver the B-2s in

three configurations (referred to as blocks 10, 20, and 30), and each

successive block possesses improved capabilities. By 2000, the Air Force

plans to have 21 B-2s in the block 30 configuration in its inventory.

In 1970, the Air Force began to develop the B-1 bomber for strategic

nuclear missions as a high-speed aircraft designed to penetrate Soviet

airspace and evade Soviet radar by flying low to the ground. The B-1

program experienced difficulties from its inception, and in 1977, the

program was canceled. But, in 1981, DOD revived the B-1 program,

approving production of the B-1B to be part of a two-bomber program to

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

replace the aging B-52 fleet. The B-1B was intended to serve as a

penetrating bomber until the B-2 bomber was deployed in the 1990s, at

which time the B-1B was expected to assume a standoff role. The first

squadron of B-1Bs became operational in October 1986. The contractor

delivered the 100th and final B-1B in May 1988. As a result of crashes, 

95 B-1Bs remain. Throughout its existence, the B-1B has had technical

problems, particularly with its defensive avionics system.

B-52 bombers, which were first introduced in 1954, were produced in eight

configurations (A through H) with the last H aircraft delivered in

October 1962. While 744 B-52s were built, only 94 remain. During the

decades of the Cold War, B-52s were dedicated primarily to deterring

nuclear war. However, B-52Gs were the first missile-capable B-52 bombers

and were used in conventional roles in Vietnam and the Persian Gulf.

During Operation Desert Storm, B-52Gs dropped approximately one-third

of the total tonnage of bombs delivered by U.S. air forces striking

wide-area troop concentrations, fixed installations, and bunkers and are

credited with destroying the morale of Iraq’s Republican Guard. Following

Desert Storm, the Air Force retired the B-52Gs and provided B-52Hs with

enhanced conventional capabilities. While the 744 B-52s originally cost a

little over $4.5 billion (an average unit cost of $6.1 million), over $41 billion

has been spent over more than 40 years for their development,

procurement, modernization, and service life extension. On the basis of

engineering studies, the Air Force estimates that the B-52H will be

structurally sound until about 2030.

Planned Changes in

Bomber Force

Structure

Since 1992, DOD and the Air Force have completed four major studies that

have addressed bomber requirements—the Nuclear Posture Review, the

Bottom-Up Review (BUR), the Air Force Bomber Roadmap, and the

congressionally mandated 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study. On the basis

of these studies, DOD plans to make changes (shown in table 1.1) to the

bomber force structure by 2001.

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Current and Planned (for

2001) Bomber Force

Bomber

Current

inventorya

Current

operational

inventoryb

Planned

inventory

Planned

operational

inventory

B-2 13 6 21 16

B-1B 95 60 95 82

B-52H 94 56 71 56

Total 202 122 187 154

aNumber of aircraft funded for flying, test and maintenance backup aircraft, and aircraft held in

reserve for later use.

bNumber of aircraft funded to fly.

Source: Department of the Air Force.

Of the planned operational aircraft, 130 bombers will be available for

conventional and nuclear missions and 24 will be used for training. The

remaining 33 aircraft are test and backup aircraft.

The Air Force has chosen to fully fund the operation of only 60 B-1Bs for

the next few years, compared with plans to fund 82 beyond fiscal 

year 2000. In the short term, the Air Force has classified 27 of 95 B-1Bs as

“reconstitution aircraft.” These aircraft are not funded for flying hours and

lack aircrews, but they are based with B-1B units, flown on a regular basis,

maintained like other B-1Bs, and modified with the rest of the fleet. B-1B

units will use flying hours and aircrews that are based on 60 operational

aircraft to rotate both the operational aircraft and the reconstitution

aircraft through its peacetime flying schedule. However, because the Air

Force has chosen not to fund aircrews for its reconstitution reserve

aircraft, placing aircraft in reconstitution reserve reduces the number of

aircraft the Air Force can support during wartime. In fiscal year 1997, the

Air Force plans to begin reducing the number of reconstitution reserve

aircraft by establishing two additional squadrons of B-1B aircraft and

funding additional aircrews and flying hours.

Since the Cold War ended, DOD has transferred some long-range bombers

to the Air Force reserve components for the first time. In 1994, the Air

Force Reserves and Air National Guard established 1 B-52H squadron with

8 aircraft and 1 B-1B squadron with 10 aircraft. The Air National Guard

will establish one additional B-1B squadron of eight aircraft in the near

future.

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

All bombers will be based in the continental United States. The Air Force

plans to expand the number of B-1B bases from three to five beginning in

fiscal year 1996. Specifically, the Air Force plans to move six B-1Bs to

Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho and establish a new Air National

Guard squadron of B-1Bs at Robins Air Force Base in Georgia. Another Air

National Guard squadron of B-1Bs is located at McConnell Air Force Base

in Kansas. Figure 1.1 shows the locations of the future bomber force.

Figure 1.1: Future Locations of Bomber Forces

B-52H Base


B-1B Base


B-2 Base

Dyess AFB, TX

McConnell


AFB, KS

Ellsworth


AFB, SD

Whiteman


AFB, MO

Barksdale


AFB, LA

Minot AFB,


ND

Robins


AFB, GA

Mt. Home


AFB, ID

Source: Department of the Air Force.

B-52H’s and B-2’s

Nuclear Role

In 1991, the President of the United States took the bombers off nuclear

alert status. Subsequently, in January 1993, the Presidents of the United

States and the Russian Federation signed the Strategic Arms Reduction

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Treaty (START) II building on agreements reached in START I signed

July 1991. The treaty sets equal ceilings on the number of nuclear weapons

that can be deployed by either party. If ratified by both countries, the

START II treaty would reduce the deployable nuclear warheads to no more

than 3,500 by the year 2003. In assessing bomber requirements in light of

the new limits, DOD plans to remove the B-1B from the nuclear role. The

B-2s and B-52Hs will retain the nuclear mission. B-52Hs assigned to the Air

Force Reserve remain available for nuclear missions, but they will be

flown by active duty pilots if assigned nuclear missions.

Air Force’s

Conventional Concept

of Operations for

Bombers

According to the Air Force Bomber Roadmap, bombers will provide the

majority of the firepower during the initial and sustained operations

phases of major regional conflicts. From bases in the United States, the Air

Force expects the bombers to fly long duration, round-trip missions of up

to 36 hours to make initial attacks within 24 hours of being tasked. Within

a few days of the start of a conventional conflict, bombers will be

expected to deploy to forward locations for sustained operations, flying

shorter and more frequent missions. The goal of the bomber missions will

be to halt invading enemy armored forces and disrupt the enemy’s ability

to wage war by attacking time-critical targets quickly, using a combination

of direct attack and standoff munitions. Some bombers deployed to a

major regional conflict will be expected to swing to a second regional

conflict if needed.

Each bomber will play a different role in a major regional conflict. The Air

Force envisions the B-2 as the leading edge of the initial response to

conflict because of its projected stealthiness and weapons delivery

precision. The B-2 will be expected to fly into heavily defended areas to

attack highly valued targets as well as enemy ground troops. The Air Force

will assign both standoff and penetrating missions to the B-1B in

medium-to-high threat environments and will expect the B-1B to destroy

the bulk of the defended, time-critical targets early in the conflict using

direct attack and standoff munitions. The B-52H will be primarily a

standoff bomber in the early phases of conflict, using precision-guided

munitions such as conventional air-launched cruise missiles, and will

provide massive firepower by directly attacking targets in low- to

medium-threat environments using munitions such as the Joint Direct

Attack Munition.1

 Figure 1.2 shows the Air Force’s planned employment of

the bombers.

1

The “Joint Direct Attack Munition” is a 2,000-pound MK-84 unitary warhead bomb modified with a kit

that includes steerable fins, a global positioning system receiver, and an intertial navigation system to

increase the range and accuracy of the weapon.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.2: Planned Bomber

Employment Based on Threat

B-52

B-2

B-1

Lightly Defended Targets


(Many, Least Critical)

Moderately Defended Targets


(Some, Less Critical)

Heavily Defended Targets


(Few, Most Critical)

Direct-Attack or Standoff Weapons

Standoff Weapons Only

Source: Department of the Air Force.

Additional Investment

in Bombers Spurred

by Bomber Concept of

Operations

In addition to defining the new concept of operations for bombers, the Air

Force’s 1992 Bomber Roadmap established an investment strategy to

enhance the conventional capabilities of the bombers. The study

recognized that all three bombers currently have limited conventional

capabilities, the B-1B defensive avionics system needs to be upgraded, and

the B-2 and B-1B bombers lack sufficient mobility readiness spares

packages to meet wartime requirements. The 1992 Bomber Roadmap

estimated B-1B and B-52H upgrades would cost about $3 billion. The costs

to integrate conventional munitions on the B-2 are included in the B-2

program cost. In 1993, we concluded that B1-B upgrade costs were

underestimated by billions of dollars because they did not include costs to

fix B-1B operational problems, acquire an effective B-1B defensive

avionics system, and acquire adequate mobility readiness spares packages.2

2

Strategic Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time-Consuming, and Costly

(GAO/NSIAD-93-45, Feb. 5, 1993).

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

 B-2 modifications involve integrating conventional munitions on the

aircraft and developing a deployable mission planning system to

accommodate rapid changes in scenarios and mission routes. The block 10

B-2, currently in the Air Force’s inventory, can carry only gravity bombs,

but after all modifications are complete, it will be able to carry additional

gravity weapons and some advanced munitions.

The B-1B currently can drop only gravity weapons and, because of

problems with its defensive avionics system, would be limited to

low-threat environments. The Roadmap’s B-1B Conventional Munitions

Upgrade Program addresses these shortfalls in a phased approach. By

1997, the aircraft will be certified to use a family of cluster munitions, but

its capability to employ advanced direct attack and standoff precision

munitions will not be available until after 2000. Also, the defensive

avionics system upgrade will not be completed until well into the next

decade.

The B-52H requires the least amount of funding to upgrade its

conventional capabilities and is and will continue to be the most versatile

bomber in the fleet. It is the only standoff bomber in the inventory today,

and in the future, still will carry more types of weapons than either the

B-1B or the B-2. Appendix I includes a description of the munitions

planned for the bombers. Table 1.2 shows the current and future

munitions carrying capabilities of the three bombers.

Table 1.2: Bomber Capability to Carry

Conventional Munitions B-52H B-1B B-2

Munition Current Future Current Future Current Future

Gravity Bombs

(unguided) X X X X X X

Cluster Bombs

(unguided) X X X X X

Sea Mines X X X X

HAVE NAP X X

CALCM X X

Harpoon X

JDAM X X X

WCMD X X

JSOW X

JASSM X X X

Source: Our analyses based on Air Force data.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

The Chairman of the House Budget Committee requested that we evaluate

the basis for DOD’s bomber force structure requirements, assess Air Force’s

progress to implement its new conventional concept of operations for

using bombers, and determine the cost to keep the bombers in the force

and enhance their conventional capabilities. As part of this review, we also

identified and assessed the potential cost savings and effects on military

capability of four alternatives for reducing bomber costs, including retiring

or reducing the B-1B force, as well as the need for procuring additional

B-2s if the B-1B force is reduced or retired.

To assess the basis for the number of bombers in DOD’s planned force

structure, we reviewed documents supporting the four major DOD bomber

requirements studies. We discussed major study assumptions with Joint

Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Air Force, and Institute

for Defense Analysis (IDA) officials to understand the significance to the

study conclusions. We compared the assumptions with current defense

guidance, the new bomber concept of operations, and information

obtained from war-fighting commanders in chief (CINC) concerning their

plans for bomber operations. Also, we assessed bomber contributions to

two major regional conflicts by analyzing (1) DOD’s database used in the

Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements development process and

(2) the results of Air Force modeling of recent DOD wargaming of the two

major regional conflict scenario. In evaluating the number of bombers

required for the nuclear mission, we discussed the nuclear force structure

options and major study assumptions included in the Nuclear Posture

Review with Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command

officials, and Air Force officials.

To assess Air Force progress in implementing the concept of operations

for bombers, we evaluated Air Force documents on a range of factors that

are critical to effective implementation of the concept, such as the

sufficiency of mobility readiness spares packages and bomber staffing

levels, the operational readiness of the bombers, and technical challenges

to modify the bombers for the conventional mission. We also reviewed our

prior reports and those of DOD and others addressing these factors, and we

discussed them with CINC staff, Air Force headquarters, Air Combat

Command, and bomber unit officials to understand their significance.

To determine the cost to keep the bombers in the force and modify them,

we obtained and analyzed investment and operational and support costs

related to the bomber force from DOD’s Fiscal Year 1997 Future Years

Defense Program (FYDP). We obtained and analyzed Air Force documents

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

on the cost to modernize the bombers beyond the FYDP. We compared

these costs with those reported in the 1995 DOD Heavy Bomber Force

Study to identify any significant differences.

On the basis of our assessment of DOD’s bomber requirements and force

structure plans, we developed four alternatives to the planned B-1B

bomber force structure and assessed the costs and risks associated with

each one. In identifying options for smaller bomber forces, we limited our

analysis to B-1B alternatives because the B-1B will play no role in the

nuclear mission and therefore seems a more logical candidate for

downsizing than either the B-52 or the B-2. Also, we examined placing 24

more B-1Bs in the Air National Guard because this would result in a 50/50

active/reserve ratio and the Air Force has placed 50 percent or more of

some refueling and air mobility assets in the reserve component. We asked

the Congressional Budget Office to estimate the budgetary savings of the

alternatives and discussed the risks associated with the alternatives with

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Strategic Command, and Air Force

officials.

Because DOD and the Congress have considered the need for additional

B-2s beyond the planned force in recent years and our options to retire or

reduce the B-1B force may raise further questions about the need for

additional B-2s, we assessed their need in light of the estimated cost of

more B-2s and DOD’s aggregate conventional and nuclear war-fighting

capabilities. We reviewed and compared cost estimates for 20 additional

B-2s developed by DOD, the B-2 contractor, the Congressional Budget

Office, and IDA. To assess the impact of more B-2s on DOD’s conventional

war-fighting capabilities, we reviewed studies by IDA, the Congressional

Budget Office, and several private organizations and compared their

methodologies and key assumptions. We also assessed the contributions

of B-2s by analyzing the types and number of targets assigned to B-2s in

DOD’s 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study and DOD’s Capabilities Based

Munitions Requirements development process. To assess the impact of

more B-2s on DOD’s nuclear force, we discussed the need for additional

B-2s with U.S. Strategic Command officials and obtained their assessment

of how additional B-2s would affect compliance with nuclear warhead

carrying capability limits included in the START II.

We performed our review at the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Joint

Chiefs of Staff; Air Force Headquarters; the National Guard Bureau; IDA;

the United States Central Command; the Central Command Air Forces; the

U.S. Pacific Command; the U.S. European Command; the U. S. Strategic

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Command; the Air Combat Command; the 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale Air

Force Base, Louisiana; the 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base,

South Dakota; and the 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman Air Force Base,

Missouri.

We conducted this review from November 1994 through May 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 2 

DOD Has Not Adequately Supported Stated

Requirements for Bombers

DOD has not demonstrated convincingly that it needs to retain 187 bombers

to meet war-fighting requirements. According to a major DOD study of

nuclear requirements completed in 1994, only about 45 percent of DOD’s

planned bomber force—66 B-52s and 20 B-2s—will be needed for the

nuclear role. DOD’s decision to maintain an overall force of 187 bombers

was shaped largely by three key DOD and Air Force studies—the BUR, the

1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study, and the Air Force Bomber Roadmap.

None of the studies fully addresses the Commission on Roles and Missions

concern that DOD may have more ground-attack capability than it needs or

assesses whether other less costly alternatives exist to accomplish

missions that would likely be assigned to bombers. Moreover, in

concluding that DOD would need up to 100 bombers for a major regional

conflict, the three studies assume that CINCs will use significantly more

bombers in future conflicts. In addition, the Air Force’s principal study of

bomber requirements—the Bomber Roadmap—appears to have overstated

bomber requirements by assuming that a significant portion of the bomber

force will need to be reserved solely for nuclear missions, although DOD

has taken bombers off nuclear alert and considers all bombers to be

available for conventional operations.

Our analysis shows that DOD has extensive, overlapping capabilities to

conduct ground attack. While DOD needs a level of redundancy and overlap

to provide CINCs with a safety margin and flexibility, it may not need to

upgrade its capabilities to the extent currently planned. Despite recent

downsizing, the services continue to operate about 5,900 advanced

fixed-wing combat aircraft and helicopters, as well as other advanced

airpower assets that will be used to attack the same types of targets as

bombers during conventional conflicts. Although bombers are unique in

that they carry large quantities of munitions over long distances, they do

not provide a unique contribution to destroy most types of targets they

would likely be assigned. In response to a finding by the congressionally

chartered Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces that

DOD may have more ground attack capability than it needs, DOD is

reassessing its requirements for ground attack assets, including bombers,

across the services.1

1

U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 2 

DOD Has Not Adequately Supported Stated

Requirements for Bombers

Nuclear Mission Will

Require Less Than

Half of DOD’s Planned

Bomber Force

In 1994, DOD conducted the Nuclear Posture Review, the first such review

in 15 years, to determine the number of bombers needed for the nuclear

mission assuming that START I and II agreements would be implemented by

2003. The review concluded that the United States should retain 66 B-52Hs

and no more than 20 B-2s for the bomber leg of the nuclear triad after

analyzing several combinations of ballistic missile submarines,

intercontinental ballistic missiles, and bombers that, together, could carry

3,500 warheads stipulated as the maximum allowable warhead carrying

capability in START II. DOD tentatively plans to allocate 1,320 of these

warheads to the bomber force. The review also concluded that B-1Bs were

not needed for the nuclear role, and according to DOD officials, did not

specify that any bombers be dedicated solely to the nuclear mission.

In mid-1995, DOD determined that it would reduce its B-52H force from 94

to 66 and limit the number of B-2s to 20, consistent with the results of the

Nuclear Posture Review. However, DOD subsequently decided to maintain

71 B-52Hs and convert the first B-2 test aircraft to an operational aircraft

for a total of 21 B-2s. Although DOD plans to retain a larger number of

B-52Hs and B-2s than previously planned, the decision to retain more

aircraft was not prompted by a need for a larger nuclear force structure.

According to Air Force officials, the Air Force decided to increase the

B-52H force to provide a larger attrition reserve force to hedge against

potential future losses of B-52Hs. Moreover, the 21st B-2 is being procured

because the Congress made available an additional $493 million in fiscal

year 1996 for the B-2 program. Although they may not be needed for the

nuclear mission, the carrying capability of these additional aircraft will

count toward the START II limits. In order to stay within treaty limits if the

treaty is ratified, the Air Force plans to modify some B-52Hs so that they

can carry fewer than their maximum capability of 20 warheads.

Studies’ Limitations

May Have Caused

DOD to Overstate

Bomber Requirements

Although none of the studies (BUR, the Air Force Bomber Roadmap, and

the 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study) concluded specifically that DOD

should maintain 187 bombers, taken together, they played a major role in

DOD’s decision to keep 187 bombers in the force and modify them for the

conventional role. However, all three studies have significant limitations

that may overstate DOD’s need for bombers. For example, none of the

studies assessed the cost-effectiveness of bombers compared with that of

other deep attack assets (such as tactical fighter aircraft and missiles) in

DOD’s inventory. In addition, BUR did not adequately consider the potential

contributions of precision-guided weapons and new weapon systems in

development. Moreover, the Bomber Roadmap used some questionable

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assumptions. For example, it assumed that (1) bombers would be the only

assets available during the initial days of a conflict to attack time-critical

targets and (2) a significant number of bombers would need to be

dedicated solely to nuclear missions. In concluding that about 100

bombers would be needed for the first major regional conflict, all three

studies assumed that CINCs would use significantly more bombers than

they plan to use today and deploy them earlier in future conflicts.

However, this assumption appears questionable because DOD currently

categorizes its ability to execute the two major regional conflict strategy

as adequate and our analysis of DOD data shows that the threat is not

expected to increase significantly within the next decade.

BUR Requirement Based

on Limited Analysis

BUR, completed in 1993, concluded that 100 bombers would be adequate

for a major regional conflict and that some of these bombers would shift

to a second conflict if needed. BUR further concluded that a total inventory

of up to 184 bombers was needed to meet nuclear and conventional

requirements. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense

officials told us that BUR’s conclusion that 100 bombers would be adequate

for a major regional conflict was based on several factors—including the

number of bombers used in Desert Storm and military judgment. However,

DOD did not conduct detailed analysis or modeling to determine how a

range of alternative bomber forces would fare in the context of two nearly

simultaneous major regional conflicts. Moreover, DOD did not examine the

cost-effectiveness of using bombers to destroy ground targets compared

with the cost-effectiveness of using other deep-attack assets.

In 1995, we reported on BUR’s methodology and concluded that DOD had

not fully analyzed key BUR assumptions about the availability of forces,

supporting capabilities, and force enhancements needed to execute the

two major regional conflict strategy.2 BUR assumed that some specialized

assets such as bombers would swing to a second major regional conflict,

but as noted in our prior report, DOD did not analyze the specific types and

numbers of assets that would swing, the timing of the swing, or logistical

requirements. Also, BUR projected force requirements only to the 1999 time

frame, prior to the completion of bomber modifications and the fielding of

many new precision weapons (such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition

and Joint Standoff Weapon) that should greatly improve fighter and

bomber effectiveness and potentially reduce the number of bombers and

fighters needed to fight two major regional conflicts.

2

Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions (GAO/NSIAD-95-56, Jan. 31, 1995).

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Bomber Requirements

Asserted by the Air Force

Bomber Roadmap Based

on Questionable

Assumptions

The Air Force Bomber Roadmap—first published in 1992 and updated in

1995—established the Air Force’s conventional concept of operations for

bombers to provide initial attacks and sustained firepower for major

regional conflicts and identified and set into a motion a bomber

modernization plan to upgrade the bombers’ conventional capabilities. The

Roadmap established a requirement for 210 bombers, 23 more than DOD

plans to retain in the force, through 2004 as shown in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Air Force Bomber Roadmap

Requirements Operational bombersa

Available to deploy to major regional conflict 100

Dedicated nuclear withholdb 66

Trainers 24

Total operational bombers 190

Backup and test bombers 20

Total bomber requirement 210

a“Operational bombers” are those funded for flying. The Air Force refers to these aircraft as

primary authorized inventory and includes bombers that are combat-capable and designated for

training.

bBombers held in reserve for the nuclear mission and unavailable for conventional missions.

Source: Air Combat Command Bomber Roadmap, January 1995.

DOD has decided to keep only 187 bombers in the force because it

considers other programs that compete with bombers for the Air Force’s

share of projected budgets to be higher priority. However, in 1995, the

Commander of the Air Combat Command, who is responsible for

developing the Roadmap, testified that, on the basis of the Air Force’s

analysis, he believed DOD’s planned force may be too small.

Our analysis of the Bomber Roadmap showed that it may overstate

requirements because it included three questionable assumptions. First,

the Air Force accepted the BUR’s conclusion that 100 deployable bombers

would be needed for a major regional conflict without conducting detailed

modeling to validate this number. Second, the Air Force identified a

requirement to dedicate 66 bombers for the nuclear mission even though

DOD has removed bombers from nuclear alert and considers all bombers

available for conventional missions. Third, the Air Force assumed that

only bombers would be available to strike a notional set of over 1,250

time-critical target elements (aim points for about 240 targets) based on

the military’s experience in Desert Storm. The Roadmap analysis showed

that the current bomber force could strike only about 24 percent of the

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time-critical target elements in the first days, but, in 2001, upgraded

bombers will be able to strike all of the target elements.

With respect to the third issue, the Air Force did not take into account the

contributions of other deep attack assets (such as Air Force and Navy

tactical fighters and missiles) that could attack some of these same

targets. We pointed out this shortcoming in our 1993 report on DOD’s

bomber modernization plan.3

 In response to our report, DOD responded

that the Bomber Roadmap was not a coordinated DOD-wide effort, but an

Air Force plan for equipping bombers. The 1995 updated Roadmap again

did not address this shortcoming, even though current DOD planning

guidance assumes that Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft would arrive

early enough in theater to attack targets during the halt phase of a major

regional conflict.

DOD’s 1995 Heavy Bomber

Force Study Did Not

Compare Bombers With

Other Deep Attack Assets

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995 and the DOD

Appropriations Act of 1995 required DOD to study bomber requirements

and provide an independent cost-effectiveness analysis of Air Force

bomber programs. The overall objective of the study was to assess bomber

force requirements (on the basis of Defense Planning Guidance) for two

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts in 1998, 2006, and 2014, and

to analyze the cost-effectiveness of alternative Air Force bomber forces in

achieving U.S. military objectives. DOD contracted with IDA, a Federally

Funded Research and Development Center, for the study. IDA used DOD’s

then-projected force structure of 182 bombers, Defense Planning Guidance

scenarios, and DOD planning factors for force deployments, and weapons

inventories for each of the 3 years as its baseline case to analyze and

compare the cost-effectiveness alternative bomber forces. The study also

analyzed excursions from the Defense Planning Guidance, including

shorter warning times, delayed arrival times for U.S. forces, fewer

available tactical aircraft, and improved enemy threats.

To assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative bomber force mixes, IDA

modeled five bomber force structures ranging from a small force of 115

bombers to a large force of 210 as shown in table 2.2. The number of

bombers shown is the total aircraft inventory. The actual number of

bombers that DOD assumed would deploy for each alternative in the study

is classified but is less than the total inventory.

3

Strategic Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time-Consuming, and Costly

(GAO/NSIAD-93-45, Feb. 5, 1993).

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Table 2.2: Bomber Force Structure

Alternatives Assessed in the Heavy

Bomber Force Study

Number of bombers

Bomber force structures analyzed B-52Hs B-1Bs B-2s Total

Planned force 66 95 21 182

Increase B-52Hs 94 95 21 210

Retire B-1Bs 94 0 21 115

Buy 20 B-2s, retire B-1Bs 94 0 41 135

Buy 20 B-2s for planned force 66 95 41 202

Source: DOD’s Heavy Bomber Force Study.

On the basis of the results of IDA’s analysis, DOD concluded that (1) the

planned bomber force can meet the national security requirements of two

nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts for anticipated scenarios and

reasonable excursions and (2) planned conventional mission upgrades to

the B-1B force are more cost-effective than procuring additional B-2s. IDA’s

analysis showed that the United States would win two nearly simultaneous

major regional conflicts for all the options modeled. However, the study

concluded that DOD’s planned force of 182 bombers was more

cost-effective than other options, including the two smaller bomber forces

modeled.

While the Heavy Bomber Force Study is the most comprehensive of the

DOD and Air Force studies to date, it has one key shortcoming. Like the

other studies discussed, this study did not examine whether tactical

fighters or long-range missiles could accomplish the mission more

cost-effectively than bombers. Bomber force structure size varied for each

of the options, whereas other deep attack forces such as tactical fighters

remained constant.

Unified Commanders Plan

to Use Fewer Bombers

Than Suggested by Studies

Although the three major studies of bomber requirements concluded that

military commanders would need about 100 bombers for a major regional

conflict, the CINCs currently plan to use far fewer than 100 bombers to

implement their war plans. The number of bombers included in the CINCs’

current war plans may be smaller than DOD envisions in part because DOD

has fewer bombers in its inventory today that are funded for combat

operations and because the B-1Bs currently have limited conventional

capabilities. Once the bombers are upgraded, the CINCs might choose to

include more bombers in their plans than they would today. However,

none of the CINCs’ representatives we spoke with expressed concern that

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the smaller number of bombers in DOD’s current inventory was a limiting

factor that would adversely affect the outcome of a campaign.

Additionally, one CINC’s current war plan would not require bombers to

deploy as early as envisioned by DOD and Air Force studies. How quick

bombers deploy to forward operating locations would depend on the

CINCs’ priority for airlift. In 1995, the Congressional Budget Office pointed

out in its analysis of bomber force options that, even in a conflict with

little warning, it is unlikely that CINCs would divert airlift to forward deploy

bombers in lieu of other forces.4

 The CINCs would likely use available airlift

to rush more flexible tactical aircraft and ground forces to the theater

while using bombers for operations from bases within the United States at

reduced sortie generation rates.

Services Have

Numerous Ways to

Attack Ground

Targets

The services have numerous, overlapping ways to attack ground targets in

major regional conflicts and have concluded that they have enough

capability to carry out the national military strategy. CINCs plan for

redundant target coverage when assigning targets to the services and often

have many ways to attack targets using various combinations of weapons

and platforms. Moreover, planned enhancements will increase DOD’s

capabilities substantially over the next several years, particularly its

capabilities to attack ground targets. DOD has numerous other ways to

attack targets that would likely be assigned to bombers in conventional

operations.

Although DOD has reduced its total combat aircraft by almost 30 percent

since the Persian Gulf War, the military services continue to operate over

5,900 fighter and attack aircraft and helicopters. Aircraft are increasingly

being supplemented by other advanced combat airpower assets,5

 such as

long-range cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and theater air

defense forces. Many of these assets will be used to interdict enemy

ground targets—one of the principal missions for which bombers are

being maintained and upgraded. Table 2.3 identifies other airpower assets

that are assigned the interdiction mission.

4

CBO Papers: Options for Enhancing the Bomber Force (July 1995).

5

This includes not only fixed-wing aircraft, but also attack helicopters, long-range cruise missiles,

unmanned aerial vehicles, and other assets that provide the United States the ability to maintain air

superiority and to project power worldwide through the air.

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Table 2.3: Other DOD Assets Used to

Interdict Enemy Ground Targets Airpower assets by service 1996 Inventory

Air Force

F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1,450

F-15E Strike Eagle 203

F-117A Stealth Fighter 54

A/OA-10 Thunderbolt II 369

Navy/Marine Corps

F/A-18 Hornet 806

F-14 Tomcat 323

AV-8B Harrier 184

A-6 Intruder 63

AH-1W Cobra 176

Tomahawk 2,339

Army

AH-64 Apache 798

Cobra/Kiowa Warrior 758

ATACMS 1,456

Source: Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

We reviewed DOD’s plans to modernize its numerous combat airpower

assets and concluded that some of DOD’s airpower modernization

programs will add only marginally to the already formidable capabilities

and some should be reconsidered from a joint perspective.6

 We concluded

that, although some redundancy is needed to provide the CINCs with

operational flexibility, DOD may have more than ample capability to

perform such missions. In May 1995, the congressionally mandated

Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces also concluded

that DOD may have greater quantities of strike aircraft and other deep

attack weapons than it needs.7

CINCs routinely apportion more than 100 percent of the targets to the

services to provide a safety margin and ensure flexibility. For example, we

previously reported that one CINC assigned the Army 5 to 10 percent, the

Navy 20 to 30 percent, the Marines 15 to 25 percent, and the Air Force 

65 to 75 percent of one target type—a total apportioned range of 105 to

6

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196, June 27, 1996).

7

Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

(Washington, D.C.: GPO, May 24, 1995).

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140-percent coverage—even though the CINC’s objective was to destroy

only 80 percent of the target quantity. Therefore, even if the services can

achieve only the low end of the total apportioned range (105-percent

coverage), the 80-percent destruction goal will be met. This

over-apportionment creates a margin of safety and allows flexibility to

ensure targets will be hit even if some expected capabilities are not

available. However, it also establishes the expectation that the services

will acquire and maintain sufficient forces to provide this level of target

coverage. Figure 2.1 shows the CINC’s total apportionment of targets to the

services compared with the CINC’s destruction objective for selected

targets identified for one major regional conflict. (Providing specific target

names would require the figure to be classified.)

Figure 2.1: CINC’s Total Apportioned Percentages for Selected Targets in One Major Regional Conflict

12345

0

50

100

150

200

250

Targets

Percentage

Minimum Range CINC Objective

105-140%

80%

150-160%

100%

155-210%

100%

180-200%

100%

90%

112-152%

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

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Our analysis of DOD’s Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements database

for two major regional conflicts in 2002 shows that the services have

numerous ways to strike ground targets that may be assigned to bombers.

This database consists of Defense Intelligence Agency ground target data

for the two major regional conflict scenario, and in conjunction with CINC

allocations of targets to the services, is used in DOD’s computation of

munition requirements. It includes both strategic and interdiction targets,

which are the bombers’ principal targets. Strategic targets are those vital

to the enemy’s war-making capacity and may include manufacturing

systems, communications facilities, and concentrated enemy armed

forces. Interdiction targets are those ground targets generally beyond the

close battle and commanders interdict these targets to divert, disrupt, or

destroy them before they can effectively be used against friendly forces.

We analyzed strategic and interdiction targets assigned to the Air Force to

determine whether there were any bomber-unique target types

(considering all Air Force aircraft but excluding other services’ assets that

may also be assigned to hit the same types of targets as bombers). We

found three bomber-unique targets in the first conflict and eight in the

second conflict as shown in table 2.4. The B-2 and B-1B unique targets

types were strategic targets. Most of the B-52H unique target types also

were strategic targets.

Table 2.4: Number of Target Types Assigned to Bombers and Number of These Targets Also Assigned to Other Air Force

Aircraft in 2002

Major regional conflict 1 Major regional conflict 2

Bomber

type

Number of target

types assigned to

bombers

Number of these

target types

assigned to other

Air Force aircraft

Number of

bomber-unique

target types

Number of target

types assigned to

bombers

Number of these

target types

assigned to other

Air Force aircraft

Number of

bomber-unique

target types

B-2 15 15 0 9 7 2

B-1B 11 10 1 11 11 0

B-52H 11 9 2 21 15 6

Source: Our analysis of DOD’s Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements database.

However, when considering all of the services’ ground attack assets, Air

Force modeling of the two major regional conflict scenario showed that

there were no unique bomber target types.

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DOD Is Assessing

Deep Attack

Requirements for All

Services

In response to a May 1995 recommendation from the Commission on the

Roles and Missions,8 DOD initiated a Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study to

assess deep attack requirements across the services. The Commission

recommended that DOD conduct a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness study to

determine the appropriate number and mix of deep attack capabilities

currently fielded and under development by all services.

The President of the United States has directed that the study examine

trade-offs between long-range bombers, land- and sea-based tactical

aircraft, and missiles that are used to strike the enemy’s rear. The

President also directed that it focus on the potential that the growing

inventory and the increasing capabilities of weapons could allow some

consolidation of the ships, aircraft, and missiles that will deliver them. The

first part of the study, to be completed in late 1996, will analyze weapons

mix requirements for DOD’s planned force in 1998, 2006, and 2014 and

determine the impact of force structure changes on the weapons mix. The

second part of the study will analyze trade-offs among elements of the

force structure, such as bombers and tactical aircraft, for the same years

and is to be completed in early 1997.

In May 1996, we recommended that DOD should routinely review service

modernization proposals based on how they will enhance DOD’s current

aggregate capabilities and that such analyses should serve as the basis for

deciding funding priorities.9

 Moreover, in a recent testimony, we

concluded that such assessments should (1) assess total joint war-fighting

requirements; (2) inventory aggregate service capabilities, including the

full range of available assets; (3) compare aggregate capabilities to joint

requirements to identify excesses or deficiencies; (4) assess the relative

merits of retiring alternative assets, reducing procurement quantities, or

canceling acquisition programs where excesses exist or where substantial

payoff is not clear; and (5) determine the most cost-effective means to

satisfy deficiencies.10

Conclusions DOD has not made a compelling case that it needs to maintain and upgrade

187 bombers in light of the services’ already extensive and overlapping

8

The Commission was authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 

(P.L. 103-160, Nov. 30, 1993).

9

U.S. Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).

10Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196, June 27, 1996).

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capabilities to attack ground targets. Because the studies do not

adequately consider the potential that DOD may need to reduce its overall

ground attack capabilities and other airpower assets may be more

cost-effective in providing ground attack than bombers, they do not

provide a sound basis for DOD’s conclusion that it needs 187 bombers.

Once the bombers are upgraded, their contribution to conventional

conflicts may be smaller than assumed by the studies if the CINCs maintain

their plans to use fewer than 100 bombers for a major regional conflict and

do not place higher priority on airlifting bombers to forward operating

locations.

DOD’s Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study will provide DOD with an

opportunity to address the methodological shortcomings of its prior

studies and identify options to reduce some of its extensive ground attack

capabilities, including bombers. The success of this study depends on how

well DOD components will be able to work together to produce an

objective analysis of DOD’s airpower and weapons requirements that

results in a force that is both adequate and affordable within the context of

projected DOD budgets.

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Significant Challenges Remain to Implement

Air Force’s Operational Concept for

Bombers

The Air Force faces significant challenges in implementing its

conventional concept of operations for bombers established by the

Bomber Roadmap. The Air Force’s ability to implement the concept

depends on its ability to successfully complete its bomber modernization

program, achieve and maintain an acceptable mission capable rate,1

 and

ensure that the bombers can sustain operations from forward operating

locations. The B-2 has not demonstrated that it can meet some of its most

important conventional mission requirements, and most B-1B

modernization programs will not be completed until about 2006. The B-1B,

which is expected to be the backbone of the conventional bomber force,

has experienced difficulty in maintaining acceptable mission capable

rates. Moreover, demonstrating the capability to operate at overseas

locations poses a significant challenge for the B-2 and the B-1B, both of

which were originally designed with limited conventional capabilities and

deployment requirements. For example, limited mobility readiness spares

packages for the B-2 and B-1B and shortages in some military occupations

for the B-1B and B-52H may hinder the deployment and sustainability of

these bombers.

Bomber

Modernization Efforts

Face Technical and

Schedule Challenges

The Bomber Roadmap established a plan to upgrade the conventional

capabilities of the bombers to enable them to deliver (1) additional types

of unguided munitions currently in DOD’s inventory and (2) new

high-altitude, all-weather precision munitions that DOD is developing for

the bomber force and Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft. The plan also

provides for defensive system upgrades for better protection against

enemy air defense systems for the B-1B and new radios for all bombers to

allow them to better communicate in the tactical environment. The B-52H

modification program is almost completed. However, the B-2 and B-1B

programs will not be completed until about 2000 and 2008, respectively.

The Air Force faces significant technical challenges in completing the 

21 B-2s authorized by the Congress, modernizing the B-1B, and

demonstrating that they will meet operational requirements.

B-2 Has Not Demonstrated

That It Can Meet Some

Important Mission

Requirements

The B-2’s principal mission changed from nuclear to conventional in late

1992 when the Air Force decided to incorporate precision-guided

munitions on the bomber. Its operational requirements specify that the B-2

weapon system have low observable characteristics and sufficient range

and payload to deliver nuclear or conventional weapons anywhere in the

1

The “mission capable rate” is the percentage of time the bombers are available for missions. The Air

Force considers a bomber to be mission capable if it can perform at least one of its assigned peacetime

or wartime missions.

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Bombers

world requiring the blending of conventional and state-of-the-art

technologies. This blending of aircraft technologies make the B-2 a

complex and costly aircraft to develop and produce. In 1987, the Air Force

gained approval to procure the B-2 concurrently with development and

testing. The Air Force is accepting the B-2 in three configuration blocks

with each new block acquiring additional capabilities that must be

demonstrated in flight testing.

The first B-2 deliveries are block 10 configurations for which flight testing

has been completed. The block 10 configuration provides the Air Force

with a training aircraft with limited combat capability. The block 20

configuration will include an interim precision strike capability not

available in the block 10, and the block 30 B-2 will have additional

precision strike capability. By 2000, the Air Force plans to have 21 block

30 B-2s.

Since 1990, we have issued several unclassified reports on the Air Force’s

progress and problems in fielding the B-2. In August 1995, we reported that

the Air Force had not yet demonstrated that the B-2 could meet some of its

important mission requirements and that the contractor had experienced

difficulties in delivering B-2s that meet operational requirements.2

 The

report noted that B-2s were generally delivered late with significant

deviations and waivers, but that the Air Force plans to correct all

deficiencies as the aircraft undergo block modifications. Also, we found

that flight testing has been slower than planned and that the Air Force’s

projections for completing testing were optimistic. We estimated that the

Air Force may need an additional 55 aircraft test months to complete the

planned flight testing.3

 As of April 1996, the Air Force had completed

75 percent of the flight testing; it plans to complete flight testing by July 1,

1997. However, given the amount of flight testing that remains, the Air

Force may not be able to meet this completion date. The Air Force has

reduced the amount of flight testing planned and is assessing further

reductions in order to meet the planned completion date.

Early test results have identified potential problems in the B-2’s ability to

meet some important mission requirements. For example, achieving

acceptable radar signatures, the most critical stealth feature needed for

B-2 operational effectiveness, has been a problem. This problem resulted

in the redesign and retesting of the test aircraft, and in redefinition of

2

B-2 Bomber: Status of Cost, Development, and Production (GAO/NSIAD-95-164, Aug. 4, 1995).

3

An “aircraft test month” is the availability of one test aircraft for 1 month and equates to about 

20 flight test hours.

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Bombers

acceptable radar signatures for the block 10 configuration. Subsequently,

the Air Force completed radar signature flight testing for the block 30 B-2

in March 1996, and characterized test results as generally meeting

predictions. However, in some cases the radar signatures did not meet

planned essential employment capabilities. The Air Force is analyzing the

signatures that did not meet requirements to determine whether further

design and testing is needed. Also, testing revealed problems with the

software and radar system for the terrain-following and terrain-avoidance

system needed for low-level flight. Additional problems may be found as

the concurrent testing and manufacturing proceed, potentially resulting in

the delivery of B-2s with limited operational capability or the need for

modifications beyond the block 30 configuration, which would require

additional funds to correct.

Most B-1B Conventional

Upgrades Not Completed

Until 2006 and Defensive

Avionics Upgrades Not

Fully Defined

The B-1B has had a history of problems and was fielded with some

unproven systems that did not meet user requirements including the

weapon, defensive avionics, and terrain-following systems. DOD has

embarked on a three-phase Conventional Munitions Upgrade Program for

the B-1B that will incrementally equip it with advanced precision-guided

munitions and upgraded computer and defensive avionics systems. Phase I

will equip the bomber with three types of the most modern family of

cluster munitions, including the combined effects munition to attack soft

area targets, mines to attack armor and personnel, and sensor-fuzed

weapons to attack armor. Phase II will add global positioning system

technology; upgrade communications, computer, and defensive avionics

systems; and enable the B-1B to carry new near-precision, short-range

munitions such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition and Wind-Corrected

Munitions Dispenser. Phase III will provide the aircraft with standoff

capability by integrating the Joint Standoff Munition. While most of the

upgrades will be completed about 2006, the defensive avionics upgrades

will not be completed until about 2008 (as shown in fig. 3.1).

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Figure 3.1: Conventional Mission Upgrade Program Schedule

Phase I


Enhanced Capability

Cluster Bomb Unit 87,89, 97

Phase II


Enhanced Capability

Global Positioning System/


Communications Upgrade

Joint Direct Attack Munition/


1760 Interface

Computer Upgrade

Wind Corrected Munitions 


Dispenser

Defensive System Upgrade

Towed Decoy

Phase III


Standoff Capability

Joint Standoff Weapon

Joint Air-to-Surface 


Standoff Missile

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

DEVELOPMENT

CAPABILITY

PRODUCTION

2008

Source: Department of the Air Force.

The Air Force has changed its plans to upgrade the B-1B computer and

defensive avionics systems, which are crucial for integrating and

employing precision munitions, because the planned computer upgrades

would not fully meet operational requirements and the planned defensive

avionics system was too costly. Upgrading computers and software is

critical to enhancing the conventional capabilities of the B-1B. In 1995, we

reviewed the Air Force’s plans to upgrade the B-1B’s computer and found

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that the Air Force had analyzed several options ranging from simply

expanding the current system’s memory to installing new systems and

software.4

 Because of funding priorities, the Air Force initially chose to

only upgrade the memory of the current system. We concluded that simply

upgrading the memory would be inadequate because it would not fully

support the planned conventional mission upgrades and operational

requirements. In response to our report, the Air Force decided to increase

funding to replace the existing computer and convert to new software. We

further concluded that it is extremely important that the Air Force not

revert to a computer upgrade approach for the B-1B based on cost alone

but ensure that sufficient resources are allocated so that the computers

support the planned B-1B conventional capability enhancements. The Air

Force currently estimates that the computer upgrade design phase will be

completed in January 1997 and the upgrades will be completed about the

middle of fiscal year 2006.

In 1988, the Air Force determined that the B-1B defensive avionics system

was flawed and could not meet contract specifications. The specifications

were relaxed to support the B-1B’s nuclear role as a low-altitude

penetrator against Soviet air defenses. In 1992, the Bomber Roadmap

noted that an effective defensive avionics system is more crucial for

conventional missions because of the diversity and number of threats that

the B-1B may encounter. In 1993, DOD began to evaluate defensive avionics

systems requirements and alternatives and developed a two-phase

approach to upgrade the defensive avionics system to incrementally add

capabilities based on when enemy threat systems are expected to become

operational. DOD planned for limited operational capability in 2003 and full

operational capability in 2007. In 1995, the defensive avionics system

upgrade was again redirected to another less costly two-phased approach

that incorporates off-the-shelf components already being used on other

aircraft and technology from other programs. The Air Force plans for the

first phase to provide capabilities adequate for the threat expected

through 2002 and the second phase to provide full capability against more

advanced threats in 2008.

The Air Force currently is modifying the operational requirements

documents for the defensive avionics system and has not completed the

required cost and operational effectiveness analysis for it. This analysis

was initially to be completed in the fall of 1995, and the Air Force currently

expects it to be completed in October 1996. In a December 1995 letter to

4

Embedded Computers: B-1B Computers Must Be Upgraded to Support Conventional Requirements

(GAO/AIMD-96-28, Feb. 27, 1996).

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the Secretary of the Air Force commenting on the conventional upgrade

program, we noted that the B-1B was fielded with a defensive avionics

system that did not meet user requirements in large part because testing

was sacrificed to meet the schedule of fielding the system. We observed

that the Air Force’s current plan appears to include an adequate testing

program. However, we cautioned that the planned testing program needs

to be maintained even if it means extending the program’s completion.

B-1B Has Experienced

Operational Readiness

Problems

It has historically been difficult for the B-1B force to maintain an

acceptable mission capable rate. These rates directly impact the number

of sorties that can be flown over a period of time. In the Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, the Congress expressed its concern

about the low B-1B mission capable rate by requiring the Air Force to

conduct a B-1B Operational Readiness Assessment to determine whether

one B-1B wing could achieve and maintain the 75-percent mission capable

rate for 6 months, if fully supported with personnel, spare parts,

maintenance equipment, and logistical support. The Air Force conducted

the assessment between June 1, 1994, and November 30, 1994, and issued

its final report to congressional defense committees on February 28, 1995.

We, at the direction of the Congress, monitored and reported on the

assessment and found that it was complete and comprehensive and that

the data it generated was credible. The Air Force reported that during the

assessment, the 28th Bomb Wing achieved an 84-percent mission capable

rate. At the end of the assessment, the rate for the entire B-1B fleet was

about 65 percent. The report pointed out that the assessment showed that

the B-1B support structure, if fully funded, could keep the B-1B in a

mission capable status but that it was not a measure of B-1B’s

effectiveness in executing assigned missions. For the 2 years prior to this

assessment, the B-1B fleet mission capable rate averaged about 57 percent.

The rates have improved over time and, in the first 6 months of fiscal year

1996, averaged about 72 percent.

The Air Force concluded that, with an additional $11.2 million for

management actions and reliability and maintainability improvements, the

B-1B fleet has the potential to achieve and sustain a 75-percent mission

capable rate by 2000 if already ongoing initiatives and continued funding

for spare parts are completed. In response, the Congress included

$11.2 million in the Air Force’s fiscal year 1996 budget to improve the

B-1B’s mission capable rate. However, on the basis of our analysis of the

operational readiness assessment, we reported that the $11.2 million

estimate was optimistic and that the Air Force cannot predict how

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successful the ongoing or planned initiatives will be.5 Therefore, the

potential cost to achieve and sustain a 75-percent mission capable rate is

unknown.

Difficulties

Supporting Bombers

at Forward Operating

Locations

Significant challenges remain in demonstrating that the numbers of B-2s

and B-1Bs envisioned for use in conventional conflicts will be able to

operate from forward operating locations for sustained periods of time.

For example, whereas nuclear missions require a single-sortie penetration

of enemy airspace, conventional missions require repetitive sorties, the

ability to deploy to forward operating locations relatively close to the

conflict, and the ability to sustain operations for an extended period of

time. Mobility readiness spares packages, which allow the bombers to

operate from remote locations without resupply until a supply line is

established, were not initially authorized for B-2 and B-1B units because

they were not needed for the nuclear mission. Also, personnel

requirements were geared primarily to nuclear operations.

Officials at one war-fighting command told us that they raised concerns to

the Air Force about the reliability, deployability, and supportability of the

B-1B in developing their war plans and that they initially preferred the

B-52H. These concerns related to B-1B’s historically low mission capable

rate, insufficient mobility readiness spares packages, and personnel

shortfalls. But, at the urging of the Air Force, the war-fighting command

has included some B-1Bs in their war plans.

Mobility Readiness Spares

Packages

Historically, the Air Force has equipped deploying aircraft units with

mobility readiness spares packages that would support them in combat

operations for a 30-day period without the need for resupply. This 30-day

period allows time for the Air Force to establish a resupply system as

airlift becomes more readily available. In 1993, we reported on adding

conventional capabilities to the bombers and noted that 30-day packages

were critical to sustaining B-52G operations in Operation Desert Storm.6

Currently, tactical fighter and B-52H units are authorized 30-day packages.

However, the Air Force plans to provide B-2 and B-1B units with packages

that will support them for only a 14-day period. Air Combat Command

logistics officials responsible for managing the packages believe that the

5

B-1B Bomber: Evaluation of Air Force Report on B-1B Operational Readiness Assessment 

(GAO/NSIAD-95-151, July 18, 1995).

6

Strategic Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex, Time-Consuming, and Costly

(GAO/NSIAD-93-45, Feb. 5, 1993).

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14-day kits may not be adequate to sustain combat operations until

resupply systems are in place. However, the Air Force has not funded

30-day packages because it views other programs as higher priorities.

The Air Force has budgeted $98.1 million in the fiscal year 1997 FYDP to

procure additional B-1B parts and equipment for the 14-day packages

currently authorized. According to Air Force officials, this amount should

fully fund these packages. The 1997 FYDP does not include funds for

additional packages to support the additional B-1B units that the Air Force

will establish with the reconstitution reserve aircraft.

The Air Force, also plans to fund 14-day mobility readiness spares

packages for B-2 units, using funds appropriated for the B-2 program.

According to Air Force officials, the size and cost of the packages have not

been determined yet because the Air Force has limited experience with

the B-2 and cannot yet predict effectively what parts are likely to break

and, therefore, should be included in the packages. The Air Force has

formed a team of B-2 logisticians and maintenance personnel to determine

the mobility readiness spares package requirements for the B-2. By 2000,

the Air Force expects to be able to deploy 16 block 30 B-2s with 14-day

packages. However, it is not clear that 14-day packages will be adequate,

particularly given that some B-2s will be expected to swing to a second

major regional conflict if the need arose.

Personnel Shortages The Air Force currently cannot meet its war-fighting requirement to

support the full complement of B-1B and B-52H bombers allocated to

war-fighting CINCs because of personnel shortages in some occupational

specialties, especially bomb assembly and bomb loading. The shortages

will increase significantly in fiscal years 1999 to 2001 after the Air Force

has established additional B-1B squadrons using the reconstitution reserve

aircraft. By 2003, the Air Force estimates it will need about 1,600 more

personnel than available (as shown in table 3.1).

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Table 3.1: Initial Air Force Projections

of Additional Personnel Needed to

Meet Conventional Wartime Bomber

Deployment Requirements

Fiscal year

1998

Fiscal year

2001-03

B-52 ShortagesB-52 Shortages

Bomb loaders 72 72

Bomb assemblers 191 191

Others 145 145

B-52 Total 408 408

B-1 Shortages

Bomb loaders 69 150

Bomb assemblers 67 275

Others 76 742

B-1 Total 212 1,176

Total 620 1,584

Source: Air Combat Command.

DOD did not include funding in the fiscal year 1997 FYDP to resolve these

personnel shortages. Moreover, the Air Force’s program objective

memorandum for fiscal year 1998 did not include funding to alleviate

them. The Air Force has tasked the Air Combat Command to develop a

plan and identify funding requirements to eliminate the shortages using

either active or reserve personnel or a combination of both. The numbers

in table 3.1 may change somewhat once the Air Combat Command

completes a more detailed review of its requirements.

Conclusions The Air Force faces significant challenges in successfully implementing its

conventional concept of operations to use bombers in two major regional

conflicts. The Air Force has not yet demonstrated that the B-2 can meet

some of its most important operational requirements. B-2 testing to date

has revealed some problems, and continued testing concurrent with

production could result in the delivery of B-2s with limited conventional

capabilities or that require additional modification. The B-1B computer

and defensive system upgrades have been recently redirected and will not

be fully completed until 2006 and 2008, respectively. The Air Force’s

planned testing programs for the B-2 and B-1B need to be fully

implemented to ensure that operational requirements are met.

The Air Force also faces operational challenges in deploying bombers to

forward operating locations early in the conflict and sustaining their

operations. If the B-1B force cannot achieve and sustain a 75-percent

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mission capable rate, it will not be able to generate the number of sorties

envisioned by the Bomber Roadmap. While the B-1B Operational

Readiness Assessment showed that one fully supported wing of B-1Bs can

achieve and sustain at least a 75-percent rate, it is still not known whether

the entire B-1B force can achieve that rate by 2000. The Air Force has not

resolved the bomber personnel shortages in order to meet CINCs

requirements for deployed bombers. Also, the bombers may not be able to

sustain operations before a resupply system is in place because the Air

Force plans to fund 14-day mobility readiness spares packages for the B-2

and B-1B instead of 30-day packages.

Recommendations Bombers that remain in the force will need to be able to deploy and

sustain operations at overseas locations to meet CINC requirements.

Therefore, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the

Secretary of the Air Force to (1) provide an assessment of the risk

resulting from shortfalls in meeting requirements for mobility readiness

spares packages and providing personnel needed to support conventional

operations overseas, including the impact of the shortfalls on the Air

Force’s ability to meet CINC requirements for bombers and (2) prepare

plans and time frames to eliminate these shortfalls or mitigate the risks

associated with them.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with

the recommendation that the Secretary of Defense require the Secretary of

the Air Force to (1) provide an assessment of the risk resulting from

shortfalls in meeting requirements for mobility readiness spares packages

and providing personnel needed to support conventional operations,

including the impact of the shortfalls on the Air Force’s ability to meet

commander in chief requirements for bombers and (2) prepare plans and

time frames to eliminate these shortfalls or mitigate the risks associated

with them. DOD agreed that there is a shortfall in personnel impacting the

Air Force’s ability to meet requirements. The Air Force is evaluating

several options to resolve the personnel issue.

DOD did not agree that there is a shortfall in the mobility readiness spares

packages. DOD noted that, after careful review and analysis, it made a

conscious decision to field 14-day versus 30-day packages for the B-1B and

B-2. DOD said that the new logistics emphasis on rapid transportation

versus large and expensive inventories is consistent with 14-day packages.

Also, DOD noted that it incorporated DOD’s strategic logistics initiative in

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B-1B and B-2 mobility readiness spares package computations. Neither Air

Force nor DOD officials provided evidence that the decision was based on

logistics initiatives, however. Moreover, DOD’s position is contrary to

information we obtained from the Air Combat Command and Air Force

headquarters concerning this issue. Officials at both levels expressed

concern that the 14-day packages were insufficient to meet requirements

and that the decision to fund only the 14-day package was budget driven.

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Costs to Operate and Modernize the Planned

Bomber Force Are Significant and Will

Increase

DOD’s fiscal year 1997 FYDP includes about $17 billion to operate, sustain,

and modernize the planned bomber force for 1996 through 2001. As shown

in table 4.1, $6.3 billion, or 37 percent, reflect investment costs,1

 while

$10.7 billion (63 percent) reflect amounts planned to operate and support

bombers.2

 Spending on operations and support funding is expected to

increase significantly after 2001, once the Air Force has established two

new squadrons of B-1Bs and has completed the B-2 program. Cost

estimates developed by IDA for the 1995 Heavy Bomber Force Study show

that the B-1B force will account for the largest portion of future bomber

operation and support costs but that the B-2 will be by far the most costly

bomber to operate on a per aircraft basis, costing over three times as

much as the B-1B and over four times as much as the B-52H.

The total cost to modernize DOD’s heavy bomber force is likely to exceed

$7 billion by 2008. In addition to spending over $6 billion between fiscal

years 1996 and 2001 to modernize the bomber force, the Air Force expects

to spend almost $800 million beyond 2001 to complete modifications to the

B-1B. Moreover, the Air Force is studying options to upgrade the B-2 force

beyond the block 30 configuration which, if approved, would result in

additional investment costs beyond those programmed in the fiscal 

year 1997 FYDP.

Table 4.1: Fiscal Year 1997 FYDP

Funding for Heavy Bombers Dollars in billions 1996-2001

Bomber

Operations and

support Investment Total

B-2 2.8 4.1 6.9

B-1B 4.7 1.9 6.6

B-52H 3.2 0.3 3.5

Total 10.7 6.3 17.0

Source: Our analysis of the fiscal year 1997 FYDP.

Operations and

Support Costs Will

Grow

Operations and support costs included in the fiscal year 1997 FYDP support

a smaller number of operational bombers during the initial years, then

grow to support a larger force once the Air Force establishes two new

B-1B squadrons and additional B-2s enter the inventory. For example, in

fiscal year 1996, the fiscal year 1997 FYDP reflects funding for only 

1

“Investment costs” include funds programmed for research, development, test, and evaluation;

military construction; and procurement.

2

“Operations and support costs” include operations and maintenance and military personnel funding.

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60 operational B-1Bs because the Air Force has placed 27 B-1Bs in

reconstitution reserve and categorizes the remaining aircraft as test or

backup assets. Operations and support costs for 2001 reflect funding for 

82 operational B-1Bs. In addition, the Air Force expects to have 

16 operational B-2s by 2000 versus 9 B-2s in fiscal year 1996. As more B-2

and B-1B aircraft become operational, costs for personnel, fuel, general

and system support, and depot-level maintenance will increase.

According to an analysis conducted by IDA as part of the 1995 DOD Heavy

Bomber Force Study, annual operations costs for DOD’s planned bomber

force will continue to increase beyond 2001, until the planned bomber

force reaches its steady state in the year 2007 (when bomber modifications

are nearly completed). The Air Force does not have as much experience

operating the B-1B and the B-2 as it does operating the B-52. Thus, B-1B

and B-2 long-term operations and maintenance costs are somewhat

difficult to predict. However, costs to maintain the B-1B and B-2 force,

particularly for items such as software maintenance, are expected to

increase once these aircraft are upgraded for the conventional role and

gain the capability to deliver a wider range of unguided and

precision-guided weapons. As part of the 1995 DOD Heavy Bomber Force

Study, IDA estimated steady state operations and support costs for each of

the bombers. Figure 4.1 compares the average annual operations and

support costs for each of the bombers reflected in DOD’s fiscal year 1997

FYDP with IDA’s estimate of annual steady state costs to operate and

maintain each of the bombers.

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Increase

Figure 4.1: Comparison of Average Annual Operations and Support Costs by Bomber Type (In millions of fiscal year 1996

constant dollars)

B-2 B-1B B-52H TOTAL

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

433

721

506

1,660

637

912

448

1,997

Costs

FYDP IDA

Note: Comparison is between costs reflected in DOD’s 1997 FYDP and IDA’s estimate of annual

costs beginning in 2007.

Source: Our analysis of data from the fiscal year 1997 FYDP and IDA data supporting DOD’s

Heavy Bomber Force Study.

The planned bomber program will cost about $337 million more annually

than the average annual costs in fiscal year 1997 FYDP, or about $2 billion

more over a 6-year period. This represents an increase in costs of

20 percent.

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Bomber Force Are Significant and Will

Increase

As shown in figure 4.1, the total B-1B force will cost more than either the

B-52H or the B-2 force to operate and sustain both in the near term and the

more distant future. This is because DOD plans to maintain a larger B-1B

force compared with the B-52H and the B-2 forces. As shown in figure 4.2,

each B-2 is over three times as expensive as a B-1B and over four times as

expensive as a B-52H.

Figure 4.2: Annual Operations and

Support Costs Per Bomber in 2007 (in

Millions of Fiscal Year 1996 Dollars)

B-52H B-1B B-2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Millions

6.8

9.6

31.9

Source: Our analysis of IDA data supporting DOD’s Heavy Bomber Force Study.

Costs to Modernize

the Heavy Bomber

Force

The total cost to modernize DOD’s bomber force will be at least $7 billion

through 2008. The fiscal year 1997 FYDP includes about $6.3 billion to

modernize the heavy bomber force. About 95 percent of these funds will

be used to upgrade the conventional capabilities of the B-1B and complete

the B-2 program. Modifications to the B-52H to enhance its conventional

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Bomber Force Are Significant and Will

Increase

capabilities and improve safety and reliability will cost only about

$300 million. DOD plans to spend almost an additional $800 million beyond

2001 to complete the B-1B conventional upgrade.

B-1B Investment Costs The costs to modernize the B-1B force between fiscal years 1996 and 2008

will exceed $2.8 billion. The Air Force plans to spend about $2.3 billion to

improve the B-1B’s conventional capabilities and about $0.5 billion to

improve the B-1B’s engine, power system, and flight safety. The estimated

B-1B investment cost is shown in table 4.2.

Table 4.2: B-1B Investments

Dollars in millions

Fiscal years

1996-2001

Beyond fiscal

year 2001 Total

Conventional

enhancements

1,543 799 2,342

Other modifications

and support items

433 46 479

Total 1,976 845 2,821

Source: Our analysis of Air Force data.

B-2 Investment Costs The fiscal year 1997 FYDP includes about $4.1 billion in research and

development and procurement funds to complete 21 B-2s. The 1994

Defense Authorization Act limited B-2 program acquisition costs to 

$28.968 billion, expressed in fiscal year 1981 constant dollars. In

August 1995, we reported that an Air Force cost estimate indicated the

final cost for 20 operational aircraft will be about $28.820 billion in fiscal

year 1981 dollars, or about $44.4 billion in then-year dollars. Although the

legislative cost cap for the first 20 aircraft no longer applies as a result of

language included in the fiscal year 1996 Defense Authorization Act, the

Air Force still plans to complete the first 20 B-2s for about $44.4 billion.

The Air Force plans to use $493 million in additional B-2 funds made

available by the Congress in fiscal year 1996 to convert a test aircraft,

known as AV-1, into the 21st operational B-2.

The Air Force is studying several options to upgrade the B-2’s capabilities

beyond those included in block 30 that could result in additional B-2

investments. In 1994, the Air Force began to explore options for a B-2

Multi-Stage Improvement Program by contracting with the B-2 prime

contractor to study potential enhancements to the B-2. The contractor

developed four options to improve the B-2’s conventional capabilities and

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reduce operations and support costs. The Air Force will further assess the

options to determine their cost-effectiveness. Also, as part of the 1995 DOD

Heavy Bomber Force Study, IDA identified several additional

enhancements to the B-2 for DOD to consider. The fiscal year 1997 FYDP

does not include funding for any of these options.

Conclusions Over the next decade, DOD plans to spend billions of dollars to operate,

sustain, and modernize the bomber force. In constant dollars, the costs to

operate and sustain the bomber force will increase as the Air Force funds

more bombers for operations and the bomber force reaches a steady state

around 2007. While the B-1B will cost more in total operations and support

costs on an annual basis than the other bombers because of its larger

numbers, the B-2 will be by far the most expensive bomber to operate and

sustain on a per aircraft basis, costing over three times as much as the

B-1B and over four times as much as the B-52H.

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Options for Reducing Bomber Costs

On the basis of our analysis of DOD’s requirements for bombers and

planned force structure, we identified four options for reducing and

restructuring DOD’s bomber force that would achieve cost savings while

retaining extensive aggregate airpower capabilities. The first two

alternatives—retiring all or a portion of the B-1B fleet—would result in a

smaller bomber force than DOD currently plans. Retiring or reducing the

B-1B force would not result in a significant decrease in DOD’s existing

capabilities given that the B-1B currently lacks an effective defensive

avionics system and is capable of delivering few types of conventional

weapons. Retiring or reducing the B-1B force after the conventional

upgrades are completed would reduce the CINCs’ ability to attack some

targets as quickly as desired and would reduce DOD’s long-range capability.

However, DOD would retain sufficient airpower capabilities in the

aggregate to destroy ground targets associated with two major regional

conflicts. The third and fourth options—increasing the number of B-1Bs in

the Air National Guard and reducing the number of planned B-1B

bases—offer lower cost savings because they do not reduce the number of

bombers in the planned force.

The options we developed, even those that call for a smaller bomber force,

assume that DOD will maintain its planned force of 21 B-2s and 71 B-52Hs.

These aircraft will continue to be needed for the nuclear role and

therefore appear to be less suitable candidates for retirement or

downsizing than the B-1B. Although both DOD and the Congress have

considered the need for additional B-2s in recent years, substantial future

costs could be avoided if the size of the B-2 force is capped at 21 aircraft

as DOD currently plans. Procuring additional B-2s would hinder DOD’s

efforts to develop an affordable long-term recapitalization plan unless

offsetting cuts in other programs were realized.

Restructuring or

Reducing the Bomber

Force Would Generate

Savings

According to DOD officials, DOD must identify funds for recapitalization if it

is to ensure a modern, ready force for the future. For example, many of the

tactical aircraft purchased during the defense buildup in the 1980s will

reach their projected retirement age over the next 10 or more years. DOD’s

tactical aircraft procurement plans call for much greater than expected

resources in the outyears than currently planned. By the year 2001, DOD

expects procurement funding to increase to $60 billion—over 40 percent

higher than the administration’s fiscal year 1997 budget request. This plan

assumes that (1) the defense budget top line will stop its decline in fiscal

year 1997 and begin to rise again, (2) DOD will achieve significant savings

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Options for Reducing Bomber Costs

from infrastructure reductions, and (3) DOD will achieve significant savings

through acquisition reform.

Within the past few years, defense experts have questioned the realism of

DOD’s plan for achieving a balanced, modernized force that assumes no

further reductions from force levels established by BUR. For example, our

analysis of DOD’s planned funding for infrastructure,1

 issued in April 1996,

states that DOD will realize no significant net infrastructure savings

between fiscal years 1996 and 2001 that can be applied to modernization.

Moreover, DOD has not quantified the savings it expects to achieve from

acquisition reform. In recent months, DOD’s leadership has recognized that

DOD may need to identify other sources of funding from within DOD’s

budget for high-priority modernization efforts. Among the options being

considered by DOD are reducing infrastructure below levels assumed in

DOD’s fiscal year 1997 FYDP, transferring additional missions to the reserve

component, and identifying opportunities for eliminating systems that

provide redundant capabilities. DOD’s Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study,

which will examine the contributions of each of the services’ airpower

assets compared with other assets in DOD’s current and projected

inventory, is one such effort that may identify opportunities for reducing

or eliminating redundant airpower capabilities, according to DOD officials.

Options Differ in

Terms of

Opportunities for Cost

Savings and Effects

on Military Capability

The four options we developed differ in terms of their potential for

achieving cost savings and their effects on DOD’s aggregate airpower

capabilities. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the potential

budget savings associated with the four options, using DOD’s fiscal year

1996 plan as its baseline. As shown in table 5.1, option one would yield the

greatest cost savings; option four the least savings. Options two through

four are not mutually exclusive. Various combinations of them would save

DOD more money.

1

Defense Infrastructure: Budget Estimates for 1996-2001 Offer Little Savings for Modernization

(GAO/NSIAD-96-131, Apr. 4, 1996).

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Options for Reducing Bomber Costs

Table 5.1: Five-Year Cost Savings of

Four Options (fiscal years 1997-2001) Dollars in millions

Option Budget authority Budget outlays

Retire 95 

B-1Bs

$5,890 $5,310

Retire 27 

B-1Bs

450 380

Place 24 more

B-1Bs in Air National Guard

70 70

Consolidate Basing of Active

B-1Bs

40 39

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

The first two options would reduce somewhat DOD’s aggregate capability

to attack some ground targets and would reduce DOD’s inventory of

long-range assets that can attack targets at significant distances without

refueling. However, because significant redundancy exists in the services’

ability to destroy ground targets, the United States would still have

sufficient airpower capabilities to destroy ground targets associated with

two major regional conflicts. The last two options would keep 95 B-1Bs in

the force and therefore would have negligible impact on DOD’s

conventional capabilities. Because the B-1B will be taken out of the

nuclear role in the near future, none of the options will have an effect on

DOD’s planned nuclear force, even if START II is not ratified.

Option 1: Retire

DOD’s B-1B Force

As discussed in chapter 2, DOD’s principal studies of bomber requirements

have significant limitations in their methodology and in some cases

include questionable assumptions that may overstate DOD’s need for

bombers in conventional conflicts. Moreover, our 1996 review of DOD’s air

power capabilities and the Commission on Roles and Missions concluded

that DOD appears to have more than ample capability to destroy ground

targets.2

 In October 1995, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated

that he will challenge the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to

propose innovative recommendations to maintain U.S. war-fighting

capability without necessarily maintaining the same number of systems.

The Chairman’s report further stated that DOD cannot afford all of the

validated requirements in the queue and that tough decisions must be

made on which modernization programs to go ahead with and which to

2

Combat Air Power: Joint Mission Assessments Needed Before Making Program and Budget Decisions

(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-196, July 27, 1996).

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cancel so that DOD can develop and implement a long-term, sustainable

recapitalization plan.

Retiring the B-1B is one option that would somewhat reduce DOD’s

aggregate conventional airpower capabilities and result in significant cost

savings—about $5.9 billion in budget authority for fiscal years 1997-2001.

Eliminating the B-1B force would decrease DOD’s inventory of long-range

airpower assets and increase U.S. forces’ dependency on other capabilities

and, therefore, the risk that some targets might not be hit as quickly as

desired. However, it is plausible to expect that the targets could be hit by

other U.S. military assets. B-2s and B-52Hs would still be available for

missions requiring long-range and large payload capabilities.

Risk Associated With

Retiring B-1Bs May Be

Acceptable in Light of the

Multiple Ways to Strike

Targets Assigned to B-1Bs

Our analysis of Air Force modeling of the air campaign for two major

regional conflicts in the 2001-2005 time frame showed there are no unique

B-1B targets. Table 5.2 shows that DOD has numerous ways to attack the

target the B-1B would strike most frequently during the first 7 days of a

conflict.

Table 5.2: Multiple Ways to Hit B-1B’s

Most Frequent Target During the First

7 Days of a Conflict

Munition B-1B B-2 B-52 F-15E F-16 MLRS

GBU-12 X X

GBU-15 X

GBU-24 X X

MK-82 X X X

MK-82R X

MK-82R/B-1B X

MK-84 X X

MK-84R X

M-117 X

JDAM/MK-84 X X X X X

AGM-65G X

AGM-130/BLU-109 X

ATACMS-Block I X

ATACMS-Block IA X

Source: Our analysis of DOD data.

In May 1995, DOD’s Heavy Bomber Force Study concluded that retiring the

existing 95 B-1Bs would save $20 billion over 25 years but would not be

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cost-effective because it would reduce force effectiveness appreciably.

However, the DOD Heavy Bomber Force Study focused on comparing the

relative cost-effectiveness of alternative bomber forces. It did not attempt

to evaluate cost-effectiveness trade-offs between bombers and other force

alternatives, such as carrier battle groups or Air Force tactical aircraft.

Air Force officials and documents cite several advantages to keeping

B-1Bs in the force. For example, near-supersonic airspeed and

maneuverability give the B-1 the ability to fly with Air Force fighter aircraft

in force packages much like the F-111 did in the Gulf War—but instead of

four 2000-pound weapons, the B-1 can carry as many as 24. Another

advantage of using bombers in conventional conflicts is that they can be

based outside the theater of operations and attack targets at greater

ranges than fighter aircraft that require refueling. Retiring the B-1B could

increase a CINCs’ need to rely on refueling assets in planning an air

campaign. However, DOD plans to improve its refueling capabilities

through greater use of multi-point refueling and most likely theaters are

small enough that, with available refueling support, all types of aircraft can

reach most targets. The loss of long-range capability associated with

retiring the B-1B would have the greatest impact in scenarios in which

tactical aircraft are assumed to have no access or limited access to bases

in theater. However, the United States has agreements with many nations

to facilitate access to overseas bases in times of crisis. Another advantage

to keeping the B-1B is that it provides mass—the ability to drop large

quantities of weapons to achieve widespread destruction and, as

evidenced by Desert Storm, with the B-52’s psychological effect. However,

even if the B-1Bs were retired, DOD would still have B-52Hs and B-2s

available for this purpose in numbers comparable to those used during

Desert Storm.

Retiring the B-1B would not degrade U.S. military capabilities in mission

areas other than ground attack. The B-1B does not have an air-to-air

capability in contrast to multi-mission platforms such as F-16s and

F/A-18s, which would be assigned many of the same types of targets as

B-1Bs during a conventional conflict. In addition, as noted in chapter 3, the

B-1B bomber—unlike many other ground-attack assets in DOD’s current

inventory—has not yet demonstrated critical capabilities needed to be

effective in conventional operations. Retiring the B-1B force also would

have no adverse effect on DOD’s nuclear mission. Unlike the B-52H and the

B-2, the B-1B will no longer have a nuclear mission once B-2s enter the

force. DOD officials stated that even if START II is not ratified and the United

States decides to maintain a larger nuclear force than the Nuclear Posture

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Review recommended, DOD would not reassign B-1Bs a nuclear role. Once

the B-1B’s computers are modified so that the B-1B can deliver precision

conventional weapons, the B-1B will no longer have the software needed

to deliver nuclear weapons. DOD could modify B-1B software and recertify

personnel for the nuclear mission. However, this would require at least 

18 months and would be very costly, according to DOD officials. Instead,

DOD evaluated several other options for maintaining a larger force

structure in the event that START II implementation is delayed, such as

keeping more TRIDENT submarines than if the treaty is implemented.

Retiring the B-1B Would

Result in Significant Cost

Savings

Retiring the B-1B force would save about $5.9 billion in budget authority

and about $5.3 billion in budget outlays for fiscal years 1997-2001. 

Table 5.3 identifies the annual savings for this option.

Table 5.3: Budget Savings for Retiring

the Air Force’s 95 B-1B Bombers Dollars in millions

FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 Total

Budget authority $770 $1,230 $1,240 $1,270 $1,380 $5,890

Outlays 490 1,040 1,150 1,240 1,390 5,310

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

In estimating the cost savings of this option, the Congressional Budget

Office assumed that the B-1B force would be retired over a 1-year period

beginning immediately, resulting in smaller savings for fiscal year 1997.

Option 2: Retire 27

B-1Bs in

Reconstitution

Reserve

The Air Force currently has 27 aircraft in reconstitution reserve that lack

aircrews and funding for operations. Beginning in fiscal year 1997, the Air

Force will begin to reduce the number of unfunded reconstitution reserve

aircraft and will establish two new operational B-1B squadrons by using

the aircraft that are currently in reconstitution reserve and funding

additional aircrews and flying hours. The Air Force has included the cost

of upgrading reconstitution reserve aircraft in the B-1B Conventional

Munitions Upgrade Program estimated to cost $2.3 billion from fiscal 

years 1996 through 2008.

If DOD perceives that the risks to retire the entire B-1B fleet outweigh the

savings that could be realized, it could choose to retire 27 reconstitution

reserve B-1Bs and keep 68 B-1Bs in the force, 60 of which would be funded

for combat operations or training. Retiring 27 of DOD’s 95 B-1Bs would

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mean that DOD would have to accept some decrease in long-range

capability and may not be able to strike some of the ground targets DOD

planners have identified for two major regional conflicts as quickly as it

could with a larger bomber force. However, this option would not result in

as much of a loss in capability as retiring the entire B-1B fleet. If 27 B-1Bs

were retired, DOD would still have numerous other combinations of

platforms and weapons to attack the types of targets that the B-1B is

planned to destroy, and DOD would retain the ability to attack ground

targets associated with two major regional conflicts. In comparison with

retiring all 95 B-1Bs, this option would provide the CINCs with more

flexibility in planning air campaigns and basing aircraft in theater, since

B-1Bs would be based somewhat farther away from the theater of

operations and would not require refueling during a typical wartime

mission, unless operating from the United States. This option would also

provide some B-1Bs that could fly with tactical aircraft to provide massive

firepower during the early phase of an air campaign. Retiring 27 B-1Bs

would have no impact on DOD’s ability to fulfill its nuclear mission.

Retiring the 27 B-1Bs in reconstitution reserve would save about

$450 million in budget authority for fiscal years 1997-2001, according to

the Congressional Budget Office. Table 5.4 identifies the annual savings for

this option.

Table 5.4: Budget Savings for Retiring

27 B-1B Reconstitution Reserve

Aircraft

Dollars in millions

FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 Total

Budget authority $2 $4 $4 $80 $360 $450

Outlays 2 4 4 60 310 380

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Recognizing that reconstitution reserve aircraft place an increased

maintenance workload on the squadron, the Air Force has authorized and

funded four additional maintenance personnel per reconstitution reserve

aircraft. Savings in the near term reflect the immediate termination of

these positions. Savings increase significantly in 2000 because DOD would

not establish two additional operational squadrons and could eliminate the

personnel and flying-hour costs associated with these aircraft. Retiring 27

B-1Bs also would save procurement funds since DOD would upgrade only

68 B-1Bs for the conventional mission instead of 95 B-1Bs. However, the

Congressional Budget Office did not include these savings in its estimate

because the upgrades will occur beyond 2001.

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Option 3: Place

Additional B-1Bs in

the Air National

Guard

Placing more B-1Bs in the Air National Guard is an option that could

reduce the cost to maintain DOD’s bomber force while preserving the

war-fighting capability of DOD’s planned bomber force. By fiscal year 1998,

the Air Force will have 18 B-1Bs fully trained in the conventional role and

able to deploy for wartime operations. B-1Bs will no longer have a nuclear

role in the near future, thus making the transfer of B-1Bs to the Air

National Guard somewhat easier than transferring B-52s to the Air Force

Reserve. According to DOD, the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard

have successfully met the challenges of operating fighter, transport, and

tanker aircraft and should be able to readily adapt to the bomber mission.

Placing 24 more B-1Bs in the Air National Guard would save about

$70 million in budget authority for fiscal years 1997 to 2001. We examined

placing 24 more B-1Bs in the Air National Guard because it would achieve

a 50/50 active/reserve ratio when attrition and backup aircraft are

excluded and the Air Force has placed 50 percent or more of some

refueling and air mobility assets in the reserve component. Greater cost

savings could be achieved by placing a higher percentage of the B-1B force

in the Air National Guard. However, active Air Force and Air National

Guard officials stated that placing the entire B-1B force in the National

Guard would not be advisable because the reserve component relies on

active-duty units to develop tactics and provide a pool of trained labor. For

example, more than 98 percent of the reserve components’ pilots and over

70 percent of their maintenance specialists have prior active service

experience, according to a RAND study on reserves.

War-Fighting Capability

Would Be Maintained

On the basis of our review of DOD analyses and other studies that have

examined the active/reserve mix, we believe that transferring additional

B-1Bs to the Air National Guard is not likely to degrade combat

effectiveness. In 1993, DOD reported to the Congress that placing B-1Bs in

the Air National Guard would result in no loss of war-fighting capability.

Moreover, according to RAND, air reserve combat units appear to have

readiness similar to active-duty units. For example, during Desert Storm,

no post-mobilization validation or significant additional training was

required prior to deploying reserve component tactical fighter units. Also,

many air reserve units are required to be ready to deploy within the same

time as active units based in the continental United States.

Air Force officials cited the Air National Guard’s limited experience with

the B-1B mission as one of the key reasons the Air Force decided to place

only 18 B-1B bombers in the Air National Guard instead of assigning a

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larger percentage of the force to the Guard. Also, one Air Force official

stated that one disadvantage of placing more B-1Bs in the Air National

Guard is the risk that presidential call-up of the reserves could be delayed.

According to this official, this concern has led CINCs to plan on deploying

active combat aircraft units before reserve units, even though reserve

units are often required to maintain a capability to mobilize within the

same number of days as active units. For example, during Desert Storm,

the Air Force met most of its requirements for combat aircraft first with

active units, then with reserve units.

Air National Guard Units

Are Less Expensive Than

Active Units

A major benefit of transferring bombers to the reserve component is that

reserve units have traditionally been less expensive to operate than their

active duty counterparts. The decision to assign B-1B bombers to the Air

National Guard was supported by cost model comparisons and

cost-benefit analyses. DOD’s analysis, which was completed in 1993,

showed that a B-1B Air National Guard squadron consisting of 10 aircraft

would cost less to operate than a comparable active squadron. These

savings are attributable to two factors. First, DOD expects that an Air

National Guard squadron will require fewer flying hours than an active

squadron because Air National Guard units are able to recruit more

experienced pilots who require less frequent training to maintain their

proficiency. Personnel costs are the second major factor that account for

the Air National Guard’s lower cost. In comparison with active squadrons

that consist primarily of active military personnel, Air National Guard

units rely heavily on less-costly civilians and part-time guard personnel.

Placing an additional 24 B-1Bs in the Air National Guard, thereby

achieving a 50/50 active/reserve ratio when attrition and backup aircraft

are excluded, would result in a cost savings of about $70 million in budget

authority for fiscal years 1997-2001, according to the Congressional Budget

Office. Table 5.5 identifies the annual savings associated with this option.

Table 5.5: Budget Savings for Placing

24 More B-1Bs in the Air National

Guard

Dollars in millions

FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 Total

Budget Authority 0 0 0 $20 $50 $70

Outlays 0 0 0 20 50 70

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

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In developing its estimate, the Congressional Budget Office assumed that

one additional Air National Guard unit consisting of eight aircraft would

be started in fiscal year 2000 and two additional units would be started in

2001. Savings shown for 2001 would recur annually beyond the years

shown. Although there would be some costs associated with starting up

new Air National Guard units, these costs could be kept to a minimum if

the units are located at the same bases as active duty bomber units, as DOD

suggested in its 1993 report to the Congress on transferring bombers to the

reserve component. This has occurred at Barksdale Air Force Base in

Louisiana where the Air Force has located a B-52H Air Force Reserve

squadron alongside active B-52H units.

Option 4: Consolidate

Basing of Active B-1B

Bombers

The Air Force plans to move a detachment of six B-1Bs currently located

at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota to Mountain Home Air Force

Base in Idaho so that the detachment will be collocated with the 366th

Wing, one of the Air Force’s three composite wings. Keeping these six

aircraft at Ellsworth would result in no measurable loss of capability and

would enable DOD to save about $40 million. Leaving these six B-1Bs at

Ellsworth also would eliminate potential difficulties in operating from

Mountain Home that could occur over the next few years if the Air Force

moves the aircraft as planned before construction of permanent facilities

has begun.

Impact on War-Fighting

Capability Would Be

Minimal

Force projection composite wings are a significant change from the Air

Force’s traditional peacetime basing and wartime employment of aircraft.

Traditionally, the Air Force has based one type of aircraft in a wing to

achieve economies of specialization. In wartime, the Air Force assembles

the needed mix of aircraft as a composite force package en route to a

target. By permanently collocating different types of aircraft under one

commander, the Air Force intends that force projection composite wings

can deploy rapidly and fight autonomously, if necessary. According to the

Air Force, moving the B-1Bs to Mountain Home Air Force Base will

improve the operational readiness of the 366th Wing by providing more

opportunities for B-1B crews to train with other wing assets, including

F-15s and F-16s.

However, the Air Force has not demonstrated that composite wings

provide significant benefits over traditional basing schemes. In 1993, we

reported that the Air Force did not conduct sufficient analysis before

deciding to build force projection composite wings in the United States

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and that evidence does not exist that these wings will achieve significant

advantages when compared with traditional peacetime basing concepts.3

The Air Force’s experience in establishing a wartime composite wing at

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, during the Gulf War demonstrated that the

advantages attributed to force projection composite wings can be

achieved without permanent collocation of aircraft. In addition, the three

force projection composite wings the Air Force has established still need

to train and deploy with specialized aircraft gained from different bases

and commanders. Finally, opportunities for composite training by force

projection wings could be limited by competing priorities and range

restrictions. The Air Force acknowledges that the Mountain Home Air

Force Base training range is incapable of supporting large-scale composite

force training. Larger ranges are available in Utah and Nevada that can

accommodate these exercises; however, using these ranges requires

additional flying time and fuel.

The Air Force plans to move the B-1Bs to Mountain Home during fiscal

years 1996 and 1997, before funds to construct permanent facilities are

approved. The unit will be housed in temporary facilities until permanent

facilities are completed several years later. During the intervening years

prior to the completion of permanent facilities, the B-1B squadron at

Mountain Home will be dependent on maintenance and munitions support

from Ellsworth Air Force Base. Turnaround times for replacement or

repairs of spare parts could increase due to the need to transport

reparables between the two locations. In addition, the unit at Mountain

Home Air Force Base will have very limited combat munitions loading

capability until sometime after the year 2000 when munitions storage

facilities are completed. If tasked with a wartime mission during this

period, B-1Bs based at Mountain Home would either deploy to an

in-theater forward operating location without munitions or fly to Ellsworth

to be loaded with munitions before deploying to theater.

Military Construction

Costs Could Be Avoided

The Air Force estimates that temporary and permanent facilities at

Mountain Home will cost about $40 million to construct. The Air Force has

programmed about $6 million in operations and maintenance funds to

provide temporary facilities in fiscal year 1996 and plans to obligate these

funds shortly. In addition, the Air Force funded $34 million in the fiscal

year 1997 budget for military construction of permanent facilities for

maintenance, operations, and housing. It does not expect construction of

3

Air Force Organization: More Assessment Needed Before Implementing Force Projection Composite

Wings (GAO/NSIAD-93-44, May 5, 1993).

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these facilities to be complete until sometime after the year 2000. Table 5.6

identifies the annual savings for this option.

Table 5.6: Budget Savings for

Reversing the Air Force’s Decision to

Move Six B-1Bs to Mountain Home Air

Force Base

Dollars in millions

FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 Total

Budget authority $6 $34 0 0 0 $40

Outlays 5 7 13 9 5 39

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Additional B-2s Would

Exacerbate DOD’s

Efforts to Develop

and Implement a

Long-Term

Recapitalization Plan

Although funding for additional B-2s is not included in DOD’s plan, DOD and

the Congress have considered the need for additional B-2s beyond DOD’s

planned force of 21 B-2s in recent years. Proponents of buying additional

B-2 bombers perceive that DOD needs more than the 187 bombers it plans

to keep in the force because BUR stated that the United States may need

100 bombers for a major regional conflict and DOD may need to swing

bombers from one theater to another if a second major regional conflict

arose. However, on the basis of the analysis conducted during the 1995

DOD Heavy Bomber Force Study and affordability concerns, DOD

determined in May 1995 that it should not procure additional B-2s. In early

1996, the President directed that the issue of more B-2s be reexamined.

DOD will examine the potential contribution of B-2s further as part of its

Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, scheduled for completion in early 1997.

While our options for retiring or reducing the B-1B force would achieve

significant savings, these savings would be eliminated if DOD procured

additional B-2s. Substantial future costs could be avoided if the current

B-2 force were capped at 21 as DOD currently plans. Moreover, additional

B-2 procurements would make it more difficult for DOD to develop and

implement a long-term recapitalization plan. In October 1995, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that he, along with the CINCs

and Joint Chiefs, continues to strongly recommend against congressional

action to add additional funding for more B-2s because the military has

much higher priorities on which to spend limited procurement dollars. As

shown in figure 5.1, life-cycle cost estimates for 20 additional B-2s

developed by government agencies, IDA, and Northrop Grumman range

from $18.7 billion to $26.8 billion.

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Figure 5.1: Twenty-Five Year Life Cycle Cost Estimates for 20 Additional B-2s (In billions of fiscal year 1996 dollars)

Northrop-Grumman IDA Air Force CAIG CBO

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

18.7

24.5 24.6

26 26.8

Estimator

Costs

Source: Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

Our analysis of DOD’s airpower capabilities suggests that DOD may be able

to eliminate some of its planned capabilities, rather than carry through

with all of the planned upgrades or expand beyond its existing plans by

procuring additional systems such as more B-2s. For example, our report

on interdiction concluded that DOD has ample capability today to destroy

interdiction targets associated with two major regional conflicts and

questioned the need for some planned improvements to DOD’s interdiction

capability given the amount of redundancy that exists today.4

4

Combat Air Power: Reassessing Plans to Modernize Interdiction Capabilities Could Save Billions

(GAO/NSIAD-96-72, May 13, 1996).

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Some B-2 advocates also argue that procuring 20 more B-2s will save

money because B-2s will be able to penetrate defenses and use low-cost,

short-range attack weapons rather than expensive standoff weapons.

However, in 1995, the Congressional Budget Office found that additional

B-2s would reduce the cost of weapons expended by the bomber force by

less than $2 billion during the first 2 weeks of a conflict when the Air

Force envisions bombers would make their greatest contribution. This is a

small fraction of the $26.8-billion life cycle cost that the Congressional

Budget Office projects that an additional 20 B-2s would cost.

Within the past few years, several studies sponsored by industry,

independent think tanks, and federally funded research and development

centers have analyzed the need for more B-2s. Many of the studies that

advocate procuring more B-2s assume that the B-2 will be a highly stealthy

aircraft that will be able to find mobile targets and react quickly to

changes in air defenses. However, as discussed in chapter 3, the B-2 has

not yet demonstrated some of its essential mission capabilities, including

the extent to which it will be able to evade detection by enemy radar. 

Moreover, unless upgraded beyond the block 30 configuration, B-2s would

have to rely on other sensors to tell them where to look and would have

trouble adjusting to rapid changes in threat.

Many of these studies also assume that conflicts would happen without

warning and, therefore, tactical aircraft will not be available in large

numbers. In contrast, DOD’s Heavy Bomber Force Study, which concluded

that procuring additional B-2s would not be cost-effective compared with

the planned bomber forces, assumed that significant numbers of tactical

aircraft would be available at the outset of a conflict, thereby reducing the

potential contribution of B-2s. In conducting the Heavy Bomber Force

Study, IDA reviewed a number of studies that advocate procuring more

B-2s and concluded that the differences in the studies are due primarily to

differences in assumptions, particularly those regarding warning time and

the availability of tactical aircraft. The assumptions used by IDA are

generally consistent with those used in DOD’s BUR, the Defense Planning

Guidance, and the Joint Staff’s Nimble Dancer wargame.

In addition, DOD has concluded that additional B-2s are not needed to meet

future nuclear war-fighting requirements, particularly in view of the

nuclear weapons carrying capability limits included in START II. DOD’s

Nuclear Posture Review, completed in 1994, concluded that 66 B-52Hs and

20 B-2 bombers would provide sufficient capability for the nuclear leg of

the strategic triad, assuming implementation of START I and II agreements

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by 2003. The START II, once implemented, will limit the U.S. nuclear

warhead carrying capability to 3,500 warheads, of which about 1,320 are

planned for the bomber force. Even with DOD’s planned force of 21 B-2s

and 71 B-52Hs, the Air Force will be required to modify some B-52Hs so

that they can carry fewer warheads to stay within the 1,320 limit allocated

to the bomber force. More specifically, some B-52H bombers may be

modified so that they can carry only 12 nuclear weapons under the wings

instead of the maximum of 20 (12 under the wings and 8 inside the bomb

bay). If START II is implemented, procuring 20 additional B-2s would require

further changes in the B-52H force, which could be achieved either by

reducing the size of the force or modifying more B-52Hs so that they can

carry fewer weapons.

Conclusions Considering the extensive and improving ground-attack capabilities of U.S.

forces, the numerous other options that DOD has to attack most targets that

the B-1B is likely to be assigned in future conflicts, and DOD’s awareness

that it may need to reduce the number of systems currently planned to

ensure a stable, modernized force for the future, we believe that retiring

the B-1B force is an option that merits consideration in the context of

DOD’s ongoing assessment of its future airpower needs. Retiring the B-1B

force would leave DOD with a bomber force of 71 B-52s and 21 B-2s that

seems small by Cold War standards. However, DOD’s decision about what

forces to keep in the post-Cold War era should be based on keeping the

most cost-effective combination of weapon systems needed for a

particular mission rather than on a separate examination of requirements

for each type of platform in the services’ inventory. When compared with

the B-52H and B-2 bombers (which will continue to have a nuclear role in

the future) and tactical aircraft that contribute ground-attack capability

and air-to-air capability, the B-1B appears to be a logical candidate for

retirement. Its role will be limited to adding to DOD’s already formidable

ground attack capabilities. For these reasons, it seems questionable that

upgrading the B-1B’s capabilities at a cost of about $2.8 billion and

spending close to $1 billion per year to maintain the B-1B in the force will

have a significant payoff. If DOD were to retire the B-1B force, it would not

be necessary to procure additional B-2s to offset the loss of the B-1B’s

capabilities. Doing so would only exacerbate DOD’s difficulties in achieving

a long-term balance between near-term readiness and recapitalization.

If DOD and the Congress determine that the B-1B should not be retired,

other options exist for reducing the costs of the bomber force that would

preserve much or all of DOD’s current bomber force capabilities. Retiring

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the 27 B-1Bs currently classified as reconstitution reserve aircraft, placing

more B-1Bs in the Air National Guard, or canceling the planned move of

six B-1Bs to Mountain Home Air Force Base would result in savings while

enabling DOD to preserve the CINCs capability to draw on a wide range of

assets in planning wartime operations. In particular, placing more B-1Bs in

the Air National Guard would save significant operations and support

costs but would have little impact on DOD’s overall bomber capabilities.

Moreover, at a time when DOD is seeking to reduce its infrastructure costs,

reversing the Air Force’s decision to expand the number of B-1B bases

would assist DOD to reduce infrastructure costs by avoiding the need for

$40 million in military construction.

Recommendations DOD’s ongoing Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study is designed to determine

the most cost-effective mix of systems needed for the deep attack mission.

Given the challenges of long-term recapitalization of the force, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense consider options to retire or

reduce the B-1B force as part of this study. Regarding the other two B-1B

options, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force assess the

potential to place more bombers in the reserve component and reexamine

the decision to relocate six B-1B bombers to Mountain Home Air Force

Base.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with

one recommendation and did not concur with the other one. DOD partially

concurred with our recommendation to include options to retire or reduce

the B-1B force in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study but disagreed with

some of our analysis supporting the recommendation. DOD also stated that

it plans to consider a number of force structure options as part of its

analysis, including retiring the B-1Bs. DOD stated that we used the Nimble

Dancer wargame to support a number of conclusions about bomber

effectiveness but that the wargame was never intended to provide specific

information about the effectiveness of selected weapons systems across a

broad range of scenarios. We agree that the Nimble Dancer wargame was

not designed to provide a cost-effectiveness comparison of weapon

systems and we did not use it in that manner. We used Air Force modeling

of the air campaign for two major regional conflicts, which was provided

to the Joint Staff as input to the Nimble Dancer wargame, to show that

targets assigned to the B-lB were not unique to the B-1B.

Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 5 

Options for Reducing Bomber Costs

Results from the modeling were only one factor we considered in reaching

our conclusions. We point out in the report that DOD has numerous and

overlapping capabilities to strike ground targets and has not adequately

supported its stated requirements for bombers. Given that DOD has stated

that it cannot afford all of its planned modernization efforts and that the

B-1B will require billions of modernization dollars, we believe that options

to retire or reduce the B-1B force should be included in the Deep Attack

Weapons Mix Study.

DOD also stated the draft report implied that the next generation of

precision-guided munitions will be such a large force multiplier that they

provide justification for retiring the B-1B now and that there is insufficient

evidence to support this assertion. DOD acknowledges, however, that

precision munitions are a fundamental enhancement to combat

effectiveness. We noted that completion of bomber modifications and

fielding of many new precision weapons for use by all attack aircraft

should greatly improve bomber and fighter effectiveness potentially

reducing the number of bombers and fighters needed to fight two major

regional conflicts. The February 1996 Presidential redirection of the Deep

Attack Weapons Mix Study also highlights the potential of future precision

munitions. The redirection states that part two of the study will focus on

the potential that the growing inventory and increasing capabilities of

weapons could allow some consolidation of the ships, aircraft, and

missiles that will deliver these weapons. It also states that the potential

reduction in sorties required for deep attack missions could produce

opportunities for appropriate force structure and platform tradeoffs. DOD

has recognized that it cannot afford all of the modernization programs

currently planned and must make difficult decisions on which programs to

terminate or reduce. The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study should help DOD

with these decisions. Inclusion of B-1B options will provide DOD with the

opportunity to assess the cost effectiveness of the B-1B prior to

committing billions of dollars to upgrade the aircraft.

Although DOD written comments state that B-1B options are already

included in the Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study, DOD officials stated in an

exit conference that the list of options has not been finalized. They also

told us that time constraints may limit the number of options that will be

considered in the study and therefore some will probably be eliminated.

Therefore, we still recommend that the B-1B options be included the

study.

Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Chapter 5 

Options for Reducing Bomber Costs

DOD did not agree with the recommendation that the Secretary of the Air

Force assess the potential to place more bombers in the reserve

component and reexamine the decision to relocate six B-1Bs to Mountain

Home Air Force Base. DOD said that it evaluates the active/reserve mix

annually during the budgetary process and believes it has the right bomber

mix in place. DOD noted that the majority of the bomber force will most

likely be required to strike targets on the first days of a conflict and that

the call-up and mobilization requirements for reserves may stress reserve

units’ capacity to respond within time constraints.

RAND reported in 1993 that the Air Force reserve components train to

similar readiness requirements as their active counterparts. Additionally,

in responding to the congressional inquiries concerning the initial

transfers of bombers to the reserves, the Air Force stated that such

transfers would not adversely impact war-fighting capability. DOD already

relies heavily on the reserve components to provide time-critical airlift and

refueling aircraft. The reserve component operates over 50 percent of

some types of these aircraft. Given the potential cost savings that could

accrue, we continue to believe that DOD should reassess the potential to

place more bombers in the reserve component.

With respect to relocating B-1Bs to Mountain Home Air Force Base, DOD

stated that the move would eliminate lost training opportunities,

additional flying hours, and temporary duty expenses incurred with the

bombers stationed at Ellsworth Air Force Base. We still believe that the

Air Force should reexamine the decision to move B-1Bs to Mountain

Home Air Force Base. We previously reported that DOD has not

demonstrated that the benefits associated with the composite wing

concept outweigh the additional cost to maintain very small numbers of

dissimilar aircraft at the same location compared with the traditional

basing concept. Also, for several years after the move, the B-1B unit will be

housed in temporary facilities until construction of permanent facilities

are completed; remain dependent on maintenance support from Ellsworth

Air Force Base; incur additional temporary duty and freight costs to

accommodate maintenance; and remain dependent on other locations for

wartime bomb loading support in the event deployments are necessary.

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Description of Bomber Munitions

Heavy bombers can carry a variety of ground-attack munitions, including

unguided gravity bombs, glide bombs, and cruise missiles. Gravity bombs

can be either unguided or guided. Unguided bombs are unpowered and

simply fall to the ground. Their direction and path are subject to the

effects of air resistance and wind. Unguided bombs have ranges of 

5 to 10 kilometers and are not very accurate, especially when dropped

from high altitudes. Most gravity bombs in the inventory today are

unguided but some are guided by movable fins that steer them to their

targets and improve accuracy. Glide bombs have small wings that give

them greater range than gravity bombs—40 to 75 kilometers when

launched from high altitudes. Some glide bombs are unpowered and some

are propelled by small rockets. Use of glide bombs versus gravity bombs

increases aircraft survivability because the longer range of glide bombs

allows the aircraft to remain farther away from enemy air defenses. Cruise

missiles are designed to fly at least several hundred kilometers, which

allows aircraft to avoid enemy air defense systems. Cruise missiles are

essentially unmanned aircraft powered by a jet engine.

All three types of munitions can carry either a unitary warhead or cluster

bombs. Unitary warheads have a single explosive charge, and cluster

bombs dispense several submunitions or bomblets designed for specific

targets. Unitary warheads are used for attacking fixed, hard targets such

as bridges, aircraft shelters, and buildings. Cluster bombs are used for

attacking dispersed targets such as troops, marshalling yards, broadcast

antennas, vehicles, and tanks. Submunitions scatter to increase the

weapons’ area of impact. Some types of submunitions contain terminal

seekers to guide them to an individual target such as a tank or truck.

Gravity Bombs Gravity bombs include the MK-82, MK-84, and MK-117; the Joint Direct

Attack Munition (JDAM); the Global Positioning System-Aided Munition; the

Cluster Bomb Unit (CBU)-87, CBU-89, and CBU-97; and the

Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD).

Unitary Warhead

Munitions

The MK-82, MK-84, and MK-117 are unguided unitary warhead bombs

weighing 500, 2000, and 750 pounds, respectively. To increase the

effectiveness of the MK-84, DOD is developing JDAM, which is a MK-84

modified with a kit that includes steerable fins, a global positioning system

receiver, and an inertial navigation system to increase the range and

accuracy of the weapon. Before release, the weapon will receive

information from the aircraft on the target’s location and, once released,

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Description of Bomber Munitions

will receive signals from satellites needed to guide it to the target. Several

ground-attack aircraft use these munitions. To give the B-2 interim

precision capability, the Air Force is developing the Global Positioning

System-Aided Munition. This weapon incorporates a tailgate and global

positioning system guidance on a MK-84, and will be replaced when the

munition is fielded.

Cluster Munitions Cluster munitions include the CBU-87, CBU-89, and CBU-97, and the WCMD.

The CBU-87 is a 1,000-pound, combined effects munition for attacking soft

target areas with detonating bomblets. The CBU-89 is a 1,000-pound

cluster munition containing antitank and antipersonnel mines. The CBU-97

is also a 1,000-pound, sensor-fuzed weapon containing sensor-fused

submunitions for attacking armor. Each submunition contains four

armor-penetrating projectiles with infrared sensors to detect armored

targets. Once a target is detected, a rocket motor fires the projectile into

the target. If no target is detected after a period of time, the projectiles

automatically fires, causing damage to material and personnel. Several

U.S. aircraft employ these munitions. To make all three of these cluster

munitions more effective on the B-1B, DOD is developing the WCMD. Similar

to JDAM, WCMD will add steering fins and an inertial navigation system to the

munitions to guide them to the proper release points.

Glide Bombs Glide bombs include the Joint Stand-off Weapon and the Have Nap.

Joint Stand-Off Weapon The Joint Stand-off Weapon is an unpowered glide bomb in development

that provides a short-to-medium range standoff capability. It is a complete

airframe that uses a global positioning system aided inertial navigation

system and will dispense the combined effects munition and the sensor

fuzed weapon. The range of the weapon allows the B-1B bomber to attack

targets at ranges outside of the enemy’s air defenses. The weapon will be

used by several other U.S. aircraft.

Air-to-Ground Guided

Missile-142 (Have Nap)

The air-to-ground guided missile-142, also known as the Have Nap,

provides the Air Force with a precision man-in-the-loop capability for the

B-52H to attack high-value, fixed targets from standoff ranges. The B-52H

is the only U.S. aircraft that employs the missile. The munitions data link

provides for single aircraft operation or the munition’s guidance may be

turned over to a second aircraft allowing the first aircraft to leave the area.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix I 

Description of Bomber Munitions

It can be configured with a 750-pound warhead that breaks into fragments

or a 770-pound warhead that penetrates hard surfaces.

Cruise Missiles Cruise missiles include the Conventional Air-Launched Cruise Missile,

Harpoon, and the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile.

Conventional Air Launched

Cruise Missile

The Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile is the only long-range

cruise missile currently available and provides the B-52H with a capability

to attack fixed soft targets while the aircraft remains outside of threat

enemy air defenses. The missile uses blast fragmentation warhead and has

a range of greater than 350 nautical miles. Guidance information on the

missile is classified.

Harpoon The Harpoon missile provides the B-52H and several naval aircraft with

the capability to attack surface ships at ranges greater than 100 kilometers.

The missile uses a radar seeker to guide itself to the target.

Joint Air to Surface

Standoff Missile

DOD is in the concept development phase for Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff

Missile, which will replace the canceled Tri-Service Standoff Attack

Missile. DOD plans for several U.S. aircraft to use the weapon, including all

bombers. It will be a long-range cruise missile with autonomous precision

guidance used to attack fixed and movable targets. It will carry a

1,000-pound penetrating warhead.

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 12 and 75.

Now on pp. 12 and 75.

Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 12 and 52.

Now on pp. 12 and 52.

Page 84 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix II 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 85 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Appendix III 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

Internation Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Janet St. Laurent, Assistant Director

William J. Wood, Senior Evaluator

Amy Lowenstein, Evaluator

Mae F. Jones, Communications Analyst

Norfolk Field Office Gaines R. Hensley, Evaluator-in-Charge

Connie W. Sawyer, Jr., Senior Evaluator

Paul Gvoth, Operations Research Analyst

Susan J. Schildkret, Evaluator

Frank M. Guido, Referencer

Dayton Field Office Michael J. Hazard, Senior Evaluator

Page 86 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Related GAO Products

Embedded Computers: B-1B Computers Must Be Upgraded to Support

Conventional Requirements (GAO/AIMD-96-28, Feb. 27, 1996).

B-1B Conventional Upgrades (GAO/NSIAD-96-52R, Dec. 4, 1995).

B-2 Bomber: Status of Cost, Development, and Production (GAO/NSIAD-95-164,

Aug. 4, 1995).

B-1B Bomber: Evaluation of Air Force Report on B-1B Operational

Readiness Assessment (GAO/NSIAD-95-151, July 18, 1995).

B-2 Bomber: Cost to Complete 20 Aircraft Is Uncertain (GAO/NSIAD-94-217,

Sept. 8, 1994).

Air Force: Assessment of DOD’s Report on Plan and Capabilities for

Evaluating Heavy Bombers (GAO/NSIAD-94-99, Jan. 10, 1994).

Strategic Bombers: Issues Relating to the B-1B’s Availability and Ability to

Perform Conventional Missions (GAO/NSIAD-94-81, Jan. 10, 1994).

B-2 Bomber: Assessment of DOD’s Response to Mandated Certifications

and Reports (GAO/NSIAD-94-75, Nov. 3, 1993).

The U.S. Nuclear Triad: GAO’s Evaluation of the Strategic Modernization

Program (GAO/T-PEMD-93-5, June 10, 1993).

Operation Desert Storm: Limits on the Role and Performance of B-52

Bombers in Conventional Conflicts (GAO/NSIAD-93-138, May 12, 1993).

Strategic Bombers: Adding Conventional Capabilities Will Be Complex,

Time-Consuming, and Costly (GAO/NSIAD-93-45, Feb. 5, 1993).

Strategic Bombers: Need to Redefine Requirements for B-1B Defensive

Avionics System (GAO/NSIAD-92-272, July 17, 1992).

Strategic Bombers: Updated Status of the B-1B Recovery Program

(GAO/NSIAD-91-189, May 9, 1991).

Strategic Bombers: Issues Related to the B-1B Aircraft Program

(GAO/T-NSIAD-91-11, Mar. 6, 1991).

Page 87 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
Related GAO Products

Strategic Bombers: B-2 Program Status and Current Issues (GAO/NSIAD-90-120,

Feb. 22, 1990).

(701053) Page 88 GAO/NSIAD-96-192 Air Force Bombers
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