Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy Systems:

An Assessment of Oil and Gas Systems,

Deepwater Ports, and Nuclear Powerplants

Off the Coasts of New Jersey and Delaware

November 1976

NTIS order #PB-274033
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402- Price $4.45

Stock NO. 052-003 -00245-1
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director

Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director

OCEANS ASSESSMENT ADVISORY PANEL

Richard Sullivan, Panel Chairman, Stevens Institute of Technology

David J. Bardin

Commissioner, New Jersey Department of

Environmental Protection

E.C. Broun, Jr.

Dresser Industries, Inc.

Francis T. Christy, Jr.

Resources for the Future

John Daniello

Secrtary for Delaware Community Affairs

and Economic Development

John Mark Dean

University of South Carolina

Richard M. Eckert

New Jersey Public Service Electric and

Gas Company

Don E. Kash

University of Oklahoma

H.W. Menard

Scripps Institution of Oceanography

Charles C. Mollard

Seafarers International Union,

AFL–CIO

James Sullivan

Center for Science in the Public interest

OTA OCEANS PROGRAM STAFF

Robert W. Niblock, Program Manager

Prudence S. Adler Thomas A. Cotton

Kathleen A. Beil Emilia L. Govan

Judy B. Cefkin Peter A. Johnson

Judith M. Roales
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BoAR D Congress of the United States EM ILIO Q. DADDARIO

DIRECTOR

OLIN E. TEAGUE, TEXAS, CHAIRMAN

CLIFFORD P. CASE, N. J., VICE CHAIRMAN OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT DANIEL V. DE SIMONE

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS. MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ. W ASHINGTO N, D.C. 2051 0

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS. S.C. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN. CHARLES A. MOSHER, OHio

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA. MARVIN L. ESCH, MICH. Nov 11 1976

TED STEVENS, ALASKA MARJORIE S. HOLT, MD.

EMILIO Q. DADDARIO

The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings

Chairman

National Ocean Policy Study

United States Senat e

Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Board of the Office of Technology Assessment, we are forwarding to you the report Coastal Effect s

of Offshore Energy Systems: Oil and Gas, Deepwater Ports,

and Floating Nuclear Powerplants.

The report consists of two volumes: the first covers the

findings and analysis and the second provides back-up

material . This report concludes OTA’S assessment of the

onshore effects which may be associated with the implementation

of one or a combination of the three technologies studied

off the coast of New Jersey and Delaware.

This study was requested by you in your capacity as Chairman of the National Ocean Policy Study, in a letter dated

January 14, 1974 . The request was accepted and the study

authorized by the Technology Assessment Board on July 23,

1974. A draft version of the offshore oil and gas section

of this report was transmitted to NOPS in April 1976.

Sincerely,

Clifford P. Case

Chairman

Enclosur e

iv
TECHNOL o gY A SSESSMENT B OAR D Congress of the United States EM ILIO Q. DADDARIO

OLIN E. TEAGUE, TEXAS, CHAIRMAN DIRECTOR

CLIFFORD P. CASE, N. J., VICE CHAIRMAN OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT DANIEL V. DE SIMONE

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS. MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ. WASHINGTON , D.C. 20510 DEPUTY DIREcTOR

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN. CHARLES A, MOSHER, OHIO

RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA. MARVIN L. ESCH, MICH.

RED STEVENS, ALASKA MARJORIE S. HOLT, MD. Nov 11 1976 EMILIO Q. DADDARIO

The Honorable Olin E. Teague

Chairman of the Board

Off ice of Technology Assessment

Congress of the United State s

Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The enclosed report, Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy Systems:

Oil and Gas, Deepwater Ports, and Floating Nuclear Powerplants ,

presents OTA'S analysis of the probable onshore impacts of imple–

menting one or a combination of the three technologies studied

off the coast of New Jersey and Delaware.

The assessment was requested on January 14, 1974, by Senator

Ernest F. Hollings, Chairman of the National Ocean Policy Study.

It was prepared by the Oceans Program Assessment staff, and has

been reviewed extensively within OTA, by the Ocean Assessment

Advisory Panel, and by personnel from the Federal agencies, States ,

and industries which will be affected by the study.

The report specifically (1) delineates the possible action s

Congress may want to consider in future legislation and oversight dealing with offshore oil and gas, deepwater ports, and

floating nuclear powerplants ; (2) analysis past and futur e

government actions in preparing for the three technologies off

New Jersey and Delaware; (3) presents the possible economic ,

political, social, institutional , and legal impacts of implementing

the technologies; and (4) reviews the alternatives to the tech–

nologies or the implications of not implementing the technologie s

in the study area.

Some of the analysis required for the overall assessment has

already been made available to Congress and used by committees

responsible for developing amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Act and amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands

Act of 1953 . The assessment also resulted in the preparation

and publication of three other studies desired by Congress for

specific uses . Those were: “An Analysis of the Department of

the Interior’s Proposed Acceleration of Development of Oil and

Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf, “ “An Analysis of the

v
The Honorable Olin E. Teague

Page 2

Feasibility of Separating Exploration from Production of Oil

and Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf,” and “Oil Transportation

by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and Safety Measures.”

This assessment was the first major undertaking by OTA to

include a large-scale public participation program. The public

participation element was an effort to bring about an exchange

of information between OTA and citizens in the study region.

The two-way flow of information was intended to contribute to

the public’s understanding of the technologies being assessed

and to obtain information directly from the affected citizens

about impacts of greatest public concern. The data obtained

contributed to OTA’S effort to insure that these factors were

adequately addressed in the study so as to assist the Congress

in anticipating, understanding, and considering to the fullest

extent possible, the consequences of technological application

as mandated by the Technology Assessment Act of 1972. The

contributions of the public participation program are detailed

in the report.

This transmittal includes two volumes: the assessment report

itself and working papers which are back-up material for the

findings and discussions in the assessment report.

EMILIO Q . DADDARIO

Directo r

Enclosures

vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment Oceans

Program staff. The staff wishes to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation of

the following contractors and consultants in the gathering and formulation of the

background data:

The BDM Corporation Intermountain Technologies, Inc.

Pamela L. Baldwin Hittman Associates, Inc.

Dr. Robert L. Bish Lawrence-Allison and Associates, Inc.

Dr. Irving C. Bupp, Jr. Thomas B. Neville

Dr. Michael J. Canoy Nuclear Engineering Services, Inc.

Dresser Industries Potomac Policy Group

Ecological Analysts, Inc. Princeton University

Energy and Environmental Analysis, Rutgers University

Inc. Dr. Stephen N. Salomon

Engineering Computer Optecnomics, Robert Taggart Inc.

John Gardenier Dr. Irvin L. White

The staff further wishes to acknowledge those organizations, both public and

private, which reviewed and commented on various draft documents circulated by

OTA or provided other types of assistance:

American Institute of Merchant Shipping

American Littoral Society

American Petroleum Institute

American Trust of Merchant Shipping

Amoco Oil Co.

Atlantic City Electric Co.

Atlantic City, N.J., Division of Civil Planning

Atlantic County Citizens Council on the Environment

The Honorable Dolph Briscoe, Jr., Governor of

Texas

Brookhaven National Laboratory

Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of

the Interior

The Honorable Brendan T. Byrne, Governor of

New Jersey, and his staff

Cape May, N. J., Planning Board

Chesapeake Utilities

Citizens Energy Council

Clean Atlantic Associates

Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Transportation

Conservation Foundation, The

Council on Environmental Quality

Deepwater Ports Office, U.S. Department of Commerce

Delaware Bay Transportation Co.

Delaware River and Bay Authority

Delaware State Planning Office

Delmarva Power and Light Co.

E.]. du Pent de Nemours & Co.

The Honorable Edwin W. Edwards, Governor of

Louisiana

Elizabethtown Gas Co.

Environmental Policy Center

Environmental Policy Institute

EXXON Corp.

Florida Audubon Society

Geological Survey, U.S. Department of the Interior

Getty Oil Co.

Jersey Central Power and Light Co.

vii
Keys to Education for Environmental Protection

League of Women Voters

Monmouth County, N.J., Environmental Council

National Council on the Public Assessment of

Technology

National Interveners

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce

National Wildlife Federation

Natural Resources Defense Council

New Jersey Department of Environmental

Protection

New Jersey Department of Public Advocate

New Jersey Energy Office

New Jersey Friends Council

New Jersey Library Association

New Jersey Sierra Club

New York State Department of Environmental

Conservation

Ocean County, N. J., Planning Board

Office of Business Advocacy, New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry

Office of Domestic Shipping, U.S. Maritime

Administration

Offshore Power Systems, Inc.

Passaic River Coalition

PenJerDel Corp.

Program Development Office, U.S. Department of

the Interior

Public Service Electric and Gas Co.

Sea-Land Service, Inc.

Secretary of the Interior

Stop Nuclear Power

Texas A & M University, Ocean Engineering

Program

The Honorable Sherman W. Tribbitt, Governor of

Delaware, and his staff

United Auto Workers

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

University of South Carolina Institute for Marine

Biology and Coastal Research

Virginia Seafood Council

Watch Our Waterways

The Wilderness Society

Zero Population Growth
LIST OF WORKING PAPERS

The following working papers have been prepared by OTA and include background data, detailed analyses, and further documentation of specific subjects

referenced throughout this assessment. The working papers 1 through 10 are

published as volume II of this report (OTA-O-38) and maybe ordered through the

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

20402 (Stock No. 052–003–00246–9.) price $11.75.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

Federal and State Regulation of the Three Offshore Energy Technologies

Biological Impacts of Three Offshore Energy Technologies

Oil Spill Risk Assessment for OCS Oil and Gas and Deepwater Port

Development

Air and Water Quality Impacts of Oil and Gas Processing Facilities

Regional Energy Supply and Demand Considerations

Fiscal Effects of OCS Oil and Gas and Deepwater Port Development

Environmental Studies for OCS Oil and Gas Development

Safety Analysis for Floating Nuclear Powerplants

Analysis of Fuel and Waste Handling and Decommissioning for Floating

Nuclear Powerplants

Economic Considerations for Floating Nuclear Powerplants

ix
LIST

I

11

III

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OF WORKING PAPERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

STUDY AREA APPROACH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SELECTION OF ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DATA SOURCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MAJOR FINDINGS AND SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SYSTEMS:

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DEEPWATER PORTS:

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FLOATING NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS:

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ALTERNATIVES TO OFF SHORE TECHNOLOGIES:

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ISSUES AND OPTIONS ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

COMMON ISSUE:

1. Offshore Priorities and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ISSUES:

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Federal Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Regulation and Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Oil Spill Liability and Compensation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Environmental Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Pollution Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conflicting Ocean Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

i x

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1 ’

DEEPWATER PORTS ISSUES:

10. Tanker Design and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

11. Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup at Deepwater Ports. . . . . . 80

12. Standards in State Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

13. Adjacent Coastal State Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

FLOATING NUCLEAR PLANT ISSUES:

14. Risks From Major Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

15. Deployment involute.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

16. Technical Uncertainties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

17. Siting offloading Powerplants Outside U.S. Territorial Limits 106

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

DISCUSSION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

DEVELOPMENT OF OFF SHORE PETROLEUM

TECHNOLOGIES IN THE MID-ATLANTIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Activities to Date..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Seismic Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ... ... ...... 124

Resource Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Interior Department Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Selection of the Lease Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Environmental Impact Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Environmental and Other Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Coastal Zone Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

State Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Future Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Lease Sale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Exploration and Its Impacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144

Development Plans.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

Production and Its Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Transportation and Storage and Their Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

Oil Spills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 165

Processing and Refining and Their Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Effects on Regional Energy Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Decommissioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

THE POSSIBILITY OF DEEPWATER PORTS IN THE

MID-ATLANTIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

The Need for Deepwater Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Deepwater Port Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Status of New Jersey and Delaware Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

Description of Deepwater Port Technology in the Mid-Atlantic. . . 188
THE PROPOSAL FOR A FLOATING

IN THE MID-ATLANTIC. ... , . .

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nuclear Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Breakwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Power Transmission . . . . . . . . . . .

Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Licenses . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . . .

Public Role in Licensing. . . . . . . .

costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Breakwater Construction . . . . . . .

Transmission System . . . . . . . . . . .

Plant Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fuel Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Waste Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Decommissioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Decommissioning Alternatives. .

River and Bay Sites . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conventional Nuclear Plants. . . .

Coastal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Direct Benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Environmental and Social Effects

Risks and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accident Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

NUCLEAR POWERPLANT

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Probability of Core-Melt Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Consequences of a Core-Melt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accident Risks in the Study Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ALTERNATIVES TO OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Constraints on Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Energy Patterns in the Mid-Atlantic States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Offshore Oil and Gas Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Solar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Automobile Efficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Floating Nuclear Plant Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Interconnection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Conservation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cogeneration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

197

197

204

204

204

206

207

207

207

207

210

211

212

213

213

213

214

214

215

218

219

222

222

224

224

225

226

230

230

230

232

236

238

239

240

240

241

241

241

242

242

242

243
PACE

coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247

v PUBLIC PARTICIPATION ● ...,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● *...... . . . . . . . . 255

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: A PILOT PROJECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

MAJOR FINDINGS FOR ALL TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

Overall Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

Findings by Region.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

Offshore Drillings for Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

Anticipated Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

Process of Implementing the Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261

Preferences and Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

Deepwater Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Anticipated Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Process of Implementing the Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Preferences and Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

Floating Nuclear Powerplants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

Anticipated Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268

Process of Implementing and Managing the Technologies. . . . . . 270

Preferences and Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270

HOW PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AFFECTED THE OTA

ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

SOURCES AND USES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION DATA . . . . . . . 274

Workshops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274

Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

Followup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277

Review of Draft Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279

IV GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE NO. PAGE

II–l—BaltimoreCanyon Trough lease sale area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

II–2—Hypothetical deepwater port site offshoreNew Jersey coast . . . . . . . . . . . 20

II–3—Proposed site of the floating nuclear powerplant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

III–l-Cablesand ship traffic lanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

III–2—1mportant fisheries near lease area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
IV– l—The coastal zones of Delaware and New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

IV–2-Cape Helopen, Del., Seashore.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

IV– 3—Baltimore Canyon development activities by phase of development and

by year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

IV–4—Potential energy supply provided by Baitimore Canyon oil and gas

development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

IV–5—Estimates of undiscovered recoverable oil and gas resources in U.S.

offshore areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

IV–6—Simplified flow diagram showing operations necessary for discovery,

production, and abandonment of an oil field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

IV–7—Baltimore Canyon Trough lease sale area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

IV–8-OCS leasing procedures: Information flow into decision points . . . . . . . 140

IV–9—Proposed OCS planning schedule (June 1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

IV–10—Ongoing activities in U.S. offshore areas... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

IV–ll—OTA assumptions for oil and gas development in Baltimore Canyon

Trough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

IV–12—Drilling crews at work offshore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

IV–13—Three exploratory rigs for possible use in the Mid-Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . 148

IV–14—Assumed rates of exploratory drilling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

IV–15—Artist’s drawing of production platform similar to those which might

be us ed in the Mid-Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....:... 152

IV–16—Platform construction yard outside Morgan City, La. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

IV–17—Potential sites and land requirements for OCS supported bases . . . . . . . 154

IV–18—Total new land requirements related to OCS development during years

of peak activity in New Jersey and Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

IV–19—Direct employment from all OCS activities under the high and median

recovery assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

IV–20—Annual earnings of direct regional OCS workers under median and

high recovery assumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158

IV–21—State-local tax revenue per OCS employee and their families compared

to revenue from non-OCS workers and their families. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

IV–22—Typical pipelaying barges similar to those which could be used in the

Mid-Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

IV–23—Responsibility of Federal agencies for pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164

IV–24-Clean Atlantic Associates initial equipment stockpiles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

IV–25—Partial listing of presently available equipment in the Mid-Atlantic

area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . 168

IV–26—0il cleanup equipment at work skimming spill from Gulf of Mexico . . 169

IV–27-Oil spills in the U.S. waters ranked by operation, calendar year 1974.. 170

IV–28—U.S. oil supplies 1950/74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

IV–29—Tanker capacities of major U.S. oil ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174

IV–30—Major U.S. Refining Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

IV–31—Mid-Atlantic refinery capacity as of January l, 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

IV–32—Oceanborne crude petroleum to the United States—1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
PAGE

IV–33—Worldwide single-point mooring installation—1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

IV–34—Proposed deepwater port site in Delaware Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

IV–35—Deepwater port site offshore northern New Jersey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

IV–36—LOOP and Seadock deepwater port sites in the Gulf of Mexico . . . . . . . 183

IV–37—LOOP deepwater port layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184

IV–38—1976 projections of petroleum supply and demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

IV–39—Hypothetical deepwater port site offshore New Jersey coast . . . . . . . . . 189

IV–40-Catenary anchor leg mooring (CALM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190

IV–41—Single anchor leg mooring (SALM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

IV–42—Hypothetical deepwater port layout including onshore facilities. . . . . . 192

IV–43—Fifteen-year totals of oil spills from one, 1.6-million-barrel-per-day

deepwater port compared to small tanker alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194

IV–44—Size comparison of proposed Atlantic Generating Station . . . . . . . . . . . 198

IV–45—Visualization of a floating nuclear powerplant in comparison to the

USS Franklin D. Roosevelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

IV–46—Annual observed and forecast values for energy consumption and

peak-hour demand, 1963– 1987, for Public Service Electric & Gas Co. service

area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

IV–47-Cutaway diagram of a floating nuclear plant containment building . . . 205

IV–48—Offshore siting rubble-mound breakwater. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

IV–49—Proposed site of floating nuclear plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

IV–50—Cost estimates of nuclear units at time of order vs. actual finished cost

or estimate as of December 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

IV–51—Floating nuclear powerplants manufacturing facility, Jacksonville,

Florida ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212

IV – 52—Annual shipments of radioactive materials to and from the two-unit

Atlantic Generating Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

IV –53—Probable actions to be taken in decommissioning a floating nuclear

powerplant by various methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

IV–54—Three siting alternatives for floating nuclear plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

IV–55—Benefits from the proposed Atlantic Generating Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225

IV–56—Monetary costs of construction and operation of the Atlantic Generating Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 225

IV–57—Environmental costs of the proposed Atlantic Generating Station. . . . . 338

V–l—Public participation questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258

V– 2—Results of public participation questionnaire: offshore drilling for oil

and gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262

V–3—Results of public participation questionnaire: deepwater ports. . . . . . . . . 266

V–4—Results of public participation questionnaire: floating nuclear

powerplants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

V–5—Sites of OTA contacts during public participation program . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

About half of all Americans live and work

along the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, the Gulf of

cording to a Senate Commerce Committee study,

within 50 miles of a coastline—

Mexico, or the Great Lakes. Acthat figure may grow to 80 percent of the total population by the turn of the century. With any such concentration

of people in less than 10 percent of the Nation’s land area will come intense

development and competition for land for housing, industry, commerce, energy

facilities, resort communities, and transportation networks.

The consequences of 25 years of accelerated dredging, filling, and construction

in coastal areas are not understood at this time, So far, the growth of population in

the coastal areas has proceeded with little research into the long-range implications

of increased activities in those areas. It is known that marshes, estuaries, and tidal

flats along the coasts of the United States are crucial to sustaining marine life,

directly or indirectly. It is not known how much more development and what

kinds of development can take place in coastal areas before the complex relationships between land and sea and between human life and marine life may be irreversibly disrupted. In fact, it is only since the enactment of the Coastal Zone

Management Act of 1972, the principal legislation dealing with problems of the

coastal zone, that these questions have been addressed in an organized fashion.

(The relationship of coastal zone management and offshore energy systems is discussed in chapter IV.)

This assessment is an attempt to add to the understanding of the effects of

coastal development by focusing on three energy systems which have been proposed for the waters off New Jersey and Delaware.

The objective of the study has been to trace the likely consequences of three

energy systems for the ocean environment, the coastal environment, and the

economics and patterns of life in both States during the next two decades.

The three systems are:

1. Oil and natural gas development on the Mid-Atlantic Outer Continental

Shelf;

2. Installation of a deepwater port to accommodate supertankers in the

Mid-Atlantic area; and

3. Construction of at least two floating nuclear powerplants.
The study was requested by Senator Ernest F. Hollings, chairman of the National Ocean Policy Study and sponsor of the Coastal Zone Management Act. The

request was approved by the Technology Assessment Board on July 23, 1974

This report has been prepared by the Oceans Program of OTA with the assistance of an advisory panel of 11 members from industry, Government, and

academia, who have reviewed draft material for each section of the report and met

periodically to comment on the course of the study and to provide guidance to the

staff. The Advisory Panel provided advice and critique throughout the assessment,

but does not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse the report, for which

OTA assumes full responsibility.

The Technology Assessment Board approves the release of this report, which

identifies a range of viewpoints on a significant issue facing the U.S. Congress. The

views expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Board nor of individual members thereof.

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was created in 1972 as an advisory arm of Congress. OTA’S basic function is to help legislative policy makers anticipate and plan for the consequences of technological changes and to examine the

many ways, expected and unexpected, in which technology affects people’s lives.

The assessment of technology calls for exploration of the physical, biological,

economic, social, and political impacts which can result from applications of scientific knowledge. OTA provides Congress with independent and timely information

about the potential effects—both beneficial and harmful-of technological applications.

Requests for studies are made by chairmen of standing committees of the

House of Representatives or Senate; by the Technology Assessment Board, the

governing body of OTA; or by the Director of OTA in consultation with the Board.

The Technology Assessment Board is composed of six members of the House,

six members of the Senate, and the OTA Director, who is a non-voting member.

OTA currently has underway studies in eight general areas-energy, food,

health, materials, oceans, transportation, international trade, and policies and

priorities for research and development programs.

STUDY AREA AND APPROACH

This study concentrated on proposed developments off the coast of New

Jersey and Delaware for several reasons, one being that plans to deploy energy

facilities off the coasts of those States are actual rather than hypothetical proposals.

The Department of the Interior accepted bids in August 1976 for leases on 154

tracts on the Outer Continental Shelf off the New Jersey and Delaware coasts and it
was expected that oil companies could begin exploratory drilling within 6 months

after the sale of leases.

In the summer of 1976, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was well

along in its technical evaluation of, and hearings on, proposals to moor two floating nuclear powerplants inside a breakwater off the New Jersey coast.

Plans to build a deepwater port in the area have been in suspension since the

early 1970’s, when changes in the world oil situation reduced the economic incentives for such a port. But the Delaware Bay area would be a logical candidate for siting a deepwater port if future changes in the oil distribution system revived interest in a port.

In addition, New Jersey and Delaware share some characteristics with other

coastal States. Both depend on expanded industrial activity to create new jobs and

sustain economic growth. Expanded industry means expanded energy resources

and both States depend on other regions of the United States or on foreign suppliers for all of their oil and natural gas. Both States also depend heavily on tourist

income which, in turn, depends on the attractiveness of beach areas which would

be vulnerable to damage from accidents during the operation of any of the three

energy systems.

Finally, planning for the offshore energy systems has been proceeding faster

than planning for effective management of coastal areas under the Coastal Zone

Management Act.

Because many States share these characteristics to some degree, the findings of

this study can be applied to other States if adjustments for differing conditions and

levels of resources are made that might be anticipated in other areas.

The study area is described in more detail in chapter IV.

The study approach was basically the same for each energy system. A foundation of data was developed to provide a framework for analyzing issues for congressional consideration.

The first step in assessing each system involved a detailed examination of each

technology and how it most likely would be deployed. This phase of the study considered only those technologies and systems in their most likely configurations in

waters off New Jersey and Delaware and drew largely on published reports. The

reports were supplemented by analysis in areas where published data did not provide enough detailed information for full development of issues and options.

The next step in the study was to identify and evaluate the probable impacts of

the energy systems on the ocean and coastal environments either as a result of

routine operations or as a result of malfunctions which experience with similar

technology in other areas has shown are likely to occur. In the case of floating

nuclear powerplants, which have not been installed anywhere, the projections of

impact were based on land-based nuclear-plant experience adjusted to reflect

operation in an ocean environment.

Finally, the study produced estimates of the effect that each energy system
would have on New Jersey and Delaware. These included changes in employment

in the region, in the cost and reliability of energy supply, the impact on air and

water quality, on road and rail networks, on land that would be diverted from

other possible uses to support the proposed systems, and on general patterns of life

within each State.

SELECTION OF ISSUES

In the course of the study, areas of possible conflict emerged between technology and the environment or among institutions that would share responsibility

for the systems. Potential or actual conflicts which appeared to be amenable to

policy consideration by Congress or by State governments or private groups were

identified. These conflicts are discussed in chapter 111 as issues with options for

congressional consideration. In most cases, the issues evolved from analysis of the

likely consequences of deployment of a technology under existing legal and institutional frameworks and comparison of those consequences with changes in law or

custom.

The nature of the issues differs from system to system.

In the case of oil and natural gas development, the major issues are concerned

less with individual technology than with the system as a whole and particularly

with the institutional framework in which the system operates. In the case of deepwater ports and floating nuclear powerplants, the issues stem largely from the

technology, from questions about its reliability, and from avenues that offer promise of reducing risk by changing design or by more careful analysis of risks inherent in the technology.

The changing events that are natural with technologies in active planning required flexibility in the execution of this assessment. Pertinent new or revised information became available to the study team at every stage. Some of the analysis

required for the overall assessment had timely congressional utility and was

published in special documents or released in draft form by the Technology Assessment Board.

These publications include the following reports:

● Oil Transportation by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and

Safety Measures.

● An Analysis of the Feasibility of Separating Exploration From Production

of Oil and Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf.

● An Analysis of the Department of the Interior’s Proposed Acceleration of

Development of Oil and Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf.

● Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy Development: Oil and Gas Systems.

These documents and drafts were of particular help to congressional committees responsible for developing amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Act

and amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.
DATA SOURCES

Basic data used in the study have been subjected to critical analysis by the

OTA staff to develop projections of development patterns and impacts.

The estimates of resources in the Baltimore Canyon Trough which were used

to project impacts were drawn from U.S. Geological Survey estimates. During the

course of the study, U.S. Geological Survey changed its estimate of resources from 8

billion barrels of oil to 1.8 billion barrels and the study was modified to reflect the

reduction.

Resource projections are discussed along with the history, current status, and

possible future development of each technology in chapter IV. Alternatives to these

technologies, based on projections of energy supply and demand, also are discussed in chapter IV.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

To broaden the information base for this study and to make certain that public

attitudes toward the three energy systems were taken fully into account, OTA conducted a public participation program as part of the assessment.

Workshops were held in New Jersey and informal meetings with groups of

private citizens as well as representatives of interest groups were held in Delaware

to explore citizen attitudes. About 15,000 brochures explaining the technology

assessment process and asking for views on all three technologies were distributed

in both States. About 1,000 persons responded to a questionnaire that was included

in the brochure and an analysis of the responses is included as an integral part of

this report in chapter V.

Chapter II

MAJOR FINDINGS AND SUMMARY

The following are the major findings of this assessment of the three energy

systems which have been proposed for deployment off the coast of New Jersey and

Delaware. A summary of the assessment of each of the technologies is included

after the findings.

● No significant damage to the environment or changes in patterns of life

in either New Jersey or Delaware is anticipated during operation of the

three systems at presently projected levels. However, careful planning,

engineering, and strict operational monitoring are required for each of

these complex systems. To a large extent, such planning and monitoring will depend on the quality of oversight by the responsible Federal

agency.

● Future deployment of ocean technologies on a scale larger than that

anticipated at the present time could create serious conflicts among

users and impose excessive burdens on ocean and coastal environments. No formal mechanism exists or is planned for resolving conflicts

or directing research to discover the cumulative social and environmental consequences of vastly expanded uses of the oceans.

● Changes in Federal practices are necessary to reduce delays in determining offshore oil and gas resources, to provide full attention to State

and local needs and potential impacts, and to assure strict enforcement

of operating standards to minimize ocean and coastal pollution. Consolidation of authority within the Department of the Interior is essential

to supervision of offshore development and the coordination of operations with State and local governments.

● While floating nuclear powerplants may offer economic and environmental advantages over land-based nuclear plants, the siting of nuclear

plants on water may present unique accident risks which have not yet

been comprehensively assessed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

● Tankers that would use deepwater ports off New Jersey and Delaware

pose a greater pollution and safety threat than the ports themselves.

Confining tanker operations to a port several miles from the coast may

offer environmental and safety advantages, provided that the tankers

using the facility are strictIy regulated.

11
● There are specific alternatives which, if substituted for each of the proposed offshore projects, could supply equivalent amounts of energy to

the Mid-Atlantic region. None, however, offers clear social, environmental, or economic advantages. Increased imports are an alternative

to offshore oil and gas development. Onshore nuclear plants and coalfired plants are alternatives to floating nuclear powerplants. Greater

reliance on small tankers is an alternative to deepwater ports. Reduction of energy consumption could offer long-term advantages, but there

are no specific plans at the State or national level for an energy conservation program that might eliminate the need for the energy supplies

which would come from one or more of the proposed offshore systems.

A principal product of this assessment is the development of public policy

issues associated with the deployment of each offshore technology and the identification of congressional options for addressing those issues.

Chapter III contains a complete presentation of the issues and options.
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SYSTEMS—SUMMARY

The submerged Outer Continental Shelf

(OCS) lands of the Mid-Atlantic wer e

classified by geologists as a potential source of

oil and natural gas in the late 1950’s, but they

did not become a priority target for development until the 1970’s.

Following the oil embargo imposed by the

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in October 1973, accelerated leasing and

development of the Mid-Atlantic OCS was

made a high priority item in the Administration’s plan for lessening U.S. dependence on

foreign sources of oil.

In 1974, studies by the U.S. Geological

Survey estimated that as much as one-third of

the U.S. oil reserves for the future were most

likely to be discovered in the OCS regions. In

the Mid-Atlantic, estimates were that oil production could be as much as 7 percent of the

1973 national production level and gas production could be as much as 8 percent of the

1975 national production level.

As first announced, accelerated OCS

development called for leasing a total of 10

million acres in a single year, an amount equal

to what had been leased during the previous

21 years.

Although the Bureau of Land Management

(BLM), Interior’s lead agency in leasing, had

been examining the possibility of an accelerated program for 2 years before the 1973 decision was made, it was not prepared for a sudden change of this magnitude. In the period

since the acceleration program was announced, BLM has been chronically short of

staff, particularly the specialists required for

analyzing coastal and onshore impacts in

frontier States. BLM was also unprepared for

the adverse reaction of Atlantic Coastal States

to the 1973 accelerated leasing decision.

The Governors of both New Jersey and

Delaware publicly favor early exploration of

the Mid-Atlantic OCS for oil and natural gas,

but their support is qualified. Both have

argued for changes in Federal OCS policy as a

condition of their full support.

The desire for change stems from several

factors. One involves basic uncertainties about

environmental and economic impacts of a

technology which is alien to the Mid-Atlantic

even though it is familiar to the Gulf of Mexico. Another involves a series of lapses in

communication and coordination between the

States and the Interior Department which

have raised doubts among State officials about

the capability of the Federal Government in

planning for operation of offshore oil and gas

systems.

The Mid-Atlantic OCS program intensified

pressure on the State governments, particularly from residents along the coast, to

protect their beaches. Because existing law

restricts major decisions about OCS development to the Federal Government, State

officials have argued for a role as active participants, rather than observers, in three

general areas. They are:

●

●

●

Drafting of oil and gas regulations and enforcement plans which could affect the

quantities of oil that may be spilled during

offshore development;

Selection of areas to be leased which will

affect locations of such facilities as onshore

staging areas, pipeline landfalls, tank farms,

and gas processing plants; and

Approval of development plans which set a

pattern of deployment of technology that

would prevail in the area during the life of a

Mid-Atlantic oil and gas field.

State officials also desire more centralization of responsibilities and authority within
Figure 11-1. Baltimore Canyon Trough lease sale area

)

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Source Office of Technology Assessment and U S Department of the Interior
the Interior Department to facilitate the flow

of information to the States.

This report contains detailed descriptions of

each of the component elements in a typical

offshore oil and gas system, starting with

geophysical survey ships which are used to

gather preliminary data on resources and continuing through technology used for exploration drilling, production drilling, transportation, storage, and processing. Deployment of

technology is traced over time for two

assumptions-one in which 1.8 billion barrels

of oil and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of gas are discovered and recovered and another for 4.6

billion barrels of oil and 14.2 trillion cubic feet

of natural gas.

It is estimated that 25 platforms could be installed offshore, each with 24 producing wells,

within 14 years after the initial lease sale to

produce the 1.8 billion barrels of oil at an

average peak rate of 313,000 barrels per day.

Under the 4.6 billion barrel assumption, there

could be 52 platforms, each with 24 producing

wells within 15 years after a lease sale. Peak

daily rate for this assumption would be

650,000 barrels.

Onshore, the oil and gas distribution network, averaging both assumptions, would

cover about 3-square miles with pipeline

rights-of-way, staging areas (of up to 170

acres), tank farms (covering 50 to 75 acres

each), and gas processing plants (on sites of

about 100 acres each). If drilling platforms

were fabricated in either State, land needs

would increase by about 1,000 acres.

Five areas in the New Jersey–Delaware

region could serve as staging areas for

offshore development, three coastal sites and

the port complexes of New York City and

Philadelphia–Camden. All three coastal

sites—Atlantic City and Cape May, N.J., and

Lewes, Del.—would meet such staging area

requirements as availability of harbors for

supply boats, accessibility by rail, proximity

to lease sites, and availability of land for

storage and service facilities. Service firms

under contract to oil companies would choose

staging areas on the basis of lowest overall

operating costs.

Earlier studies by the Council on Environmental Quality, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Department of the Interior

have produced varying projections of the

physical, biological, and social changes that

would result from offshore development in

the Mid-Atlantic OCS. The earlier studies used

different assumptions about the amounts of

oil and gas that may be recovered and

different State and/or regional boundaries for

consideration. When these projections are adjusted to a common base, however, they fall

within the same general range of effects that

are estimated in the OTA study.

It is concluded that, if a major spill occurred

at a drilling or production platform 50 miles

at sea, the odds are one in ten that an oil slick

would reach the beaches of New Jersey and

Delaware.

The danger of oil striking a beach would increase if a spill occurred as a result of a

pipeline rupture nearer to shore. The danger

would decrease if a spill occurred at structures

farther than 50 miles from shore. The platforms expected as a result of the first MidAtlantic lease sale will be located approximately 54 to 100 miles from shore. The distance lowers the risk of oil striking the beach

and also makes the structures invisible from

shore.

One element of the offshore oil system that

would require particularly careful planning is

the placement of pipelines in coastal areas.

There is general agreement that pipelines

should be routed to avoid marshlands, a

design that would be difficult to achieve along

the New Jersey or Delaware coast, virtually all

of which is backed by marshlands,

Direct employment in New Jersey and

Delaware would peak at about 9,000 workers
,, I

‘1 ‘ I 1“

if the high estimate of 4.6 billion barrels of

recoverable oil is correct and at about 4,500

workers if the median estimate of 1,8 billion

barrels is correct. Capital expenditures would

total between $2 billion and $4 billion. Peak

land requirements for the high estimate would

be about 1,645 acres in the New Jersey–

Delaware region. Of that, 320 acres could be

coastal land around coastal harbors and the

remainder would be inland. Seven hundred

acres would be required for pipeline rights-ofway that probably would parallel existing

railroad lines or highways.

Analysis of the tax systems of a variety of

coastal States, including New Jersey and

Delaware, indicates that per capita tax

revenue from OCS-related installations

onshore would be significantly higher than

the statewide average per capita revenues

from other sources, except during the first 2 or

3 years of development. The principal reason

is that the major onshore installations, such as

tank farms and pipelines, are capital intensive,

and therefore produce substantial sales and

property tax revenues. However, this estimate

is for statewide revenues only. It is quite

possible that particular localities within a

State will experience net adverse budgetary

impacts during the course of OCS development, since there is little reason to expect that

the tax revenue-producing onshore facilities

would be located in the tax jurisdiction of the

communities that must provide public services and facilities for the population supporting offshore exploration and development.

This problem may also occur between States if

the oil and gas are not landed in the same State

in which the main support bases are located. It

is also possible that a locality could experience

a net negative fiscal impact if extraordinary

expenditures for public facilities such as roads

are required to support OCS development.

The major source of potential impacts on

air and water quality onshore would be any

new refinery capacity that might result from

OCS development. Ambient air quality standards, particularly those related to oxidant

levels, could be a significant constraint on new

or expanded refinery capacity. Concentrations

of waterborne pollutants in refinery effluent

are relatively small and probably would not

significantly affect the quality of a receiving

stream. Refinery cooling, however, could produce thermal pollution problems in Delaware

Bay or Newark Bay, both of which are already

very close to the maximum permissible load.

Dramatic changes in regional energy prices

should not be expected to follow OCS

development. Lower transportation costs

might give New Jersey and Delaware a price

advantage compared with some other regions

of the country. But future prices would depend, in part, on oil and gas price control

policies.

As a result of its study, OTA has identified

the Federal-State conflicts as the major issues.

Eight specific OCS issues are treated in this

report. They are:

Federal Management System .—Federal

management of the offshore oil and gas

program is fragmented within the Department of the Interior and coordination with

other Federal agencies which share jurisdiction is ineffective. (See pages 43–46.)

Regulation and Enforcement.—Inadequate

regulation and enforcement of offshore oil

and gas technology could result in more accidents and more oil spills than would occur if a more effective system were implemented. (See pages 47–50.)

Oil Spill Liability and Compensation.—Exist -

ing laws are not adequate either to assign

liability or compensate individuals or institutions for damages from oil spills resulting from exploration, development, or production in the Baltimore Canyon Trough

area. (See pages 51 –56.)

Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup.—There
I I

is no assurance that the technology utilized

in the Baltimore Canyon Trough or in any

other OCS frontier region would be adequate for oil spill surveillance, containment,

and cleanup. (See pages 57–59.)

Environmental Studies.—Environmental

research and baseline studies are not formally coordinated with the Interior Department’s leasing schedule and there is no requirement that information gathered be

used in the decisionmaking process for sale

of offshore lands and subsequent operation.

(See pages 60-62.)

State Role.—The limited role of State governments in the decisionmaking process for

OCS development under existing laws and

practices may lead to unnecessary delays

and improper planning for such development. (See pages 63–66.)

Pollution Research.—The effects of pollutants

which may be discharged during OCS

operations cannot presently be determined

with any accuracy and recent research

efforts have not clarified conflicting claims

by oil companies and environmental

groups regarding the amount and consequences of marine pollution. (See pages

67–69,)

Conflicting Ocean Uses.—There are potential

conflicts between OCS oil and gas activities

and vessel traffic engaged in commercial

shipping and fishing activities. However,

there has been no comprehensive study and

analysis to identify all conflicts and to find

ways of resolving them. (See pages 70–75.)

.——. —

OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SYSTEMS—FINDINGS

Effects of OCS Development

Oil and natural gas can be produced in

the amounts presently projected off the

Mid-Atlantic coast without significant

damage to the environment or disruption

of patterns of life in New Jersey or

Delaware if operations are carefully

designed, planned, and monitored.

However, careful planning, engineering,

and strict operational monitoring are required for each of these complex systems.

To a large extent, such planning and

monitoring will depend on the quality of

oversight by the responsible Federal

agencies. (See pages 150– 160.)

Changes in lines of authority within the

Department of the Interior would improve the Department’s ability to supervise offshore development and to coordinate operations with State and local

governments. (See pages 43–46 ,

1 30–131 .)

Federal-State Relations

States cannot participate in a meaningful

way in the process that leads to major

leasing and OCS decisions under present

policies. The State role at present is little

more than that of commentator. (See

pages 131–140, 155- 156.)

Existing laws and regulations do not

clearly specify the information about

OCS activities to which States are entitled, a lapse that encourages disputes

over rights to data between State and

Federal officials. (See pages 63–66, 125,

138–140, 147–150.)

Federal efforts to deal with State concerns

are fragmented among many departments and agencies and seldom reflect a

sense of need for coordination, clear lines

of communication, and close working

ties. (See pages 43–46, 130, 152–155,

161 –165.)

The Interior Department’s relations with
State governments are improving but

relations still depend more on individual

judgments by Interior Department

officials than on formal administrative

procedures on which the States can rely.

(See pages 139-140.)

● Changes in Federal OCS policies and

practices have lagged behind changes in

the social and political climate in the

Mid-Atlantic in which offshore development will occur. The lag is particularly

important with respect to environmental

concerns and a desire among States for

greater access to Federal information and

decision making. (See pages 63-66,

127–1 31.)

. As of mid-1976, the Office of Coastal

Zone Management had not asserted itself

as coordinator of State and Federal activities involving the effects of offshore

development on the coastal zone. (See

pages 43–46, 136-138.)

. Concerns of New Jersey and Delaware

officials over environmental and social

impacts of offshore development are

compounded by their doubts about the

quality of Federal management of the

leasing program and doubts about the

effectiveness of the enforcement of OCS

regulations. (See pages 63–66. )

. Neither Delaware or New Jersey wants to

delay offshore development unnecessarily, but both are prepared to seek

legal remedies if development in the MidAtlantic proceeds without what they consider adequate State participation in decisions. (See pages 159–160.)

Planning

. Federal requirements under the Coastal

Zone Management Act that Federal activities be consistent with a State’s coastal

zone management plan have played no

role as yet in Mid-Atlantic OCS activities

●

because neither New Jersey or Delaware

has completed coastal zone management

plans. (See pages 136–138.)

The exact location of OCS facilities and

the magnitude of development impacts

will not be known until Outer Continental Shelf “frontier areas” have been explored and the size and location of

petroleum resources have been determined. (See pages 133, 143-144,

146– 172.)

Regulation, Safety, and Pollution

●

●

The regulation of offshore technology by

the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) is

based on general guidelines to the industry with minimal inspection and enforcement, USGS regulations are more concerned with specific pieces of equipment

than with the total oil and gas production

system. (See pages 47-50, 130, 146,

152–155, 161–163.)

Techniques exist, but are not always

used, for setting design standards and installation practices and for testing all major items of equipment involved in OCS

operations. (See pages 47–50, 152–155,

161 –163.)

Federal regulations are not sufficiently

precise with regard to standards for construction of offshore platforms or

pipelines. (See pages 47–50, 152- 155.)

The purpose of the Interior Department’s

OCS environmental studies program and

its role in the management of OCS activities is not clearly defined. In their

present form, environmental surveys

conducted under the auspices of this

program are not useful either in writing

environmental impact statements or in

making OCS leasing decisions. (See pages

60–62, 134–135.)
. Federal pollution research efforts are not

as well coordinated as are those sponsored by private industry. (See pages

67–69, 167–169.)

Oil Spills

● Under some weather conditions, oil spills

from a platform as far as 50 miles at sea

could reach the New Jersey and Delaware

coasts but it is not possible to predict the

point of impact. (See pages 165–166.)

● Weather, wind, and ocean currents will

affect the dispersion, trajectory, chemical

composition, and ultimate disposition of

oil spills. These conditions vary from

season to season, and even from day to

day, but research on ocean conditions in

OCS areas has a low budget priority. (See

pages 165–166.)

● The Federal Government does not set

definitive standards for the industry to

follow in carrying out its responsibility

to provide cleanup equipment in the

event of a major oil spill. USGS does not

inspect cleanup equipment but relies on

industry to make its own inspections.

(See pages 57-59, 166- 167.)

. USGS procedures for monitoring discharges of oil and other pollutants during

OCS operations are inadequate and the

agency does not use monitoring equipment that is available and in use by other

Government agencies. (See pages 57–59,

166–169.)

● Under existing Federal practices there are

no standards that cleanup and containment equipment, which would be available in the Mid-Atlantic, must meet, and

no assurance that a major oil spill actually could be confined and removed

from the water even if the best equipment

is available. (See pages 57–59, 166– 169. )

At the present time, the laws of an adjacent State would be used to determine a

lessee’s liability for oil spill damages but

neither New Jersey or Delaware laws

provide for compensation to injured parties. (See pages 51–56.)

Impacts

●

●

●

●

●

Drastic changes in regional energy prices

will not result from offshore development in the Mid-Atlantic. (See pages

171–172.)

A net fiscal benefit to Mid-Atlantic State

governments probably will result from

onshore facilities related to offshore

development but there may be localized

fiscal problems and the advantage would

not occur until after the first 3 years of

offshore activity. (See pages 157– 159.)

Discovery of offshore oil would not

necessarily lead to construction of new

refineries in the Mid-Atlantic. In fact, existing air quality regulations might prevent construction of new refineries in

New Jersey and Delaware. (See pages

169–170.)

The major impacts on air and water

quality in the region would result from

expanded refineries and from gas processing plants. (See pages 170– 1 71. )

There is no formal mechansim for resolving conflicts among the many users of the

ocean or for directing research to discover the cumulative environmental consequences of expanding the use of the

ocean for energy development and other

purposes. (See pages 37-42, 70-75,

155–156.)
Figure II-2. Hypothetical deepwater port site offshore New Jersey coast

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Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
DEEPWATER PORTS — SUMMARY

In the late 1960’s, energy supply patterns

and environmental concerns seemed to justify

construction of at least one deepwater port for

supertankers off the coast of New Jersey and

Delaware.

By 1976, that was no longer the case. A

series of changes in State laws and Federal

policies, capped by the inflation and uncertainty of supplies that followed sharp increases in world oil prices, had changed the

region’s petroleum distribution system dramatically.

Plans for expanding old refineries and

building new ones were on the shelf. Increases

in demand for petroleum products were being

met by Gulf Coast and Caribbean refineries.

Inflation had doubled original estimates of the

cost of a deepwater port.

Extensive interviews with industry officials

and analysis of feasibility studies disclose

that—barring future changes as drastic as

those of the early 1970’s—the oil industry will

not revive Mid-Atlantic deepwater port plans

for at least 10 years.

New tax policies, changes in environmental

laws, changes in oil prices or sharp increases

in Mid-Atlantic demand for imports could

change the picture again. It also is possible

that environmental or political goals could

prompt States to build a deepwater port even

if it were not attractive on purely economic

grounds.

In the meantime, the oil industry is moving

ahead with plans to build two deepwater

ports off the shores of Texas and Louisiana

that eventually can handle 10 million barrels

of oil a day. A program of refinery construction and expansion is underway in both Texas

and Louisiana to handle imports of crude oil.

water ports, several sites and types of terminals were studied, including a sea pier located inside Delaware Bay. Of these, the technology most likely to be placed in waters

under Federal jurisdiction is a large

monobuoy complex located far enough from

the coast to serve the largest supertankers in

the world fleet. These are 480,000 deadweight

ton (dwt) ships, a quarter-of-a-mile long, that

carry up to 3.7 million barrels of oil and require 110 feet of water depth for maneuvering.

One site that could accommodate the largest

tankers is 32 miles off southern New Jersey

where waters are 110 to 115 feet deep.

Oil could be pumped from the site through

underwater and overland pipelines to the

Delaware River refinery complex which includes seven refineries with a total capacity of

890,000 barrels of petroleum product per day.

The capacity of the refineries could be nearly

doubled without acquiring additional land.

During the course of this study, several

bulk-oil terminal designs were analyzed. The

monobuoy was selected for detailed study

because it is a proven technology, already in

operation in more than 100 deepwater ports

around the world, and because it is less expensive, safer, and more accessible in rough

weather than other designs.

A monobuoy is a floating steel drum, 30 feet

to 50 feet in diameter, which is anchored over

a buried pipeline leading to shore. Tankers tie

up to the buoy, connect the buoy’s floating

rubber hoses to their cargo compartments and

pump oil through the hoses and into the

pipeline.

Under 1976 conditions, the cost of building

and operating a monobuoy complex off

Delaware Bay would make the price of

transferring oil through the deepwater port

During the period of strong Government higher than the existing system, which uses

and industry interest in Mid-Atlantic deep- lightering barges. Another barrier is
Delaware’s Coastal Zone Act which prohibits

pipeline landfalls in that State. New Jersey’s

Coastal Area Facilities Review Act does not

prohibit pipeline landfalls outright but both

the present and immediate past Governors of

New Jersey are on record in opposition to

deepwater port development in their State.

Thus, the descriptions of technology and

the likely consequences of its deployment

which are discussed in this study are purely

hypothetical. Basic changes in policy and the

economics of oil distribution will be necessary

before a deepwater port can be

the region.

Given the lack of interest in a

deepwater port on the part of

officials and the oil industry, the

deployed in

Mid-Atlantic

Government

matter is not

a major public issue at this time. The passage

of the Federal Deepwater Port Act of 1974 also

has reduced the number of issues of Federal

concern.

However, this study has identified several

potential issues. They include:

Tanker Design and Operations.—Tanker

spills are the source of five to fifteen times

as much oil as all offshore drilling and port

DEEPWATER PORTS—FINDINGS

Construction

. A deepwater port is not likely to be built

to serve the Mid-Atlantic during the next

10 years. (See pages 186–188.)

. Industry is not likely to abandon its existing marine transportation system for

supplying the Mid-Atlantic with oil

products as long as there is no clear cost

advantage. (See pages 173-178 ,

186–188.)

. Expanded or new refinery capacity

would be necessary to make a deepwater

port economically feasible, But existing

operations combined; yet pollution control

regulations are far less stringent for tankers

than for either deepwater ports or offshore

oil and gas operations. (See pages 76–79. )

Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup at Deepwater Ports.—The use of offshore deepwater ports may reduce the risk of certain

oil spills and environmental damage below

that of transporting crude oil by smaller

tankers into the congested New York Harbor and Delaware Bay. Even the very small

risk of a catastrophic spill from a supertanker, however, dictates that stringent

pollution control and cleanup systems be

used. (See pages 80–82.)

Standards in State Waters.—Under existing

Federal law, operators of deepwater ports

in State waters could ignore the safety and

environmental pollution standards that apply to ports outside the 3-mile limit. (See

pages 83-85.)

Adjacent Coastal State Status.—Differing interpretations of statutory criteria for determining adjacent coastal State status make it

difficult to predict which States could

qualify for that status in the future and

whether some States may be deprived of the

benefits of such status. (See pages 86–89.)

Federal and State air quality regulations

make construction of new refineries

along the Delaware River and Bay

unlikely in the foreseeable future,

although existing refineries may be expanded without exceeding pollution

standards. (See pages 186– 188.)

Environment

. Because a decision to build a deepwater

port would logically follow—not force—
a decision to build new refineries, a port

is likely to be postponed at least until,

and if, refinery capacity in the MidAtlantic expands significantly. (See pages

186–188.)

● A deepwater port system would offer environmental advantages over small

tankers operating in existing ports. Presently, small tankers spill twice as much

oil that can damage the coastal zone as

would be spilled in a deepwater port

system. (See pages 193–194.)

● The most serious threat of oil spills as a

result of a deepwater port system comes

from the tankers using the port. Yet,

tanker regulations are less strict than port

regulations. (See pages 76–79, 195– 196. )

● Because of the serious design limitations

of containment and cleanup equipment,

even the most advanced equipment will

be effective only about 55 percent of the

time in winter seas off the Mid-Atlantic

coast. These facts emphasize the importance of preventing spills rather than

regulating cleanup equipment. (See pages

80–83, 193–194.)

Planning and Procedures

● Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Surveillance

Systems are not required for deepwater

ports in State waters and budget

priorities in the Coast Guard could delay

installation of these systems for the ports.

(See pages 83-85, 185- 186.)

● There is disagreement among Federal

officials, State governments, and other

interested parties as to statutory criteria

for determining which States near a

deepwater port are eligible for economic

assistance and regulatory powers of the

Deepwater Port Act. (See pages 86–89,

195.)

. Applications for the construction and

operation of deepwater ports in State or

territorial waters are not under the

jurisdiction of the Deepwater Port Act

and there is minimal coordination between the two agencies which do have

jurisdiction —the A r m y Corps o f

Engineers and the Depart men t of

Transportation. (See pages 83-85,

185–1 86.)
Figure II-3. Proposed site of the floating nuclear powerplant

I

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Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment and Public Service Electric &I Gas Co
FLOATING NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS—SUMMARY

Late in 1972, New Jersey’s largest public

utility company concluded that floating

nuclear powerplants moored off the coast

would solve a major problem faced with all

large-scale generators—access to cooling

water. The company, Public Service Electric &

Gas Co., which generates more than 60 percent of the State’s power, also concluded they

could be built for less money and be less environmentally damaging than land-based

plants. Access to cooling water was crucial to

the company’s future plans. At the time its

customers were using electricity at rates that

meant doubling Public Service’s generating

capacity every 8 years—a rate of growth well

above the national average—and the number

of sites for new plants that could be built

without cooling towers was severely limited.

During the period of steep growth in demand in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the

offshore plant was a critical element in Public

Service’s long-range plans for providing new

generation facilities. Its construction schedule

called for having large amounts of new

generating capacity in place by the early

1980’s. Two land-based nuclear plants near

Salem, N. J., were running 5 years behind

schedule. Construction of two more nuclear

units was delayed when objections to the use

of Newbold Island in the Delaware River

forced Public Service to relocate the project to

Hope Creek, just north of the Salem plants.

Lead times for land-based plants elsewhere in

the State were running between 8 and 12

years.

In September 1972, after conducting its own

site surveys off the New Jersey coast, Public

Service contracted to buy the first two floating

plants to be produced by Offshore Power

Systems, Inc. In 1973, Public Service signed a

contract for two more floating plants.

Today, after 3 years of analyzing the

offshore power concept, staff members of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and

some other Federal agencies have come to the

same general conclusion about the cost and

environmental impact of floating nuclear

powerplants. These staff judgments are tentative and are not in any sense formal endorsements of the concept or the construction

plans. The Public Service proposal still must

work its way through a series of reviews,

public hearings, and decisions by Federal and

State agencies and meet challenges from environmental groups, New Jersey beach communities, and some nuclear scientists and

engineers who say that the systems are unnecessary, and may be unworkable or unsafe.

Before an offshore nuclear plant can start

generating power it must clear three separate

stages of licensing. The first of these probably

will not be completed before 1977.

The preliminary NRC staff reviews

nevertheless have provided enough encouragement to the companies involved in the

floating nuclear powerplants—the Atlantic

Generating Station Units 1 and 2—that they

have spent more than $120 million thus far for

plans, environmental studies, and in tooling

up for production.

Public Service plans to have the first plant

operational in 1985 and the second in 1987.

Each plant is designed to generate 1,150

megawatts (MWe) of power, a supply that

Public Service estimates will provide about

one-third of the additional power it plans to

be generating by 1987. The plants are

designed to generate power for 40 years, after

which they will be shut down and decommissioned.

Several advantages of supplying electricity

from offshore stations have been advanced in

recent years by supporters and some analysts
of the concept. Promoters of offshore plants

take the position that:

● Unlimited supplies of cooling water are

available at ocean sites and the environmental consequences of discharging

heated water into the ocean will be

minimal compared with the consequences of discharging heated water into

rivers, lakes and bays.

. Offshore construction eliminates the disruption of coastal marshlands and estuaries to a great extent.

. The floating power concept moves in the

direction of standardized nuclear plant

designs, a goal the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (then the Atomic Energy

Commission) set in 1972.

. Shipyard construction of plants will

shorten the time required to put a nuclear

plant in operation after a decision is

made to build it.

. Volume production can cut costs and improve quality control.

Federal and State agencies have been

reviewing the offshore powerplant proposal

informally since late 1971 and formally since

July 1973, when the Atomic Energy Commission docketed an Offshore Power Systems application for a permit to build eight floating

nuclear powerplants.

During that time, the Atlantic Generating

Station has received encouragement from the

staff of the Council on Environmental Quality,

which views the proposal with “guarded optimism. ” The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

has declared the project “generally acceptable” as to environmental impact and risk. The

same office concluded in a Safety Evaluation

Report published in September 1975 that with

some modifications in design “there is

reasonable assurance that . . . [the reactors

could be installed] without undue risk to the

health and safety of the public.”

During preheating conferences on the

Offshore Power Systems application for a

manufacturing permit, interveners have

challenged many of these claims, questioned

design features, raised doubts about the need

for any new generating capacity in the area,

and argued that the technology is unproven

and should not be tested near New Jersey

communities.

The State of New Jersey, which has not

sought official intervener status, has complained to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that neither of two environmental impact

statements NRC has published “faces up fully

to all the risks [of floating plants] about which

you owe the public your professional advice. ”

In a May 4, 1976, letter to NRC, David J.

Bardin, New Jersey Commissioner of Environmental Protection, wrote that the most important lapse was in not addressing the possible

consequences of a major accident “on the

ground that such failures were unlikely to occur. ”

Some of the major points that interveners

have argued in preheating conferences since

1974 are:

●

●

●

●

The plant will be vulnerable to external

hazards such as ship collisions, airplane

crashes, and severe storms. Damage to

the plant could result in dispersal of

radioactive materials injurious to human

health and aquatic life.

Transportation and handling of radioactive fuel and wastes involve risks to

human safety and health and to the

marine and coastal environment.

Evacuation in case of an accident will be

difficult, especially in summer months,

and there are no adequate plans or procedures for such emergencies.

Fear of nuclear accidents will reduce the

appeal of the area for recreational uses
and have a detrimental effect on the

region’s tourist -based economy,

● Other impacts that could be adverse include industrialization of the ocean

around the site, onshore support

facilities, dredging, and defects in underwater electrical transmission lines.

. NRC should prepare a comprehensive,

programmatic EIS on the construction of

floating nuclear powerplants located

offshore.

More than 15,000 New Jersey and Delaware

residents were contacted by OTA as part of the

public participation program of this study.

From these participants, more than 1,000

responses dealing specifically with the floating nuclear plant were selected for analysis.

The analysis showed that the public was

generally well aware that advantages and disadvantages must be weighed in deciding

whether to build a floating nuclear plant. The

analysis, along with press reports and statements at public hearings, also showed that the

public sees the disadvantages as involving

questions of safety, environmental degradation and high construction costs. The advantages include increased energy supplies with

resulting economic expansion and cheaper

power than would be possible with continued

use of oil-fired generating plants.

Specific concerns about safety involve

possibilities of accidents, leakage of radioactive waste and unresolved questions about the

permanent disposal of nuclear waste. There

was a perception among those who answered

the OTA questionnaire that floating nuclear

powerplants are experimental and that there

is no experience on which to base estimates of

risk and reliability.

One of the advantages cited in questionnaires and workshops is that nuclear

powerplants are less polluting generally than

fossil-fueled plants. In turn, participants saw

advantages in floating plants over land-based

plants in their distance from shore and the

elimination of pressures on New Jersey water

supplies for cooling water.

In this study, OTA has analyzed available

information on costs, benefits, environmental

impact, safety, waste disposal systems,

transportation, transmission cables, and

decommissioning activities associated with

the floating plants. The study does not attempt

to evaluate controversies about the safety and

performance of nuclear plants in general;

these are beyond the scope of the coastal

effects analysis, It concentrates, instead, on exploring differences between the designs of

floating and land-based plants and comparing

the advantages and disadvantages of each,

The major issues identified by OTA in its

study of the floating nuclear plant are:

Risks From Major Accidents.—The Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) is not

evaluating the risks from accidents in floating nuclear plants comprehensively enough

to permit either a generic comparison of the

relative risks from land based and floating

nuclear plants, or an assessment of the

specific risks from deploying floating plants

off New Jersey. (See pages 90–98.)

Deployment in Volume.—As many as 59

floating nuclear powerplants could be built

by a single manufacturer by the year 2000

but no policy analysis of the impacts of

deploying that many plants in U.S. coastal

waters has been done or is contemplated.

(See pages 90-101.)

Technical Uncertainties.—Several technical

aspects of the deployment, operation, and

decommissioning of floating nuclear

powerpIants have not been analyzed

thoroughly enough to permit judgments

about the relative risks of the overall

system. (See pages 102–105. )

Siting of Floating Powerplants Outside U.S.

Territorial Limits.—Because there is no

physical barrier to location floating nuclear
powerplants more than 3 miles offshore, authority to regulate floating nuclear

proposals for siting plants outside ter- powerplants outside U.S. territory is not

ritorial limits are possible. However, U.S. clear under existing international law. (See

FLOATING

pages 106–111.)

. . — — — —. .-—

NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS—FINDINGS

Energy Supply

● The two 1150 megawatt floating nuclear

plants proposed to be located offshore

New Jersey could produce about 10 percent of the State’s electrical needs projected for 1990. (See pages 197–200.)

Planning and Procedures.

●

●

●

●

●

No detailed procedure or design standards have been developed for transporting fuel to a floating plant or for carrying

irradiated fuel and other radioactive

wastes to shore. (See pages 102–105,

214–218.)

Offshore sites for nuclear powerplants

offer advantages over shore-based sites

in terms of impacts on the marine environment. (See pages 106-111 ,

200–201, 222, 229.)

The floating nuclear powerplant concept

of standardizing design may provide a

method for controlling escalating costs of

nuclear power plants. (See pages

200–201, 225–228.)

There are several decommissioning options

for the floating nuclear plant, but only

the one of dismantling the radioactive internals at the plant site and disposing of

them appears to be technically and

economically feasible. (See pages

102–105, 219–222.)

Existing international law does not

specifically settle the question of jurisdiction over a floating nuclear powerplant

located beyond national territorial limits,

and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

appears not to have authority under present law to approve siting of a U.S.

nuclear powerplant in waters outside of

U.S. jurisdiction. (See pages 106–111.)

Federal licensing of floating nuclear

plants is confined to rather narrow technical and administrative questions related to building eight plants and deploying two of those plants off the coast of

New Jersey. It does not consider the implications of approving the larger scale

deployment of floating nuclea r

powerplants. (See pages 99–101.)

The one U.S. company now developing a

capacity to build floating nuclear

powerplants intends to build and market

four such plants a year after 1985.

Operating at peak capacity beginning in

1977, this company could produce 59

floating nuclear plants by the year 2000.

(See pages 99-101.)

Safety

●

●

●

The nuclear reactor and floating barge

are proven technologies but the combination of the two as a system is not, (See

page 203.)

A critical review of completed studies

discloses little foundation for concluding

that either construction or routine operations of the two plants at the Atlantic

Generating Station would endanger

public health or environment. (See pages

224–229.)

In the unlikely event of a core-melt acci-
dent in a floating plant, the molten core

eventually would melt through the bottom of any barge and release radioactive

materials directly into the ocean where

they could contaminate beaches and be

absorbed in the food chain. (See pages

90–98, 232–236.)

● The probability of a core-meltdown accident in a floating nuclear powerplant is

comparable to the probability calculated

in WASH–1400, commonly known as

the Rasmussen Report, for land-based

plants. However, the expected consequences of releases of radioactive

materials as a result of a core-melt at a

floating plant could be significantly

different. (See pages 90–98, 230–237.)

● The probability of an atmospheric release

of radioactive materials may be as much

as seven times greater for a core-melt at a

floating plant than for a core-melt at the

land-based plant, as calculated in

WASH–1400. However, the amount and

consequences of the release may be

reduced by design features and offshore

siting of the plant. (See pages 90–98,

230–237.)

. The Liquid Pathways Generic Study

being prepared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Offshore Power

Systems comparing the radiological consequences of accidental release of

radioactive materials into water at floating plants and land-based plants is not as

comprehensive as WASH – 1400’s

analysis of the consequences of accidents,

partly because it does not consider

economic impacts. (See pages 90-98,

233–236.)
ALTERNATIVES TO OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES—SUMMARY

New Jersey and Delaware would have a servation and energy supply programs, the

limited number of alternatives over at least most likely course for the Mid-Atlantic region

the next two decades if any or all of the pro- during the next 20 years is to extend the

posed offshore energy systems were not energy system that already is planned or in

deployed. place.

Without strong national leadership in conALTERNATIVES TO OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES—FINDINGS

● There are specific alternatives which, if

substituted for each of the proposed

offshore energy projects, could supply

equivalent amounts of energy. Increased

imports are an alternative to offshore oil

and gas development. Onshore nuclear

plants and coal-fired plants are alternatives to floating nuclear plants. Greater

reliance on small tankers is an alternative

to deepwater ports. None of the specific

near-term alternatives offer clear social,

economic, or environmental advantages.

(See pages 238-246.)

● Reduction of energy consumption could

offer longer term advantages but there

are no specific plans at the State or national level for an energy conservation

program that might eliminate the need

for energy supplies that would come

from one or more of the proposed

offshore systems. (See pages 240–244. )

● Utility managers will choose existing and

tested technologies that are most apt to

match the consumption levels in their

forecasts and will assign reliability of

power supply a higher priority than cost.

(See pages 239-240.)

● The most promising alternatives for

stretching out supplies of fossil fuels are

programs to improve insulation of

homes and offices, changes in automobile

●

●

●

●

design to increase mileage, and use of existing technologies to increase the

amount of power generated per unit of

fuel. (See pages 240–242.)

Coal is a potential substitute for every

basic fuel in the United States and supplies could last for more than a century

even if consumption were to quadruple.

However, massive conversion to use of

coal would entail major changes in

transportation networks, in air quality

standards, new mining techniques, and

new miner-training and safety programs.

(See pages 243-244.)

Utility companies and other energy suppliers in Mid-Atlantic States will not factor supplies of oil and natural gas from

the Baltimore Canyon Trough into their

future plans until exploration establishes

likely production levels. (See pages

238–239.)

No single new technology or change in

the way existing technologies are used is

likely to provide more than a small percentage of total energy requirements

before the end of the century. Solutions

to energy problems will be found in

ting together many relatively small

servation and supply programs.

pages 240–246.)

Given existing laws, regulations,

putcon-

(See

fuel
supplies, and technologies, New Jersey . Solar energy will not contribute much to

utilities report that they would replace energy supplies before the end of the cen -

floating nuclear powerplants with tury unless Federal programs to cut solar

shoreline floating plants, land-based installation costs and private plans to

nuclear plants, and coal-fired plants, in market solar products are given higher

that order of preference. (See pages priorities than they now enjoy. (See

238–240.) page 241.)
I

“.

-. . F
Chapter III

ISSUES AND OPTIONS

INTRODUCTION

This study has assessed the

economic effects of offshore oil

social, political, institutional, environmental, and

and gas, deepwater ports, and floating nuclear

powerplant technology on the coastal zone of New Jersey and Delaware. The potential

effects in this one region have been used to illustrate those public policy issues which

are of significant concern to Congress and the Nation.

OTA found that each of the three technologies studied posed different problems

and benefits for the area and that little cumulative effect could be expected even if all

three were to be deployed simultaneously.

There was, however, one issue which was raised by all three of the technologies:

the possibility of increasing and diversified use of the oceans in the future without any

formal mechanism for planning development, identifying priority ocean uses, and

resolving conflicts among an increasing number of users.

This chapter discusses this common issue, eight issues pertaining to the development of oil and gas resources, four pertaining to deepwater ports, and four pertaining to

floating nuclear powerplants. Analyses of these issues have been used to develop policy

options which Congress may wish to consider for resolving some of the problems identified. These policy options have been reviewed by industry and pertinent government

agencies and their comments have been considered prior to preparation of this final

report.

The comments quoted in the margins of the Issues discussions reflect the view of

citizens who joined in the public participation segment of this study and the views of

State and Federal officials who reviewed the work for OTA.

35
ISSUE 1

Offshore Priorities and Planning

Future deployment of ocean technologies on a large

scale could create serious conflicts among users and

impose excessive burdens on ocean and coastal environments unless a system for setting priorities of use

and for zoning ocean areas, much as land areas now

are zoned, is established.

FINDINGS

1. Decisions about

the oceans now are left

the most appropriate uses

to the individual judgments

of

of

private citizens and companies and the several Federal

agencies that have jurisdiction over some phase o f

ocean activities .

2. There is no formal mechanism for resolving conflicts among the many users of the ocean or for directing research to discover the cumulative environmental

consequences of expanding use of the oceans.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE

In normal operation, none of the three offshore

energy systems addressed in this study is likely to impose

intolerable burdens on either the ocean or coastal environment, singly or in combination. Conflicts between

these new systems and traditional users of waters off

New Jersey and Delaware probably can be resolved with

appropriate vessel traffic control systems and methods of

coordinating oil development and fishing operations.

If such offshore programs as floating nuclear

powerplants prove workable, they could lead to deployment of more floating powerplants and other offshore

technologies on a major scale.

No priorities now exist for uses of the oceans. No

structure, legal or administrative, exists for resolving

conflicts among users or for performing research on the

long-range and cumulative impacts of expanded ocean

use.

Environmental impact statements and public hearings which are required for most ocean licensing provide

a forum for identifying some conflicts among ocean uses,

.-

Overall Concern

Public Participation

Comments
but they seldom identify hard choices among limited

ocean resources and ocean uses.

The region’s ocean waters have been used for fishing, military operations, and commercial shipping since

colonial days. More recently, the ocean has been used for

recreation, dump sites, communication lines, and

weather stations.

Several other ocean uses have been proposed, either

for the near or distant future. One proposal would install

wind- or wave-powered generators at sea to generate

electrical power. Research and development is underway

on methods of using the ocean for controlled development of biological resources as a method to generate increased food and energy supplies. Mining of the Outer

Continental Shelf for sand, gravel, and minerals is an existing activity that could be expanded. Several proposals

exist for creating artificial islands for heavy industries

that, on land, are regarded as “bad neighbors. ”

Meanwhile, use of the ocean and its beaches for

recreation continues to grow, as do marine research,

archeological exploration, and salvage operations.

Many conflicts in ocean use are not confined to U.S.

territorial waters. Commercial fishing, shipping, and

mining, for example, are international activities that

often involve U.S. waters. The Third International Law of

the Sea Conference is addressing many marine problems,

although its primary mission is to resolve conflicts

among nations rather than conflicts among individual

users. Some industry organizations and a few international organizations, such as the Intergovernmental

Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), were created to solve problems between specific ocean activities

and other uses that conflict with those activities. IMCO

deals primarily with commercial shipping activities.

However, no single international group is responsible for

an overall view of the potential for future problems.

The following summary of the major historic and

future uses of the ocean off Delaware and New Jersey

suggests in more specific terms the potential conflicts

among ocean users, both domestic and foreign.

COMMERCIAL FISHING

The Delaware and New Jersey fishing grounds are at

the southernmost tip of the North Atlantic fisheries. In
—

the North Atlantic’s broad expanse of offshore waters—

which includes the Continental Shelf from Cape Cod to

Cape Hatteras—U.S. fishermen caught 1.5 billion pounds

of commercial fish and shellfish in 1975, which is almost

one third of the total U.S. catch.

Preliminary figures collected by the National Fisheries Service show that commercial fishermen in

Delaware and New Jersey grossed $20 million in 1975,

with a catch of more than 150 million pounds.

According to the National Fisheries Service, more

than 2,000 New Jersey and Delaware fishing boats provided full- or part-time employment to more than 3,500

persons.

In the Mid-Atlantic, foreign vessels, operating primarily outside the 12-mile national limit, have traditionally caught large quantities of fish. The vessels came

from the Soviet Union, Poland, Japan, Spain, Italy, and

East and West Germany. Even though the United States

has recently enacted a 200-mile fisheries zone, provisions

for licensing foreign fishing within this zone are still in

the future.

Commercial fishing in this region by both U.S. and

foreign fishermen, is likely to continue at the present

level without major increases in the future because many

of the resources are already utilized to their maximum

limit. There will probably be additional activity to restore

depleted stocks, to regulate and enforce new management systems for fisheries, and to find new ways to increase productivity of certain species. All of these activities will require the use of more ocean surface and

bottom space in areas that might be sought for other uses

such as oil drilling or siting of platforms. In addition, surface traffic of fishing vessels, enforcement vessels, and

research vessels which tend to stay at sea for longer

periods of time could conflict with other surface traffic.

1

SPORT FISHING

In 1970, an estimated 1.7 million salt-water sport

fishermen in the Mid-Atlantic region generated about

$300 million of business activity, according to a 1970 National Survey of Fishing and Hunting. Sport boats take

anglers to search for barracuda, shark, mackerel,

bluefish, butterfish, bass, trout, flounder, and croakers in

the Continental Shelf waters and beyond for tuna,

dolphin, mackerel, and albacore.
Between Atlantic City, N.J., and Ocean City, Md., the

ocean yields white marlin and tuna for sport fishermen.

Based on past trends, interest in sport fishing probably will increase in coming years at a rate higher than actual population growth. Boat traffic will increasingly

cause conflicts, especially at the coastal harbors that may

also be used for supply boats to support offshore technologies. In addition, land-use pressures may increase in

spawning and nursery grounds in the coastal zones,

which are utilized by 75 percent of the sport fish at some

time in their life cycle. z

MERCHANT SHIPPING

The shipping lanes off Delaware and New Jersey are

ocean versions of interstate highways that link MidAtlantic metropolitan areas. There are two major twoway traffic lanes into the Delaware Bay, second in the

region only to New York Harbor in total cargo handled.

One route is designated by the International

Maritime Consultative Organization of the United Nations as the recommended lane for traffic in and out of

Delaware Bay, However, only U.S. flag ships are forced

by the U.S. Coast Guard to comply with the recommendation and less than half of the ships that call at Delaware

Bay are U.S. flag ships. The other route is not recognized

by IMCO, but is a well-established traffic land used

heavily by foreign and domestic ships. Many other lanes

intersect the recognized lanes.

The ports on the Delaware River and New York

Harbor together are probably the most heavily utilized in

the United States. They handle over one-third of all imported and domestic oil carried by tankers. Nearly 3,000

major tankers enter and leave each port per year. Total

major ship traffic into Delaware Bay is more than 5,000

ships per year and into New York Harbor more than

8,000 per year. Almost 150 steamship liners operate out

of the Port of New York alone. Many of these ships are

foreign flag (almost all of the tankers carrying imported

oil) and traffic problems will undoubtedly increase as

other offshore users enter the region. The conflicts are

clear between offshore platforms in the Baltimore Canyon, which could be located near some traditional shipping lanes if oil is discovered.3
I

OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS

The scheduled sale of oil and gas leases in the MidAtlantic could cause a sharp increase in the number of

structures and amount of ship traffic in the ocean off

Delaware and New Jersey.

As many as 10 exploratory rigs and 50 production

platforms may be working off the Mid-Atlantic coast at

one time, along with vessels engaged in exploration, crew

transport, supply, platform and pipeline construction. As

many as 30 vessels-supply boats, tugs, and crew boats—

could be operating in the Baltimore Canyon region by

1980 in direct support of exploration rigs. When and if

Baltimore Canyon oil and gas is discovered and activities

hit their peak, the number of operating support vessels

could increase to over 200 and include construction

barges, pipelaying barges, and other varieties of

workboats. These uses and resulting traffic will conflict

with shipping, fishing, research, recreation, and other

surface uses not only offshore, but in the already limited

coastal harbors. Oil could be tankered to shore from

Outer Continental Shelf production rigs.4

MILITARY

A large portion of the Mid-Atlantic Continental

Shelf is used by the military for acknowledged and for

classified activities. Unclassified military operations in

the area include submarine missions, air exercises, gunnery practice, missile and rocket testing, search and

rescue drills, oceanographic research, and ocean surveillance. There are also several deepwater dumping

grounds for explosives and nuclear waste,

Naval ships and planes, which are most likely to

conflict with surface ship traffic, use the area 18 hours a

day on weekends. Potential air traffic conflicts are also

possible with helicopters that are used to transport crews

to offshore platforms.

INSTALLATION AND FACILITIES

The cities of Philadelphia, Pa,, and Camden, N.J.,

and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. of Edge Moor, Del.,

dump municipal and industrial waste in two deepwater

sites 50 miles southeast of Delaware Bay. The dump sites

are designated and monitored by the Environmental Protection Agency.
In 1974, barges made 222 trips from Delaware Bay to

the dump sites. Since then, the Environmental Protection

Agency has reduced the number of dump permits for the

area. Philadelphia, which dumps the largest volume of

waste, has been ordered to phase out its dumping by

1980. Because of public opposition to ocean dumping off

the resort areas of Atlantic City, N.J., Rehoboth Beach,

Del., and Ocean City, Md., it is unlikely that any new major dumping permits will be issued.

Three major transoceanic telephone cables are

buried directly east of the New Jersey shore, The cables

are buried about 10 feet deep along most of the Continental Shelf. Many conflicts between scallop fishermen, who

run dredges over the bottom near the cables, and the

telephone company have arisen in the past. New conflicts

are possible if and when oil pipelines are added to the

seafloor network.

_——— .-— ——.————

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Congress may wish to deal with problems arising

from conflicting ocean uses on any of a number of

policy levels. It could:

1. Mandate a detailed study of conflicting ocean

uses to assemble a data base on present and

future uses and suggest priorities for development and control. Such a study could also

assess present Federal organizational

capabilities to deal with such conflicts and, if

appropriate, propose changes, if any, required in

the Federal structure.

2. Provide one ocean-related agency with

authority to resolve ocean-use conflicts that

result from increased offshore activities, Any

such delegation of authority probably would

have to specify arbitration, public or private, as

an avenue for resolving some conflicts.

3. Require joint planning for offshore uses by conflicting parties, public and private, domestic and

foreign.
ISSUE 2

Federal Management System

Federal management of the offshore oil and gas

program is fragmented within the Department of the interior and coordination with other Federal agencies

which share jurisdiction is ineffective.

FINDINGS

1. The Department of the Interior, in its OCS

management role, must coordinate elements of

development which involve 4 cabinet-level departments, 15 subcabinet and independent agencies, 22

State governments, and public and private interest

groups.

2. There is no top-level coordination of OCS

management, practices, and studies initiated by the

Department of the Interior. Line responsibilities for OCS

activities are divided within the Department of the interior between two of its bureaus, both of which have a

wide range of other activities that overshadow their

OCS responsibility.

3. Clear lines of responsibility have not been

established between the Department of the Interior and

the Office of Coastal Zone Management despite the fact

that offshore development in the Mid-Atlantic could produce the most important impacts on coastal zones

since the Coastal Zone Management Act became law.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Despite the urgency which the Administration attaches to expanding offshore lease sales and petroleum

production, no consolidation of responsibility and accountability for the OCS program in one agency has occurred.

Public Participation

Comments

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of

“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapter

IV, particularly pages 124– 140.
I

The Department of the Interior, in its OCS management role, must coordinate elements of offshore development that involve cabinet-level departments, some 15

subcabinet and independent agencies, 22 State governments, and public and private interest groups. Over the

past 2 years, this coordination has been seriously questioned. Examples of this difficulty have been disputes

over pipeline jurisdiction among agencies within the Interior Department itself. One Interior Department agency

had been negotiating, without success, with a Transportation Department agency over pipeline jurisdiction for

nearly 5 years before a memorandum of understanding

was signed by the two Departments. No policy-level

pressure has been brought to bear on Interior’s Bureau of

Land Management and the U.S. Geological Survey to

solve their own jurisdictional problems about pipelines

within the Interior Departmental

Many studies of offshore development have been initiated at middle and lower levels of the Department. It is

not clear whether they will produce information that

policy makers either at the Federal or State level actually

require. There is no top-level coordination of such

studies.

Line responsibility for OCS activities is divided

within the Interior Department between two bureaus,

both of which have a wide range of other activities that

overshadow their OCS responsibilities in terms of manpower and budget. The Bureau of Land Management

(BLM) is the lead agency in developing leasing programs

and granting rights to offshore exploration and development. Once leases are signed, responsibility for supervising offshore activities passes to the U.S. Geological

Survey (USGS), which is primarily a scientific agency

with limited regulatory responsibility. The USGS drafts

technical regulations for offshore equipment and operations and enforces those regulations. The regulations

have been, and continue to be, more concerned with

specific items of equipment than with relationships between the equipment and the total oil and gas development system.

Clear lines of responsibility have not been

established between Interior officials and officials of the

Office of Coastal Zone Management for OCS operations,

despite the fact that offshore development in the MidAtlantic could produce the most important impacts on
I

coastal zones there of any single development since the

Coastal Zone Management Act became law.

2

The Office of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM)

could have a significant impact on offshore energy

development when States begin to complete coastal zone

plans. The Office has had a relatively minor role in

offshore energy development to date. This role could

change when New Jersey and Delaware submit final

plans and the Office must make judgments about

whether the plans make sufficient allowance for coastal

zone activities that are in the “national interest” and

whether, in turn, Federal activities in coastal zones are

“consistent” with State plans. Neither “national interest”

nor “consistent” has been formally defined by the OCZM

or any Federal agency so far.

State officials have expressed a hope that once

coastal plans are completed, the Office of Coastal Zon

e

Management would function as a clearinghouse for

Federal activities and plans to help States sort out various

Federal programs with coastal implications. They also

said they would hope the Office would assert authority,

once coastal plans are completed, to force coordination

among Federal programs that involve coastlines. a

In addition, long-range national policy questions

which arise from accelerated leasing schedules should be

considered.

For example, can the United States proceed indefinitely without (a) a formal process for determining

total energy needs and (b) calculating the share of those

needs that should be provided by OCS resources? That

allocation, rather than the existing program for leasing

maximum acreage in the minimum number of years,

could become the guide for future leasing programs. It is

also important to consider whether the United States can

proceed indefinitely with offshore developments for oil

and natural gas and other seabed resources, fisheries, and

commercial activities, without a formal process for reconciling conflicts not only among the uses but between

those uses and their impact on the ocean environment. —

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

. ..—-—.

1. Assign a single policy-level office within the
Department of the Interior the authority and responsibility for OCS policy coordination.

2. Assign to a single policy-level office within the

Department of the Interior general responsibility for

program coordination with all Federal agencies with

OCS responsibilities and specific line authority and

responsibility for operations of:

● those sections within the USGS which now draft

and enforce technical regulations for offshore oil

and natural gas activities;

● those sections within the Bureau of Land

Management which now supervise offshore leasing and environmental studies programs; and

● all land uses, ocean use, economic, geological,

and other planning that is now carried on

independently in various sections within the interior Department that relate to OCS operations.
ISSUE 3

Regulation and Enforcement

Inadequate regulation and enforcement of offshore oil

and gas technology could result in more accidents and

more oil spills than would occur if a more effective

system were implemented.

Oil and Gas

FINDINGS

1. The present Federal system for the regulation of

offshore oil and gas development and for the enforcement of these regulations does not assure the use of

adequate technology for safety and pollution prevention.

2. Many of the operating orders for the Mid-Atlantic

are not issued by the Department of the Interior until

after leases have already been sold.

3. Technology exists for setting design standards,

installation practices, specifications, and scheduling

tests and inspections for all major equipment items related to OCS operations but it has not been utilized.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Three principal aspects of regulating offshore oil

and gas technology are in question:

1. The standards and specifications for design, construction, and installation of individual components.

2. Regulations which are issued to guide the operations and illustrate best technical practice for use

of each component.

3. The enforcement system and procedures for

checking, monitoring, and reporting adherence to

established regulations.

A significant problem with identifying potential impacts from lapses in technology supervision is the fact

Public Participation

Comments

-.———. . - -

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of

“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapter

IV, particularly pages 140– 171.
that very little data or analysis is available for evaluating

accidents and safety questions.

During offshore U.S. oil operations spanning the 10

years from 1967 to 1976, major spills (of more than 1,000

barrels each) were few in number but caused more than

80 percent of the pollution by volume. The two principal

sources of these spills were underwater pipelines and

drilling-production platforms, each contributing roughly

equivalent numbers and volumes of spills.

“Safety Alert” notices, which are issued in the Gulf

of Mexico to warn industry of malfunctions in equipment, provide other data on causes. Of 27 such notices

reviewed, the causes of significant accidents included

platform machinery malfunctions, platform construction

operations failures, ship collisions, blowout-preventor

malfunctions, shallow gas pockets, and severe storms.1

There appears to be no systematic analysis of this accident data or any other for the purpose of determining

where specific improvements are needed.

The U.S. Geological Survey, principally through

OCS orders and other lease stipulations, regulates OCS

technology and related activities. Recent studies have

made recommendations for several changes, including

more stringent regulation of oil spill prevention equipment and techniques, better equipment standards, and

increased inspection and training. z

Few of the substantive recommendations of these

studies—which included development of comprehensive

standards and specifications, improved training, and improved inspection and enforcement practices—have been

reflected by changes in proposed OCS orders for the MidAtlantic or other regions such as Alaska. The USGS, in

fact, debates the need to complete orders and inspection

plans prior to a lease sale. The USGS has, on the other

hand, instituted a number of the procedural recommendations of these studies.3

The USGS decided, in the case of the ‘Mid-Atlantic,

orders on platforms and pipelines would not be issued

until some unspecified time after the lease sale and that

inspection procedures would be established only after exploration and development activities take place. The

USGS has said that there is no need to issue these orders

until the industry clearly intends to develop an offshore

area.
The offshore oil industry has developed a good

safety record with regard to oil spill accidents from platforms, especially since the Santa Barbara spill in 1969. At

the same time, however, Federal regulatory agencies,

principally USGS, do not appear to employ the best

available system for establishing standards and enforcing

regulations. There is, therefore, no assurance that the best

practices and standards will be consistently followed.

Pipeline networks have not been subject to stringent

regulatory standards in the United States in the past and

pipeline failures, with resulting oil discharges, have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico as well as in other offshore

development regions.4

Specific design standards, installation practice

specifications, and scheduled tests and inspections could

readily be adopted for pipelines in the Mid-Atlantic

region, and in other OCS regions, based on existing

knowledge and available technology.

New technology is available to assure pipeline safety

and could be immediately incorporated in regulations

prior to any lease sale. This includes standards for coating pipelines with corrosion protective materials, standards for welding and inspecting welds, specifications for

pipe materials, and procedures for installing and burying

pipe.

Oil production platforms are highly complex

systems, subject to great uncertainties, which are

designed, built, and installed by oil companies under

stringent self-imposed technical guidelines. There is very

little regulation of this technology. Most recognized industry standards are not required by Government regulations; the OCS order for platforms merely states that

platforms shall be adequately designed and certified,

Government inspections of construction, installation,

and operations are not systematically planned.

The American Bureau of Shipping, a private group

which sets design standards and inspects offshore equipment for insurance companies, has developed specifications and inspection procedures for offshore mobile platforms. The Bureau regularly works with the U.S. Coast

Guard to certify ships and other floating equipment.

Adoption of this regulation and enforcement practice to

fixed production platforms by OCS regulatory agencies

could increase the effectiveness of the present system immediate y.
The U.S. Coast Guard recently developed regulations for deepwater ports which, in many cases, cover

technology and hardware similar or identical to that used

in OCS operations. The Coast Guard philosophy of

regulation appears to be one of setting detailed, firm and

comprehensive rules for designing, building, and operating, and then carefully checking adherence to those rules.

On the other hand, the USGS philosophy appears to be

one of asking for industry’s best efforts and then making

broad judgments about its adequacy.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

The following options are available for making

changes to the present system:

1. Require that OCS orders be completed prior to,

and made part of, all lease sales. Such orders

should include design standards for the complete system, along with test and inspection

schedules. Require development plans to be

complete and comprehensive, to utilize environmental data developed for the region, and to

follow specified standards and practices for the

system.

2. Transfer regulatory and enforcement authority

from USGS to the U.S. Coast Guard for major

OCS systems, and apply existing Coast Guard

regulations on drill ships and floating platforms

to other offshore technology.

3. Separate regulation and enforcement for daily

OCS operations within the Federal Government

by assigning these responsibilities to an agency, or department, other than Interior, while

preserving Interior’s OCS development responsibilities.
ISSUE 4

Oil Spill Liability and Compensation

Existing laws are not adequate either to assign liability

or to compensate individuals or institutions for

damages from oil spills resulting from exploration,

development, or production in the Baltimore Canyon

Trough area.

Oil and Gas

FINDINGS ——- .

1. Because existing law does not deal comprehensively with liability for oil spills from offshore

structures in OCS activity, the law of the adjacent State

is used for determining a lessee’s liability for damages.

The laws of Delaware and New Jersey, which are adjacent to Baltimore Canyon lease areas, do not contain

explicit provisions to provide for compensation to parties injured by oil spills.

2. Under existing statutory and case law, damaged

parties lack effective protection against economic

losses that may result when an oil spill reaches shore.

3. There are benefits to having the States handle

some aspects of liability and compensation and these

benefits can be preserved by a Federal law which does

not completely preempt State laws.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Public Participation

Comments

The possibility of a major oil spill during development in the Baltimore Canyon Trough is a potential impact that concerns the public and government officials of

New Jersey and Delaware. ] The concern is intensified by I

the fact that, under existing law, damaged parties lack leaks Comp, iII II. ~ ~ r ; , ,, \ .$,

protection against economic losses that may result from must be required ~‘ I ; : ; i ‘ 1.

oil reaching shore.

The OTA oil spill risk assessment indicates that

there probably would be at least one major oil spill during development of the Baltimore Canyon Trough. Under

certain weather conditions and at certain times of the

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text

“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapter

Iv’, particularly pages 165– 1(57.

51
year, oil could come ashore anywhere in the New Jersey

area, affecting tourist and commercial fishing incomes. z

Natural resources such as estuarine areas and wildlife

preserves whose values are difficult to quantify

economically also could be damaged.

Most Federal liability statutes apply to spills from

vessels rather than spills that may occur as a result of

offshore oil and gas development. Under existing law,

offshore structures such as production platforms probably would be treated as artificial islands and would not be

governed by the principles of law governing the liability

of vessels.3

Offshore structures within the territorial seas are

covered in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

(FWPCA), as amended (33 USC 1321), which makes a

discharger liable to the Federal Government for cleanup

and removal costs up to a limit of $8 million. The discharger is liable for full costs if negligence can be shown.

However, no evidence of financial responsibility such as

a surety bond is required for offshore operators. A $35

million fund is established to support cleanup efforts

when a discharger fails to act on his own but there is no

provision for compensating parties for damages that the

cleanup effort cannot prevent. Such parties must rely on

the courts and the application of the common law of torts

to recover losses under theories of negligence, trespass

and, occasionally, nuisance. Primary responsibility for

administering the liability provisions of the FWPCA rests

with the U.S. Coast Guard which monitors all cleanup

efforts and, when necessary, initiates Government

cleanup.

Other relevant Federal statutes which deal with

liability for oil pollution are the Deepwater Port Act of

1974, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of

1973, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.

Each of these has specific and limited application.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act does not

specifically establish a system for oil spill liability,

although it does authorize the Secretary of the Interior to

promulgate regulations to prevent waste and conserve

natural resources. When read in conjunction with other

related laws, such as the National Environmental Policy

Act, that provision authorizes the Secretary to issue rules

pertaining to pollution which are binding on the lessees.4
I I

After the Santa Barbara oil spill, regulations were

issued (34 FR 13547, August 22, 1969) making lessees

strictly liable for all cleanup and removal costs. However,

the regulations stipulated that a lessee’s obligations to

third parties, other than those of cleanup costs, are

governed by applicable law (30 CFR 250.43).

In the absence of Federal law dealing with liability

for oil spills resulting from offshore development, the applicable law for determining a lessee’s liability for

damages presumably is the law of the adjacent State.5

Both New Jersey and Delaware are working on new

liability laws,6 but present laws do not seem to provide

for compensation to injured parties, other than through

civil action.

The objectives of a model oil spill liability law include an incentive to prevent spills and to move quickly

to contain and clean up those spills that cannot be prevented; compensation for damage victims, T and

assurance that a lessee would be able to assume any financial burdens resulting from damage claims.

Current laws do not meet those objectives. While

rapid cleanup may be somewhat encouraged by the present system, the incentive to prevent oil spills is not as

strong as it could be. Although an OCS discharger is

strictly liable, and there are few defenses against damage

claims, liability is limited to removal and cleanup costs

except where courts apply common law to require compensation.

Other questions have to do with whether loss of opportunity for recreation or loss of navigation rights are

properly recoverable injuries.

Under current laws, if a lessee escapes liability

under one of the permissible defenses, and cleanup costs

exceed the current $35 million fund limit under the

FWPCA, there is no source of funds from which to compensate loss. This problem could be addressed in new

legislation,

Because offshore operators are not required to

demonstrate financial responsibility and because insurance against oil spills sometimes is difficult to obtain,

it is possible that companies which could not assume current required liability expenses would be permitted to

operate off New Jersey and Delaware. B
Full liability insurance for ocean-related pollution

has been generally unavailable on the commercial market

to owners and operators of onshore and offshore

facilities. 9 This is partly because insurers cannot accurately estimate potential damage or loss, The oil industry has established an entity to compensate victims of

pollution by onshore and offshore oil structures. Oil Insurance Limited (OIL) is an insurance company set up by

members of the industry to cover catastrophes, property

damage, pollution, and wild-well control, both onshore

and offshore. Coverage up to $100 million per member

company, with a deductible of $1 million, will be provided in any one year. A company must repay OIL over a

period of 10 years for all settlements through retroactive

premiums.

While compensation for direct physical damages

could be awarded by the courts, such an award would

depend on the ability of a damaged party to underwrite

protracted legal action. Indirect damages are even less

likely to be recoverable.10 Therefore, there are many potential circumstances where an injured party would not

be able to obtain adequate compensation.

Property owners who are directly damaged by oil

would have the best chance to recover property and business losses under existing law. However, courts generally

have held that lost business profits and lowered property

values of persons whose property has not been directly

damaged by oil could not be foreseen by a negligent party

and therefore are not grounds for damage claims. Thus,

there is no recourse for such people as hotel owners

whose property is not on beach frontage and therefore

cannot be damaged directly, but who lose income

because an oil spill keeps tourists away from a resort

area. Other principles such as trespass and nuisance are

even more limited in application and also provide no

recourse for those who are indirectly damaged.11

Existing laws are not clear on the unresolved question of whether State or local governments may seek and

obtain relief for loss of wildlife or natural beauty or other

damage to the environment. Nor are the laws clear on

whet her governments may claim damages for lost tax

and licensing revenue for diminished tourism and

reduced harvesting of fish. 12

Perhaps the most controversial subject of any
liability and compensation discussion is unlimited

liability for all cleanup costs and damages.

There is disagreement on whether an unlimited

liability provision would encourage industry to undertake the least pollution-prone operation or would discourage industry from undertaking operations with any

risk at all. There is also disagreement over whether

unlimited liability would encourage those responsible for

spills to rapidly and completely clean up a spill or

whether it would encourage laxity.

Some suggest that unlimited liability is either uninsurable, or that the rates for such insurance will be

prohibitive to independent companies. However,

unlimited liability already exists in such areas as crew

claims and cargo damage in shipping, although potential

losses in these areas are easier to calculate than are oil

spill losses. Some instances of unlimited liability have

been in effect for several years without any adverse effect.

At the Federal level, the OCS regulation imposing

unlimited liability for cleanup which followed the Santa

Barbara accident has been in effect since 1969 and the

participation of independents has not been endangered.

At the State level, four States have unlimited liability

laws, and have not noticed adverse impacts on the oil industry. 13

Both Delaware and New Jersey are considering their

own liability and compensation legislation, but because

preemption of State laws is a key provision of some proposed Federal legislation, the States may be reluctant to

invest considerable effort in adopting such legislation

which could be nullified by Federal law.

However, in two important areas of liability plans—

rapid, reasonable cleanup and equitable damage compensation—States appear to be better qualified to deal with

the situation than the Federal Government. For example,

experience has shown that State agencies respond faster

to spills than Federal agencies.14 A In addition, State

officials may be better able to evaluate local damages and

a fund administered on the State level may be more accessible to claimants.

The benefits of both State- and Federal-level regulation of oil spill liability and compensation could be

preserved in a framework that would: (1) require States

to accept Federal certificates of financial responsibility,
—

thus minimizing compliance costs to industry; (2) prevent States from levying fees on oil for the purpose of

creating State funds, thus minimizing product costs to

consumers; and (3) permit States to impose their own

liability limits and to create funds by appropriations in

order to undertake cleanup operations and compensate

damage victims.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

1. Congress could adopt legislation dealing with

liability and compensation for damages associated with

offshore oil and gas production that would be comprehensive enough to cover such problems as indirect

damages, class actions, and unlimited liability.

2. Congress could adopt liability and compensation legislation that addresses only direct damages and

let other issues evolve through case law.
—

ISSUE 5

Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup

There is no assurance that the technology utilized in

the Baltimore Canyon Trough or in any other OCS frontier region would be adequate for oil spill surveillance,

containment, and cleanup.

FINDINGS

1. There is confusion

because most local officials

should be expected or who is

the event of a spill.

2. There are no definitive

follow regarding standards

Oil and Gas

——-

over who is in charge Public Participation

do not know what action Comments

available to take action in

regulations for industry to

for equipment, minimum

levels of manpower readiness, and responsibility f o r

coverage on OCS oil spills.

3. Industry is making an effort to be well equipped

to deal with spills in the Mid-Atlantic.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

An estimate of the range of probable oil spills as a

result of Baltimore Canyon development activities has

been made, based on statistics from offshore oil operations over the past 10 years, principally in the Gulf of

Mexico. A few major accidents have caused most of the

oil spilled into the marine environment. None of these

offshore spills to date has been contained and cleaned up

on site.

OTA estimates the range of oil spilled over the projected 30-year life of the field will be from 5,000 to

860,000 barrels resulting from 1 to 40 spill incidents. The

most likely amount is 40,000 barrels and 18 spill incidents. 1

Depending on the season, the size of spill, and prevailing conditions, the shoreline could be severely impacted as a result of inadequate containment and

cleanup.

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of

“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapter

]\/, particu]~rly ~~~t?s 165– 167”

57
The Coast Guard is responsible for the implementation of Federal pollution response functions in the coastal

area as required by the National Contingency Plan. A

memorandum of understanding between the Coast

Guard and the Department of the Interior gives the Coast

Guard the responsibility to respond to discharges in the

OCS consistent with this plan, but reserves for the

Department of the Interior the responsibility of controlling the discharge at the source.

The Coast Guard, in implementing the intent of the

FWPCA, has structured its enforcement and response

posture to foster the cleanup of polluting discharges by

the responsible party. The Coast Guard on-scene coordinator, in each pollution incident, makes a determination as to the propriety of the responsible party’s removal

actions and initiates Federal removal actions when they

are necessary.

The confusion over who is in charge should a spill

occur has been evidenced by OTA’S inquiries of public

and private groups in the New Jersey and Delaware

region. Most local officials are unaware of the provisions

of the National Contingency Plan or the Coast GuardDepartment of the Interior memorandum of understanding and do not know what action would occur or who is

available to take actions in the event of an oil discharge.

The key to oil spill cleanup operations is quick

response. The present capability to deploy effective high

seas removal equipment is limited by the availability of

such equipment and the ability to deliver the equipment

on scene. The Coast Guard has developed high seas containment booms and removal devices and has begun

stockpiling this equipment. Towable high-speed delivery

sleds have been developed by the Coast Guard and are to

be available prior to development of the Mid-Atlantic

OCS.

Industry, through Clean Atlantic Associates, Inc., is

developing a stockpile of equipment and operational procedures for dealing with potential oil spills, but there are

no firm Government requirements for most of their activities.

The Department of the Interior, under the authority

of its OCS operating orders, which require lessees to

maintain cleanup equipment, could monitor Clean

Atlantic Associates activities, but cannot order the group
to acquire equipment meeting certain standards or to

train personnel for certain levels of operation.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

1. Provide authority and funding for the Coast

Guard to patrol for oil spills and take charge immediately should a spill occur.

2. Prepare definitive regulations for industry to

follow, including standards for equipment, minimum

levels of manpower readiness, and responsibility for

coverage on all OCS oil spills.

OTHER OPTIONS

Federal and State officials could develop a strong

information program to advise local officials and the

public of procedures that would be followed and parties

who are responsible for actions in the event of a spill.
Environmental Studies

ISSUE 6

Environmental research and baseline studies are not

formally coordinated with the Interior Department’s

leasing schedule and there is no requirement that information gathered be used in the decisionmaking

process for sale of offshore lands and subsequent

operation.

Oil and Gas

FINDINGS

1. The purpose of Interior’s environmental studies

program and its role in the management of OCS

development has not been clearly defined.

Public Participation

Comments

2. The value of the investment in environmental

studies is questionable if there is little or no relationship between the studies and management decisions.

3. Environmental studies to date are not useful

either for Environmental Impact Statements or in leasing

decisions because they are not completed in time to be

used.

4. Some important elements are missing from the

Mid-Atlantic and other regional studies now underway,

including nearshore investigations, climatology, physical oceanography, and shallow geologic studies.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

The OCS environmental studies programs now underway in frontier areas are a major Federal undertaking

in oceanographic investigation. The fiscal year 1976

budget for these studies is over $40 million with substantial field data collection underway in the Mid-Atlantic,

Gulf of Mexico, offshore Southern California, and Alaska.

Most of the programs include collection of marine

biological data, measurements of hydrocarbons and trace

elements in the marine environment, and analyses of

physical and chemical characteristics of the marine environment. Some of the programs also include other

specific biological, oceanographic, geologic, and

meteorologic studies. 1

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text

“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapter

IV, particularly pages 131 – 1 4(1.

60
—

The purpose of these studies has not been fully

defined, and many questions remain about how the information developed can or will be used in the decisionmaking process of leasing OCS lands and managing or

regulating subsequent OCS activities. Presumably, the

environmental studies will begin to establish a definition

of the “baseline” or existing environmental conditions

from which one can measure environmental impacts that

might be caused by any oil and gas activities throughout

the life of an offshore field. The studies would also continue in conjunction with oil development and become

closely related to monitoring of any environmental

changes. In addition, many biologists believe that the

studies should identify environmentally sensitive areas

or special hazards that would indicate which areas, if

any, should be withdrawn from lease offerings.2

The vague relationship between these studies and

any decisionmaking process, however, is a principal

issue. If there is little or no relationship between the

studies and management decisions, then the value of the

investment in the studies is questionable. If the studies do

not include environmentally sensitive regions such as

nearshore waters or do not provide adequate scientific

evidence, then the usefulness of the results is questionable.

Many scientists claim that the studies are not well

planned since they attempt to solve too many complex

problems within unrealistic time frames, and that study

efforts are hopelessly fragmented. s A priority of important subjects should be established if meaningful results

are to be obtained. Some important elements are missing

from the Mid-Atlantic and other regional studies now

underway, including nearshore investigations,

climatology, physical oceanography, and shallow

geologic studies.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

The following options could be employed for making such changes in the present system as may be

needed:

‘1 ‘ , 1

I -, . ,

1. Require that environmental studies be made a

formal part of the lease-management process by
defining the content and timing necessary for

providing data for milestone decisions.

2. Require that environmental studies that would

define baselines and identify sensitive or

hazardous areas and conditions be completed

prior to preparation of a development plan, and

that the data be used in evaluating and approving development activities.

3. Separate the responsibility for environmental

studies from the agency in charge of development (Interior) and put a scientific agency in

charge (such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration).
ISSUE 7

State Role

The limited role of State governments in the decisionmaking process for OCS development under existing

laws and practices may lead to unnecessary

and improper planning for such development.

FINDINGS

delays

Oil and Gas

1. New Jersey and Delaware officials are not Public Participation

receiving information which they consider necessary to Comments

plan for dealing with the onshore impacts of offshore

development and there is no description in present laws

or regulations which specifies what information must be

provided to the State in development plans or impact

statements.

2. Top-level State officials in New Jersey and

Delaware do not believe that current laws and practices for planning and administering offshore petroleum

development allow for full State participation in important decisions.

3. Without meaningful State participation in decisionmaking, State and local officials may try to use

court action to block or delay decisions with which they

disagree.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

The flow of information from the Federal Government to the States in the 2 years since the decision was

made to accelerate offshore leasing has been slow and

uncoordinated. The States are concerned about this situation because they need comprehensive and timely information in order to plan for the onshore effects of offshore

development.

Offshore energy development eventually will mean

the location of staging areas, pipelines, tank farms, gas

processing plants, and perhaps even new refineries on

. ,, 1 ~., 1

‘ ,, , I r ! t ; : n] E, ;> I I

, “ , ! .- ~

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of

“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapter + .’ , , “

IV, particularly pages 136– 140, 146– 150.

63
shore to support OCS oil and gas production. The States

are concerned that these onshore activities may require

major investments of public funds that cannot be

scheduled without considerable advance warning and

some assurance that the investments actually are required, and that revenues ultimately generated by

offshore activity will support the expenditures.

State officials say, by and large, that they understand

the present limitations on the Interior Department in

providing some types of data. They also recognize that

some progress has been made in meeting State needs, but

most of the steps taken by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to provide information are strictly administrative actions, are not guaranteed by law, and can

be changed without consultation with the States.

State officials also say that there are still specific information gaps, principally in the following areas:

● Hard information on potential onshore impacts, including a quantification of potential

economic losses to tourist and fishing industries.

● Detailed estimates of oil and gas reserves.

. Historic and predictive data on the incidence and effects of oil spills.

● Information on geologic and climatic conditions and shoreline characteristics that

might pose dangers to offshore structures

and pipelines.

. Environmental and baseline data in general,

particularly data on wetlands and nearshore

areas.

Once management plans have been approved by

Federal officials under the Coastal Zone Management

Act, both States presumably would have a legal right

under the Act to “necessary information and data” about

any Federal activity in their coastal zone, including activity related to offshore oil and natural gas development.

However, since the Act does not specify whether the

States or the Federal Government would interpret the

word “necessary, “ it is not certain that it will solve the

States’ information problems. Final approval of New

Jersey and Delaware coastal zone management programs

is expected early in 1977.
States have also pressed for access to point-of-noreturn decisions that would affect the location and magnitude of onshore activities. By law, the States’ role is

presently limited to not much more than that of an observer. They are allowed to comment on information and

proposed actions, but there is no requirement that their

comments and suggestions be acted upon.

The goal of legislation should be to create a framework for relationships between State and Federal

Governments that would ensure States full participation

in major OCS decisions. One way to assure State involvement in those major decisions could be to make participation a legal right of a State rather than an option of

Federal decisionmakers. Thus, the right of States to a

voice in policy decisions that may have significant social,

economic, or environmental consequences for their

citizens, would be unobstructed up to, but not including,

the right to veto Federal offshore development plans.

States have the right through their riparian laws, environmental protection regulations, and zoning powers

to block or delay development once it involves State

lands. State officials with whom OTA researchers talked

in the course of the study seemed universally to prefer

continuing participation in development decisions rather

than blocking actions, but officials indicate they will take

legal action to block development if their concerns are

not satisfied.

Under pending legislation, a revision of the OCS

Lands Act of 1953, States would be entitled to comment

on development plans before they were approved by the

Secretary of the Interior, to have written explanations for

the Secretary’s rejection of those comments, and to appeal that decision to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.1

That same principle of arbitration could be applied

to other important decision points in the development

process, including the sale of leases, The Interior Department, for example, could solicit State comments on proposed lease sales and solicit State proposals for lease

stipulations which States felt necessary to protect their

environmental and economic interests. Interior could explain in writing why any State proposal had been rejected. States could have the same rights of appeal on

lease stipulations as they would have on development

plans under the pending legislation.

‘‘Exploration should I I - be

State and Federal ~: ~,

partnership

“ It WoUId sep” I I ‘

that a draft

affected State 

draft woukd, -

final reporti

. , !

[ } - n - I
Such free exchange of information and State access

to decisions would not necessarily resolve all future conflicts about offshore energy development. It would,

however, help clear up uncertainties about the ground

rules for development which affect not only Federal and

State officials but the oil industry as well. i

,.

Codifying the rights of States to participate in deci- / ‘ I ( j q I ( i ., ‘

sions, object to proposals, and appeal to third parties , I :’ [“l ‘“‘ t ‘ t, ‘ I ($ i f } : f I ,1, \c, , ,,;,~ ,,,>

could extend the time required to set offshore energy ‘ ‘I

development in motion in frontier OCS areas. However,

the existing process has its own built-in potential delays

through court actions and challenges to locations of

onshore facilities.

Codifying the rights of States would, at least, make it

possible to anticipate delays and to know with some

degee of certainty how much more time the process

would take than it does under existing law.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

1. Congress could require the Department of the

Interior to solicit State comments on proposed lease

sales, State proposals for stipulations to be written into

leases, and State comments on development plans to

protect economic and environmental interests. The

Department of the Interior could be required to explain

in writing why any State proposal was rejected and

States could have a right of appeal.

2. Congress could require enforcing agencies to

submit to the States long-range and detailed plans for

enforcing lessee compliance with operating orders,

evaluate State comments on the plans, and modify the

plans, or explain a failure to modify them, to accommodate State objections.

3. Congress could require that an impact statement be prepared to accompany each development

plan and that major development plans include detailed

descriptive, design, and procedural information on

offshore and onshore facilities that industry wants to

build.
ISSUE 8

Pollution Research

The effects of pollutants which maybe discharged during OCS operations cannot presently be determined

with any accuracy and recent research efforts have not

clarified conflicting claims by oil companies and environmental groups regarding the amount and consequences of marine pollution.

Oil and Gas

-. . . . —.

1. Many specific environmental conditions of each

OCS region which may affect the dispersion, trajectory,

chemical composition, and ultimate fate of a spill are

unknown.

2. It appears that very little public research money

is allocated to projects that address the unknowns of

the effects of oil spills and other OCS pollutants.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Some unavoidable oil spills from accidents, chronic

oil discharges from platforms, and discharges of other

pollutants will occur should the Baltimore Canyon

Trough be developed. It appears that future estimates of

pollutant discharges from OCS operations can be based

on statistical evidence from past Gulf of Mexico experience because no major changes in levels of pollution

control technology are projected. Since it probably would

require substantial investments to effect major reductions

in pollution levels, the questions of benefit received are

constantly raised. There are no reliable estimates of total

environmental damages that may be caused by OCS related pollution, and it is very doubtful whether marine

biological, esthetic or chemical changes caused by pollution can now be quantified.

What is not known and cannot be measured at this

time is the severity of damage related to amounts and

concentrations, the effects on the food chain and ultimate

consumer, and the long-term effects of chronic discharges. Also unknown are many specific environmental

Public Participation

Comments

-.

*This brief discussion of the issue is drawn from the full text of

“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapter

IV, particularly pages 134-135, 165-167.

67
conditions of each OCS region which may affect the dispersion, trajectory, chemical composition, and ultimate

fate of any spill. Environmentalists argue that with so

many unknowns, coupled with potential dangers, all

efforts should be directed toward preventing oil spills

whenever technically possible.1

The U.S. Coast Guard has recently evaluated its

Marine Environmental Protection (MEP) program,

which principally addresses oil pollution other than that

related to OCS operations, but which can serve as an example of analyses of relative causes and effects of spills.

The Coast Guard oil spill data, however, includes

only those OCS spills that are voluntarily reported. In

this evaluation it is stated that oil exploration/production

operations contributed almost a million gallons out of the

15 million gallon total discharged during 1974.

It is also stated that “the documented direct cost to

society of oil pollution incidents (from all sources) in the

United States is about $50 million a year or in excess of

$4,500 per incident. The estimate is undoubtedly low

since it includes only the costs of cleanup and the value of

the product discharged. ” A far greater concern than

direct cost is the indirect cost to society.

The U.S. Geological Survey maintains an oil spill

data base in the OCS Events Files. In this file, information

is maintained on all oil spills of one barrel or more,

blowouts, fires and explosions, fatalities, and miscellaneous accidents. Input for each incident includes

probable cause, type of operation, date, location, and

brief description of the event. The file is updated monthly

and the data are analyzed by USGS for amounts and

trends. It is unclear, however, what use USGS makes of

the anlayses since many types of incidents occur

repeatedly with no change in operating orders. Under

present laws and regulations, oil spills from exploration

or production facilities within 3 miles of shore must be

reported to the Coast Guard. Oil spills from facilities

beyond 3 miles must be reported to the USGS. There is no

coordination of the information gathered by the two

agencies.

The oil industry has sponsored a significant amount

of research into the effects of oil pollution, including a

study of the effects of oil operations on the marine environment off the Louisiana coast by the Gulf Univer-
sities Research Consortium. z In addition, the American

Petroleum Institute, the Coast Guard, and the Environmental Protection Agency sponsor regular conferences

on prevention and control of oil pollution at which many

reports on research efforts are presented.3 There appears

to be no equivalent coordination of pollution research

efforts among Federal agencies which share responsibility for OCS management.

The report to Congress of the Secretary of Commerce on Ocean Pollution is one of the few examples of a

coordinating effort. 4 The report describes oil pollution

research efforts by the National Science Foundation, the

Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of Land

Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S.

Geological Survey, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and others.

It appears that very little research money is allocated

to projects that address the unknowns of the effects of oil

spills and other OCS pollutants.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

1. Sponsor additional research on the effects of

pollutants at existing centers of excellence and

specifically coordinate research pertinent to OCS

operations through a central agency such as EPA.

2. Coordinate the collection of data about oil

spills from exploration and production facilities by giving the USGS authority to require reports for all such

spills, regardless of whether they are in State or

Federal waters.
Conflicting Ocean Uses

There are potential conflicts between OCS oil and gas

activities and vessel traffic engaged in commercial

shipping and fishing activities. However, there has

been no comprehensive study and analysis to identify

all conflicts and to find ways of resolving them.

Oil and Gas

1. It appears that proposed drilling rigs in the

Baltimore Canyon Trough would be more vulnerable to

ramming by ships than has been the case in the Gulf of

Mexico.

2. Major traffic lanes for the ports of New York and

Philadelphia lead through or near the lease area.

3. The Maritime Administration has stated that new

traffic control systems have adverse economic impacts

on shipping.

4. The Department of the Interior has already

removed some tracts from leasing because of conflicts

with fishing activities, but the presence of offshore

structures could attract marine life, thus enhancing fishing and increasing watercraft traffic.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Rammings of oil and gas platforms by merchant

ships have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. In a recent incident, the Globtik Sun, a 50,000-ton Bahamianregistered tanker, struck a Chevron platform in the Gulf

on August 15, 1975, resulting in the death of six persons,

a major fire aboard the ship and a 5-mile long oil slick.

The platform was not operational, so no oil was lost from

it. 1

While the number of Gulf of Mexico rigs which have

been hit by ships over the past 10 years has led to only 1

percent of all oil spills, the great majority of these rigs are

Public Participation

Comments

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of

“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapter

IV, particularly pages 136– 140, 144– 159,

70
in quite shallow water, close to shore, and shipping lanes

had been established to avoid them. Drilling rigs in the

Gulf of Mexico are concentrated in areas where large

ships do not normally travel, except at well-marked

entrances to harbors. Only 10 major accidents involving

ships striking drill rigs have occurred over the past 12

years. All but one (the most recent one) of the ships were

under 20,000 tons. All were traveling closer to the

coastline than was usual. By contrast, the Mid-Atlantic

tracts proposed for sale are in deepwater commonly

utilized by very large ships, but there is no proposal for

traffic control. The EIS states that the Army Corps of

Engineers issues navigation permits for locating rigs and

platforms and “generally does not allow structures to be

placed within traffic lanes as identified by the Coast

Guard.”2

Off the coast of New Jersey and Delaware, both

coastal and trans-Atlantic traffic lanes from the major

ports of New York and Philadelphia lead through or near

the lease areas. Major vessel arrivals at the Delaware Bay

have been estimated at about 5,000 per year by the

Philadelphia Maritime Exchange. Major vessel arrivals at

New York Harbor have been estimated at 8,400 per year.

These two ports handle more than one-third of all U.S.

imported and domestic oil transported by tanker. International agreements have provided voluntary vessel

traffic separation schemes, which are established lanes

for arriving and departing ships at the major harbors of

New York and Delaware Bay. These lanes, however, do

not extend as far out to sea as the proposed lease areas,

except for one New York lane extending to the Hudson

Canyon near the northern region of interest.3

One way to reduce the potential hazard is by reducing the number of structures on the surface of the water.

This can be done, and is done to some extent in the Gulf

of Mexico, by the use of subsea completions which locate

the valves and wellhead controls far underwater on the

sea floor rather than on production platforms.

It appears that in general, any proposed structure on

the surface of the Mid-Atlantic Ocean would be more

vulnerable to ramming by ships than has been the case in

the Gulf for the following reasons:

1. The large ship traffic density in the vicinity of potential rigs in the Mid-Atlantic is probably two to

three times that of the OCS region of Louisiana.
—

I

Figure Ill-1.

Source Office of Technology Assessment and U S Department of the Interior
k

I

Source Office of Technology Assessment and U S Department of the Interior
2. Traffic patterns off the Mid-Atlantic coast tend to

pass directly through potential rig locations while

those in the Gulf have, to date, circumvented major concentrations of rigs.

3. The weather conditions, including wind, sea-state

and fog, are more severe for longer periods of

time in the Atlantic than in the Gulf.

The Maritime Administration of the Department of

Commerce has agreed these factors increase the risk of

contact between ships and structures, but Commerce

believes that if all offshore structures are precisely

marked and made known to mariners and equipped with

warning lights, sound signals, and radar beacons or transponders, vessels should be generally able to avoid them

without traffic control systems. Traffic control systems

affect the speed, route, and fuel consumption of waterborne commerce, according to a Department spokesman.

Because of this adverse economic impact on the shipping

community, Commerce is reluctant to have new traffic

control systems instituted. . , (

In addition to commercial shipping vessels, more

than 275 commercial fishing vessels operate out of New

Jersey and Delaware and large numbers of fishermen

from New England and the South Atlantic States operate

in the offshore region nearby. Foreign fishing outside the

12-mile limit also is substantial. The number of foreign

fishing ships sighted was more than 100 in one month in

the Mid-Atlantic during the past year.

The fin fishing and scalloping areas which are of

prime importance to U.S. fisheries cover a large portion

of the Baltimore Canyon lease areas under consideration.

Several areas proposed for leasing have been excluded

from the proposed lease sale by the Interior Department

at the request of the Atlantic Offshore Fish and Lobster

Association. a

Sport fishing is very extensive in the New JerseyDelaware offshore region, but statistics are not available

to document numbers of vessels or fishermen currently

utilizing this area. Many charter fishing boats and larger

private sport-fishing boats regularly voyage offshore,

and various angler’s guides show locations of tuna,

marlin, dolphin, bluefish, and other species in the region

of proposed leasing. Offshore structures may attract

marine life and encourage an increase in fish population
density, which is considered an advantage by many

sport fishermen. 5

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Some of the options available to Congress for

minimizing offshore conflicts are:

1. Congress could expand the authority of the U.S.

Coast Guard to give it jurisdiction to establish

an effective offshore traffic control system. Such

authority already exists for Coast Guard

jurisdiction over navigable waters and areas

around deepwater ports.

2. Congress could authorize specific studies of

conflicts in ocean uses and means to resolve

them.

OTHER OPTIONS

1. Departments of Transportation and the Interior

could draw up a memorandum of understanding in which

they agree to a system for resolving conflicts between

vessel traffic and OCS oil and gas activities.

2. Industry, with or without Department of the interior regulations, could deploy as many subsea completions on oil and gas wells as is practical and

economically possible to reduce the number of surface

structures required for OCS production.

3. Informal planning groups, with the industries and

public involved, could be established to resolve conflicts.
—

ISSUE 10

Tanker Design and Operations

Tanker spills are the source of 5 to 15 times as much oil

as all offshore drilling and port operations combined

yet pollution control regulations are far less stringent

for tankers than for either deepwater ports or offshore

oil and gas operations.

FINDINGS

1. Tankers accidentally spill 200,000 tons of oil

each year, worldwide, and 12,000 tons in waters within

50 miles of the U.S. coast due to accidents of all kinds.

2. The major causes of these accidents are structural failure, collisions, rammings, and grounding, many

of which are in turn caused by human error.

Deepwater Ports

3. Tankers deliberately discharge 1 million tons

each year, worldwide, and some unknown portion of

tank cleaning operations. Such discharges are illegal

within 50 miles of the U.S. coast.

Public Participation

Comments

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Equipment used in deepwater ports appears to have

performed well in many worldwide applications. But the

supertankers which utilize the ports are far less dependable and greater efforts are needed to reduce tankercaused pollution to acceptable levels.

Several changes in tanker design and construction

have been proposed to reduce pollution. Such design improvements include: double bottoms and double hulls,

inert gas systems, added maneuvering devices, improved

navigation systems, and improved tank cleaning and

ballasting systems.1 Regulations regarding some of these

have been challenged however, largely by industry

groups on the grounds that the resulting reduction in the

amount of oil spilled would be small in relation to total

oil pollution.

I 1 ’

J

*This brief discussion of this issue is drawn from the full text of

“The Possibility of Deepwater Ports in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapter IV,

particularly pages 195—196.

76
Oil spill statistics do not support assigning priority

to any single improvement, but a case can be made that

several design and operational changes together would

substantially reduce oil pollution. A total system approach is needed to balance construction improvements

with operating improvements such as traffic control and

training.

The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 authorizes the U.S. Coast Guard to regulate design, construction, and operations of U.S. tankers and foreign flag

tankers operating in U.S. waters. Regulations for U.S.

tankers in domestic trade have been issued. Proposed

rules for U.S. flag tankers engaged in foreign trade and

foreign flag tankers in U.S. waters were published on

April 15, 1976. The closing date for comments on these

rules was June 12, 1976, and a final environmental impact statement was under review in August.

Hearings were held by the Senate Commerce Committee on March 2 and 3, 1976, at which witnesses expressed concern about the adequacy of Coast Guard

tanker regulations. They questioned whether best available technology was, in fact, being required and Alaska

said it would join other Western States in imposing

regulations of its own on supertankers entering its ports.

The Coast Guard testified that its regulations were based

on thorough consideration of best technology and

priorities of concern not only within the United States

but worldwide. Industry representatives supported the

Coast Guard position and pointed out that the Federal

Government, not the States, has jurisdiction over interstate and foreign commerce matters, as defined by the

Constitution. z

The problem of reducing pollution from tankers is

compounded by economics and international politics. s

First, the most economical oil tanker transportation

systems use methods that many authorities believe must

be changed to reduce pollution. Needed are design improvements, which add costs for the operator; training

and licensing programs, which may be financed by both

government and operators; and improved traffic control

and cleanup techniques, which also may be financed by

both. It is not possible to project cost/benefit figures for

pollution because few pollution damage costs have been

quantified, because the effectiveness of many prevention
measures cannot be quantified, and because the

economics of tanker transportation are subject to extreme

variations.

Second, there is controversy over the question of

multilateral versus unilateral regulation of tankers in

U.S. waters.

One school of thought is that international agreements are the best way of dealing with international

trade problems and pollution control measures. One

drawback to this approach is that international conventions have a history of extremely slow adoption and poor

enforcement. The 1973 International Pollution Convention has developed tanker standards which would make

substantial improvements, but they are not yet in effect

because they have not been ratified by a majority of signatory nations—including the United States. As of

mid-1976, only three countries had ratified it and it appears that the earliest implementation would be 1980 to

1983. Existing U.S. Coast Guard regulations on tanker

construction and operation closely parallel the 1973

agreement but many States and environmental groups

claim that U.S. regulations should be substantially

stricter than international standards.

Another school of thought is that the United States

should take unilateral action to improve tanker standards. Opponents of that approach claim that action by

the United States to make more stringent rules without

similar adoption internationally may make the U.S.

tanker fleet less competitive. Ninety-four percent of U.S.

imports are carried by foreign flag tankers and if the

United States tries to enforce stricter standards on the

foreign fleet, it could interrupt supplies.

Many environmental groups argue that the United

States, through major oil companies, does control most

foreign flag ships and that the United States is a major

tanker customer for an industry that now needs

customers.

By the end of 1976, about half of the world tanker

fleet will be surplus to need, partly because of overexpansion and partly because the world recession sharply cut

oil demand. Tanker owners are looking to the United

States to take up much of the slack because U.S. imports

are more likely to increase sharply than imports by other

countries. The situation may provide substantial leverage
for the United States to set standards for operation of

foreign flag ships in U.S. waters.

Many States and environmental groups support the

fact that the major reduction in operational discharges by

tankers can be made by requiring segregated ballast

systems aboard vessels so that ballast water is never

mixed with oil. The Coast Guard has just published advance notice of proposed rules which would require such

segregated ballast systems for all tankers over 70,000 dwt

utilizing U.S. ports.4 The proposed rules would apply to

both foreign and domestic tankers. If adopted, this requirement would be a major improvement in regulation

of tankers using deepwater ports. Comments on these

proposed rules are now being evaluated by the Coast

Guard.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Among the options available to Congress for dealing with tanker technology issues are the following:

1. Congress could require the U.S. Coast Guard to

analyze the causes of oil spills so that priorities

may be set for implementing design and operations standards for supertankers calling at U.S.

deepwater ports.

2. Congress could require the U.S. Coast Guard to

develop specific regulations for supertankers

using deepwater ports in the United States.

3. Congress could provide economic incentives

for U.S. importers to encourage them to charter

only those tankers that meet high standards of

design and operations.

OTHER OPTIONS

States could impose their own rules and regulations

for operation of tankers and deepwater ports in their

waters.
ISSUE 11

Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup

at Deepwater Ports

The use of offshore deepwater ports may reduce the

risk of certain oil spills and environmental damage

below that of transporting crude oil by smaller tankers

into the congested New York Harbor and Delaware

Bay. Even the very small risk of a catastrophic spill

from a supertanker, however, dictates that stringent

pollution control and cleanup systems be used.

FINDINGS

1. Even the most advanced Coast Guard equipment for high-seas containment of oil spills would be

effective in winter seas off Delaware and New Jersey

only 55 percent of the time.

2. Because of the serious limitations of containment and cleanup equipment, emphasis should be on

preventing spills rather than on regulations for cleanup

equipment,

3. Regulations for preventing spills from a deepwater port appear to be adequate. However, regulation

of tankers using the ports can be improved greatly.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Department of Transportation regulations require

that deepwater port operators have onsite equipment for

containing and cleaning up spills of less than 1,000 barrels, but equipment for dealing with larger spills is not

required onsite. Such equipment need only be “readily

accessible” to the operator.1

Most of the equipment needed for dealing with

large-scale spills from deepwater ports or tankers is

maintained by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has recently developed oil pumpout and salvage equipment for

use in major tanker accidents and containment and

cleanup equipment for rough waters; it is not likely that

privately built equipment would handle large volumes of

oil in rough seas as effectively. However, even the Coast

1. ‘

Public Participation

Comments

*This brief discussion of the issue is drawn from the full text of

“The Possibility of Deepwater Ports in the Mid- Atlantic,” chapter IV,

particularly pages 1 93– 195

80
Guard gear, which would be used under the provisions

of the national contingency plan for an oil spill emergency, has strict operational limits.

Even the most advanced Coast Guard system for

high seas oil containment is only effective in waves under

5 feet, currents of 1 knot or less, and winds of up to 20

knots. Winter seas off New Jersey and Delaware, where a

deepwater port might be located, exceed these limits 45

percent of the time.2

Development of containment and cleanup systems

which would more adequately handle large volumes of

oil and would be dependable in rough seas would require

a large commitment of money and technical expertise.

In addition to the limitations of existing equipment,

projections of the movement of oil at sea are limited and

little data is available for use in predicting the path an oil

slick will take or when it will come ashore.

If a spill does-reach shore, there is little equipment

available for use in cleaning up beaches and wetlands.

What is used is costly and inefficient.

Therefore, OTA has concluded that the emphasis

must be on preventing oil spills rather than on requirements for cleanup and containment equipment. Regulations for preventing spills from a deepwater port itself

appear to be adequate; however, regulations for tankers

using the ports can be improved greatly. (See Issue 10:

Tanker Design and Operations.)

A lack of reliable statistics and analysis of causes and

effects of oil spills hampers every effort to assess the risk

and damage of oil spills.

The Coast Guard operates a Pollution Incident

Reporting System which gathers and stores data on all

spills in U.S. waters. The Coast Guard also collects world

data on ship accidents and prepares some analysis of

causes. These world statistics are much more relevant to

the deepwater port question than U.S. figures because

there are no deepwater ports operating in the United

States as yet. But the world data are not well enough

verified to be usable in forecasting nor does it document

causes or trends in accidents and resultant spills. s
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Among the options available to Congress in

resolving problems relating to oil spills in the deepwater port system are these:

1. Require the Department of Transportation’s

Deepwater Port Project Office to report annually

on oil spill cleanup technology and contingency

plans for each proposed or operating deepwater

port. These reports should contain the status of

research and data efforts concerning oil spill

statistics, causes, and effects so that it could be

determined if operators are using the best

available systems.

2. Expand research efforts within the Coast Guard,

NOAA, and the Environmental Protection Agency

on trends, causes, and effects of oil spills. The

trend data base could be improved by expanding the scope of the National Transportation

Safety Board to permit it to conduct an investigation of the causes of any major accident

involving supertankers and deepwater ports

abroad.

3. Require a case study of response time, containment, and cleanup efforts used in every major

spill in order to determine whether existing

equipment and systems are used to the best advantage and to identify areas where changes are

needed.
ISSUE 12

Standards in State Waters

Under existing Federal law, operators of deepwater

ports in State waters could ignore the safety and environmental pollution standards that apply to ports outside the3-mile limit. —

Deepwater Ports

FINDINGS

1. Deepwater ports in State waters will be Public Participation

licensed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is Comments

not obliged to require the same standards for construction and operation that are set by the Department of . . . —..

Transportation under the Deepwater Port Act of 1974.

2. The law does not require a Coast Guard Vessel

Traffic Surveillance System for deepwater ports in

State waters, and budget priorities conceivably could

delay installation of such a system for a port in State

waters.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Deepwater ports in a State’s territorial waters or in

inland waters such as the Delaware Bay would not be

subject to the Federal Deepwater Port Act. All ports within 3 miles of shore would come under the jurisdiction of

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, of the States, and of

any regional commissions or authorities to which States

had delegated authority. For example, the Delaware Bay

Transportation Co. plan for a deepwater port would not

be covered by the Deepwater Port Act. ,

Since the permit authority the Corps of Engineers

could exercise over a near-shore port facility does not at

this time include a requirement that ports comply with

the same Federal standards as deepwater ports outside

the 3-mile limit, there is no guarantee that they would

meet minimum safety and environmental standards set

at the Federal level to protect the national interest and interests of States other than the host State.1

*This brief discussion of the issue is drawn from the full text of

“The Possibility of Deepwater Ports in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapter IV,

particularly pages 185-186.

83
The Corps of Engineers may issue permits on the

basis of its own judgment of an applicant’s design, without regard to DOT regulations for deepwater ports

beyond the 3-mile limit. By the same token, the Corps

could require ports under its jurisdiction to comply with

construction and operation regulations promulgated

under the Deepwater Port Act.

The States retain influence over the Corps in permit

decisions because an applicant must certify to the District

Engineer that the activity conforms to the coastal zone

management program of the State involved, If a State has

laws that regulate deepwater ports, the Corps will issue a

permit only if the State approves.

Under existing Federal law, the Coast Guard is required to install a traffic surveillance system for deepwater ports in Federal waters, but there is no such requirement for ports in State waters. Therefore, the Coast

Guard would not be obliged to improve traffic controls in

the Delaware Bay for a port proposed by the Delaware

Bay Transportation Co.

Briefly, the Vessel Traffic Surveillance (VTS) system

is an additional source of information with backup radar

capability intended to contribute to the safe operation of

vessels. It functions much the same as an air traffic control system.

The Coast Guard does have jurisdiction over VTS

within the 3-mile limit under the Ports and Waterways

Act of 1972, and is installing surveillance systems in major U.S. ports on a schedule dictated largely by budget

considerations. Those budget considerations and prior

commitments could mean that VTS would not be implemented in deepwater port areas in State waters as quickly

as it is in offshore ports.

In addition to the possible lack of safety and environmental standards, deepwater ports in State waters

would lack coverage under the insurance and liability

sections of the Deepwater Port Act. z That Act makes compensation available only to persons damaged as a result

of spills related to ports licensed by the Federal Government. That means that each State with a deepwater port

within its waters must develop its own comprehensive

liability and compensation plan to protect its citizens and

property holders and those of neighboring States which

might be affected by a spill.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Possible courses of action available to Congress

for resolving discrepancies in the laws governing construction and operation of deepwater ports in U.S. territorial waters and ports inside the 3-mile limit include:

1. Congress could amend the Deepwater Port Act

to cover all ports, including those inside the 3-

mile limit.

2. Congress could amend the law to require a

vessel traffic surveillance system as a condition of operating a deepwater port under the

jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers.

3. Committees of Congress with jurisdictional

authority could advise the Corps of Engineers to

delay approval of deepwater ports until funding

for a surveillance system was assured.

4. Congress could accelerate funding for surveillance systems generally, or it could provide

special funding authority to the Coast Guard to

meet requirements in specific port areas.

5. Congress could require, either formally or informally, that the Corps of Engineers comply with

DOT standards for deepwater port construction

and operation.

OTHER OPTIONS

1. States could enact laws for deepwater ports in

their waters that were modeled on the Deepwater Port

Act of 1974.

2. The Department of Transportation and the

Corps of Engineers could develop, by memorandum of

understanding, identical standards for deepwater port

construction and operations in State waters.
—

ISSUE 13

Adjacent Coastal State Status

Differing interpretations of statutory criteria for determining adjacent coastal State status make it difficult to

predict which States could qualify for that status in the

future and whether some States may be deprived of the

benefits of such status.

1. A recent denial by the Secretary of Transportation of a Florida petition for adjacent coastal State

status focused attention on disagreement among

Federal officials and among State governments and

other interested parties as to how statutory criteria for

determining adjacency should be interpreted and applied.

2. The Secretary’s decision left unresolved the

question of whether tankers in transit to and from a

deepwater port can ever be considered a factor in

determining adjacent coastal State status.

3. If tankers in transit are to be considered, it is not

clear whether the determining factor is only the increased risk to the petitioning State from tanker spills

related to a deepwater port, or whether relative risks

among the States should be compared, regardless of

whether overall risks are increased or decreased by a

deepwater port.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

The Deepwater Port Act gives adjacent coastal States

a role in approving or disapproving a license and an opportunity to benefit from the protections offered by law.

Unless a State is located within 15 miles of a deepwater

port or connected by pipeline to such a port, the Secretary

of Transportation makes the final determination of which

States are to be considered “adjacent.”

An adjacent coastal State is entitled; to veto a proDeepwater Ports

Public Participation

Comments

particularly page 139.

86
posed port, to collect fees for environmental or administrative costs related to such facilities, and to receive

priority over private applicants for a license to construct

and operate a port. Because of the benefits of adjacent

coastal State status and the fact that there are a large

number of coastal States close together in the Mid-Atlantic region, several States may ask to be designated “adjacent” if a deepwater port should be proposed for licensing off the coast of New Jersey and Delaware.

The Act specifies that after having received recommendations from NOAA and the Coast Guard, the Secretary shall designate a petitioning State as “adjacent” if he

determines that there is a risk of damage to the coastal

environment of said State equal to or greater than the risk

to a State directly connected by pipeline to the proposed

port. Recently, Florida asked to be declared an adjacent

coastal State in connection with the licensing of LOOP

and Seadock deepwater ports off Louisiana and Texas.

The Florida case brought attention to the fact that

different interpretations of the statute could lead to

different determinations as to whether a State’s petition

is granted or denied. ] This lack of criteria for applying

the statutory language to a specific situation may also

figure in any applications for adjacent status made by

Mid-Atlantic States.

Florida petitioned for adjacent coastal State status

on grounds that the risk of an oil spill along its coastline

from tankers moving through the Florida Straits to and

from the deepwater ports posed a danger equal to, or

greater than, the risk to either Texas or Louisiana, which

are automatically “adjacent” by statutory definition.

Based on his interpretation of the statute, the Secretary of Transportation denied Florida’s petition. In arriving at his decision, the Secretary considered the opinions

of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

and the Coast Guard, the two congressionally mandated

“expert” agencies which advise the Secretary in an “adjacency” case. NOAA concluded that risk of damage to the

coastal environment of Florida from proposed LOOP or

Seadock is equal to, or greater than, the risk posed to the

coastal environment of Texas or Louisiana, and would

thus warrant granting adjacent coastal State status to

Florida. 2 The Secretary acknowledged that the risks to

Florida from tankers in transit were greater than, or

equal to, those of Louisiana or Texas. However, instead of
basing his decision on a comparison of relative risks to

which the States were subjected, the Secretary, on the

basis of Coast Guard data, concluded that the risks to

Florida from tankers in transit would exist whether or

not the ports were built, and Florida’s petition was not

granted.3

The Secretary justified his decision by stating that

the intent of the Act was to concern itself “with those environmental hazards that were to be generated by the

(deepwater port) program it was authorizing—that is,

with those risks that would be created by the construction of the ports in question. ” He concluded that because

the deepwater port program itself did not create additional risks to Florida from tankers in transit, that was

not a class of risks that Congress intended the Secretary

to consider in his determination.4 NOAA’s interpretation

is that the legislative history of the Act shows that reduction of small tanker traffic is one of the main justifications cited by Congress in support of passage of the Act.

Because Congress already assumed this to be a benefit of

deepwater ports, the provisions for declaration of adjacency could be viewed as an additional environmental

safeguard or mechanism for assuring that States subjected to risks equal to, or greater than, adjacent States

would participate in the decisionmaking process, and

share in the benefits of adjacency.

More important, in arriving at its recommendation,

NOAA determined that the Act mandates a comparison

of the risks between the States, and that if tankers in transit are considered, the risk of damage to each respective

State must be compared, regardless of whether the overall risk to all States was reduced.

Transportation Department officials said in later

discussions with OTA that although tankers in transit

were not a determining factor in the Florida case, they

could be so considered in the Mid-Atlantic if a State could

show that a port would cause a change or “distortion” in

existing tanker traffic patterns that would result in an increase in the risk of oil spills. s However, it is not clear

whether the Secretary’s decision has set a precedent that

would be inconsistent with this type of consideration.

Industry officials have complained that applications

for adjacent status may add to the costs of deepwater

ports by delaying construction. However, the law requires all interested States to apply for adjacent status
within 14 days after a deepwater port application has

been published in the Federal Register. The maximum

delay that can result from the process of naming adjacent

coastal States, regardless of the number of States involved, is 114 days. But industry might be subject to

higher costs and more restrictions on the construction

and operation of the port as a result of State stipulations

and charges if several States are granted adjacent status.

— — .—.— .——. — .———— - —

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

1. Congress could specify whether the risk of

pollution from tankers passing a State’s coastline to or

from a deepwater port should provide grounds for

declaring a State adjacent regardless of whether such

ports increase or decrease risks from tankers in

general.

2. Congress could specify whether the comparison of risks mandated in the Act (i.e., equal to or

greater than the risks to a State connected to the

port by pipeline) should be the only determinant of adjacency or whether this should be the key factor only in

the context of overall increase or decrease of risks

from a deepwater port to all relevant States.
ISSUE 14

Risks From Major Accidents

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is not

evaluating the risks from accidents in floating nuclear

plants comprehensively enough to permit either a

generic comparison of the relative risks from landbased and floating nuclear plants, or an assessment of

the specific risks from deploying floating plants off

New Jersey.

1. A preliminary analysis by OTA1 indicates that

the probability of a core-meltdown accident in a floating nuclear plant is no greater than the land-based

plants considered in the NRC’s Rasmussen Report

(WASH- 1400). 2

2. The OTA analysis indicates that the conclusions of WASH– 1400 concerning the expected consequences of releases of radioactive material into the atmosphere as a result of a core-melt cannot be directly

applied to floating plants because:

—the probability of an atmospheric release of

radioactive materials in case of a core-melt may

be about seven times greater for a plant of the

design used in the proposed floating system

than for the plant analyzed in WASH–140Q3

—the plant design used in the floating system

may reduce the amount of radioactive material

released to the atmosphere if a core-melt accident led to a failure of the containment;

-offshore siting of floating nuclear plants may

reduce the consequence of airborne releases

because there would be no resident population

for several miles in all directions around the

plant; and

—the interaction of the molten core with

seawater that would occur in case of a coremelt accident in a floating plant could be a potential source of additional atmospheric

releases of radioactive materials not considered

in WASH– 7400.

Floating Nuclear

Powerplants

Public Participation

Comments

3. A study being prepared by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission that compares the radiological

consequences of accidental releases of radioactive

materials into water at floating nuclear plants and landbased nuclear plants is not as comprehensive as

WASH– 7400’s analysis of the consequences of accidents because it does not translate radiological doses

into health effects and does not consider economic impacts.

4. Certain aspects of the proposed site for the

Atlantic Generating Station, such as the fact that the

prevailing summer winds tend to blow from the Atlantic

Generating Station site towards an island having a peak

summer recreational population of more than 100,000,

make it impossible to apply WASH-1400’s conclusions

about the expected consequences of airborne releases

to the Atlantic Generating Station.

5. A substantial amount of information is available

that could be used to assess the consequences of a

core-melt in a floating nuclear plant, and research

programs are underway to provide additional applicable information. There do not appear to be any significant information needs that will not be satisfied by

research programs already underway .

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

The environmental and health effects of normal

operations of a floating nuclear powerplant have been

studied extensively by Government and industry

analysts. A critical review of these studies discloses little

foundation for concluding that either construction or

routine operations of two plants at the Atlantic Generating Station would pose a substantial threat to public

health or the environment.

However, while routine operations appear to pose

few problems, the most serious accident that could occur

in a nuclear powerplant—a meltdown of the fuel core—

could pose a severe threat to public health and safety and

to the environment. While operation of any nuclear

powerplant involves some accident risks, a core-melt in a

floating nuclear powerplant may involve unique risks

since the molten core probably would melt through the

n uclear powerpIants ti ‘,

must regardless Of (:~

that they are safe ;in (~

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text t)t “The

Proposal for a Floating Nuclear Powcrplant in tht’ Mid- Atlantic,”

chapter IV, particularly pages 230–237.
bottom of the floating platform and release large quantities of radioactive fission products directly into the

body of water on which the plant is floating. Public concern about the risks from floating nuclear plants is

reflected in the responses to OTA’s public participation

questionnaire, the contentions of interveners in the

licensing process, and the State of New Jersey’s request to

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for an assessment of

such risks.

Recognizing that floating nuclear powerplants present unique safety issues, the Advisory Committee on

Reactor Safeguards directed Offshore Power Systems to

perform a number of studies related to these unique

issues. As a followup, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission decided to conduct a general study of the radiological consequences of a release of radioactive materials into

water from both land-based and floating plants. This Liquid Pathways Generic Study, scheduled to be published

in draft form in late-1976, will analyze the consequences

of releases from a wide range of accidents; from relatively

minor ones to the most serious case, the core-melt. When

completed, it will be published as a Nuclear Regulatory

Commission study and will be considered in the licensing process for both environmental and safety reviews of

the Offshore Power Systems application for a license to

build eight floating nuclear powerplants.

By injecting into the licensing process a study which

includes analysis of some of the consequences of a coremelt accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission appears to have taken a step away from its policy of not requiring any consideration of core-melt accidents in

reviewing and approving applications for licenses to

build and operate nuclear powerplants. However, it

should be noted that there has been no change in the formal requirements for licensing, because the final environmental statement on the Offshore Power Systems

application will contain only an analysis of the consequences of accidents less severe than a core-melt.

OTA concludes that the accident risks posed by the

new technology of floating nuclear powerplants deserve

thorough study. The analysis that supports the conclusion must begin with an examination of the way in which

powerplant safety is treated under current Nuclear

Regulatory Commission procedures.

“The quality of Iife on this planet is

being degraded and its very existence

threatened by large-scale nuclear fission such as used in power production. “

“What’s wrong with enIarging a floating nuclear power plant to incIude a

resort hotel and offshore gambling ?

Heated waters couId be used for

central heating systems, heated swimming pools, etc General public wouId

eventualIy overcome science fiction -

stimuIated fears of nuclear power

“True, there are remote dangers but I

am familiar with Oyster Creek Nuclear

Plant and wouId not hesitate to Iive

next door

“1 do not believe that offshore

powerplants can survive the storm potential of the Jersey Coast
The Commission’s objective is “to assure that the

risk from normal operation and postulated accidents is

maintained at an acceptably low level and to assure that

the likelihood of more severe accidents is extremely

small. ”4

The Commission attempts to meet the objective with

three levels of regulations in which it:

● Establishes standards for the design, construction,

and operation of nuclear powerplants that are intended to keep the probability of failure or malfunctions at a low level.

. Requires equipment and emergency procedures to

cope with malfunctions that do occur, such as an

emergency control mechanism that will terminate

a fuel core’s chain reaction under abnormal plant

conditions.

. Requires safety systems to control a worst-case set

of “design-basis accidents”, such as a loss of a

reactor’s primary coolant that might lead to a

core-melt unless auxiliary cooling systems were

available.

The Commission divides the spectrum of postulated

nuclear powerplant accidents into nine categories, ranging from minor incidents (Class 1) to the potentially.

catastrophic but highly improbable core-melt (Class 9).

Commission policy requires only Class 1 through Class 8

accidents to be considered in licensing designs and sites

for powerplants.

Class 8 accidents include ejection of a fuel rod, a

crack in a steam line and, most importantly, a loss-ofcoolant-accident (LOCA) involving a major break in one

of the lines carrying the water that transfers heat from

the core to the steam system. The LOCA is one of two

possible initiating events for a core-meltdown. The other

is a temporary disruption of the system—known as a

transient—which raises core temperature above the

capacity of the cooling system. If a LOCA were followed

by proper operation of the engineered safety features,

such as the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), it

would be considered a Class 8 accident; if these systems

failed and the core overheated and melted, it would be a

Class 9 accident. The consequences of Class 9 accidents

could be far more severe than the Class 8 accidents,

h,, ,, , , . .

‘There is always risk in developing

more energy resources but but we have no

alter natives but to keep deveIoping

so Iv I n g the probIems as best we can.

t.J, ., 1. - , , t ,,, ,$ ,,
because they could release substantial quantities of

radioactive materials into the environment.

The NRC’s rationale for not requiring consideration

of Class 9 accidents in the design basis of protection

systems and engineered safety features or in evaluating

proposed sites is that the probability of their occurrence

is judged to be so small that the total risk from such accidents (the probability of an accident multiplied by the expected consequences of the accident) is extremely low; so

low that they can be safely ignored, even though their

consequences could be far worse than those of other malfunctions.

Until 1975, this judgment was not supported by

detailed analysis of the probabilities or consequences of

various classes of accidents. In that year, the NRC

received the final results of the Reactor Safety Study

(WASH– 1400). This was intended to develop realistic

estimates of the probabilities of major accidents, and of

their public health consequences (such as death and illnesses) and economic costs (such as evacuation, decontamination, crop losses, and loss of productive use of

quarantined land).

The report was issued in final form on October 30,

1975. It estimated that the probability of a core-melt accident in a land-based pressurized water reactor plant is

about one in twenty thousand per year of reactor operation, and that only about one in seven core-melt accidents

would lead to the release of significant amounts of

radioactive materials into the atmosphere. It also concluded that the risks from operating 100 nuclear power

reactors were small compared to other man-made and

natural risks. While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

has not yet announced whether, or how, the results of the

study will affect nuclear safety regulations, it did state

after completion of the draft report that “the very low

resultant risk described in the draft study amply justifies

the conclusion that no immediate action is required or

appropriate as a result of the draft study’s present assessment of the probabilities and consequences of coremeltdown. ”5 NRC’s view does not appear to have

changed after publication of the final report.

The validity of the conclusions of WASH– 1400 concerning the absolute level of risks from nuclear

powerplants is a matter of controversy, as is reactor
,, I

.1 I ,

safety in general. Any resolution of this controversy is far

beyond the scope of this study. Consequently, OTA’s

consideration of WASH– 1400 was confined primarily to

determining whether there are grounds for concluding

that there are significant differences in the risks associated with floating nuclear powerplants and land-based

plants, recognizing that there is disagreement over

whether the risks associated with land-based plants are

fully understood. It should be noted, however, that

results presented in (Draft) WASH– 1400 imply that

whatever the absolute level of risks from all classes of

reactor accidents may be, the total risks from Class 9 accidents are greater than the risks from Class 8 accidents,

because the lower likelihood of Class 9 accidents could be

offset by their greater potential consequences.6 This finding supports OTA’s conclusion that it would be advisable

to conduct a realistic, comprehensive analysis of the

overall risks from core-melt accidents in floating nuclear

powerplants, even though current NRC regulations require analysis of accidents only through Class 8.

As noted earlier, the Liquid Pathways Generic Study

does appear to represent a move away from the policy of

not considering Class 9 accidents at all in the licensing

process, although there has been no change in the formal

licensing requirements. However, this study is not, and

does not purport to be, a comprehensive comparison of

the risks of floating plants with those of land-based

plants similar in scope to WASH– 1400. Specifically, it

considers only liquid pathways for dispersion of radioactive releases; it does not translate calculations of radiation doses into health effects; it does not consider

economic impacts; and it considers only the consequences of an accident at a single plant, rather than attempting to calculate the risks of operation of a considerable number of floating plants.

OTA’s comparison of the reactor used in the floating

nuclear powerplant with the pressurized water reactor

examined in WASH– 1400 indicated that even though the

probabilities of a core-melt appeared similar for both

plants, the WASH– 1400 conclusions concerning the risks

from airborne releases could not be directly applied to

floating plants because of design differences affecting the

probabilities and magnitudes of atmospheric releases

from a core-melt. Furthermore, the wide range of sites on

which WASH– 2400 risk calculations were based did not
reflect the more limited range of sites available to floating

plants.

Thus, OTA concludes from its examination of the Liquid Pathways Generic Study and WASH– 1400 that substantial additional analysis will be needed to produce a

comprehensive generic comparison of the risks from

floating nuclear powerplants with those from land-based

plants. However, its examination of related research indicates that most of the information needed for such an

analysis should be currently available or forthcoming

from active research programs.

OTA also concludes that both the Liquid Pathways

Generic Study and WASH– 1400 have limited applicability in assessing the potential impacts of deploying

floating nuclear powerplants in the study area. The

calculations of expected consequences of accidents in

WASH– 1400 are based on site characteristics averaged

over 68 sites expected to be in use by 1981. The averaging

technique used makes it impossible to determine how the

characteristics of specific types of sites affect consequence

calculations. Specifically, there are characteristics of the

proposed Atlantic Generating Station site that suggest

that consequence calculations based on average site

characteristics would be misleading, For example, the

economy of the region around Atlantic City depends

heavily on summer recreational use of the beaches and

the ocean; hence an accident that released large quantities

of radioactive materials into the ocean could have a

severe economic impact, both in the short run, through

the effects of a limitation on use of the beaches and ocean

in the area, and in the long run, through adverse effects

on the attractiveness of the area for recreation relative to

other areas. The potential severity of the impact of a major accident on the regional economy also highlights the

limitations of the Liquid Pathways Generic Study, which

does not analyze economic effects.

Another site-specific factor which could increase the

consequences of a major accident is the fact that the prevailing winds during the peak summer tourist months

would tend to carry radioactive releases produced by an

accident towards Long Beach Island, whose southern tip

is 2.8 miles north of the Atlantic Generating Station site,

and whose year-round population of about 10,000 can

reach a summer daytime peak of more than 100,000. This

potential problem is compounded by the fact that only
one bridge is available for evacuation of the island in case

of an accident.

Neither WASH– 1400 nor NRC procedures for

analyzing the consequences of design basis accidents take

into account correlations between wind direction and

seasonal population peaks.

These peculiarities of the proposed Atlantic

Generating Station suggest that a site-specific analysis

would be required to assess the expected consequences of

a major accident. A recent review of WASH– 1400 indicates that differences in population distribution around

various sites considered in WASH– 1400 can affect the expected consequences (and hence the risks) of serious accidents by factors of one thousand or more.7 NRC regulations already require site-specific analysis of the

radiological (but not economic) consequences of accidents through Class 8. Since WASH– 1400 implies that the

total risks from Class 9 accidents are greater than those

from Class 8 accidents, the sensitivity of risk to site

characteristics suggests that site-specific analyses of consequences of core-melts could be useful in decisions concerning siting alternatives. It should be noted that M.

Bender and S. H. Bush of the Advisory Committee on

Reactor Safeguards have expressed opinions supporting

this view in the June 7, 1976, “Interim Report of the

Floating Nuclear Power Plant,” sent to Marcus Rowden,

Chairman of the NRC.

. —.——— . -— ———. ...- .——-——-——— ..-. — —

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Congress has delegated authority to the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission to exercise most of the options

that OTA’s analysis shows are available for dealing with

questions about safety of floating nuclear powerplants.

Where powers have been delegated to NRC, the

options open to Congress include:

. An informal notice to the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission that it would support programs to

exercise the options;

● A more formal inquiry through the hearing process

into the validity of exercising the options; and,

finally

79-188 0- 76 - 8
1 ’ 1

. A formal instruction to the NRC to exercise any

of the options that seemed appropriate to Congress or committees with jurisdiction.

The specific options that OTA’s analysis shows are

available are:

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission could carry

forward OTA’s preliminary analysis of the probabilities of core-melts and associated atmospheric releases of radioactive material in

floating nuclear powerplants as compared to

land-based plants.

2. The NRC could expand the scope of the Liquid

Pathways Generic Study to include the

economic consequences of airborne and waterborne releases of radioactive materials following postulated accidents.

3. The NRC could perform an analysis of the consequences of a core-melt at the proposed Atlantic Generating Station for explicit consideration

in the licensing process for that site.

4. The NRC could revise its regulations to require

site-specific analysis of the consequences of

Class 9 accidents as part of the site-licensing

process.

5. The NRC could conduct a comprehensive risk

analysis on floating nuclear powerplants comparable to WASH– 1400, as has been suggested

both in WASH– 1400 itself 8 and in the Environmental Protection Agency’s critique of that

study.9

6. In order to place the risks of floating nuclear

plants in broader perspective, Congress could

fund comparable studies of the risks of alternative sources of electric power, such as coal.
ISSUE 15

Deployment in Volume

As many as 59 floating nuclear powerplants could be

built by a single manufacturer by

policy analysis of the impacts of

plants in U.S. coastal waters has

templated.

the year 2000 but no

deploying that many

been done or is conFINDINGS

1. Federal licensing of floating nuclear plants is

confined to rather narrow technical and administrative

questions related to building eight plants and deploying

two of those plants off the New Jersey coast.

2. The one U.S. company now developing a

capacity to build floating nuclear plants intends to build

and market four such plants a year after 1985. If other

manufacturers were to enter the field, production could

exceed four plants a year after licenses were granted.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Offshore Power Systems, which is building a

Jacksonville, Fla., facility to manufacture floating nuclear

powerplants, estimates that it will have the capacity to

complete 19 plants by 1990. Operating at peak capacity of

four plants per year, it could complete 59 plants by the

year 2000.

The only proposals which the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission has been asked to license so far are proposals to manufacture eight plants and to deploy two of

those plants behind protective breakwaters off the New

Jersey coast.

While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has prepared impact statements for these proposed actions it understandably has not taken it upon itself to examine the

broader policy question of setting in motion a system that

could produce large numbers of plants by the end of the

century.

Floating Nuclear

Powerplants

Public Participation

Comments

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of

“The Proposal for a Floating Nuclear Powerplant in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapter IV, particularly pages 207– 210.

99
If the floating plant concept were successful, other

manufacturers might enter the field, not only in the

United States but also abroad.

The long-range implications of setting in motion a

total system for building, installing, and operating

nuclear powerplants in ocean waters have not been addressed by the NRC or by any other public or private

organization.

Among the policy questions that are raised by the

possibility of volume production of floating nuclear

powerplants are:

● To what extent should the Federal Government be

involved in major private industry decisions to

deploy new technologies such as floating nuclear

plants which could be supplying almost 10 percent of the Nation’s total electrical energy by

1990?

● To what extent should Federal action consider siting decisions for large offshore powerplants?

. To what extent should Federal or State planning

address the need for floating nuclear plants including evaluation of local and regional risks and

benefits?

. What would be the effect on coastal areas of accelerated industrialization that might result from

more plentiful supplies of electrical energy generated by offshore powerplants?

. Conceivably, the Offshore Power Systems plant

alone could build 59 floating powerplants by the

year 2000. To what degree would coastal States

become dependent on that form of offshore

energy production, if that many plants were

deployed?

. If design flaws manifested themselves only after

coastal States had become dependent on offshore

systems for power, how would prolonged shutdowns of offshore plants affect coastal economies

and the organizations involved in producing and

operating such systems?

. What would the economic and social costs of large

numbers of floating powerplants be, compared

with alternative sources of energy?
. What are the environmental and public health

consequences of operation of large numbers of

floating nuclear plants?

Raising these questions does not mean that this

study has prejudged the answers. It is probable, however,

that these long-range policy questions are at least as important as the shorter term technical and administrative

questions which are being analyzed now and that they

should be addressed formally.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

Committees of Congress with jurisdictional

authority could commission a study on the effects of

large-scale deployment of floating nuclear powerplants

in U.S. and foreign waters.
ISSUE 16

Technical Uncertainties

Several technical aspects of the deployment, operation,

and decommissioning of floating nuclear powerplants

have not been analyzed thoroughly enough to permit

judgments about the relative risks of the overall

system.

FINDINGS

1. Techniques for hand ing fuel and radioactiv e

wastes from floating nuclear plants have not bee n

planned in detail. A system for supplying floating plants

that includes barges or other vessels and shore bases

is technically feasible, but without a specific design the

risks cannot be evaluated.

2. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not

developed regulations for decommissioning large

power reactors, and levels of radioactivity to be permitted in decommissioning plans are now determined on a

case-by-case basis.

3. Twoseparate studies of decommissioning standards and practices for major power reactors are now un -

derway-one sponsored by industry and the other by the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission; however, neither study

covers floating plants.

4. If past practices were followed, only one of four

methods the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposed

for decommissioning floating nuclear plants appears to

be workable. The one workable method of decommissioning seems to be dismantling highly radioactive

materials with remotely controlled equipment before a

retired plant is withdrawn from the breakwater. The NRC

analysis did not take into account new information that

indicates that radioactive materials in the reactor

vessel will not decay to levels that permit disposal by

conventional methods for 110 years after a plant

ceases operation.

102

r---

,

Floating Nuclear

.

Public Participation

Comments

I
,. ,1 ,

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

Fuel and waste handling technology has not been

fully developed for floating nuclear plants although existing techniques at land-based plants would apply to

much of the system for floating plants. This includes

standards for shipping containers, fuel storage and handling within the plants, and waste disposal. There are no

obvious problems associated with fuel and waste handling which could not be adequately dealt with by properly engineered systems and there are no significant

differences between floating and land-based plants as to

the expected annual releases of liquid, solid, and gaseous

radioactive waste. The draft environmental impact statement for the Atlantic Generating Station describes, in

general terms, the most likely pattern for the fuel and

waste handling system to be employed. As with landbased plants, major emphasis is placed on packaging of

radioactive materials. Logical statements are made as to

expected safety of handling and shipping operations but

there is insufficient information to substantiate assigning

a low risk to the operation. Analysis is needed on the

detailed design of handling gear aboard the plant, design

of eqLIipment for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore transfer,

the design of a ship or tug-barge system to transport fuel

and wastes, and the extent of the shore-side faci1ity to

receive and transfer fuel and waste. 

1

Decommissioning plans for floating nuclear plants

have not been detailed and some of the options for

decommissioning the Atlantic Generating Station, as

stated in the environmental impact statement, have been

proposed without thorough analysis of the expected inventory of radioactive materials after 40 years of plant

operation. Decommissioning practices and the ultimate

disposal of radioactive materials that are left after a large

powerplant is shut down are questions which apply to all

nuclear power reactors, and the problem is now being

addressed, principally for land-based plants.

The NRC has issued a regulatory guide for decommissioning in general, but to date standards for future

licensing of shut-down facilities are determined on a

case-by-case basis. The Atomic Industrial Forum has

sponsored a study of decommissioning land-based I , “

*Th i+ brit’t d iwu~~ion of tht’ i~+u(~ i+ t,lht~n trom tht’ tull tt’xt of

“ J hc I’ropow” I tor ,1 l;lo,ltirl~N LICICI,I r l’()~~t’rpl,ln t i n tht’ Al id - ~ltl,l n -

tic, ” chapter IV, particularly pages 21 3–222, 224–230.
nuclear plants which is due to be released in the fall of

1976. A similar study was initiated by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission for land-based plants during

mid-1976. It is anticipated that results of both studies will

be used by NRC to reevaluate standards for, and practices

of, decommissioning large power reactors and disposing

of radioactive materials.

OTA sponsored a short study of the differences between land-based and floating nuclear plants when

evaluating decommissioning alternatives and determined that, based on past practice, only the option of dismantling the plant on site is clearly workable. Other options of sinking the activated plant, mothballing at

another site, or mothballing followed by dismantling,

which were described in the EIS, do not appear workable

without clearer standards and further analysis of the

techniques and the consequences. The OTA study also

disclosed errors due to inadequate analysis in past investigations of decommissioning the FNP. It appears that

the questions raised by OTA’s decommissioning investigation could be addressed by analysis of public

health standards for decommissioned plants, options

available to meet those standards, and other effects of

certain options such as sinking the plant in the ocean. The

question of what shore facilities and support would be

required for various approaches could also be addressed.

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

1. Committees of Congress with jurisdictional

authority could examine these uncertainties in oversight hearings. Some specific options which could be

explored in hearings include:

a. A requirement that design criteria and procedures for transferring materials to and from floating plants be completed in detaiI before an operating

license can be issued.

b. A requirement that disposal areas for spent

fuel be assured in the event that a complete

system for waste disposal and fuel reprocessing

still has not been designed by the time the Atlantic

Generating Station begins operating.

c. A requirement that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission reevaluate its conclusions an d

regulations on decommissioning for both floating

and land-based nuclear plants .

2. Committees of Congress with jurisdictiona l

authority could ask the NRC to estimate the time and

resources required to resolve technical and administrative uncertainties, and to solicit independent judgments

about whether the problems are serious enough to warrant such time and resources.

OTHER OPTIONS

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, acting on its

own authority, could initiate studies designed to

resolve the technical and administrative uncertainties.
ISSUE 17

Siting of Floating Powerplants

Outside U.S. Territorial Limits

r 7

f—————l

Because there is no physical barrier to locating floating

nuclear powerplants more than 3 miles offshore, proposals for siting plants outside territorial limits are

possible. However, U.S. authority to regulate floating

nuclear powerplants outside U.S. territory is not clear

under existing international law.

1. State laws which would otherwise apply to

nuclear powerplants would not cover any portion of a

facility sited outside a State’s territorial waters.

2. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission appears to

be unable to approve the installation of a U.S. nuclear

powerplant in waters outside U.S. borders, but on the

Continental Shelf.

3. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act applies

only to the exploration and exploitation of natural

resources and not to the construction of a breakwater,

positioning of cables, and other activities associated

with a nuclear power station.

4. Existing international law does not specifically

settle the question of jurisdiction over a floating nuclear

powerplant located beyond national territorial limits ,

and if the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference should

fail to settle the matter, the question of jurisdiction will

be left to the unilateral action of nations.

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*

An offshore nuclear power station has been proposed for location within 3 miles of the New Jersey

coastline. The Atlantic Generating Station consists of a

pair of floating nuclear plants moored within a large

breakwater. Since waters shallow enough to accommodate this type of facility (maximum 70 feet) can be found

*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of “The

Proposal for a Floating Nuclear Powerplant in the Mid-Atlantic, ”

chapter IV, particularly pages 207–210.

106
more than 3 miles from shore, proposals for more distant

locations could be made. Furthermore, there may be

technical, social, economic, environmental, or other advantages to siting a floating nuclear powerplant outside

the 3-mile limit.

United States domestic law presently appears to

prohibit the licensing of a nuclear powerplant in any

locat ion “not under or within the jurisdiction of the

United States. ” (There are certain exceptions, but they are

not relevant here. ) Because legal authority extending U.S.

jurisdiction for such purposes is lacking, it is questionable whether NRC would have the authority to issue a

license for a nuclear power station moored in waters

beyond the territorial sea. Legislation to clarify this situation would be necessary.

Moreover, the legal authority of the United States to

extend its jurisdiction to water areas over its Continental

Shelf, but beyond 3 miles, is uncertain under existing international law. Comprehensive U.S. sovereignty ends at

3 miles. Certain special purpose authority, e.g., on the

Continental Shelf for exploration and exploitation of

natural resources, is sanctioned by international law’, but

jurisdiction to authorize the construction or operation of

floating nuclear powerplants is not presently recognized.

Thus, clarification of U.S. authority under international law to regulate this activity beyond its territorial

limits is an important precedent to an extension of

jurisdiction, i f conflict with other nations is to be

avoided. Treat y articles are now being debated i n the

Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, which may settle

the international law question.

DOMESTIC LAW

1. State Jurisdiction

The regulatory jurisdiction of most States is limited

to waters within the 3-mile limit. State laws which would

otherwise apply to nuclear powerplants would not cover

a facility sited beyond 3 miles. The State would have

jurisdiction over transmission lines within State waters

but it would have no control over such matters as environmental protection. In short, a State would have very

little control over the nuclear facility located at 3.1 miles

as opposed to the same facility located at 2.9 miles. Such a
108/4 ~1 [ IN(! (J1 I 1 ( ~ \ I [ Y( J I ‘( )\l I 1< 1’[ \\ I ~ { )L 1 ~1 I ~1 L ~ I I 1{ 1{ I I ( ~1<1 \l I I All I ‘=

situation certainly would dampen a State’s desire for involvement in an extra-territorial nuclear project.

2. Federal Law

Section 101 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 2131)

reads as follows:

And

It shall be unlawful except as provided

in section 91 of this Act for any person within the United States to transfer or receive in

interstate commerce, manufacture, produce,

transfer, acquire, possess, use, import, or export any utilization or production facility,

except in accordance with a license issued by

the Commission pursuant to section 103 or

104 of this Act.

section 103 provides in part:

(d) No [commercial] license under this

section may be given to any person for activities which are not under or within the

jurisdiction of the United States. . . .

These provisions can be read to prohibit the awarding of a license by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) for a floating nuclear powerplant to be sited outside U.S. territorial limits. The waters on the U.S. Continental Shelf beyond 3 miles are not clearly “under or

within U.S. jurisdiction. ” This being so, the NRC would

be unable to approve the installation of a U.S. nuclear

powerplant in waters outside U.S. borders but on the

Continental Shelf.

NRC officials believe they have jurisdiction beyond

3 miles under existing law, but no written opinion has

been rendered by the Commission.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act creates a

regulatory regime and a system for leasing land applicable only to the exploration and exploitation of natural

resources (e.g., oil, gas, and sulphur). That law is not applicable to the construction of a breakwater, positioning

of cables, etc., associated with a nuclear power station.

Lack of this kind of authority is a further hindrance to

offshore nuclear power development beyond 3 miles.

Other Federal regulatory mechanisms, e.g., environmental controls, likewise are geographically limited.

Without a clear extension of all such authorities in

legislation, the construction of a floating nuclear
powerplant would either not be attempted or be refused

by Federal officials.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

If clarification of U.S. law is desired, a geographical

extension of U.S. laws and regulations must have international support. Without a legal basis for its action, the

United States could face protests from neighboring nations or from nations which use the high seas off U.S.

coasts.

Existing international law of the sea does not

specifically settle the question of jurisdiction over a floating nuclear powerplant located beyond national territorial limits. Existing law clearly affords a coastal nation the authority to prescribe regulatory measures for

nuclear powerplants sited within its territorial waters.

The limit of territorial waters is presently set at 3 miles by

custom but quite likely will be expanded to 12 miles in

the near future, either through custom or by treaty.

Beyond territorial waters, ocean areas are essentially free

from national control except for very limited purposes

recognized in convention or custom (Convention on the

High Seas, 1958). Authority exists by treaty, for example,

to regulate for sanitary, customs, or fiscal purposes in a

contiguous zone of 12 miles from shore (Convention on

the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958).

Presently under negotiation, in the fifth session of

the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, are

treaty provisions which will clarify jurisdiction over

economic activities in coastal waters beyond territorial

limits. The Conference’s revised single negotiating text

(RSNT), part 2, contains several provisions relevant to

the consideration of jurisdiction over floating nuclear

powerplants. Directly relevant is chapter 3 of the RSNT

which would create an exclusive economic zone extending 200 nautical miles from the coastline. (See especially

Articles 44, 45, and 48.) Article 44 specifies the rights,

jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal States in the exclusive economic zone and reads in part as follows:

1. In an area beyond and adjacent to its

territorial sea, described as the exclusive

economic zone, the coastal State has:

x- * * * *
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with

regard to establishment and use of all artificial

islands, installations, and structures;

(c) Exclusive jurisdiction with regard to

(i) other activities for the economic exploitation

and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents, and

winds;

* * * * *

These provisions, in essence, would provide the

coastal State with the legal authority to regulate (and to

authorize the location of) floating nuclear powerplants in

this 200-mile economic zone. Consequently, the question

of U.S. jurisdiction over floating nuclear powerplants

constructed beyond 3 miles, but within 200 miles

offshore may very well be settled by agreement in a new

law of the sea treaty. However, there are many who

believe that this Conference will fail and no agreement

will be reached, In that event, settlement of the question

of jurisdiction will be handled in the traditional customary law fashion, whereby nations will unilaterally claim

jurisdiction, or the right to regulate and locate such

facilities off their shores. Such claim will then be either

accepted or rejected by other countries.

In summary, international law in this area is in a

developing phase, but it may be clarified in the near

future.

—.—— —— ———— —

CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS

In light of the ambiguity of the legal regime applicable to floating nuclear plants outside U.S. territorial

waters, the Congress may wish to consider action

which would:

1. Clearly establish a U.S. claim of extended

jurisdiction in coastal waters for purposes of

regulating power-production facilities such as

offshore nuclear plants.

2. Extend seaward existing Federal laws governing

such matters as the placement of structures

offshore, the disposal of dredged materials and

pollutants, and enforcement and monitoring
thereof. Alternatively, the Congress may wish to

enact new legislation setting up a separate administrative structure for licensing of offshore

power-production facilities.

3. Establish a process by which lands under the

waters of the contiguous zone could be leased

for purposes other than resource exploration

and exploitation.

4. Extend adjacent State laws to such facilities.
Footnotes: Chapter III

ISSUE 1 OFFSHORE PRIORITIES AND

PLANNING

1.

2.

. . 3

4.

ISSUE

1.

2,

. . 3

ISSUE

1.

2.

3.

4.

ISSUE

Data based on conversation with National

Fisheries Service, May 3, 1976, and William

F. Gusey, “The Fish and Wildlife Resources

of the Middle Atlantic Bight, ” January 1976.

Ibid.

Port Authority of New York and New

Jersey, PorI of IV(J7(I York Sfnfistics, 1974, and

PII iladcl~l}l iu M ariti~~zc E.I’C-/IUIIcyc Sfntistics,

1958-74.

Working Paper #2.

2 FEDERAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Interv icws with Interior staff members,

February 1976.

During a February 17, 1976, interview with

Office of Coastal Zone Management staff

members, OTA researchers were told by one

official: “It is not clear who is doing what,

and the States are bewildered. No one even

knows for sure who is going to do what. It is

a very confused process. ”

“The Federal Government doesn’t seem to

understand why we are being so dogmatic

about some things, ” a Delaware official told

an OTA researcher on February 4, 1976.

“We have to be because they are so sloppy. ”

3 REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Working Paper #1.

Ibid.

Ibid.

According to U.S. Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting System (PIRS) data on oil

spills in 1974, a major source of discharge

was pipelines.

4 OIL SPILL LIABILITY AND

COMPENSATION

1. Written responses to an OTA questionnaire

distributed August 1975-January 1976, and

oral statements in OTA workshops in May,

June, and August, 1975.

2. Martin C. Miller, Jerry C. Bacon, Ivan M.

Lissauer, Office of Research and Development, U. S. Coast Guard, Department of

Transportation, A Comp~/kr Siml/lation Tech -

niqlle for Oil Spills off the Ncu~ \mey -

>. ?

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

Dt>l(7i(1(7)’(’ Coasflr)~c, Report No. CG-D- 1 /1975,

Springfield: National Technical Information

Service, September 1975.

Interagency Comprehensive Oil Spill

Liability Group, Department of Justice Draft

Memorandum, March 14, 1975, p.5.

Ibid.

Section 4(a) (2) of the Outer Continental

Shelf Lands Act, as amended by the Deepwater Port Act.

Interviews with State officials, June 1976.

Environmental Policy Institute, Oil: SIIIdy of

Pol//(tioil lirsllrfl)lcc lJif7hi/ify Lf77iIS, October 10,

1975.

Ibid, pp. S-5 and 6, and op. cit., Interagency,

pp. 26-27.

Ibid.

Bergman, Samuel, “No Fault Liability for Oil

Pollution Damage, ” ~oz[r]~al of Mari~i))lc l.~i(’

fl)rd Conl)llcrc(’, vol. 5, October 1973, pp.

20-21.

Lundquist, Thomas R., “Compensation for

Oil Pollution Damages, ” TIIC /~/stilr//c o~~ MmI

ai~d %ici~crs, S1/))//wsi/(///, Februa ry 1974, and

op. cit., lntera~ency, pp. 15-18.

For discussion of the current status of court

decisions on these matters, see Interagency

Study Group, March 15, 1975, pp. 14-1~,

Maine, Massachusetts, Washington, Oregon.

Environmental Policy Center testimony on

New Jersey, S. 1409, ‘June 2, 1976. -

ISSUE 5 OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT AND

CLEANUP

1. Working Paper #3.

ISSUE 6 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES

1.

2.

3.

Working Paper #10.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Draft Enzlironmental lmpct Statement for Mid-A tlmfic

Sale #40, VO1. 2, p. 359.

Straughan, Dale M,, Ei~z’ir(~}~}~[~’~~ta/ Sfr((fi(’s ns

Tl!c!{ l< f’lflfc to of fs!lorc Pctrolrrllfl O/wr(7til)/ls,

Report to the Marine Board, National

Research Council, 1975.

ISSUE 7 STATE ROLE

1. Working Paper #1.

112
1.

A. ?

. . 3

4.

ISSUI

1.

2.

?. .

4.

5

ISSUE 1(1 TANKER DESIGN AND OPERATIONS

1.

2.

3. .

4.

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology}’ Assessment, Oil TI’oIrs/JOI-1(7/;OII” hr~ T1711A(JI-s: AII

A )r (I / [/s i s of M (7 )-; )~ (> po~l~lfj[)~r (711[1 S(7f(’1.V

Mct?s;(rcs, Washington: Go\’ernnlcnt Printing Office, 1975.

U.S. Senate Commerce Comnlitte~~ hcarin~s

on Ports and Waterw’avs !%fetv Act of 1972,

March 2 and 3, 1976. “ “

Op. cit., Office of Tcchnolog}r Assessment.

Frlf(>rfil Rl;~istc1’, IT()] . 41, No, 94, Mav 13,

1976.

ISSUE 11 OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT AND

CLEANUP AT DEE PWATER PORTS

1. 33. CFR 149.319.

2. Inter\’iew With officials of U.S. Department

of Transportation, U.S. Coast C,uard.

3. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology

ISSUE 12 STANDARDS IN STATE W’ATERS

1. Working Paper #1.

2. lbici.

ISSUE 13 ADJACENT COASTAL S 1 ~1’1’[{

STATUS

1. Inter\riew with Hal Scott, Florida Auciutxln

Society, April 6, 1976.

2. Corrt~s\l(J1lclc~llccJ from U.S. D(~pclrtn~c~nt t}t

3

4.

C(~m m~~rce, Nationa I OCLJ,l n {c ,1 ncj A t -

rnospht’r i c Administration, t[~ \$’illian~ 1’.

Colcma n, Sec r-eta ry of Tra n ~pt~rt,1 t i t~n,

March 11, 1976.

C(Jrres~Otl[lcicllcc~ from U.S. DcJp,lrtnl~~nt (Jt

T r a ns p LJ r t a t i (~ n, u .s. C()’1 St (;LI ‘1 rd , t ()

William T. Coleman, St~crc~tar}r ~~f ‘1 r,~n\p~~rtati{~n, March 17, 1976.

Interview’ with DOT officials, April 5, 1976.

5, Ibici.

ISSUE 14 RISKS Fl{(>hf MAJOR ACC’II)EN”l S

‘i .- I Y , ( ) - 7( - ,
Table Ill-1. Consequences of individual release categories

ACCIDENT AVERAGE* PEAK* ●

TYPE PROBABILITY Man-rem Acute Damage Man-rem Acute Damage

PER YEAR (X106

) Fatalities ($X109) (X106

) Fatalities ($X109)

PWR 1 7X1 O-7 2,8 34 1.4 32 1,100 4.3

PWR 2 5X1 O-6 3.1 62 1.8 31 2,300 5.6

PWR 3 5X1 O-6 1.4 39 .70 13 1,100 2.6

PWR 4 5X1 O-7 .29 2.7 .24 2.9 106 1.6

PWR 5 1 X1 O-6 .07 .22 .06 .70 17 .46

PWR 6 1 X1 O-5 7.5X1 O-3 o 1.0X10-3 91 X10-3 o 4.9X10-3

PWR7 6X1 0

-5 1.3X1O-4 o 1.1X10- 5

16x10-4 o 3.6x10

-5

PWR8 4X1O-5 .92x10

-3 o .43X10- 3

15X10- 3

o 2.2X10-3

PWR9 4X1O-4 1.1X1O-6 o * O 19X10- 6

9X10- 7

o = 0

BWR1 2.2 1.7 1.2 21 115 4.4

BWR2 2X1O-6 1.8 48 1.2 16 1,200 4.0

BWR3 1X1O-5 .89 3.0 .61 9.4 110 3.4

BWR4 3X1O-5 .42 3.9 .28 4,2 90 1.5

BWR5 1X1O-5 .19 1.1 .10 1.8 52 .86

BWR6 1X1O-4 .22X1O-6 o = 0 3.5X10-6

o - 0

“Averageoverpopulafionandmeterological conditions, assuming accidentoccurs with unit probability, i.e,, given theaccident.

● “It should be understood that the probabilities of these peak values are approximately three orders of magnitude smaller than the accident probability values

given in column 2.

NOTE: The conclusion that the risks from Class 9 greater for PWR 2 than for PWR 9 (3.1 million

accidents are greater than the risks from Class 8 ac- man -reins compared to 1.1 man-reins). In terms of

cidents is implied in the table 111-1, which was early deaths, P WR 2 would produce on the average

included in the draft of the Reactor Safety Study 62 deaths and could cause up to a peak of 2,300

(page 71, Appendix VI), but not in the final report. deaths, while PWR 9 is not expected to cause early

The rows labeled PWR 1 through PWR 9 represent sets of accident sequences in pressurized water

reactors that procduce each of nine distinct categories of releases of radioactive materials from the

contament. The probability given for each release .

category is the sum of the probabilities of the

various accidents that could produce that type of

release. Category PWR 9 approximates a Class 8

design-basis, loss-of-coolant accident, in which the

safety systems function properly and no core-melt

occurs. Categories PWR 1 through PWR 7 all result

from Class 9 core-melt accidents involving some

failure of the emergency systems and ultimately

failure of the containment and escape of radioactive materials.

The relatively greater risks of Class 9 accidents

can be seen by comparing the most severe category

of core-melt accidents, PW R 2, with the Class 8

category, PWR 9. The table shows that PWR 2 is

on Iv about 80 times less likely than PWR 9, yet the

con sequences are man y orders of magnitude

greater. For example, the expected total radiation

dose to humans-the primary determinant of longterm cancer deaths—is nearly 2 million times .

deaths even under the worst weather and site conditions. In economic terms, PWR 2 would produce

on the average $1.8 billion in damages, while PWR

9 would produce essentially negligible economic

impacts even i n the worst circumstanccs.

7

8.

9.

Yellin, Joel, “The Nuclear Regulatory Comm i ss i o n ‘s R ea c t o r Safety St u d y,

WASH- 1400,” The Bell )ournal of Economics,

vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1972, Table 2, p. 325.

Op. cit., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

U.S Environmental Protection Agency, Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400: A Review of the

Final Report, June, 1976, pp. 1-8.

ISSUE 16 TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTIES

1. Working Paper #9.

2. Ibici.

Chapter IV

DISCUSSION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES

i

, INTRODUCTION

i

~ t

I

I This OTA assessment deals specifically with three technologies and the potential

I impacts on New Jersey and Delaware of the deployment of any or all of the three in I

the ocean waters off the two States. Those two States, with their divergent energy

and environmental needs, are described in this chapter.

1 The assessment involved detailed study of the equipment to be used as well as

,1

the State and Federal management systems which license, regulate, and generally

I oversee the deployment and operation of the three technologies. The equipment

I and the management systems are described and analyzed in this chapter in the context of the history, current status, and possible future development in the MidAtlantic of oil and gas resources, deepwater ports, and floating nuclear

powerplants.

During the assessment, OTA made its own projections of deployment and

resulting impacts of the technologies. Other projections have been made by industry, various executive agencies, and private study groups. In nearly every case, the

differences between the many projections of impacts are the result of differences in

the basic assumptions made by the various groups. Those impacts and assumptions

made by OTA are specified here.

OTA also investigated what would happen if any or all of the three technologies

were not implemented. The possible alternatives to oil and gas, deepwater ports,

and floating nuclear powerplants and how these alternatives are being pursued are

discussed in the final section of this chapter. I

.— . . . . . . . . —.— —-. . . . . . .— . . . -- ———. .

117
Figure IV-1. The coastal zones of Delaware and New Jersey

m

I

“x.2

.

-.

.+.

T .-

. ,–

“.

,’

. .

I

I

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment, “Energy, 011 and the State of Delaware and “Inventory of New Jersey Coastal Area, 1975’
Description of the Study Area

Delaware and New Jersey—among the

smallest and most densely populated of the 50

States—are a microcosm of the Nation’s

energy conflicts: burgeoning demand for

petroleum and electric power accompanied by

both a dependence on outside sources for

energy and a continuing concern for the

quality of life.

Wide Atlantic beaches that attract an estimated 100 million users annually1 merge with

coastal wetlands, marshes, and forests, then

give way to intense industrialization farther

inland.

Both States border the Atlantic Ocean; New

Jersey with 126 miles of ocean coastline and

Delaware with 28. Water along the ocean coast

is relatively clean and most of the resort areas

are located there. The States are separated from

each other by the Delaware Bay, which is

devoted mostly to boating, fishing, and shipping. Industrialization and pollution are

heavy along the upper Bay and the Delaware

River, which is at the southern end of an industrial corridor that stretches north to the

Hudson River of New York.

Development in both States is clustered

along the Delaware River Basin, a 300-mile

long waterway which has attracted commerce

and industry for three centuries.

In recent assessments of the Delaware River

Basin, the Council on Environmental Quality

has said the region is “at the cutting edge” of

many of the environmental concerns facing

America. Its water and air were among the

first to be heavily polluted; its oldest cities

were among the first to be changed by industrialization; its towns grew as a result of

migration from Europe and from the Southern

United States; its rural areas were among the

first in the Nation to be urbanized by residential and industrial expansion; its mountains

and beaches were among the most severely

impacted by the recreation boom, With the

energy shortage, it is a prime target for

offshore energy systems and associated industrial development.2

The economic life of the two States is inextricably tied to divergent ventures: the

energy-intensive manufacturing -refining -

petrochemical complexes of the inland area

and the tourist-recreation-fishing meccas of

the coastal waters and beaches.

Both Delaware and New Jersey enacted

laws to help deal with conflicts between industry and tourism. Delaware has a Coastal

Zone Act which prohibits new heavy industries in the coastal zone. New Jersey has a

Coastal Area Facility Review Act which sets

up a permit procedure for new or expanding

industry. In a further effort to plan for industrial growth, the urban sections of both

States belong to regional planning commissions.

The demand for oil and electricity for increasing populations and the desire to avoid

the adverse impacts associated with energy

facilities in Delaware and New Jersey have

produced pressures for clean sources of

energy, new controls on existing energy

systems and careful coordination of growth.

The conflicts have posed severe planning and

zoning problems and brought traditional State

and local regulatory systems and land-use

patterns into question. Both States are

developing coastal zone management

programs which may resolve some of the conflicts. They also are developing new State laws

to deal with changing demands,

Neither State produces any oil or natura l

gas. Their energy needs are met with crude oil

or petroleum product imports from foreign

sources or from domestic wells along the Gulf

of Mexico and natural gas from transcontinental pipelines.
Petroleum demand is expected to increase

by nearly one-third by 1985. Electricity demand is projected to increase by at least onehalf by 1985 assuming no change in the present growth pattern.

New Jersey, which has developed 29 percent of its total land area for housing, commerce, or industry, is the most heavily industrialized State in the Nations Increasing

urbanization and industrialization are taking

over New Jersey farmland at the rate of 40,000

acres a year. At the same time, New Jersey has

more land in recreational uses than any other

of the five Mid-Atlantic States.4 Fourteen percent of New Jersey’s land is recreational.

Delaware is predominantly a rural State

with the highest percentage of wetlands and

farmlands of any Mid-Atlantic State. Only 8

percent of its land is used for commerce, industry, or homes.5

New Jersey’s recreational land serves the

large populations of New York and Pennsylvania. Thirty percent of the demand for

New Jersey recreational land is made by outof-State tourists. Recreational demands are

primarily for beaches and boating and are expected to almost double by the year 2000.6

Tourism, or travel-related business, centers

along the coast primarily in Atlantic and

Monmouth Counties.

The tourist industry, which accounts for

$3.5 billion of New Jersey’s estimated $50

billion annual gross product, is second in

economic importance only to the petrochemical industry. p

Petrocemicals , which depend on

petroleum and natural gas byproducts for raw

materials, account for $4 billion of the State’s

gross product. Eleven major plants are concentrated in Northern Jersey and along the

borders with Pennsylvania and Delaware near

a refinery complex that processes two-thirds

of the crude oil refined on the east coast. 8

When all manufacturing businesses are

considered, more than 40 percent of New

Jersey’s 3 million workers owe their jobs to

manufacturing. g Manufactured goods and

petrochemical products are the primary exports from the two States.

About 31 percent of Delaware’s 200,000

jobs are in the manufacturing sector.10 The

States largest industry is petrochemicals, with

a complex of plants located in the

Wilmington-Delaware City area at the northern tip of the State.

Tourism is ranked third among income

sources in Delaware and annually generates

$202 million worth of business,

11 located

mostly in Sussex County. Most of the tourist

business in Delaware involves fishing, swimming, and picnicking. With more than 16

million people living within a day’s drive of

Delaware, 87 percent of the increasing demand for sport fishing is from out of State.12

Most of the visitors to Delaware are from the

Baltimore-Washington area.

Despite the transportation demands made

by both industry and tourism, neither State is

amply supplied with major transportation

facilities except where they coincide with the

New York City to Washington, D. C., corridor.

One major divided highway runs north-south

through the coastal region of each State. Major

rail service is limited to the metropolitan corridor and a freight service between

Wilmington, Del., and Norfolk, Va., via a

railroad ferry across the Chesapeake at Cape

Charles. Mass transit systems are limited to

the metropolitan areas.

Existing transportation probably could not

support industrial and commercial activity

that may result from any new large-scale

development.

Two large ports serve Delaware and New

Jersey. The Port of New York and New Jersey

is the Nation’s largest handler of imported

general cargos. In 1973, the port handled
nearly 218 billion short tons of cargo—primarily passengers, containers, grain, and

petroleum. The petroleum terminals are

mainly on the New Jersey side of the Port. The

Delaware River Ports, centering around

Philadelphia, have handled an increasing

amount of cargo in recent years, more than 40

percent of it crude oil. Total tonnage through

the ports in 1973 was 139 billion short tons.13

The wetlands of the two States—250,000

acres in New Jersey and 139,000 acres in

Delaware—are crucial to coastal life. The areas

are nursery and breeding grounds for much of

the marine life in the ocean and bay. They

provide nutrients which are carried by the

tides into open waters to feed fish and other

organisms. The wetlands provide shelter and

food for waterfowl and migrating birds traveling one of the Nation’s busiest flyways.14

In the coastal region of Maryland, Virginia,

New Jersey, and Delaware, nearly 1 billion

pounds of estuarine-dependent fish products

are harvested annually with a wholesale value

of almost $70 million. The important commercial species are menhaden, crabs, lobsters,

clams, and oysters. More than a million

sportmen fish in the same coastal areas annually and more than a half-million geese and

ducks are harvested by sports hunters.15

In its final environmental impact statement

on the proposed 1976 oil and gas lease sale in

the Mid-Atlantic, the Department of the Interior indicated that the costs and risks associated with developing wetlands and sandy barrier islands can be very high and that destruction of the wetlands already has curtailed the

productivity of some marine species.

The decline in the quality of commercial

and sport fisheries in the region led to the

passage of wetlands protection legislation in

both New Jersey and Delaware.16

Behind the wetlands in New Jersey, a large

and unique forest occupies most of the south

central portion of the State. Known as the Pine

Barrens, the area includes 1,500 square miles

of sandy soil with stands of rare pine species

and other plant and wildlife. Sparsely inhabited and virtually untouched by industrial

development, the Pine Barrens covers a large

untapped fresh water aquifer.

In this diversified area and off its shores,

three new energy systems are now possible:

production of oil and gas resources on the

Outer Continental Shelf, construction of a

deepwater port to handle petroleum imports

by supertankers, and siting of the Nation’s

first floating nuclear powerplant. .

The offshore oil and gas leases run parallel

to the southern half of New Jersey and the

mouth of the Delaware Bay. The most promising site for oil and gas finds—as indicated by

industry tract nominations—is located about

80 miles off Cape Henlopen, Del.

At present there is no serious proposal for a

deepwater port outside the 3-mile limit of

State waters in the Mid-Atlantic, but this

study has determined that a likely site for an

offshore deepwater port, should one be proposed, would be about 30 miles off Cape May

County, N.J., across the mouth of the bay from

the Delaware seashore.

The proposed site of the planned floating

nuclear powerplant is off Atlantic County,

N.J.

The citizens of the States reflect a wide

range of views about the proposals. Industry

representatives, labor, and the big city residents generally have favored the development

of new energy systems off the coast of

Delaware and New Jersey. Environmentalists,

beach landowners, and tourist-oriented towns

and businesses generally have opposed

offshore development. The Governors of both

States are on record in favor of exploration for

offshore oil and gas if significant changes are

made in the development process and Federal

supervision. The Governor of New Jersey is

on record in opposition to a deepwater port
which would cause large-scale industrializa- although New Jersey is currently investigating

tion of rural areas, and Delaware has the risks of such a system.17

prohibited the port and pipeline landings by The position of each State in regard to the

law. The Governors have taken no stand as yet new energy systems is discussed in more

on the proposed floating nuclear powerplant detail in later sections of this chapter.

Figure IV-2. The beach at Cape Henlopen, Delaware State Park juts out into the water where the Delaware Bay

meets the Atlantic Ocean. A few miles up the Bay, Lewes, Delaware, is a potential staging area for work crews

and supplies that will be needed on offshore oil and gas rigs and platforms.

Source Delaware State Planning Off Ice
Development of Offshore Petroleum Technologies in

the Mid-Atlantic

BACKGROUND

This study assesses the introduction of

offshore petroleum development in the MidAtlantic region. Although the submerged

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) lands within

this region were classified by geologists as a

potential source of oil and natural gas in the

late 1950’s, they were not a priority target for

development until 1974.

Initial notice of plans to develop petroleum

resources on Federal lands off the Mid-Atlantic coast was given in a 5-year leasing schedule

which the Department of the Interior first

published in June 1971. However, in his

energy message of April 18, 1973, the President announced that drilling on the Atlantic

OCS and in the Gulf of Alaska would be deferred until a study of the environmental impact of oil and gas production in these areas

could be carried out, The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) was instructed to conduct this study in consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency, the National

Academy of Sciences, other Federal agencies,

and the Governors, legislators, and citizens of

the coastal States involved. The Council held

public hearings, including hearings in cities

on the Atlantic coast; established and met

with an advisory committee comprised of

representatives of the Governors of the coastal

States; and consulted with representatives of

environmental groups and industry. ]

Development of the offshore petroleum

resources of the Mid-Atlantic area was given

high priority by the executive branch in 1974.

This change in status followed the oil embargo

imposed in October 1973 by the Organization

of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Accelerated development of the OCS, including the Mid-Atlantic, was one of the policies

announced by the Administration for lessening U.S. dependence upon foreign sources. 2

As initially announced, accelerated OCS

development called for leasing 10 million

acres in a single year, an amount roughly

equal to all of the OCS land that had been

leased during the 21 previous years. On the

basis of its review of this decision, the General

Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the

decision to accelerate leasing was made “without carefully analyzing and considering

several factors and problems affecting the

decision’s soundness. “

3 The GAO concluded

that the decision was hastily conceived by Interior and based on overly optimistic assumptions and inadequate data and that it was

reached without considering environmental

impacts, national-regional supply-and-demand needs, or alternatives to large-scale expansion of OCS leasing.

Despite the year-long CEQ study and the

involvement of the State governments and

citizens, OTA found that most affected parties

in New Jersey and Delaware, including State

and local officials, believe that the Administration’s 1974 move to accelerate

development off the Mid-Atlantic coast was

made without giving them an opportunity to

participate. They were, in part, reacting to the

realization that the decision to develop the

Baltimore Canyon Trough already has had

significant social and political consequences

for the States of New Jersey and Delaware and

their coastal communities. They also were

reacting to their dealings with the Department

of the Interior in its role as manager of OCS

resource development, Q experiences which

led them to believe that few Interior Department officials recognize the magnitude and

significance of the impacts that petroleum exploration and production may have on Mid-.

Atlantic States and coastal communities.
ACTIVITIES TO DATE

Seismic Surveys

Since about 1960 there has been active interest on the part of many U.S. oil companies

in development of potential oil and gas

resources on the Mid-Atlantic Outer Continental Shelf. The first technology which was

deployed by industry to explore for potential

deposits was that of seismic surveys.

Seismic survey ships have been

gridlines over the Baltimore Canyon

tracing

Trough

periodically since the early 1960’s, using

pneumatic or propane gas guns to generate

sound waves which penetrate the rock of the

sea floor and register their return to the surface on hydrophores which are trailed behind

the survey ships. If petroleum exists in the

Baltimore Canyon Trough, it is trapped in

layers of porous rock which have been created

over some 200 million years from soil, clay,

and gravel which has washed to sea from the

Figure IV-3. Baltimore Canyon development activities by phase of development and by year

YEARS AFTER LEASING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

ZERO RECOVERY ASSUMPTION

Geophysical (Seismic) Activity

Exploratory Drilling

MEDIAN RECOVERY ASSUMPTION

Geophysical (Seismic) Activity

Exploratory Drilling

Development Drilling

Product ion

Pipelines

Tank Farms

Gas Processing Plant Construction

Gas Processing Plant Operation

HIGH RECOVERY ASSUMPTION

Geophysical (Seismic) Activity

Exploratory Drilling

Development Drilling

Product ion

Pipelines

Tank Farms

Gas Processing Plant Construction

Gas Processing Plant Operation

I I 1 1 1 I l l 1 1 I I 8 1 1 I t 1 I 1 I I I

FROM

1960 V

o

0

FROM

1960 V

FROM

1960 V

A

A

o

❑

o

●

o

0

0

●

a

o

0

0

0

0

0

1975 ‘ 1977 ‘ 1979 ‘ 1981 ‘ 1983 ‘ 1985 ‘ 1987 ‘ 1989 ‘ 1991 ‘ 1993 ‘ 1995 ‘ ‘

NOTE MARKS FOR YEARS DESIGNATE THE BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR

KEY: A First Major Discovery; ● Peak of Production; v Lease Sale; Construction; Operation;

❑ Termination of Activity; Gas Processing Plant on Line

Source Office of Technology Assessment
Appalachian highlands. 5 Because sound is

reflected by different layers of rock through

which it travels, the records of the soundwaves returning to the survey ships can be

processed by computers to give an interpreter

a detailed picture of the rock formations the

soundwaves have penetrated.

A seismic survey is a rough and indirect

measure of petroleum resource potential in a

region and is most uncertain when it is used

in a frontier area that has never been drilled

such as the Baltimore Canyon Trough,

If oil is discovered in the amounts projected

by geologists using seismic survey results

these ships will continue to operate until 1990,

overlapping the start of exploration and production drilling in an effort to outline possible

areas where oil and natural gas might exist.

Figure IV-3 summarizes the oil exploration

and development activities that OTA has projected between now and 1995.

Although crude, seismic data is used to indicate the size and extent of potential oil

fields. For this reason, the unsuccessful attempts of New Jersey and Delaware to obtain

seismic data from the Government have been

a source of irritation for many officials. The

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) itself has conducted some seismic surveys and the data,

theoretically, could be transmitted to the

States. The USGS also has various kinds of

seismic data purchased or obtained from industry as a requirement for permits for

seismic surveying. These data, however, are

proprietary information and are not available

to the States.

Delaware State Geologist Robert Jordan

told OTA that, the States have been pushing

USGS, without success, to make so-called

“public” information available more quickly.

If the USGS surveys were made available to

the States 2 or 3 years in advance of a lease

sale, he said, the States probably would have

adequate information about the OCS for planning purposes.

Resource Estimates

It is common practice to use seismic survey

data, measurements of magnetic fields, gravity

and subsea geology as well as various indicators of past trapping of hydrocarbon deposits

to make judgments of potential resources in a

region. The oil industry invests substantially

in surveys, data analysis, and expert judgments to make these estimates but does not

publish specific results.

Based on seismic and other proprietary

geophysical data, the U.S. Geological Survey

has made several estimates of the resources in

the Baltimore Canyon Trough. These estimates have changed several times over the

past 2 years and even the methods of making

estimates have been debated among geologists

in industry and government.

The USGS resource estimates for the

Baltimore Canyon Trough were revised

downward by about 50 percent in the last 2

years. The estimates are now given in terms of

probabilities and ranges of possible discovery

and recovery. The present estimate for the median of probable resource was announced for

many OCS regions, including the Baltimore

Canyon Trough in May 1975. The estimate

was 1.8 billion barrels of oil and 5.3 trillion

cubic feet of natural gas. 6 For the area which is

being leased first, the USGS estimated in September 1975 that recoverable resources could

range from 0.4 to 1.4 billion barrels of oil and

from 2.6 to 9.4 trillion cubic feet of natural

gas.

The continually changing nature of these

figures indicates that they cannot be taken as

any more than well-educated guesses about

the amount of undiscovered resources.

Interior Department Preparations

Since the announcement that the Federal

Government would accelerate the process of

leasing Federal land on the Outer Continental

Shelf for petroleum development, the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Bureau of
Figure IV-4. Potential energy supply provided by Baltimore Canyon oil and gas development

OIL PRODUCTION

Million Barrels Per Day

4

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

1980 1985 1990 1995

GAS PRODUCTION

Million Cubic Feet Per Day

1650

560

1980 1985 1990 1995

MEDIAN RECOVERY

HIGH ‘RECOVERY

Source U S Geological Survey resource estimates and Office of Technology Assessment development assumptions

Land Management (BLM)—Interior’s leasing

agency—have been preparing and proceeding

with the many steps in the process. Leasing is

carried out by BLM under the present system

pursuant to the OCS Lands Act of 1953. A

complete description of the present system is

given in a March 1976 report prepared by the

Congressional Research Service titled Effects Of

Offshore Oil and Natural Gas Development on the

Coastal Zones. Proposed changes as given by

Senate and House bills to amend the OCS

Lands Act are contained in Working Paper #l

of this study. At present the Baltimore Canyon

Trough region is one of more than a dozen

OCS frontier areas now in the program for accelerated leasing which includes regions off

the shores of all coastal States. As of this writing some of these areas have already been

leased (deep portions of the Gulf of Mexico,

Southern California, eastern Gulf of Alaska,

and the Baltimore Canyon).

The steps up to leasing include:

●

●

●

●

Planning and estimating the potential of

a specific region;

Selecting a lease area from industry and

government-proposed targets;

Preparing of Environmental Impact

Statements and conducting environmental studies;

Coordination of Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Programs and States’ concerns for

development impacts; and

● Final decision to lease, announcement of

sale, and acceptance of bids from industry.

Although the Bureau of Land Management

(BLM) had spent 2 years examining the

possibility of accelerating lease programs

before the 1973 proposal for a 10-million acre

sale, they were not prepared for a sudden

change of that magnitude.

In 1972, the BLM’s OCS budget was

$650,000 and 2 years before the Bureau had

only nine staff members, some of them part

time, in Washington to deal with offshore

leases. 7 In the period since the acceleration

program was announced, BLM has been

chronically short of staff, particularly of

specialists in urban land use, industrial

Figure IV-5. Estimates of undiscovered recoverable oil and gas resources(a) U.S. offshore areas

AREA CRUDE OIL(b)

(Billions of barrels)

Water Depths of 0-200 metres I 95% 50/0 Statistical

(includes state and Federal lands) Probability Probability Mean

1.

I 2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

North Atlantic

Mid-Atlantic I

South Atlantic

MAFLA (Eastern Gulf of Mexico)

Central Gulf of Mexico}(g) 

South Texas

Southern California

Santa Barbara Channel

Northern California

Washington - Oregon

Lower Cook Inlet

Gulf of Alaska (h)

Southern Aleutian Arc

Bristol Bay Basin

Bering Sea

Chukchi Sea

Beaufort Sea

Water depths of 200-2500 metres ”)

(c) (e)

o

0

0

0

2.0

0.4

0.6

0

0

0.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.2

0.3

(d) (e)

2,5

4.6

1.3

2.7

6.4

2.1

3.0

0.8

0.7

2.4

4.7

0.2

2.4

7,0

14.5

7.6

(f)

0.9

1.8

0.3

1.0

3.8

1.1

1.5

0.4

0.2

1.2

1.5

0.1

0.7

2.2

6.4

3.3

4. MAFLA (Eastern Gulf of Mexico)

5. Central Gulf of Mexico }(g)

6. South Texas }

7. Southern California

8. Santa Barbara Channel

. . . . . - .— ---- . . ,. ., —--—— . . . ., .

1.3

1.9

2.9

2.1

0.5

0.9

1.2

0.9

—.——- .

I NATURAL GAS

(Trillions of cubic feet)

I

I 95% 5°70 Statistical

Probability Probability Mean

(c) (e) (d) (e) (f)

o

I o

0

0

17.5

0.4

0.7

0

0

1.0

0

0

0

0

0

0

13.1

14.2

2.5

2.8

93.0

2.1

3.3

0.8

1.7

4.5

14.0

0.5

5.3

15.0

38.8

19.3

4.4

5.3

0.7

1.0

49.0

1.1

1.7

0.4

0.3

2.4

5.8

0.1

1.6

5.7

19.8

8.8

0 1.2 0.3

0 19.3 8.7

0.2 2.9 1.2

I 0.4 2.3 1.1

L -. ..--. -—-----

a) For assessment of maxlmurn anticipated enwronmental Impact, use of the 50/. probability resource estimate IS suggested.

‘b) Natural gas Ilqutds not included. Total U S NGL resources to 200 metres water depth are calculated to be 28 billion barrels, based upon statistical mean

estimates of undiscovered recoverable natural gas resources and an appropriate gas /oil ratio Information IS inadequate to warrant estimates for indlvidual areas

(c) 19 in 20 chances that a? least the amount estimated IS present. An estimate of O indicates that there IS less than 95%. probability of Commercial quantities being

present Such estimates are made for frontier areas because the presence of 011 and/or gas has not yet been established by drilling

(d) 1 in 20 chance that more than the amount estimated IS present

(e) It IS statistically incorrect to sum either the 5°/0 or the 950/o probabtllty estimates for Indwldual areas to obtain totals for a region

[f) Mean estimates for lndwldual areas maybe summed for regional or U S totals

[g) Estimates for these two areas combined

[h) Includes Kodiak Tertiary Province

[II Estimates Ilmlted to areas where development IS underway or Ieaslng IS planned {n the Immediate future

Source U S Geological Survey (estimates)
Figure IV-6. Simplified flow diagram showing operations necessary for discovery, production, and abandonment of an oil field

1. GEOPHYSiCAL EXPLORATION

r

I

I ,

I

2. EXPLORATORY DRILlNG Drill

Exploratory Well I

Quit Claim

I a

Hydrocarbon

s ------- - Lease Ho e Discovery and

I Completion

!

Updated ----- P- -

Geophysical Work I

I

:

t

I

Drill Confirmation

~

EK3

-

Development

Drilling Development ‘

Program

Dry Completion

Inject I Sale

I

-A 4

3. DEVELOPMENT 1 .

Provide Order and Install

Access to Oil Production Permits Contract

Facilities

●

I I I

4. PRODUCTION

Maintain and Install and Drill and

Expand Production Maintain Complete Well Produced Water

Development Servicing Disposal Facilities Facilities Artificial Lift

b

1 v

i

● 4 P 1

Remove Additional Remove

Facilities Recovery Projects Facilities

I

Remove

Facilities

I

Abandon Field,

5. TERMINATION Remove Facilities,

and Complete

Cleanup Operations

Comply with Section 102(2)(C) of National Environmental Policy Act if Federal lease requires preparation and approval of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

NOTES: (1) Manpower requirements, while not detailed above, are substantial in all phases of the petroleum industry. All types are required, including technical,

skilled and common labor.

(2) Not shown are requirements for permits and approvals by numerous Federal, State and local agencies throughout the Iife of the field.

Source National Petroleum Council
economics, and other skills and expertise required for analyzing coastal and othe r

onshore impacts in States like New Jersey and

Delaware. 8 Efforts have been made to remedy

this and, as of early 1976, BLM had four

regional offices and an OCS budget of $55

million; however, it was still short of staff in

the specialty areas cited above.9

BLM officials were also unprepared for the

reaction of Atlantic coastal States to the 1973

accelerated leasing proposal despite the reactions they had observed following events like

the 1969 Santa Barbara blowout. Most of the

leasing experience of BLM officials was based

on development in the Gulf of Mexico, which

had taken place during a time when attitudes

and the social context were quite different

than they were in 1974.

Frank A. Edwards, Assistant Deputy Director of Minerals and Management, BLM, said in

an interview with OTA on January 30, 1976,

that the Bureau “had total agreement and understanding with Texas and Louisiana. They

were pro- oil and -gas and we just didn’t realize at first that the other States would be so

different. We didn’t realize it would be so crucial to educate them and coordinate with

them. ”

William R. Moffat, former Director of

Policy Analysis for the Interior Department,

said in an interview on January 29, 1976, that

the Department “had been operating in a

benign environment in the Gulf. Louisiana

and Texas didn’t really care what we did out

there. The whole ethos was different. They

considered it a waste of time when we tried to

coordinate with them. So, at the time, it was

not obvious to anybody that we were in a

whole new ball game. ”

But, State and local officials in the MidAtlantic States responded to the leasing proposal more like Californians responding to

Santa Barbara than like the people of Louisiana responding to similar accidents in the

Gulf. The Mid-Atlantic States were less recep7 ( 1 j,{ ( ) - 71, . )()

~D•Œ j ( ‘ ‘ \ I ) \ t I 1

tive to proposals to produce oil and natural

gas off their coasts and were skeptical of

assurances that the development would not

disrupt existing patterns of life and land use.

Except for its Gulf of Mexico experience,

BLM’s background as a manager of public

resources came from managing Federal

mineral, timber, and grazing rights on some

450 million acres of land, mostly in the

Western States and in Alaska, This background had not prepared it to meet the new

challenges posed by the accelerated leasing

program.

To obtain more people with the required

skills, BLM has generally had to look outside

the agency. This, in turn, has lengthened lead

times both in terms of staffing and in terms of

acquainting new staff members with Bureau

activities. One result was that the New York

City office, which was set up November 26,

1973, and drafted the Environmental Impact

Statement for the Mid-Atlantic lease sale, still

was short of its full requirement for professional staff members by 10 positions in March

of 1976.10

The rush of events set in motion by the proposal to accelerate lease sales meant that BLM

was playing “catch-up” during most of 1974

and 1975.

The net effect of BLM’s experience and personnel limitations was to leave it ill-equipped

to coordinate offshore development with

States such as New Jersey and Delaware. In an

effort to overcome these limitations and to

deal with State concerns, the Assistant Secretary of Interior for Program Development and

Budget was designated the OCS policy coordinator. Although State officials told OTA that

the effort improved the flow of information

from Interior, BLM officials said the arrangement did not always work well, partly because

lines of communication between BLM and the

OCS coordinator sometimes broke down.11

One such case involved an assurance by the

OCS coordinator that State officials could
review sections of the Environmental Impact offshore equipment and operations and enStatement in advance of its publication. forces those regulations. The regulations have

Because of standing orders within BLM, which been, and continue to be, more concerned

were not rescinded after the assurance from with specific items of equipment than with

the OCS policy office, State officials were also relationships between the equipment and the

advised that they could review sections of the total oil and gas development system.

statement, but only in the New York office of During the 14 months ending January 1976,

BLM and only during certain hours of the day. the former Assistant Secretary for Program

It was only after considerable complaining Development and Budget, Royston S. Hughes,

that changes were made in the BLM order and was responsible for coordination of OCS acState officials were given easier access to infor- tivities at the Interior Department. It was an

mation as it was being assembled. The misun - assignment he combined with managing the

derstanding eventually led to the adoption of Department’s budget, supervising policy

internal guidelines for contact with the States planning and analysis, doing economic

through the EIS process at Interior. analysis of Department programs, and dealing

The resulting guidelines, Instructional with environmental and natural resource

Memorandum No. 76, dealing with “Contacts policy issues.

with State governments through the OCS leasing process, ” requires that States be contacted

to attend meetings during which activities like

tentative tract selection are discussed, to participate in preparation of the EIS, and to

review preliminary drafts of the EIS. Other

procedures require that the States be informed

of the EIS contents where appropriate, and advised of such activities as announcement of

tentative tract selection, release of draft and

final EIS, and notice of sale.

Line responsibility for OCS activities at Interior is divided between two bureaus, both of

which have a wide range of other activities

that overshadow their OCS responsibilities in

terms of manpower and budget. The Bureau of

Land Management is the lead agency in

developing leasing programs and granting

rights to offshore exploration and development. Once leases are signed, responsibility

for supervising offshore activities passes to

the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), which is

primarily a scientific agency with a limited

regulatory role. The USGS is also responsible

for topographic mapping, monitoring of

domestic water resources, and locating and

estimating the extent of deposits of all

minerals under both public and private lands.

The USGS drafts technical regulations for

Officials in New Jersey and Delaware and at

the Interior Department said that Hughes’

departure to join the White House staff disrupted progress toward opening a line of communications through which substantive issues

could be argued to conclusion. State officials

also insisted that the lines of communication

depended on Hughes being in the position he

held, not on the way in which Interior was

organized to deal with the States. 12

Despite the fact that the program to lease

tracts off the Mid-Atlantic coast had moved

through several crucial phases, the position of

the OCS staff director was vacant from September, 1975 to March 1, 1976, when Alan

Powers was hired to replace Darius Gaskins,

who had returned to academic life. The position of OCS Coordinator/Assistant Secretary

was vacant from the time of Hughes’ resignation until May 21, 1976, when Ronald Coleman was confirmed to replace him. In the interim, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Program Development and Budget, Stanley D.

Doremus, acted as coordinator.

A plan for reorganizing the OCS offices was

completed early in 1976 for consideration by

the Secretary of the Interior. 13

In general, it called for the Assistant Secre-
tary for Program Development and Budget to

continue combining OCS coordination with

his other responsibilities. In addition, the plan

called for a fulltime OCS director who would

report to the assistant secretary. The office

would be responsible for analyzing OCS

policies, assuring the participation of States in

decisions, resolving differences among Interior officials who have line responsibility for

offshore oil development, and coordinating

studies involving OCS activities.

The plan would not change line responsibility for any aspect of offshore oil development. It contained no recommendations as to

the size of staff required to coordinate offshore

development. The plan, in effect, continued

the structure that existed before Assistant

Secretary Hughes left Interior.

Based on experience of the 2 years since the

Administration adopted a policy of accelerated offshore oil development and because of

fragmented responsibility and lack of a single

leader, the present structure probably will not

be adequate to solve the problems of coordination with other Federal agencies and with

the coastal States. These problems will intensify when offshore development begins in the

Mid-Atlantic.

Selection of the Lease Area

For administrative purposes, the Outer

Continental Shelf is divided into a chessboard

pattern of tracts each containing a maximum

of 5,760 acres or 9 square miles. Oil companies

bid for leases by tract rather than by oil-bearing structures.

On March 25, 1975, the Bureau of Land

Management, which acts as agent for the Interior Department in lease sales, called for

nominations by the oil industry of tracts it

would like to have offered for leases. Oil companies designated 557 tracts covering 3.1

million acres of the Outer Continental Shelf—

about ha 1 f of the Trough area which runs

roughly parallel to the Atlantic coast for 150

miles between New York and the north coast

of Virginia, 14

In August 1975, BLM selected 154 tracts

covering 876,750 acres from among those

nominated and tentatively scheduled a sale of

leases for the tracts for May 1976. (See figure

IV-7.) Some of the 557 tracts nominated by oil

companies were eliminated because of concerns among commercial fishermen that oil

operations would interfere with their activities. In other cases, BLM gave no reason for

withdrawing nominated tracts from the lease

sale. 15

The final decision to hold the Mid-Atlantic

Lease Sale #40 was made by Secretary of the

Interior Thomas Kleppe late in June and the

sale was finally held on August 17 in New

York City.

Environmental Impact Statements

The most comprehensive packages of information which were provided to the States

prior to the sale were the environmental impact statements (EIS) on the Baltimore Canyon Trough Lease Sale #40. The environmental impact statement is required by the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

for any Federal action that may have a “significant” effect on the environment.

Preparation of the document was largely

the responsibility of the regional BLM office in

New York. But staffing problems at the New

York City office forced BLM to choose in early

1975 between meeting a deadline for the draft

EIS and taking time to do research on coastal

impacts at the county and local rather than the

State level. BLM officials chose to rely on secondary data for such important data as tourist

income to Cape May County and other New

Jersey coastal areas. Although Interior claimed

that contractor-prepared data was used for

overall consistency among the tourist areas, in

the case of Cape May County, the decision

resulted in a basic conflict between the draft

impact statement’s assessment that annual
Figure IV-7. Baltimore Canyon Trough lease sale area

.

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment and U S Department of the Interior
tourist receipts for the County were $33

million and County records that showed the

receipts as $120 million.16 After protests by

Cape May County and the State of New Jersey,

tourist income figures were revised in the

final EIS to reflect the county’s tabulation.

The draft EIS was issued December 10,

1975, and circulated for comments by Federal,

State, and local agencies. Public hearings were

held January 27–30, 1976, in Atlantic City,

N.J., and the final impact statement was

released May 26, 1976.

Both impact statements were prepared

without benefit of recent updated guidelines

or regulations as to content. The only applicable guidelines for preparation of EIS in Interior are contained in two manuals and an instructional memorandum. Neither manual is

more recent than 1972.17 No recent manuals

implementing CEQ guidelines of 1973 have

been issued, although BLM did say that a

revised manual is currently in preparation.18

The environmental impact statement is supposed to guide the Secretary on the question of

whether a lease sale should be held and which

tracts should be leased after consideration of

the proposed action, the consequences of that

action, and the alternatives.

But State officials and some participants in

the OTA public participation program expressed doubt that the impact statement for

the Mid-Atlantic was adequate for that purpose.

The declared intent by BLM to “lease in all

frontier areas by 1978,” including the MidAtlantic, has led to an impression among New

Jersey and Delaware officials that the EIS

process was a procedural requirement unrelated to the actual leasing decision. 19

Predicting the environmental consequences

of any proposed action must, of necessity, involve some uncertainties and some guesswork. In the case of OCS development, some

of the most specific and significant impacts

cannot be predicted before exploratory drilling produces information on the quantity and

location of OCS oil and gas. Despite these

limitations, pre-lease environmental impact

statements can be made more responsive to

State needs by requiring that the EIS contain

details of alternative “exploration plans, ” including possible locations of onshore support

facilities for exploration, complete sets of OCS

orders and lease stipulations covering specific

geographic regions. To insure that the EIS

contains as much useful information as possible, BLM could be required to solicit—in advance of preparation of the EIS—written comments by affected States on information they

wish to have developed and included. Joint

Federal-State preparation of the EIS also could

avoid some of the difficulties encountered in

the Mid-Atlantic statement where States and

localities found that information about their

areas was either inaccurate or missing. An additional requirement could be imposed that

would call for the draft EIS to be submitted to

the affected States well before it is released,

with release conditional upon State agreement

that the draft contains accurate and relevant

information about the States.

The basic decision as to whether an impact

statement will be written is left to the Federal

agency initiating the “major Federal action. ”

There are only departmental guidelines on

what constitutes a “major Federal action” for

purposes of NEPA, and Interior officials concede that ultimately the decision on whether a

statement is required is “a judgmental one”

made by “responsible Federal officials. '' 20 I n

the case of OCS activities, Interior has determined that the major action is the decision to

lease and prepares impact statements at that

stage. Subsequent stages, such as exploration

or development of the leases, are not considered major actions and separate impact

studies are not made.

Presently, the State role with regard to

NEPA procedures-consisting primarily of

written comments and oral testimony on the
draft EIS—is, at best, that of commentator. The Bureau of Land Management presently

State comments on an EIS are not binding on a conducts an environmental studies program

Secretary of the Interior when he is deciding in OCS regions under a general mandate to

whether to hold an OCS lease sale that would collect environmental baseline data and moni -

affect coastal States. State recourse to the tor environmental changes in offshore areas

courts is purely procedural. A State can pre- under development. Prior to initiating these

vail temporarily, and thus delay a lease sale, if studies, BLM determines the kinds and

it can argue successfully that the Interior amounts of data needed in each OCS lease

Department has not fulfilled the obligations of area, usually after consulting State and local

the Act, but it cannot reverse a decision on the groups and the OCS Environmental Advisory

merits of its case.

States question whether the timing or the

contents of recent EISs qualify as decisionmaking tools for the Secretary rather than as

justifications for his decisions.

The National Environmental Policy Act

gives the States 30 days to comment on the

final EIS but Secretary Kleppe announced his

decision to hold Lease Sale #40 Only 21 days

after the final statement for the Mid-Atlantic

was released and without waiting for all the

comments to come in.

Environmental and Other Studies

The EIS is supposed to guide the Secretary

on the question of whether a lease sale should

be held and which tracts should be leased. But

it can do that only if it contains some

minimum information gathered through

baseline studies which are completed before

the EIS is written. Without such data a Secretary cannot decide which offshore and

onshore areas are environmentally sensitive

or are otherwise not suitable for drilling or for

siting of exploratory support facilities.

However, the environmental baseline study

for the Mid-Atlantic area will not even be

completed until February 1977—nearly 6

months after the lease sale.

Committee and holding planning conferences

and workshops to design the studies. BLM

usually contracts with private or university

groups for the studies or, in some cases, delegates the work to the Commerce Department’s

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration .22

NOAA is presently conducting a broad

range of environmental studies for BLM. In

the Mid-Atlantic, the Virginia Institute of

Marine Science is under contract to BLM to

conduct an offshore baseline study only. In all

cases, lease sales are planned before any data

from these studies are available and, therefore,

the timing of the studies has been severely criticized.23 It is evident that the environmental

studies to date are useful neither for the EIS

process or to affect a leasing decision because

they are not completed in time to be used. It

also is not clear whether later OCS management decisions could or would be affected by

data from environmental studies. Certainly

there is no firm requirement to utilize the

data. Interior has even opposed legislation

which would give it the power to cancel leases

if serious environmental problems were identified by the studies.

Presumably, a monitoring program in an

OCS region where oil is being produced may

Baseline studies are intended to provide in- detect adverse environmental impacts.

formation about the existing chemical and However, no formal procedures exist for

physical state of waters before oil operations using monitoring data to regulate production

begin so that monitoring in later years can activities. Some State representatives claim

provide scientists with data to use to deter- that a formal method to tie environmental

mine whether changes in marine-life patterns studies to management decisions is needed.

are associated with oil production.21 Others claim that too much effort is being
spent on these studies, that a minimum of crit- ments and agencies could be involved in

ical baseline and monitoring data is needed at answering the questions. This action could

leasing time, and that only after a discovery is further undermine State confidence in the

made should environmental studies receive seriousness of the Federal Government’s atserious attention .24 tempt to assist them in planning for OCS

BLM also handles or regulates the collection development.

and dissemination of other types of informa - According to Interior staff members, the list

tion in addition to that gathered in baseline of data needs identified by the BLM/OCZM

studies and environmental monitoring. survey will be distributed to all agencies with

One example is a contract for a comparison

of costs and benefits of oil development as it

relates to coastal areas. This contract was sent

out for bids in February 1976, nearly a year

after the call for nomination of tracts for leasing, despite the fact that the States had been

expressing concern for more than 2 years that

they might have to underwrite part of the

costs of offshore development by providing

new roads, new schools, and other public

service to support an increase in population. 25

Deadline for completion of the contract—

assuming the deadline will be met—is June

1977, by which time exploratory drilling

probably will be underway off New Jersey

and Delaware.

Interior has explained the discrepancy in

timing by saying that the study is not intended

to turn out information that will be useful to

the Mid-Atlantic. Rather, according to staff

members in the office of the OCS Coordinator,

it is intended to use the Mid-Atlantic as a

model for developing a system of predicting

costs and benefits for other frontier areas.26

In another effort to collect and distribute

data, the Bureau of Land Management and the

Office of Coastal Zone Management planned a

series of field trips to coastal States in early

1976 to ask State officials what information

they required to begin planning to cope with

the onshore impacts of offshore oil and

natural gas development.

However, no plans were made to guarantee

that studies and analysis would be initiated to

answer the questions which the States might

potential interest or responsibility in the OCS

and coastal zone so that each agency can deal

with the problems in its own way. In a final

report, BLM will identify needs that are com -

mon to all States, needs that are common to

each leasing region, and needs that are specific

to certain States. This report, which will be

distributed to the States and Congress as well

as the agencies, is expected in late 1975.27

In interviews, Federal officials have

emphasized the long lead-time involved in

offshore development and said that they felt

that the States were operating under a misap -

prehension that offshore development would

occur suddenly. In fact, they said, platforms

probably could not be installed off the New

Jersey and Delaware coast before 1980 and

development of the Baltimore Canyon Trough

would be drawn out over a period of 20 years .

or more.

There is one aspect of the pattern of

development, however, that could compress

the lead times for offshore development. Oil

companies contract with independent service

companies for most of the goods and services

involved in exploratory and production drilling. Some service companies would establish

operations on the East Coast at the onset of exploration drilling, which could begin early in

1977. Service companies tend to cluster in the

same area so that the first of these companies

to establish an east coast base might very we]]

make a long-lasting decision about the location of staging areas and other support

facilities before either New Jersey or Delaware

had completed a coastal zone management

pose to the joint teams since many depart- plan.
Coastal Zone Management

With the passage of the Coastal Zone

Management Act of 1972, the 30 States eligible

for funds under the CZM program gained a

potential lever in their efforts to influence Interior Department policies. At present,

however, the emphasis must be on the word

“potential,” because the key section of the

Coastal Zone Management Act—the so-called

“Federal consistency provision’ ’—has yet to

become effective.

The Act made funds available to coastal

States and territories to develop coastal zone

management programs. The Act contains

broad guidelines for developing such

programs, but leaves a large degree of flexibility to the States to meet their particular

needs. While participation is voluntary, all 30

coastal States and three of four eligible territories have chosen to participate.

On completion of a coastal management

program, a State submits its program to the

Secretary of Commerce who approves or disapproves the program, depending on his

judgment as to whether it meets legislative requirements. If the Secretary approves a State’s

program, the State becomes eligible to receive

funds for the implementation and administration of its program, The approval of a State

program also triggers the “Federal consistency” provision.

That provision, found in Section 307 of the

Act, reads, in part, as follows:

After final approval by the Secretary of

a State’s management program, any application for a required Federal license

or permit to conduct an activity affecting land or water uses in the coastal

zone of that State shall provide in the

application to the licensing or permitting agency a certification that the proposed activity complies with the State’s

approved program and that such activity will be conducted in a manner

consistent with the program. At the

same time, the applicant shall furnish to

the State or its designated agency a copy

of the certification, with all necessary information and data. . . . At the earliest

practicable time, the State or its designated agency shall notify the Federal

agency concerned that the State concurs

with or objects to the applicant’s certification. . . . No license or permit shall

be granted by the Federal agency until

the State or its designated agency has

concurred with the applicant’s certification or until, by the State’s failure to

act, the concurrence is conclusively

presumed , unless the Secretary . . . finds . . . that the activity is consistent with the objectives of this title or

is otherwise necessary in the interest of

national security. (Emphasis added. )

During the summer of 1976, the Office of

Coastal Zone Management (OCZM) drew up

a draft of regulations for implementing the

Federal consistency policy.

The philosophy behind the regulations centers on the mutual “cooperation” and “involvement” of Federal and State agencies and

is summed up in the draft:

. . . the consistency provisions are dependent upon the continuing cooperative,

participatory and reasoned interaction of

the coastal States and relevant Federal

agencies set forth throughout the Act and

highlighted in its legislative history. This

one aspect of the many implementary activities States will undertake, will require

the closest possible one-to-one involvement of the State and Federal community. The Secretary, and through him,

NOAA and OCZM, will maintain

responsibility for prudent administration

of the Act and assuring that the views of

the Federal agencies and the States are

balanced within the framework of national CZM policies. In addition to its

‘good offices,’ NOAA will also utilize its
responsibility to evaluate the continuing

performance of the States and its reporting responsibilities to the President and

the Congress to assist in achieving the intergovernmental goals embodied in the

Act and its consistency provisions.

The draft regulations also set up procedures

for maintaining consistency of Federal projects, licenses, and permits with State coastal

zone management programs. In the case of

conflicts which cannot be resolved by the State

and Federal agencies involved and the OCZM,

the Secretary of Commerce makes final decisions “guided ‘by a presumption of validity of

the State agency’s position except to the extent

that the (Federal) applicant makes out a case

for the proposed activity being either consistent

with the purposes of the Act or necessary in the

interest of national security or both. ”

The Office of Coastal Zone Management has

not finally defined “national interest” but has

suggested that States meet the requirement for

considering national interest by developing a

policy statement concerning the national interest in their coastal zone.

The Secretary’s decision on whether the

Federal action shall be allowed is final, except

that he is bound to report to the President and

Congress on all activities and projects which

are not consistent with an approved State

management program.

There is some uncertainty about just how

much leverage the Federal consistency provision would give a State over OCS-related activity. It is clear that having an approved

coastal zone management program would

give the State an additional vehicle for influencing the location of those onshore and

nearshore facilities, such as pipelines, which

require a Federal permit. However, because

the State’s objection to a proposed Federal action can be overturned by the Secretary of

Commerce, Federal consistency does not provide an absolute veto over actions the State

deems undesirable. Despite that limitation,

the existence of the provision and the potential for delay that it gives a State should give a

company seeking a permit, the permitting

agency, and the Secretary of Commerce an incentive to work together to insure that State

concerns are taken into account before any

decisions about the location of facilities are

made.

While the general relevance of the Coastal

Zone Management Act to onshore and

nearshore OCS-related facilities is clear, only

under 1976 amendments to the Act was it

specified that each Federal lease had to be submitted to each State with an approved coastal

zone management program to determine

whether the lease is consistent with the State

program. The amendment specifically applies

the consistency requirement to the basic steps

in the OCS leasing process-exploration,

development, and production—in an attempt

to satisfy State needs for complete information, on a timely basis, about the details of the

oil industry’s offshore plans.

While the amendments give the States an

important new point of access to the OCS

decision process, they also will expedite OCS

oil and gas development by specifying that

once a lease is certified as consistent all individual activities described in detail in the

leasing information submitted to the States

also will be presumed consistent.

The leverage created by the “Federal consistency” provision is only potential at this time

because no State has received approval for a

coastal zone management program. In fact,

the applicability of Federal consistency to OCS

leasing was moot as far as New Jersey and

Delaware was concerned because neither State

had an approved management program at the

time of the lease sale. Approved programs in

both States are not expected until early 1977.

Grants to Delaware for coastal zone planning as of July 31, 1976, totaled $511,666, of

which $102,000 was a supplemental grant to

be used for work related to OCS development.
New Jersey grants total $1,082,750, including

$377,000 in supplemental funds to be used by

county planning offices to finance studies and

planning for offshore development on a

regional and more detailed scale than will be

done by the State coastal zone planning office.

The 1976 amendments also intensify State

needs for data about OCS activities and expected impacts because the amendments require that States plan for possible location of

energy facilities in the coastal zone. The

amendments also require that States show that

they will be affected by energy facilities in

order to qualify for planning grants and loans

under the Act.

The Office of Coastal Zone Management

(OCZM) could have a significant impact on

offshore energy development when States

begin to complete coastal zone plans. The

Office has had a relatively minor role in

offshore energy development to date. This

could change when New Jersey and Delaware

submit final plans and the Office- must make

judgments about whether the plans make

sufficient allowance for coastal zone activities

that are in the “national interest” and

whether, in turn, Federal activities in coastal

zones are “consistent” with State plans.

State officials have expressed a hope that

once coastal plans are completed the Office of

Coastal Zone Management would- function as

a clearinghouse for Federal activities and

plans to help States sort out various Federal

programs with coastal implications. They also

have said they hope that once coastal plans are

completed OCZM will assert authority to

force coordination among Federal programs

that involve coastlines.

With the passage of the 1976 amendments

to the Coastal Zone Management Act, giving

OCZM an additional $1.2 billion for grants

and loans to coastal States, Congress has additional criteria for determining whether OCZM

is adequately asserting its role as coordinator.

State Views.

The list of specific grievances which State

officials say arise from existing laws and practices is long. For example:

●

●

●

A decision was made within the Bureau

of Land Management in January to

postpone the sale of Mid-Atlantic OCS

leases from May 1976 to August or later.

State officials had not been advised of the

decision as late as March, although the

decision was common knowledge among

State officials as a result of informal discussions with BLM personnel.

The Interior Department has refused to

share seismic data with State officials on

the ground that it is proprietary information. State officials could purchase the

data from individual seismic survey companies and pay geologists to interpret the

data to give the States early warning

about the possible location of major exploration activities and, in turn, about

specific areas of coastal impact. 2 8

Delaware officials were told by the Office

of Coastal Zone Management that they

could use Federal grants to pay for the

data and interpretation which the Interior Department declines to share with

them.

29 As of August 1, the State had

spent nearly $27,000 acquiring seismic

data.

The State of New Jersey proposed that the

task of preparing an environmental impact statement be handled by the affected

coastal States under contract to the Interior Department. The Interior Department said such an arrangement was not

possible, but the Council on Environmental Quality advised OTA that it

would be acceptable for the Interior

Department to contract with a coastal

State for data and informational support

for Interior preparation of an EIS, including a State-oriented analysis of environmental impacts.
. State officials complain that there has

been no single person or office within the

Interior Department to which they could

turn for answers to important questions

about OCS development.

. They also say they have been forced to

argue their right to information that

should have been offered freely.

Ž State and county planners said that they

had invested both money and manpower

in gathering data to aid in assessing potential impacts of offshore energy

development but that the draft EIS did

not reflect the data that was forwarded to

the Bureau of Land Management.

. Information which was supplied to the

Bureau of Land Management about the

importance of the tourist industry was

not used in the environmental impact

statement on the proposed Lease Sale

#40 and was, in fact, replaced by inaccurate data which was obtained from other

sources. 30

. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of

1953 does not provide for State involvement in offshore energy development

decisions and the States claim that the Interior Department has stuck to the letter

of the law.

. Some State officials feel Congress has

missed the mark in efforts to provide

State access to the offshore energy process. One State geologist said “The proposed legislation seems to want to shake

up the system almost in a punitive

fashion . . . but the States still would

stand somewhat on the outside. Having

more power pulled into Congress

wouldn’t help the States. ”

Under the present system, there are several

stages in the process where a form of State

participation is possible but not required. In a

“fact sheet” dated December 1975, the Bureau

of Land Management listed eight steps in the

process (environmental study program,

development of OCS orders, call for nominations, tract selection, draft of Environmental

Impact Statement, public hearings and comments, decision by the Secretary, review of

development plan) at which they note that

there is “public participation. ”31 The States

participate at each of these stages by three

basic methods: (1) serving on advisory bodies

(e.g., the OCS Research Management Advisory Board); (2) reviewing and commenting on

various documents (draft impact statement,

development plan); (3) being “consulted”

before various actions are taken (e.g., tract

selection and offer of tracts for sale).

The BLM has instituted some changes in the

past year “in an attempt to meet concerns expressed by the public and the States to improve the leasing program. ”32 Included in the

changes are provisions for State participation

in the preparation of the final environmental

impact statement and operating orders for

leases off their shores. Interior has also issued

a ban on joint bidding among major oil companies, cooperated with the States in securing

access to proprietary geologic data from a

stratigraphic test program for the Mid-Atlantic (although Interior officials told OTA they

will not push industry to make similar information available in all cases), modified the

bidding system, and proposed legislation for a

loan program to deal with State needs for

front-end money and a comprehensive oil

spill liability and compensation plan.

- Congress also is dealing with several pieces

of legislation which will alter the processes involved in offshore leasing and development of

oil and gas resources; establish ground rules

for liability for oil spill damage; and place

some aspects of energy development within

the realm of the Coastal Zone Management

Act of 1972.

No legislation, however, addresses the

problems which the States view as most

serious—problems that arise, by and large,
from the way in which Federal-State relationships in OCS matters are now structured. State

officials feel that they have no power to

negotiate in a serious way decisions that affect

their responsibility to State residents both to

FUTURE ACTIVITIES

Lease Sale

The lease sale for the Mid-Atlantic frontier

was held on August 17, 1976, in New York

City while legislation dealing with the system

for leasing and developing the potential oil

and gas fields was pending in Congress.

Several U.S. Senators and Representatives

asked Secretary of the Interior Thomas Kleppe

to delay the lease sale until after pending

minimize harmful impacts that might result

from OCS development and to assure supplies

of energy that meet

dents generally and

ticular.

amendments to the

law.

Kleppe responded

the needs of State resi -

State industries in par-

(3CS Lands Act became

that he felt “it would n o t

be in the national interest” to delay because

legislation had not yet been enacted and

signd into law by the President and i t was

not clear that it W Ould be.

Figure IV-8. OCS leasing procedures: information flow into decision points

— . . . .

Regional Resource 4 Potential Evaluation 1

;

(G. S.) Area Selection ●

*

Including t

I Preparation Summary Call for

i ~ Nominations

● of a 5-Year Geologic

I Regional Environmental Federal Area Schedule Report (BLM)

1 Assessment and Hazard ~ Selection ~ (G. S.) \

I Evaluation I 4 t . .

1 (G. S.)

,

i Federal Tract

Selection

(G.S, & BLM)

●

I Tract Environmental

Environmental

~

Base Line

I Assessment Studies

/

(G. S.) (Interagency) *

I

c

I

* +

I

Final EIS

I

Program Decision

Option Document

1 i

#

Notice

of Sale

(BLM)

I

Tract

Evaluation

(G. S.)

1

!

1

Sale Post Sale :

Activities

(G. S.)

Source” Draft Environmental Impact Statement Proposed Geological Geophysical Expiration, Department of the Interior, May 1975
Figure IV-9. Proposed OCS planning schedule (June 1975)

z

o

u)

<

n

z

o

VI

a

u.

-2

n

z

0

U.2

a

a

u.

z

0

m

u

u

o

.+ -

I

I

!

. . . -—

Source U S Department of the Interior
Figure IV-10. Ongoing activities in U.S. offshore areas

/

u

15 L - -

12 \

‘\ ,

/ I I

4

Blake Plateau Trouah

Gulf of \ :~;t:ja;

‘ex’co 1 Western

California Borderlands

Santa Barbara Channel

Santa Maria Basin

Georges Bank Trough 1

Baltimore Canyon Trough 2

Cape Fear Arch 3

S.E. Georgia Embayment 4

5

6

8

9

0

1

Santa Cruz Basin 12

Arena Bodega Basin 13

Eel River Basin 14

Astoria Basin 15

Olympic Basin 16

Gulf of Alaska 17

Kodiak Shelf 17

Aleutian Shelf 19

Lower Cook Inlet 20

Bristol Basin 21

St. George Basin 22

Bering Shelf 23

St. Matthew Basin 24

Norton Basin 25

Hope Basin 26

Arctic Offshore Basin 27

Beaufort Basin 28

Source Shell 011 Company
1.

‘7A .
on the quantity and location of oil and gas that

may be discovered:

.

● Exploratory drilling of the most likely

prospects for discoveries;

● Planning of production facilities for any

fields located;

● Further development and delineation of

oil or gas fields to determine actual product ion potential;

● Construction and installation of production platforms, pipelines to shore, and

other offshore production facilities;

● Construction of shore facilities for processing, transporting, or utilizing any oil

or gas produced;

● During all steps above—provision of

offshore and onshore support: ships’

personnel and equipment;

. Actual production of oil and gas forperiods up to 20–30 years thereafter.

Many government and industry projections

have been made of the number of drilling rigs,

support equipment, personnel, and facilities

that might be developed after a lease sale in the

Baltimore Canyon Trough. DUring this assessment OTA projected certain deployment patterns for the New Jersey and Delaware study

region. While some of the projections differed.

from previous ones by industry or governmen t agencies, the differences given were

small compared with the great uncertainties

associated with the oil exploration and pro -

duction business.

The following sections dealing with future

technology deployment and possible impacts

are based on some major assumptions stem -

ming from these OTA projections, as follows:

● Exploratory drilling W ill start by

m id -1977.

● Total potential oil reserves in the

Baltimore Canyon Trough range from a

●

●

●

median of 1.8 billion barrels to a high of

4.6 billion barrels.

Total potential gas reserves in the

Baltimore Canyon Trough range from a

median of 5.3 trillion cubic feet to a high

of 14.2 trillion cubic feet.

There is a one in twenty chance that no

oil or gas in commercial quantities will be

discovered.

Given the above, OTA has, in turn, made

assumptions about production levels, rig

deployment, employment, and land use.

These assumptions are shown in figure

1 V -11.

Exploration and Its Impacts

A final period of intensive seismic surveying probably would follow the signing Of the .

first leases in the Baltimore Canyon Trough,

after which exploratory drilling rigs would

move onto station and begin drilling, proba -

bly within 6 months of the lease sale.

Based on current practice, industry proba -

bly would first move three rigs to the best

lease prospects. If early exploration provided

evidence that oil resources i n the area were

large, the number of exploratory rigs on stat ion could grow to 10 during the first phase.

EXPLORATORY RIGS

Three classes of exploratory rigs, which are

self-contained drilling platforms designed to

be moved from area to area in an offshore

developmen t field, could be used in the

Baltimore Canyon Trough area. They are drill

ships, jack-up rigs, and semi-submersible rigs.

Jack-up rigs are large, complex platformsup to 300 feet on a side-containing drilling

equipment, crew quarters, and storage. They

are support by massive steel legs that are

lowered to the ocean floor and then used to

jack the rig decks up 50 to 60 feet above the sea

surface.

Semi-submersible rigs are similiar large
platforms }~h ich arc supported bV steel legs

that arc mounted on submerged pontoons.

When operational, the pontoons float beIow~

the sea surface and the legs extend throu~h the

surface to hold the platform 50 to 60 ttwt

.II.X)IC the water. They arc usua]ly moored to

the sea floor \\’ith large anchors.

Drill ships contain the same equipment,

quarters, and supplies as semi-submersibles

arranged instead aboard a I a r~e ship, t h LIS

providing selt-propulsion Capclbilit]r.

The ,lrri\’al of exploratory rigs tvould start

in operation a svstem of support that would

expand as the field was developed.

The rigs normally carry a crew of more than

100 persons who work 12-hour shifts for 7 to

14 days. Such a syrstem requires about 217

people, including some shore supert~isors. If

exist ing practice were followed, mot-e than

half of the crews of exploratory rigs \voLIld

return to the G u 1 f o f Mexico area Lt’ hen the~~

were on leave. In addition, a large shore and

workboat support force L\’ould be requ i red,

reach ing a total of about 26[1 ~~orkers for 10

exploratory rigs.

Figure IV-11. OTA assumptions for oil and gas development in Baltimore Canyon Trough at peak production of

median- and high-recovery projections (reached about 1992)

OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION

Oil Production (in million

barrels per day)

Gas Production (in million

cubic feet per day)

DRILLING RIG DEPLOYMENT

Zero

Discovery

Exploration Rigs

(from start to

peak) 3

Production Rigs

(peak level) o

Production Wells

(peak level) o

Median

Recovery

313,000

844

Median

Recovery

3-5

25

600

High

Recovery

650,000

1,933

High

Recovery

3-1o

52

1,248

EMPLOYMENT FROM ALL OCS ACTIVITIES

IN NEW JERSEY AND DELAWARE

Median High

Recovery Recovery

Direct Employment

(peak–reached about 1985) 4,500 9,000

LAND USE FOR ALL OCS ACTIVITIES PROJECTED

Activity

Geophysical Surveys and

Support

Exploratory Drilling

support

Platform Construction

Piatform Installation

support

Development Drilling

support

Pipeline Construction

support

Oil and Gas Production

support

Pipeline Corridors

Tank Farms

Gas Processing Piants

Land Required

Docking space for one or

two ships in coastal ports

5 acres per rig in coastai

ports

500-1,000 acres for one

major fabrication facility

Docking space for tugboats

and crane barges in a iarge

port

5 acres per rig in coastal

ports

Docking facilities and

storage of 10-20 acres in

large port

yz acre per platfOrm ‘n

coastal port

2 corridors: approximately

90 miles total onshore,

20 miles each in coastal

zone, 7.5 acres/mile right

of way

2 sites near the coast;

total 50-75 acres

100 acres per plant near

the coast

NOTES:

● Gas processing plants will be built in the region to handle all gas produced but no new refineries are expected

. Onshore pipelines and tank farms will be the major permanent coastal facillt ies required to hand Ie the t ransportation of OCS oil produced

● Support bases for exploration and development drilling will be located at coastai ports in the region such as Atlantic City, Cape May or Lewes, Delaware

. Construction of platforms and support for major operations such as pipelaying may take place partially in the

major port areas in the region and partiaily at traditional construction sites outside of the region

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessmen!

~,. !’] ‘; ( ) - 7{, - I I
REGULATIONS

Development Plans
On November 4, 1974, the Interior Department published a revision of 30 CFR 250.34

which requires offshore oil and gas operators

to submit it to States both a technical devolopment plan and a description of activities that

would be associated with development.

Figure IV-12. Drilling crews work with the drill string at an offshore well similar to those which will be put down

in the Mid-Atlantic.

Source Shell 011 Company
Figure IV-13. Three exploratory rigs for possible use in the Mid-Atlantic

Semi-submersible rig Source Marine Engineerlng/Log
information that could be required for inclusion in inidustry plans and in supplements

to standard development plans include:

● description, quantity , and location of the

resources discovered;

● complete description of the o i I and gas

production system, i ncluding platforms,

gathering lines, pumping facilities,

separation equipment, and pipelines;

Figure IV-14. Assumed rates of exploratory drilling

Zero

Year Recovery Assumption

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Total

Exploratory

Wells

Rigs Wells

3 12

3 12

24

● a det a i led ana1ysis of the site-specific en -

.

vironmental cond it ions for the offshore,

nearshore, and onshore areas where oil

and gas has been found and at which

platforms and pipelines would enter; and

Median

Recovery Assumption

Rigs

3

3

5

5

5

5

5

5

5

Wells

12

12

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

164

High

Recovery Assumption

Rigs

3

3

6

8

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

Wells

12

12

24

32

40

40

40

40

40

40

40

40

40

40

40

520

Summary of Assumpt ions

. Drilling Begins in 1977

• Each rig drills 4 holes/year

. Basis for drilling program

-Zero Case: Stop in two years

-Median: Explore 7 major traps plus additional exploration in intermediate traps

-High: Explore 7 major 23 intermediate traps plus additional exploration

Source Office of Technology Assessment
● ShLll]OV%” ~LX@ic and occanograph ic

d es c r i p t i c) ns, i n c 1 LI d i n g s e d i m e n t

toehcli’ii)r and idcntific,ltion of hclza rdous

cl rcas;

. 13iolc)gic descriptions, i ncl LId ing iden -

t i fication of scns it it’c .1 rt~.ls;

● meteorological inform ,It ion; and

Production and Its Impacts

The series of actions in~olvml in production

woLI ]d hat~e L?nkr i ron men ta ], economic, a nd in -

st i tu t iona 1 con seq L] L?nces for NCLV jerse}~ and

Delaware. OTA has assL]mcd, t(~r the pL~rposc

ot this section, no change i n existing law’s,

reg LI I at ions, t)r practices a m on~ o i 1 companies

or Federal, State, and lc)ca 1 regu Iators.

None of the information that has been

gathered d u r i ng the study [L?~dS OT A

researchers tc) conclude that o i 1 and gas

dmrc]opmcn t off the Mid-Atlantic coast WOLI ]d

prod LICC i rrekrt!rs ib ie d,l magt! or changes i n

patterns of life in either State, provided that

the technologies u’cre prc}perly planned and

eng i necrcd a n d thci r [)pc’rcl t io ns w’erc strict 1 v

monitored. State officials, i ncl LId i ng G()\: .

Brendan T. Byrne t)f New Jersey and Co\T.

Sherman W. Tribbitt of Delaware, ha~c said

pub] icly and privately that they ha~e reached

sirn i la r concl LIS ions. 3’1 They a ISO have said

repeated 1}’ that i n i’ iew of the potent ia 1 (or

Lia m age to their coastal ,~rc,ls, t~’h ich are

Lra I LId both for their en l’ i i-on men t and for thc~

to Llrist income that the}’ produce, the go\crno rs have an ob] iga t it) n to satisfy thin-n SC’] I’cs

that offshore dcirclc)pment Jvc)~Ild be cc)n -

d LICtL?Ci at least .1s prudcn tl~’ .ls the states

\\’() L1 Id proced i t t hc’i’ h .Id CL) n t ro 1 oi’er t hc’

process .

PRODUCTION PLATFORh4S

Figure IV-15. Artist’s drawing of production platform

similar to those which might be used in Mid-Atlantic

Source Mobil 011 Corporation

FIXED PLATFORM

\

/

\

/

against blowouts during the drilling process.

In the Baltimore Canyon Trough, wells may

be drilled to about 15,000 feet. “Storm chokes”

or downhole safety halves are installed in producing wells after drilling is completed to seal

off an oil flow if pressure rises suddenly and

threatens a blowout. “Blowout preventers, ”

stacks of heavy valves, are inserted between a

drilling rig and a well to control blowouts

during the drilling process,

CREW REQUIREMENTS

Development and production drilling

would require about the same number of platform crewmembers as exploration rigs, working 7 to 14 days and taking 7 to 14 days o f

leave. The flow of food, fuel, drilling pipe, casing, mud, and other materials to offshore platforms would be about the same as that required for exploratory drilling.

Once drilling was completed and wells

were connected with a distribution network,

maintenance crews would live on central platforms from which they would travel to producing platforms to pm-form routine repairs

and inspection. On average, 50 personnelmechanics, electricians, painters, and other

maintenance workers-could service four

producing platforms. Thus, offshore personnel requirements would drop, once drilling

was completed, from more than 800 workers

for four platforms to about 50 workers.

PLATFORM REGULATIONS

Oil production platforms are highly complex systems, subject to great uncertainties.

The platforms are designed, built, and installed by oil companies under stringent, selfimposed guidelines. There is very little regula -

tion of this technology. Most recognized industry standards at-c not required to be

followed; the OCS order for platforms merely

states that they shall be adequately designed

and certified. Government inspections of construction, installation, and operations are not

systematically planned.

The OCS order covering platforms for the
Mid-Atlantic was not issued before the least>

sale. The EIS for the Mid-Atlantic states that

“Ma jc)r c~ffshore structu rcs are designed tcl

W’ ithsta nd en ~’ i rc~n men ta 1 st rcsscs spcci ficd b~~

the owner (Jr operator . Typically, forcci

a .SSO c i a t ed }V i t h t h c 10(1-v M r storm h a v c’ been

the spc~cified strc~ss. ” This is a major area of

u ncerta i ntl’: first, i t is not known for sure that

opcrato rs \\’c)u ld design to a 1 (1(1 -vcar storm

and rcg LI I a t i () ns d o not rqu i rc it; SUN n Ci, t h L’

natu t-c of a 1 (N-\’LM r storm i n the Mid-Atlantic

is not kno\\’ n \\r ith ,In}r acc LI racy; third, the

rnagn itu~jc of m an~’ other i ntcract i ng environ - , men tal factors SLI ch as tern pcrat u rc, ~1’a \’t’s,

CLI r run ts, and botto” m stab i I i tv is not kn o\\rn

~t’ ith an}’ accu rac?’; a n Li to L] rt h, t hmc arc no

rect) m men d a t i t)ns as tc) sa tcty fclctc)rs a

designt>r must LI SL’ to account for LI ncerta i n t it’s.

The Americ,ln BL] rt.’au of Shipping, a pri\’ate

~t,

classi ficat ion society which sets cic’sign sta n~i -

a rds and inspects o ffsh o w eq L] i pm cn t to r i nsu rancc com pan ies, has Liorclopcci spL~ci tica -

tions and inspection proceci LI rcs tor oitsh[)rc

platforms. The Bureau has ccrtiiic~~i th~~ ciesi~n

and operation of o\’er 200 flea t i ng Li r i 11 i n; rigs

(exploration rigs) and regularl~’ \tI)rks \\ith

the U.S. Coast Guarci to cert if?’ ships anci t)th~~r

floating eqLI iprnent. The pr~)cwi urt) inc] LILjL>S

publishing a book O( design XL] idt)l inm, C(JIII -

pletely rcnliew’ing and appro[ing or rc’lc~cting

all ciesign plans, inspect i ng .111 mater i a Is .Inci

com poncnts as the}’ are bLI i It, and fi na 1 ] \r, tc>st -

.

ing all major parts. The pr~)ccd LI r~} h .I+ bc>c)n i n

use in the Un itcd States tc)r a I I t)c(’a n -SI) i ng

merchant ships for manl’ vea rs. Adopt i C) n c) f

the principle by OCS - r[’gul.ltclr>’ agL’n c i L’S

cou Id increase the effect i\’~mt’ss of t hL’ pr~’s~’n t

s}~stenl immcd iatclv.

Figure IV-16. Platform construction yard outside Morgan City, Louisiana

< ~““ “ ““’”

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Figure IV-17. Potential sites and land requirements for OCS support bases.

I

I

I

L

Source Office of Technology Assessment
Figure IV-1 7. continued

. . .

The total acreage given below is for onshore support ~

bases which most likely would be located in coastal 

ports such as Atlantic City or Cape May, New Jersey, ~

and Lewes, Delaware. The totals are for peak activity ;

years, most likely between 1980 and 1985. k

Acreage Acreage 

3 for Median for High i

i Recovery Recovery

1

 Exploratory Drilling Support 25 50 ~

Development Drilling Support 55 120

Total Support 80 170

. . . ,

Source Office of Technology Assessment

detailed, firm, and comprehensive rules for

designing, building, and operating, and then

careful IV checking adherence to those rules.

On the other- hand, the USGS philosophy appears to be one of asking for industry’s best

efforts and then making broad judgements

about its adequacy. 42 

CONFLICTING OCEAN USES

Delaware is now used intensively for such tra -

ditional activities as commercial fishing,

marine transportation, disposal of sewage

sludge, and military operations. The most

serious near-term offshore conflicts will probably be between proposed oil and gas operations and both commercial fishing and com -

mercial shipping. Both coastal and transAtlantic traffic lanes from the major ports of

New York and Philadelphia lead through or

We are concerned that the conflict between heavy vessel traffic in the Mid -

Atlantic and the prescence of offshore

platforms could, in the event of the lease

sale, become seriouS. Five tracts are in the

direct path of an existing shipping lane,

six other tracts are considered most

hazardous to navigation, and thirty-one

additional tracts are in conflict with- or in

close proximity to commonly used shipping routes. Any accidents or collisions~

involving platforms and vessels, particularly during anticipated storms or

fog, could pose a substantial threat of ad -

verse environmental, social, a n d

economic impacts on the shoreline com -

m unities where recreationl values of

wetlands and beaches at-c high. Considering that adequate technology does not ex -

ist for containment of oil on the high

seas, there is a probability that oil spills 

would impact the sensitive shorelines.43

SUPPORT BASES
the Baltimore Canyon Trough area were to

yield 1.8 billion barrels of oil, and about 120

acres if the yield were 4.6 billion barrels. This

land is in addition to that required for exploratory drilling, Figure IV-17 summarizes total

land requirements for support bases likely in

the region.

Five possible areas i n the New Jersey - .

Delaware region could serve as staging areas

for offshore development, three coastal sites

and the port complexes of New York City and

Philadelphia-Camden. All three coastal sites—

Atlantic City and Cape May, N. J., and Lewes,

Del .—WoUld meet such staging area requirements as availability of good supply boat harbors with about 15 feet of water depth, accessibi lity by rail, proximity to lease sites, and . .

availability of land for storage and service

facilities. ‘

Service firms under contract to oil companies would choose staging areas on the

basis of lowest overall operating cost, which

cannot be evaluated in enough detail at this

time to pet-m it determination of the most

likely sites. Operating from coastal sites, supply boats would travel between 80 and 250

fewer miles on each round trip to the oil field

than they would if they were based at either

inland port. The resulting savings, however,

might be offset by lower land prices at inland

areas or by the cost of warehouse facilities

which WO uld have to be built if coastal sites

were chosen.

Atlantic City, N. J., could provide enough

acreage to meet all requirements for Support

development if median estimates of recovera -

ble oil and natural gas are correct. If explora -

tion activities expanded, additional staging

areas might be required, Such as Cape May

and Lewes.

zoning and permit powers, including State

powers relating to air and water pollution, is

an effective tool for controlling development.

Nonetheless, in the case of OCS development,

States and localities find themselves limited to

reacting to Federal decisions which set in motion chains of events that can affect population

levels, employment patterns, requirements for

State and local expenditures for public

facilities and services, and social patterns. With

key OCS decisions being made at the Federal

level, States can only approve or disapprove

location of refineries, platform construction

sites, and service bases; or react favorably or

unfavorably to genera] oil company efforts to

build OCS-support facilities. They cannot participate in the process which leads to such

decisions. Their only option is to try to exercise their legal rights to choose whether or not

to approve OCS-related facilities after the fact

of Federal decisions, oil company investments,

and actual oil disco series.

CAPITAL INVESTMENT

Development of oil and natural gas off the

New Jersey and Delaware coast could involve

$2 billion to $4 billion in initial capital investments and could influence the U.S. balance of

trade by as much as $50 billion over the life of

the project, based on very rough figures for

capital investment and discount over the life

of the field.

Figure IV-18. Total new land requirements related to

OCS development during years of peak activity (1 980 to

1990) in New Jersey and Delaware under high recovery

assumptions

Activity Acreage

Required

Support Bases in Coastal Ports 170

Pipeline Corridors in Coastal Zone 150

Pipeline Corridors outside Coastal Zone 550

Tank Farms 75

Gas Processing Plants 700

Total Peak Land Requirement 1,645

State variations, the control of land through Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Direct employment in New Jersev and

Delaware would peak at about 9,000 w;orkers

i f the high estimate of resources wet-e correct

and at about 4,500 workers if the median mti -

mate o f resources were correct. Capital

expend itures would peak ciur ing the seventh

year of de\ felopment at approximately $1

billion. Peak lanci requirements are estimated

to be 1,645 act-es in New Jersey and Delaware.

Of that, 32(] acres would be coastal land and

the remainder would be inland. Sei~en

hundred acres would be required for pipeline

corridors \vh ich probablv would parallel cx -

isting h ighwa~’s or ra i] road “ 1 i nes. Figure

IV–18 summarizes the total new land req u i red.

FISCAL EFFECTS

Analysis of the effects of offshore de\’elopment on tax rm’en Lies in a w’ ide variety of

coastal States, inclucl i ng New Jersey an d

Delaware, shows that in States where major

onshore facilities are located the per capita tax

re\~en LieS from OCS act i\~ities probably w~ould

be significantly higher than from businesses

and indi\idu~ls in the rest of the State

econorn}r except during one time period. Dur -

i ng the first 2 c)r 3 ~~ears of OCS-related

development, very 1 ittle revenue woLlld he

received from OCS-related businesses so that

per capita revenues woLIIci be lower than the

statewide average. Beg i n n i ng i n the fourth

year, however, the net statewide fiscal impacts

wou Id become favorable as i n vestmen ts w’cre

made i n capita 1- i ntens i\’e onshore facilities

needed d LI ri ng the production phase.~~

OTA has prepared a fiscal analysis of costs

and rm’cm UC’S from OCS act i \’ i t ies i n t hc’ Statw

of New Jersey and Delaware assurn i ng projected development associated with disco\’erv

t)f 1.8 b i 11 ion barrels of o i 1 i n the Ba It i more

Canvon Trough.

The fiscal anal }rsis conc[ LIdcs that, i n

general, per cap ita tax rc\’enum from OCS-re -

]ated acti\ritit% I%rOLIld be cc)nsidcrablv h ighcr

ironl the foLI rth Prca r on L%rard than statc)~%r ide

Figure IV-19. Direct employment from all OCS activities

under the hiah and median recoverv assumptions

5000 I I

I

m MEDIAN I

4000

3000

2000

1000

10,000

9000

8000

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

I

1000 I

al

:

“g

u

.RY

1980 1985 1990 1995

HIGH RECOVERY

.

-g

L

ii

z

-co

“Ej

-a

.

1980 1985 1990 1995

PRODUCTION

INSTALLATION AND Developmen t

EXPLORATION

OTHER

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
per capita revenues from other sectors under

the assumptions of the study.

There is an important caveat to the conclusion. It assumes that public costs of supporting OCS bases and providing services to OCSrelated workers and their families in one State

would be offset by revenues from onshore investments in that same State. If, however,

most of the support areas and OCS employees

were located in one State and the landings of

oil and natural gas were made in another, the

results would be very different.

In 1972, per capita State and local revenues

in New Jersey were $847. Before any major

Figure IV-20. Annual earnings of direct regional OCS

workers under median and high recovery assumptions

Annual Payroll

($ Millions)

200

160

120

80

40

●

1980 1985 1990 1995

HIGH

Source Office of Technology Assessment

onshore investments occurred, revenues produced by OCS activities would be primarily

those from taxes on individuals which average

$512 per capita in New Jersey. Assuming that

per capita expenditures for public services are

about equal to total per capita revenues of

$847, per capita expenditures to support OCSrelated population would exceed the per

capita revenues from OCS activities by about

$335 during the first 2 years of development.

The gap would decrease to $225 in the third

year as some business taxes accrued.

The picture would change in the fourth year

when major onshore investments would be

made for pipelines, tank farms, and . natural

gas processing plants. In the year when these

investments were made, the State would

receive revenues from a real estate transfer tax

and from its sales tax (or equivalent use tax).

Since these are assumed to be concentrated in

the fourth year, the per capita tax revenue is

calculated to jump nearly $11,000 in that year

in New Jersey. The jump would not be so pronounced in Delaware where there is presently

no sales tax.

In subsequent years, the property tax would

become the main source of revenues. Property

tax revenues would decline on a per capita

basis for a period because they would be

divided among an increasing direct population engaged in offshore construction and

development drilling, Finally, per capita property tax revenues would begin to rise in the

ninth year when completion of construction

would lead to a decrease in OCS-related

population. For all years after the fourth year,

per capita revenues from OCS activities would

substantially exceed the statewide average.

If either business gross receipts or corporate

income taxes are added, the per capita

revenues accruing from OCS-related activities

would be even higher after the sixth year or so

as production was under-taken. The other un -

certainty—that some components of onshore
construction may be exempt from sales taxa -

tion—cou]d reduce actual sales tax revenues

below the calculated Im’els. However, this

wou Id not a]ter the conclusion that, for most

States, the per capita tax revenues produced

by OCS development should exceed the

statew idc a\’erage after the first 3 years o f

dc\elopment.

There are important qualifications to these

con cl us ions. First, higher than average per

capita tax rc~\’cnucs from OCS development

act i\’ i tics i m plf’ net fiscal benefits only i f these

act i\’ i tics cio n“ot rcqu i re proportionately high

or h i~her expend itu res for public facilities and

ser\iccs. In st~me States, OCS development

mav requ i rc faci I itics such as roads in areas of

.

unusuall}r high construction costs. This could

lead to a net negative fiscal impact in spite of

rclat i\’cl}~ high per capita tax revenues.

SeconLi, the analysis deals only with normal

g(~ternmcnt,ll expenditures and does not take

into account sLIch less easilv quantified costs

as en~’ i ron mental degradation and loss of

recrcat i(lnal lands.

Thus, the conclusion that there may be net

fiscal benefits dot’s not imply that there are no

t]l~c(~n?~?cl~satc)~i costs of development.

Third, while there may be a net fiscal

benefit on a statewide basis, there could still

be serious localized fiscal problems if development were concentrated in a small cornmunity. One of these problems is that during

the first 3 years when revenues are low, a local

government may not have the fiscal capacity

to provide public services to the related

population, and even in year four the major

revenues are sales taxes which accrue pri -

mari Iy to the State rather than local government. It may also be the case that onshore in-

~~cstmcmts subject to sales and property taxa -

tion are in one local government jurisci iction

w’h i Ie a majority of the associated population

resides i n another. This same problem mav

occ L] r kwtw’ecn States if OCS expl(~rat ion anci

de\~elopmcnt activities are supportcci from

bases in a State different from the onc in

which the oi 1 and/or gas is ultin~att’1~~ Iancic{i.

STATE ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT AND

PRODUCTION

Because of the uncertainty, State officials

have been increasingly insistent that they be

brought into the development process as participants rather than observers. State officials

have been, and continue to be, concerned that

such critical decisions as choosing pipeline

corridors, siting tank farms, and locating staging areas may be made without adequate consultation and that, in the end, States would

have to accept the decisions or try to block

development. The lack of State participation at

early stages of the decision process therefore

creates an adversary relationship in which the

State’s only option for controlling adverse

onshore impacts is to obstruct, possibly

through lengthy litigation, thus bringing

about the very delay in OCS development that

the Federal Government is trying to avoid.

The States and Ioca 1 i ties ha \zc sever-a 1

avenues for blocking OCS development. The

most dramatic is simply to file suit to block a

proposed lease sale. Neither New Jersey nor

Delaware has threatened such action publicly.

However, staff members of the Attorneys

General of both States have explored courses

of legal action open to them if the Governor of

either New Jersey or Delaware were to decide

at some future date that the State should try to

block or delay offshore development.

States and localities also have some legal

basis for intervening later in the development

process to block decisions that they oppose.

For example, they could refuse to permit the

construction of pipelines in their coastal zones

by invoking their rights under either the 1 (lth

Amendment or their own riparian laws.

However, State and local officials are concerned about reliance upon such measures for

several reasons:
. There is some doubt about the effectiveness of these powers because they have

not been tested under circumstances

identical to those the States would face in

confrontation with Federal powers.

. Neither State wants to block development of energy sources that may exist in

the Baltimore Canyon Trough, particularly if it means fighting rearguard

actions on technical points.45

. Some State and local officials fear that

their concerns would be overwhelmed by

the combined forces of the Federal

Government and the energy industry

joining in the search for new sources of

energy. In August 1975, Thomas O’Neill,

former assistant commissioner of Environmental Protection for New Jersey,

said: “There is a fear among coastal residents and officials that they’re not going

to have any control. They see a combination of big Government and big oil coming down on them and you’ve got some

poor commissioner in Wildwood, N. J.,

who feels like he’s standing up there all

alone against this juggernaut. ”

What State officials seemed to be seeking, as

reflected in interviews with OTA researchers,

is a new process that would require formal,

effective channels for State participation that

would satisfy State obligations to protect their

coastlines and still assure adequate supplies of

energy for State residents and the Nation as a

whole.

Transportation and Storage and Their Impacts

The next phase in development of oil and

gas off the coast of New Jersey and Delaware

would be construction of a network to move

oil and gas from platforms to storage tanks

Figure IV-21. State-local tax revenue per OCS employee and their families compared to revenue from non-OCS

workers and their families

DELAWARE

Dollars

10,000

8000

6000

4000

3000

PER CAPITA REVENUE

2000

1000

------------------------------------ -

STATE-LOCAL PER CAPITA REVENUES

I I I I I I 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1

NEW JERSEY

Dollars

– 10,000

-800 0

PER CAPITA REVENUE

– 6000

4000

3000

2000

STATE-LOCAL PER CAPITA REVENUES

I I 1 I I I 1 1 I I I I I 1 I I 1 1

Years 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

Source Office of Technology Assessment
! 4

and processing plants and from there to refin- ing lease stipulation will be applied:

cries and into the distribution system.

It is technically possible to lay pipelines to

shore and build storage tanks on a schedule

that would have them in place when commercial quantities of oil and natural gas begin

flowing from the Baltimore Canyon Trough

area. OTA has assumed for this description

that pipelines and tank farms would be built.

It is possible, however, that pipelines would

not be built if:

● oil or natural gas were found in quantities too small to justify the approximately $1 million-per-mile cost of

pipelines;

● oil companies decided that for market

reasons they would refine Mid-Atlantic

crude in some other location;

● oil companies decided that regulation of

pipelines or refineries in either State

would be too stringent to warrant pumping crude ashore in New Jersey or

Delaware.

In any of these cases, crude oil could be

pumped from platforms into offshore storage

tanks and carried to refinery sites by tanker.

PIPELINES

“Whenever technically and economically

feasible, all pipelines . . . shall be buried to a

depth suitable for adequate protection. . . .“ It

should be possible to specify burial depths

where current and sand-shifting are high,

where shipping lanes and anchoring grounds

are located, where pipelines are traversing

beaches, or where fish trawling or dredging

takes place. The terms “suitable” and “adequate protection” could be defined more precisely.

Two kinds of pipelines would be laid on the

ocean floor to transport oil to shore from

offshore platforms. Gathering lines, usually 12

to 24 inches in diameter, connect individual

wells to central platforms. Flow lines connect

central platforms to shore. In the Baltimore

Canyon Trough area flow lines probably

would be more than 2 feet in diameter and extend 80 to 100 miles to shore.

Pipelines from offshore oil and gas production facilities might carry an initial installation

cost in range of $100 million46 for a 24- to 36-

inch pipeline between New Jersey or

Delaware and an offshore oil field.

Given the size of the investment, it is in the

best interests of industry that pipelines be

coated with corrosion protection coatings and

If pipelines were laid, the work would be properly weighted with concrete where

done by 175-man crews working on 300-foot necessary, be installed with care from pipeline

“lay barges” which can assemble and drop to barges, be adequately welded and inspected,

the ocean floor 1 mile of pipeline per day. The be buried throughout most of the distance

process involves welding 40-foot sections of offshore as well as onshore, and be adequately

steel pipe, coating them with asphalt paste or tested prior to use.

epoxy resin, bathing them in concrete to make PIPELINE REGULATIONS

them heavy enough to stay in place on the

ocean floor, and trailing the assembled pipe

over the side or stern. Smaller barges, dragging a “jet-sled” over the ocean floor, follow

the lay-barges and pump water through

nozzles on the sled to dig a trench into which

the pipeline settles.

The environmental impact statement for the

Mid-Atlantic lease sale states that the followPipeline networks, however, have not been

subject to stringent regulatory standards in

the United States in the past and pipeline

failures, with resulting oil discharges, have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico as well as other

offshore development regions. According to

the Coast Guard Pollution Incident Reporting

System data on oil spills in 1974, a major

source of discharge was from pipelines.

7 1-1$$ , ( ) - 7,, . ,?
Figure IV-22. Typical pipelaying barges similar to those which could be used in the Mid-Atlantic

Source Marine Engineering/Log
Regulatory authority for setting pipeline

design standards is now divided between the

Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the USGS

in the Department of the Interior. The OPS

standards apply to both offshore and onshore

p i pe 1 i n es w i t h o u t differentiation o r

allowances for special seafloor conditions or

stresses due to ocean installation.

OPS has proposed modifications to standards for offshore pipelines which are quite

detailed and firm but the proposed rules were

not in effect when the Mid-Atlantic lease sale

was held. The USGS has developed an OCS

order covering pipelines in existing areas such

as the Gulf of Mexico but has not developed a

similar order for the Baltimore Canyon

Trough. A memorandum of understanding

has been developed between OPS and USGS

concerning pipeline regulations, but the formal process of translating an agreement into

Federal regulations could take some months.

The memorandum sets out the responsibilities of each Department, basically giving

DOT responsibility for pipelines from a production platform to shore and giving Interior

responsibility for pipelines from the wells to

the production platform. The two Departments will coordinate inspection and enforcement activities and will jointly be responsible

for research, according to the agreement, and

at least once a year will jointly review all existing standards, regulations, and operating

practices concerning pipelines. (See figure

IV-23.)

Specific design standards, installation practice specifications, and scheduled tests and inspections could readily be adopted for

pipelines in the Mid-Atlantic region and in

other OCS regions based on existing

knowledge and technology. Such regulations

do not require detailed knowledge of the

regions or environmental conditions because

specifications normally establish standards

based on a formula which would accept a

range of inputs and include safety factors for a .

specific design.

Much new technology is available to assure

pipeline safety and could be incorporated in

regulations, in some cases without additional

research. Such technology includes:

●

●

●

●

Standards for coating pipelines with corrosion protection materials that have

been tested and proved to be effective

over long periods of time.

Standards for welding and inspecting

welds a n d specifications for pipe

materials and sizes including temperature

characteristics which could assure an initially sound line.

Procedures for installing and burying

pipe which would protect the line from

overstressing as water depths increase. 47

Pipeline inspection devices which could

be used regularly over the life of a

pipeline to detect any deterioration prior

to a possible leak.48 Some private firms

are now using these devices to inspect

offshore pipelines although few w i 11

make the inspection results public. As a

regulatory tool the Government C Ould

readily perform its own inspections with .

these devices.

Another element of the system that would

require particular attention is the placement of

pipelines at coastal landfalls. Most biologists

and other scientists agree that pipelines

should be routed to avoid marshlands, a

design that would be difficult to achieve along

the Delaware or New Jersey coast. If marshlands cannot be avoided, biologists argue for

‘‘minimum disruption o f such areas

although there is no accepted definition of

either “mini mum” or “disruption. “49

STORAGE TANKS

Oil coming ashore through pipelines probably would be stored temporarily in tank farms

to provide a means of regulating the flow of
— —

oil to refineries. Natural gas would be piped

ashore in separate pipelines to gas processing

plants that probably would be located near

tank farms.

The oil industry rule of thumb for such tank

farms is that they would be able to hold 10

days production of oil or gas. At the median

estimate of Baltimore Canyon Trough

resources, this would translate to five storage

tanks on about 50 acres of land which could be

located close to shore or well inland. For the

high recovery estimate, 75 acres would be required.

TANKERING

It is feasible and sometimes economical to

transport oil produced at offshore fields

directly to refineries by tankers rather than by

pipelines. The practicality of such a system depends on many variables such as distance

from the offshore field to the refinery, amount

of oil produced, cost of pipelines, status of

field development, number of wells and platforms producing, cost of offshore storage and

loading terminals, gas mixture, and pollution

potential. In the Gulf of Mexico all production

from offshore wells is transported by pipeline

Figure IV-23. Responsibility of Federal agencies for pipelines

MANIFOLD PLATFORM

N

PRODUCTION PLATFORM

Dehydrators, Scrubbers, Heater Treaters,

Separators & Other Production Equipment

I

I

Shoreline

+

i

:

1

! MANIFOLD PLATFORM I

!

1

:

I PRODUCTION PLATFORM

1

Compressor for 1

Regulated Scrubber or Separator \ \

by DOI \

‘ \

.

\ \

--- -

I

/

I Separators, Dehydrators,

. #

# Heater Treaters, Scrubbers & /

i

Other Production Equipment

Compressor or Pump Station

to be Regulated by DOT

— Pipelines Regulated by the Department of the Interior (DO I);

--- Pipelines Regulated by the Department of Transportation (DOT)

Source DOI/DOT Memorandum of Understanding
to refineries along the coast and inland. A major reason for this is that offshore production

has been a gradual extension of producing

areas on the coast and many wells are spread

overwide areas in relatively shallow water. In

some other major offshore producing areas

very large fields were discovered which

justified major pipelines. In other special

cases, such as some North Sea fields, it was

determined that offshore storage and tankering would be the best method of transporting

oil ashore at least for some initial period of

field development.

In the case of offshore New Jersey and

Delaware, the potential fields are a substantial

distance seaward (more than 80 miles) and

pipelines may not always be economically

justified, especially during initial development stages. It would be feasible to start producing into a storage tank and using tankers

to ship the oil ashore. Of course, if major gas

discoveries are made a pipeline would be required.

There are some advantages to tankering

nominal quantities of oil when compared to

the disruption that pipeline construction may

cause. It should be noted, however, that oil

pollution from tankers may not be as easily

controlled as that from pipelines.

Oil Spills

In all stages of OCS development, oil spills

are a major concern and pose the possibility of

major impacts.

RISK ASSESSMENT

The possibility of oil spills is usually

described in terms of risk probability. An

OTA oil spill risk assessment indicates that

there probably would be at least one major oil

spill during development of the Baltimore Canyon Trough.

OTA projects that it is unlikely that there

would be more than two spills of more than

24,000 barrels of crude oil each during the 30-

year life of the Baltimore Canyon Trough

field. The projection of oil spill risk assumes

the high recovery estimate of the USGS of 4.6

billion barrels.50 For a median recovery estimate of 1.8 billion barrels, oil spill risk figures

are roughly cut in half. (Only high and

dian recovery estimates were used in the

assess merit.)

This risk assessment concludes that

odds of an oil slick, even from a major spi

a Platform 50 miles offshore, reaching

merisk

the

11 at

the

New Jersey or Delaware shore would be onein-ten after the spill had occurred. If oil slicks

did reach Mid-Atlantic beaches, howeverr

they could hit any point along the coastline.

Vague and general as these conclusions are,

they represent the outer limits of judgments

that can be made in view of such variables as

wind force and direction, wave action, ocean

currents, and size and location of a spill. 51

This estimate of the range of probable

oilspills as a result of Baltimore Canyon

Trough development activities has been made

based on statistics from offshore oil operations over the past 10 years, principally in the

Gulf of Mexico. The greatest volume of oil has

come from a small number of major spills.

None of these offshore spills to date has been

contained and cleaned up on site. OTA’s estimate of a probable range of large oil spills,

given OCS development follows the high

recovery scenario, is from 5,000 to 860,000

barrels resulting from 1 to 40 spill incidents,

with the most likely amount being 140,000

barrels and 18 spill incidents. 52

Should a major oil spill occur during MidAtlantic OCS operations it is doubtful that the

spill would be cleaned up. Depending on the

season, the size of spill, and prevailing cond i -

tions, the shoreline could be severely impacted. An independent study conducted for

OTA by the Coast Guard, indicated that during a stagnant summer high pressure system,

the probability of an oil spill from OCS sites

reaching the shore is very high. 53 On the
other hand, a Chevron representative at the

January 1976 Atlantic City EIS hearings stated

that “we believe that there is no chance of oil

reaching shore from the proposed (Baltimore

Canyon Trough) OCS lease area. ”54

it has been pointed out by local officials in

the States that if an oil spill were to reach the

coast during a tourist season, the affected area

could lose an entire season receipts.55

Economic losses would be sustained not only

by those whose property was directly

damaged by oil but also by those who depend

for income on the seasonal tourist industry.

These could include owners and employees of

hotels, restaurants, charter boat operations,

and other tourist -oriented activities.

Commercial fishermen also could be adversly affected—in the short run as a result of

fish kills or contain i nation and in the long run

if damage to spawning and feeding grounds

were to reduce the yield. The surf clam industry, which is economically important to New

Jersey, would be vulnerable to oil spill damage.

Severe oil spills can cause major damage to

marshlands if the spill reaches inshore, to

waterfowl if large quantities of oil reach their

habitat, to bottom-dwelling marine life if

quantities sink and smother them, and to most

fish, plants, and other biota if the concentration is high enough. What is not known and

cannot be measured at this time is the severity

of damage related to amounts and concentrations, the effects on the food web and ultimate

consumer and the long-term effects of chronic

discharges. Also unknown are many specific

environmental conditions of each OCS region

which may affect the dispersion, trajectory,

chemical corn posit ion, and ultimate fate of

any spill, Environmentalists argue that with

so many unknowns, coupled with potential

dangers, all efforts should be directed toward

preventing o i1 spills whenever technically

possible. 57

OIL SPILL REGULATION

At the same t i me, however, Federal

regulatory agencies, principally USGS, do not

appear to employ the best available system for

establishing standards and enforcing regulations dealing with oil spill prevention and

cleanup. Recommendations contained in a

GAO report of June 1973 covered the need for

trained inspectors, improved inspection

systems and standards for enforcement.

Although USGS has advised Congress that it

is proceeding with programs to meet the criticisms, no detailed descriptions of changes in

procedure has been published.

The Federal Government, principally

through agencies such as the Coast Guard and

the EPA, has invested substantial resources in

the research and development of oil spill surveillance, containment, and cleanup systems.

Many of the more advanced systems have

been produced and are available in the Coast

Guard inventory. These include airborne oil

spill detection systems which can locate and

“fingerprint” discharges as well as high-seas

spill containment and recovery equipment. 58

But the Coast Guard has no statutory

authority over oil and gas development activities on the OCS. The Department of the Interior, through USGS, regulates OCS development and has a memorandum of understanding with the Coast Guard which provides that

a Coast Guard coordinator will be available in

the area for emergencies.

Mid-Atlantic OCS Order No. 7, the pollution and waste control order which was

published in the Federal Register on July 12,

1976, places most of the responsibility for oil

spill control and removal with the USGS. According to the order, “The primary jurisdiction to require corrective action to abate the

source of pollution and to enforce the subsequent cleanup by the lessee or operator shall

remain with the (USGS) Area Supervisor pursuant to the provisions of this Order and the

memorandum of understanding between the

Department of Transportation (U.S. Coast

Guard) and the Department of the Interior
(U.S. Geological Survey) dated August 16,

.

1971. ”

According to Coast Guard instructions for

implementing that memorandum of understanding, USGS has primary responsibility in

any areas leased under the provisions of the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in recognition of USGS expertise with respect to abatement of the source of pollution at an offshore

facility,

The instructions add, however, that the

provisions of the memorandum of understanding will prevail only as long as removal of

the pollutant is accomplished to the satisfaction of the Coast Guard on-scene coordinator.

If cleanup is not satisfactory to the Coast

Guard, the on-scene coordinator may take

over under provisions of the National Oil

Spill Contingency Plan.

In implementing its responsibilities, the

USGS holds private offshore operators

responsible for oil spill cleanup but has no

check system to review the adequacy of the

cleanup equipment available to operators. 59

OCS Order No. 7 requires only that operators

inspect their own equipment regularly.

Offshore cleanup is particularly troublesome

because even the most advanced systems will

perform only about 50 percent of the time in

rough waters of the OCS.

The Coast Guard is responsible for a National Contingency Plan and has available a

strike force for spill cleanup from any source.

It appears that the Coast Guard would step in

to clean up a spill in the Mid-Atlantic only

after all other efforts failed.

On its own, the offshore oil industry apparently has developed a good safety record

with regard to oil spill accidents, especially

since the Santa Barbara spill in 1969. -

Some oil companies have formed associa -

tions in active OCS regions for the purpose of

providing oil spill cleanup systems and manpower. These are voluntary groups which are

not required to use advanced technology

which has been developed by the Coast

Guard.

Sixteen oil companies interested in leasing

tracts in the Mid-Atlantic have formed Clean

Atlantic Associates and committed $1 million

to purchase cleanup and containment equipment and to inventory existing equipment and

expertise which could be used to supplement

the group’s resources.

By July, Clean Atlantic had named Haliburton as contractor for its cleanup operations

and had contracted with Raytheon Corp. for

studies to map coastal areas of unusual sen -

sitivity, identify the bird population, and

draw up a plan of action to be followed in the

event of Mid-Atlantic spills.

Although a base of operations had not yet

been formally chosen, O.J. Shirley, chairman

of the group, said equipment and manpower

would probably be located at Davisville , R.I.,

and at one o f the oil company support bases

which are expected to be located in either New

Jersey or Delaware. .

According to Shirley, Clean Atlantic would

be procuring equipment throughout the summer and expected to be operational before ex -

ploratory drilling begins in the Mid- Atlantic.

If commercial discoveries of oil are found, he

said, additional gear may be purchasd.

Shirley has testified at hearings on the final

EIS for the Mid-Atlantic sale that under normal conditions Clean Atlantic equipment

could be operational at a spill site as far as 125

miles from its shore base within 12 hours.

POLLUTION RESEARCH

The OTA oil spill risk assessment also con -

eludes that no less than 85,000 barrels of oil

and no more than 1 million barrels of o i 1

would be spilled as a total of major- platform

or pipeline accidents, chronic discharge of oil

from platforms, and inevitable leakage from
1 ’

Figure IV-24. Clean Atlantic Associates initial equipment stockpiles

—.—.—.—- . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . .- .—. . --- - . . . . . .$

Item Number

OPEN SEAS

Fast Response Open Seas &

Bay Skimmer Systems 2

Mini-Fast Response Units 2

Open Seas Containment Boom 2000 Ft.

Vikoma Sea Pack

(1600 Ft. Open Seas Boom) 1

NEARSHORE/lNLAND

Helicopter Spray Units 2

Boat Spray Units 3

Dispersant 50 Drums

Collection Agent 10 Drums

BEACH PROTECTION & AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT

Communication System 1

Automatic Propane Guns

(Bird Scarers) Set of 12 2

..- . . .

Figure IV-25. Partial listing of presently available equipment in mid-Atlantic area

Source Clean Atlantic Associates

Source Clean Atlantic Associates

pipelines over the 30-year life of a field. All

estimates were the result of a statistical extrapolation of experience in the Gulf of Mexico

and may not apply in the Mid-Atlantic if improvements in pollution control equipment

and procedures should occur before the

development of this potential offshore oil

field.

Oil companies state that the low-level discharge of hydrocarbons which result from

chronic or routine discharges do not have a

detrimental effect on the marine environment

or the marine biota.60

The oil industry has sponsored a significant

amount of research into the effects of oil

pollution, including a study of the effects of oil

operations on the marine environment off the

Louisiana coast by the Gulf Universities

Research Consortium. 61 In addition, the

.

Item

CONTAINMENT BOOMS

Small (18” & Under)

Large (19’’-36”)

Extra Large (Over 36”)

SKIMMING APPARATUS

Self-Propelled

Self-Powered & Other

OTHER EQUIPMENT

Vacuum Barges

Vacuum Trucks

Pumps

Boats (Over 15 Ft.)

Sorbents (Pillows &

(Boom)

Storage

Available t

1

62,600 Ft. 1

28,000 Ft. I

4,200 Ft. ~

f

i

1 $

141

~

4 ~

*

28+

161 + /

I

93 i4

Bags) 35,000 i

10,000 Ft.

32+ Million i

;

Gallons i

\

Ocean Going Barges 50 ●

Automat ic Propane Guns f

(Bird Scarers) 12 ~ Bird Rehabilitation Units 2

>

Earth Moving Equipment Readily Available ~

- . . . .- — . . . . , . .— .

American Petroleum Institute, EPA, and USGS

sponsor regular conferences on prevention

and control of oil pollution at which many

reports on research efforts are presented.62

There appears to be no equivalent coordination of pollution research efforts among

Federal agencies which share responsibility

for OCS management.

The Report to Congress of the Secretary of

Commerce on Ocean Pollution is one of the

few examples of a coordinating effort.63 The

report describes oil pollution research efforts

by the National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of

Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Geological Survey, the National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

and others.

The Coast Guard has recently evaluated its
Source Clean Gulf Associates

Marine Environmental Protection (MEP)

program which principally addresses oil

pollution other than that related to OCS

operations but which can serve as an example

of analysis of causes and effects of spills. In

this evaluation it is stated that oil explora -

tion/production operations contributed only a

million gallons out of the 15-million-gallon

total discharges into U.S. waters during 1974.

(See figure IV-27.) It is also stated that “the

documented direct cost to society of all oil

pollution incidents (from all sources) in the

United States is about $50 million a year or in

excess of $4,500 per incident. The estimate is

undoubtedly low since it includes only the

costs of cleanup and the value of the product

discharged. ”

Processing and Refining and Their Impacts

Discovery of oil offshore would not

necessarily y lead to the construction of new

refinery capacity to process that oil. Because

refinery construction and expansion decisions

probably would depend more on regional demand than on local availability of crude oil

supplies, it is likely that OCS oil would be

processed in existing or expanded refineries

and would replace higher priced crude from

foreign sources by an equivalent amount.

Throughput for refineries located in eastern

Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware is

projected to total 1.87 million barrels per day

in 1985 compared with the current

throughput of more than 1 million barrels per
Figure IV-27. Oil Spills in U.S. waters ranked by operation, calendar year 1974

i

j

I

Vehicle, Pipeline

Transport

Vessel Underway

Vessel Facility

Oil Transfer Operation

Unknown Operation

Natural Resources

Exploration/Production

Vessel Mooring,

Anchoring

Industrial Operations

Other Facility

Operation

Vessel, Facility

Fueling

Other Vessel

Operation

Vessel Maintenance

Other Non Transportation

Related Operations

5,959,403

2,554,443

2,308,101

2,265,801

989,369

385,487

290,643

275,583

113,037

47,104

36,658

34,130

38.9

16.7

15.1

14.8

6.5

2.3

1.9

1.8

0.8

0.3

0.3

0.2

*

Source U S Coast Guard, “Marine Environmental ProtectIon Program Evaluation of MissIon Per formance, ” August 1975

day. Since this projected throughput exceeds

the most optimistic estimate of peak Baltimore

Canyon Trough oil production of 650,000 barrels per day by more than 1.2 million barrels

per day, OCS crude could be processed in

these refineries without further expansion.

If the rate of growth of existing markets for

products of existing refineries in the New

Jersey and Delaware areas were the controlling factor in decisions about building new

refineries, then the demand could be handled

by expansion of refineries already in place in

the region. Refineries in the area now have a

capacity of 1.3 million barrels of crude oil per

day which could be nearly doubled without

need for additional land. It is not clear,

however, that growth in existing markets

would be the controlling factor. For example,

an oil company that had no regional refinery

capacity might discover a significant deposit

of OCS oil and choose to build a new refinery

in the area to process it. Or, oil discovered in

the Georges Bank area to the north could be

tankered to the Mid-Atlantic refineries and

lead to pressure for new construction.

If significant amounts of natural gas are

found, the gas would be piped to processing

plants where methane (the key ingredient of

commercial natural gas) would be separated

from ethane (which is used as a petrochemical

feedstock) and other compounds. After treatment, natural gas would flow into gas distribution systems.

Gas processing plants would require about

100 acres of land each. For the high recovery

estimate, seven plants and 700 acres would be

required.

AIR QUALITY

The primary source of onshore air and

water impacts (other than oil spills) associated

with offshore oil and gas development would

be new refinery capacity, if any refineries

were built as a direct result of offshore discoveries. Analysis shows that the most important

air quality impacts would result from hydrocarbon emissions while the most important water impacts would result from thermal

pollution and from demands on regional

water supplies.

Analysis of existing air quality in the study

region indicates that environmental standards

may be a significant constraint on either new

or expanded refinery capacity. Under current

regulations, these facilities are required to

conform to the most stringent limits for each

pollutant set by two basic types of standards

imposed by Federal and State governments.

Effluents emitted by each facility must meet

certain quantitative standards with regard to

pollutant content and, in addition, the ambient air quality must not be degraded below

specific standards for the area by additional

pollutant discharges.

Analysis indicates that in the study region
the refinery pollutants of primary concern are

nonmethane hydrocarbons, which react with

nitrogen oxides in the presence of sun] ight to

form photochemical oxidant, an irritating secondary pollutant. It is estimated that a

250,000-barrel-per-day refinery emits about

40 tons of hydrocarbons per day (or 14,600

tons per year), of w’h ich 80 percent or more

can contribute to the production of oxidants.

The area of study is, for the most part, at or

o\’er the oxidant and nonmethane hydrocarbon air quality standards. With any additional

hydrocarbons from a new petroleum refinery

or additional expansion of existing refineries,

the air quality situation most likely would get

worse. E\~en w~ithout the added pollutants, the

New Jersc}~, NWV York, Connecticut, and

Metropolitan Philadelphia Air Quality Control Regions total hydrocarbon emissions exceed air qual it)’ standards. In the first area, a

reduction from 1971 le\’els of 67 percent, or

287,000 tons pm year, is required. Therefore, if

there is an air quality constraint on possible

new or expanded refineries in the area, it

would in~’ol L’e hydrocarbon emissions from

refineries and tank farms.

WATER QUALITY

Analysis suggests that the concentration of

waterborne pollutants from a new 250,000 -

barrel-per-day refinery effluent are relatively

small and probably would not detrimentally

affect the water quality of a receiving stream.

The primary potential problem involves thermal impacts. The Delaware Bay and Newark

Bay areas are both \’ery close to the maximum

permissible thermal load. Refinery cooling

water would have some impact on these areas

but technological alternatives such as the use

of cooling towers could alleviate some of these

problems.

As to water a\~ailability within the study

area, potential problems could exist. If the

various water supply regions with in New

Jerse}~ are looked at in isolation and if the .

water demand increases up to 2,500 m i 11 ion

gallons a day in northeastern New’ Jersey, a

supp] y deficit cou Id result. H o~’m’er, i f the

total region including the H LIdson and

Delaware Rivers is considered, the o\erall

supply of water is more than adequate to meet

projected demands. Ample potential supplies

of w’ater exist but control over the distribution

system is fragmented and funds are not

a va i 1 a b 1 e t o expand the s yst w-n t o t a kc> a d \’ a n -

tage of a\~ailable supplies. Wat~~r frt~nl ne}~~

sources wou]d require the construction of

transrn ission systems and water control

facilities such as dams, may encounter considerable opposition.

Effects on Regional Energy Prices

Dramatic changes in regional encrg?~ prices

are not expected as a result of OCS dmzelop -

ment. However, While nO absol LltL? price

decreases are expected, the area recei~ing OCS

oil and gas may have lower energv prices rclf7-

tivc to some other regions which may pay pre -

m iums for higher transportation costs.

Another factor would invol\~e futur-e policies

on oil and gas price control s.(’~

The expected effects of natural gas disco\-

eries in the Baltimore Can}’(~n Trough on

regional natural gas prices are highly dependent on assumptions concerning deregulation.

In the case of complete deregulation, sales of

intrastate gas in the CL]] f Coast area su~gcst

that prices of OCS gas wou]d tt>nd to fo] lo~~r

the price of oil on a dollar-per-million Btu’s

basis, regardless of production costs. In the

case of continued regu Iat ion, ani’ price effects

would depend on possible pass-through of

relati\~e cost savings resulting frt~m red LIcecl

transportation costs compared to gas from the

Gulf Coast, However, since transportation

costs are a relatively small share of the

delivered price of gas in the northeast, the

possibility]’ of offsetting increases in prociuction costs makes large cost savings (relative to

Gulf Coast gas) and price decreases unlikely.

Increasing curtailments of natural gas mean

that increased a\’ailabil ity of this clean-burn-
ing premium fuel from the OCS would be of Fourth, the cost of producing Mid-Atlantic

greater importance than price savings to con- oil may be quite high, and

sumers. To the extent that deregulation is less

than complete by the time that gas production

begins from the Baltimore Canyon Trough,

greater use of natural gas in lieu of higher

priced oil would represent a cost savings to

users due to a change in mix of fuel types.

Predictions of the effects of OCS oil discoveries on regional energy prices are more uncertain than for natural gas,

First, as is the case with natural gas,

deregulation could have a major impact on

the price of domestic oil.

Second, even under the high recovery

assumptions, large quantities of imports will

still be used in the region,

Third, OCS oil probably will tend toward a

market price which is set by OPEC-controlled

imports.

Finally, even if there were savings in costs,

there would be little incentive to cut prices in

order to achieve a larger share of a market

because demand for secure sources of oil is

greater than supply.

With this degree of uncertainty, any prediction of prices is necessarily contingent on

assumptions concerning the future strength of

the OPEC cartel and U.S. price controls.

Decommissioning

When production from a platform dropped

after 15 to 30 years to levels that no longer

justified its operation, the platform would be

decommissioned. As the Baltimore Canyon

Trough field became depleted, all platforms

would be removed, pipelines would be abandoned, and tank farms and gas processing

plants would be dismantled.65
The Possibility of Deepwater Ports in the Mid-Atlantic

THE NEED FOR DEEPWATER PORTS

U.S. imports of crude oil nearly trebled between 1950 and 1970, reaching 1.3 million

barrels a day just as domestic production

began a steady decline from a peak of 11.2

million barrels per day of oil and natural gas

liquids. (See figure IV-28.) To fill the increasing gap between demand and domestic supply, imports soared to 6 million barrels of

crude and refined product between 1970 and

1973. Similar increases in oil imports took

place in all industrial nations.

With the world oil industry seeking to cut

the costs of moving increasing amounts of oil

from producers to consumers, tankers grew in

Figure IV-28. U.S. oil supplies 1950/74

MILLION TONS

PER YEAR

750

500

250

350 1955 1980 1965 1970 1974

REFINED PRODUCTS IMPORTS

OVERSEAS CRUDE OIL IMPORTS

CANADIAN CRUDE OIL IMPORTS

.,

. c. * DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION

Source Brltk3h Petroleum Statlst!cal Rewew of the World 011 Industry

size through the 1950’s and 1960’s. Supertankers now in service range from 100,000 to

500,000 deadweight tons (dwt), which is a

measure of their cargo capacity. Supertankers

are among the largest ships afloat. Their cost

advantage is demonstrated by comparison between a 250,000-dwt tanker and a 50,000-dwt

tanker, which in the early 1950’s was itself

considered huge. Tankers of 50,000 dwt, a size

that normally serves New York Harbor and

Delaware Bay, average 750 feet in length, 100

feet in width, and 40 feet in draft. An average

supertanker of 250,000 dwt is 1,100 feet long

and draws 70 feet of water but it can carry five

times as much oil as a 50,000-dwt tanker at

about half the cost-per-barrel over long trade

routes. 1 By 1976, supertankers of all sizes

represented 55 percent of the world tanker

capacity. 2

The growing dependence on super-tankers

in the world distribution system in the 1960’s

prompted Federal officials and oil industry

executives to press for deepwater ports in U.S.

waters to handle this country’s fast-growing

imports.

Today only three U.S. ports can accommodate tankers of more than 100,000 dwt-Los

Angeles, Long Beach, and Puget Sound. ? There

are no deepwater ports in the Mid-Atlantic

area where nearly all crude oil is imported by

tanker, a degree of dependence on imported

oil which is unique in the United States. (See

figure IV-29.) Tankers presently deliver more

than 1.2 million barrels of crude daily from

the Middle East, Africa, and South America to

nine Mid-Atlantic refineries.

The nine Mid -Atlantic refineries are

clustered in two locations. (See figures IV-30

and 31. ) More than two-thirds of the capacity

is in Delaware and New Jersey where tankers
Under 50,000 Tons 50,000-75,000 Tons

San Francisco Boston

New York

Delaware Bay

Baltimore

Norfolk

Houston

Galveston

Source Office of Technology Assessment

must sail up the Delaware Bay and into the

Delaware River to discharge their cargo. The

other one-third of the capacity is in northern

New Jersey near New York Harbor. Loaded

tankers of more than 55,000 dwt—far smaller

than supertanker class-draw too much water

to reach the oil terminals at either location

without being lightered. The controlling depth

of the Delaware River channel is 40 feet. A

fully loaded 100,000-dwt tanker requires 50

feet; the largest supertankers (480,000 dwt)

require at least 100 feet of channel depth.

Supertankers up to 150,000 dwt now anchor

inside Delaware Bay, off Big Stone Beach, Del.,

and just outside of New York Harbor, to

pump their oil into barges for final delivery to

75,000-100,000 Tons 100,000-150,000 Tons

Los Angeles Long Beach

Portland, Maine Puget Sound

the refineries. Tankers can lighter their entire

cargo, or when enough oil has been

“lightered” to allow a tanker to ride higher in

the water, the ship can proceed to a refinery

terminal to discharge the remaining cargo.

In 1975, oil from 429 tankers was lightered

to 1,055 barges in the Delaware Bay

anchorage. Spillage reports on this lightering

operation, run by Interstate Oil Transport Co.

of Philadelphia, indicate it is exceptionally

clean and free of accidents that lead to pollution. Officials of the lightening firm claim the

operation was responsible for only 5 gallons

of oil spilled into the bay during 1975. J This is

not, however, an adequate measure of the
Figure IV-30. Major U.S. refining centers

1.3 MM BID

1.8 MM B/D

(

Refining Centers

Source Office of Technology Assessment

risks of the present system because lightening

operations force a substantial increase in

barge and small tanker traffic, and these

vessels themselves often are responsible for

serious polluting accidents in world harbors. s

One comparison of the lightening system

with a deepwater port system was provided

by the president of the Philadelphia Maritime

Exchange several years ago during testimony

before the Delaware General Assembly:

“On April 28, 1974,” he said, “the largest

tanker ever to enter the Delaware Bay,

the 191,000-dwt Japanese tanker

Yasutama Maru, arrived at the Big Stone

Beach tanker anchorage and lightered her

entire cargo of crude oil—1,283,865 barLOOP

rels—using a small ship and barges to

transport the oil upriver. The vessel

sailed out of the bay in ballast on May 10,

During the oil transfer operation, while

in the bay, 15 separate lightening operations were needed. This involved a

25,000-dwt tanker which made 4 trips

from the anchorage to the upriver refinery plus 11 barge voyages to and from

Big Stone Beach anchorage. How much

better and safer this could have been

handled under the controlled conditions

of a deepwater port which would permit

a tanker to tie up to a platform, transferring its cargo into a pipeline, in a single

operation, moving the oil via the pipeline

direct to the refinery. ”
i ’

Figure IV-31. Mid-Atlantic refinery capacity as of January 1, 1973

. .

a

a

I

r

.

,

I

Source Office of Technology Assessment and EXXON Corporation
In 1973, tankers brought 870,000 barrels of

crude oil a day to Delaware River ports and

410,000 barrels per day into New York Harbor. 6 The combination of increasing demand

and dwindling domestic production in the

early 1970’s led the oil industry to plan new

Mid-Atlantic refineries to be supplied by

foreign crude. At that time, it appeared that

crude oil demands could be met with

relatively cheap and virtually unlimited supplies from the Middle East. (See figure IV-32.)

Several studies commissioned by the

Federal Government and by private industry

between 1968 and 1973 reached the general

conclusions that:7

● Increasing volumes of oil shipped to the

United States over the next 10 to 25 years

would be carried by supertankers.

●

●

●

●

●

! ,

,. ,

Most of the crude imported by the United

States would be shipped from the Middle

East and Africa.

The United States had a choice of installing deepwater ports to handle imports

directly or relying on transshipment in

smaller tankers from deepwater ports in

Canada and the Caribbean.

Transshipment would be more expensive

than direct delivery of crude oil in supertankers to Mid-Atlantic deepwater ports.

The economic and environmental costs of

dredging existing channels in the MidAtlantic harbors to enable supertankers

to reach existing dock facilities probably

would rule out such an approach.

Deepwater ports could be built in New

England, the Mid-Atlantic, the South

Figure IV-32. Oceanborne crude petroleum to the United States— 1969 (millions of barrels per year)

I

~

o Imports

Source Executive Summary, “Offshore Terminal System Concepts, ” Maritime Administration

7fl -188 0 - 76 - 13
Atlantic or the Gulf of Mexico without

modifying the technology already in use

in deepwater ports off the shores of other

industrial nations.

. The need was greatest in the Mid-Atlantic region.

In the early 1970’s, industry and Government sources talked of moving 2 million barrels of crude a day into Delaware River ports,

which would mean an average of five arrivals

each day of 55,000-dwt tankers, the largest

ships that could navigate the Delaware River

channels. If the crude came in one 200,000 dwt

to 250,000 dwt, it would require lightening

into 15 smaller vessels or into a deepwater

port.

Many studies between 1970 and 1973

stressed the economic advantages of deepwater ports for the Mid-Atlantic. In general,

they concluded that it would cost less to ship

oil from Africa or the Persian Gulf to east

coast refineries with supertankers and deepwater ports than with the existing system. A

range of sites and systems were proposed.

Savings, when compared to such alternatives

as transshipping thru Caribbean ports, were

estimated to be 5–15 cents per barrel (less

than one-third-of-a-cent per gallon).8 While

this is a small unit cost, it translates to major

savings for a transport system carrying nearly

half-a-billion barrels per year to the east

coast—between $75 million and $225 million

a year.
DEEPWATER PORT PROPOSALS

Studies sponsored by Government and industry in the 1960’s and 1970’s produced a

variety of approaches to construction of deepwater ports at specific locations on the east

coast and in the Gulf of Mexico. All of the

studies drew on experiences abroad, where

deepwater ports were developed in the 1960’s,

principally to handle supertankers in the Persian Gulf-to-Europe and the Persian Gulf-toJapan trade. More than 100 such ports are in

use today, as shown in figure IV-33.

The kind of deepwater ports contemplated

for various locations around the United States

will have their principal use as terminals for

very large tankers carrying crude oil to major

refining centers from distant major producing

fields such as the Persian Gulf.

Other products also can be or are proposed

to be transported through offshore terminals,

including ore slurries, but most of those are

very special situations.

Deepwater ports are not usually justified

for transferring refined products because

smaller tankers are used to carry refined products, the products are widely distributed

through small, scattered terminals, and the

present transport system is geared to the use

of the smaller tankers within existing harbors

and waterways.

A study for the U.S. Maritime Administration by Soros Associates Inc. in 1972, concluded that a 500-acre artificial island could be

built inside Delaware Bay off the southern tip

of New Jersey, creating a port that would handle 6 million barrels of crude per day. The port

would have berths for six supertankers.

Storage tanks would be located on the island

with the port.

A study for the Council on Environmental

Quality, prepared by Arthur D. Little Inc. in

1973, pictured a port in the Delaware Bay area

transferring about 6.6 million barrels per day

to new refineries in Cumberland and Cape

May Counties of New Jersey. The report said

that 14 square miles of the counties—which

now are devoted to farming and resort activities—would be required for at least 9 new

refineries and 13 new petrochemical plants.

As a result of the port and associated industries, the two counties would become “a new

industrial center” with employment doubling

to 300,000 workers by the year 2000, the

report said.

Industry’s own private studies resulted in

proposals for deepwater ports in the Atlantic

off Long Branch, N.J., and in the Delaware

Bay.

The Delaware Bay site was proposed by a

consortium of oil companies which own refineries along the Delaware River.

The consortium, the Delaware Bay

Transportation Co., purchased 1,800 acres of

coastal land in Kent County, Del., for storage

tanks, landside headquarters, and a supply

base for the deepwater port. The companies

planned to build their port 5 miles offshore

but inside the bay. (See figure IV-34.) They

planned a sea pier which could berth three

super tankers of up to 250,000 dwt

simultaneously and transfer crude oil into

pipelines running first underwater to the tank

farm and then overland to upriver refineries.

The port capacity was to be 2 million barrels

per day, an amount the consortium concluded

would satisfy the needs of existing refineries

(with expansion that was then planned) and

one new refinery (which was then planned by

Shell Oil Co.). The proposed port was to use a

natural deepwater channel into the bay and

require only “minimal” dredging to maintain

a draft of 70 feet along the approaches to the
Figure IV-33. Worldwide single-point mooring installations—1 973

11,

/ ‘i

r

South Atlantic Ocean

port and at the port itself. In the late 1960’s,

planners projected that construction would

cost $193 million.9

Local opposition to the Delaware Bay port

was strong. In 1971, Delaware’s General

Assembly approved one of the Nation’s

strongest pieces of land use and environmental legislation, the Delaware Coastal Zone Act,

which prohibited the construction of any new

heavy industry—including refineries, tank

I

i ---- -

Number of Ports

1960 1965 1970 1975

GROWTH OF DEEPWATER PORTS

WORLDWIDE

.-. .

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment

farms, pipelines, and bulk offshore unloading

terminals—in the coastal area. Almost immediately after passage of the law, a campaign

was organized to have the law repealed or

amended. To date, those efforts have been unsuccessful.

Before the 1973 Arab oil embargo, EXXON

Corp. gave serious consideration to a deepwater port in 110 feet of water some 13 miles

off the coast of Long Branch, N.J. (See figure
Figure IV-34. Proposed deepwater port site in Delaware Bay.

I

I

I

I

Source Of f(ce of Technology Assessment and Energy 011 and the State of Delaware
Figure IV-35. Deepwater port site offshore northern New Jersey, proposed by EXXON in 1973

I I

I

I

I

I

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment and EXXON Corp.
IV-35.) The proposal no longer is an active

plan. EXXON has chosen to expand its Baytown, Tex., refinery rather than its Bayway,

N.J., refinery. Total refining capacity in northern New Jersey now is about 500,000 barrels,

less than half of the capacity that one EXXON

official said would be required to support a

northern New Jersey deepwater port.

New Jersey residents, particularly in the

south, opposed construction of deepwater

ports off the southern shore and the massive

industrialization which the Little study indicated might result. In 1973, the New Jersey

Legislature declined to pass a formal ban on

deepwater ports and related development,

and instead made each energy facility proposed for the coastal area subject to individual

review. The former Governor, Thomas Cahill,

declared himself strongly opposed to plans for

a deepwater port that would industrialize

rural counties. The present Governor, Bren -

dan Byrne, has taken a similar public position. 10

Consortia of oil and petrochemical companies also proposed two deepwater port proj -

ects in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of

Texas and Louisiana. Both projects are still active. (See figure IV-36.)

Figure IV-36. LOOP and Seadock deepwater port sites in the Gulf of Mexico

● ● Dallas

Fort Worth ● Shreveport ,1 *

‘\

. \

\

-/. )

‘r .

%

●

●

\ \

Venice

Morgan City

Head of ;

o

Passes

LOOP

Gulf of Mexico

Coastal Zon e

o

Terminal Sites under Study

Source Arthur D Little, Inc
Seadock, the Texas terminal, was planned

by a company made up of nine oil and chemical firms with plants in the area. They propose

a port of three monobuoys anchored in 100

feet of water 26 miles off Freeport. Capacity

will be 2,5 million barrels of oil per day by

1980 with an ultimate expansion capacity to 4

million barrels per day. The port plan also includes offshore pumping stations which will

move crude oil at the rate of 125,000 barrels

an hour from the monobuoys to inland refineries. In 1976, the cost of the system is estimated at $659 million.11

LOOP (Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, Inc.)

plans a monobuoy port located in 100 feet of

water 19 miles off the Louisiana coast. The

port will start operation with a capacity of 1.4

million barrels a day and expand to a capacity

of 3.4 million barrels a day by the year 2000.

Cost of the LOOP system is put at $348

million for the early phase and $800 million

It has been suggested that offshore deepwater ports could be utilized for mooring

supertankers while offloading cargo into

smaller tankers or barges for transport to

refineries rather than through pipelines, as is

a more common plan. It would be feasible to

operate such a monobuoy lightening port and

some advantages could be expected, such as

employment of more small tankers and barges

and a more flexible distribution to a variety of

refinery locations.

The chief disadvantage is that the use of

more small tankers and barges increases the

risk of pollution.

It appears that industry plans for deepwater

ports do not presently contemplate using the

lightening system; however, offshore lightening has been used in the past and is part of a

major project to supply the new 200,000-barrel-per-day “EcOS” refinery in Louisiana for

for the expanded version. 12 the next 3 years. The plan is to offload superFigure IV-37. LOOP deepwater port layout

TERMINAL

.

IAN I FOLD TO REFINERIES

LARGE DIAMETER SUBMARINE PIPELINE

PIPELINE PIPELINE

Source “Louisiana Offshore 011 Port, ” LOOP, Inc , New Orleans, Louisiana
tankers into smaller tankers of about 90,000

dwt while underway offshore. This system

will be utilized until the LOOP deepwater

port is ready to handle the oil.13

Faced with a growing number of specific

proposals for deepwater ports, Congress

enacted the Deepwater Port Act of 1974. The

Act requires that the Secretary of Transportation license all ports located in Federal waters

and that the Coast Guard write and enforce

regulations for the construction and operation

of the ports. Comprehensive Coast Guard

regulations were published in the Federal

Register on Nov. 10, 1975,11 along with proposed guidelines for developing design criteria for specific sites, guidelines for sitespecific environmental impact statements, and

guidelines for detailed operating procedures.

The Coast Guard is pursuing several

research programs to develop design criteria

on which to evaluate future port construction

and operations. The principal concerns, which

will receive priority research and development attention, are in the areas of oil spill

prohibits obstructions to navigation and

dredging in navigable waters without a permit

from the Corps, and section 404 of the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, which

requires a permit before dredged material can

be deposited in navigable waters.

The Corps of Engineers is not bound by the

Deepwater Port Act. It may issue permits on

the basis of its own judgment of an applicant’s

design without regard to Coast Guard regulations for deepwater ports beyond the 3-mile

limit. By the same token, the Corps could require ports under its jurisdiction to comply

with construction and operation regulations

promulgated under the Deepwater Port Act.

One port in local waters recently has been

approved by the Corps. Permits for that port,

a monobuoy facility to be located about 2

miles off the south coast of St. Croix in

Canegarden Bay in water depths of 200 to 230

feet, were issued to the Virgin Islands Refinery Corp. on June 18. Construction of the port

will begin immediately and completion is expected within 3 years.

response systems, oil spill consequences, in- The absence of any required coordination

spection methods, and procedures. It appears between the Corps and Transportation’s

that the Coast Guard approach to regulations Deepwater Ports Office could lead to

and further research to improve regulations is problems in the future because there is no

reasonable and should provide for future con- guarantee that ports in local waters would

tangencies. meet minimum safety and environmental

.

Seadock and LOOP have both applied for standards set at the Federal level to protect the

licenses under the Deepwater Port Act. The national interest and the interests of States

Delaware Bay Transportation Co. would not other than the host State.

need a license under the act because its proposed port is located in the State waters controlled by Delaware.

Deepwater ports in local waters require no

license from the Transportation Department

under the Deepwater Port Act, but they do require permits from the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers.

The Corps’ jurisdiction over nearshore

deepwater ports originates in two laws—the

Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which

The Corps’ Jacksonville division, which

issued the permits for the Virgin Islands port,

coordinated its activities with Transportation

only by sending a public notice of the application to the Coast Guard and by contacting the

Coast Guard on the environmental impact

statement. The Jacksonville office also asked

the Coast Guard to develop a vessel movement control system for the port, but made no

effort to apply Federal safety or equipment

standards to the port before approval of the

permit.15
Presently another nearshore application is tion of the ports will be useful in determining

pending in the Virgin Islands, and at least two whether closer coordination of Corps and

other ports in State waters are in early plan- Transportation procedures and regulations is

ning stages elsewhere off the east coast. These needed.

applications and the construction and operaSTATUS OF NEW JERSEY AND DELAWARE PLANS

A deepwater port probably will not be built

to serve the Mid-Atlantic States during the

next 10 years.

The Arab oil embargo and the cloud it

placed over the reliability of imports was a

major factor in the oil industry’s decision to

postpone deepwater port development. But it

is only one of several factors, including State

policies to discourage new refineries, Federal

air quality regulations, which have the same

effect, and sharply inflated construction costs.

Another major factor is the oil industry’s decision, faced with growing opposition to refineries and encouraged by Federal tax policies

and import quotas, to develop an alternate

system for supplying Mid-Atlantic oil products from Caribbean and Gulf Coast refineries. Industry is not likely to abandon the

system as long as its costs are relatively close

to the costs of refining oil on the Atlantic

coast.

Oil consumption in the United States

dropped in 1974 and then leveled off in 1975

at 16.3 million barrels a day, principally

because of the 1974–75 recession. Recent

forecasts estimate that consumption will climb

to 20 million barrels a day by 1985.16

As much as half of the projected 1985 supply may be imported because domestic oil

production has continued to drop since 1970.

Even with production on Alaska’s North

Slope, domestic output is not likely to return

to its 1970 peak of 11.2 million barrels, at least

in the near future.

Oil consumption in New York, New Jersey,

Delaware, and Pennsylvania is expected to

climb to 3.8 million barrels a day by 1985, an

increase of 1.1 million barrels a day over the

1975 levels. During that time, total imports of

crude oil to refineries supplied through New

York Harbor and the Delaware Bay may increase from 1975 levels of 1.2 million barrels a

day to 2 million barrels a day only it there are

expansions in refinery capacity,

Estimates in figure IV–38 were developed

from a February 1976 forecast of demand by

the Federal Energy Administration. Crude oil

import figures assume that there will be some

Figure IV-38. 1976 projections of petroleum supply and

demand

IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS PER DAY

A. UNITED STATES TOTAL

1975 1985

Total Demand 16.3 20.0

Imports 6.0 10.0

B. MID-ATLANTIC REGION

(New Jersey, Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania)

1975 1980 1985

Total Demand 2.7 3.4 3.8

Total Imports 2.2 2.9 3.3

Crude Oil Imports° 1.2 1.5 2.0

‘Likely to f low through any deepwater port

Source Federal Energy Administration, “National Energy Outlook, ” 1976 (for

1965 reference case) and with present crude oil to total import ratio extrapolated
refinery expansion so that area refineries will

continue to supply about 55 percent of the

region’s petroleum products.

Increases in excess of refinery capacity in

the Mid-Atlantic will be in product while

crude oil moves to the Gulf Coast for refining

and redistribution coastwise by small tankers

or overland by product pipeline.

About one-third of all oil products used in

the Mid-Atlantic in 1974 were residual fuels

which were transshipped from the Caribbean

for generating electricity. Although the

Federal Energy Administration forecasts a

shift of about 12 percent of electric power

generation from oil-fired to nuclear or coalfired plants over the next 10 years, its projections still imply a continued heavy reliance on

residuals. 17

In recent years, State land use and environmental policies have discouraged the construction of new refineries in coastal areas of

New Jersey and Delaware.

The Delaware Coastal Zone Act flatly

prohibits construction of refineries or pipeline

landings in the coastal area. Existing Federal

and State air quality regulations make construction of new refineries along the Delaware

River and Bay unlikely in the foreseeable future

although existing refineries may be expanded

without exceeding pollution standards.18

Since 1970, an Amerada-Hess refinery in

the Mid-Atlantic region has been closed; plans

to double the capacity of a Mobil Oil Co. refinery in New Jersey have been canceled; and

construction has not begun on a Shell Oil Co.

refinery, originally planned for a site in

Delaware and then for a site in New Jersey.

Because a decision to build a deepwater port

would logically follow—and not force—a

decision to build new refineries, a port is

likely to be postponed at least until the MidAtlantic refinery picture changes.

1’ , 1,

tion of a deepwater port, pushing the costs of

a port inside Delaware Bay from $193 million

to more than $400 million. The estimated cost

of dredging some 15-million to 20-million

cubic yards of bay bottom for a channel to the

port that would handle 250,000-dwt tankers

has increased in that time to more than $40

million. 19

In 1971, the Delaware Bay Transportation

Co. estimated that oil could be transferred

through its proposed port for 12 cents a barrel. At the inflated construction costs, the price

in 1975 would be closer to 25 cents and possibly as much as 39 cents if Delaware were to

tax incoming oil at 1 percent of its market

value. 20

At those prices, most of the cost advantage

of using supertankers would be lost and the

port would provide an economic advantage

only for tankers on the longest trips between

the Persian Gulf and the Mid-Atlantic region.

Even on that route, savings would be significant only with tankers of 250,000 dwt or

more. There would be little or no cost advantage over lightening for tankers between

100,000 dwt and 200,000 dwt. Deepwater port

transfer costs actually could be higher than

lightening for small tankers or for large

tankers on shorter runs from Africa or South

America.

The increased transfer costs would eliminate much of the economic advantage which

was perceived by New Jersey and Delaware

residents to be a prime argument in favor of a

deepwater port.

Citizens responding to OTA questionnaires

said they believed the port would reduce the

cost of petroleum products by providing a

more efficient transportation system.

Not all oil industry officials agree with the

cost figures cited in this study, which were

generated by the PenJerDel Corp., an affiliate

of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, in

Inflation also has worked against construc- a 1975 study. Industry officials do agree,
however, that a Mid-Atlantic deepwater port

would be marginally feasible in the near

future, 21 particularly when its costs are compared with the 1975 lightening charge of 8 to

11 cents per barrel.

However, one change in the existing

Delaware Bay system could revive interest in a

deepwater port—for environmental rather

than economic reasons.

There never has been a major lightening accident in Delaware Bay. One accident or a

series of accidents could provoke political action to build a deepwater port not only to

eliminate lightening but to reduce the number

of tankers that will be required to carry growing supplies of imported crude oil to docks in

the Delaware River.

Many people responding to the OTA public

participation questionnaire said a reduction in

the risk of lightening accidents is a major argument in favor of building a deepwater port.

DESCRIPTION OF DEEPWATER PORT TECHNOLOGY

IN THE MID-ATLANTIC

If a deepwater port were constructed in the

Mid-Atlantic, it would probably be a

monobuoy port located off southern New

Jersey.

The OTA study investigated a range of technical and siting options for a port under

several demand assumptions. Because the

capacity to expand refineries is substantially

greater in the Delaware Bay area than in

northern New Jersey, the study assumed the

port would be oriented toward the Delaware

Bay refineries and located 30 to 32 miles off

the New Jersey coast. At such a site, the port

would be in waters under Federal jurisdiction

and would be located far enough from the

coast to serve the largest supertankers in the

world fleet, the 480,000 dwt, which require

110 feet of water depth for maneuvering. (See

figure IV-39.)

Because of uncertainties about import projections and the low level of industry interest

in any near term project, this description of

port technology is confined to one logicalsized port and its impacts.

It should be emphasized that the site and

type of port selected relate only to technical

feasibility y. Basic changes in Government

policy, the economics of oil distribution, and

standards governing air pollution would be

necessary before the events described in this

report could actually take place.

Several general categories of deepwater

ports now operating around the world could

be adapted to the east coast, including the integrated, bulk cargo, island port—which

would require much more detailed planning

than has been done to date—and the structural pier built for alongside mooring of

tankers—which would be a likely design for

use inside the Delaware Bay.

The OTA study assumed that the choice

would be a monobuoy, the least expensive

and most versatile system in the present

world network of more than 100 deepwater

ports. This is essentially the same technology

proposed for LOOP and Seadock in the Gulf of

Mexico.

The technology for monobuoys has been m

use since 1960. Foreign ports have demonstrated safe operations over several years of

intensive use. Although it is true that the

United States has no experience with the ports
Figure IV-39. Hypothetical deepwater port site offshore New Jersey coast

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Source “Tankers and the U S Energy Situation, ” Poricelli and Keith.

in its waters, many of the ports in the world- Mooring system (CALM). (See figure IV-40.)

wide system are owned by the multinational

oil companies which would be able to transfer

their knowledge to American sites. In addition, the technology for component parts of

the monobuoy system—the platforms,

hookups, pumps, pipelines, and storage

tanks—has been in use in offshore exploration

and production, shipping, lightening, and distribution of oil in the United States for several

decades. .

Two types of monobuoys are presently in

use and could be adapted to the Mid-Atlantic.

The most common is the Catenary Anchor Leg

The other, more recent, design is the Single

Anchor Leg Mooring system (SALM). (See

figure IV-41.)

The CALM is a floating steel cyclinder 30-

to 50-feet across and 15 feet thick which is

tethered to the sea bottom by 6 to 8 anchors

and chains. Rubber hoses rise from a connection with a pipeline buried under the sea floor

through the center of the buoy and float on

the ocean surface. Tankers tie up to the CALM

and launch crews guide floating hoses to the

tankers, hoist the hoses aboard, and secure

them to discharge manifolds. Crude is then
Figure IV-41. Single anchor leg mooring (SALM)

MOORING LINES

MOORING BUOY

LOADING HOSE TO TANKER

Source “Tankers and the U S Energy Situation, ” Poricelli and Keith

pumped through the hoses, into the pipeline

and on to shoreside storage tanks.

Because tankers can weathervane around

the CALM and maintain a heading into wind

and waves, there usually is no need for protective breakwaters even offshore. But because

launches are required to help secure hoses to a

tanker’s manifold, mooring operations cannot

be conducted in seas higher than 6 to 8 feet.

Once moored, however, a tanker can discharge crude oil in waves as high as 10 to 12

feet and winds of up to 40 knots.

One drawback to the CALM is that there is

a danger of tankers overriding the buoy and

tearing the hose connections which are

mounted on top of the buoy. The newer SALM

system reduces that danger. In the SALM

design, the steel buoy is tethered by one vertical anchor chain. Instead of rising through the

buoy, the rubber hoses connect to a pipeline

below the water at a point deep enough that

the danger of a break in the hose-pipeline connection is reduced in the event a tanker collides with a buoy.

In addition to the monobuoy, the port complex would include one or more pumping stations to force the crude through the pipelines

to shore. The stations would be mounted on

structural-steep platforms fastened to the sea

floor with pilings similar to those that support

offshore oil platforms. One or more decks

would be mounted to support pumps, a

helicopter pad, and crew quarters. The pumping station would be located at least 8,000 feet

from the monobuoy to reduce the danger of

having it rammed by a tanker entering or

leaving the port proper.

If a port off New Jersey were planned to

handle 1.6 to 2 million barrels per day initially, it would consist of two monobuoys
situated about 5,000 feet apart. (See figure

IV-42.) The port could be expanded at intervals of 5 years to increase capacity to 3.5

million barrels per day to satisfy the area’s

needs for at least 20 years.

Several firms already supply monobuoys,

which would be constructed at existing yards

and towed or carried on barges to the MidAtlantic site to be anchored in place. Pumping

platforms and other equipment are also supplied by existing specialty firms and shipyards

so that, except for pipelines, the production of

equipment probably would not generate

employment for the Delaware/New Jersey

region. Pipe could be fabricated on the east

coast,

Construction of the offshore portions of the

deepwater port would require about 2 years

after a license was granted.22 During the construction phase, about 20 acres of waterfront

land would be required for support. Such support includes construction crew and equipment staging, repair, and pipeline supply. This

land could be used for headquarters operations after the port was completed.23

Pipelines from port to shore would be put

in place by lay barges using procedures identical to those for laying pipes for Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas production. The

pipeline from a port off New Jersey could

come ashore between Townsend’s Inlet and

Sea Isle City, N.J. If that occurred, a tank farm

would be built in central Cape May County

with the pipeline continuing overland to the

Camden area and to the refineries,

Typically, tank farms for deepwater ports

will store 10 times the port’s daily capacity to

assure refineries of a continuous supply of

crude even if the port is shut down because of

bad weather or an accident. A typical storage

Figure IV-42. Hypothetical deepwater port layout including onshore facilities

TANK FARM

(15 Million Barrels ] \ PLATFORM

on 125 Acres)

I

RETAINING

\

-

SHORE SUPPORT FACILITY

. - . . ---

TANKS V

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
tank holds 600,000 barrels of crude; therefore,

the initial two-buoy port discussed here

would require 25 tanks on 125 acres of land to

store a 10-day supply of 1.6 million barrels

per day. If the port were expanded to 3.5

million barrels per day capacity, 58 storage

tanks on 250 to 300 acres of land would be required.

If new refineries were built, distribution

pipelines to these could be added from the

tank farm.

There is substantial public concern over potential oil spills associated with deepwater

ports, especially large spills which may reach

New Jersey and Delaware beaches. But an oil

spill risk analysis prepared for this study indicates that the likelihood of spills in rivers, harbors, and coastal waters out to 50 miles is

reduced by about one-half if a supertanker/deepwater port system, rather than

small tankers, is used to move oil.24

Two principal factors make the risks of oil

spills from deepwater ports lower than the

risk from small tankers., First, a deepwater

port reduces the number of tankers that must

be used to move a given quantity of oil. Second, if oil is spilled at a deepwater port, the

distance between the port and the shoreline

may reduce damage to the coastal areas.

The OTA oil spill risk analysis for a deepwater port of 1.6 million barrels per day

capacity located about 30 miles off the New

Jersey coast was based on data from regional

and worldwide spills from ports and tankers

of all sizes. The results of the analysis indicate

that over a 15-year period there is a 50 percent

chance that 150,000 barrels of oil will be

spilled within 50 miles of shore by a deepwater port/supertanker system. During the

same period, there is a 50 percent chance that

small tankers will spill 310,000 barrels in the

same area. Total spillage from the port system

in the same time period and area could range

from a low of 50,000 barrels to a high of

720,000 barrels. Total spillage from the small

tankers could range from a low of 32,000 barrels to a high of 1.4 million barrels. The high

estimates include the pessimistic assumption

of a major tanker accident. (See figure IV-43. )

The statistical average of these estimates

gives deepwater ports a two-to-one advantage

over small tankers based on total spillage

within 50 miles of shore.

When spills in the seas beyond 50 miles are

considered, there is less difference between

the two systems. This is because of two factors

which are common to both systems: 1) most

discharges from routine tank cleaning occur

far at sea; and 2) most spills from major accidents such as structural failures have occurred

far at sea.25

Because there are fewer supertankers and

they have been in use a shorter time, the maximums used for the deepwater port/supertanker figure are higher and more uncertain

than those for small tankers.

The OTA Working Paper on oil spill risk

assessment describes the data and basis for

estimating this potential oil spillage. From

these spillage estimates, the study concludes

that a deepwater port system would offer environmental advantages over small tankers in

existing ports. This study assumes that pollution control technology and the tankers themselves utilizing deepwater ports will have

safety features equivalent to the smaller

tanker alternative.

The Coast Guard has prepared for OTA an

analysis of potential oil spill movements

should a spill occur at the deepwater port. The

data indicates that with a stagnant summer

high pressure system producing steady south

to east winds, a spill could be expected to

move ashore within 3 days.26 Such projections

are subject to great uncertainties because the

state of knowledge about the movement of oil

at sea is limited and little data is available.

Regulations recently issued by the Department of Transportation (DOT) for deepwater

! ( ) - ‘if, - I ‘1
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Figure IV-43. Fifteen (15) year totals of oil spills from one 1.6 million barrel per day deepwater port compared

to small tanker alternative

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment, Working Paper #3

port operations require an operator to provide

onsite oil spill containment and cleanup

equipment for spills of less than 1,000 barrels

which might result from malfunctions in port

operations. In addition, the operator must

have “readily accessible” equipment to clean

up larger spills on a scale that might result

from a tanker accident.

Equipment will be subject to approval

based on port capacity, operating conditions,

weather, experience of the operator, and

availability of equipment. The operator will be

required to prepare an operations manual

describing procedures for use of his own

resources as well as possible use of the National Contingency Plan.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) deepwater ports project
office is responsible for evaluating environmental risks associated with deepwater ports

and for relating those risks to specific States. A

recent NOAA attempt to assess environmental

risks to Florida, Mississippi, and Texas from

the proposed LOOP and Seadock terminals,

however, confirmed the shortcomings of existing data for use in quantifying and forecasting damage and costs. NOAA is exploring

methods to improve both the data base and

analytical techniques.

The situation off Florida, Mississippi, and

Texas also surfaced another problem—the apparent confusion over which States should

share in the benefits and protections of the

Deepwater Port Act when a port is located

offshore.

The. Deepwater Port Act gives “adjacent”

coastal States a role in approving a license and

benefiting from the protections and provisions of the law. But, except for those States

directly connected by pipeline, the Secretary

of Transporation makes the final determination of which States are adjacent to a proposed

deepwater port.

Because of the benefits of adjacent status

and the fact that there are a large number of

States close together on the east coast, several

States may ask to be designated as adjacent

coastal States if a deepwater port should be

considered for licensing off the coast of New

Jersey and Delaware.

Recently, Florida asked to be declared an

adjacent coastal State in connection with the

licensing of LOOP and Seadock deepwater

ports off Louisiana and Texas. The Florida

case brought attention to an ambiguity in the

law which may also figure in any applications

for adjacent status made by Mid-Atlantic

States.

Florida asked for adjacent status because it

felt its beaches and coastal wildlife preserves

and parks would be subjected to an added risk

through the Florida Straits to and from the

deepwater ports. The Florida request was

denied by the Secretary of Transportation on a

question of statutory interpretation.

The Secretary ruled that tankers in transit to

and from the port should not be considered in

determining the risks to States. That ruling

has now been appealed in the courts.

Citizens who participated in the OTA study

seemed satisfied that the existing technology

and regulations for deepwater ports are adequate for safe operation. But there was concern that the supertankers using a deepwater

port would be major sources of pollution,

A recent OTA report, “Oil Transportation

by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution

and Safety Measures, ” examines the evolution

of tankers and the pollution and safety

problems they cause.27 It presents approaches

for reducing pollution and improving the

safety of operations and reviews the international and domestic regulation of these operations. The world fleet of tankers spill about

11.1 million barrels of oil into the seas every

year: 7.5 million barrels during routine operations such as cleaning tanks and dumping

ballast, 1.6 million barrels as a result of accidents, and 2.0 million barrels during drydocking operations. 28 This spillage accounts for

nearly one-third of all ocean oil pollution.

Both the Coast Guard and international

organizations are attempting to solve some of

the problems of oil pollution of the seas by

implementing stricter tanker standards.

In 1973 the International Conference on

Marine Pollution drew up a treaty which required new tankers of 70,000 dwt or more to

have a segregated ballast capability but the requirement has not been approved by all member nations. The concept of segregated ballast

is that a tank vessel must have sufficient

spaces set aside for carrying ballast water

separately so that in all but unusually rough

of oil spills as a result of tankers moving weather conditions it will not be necessary to
introduce ballast water into cargo tank spaces.

The concept has gained worldwide acceptance

as offering major environmental benefits. 29

The Coast Guard has implemented a similar

requirement for U.S. tankers in domestic service and proposed the same for U.S. tankers in

foreign service and foreign tankers visiting

U.S. waters.

In addition, the International Conference

on Marine Pollution recommended that

governments undertake concerted efforts to

reduce the discharge of oil from ships into the

sea with a view to complete elimination of international pollution by the end of this

decade.30

To follow up on that recommendation, the

Coast Guard is now considering an extension

of the segregated ballast concept to make it

mandatory for all existing U.S. tankers of

70,000 dwt or more. The Coast Guard has

asked for comments on the feasibility and

economic impact of retrofitting U.S. tankers

and has publicly said that the agency believes

the retrofit is possible. According to a notice

published in the Federal Register on May 13,

1976, the Coast Guard favors the change now

because: 1) the present tanker tonnage surplus

is expected to last for at least 5 years, allowing

time for necessary shipyard alterations without much disruption in the transportation

system; 2) most vessels will require only

minor changes to the cargo and ballast piping

systems; and 3) increases in consumer cost of

oil as a result of the change will have only a

minimum impact on the present inflationary

trend because transportation costs are a

relatively small part of the price consumers

pay for oil products.31
The Proposal for a Floating

Mid-Atlantic

BACKGROUND

The need for vast amounts of cooling water

has ruled out many potential sites for nuclear

powerplants around the Nation. Late in 1972,

New Jersey’s largest public utility company

concluded that the answer to its own siting

problems would be floating nuclear plants,

moored off the coast where they would have

virtually unlimited amounts of seawater for

cooling. The company also concluded the

floating plants could be built for less money

and be less environmentally damaging than

land-based plants. Access to cooling water

was crucial to Public Service Electric and Gas

Co., which generates more than 60 percent of

the State’s power. Its customers were using

electricity at rates that meant doubling Public

Service’s generating capacity every decade or

so and water supply problems were ruling out

many potential sites for new generating

capacity.

Today, after 3 years of analyzing the

offshore power concept, staff members of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and

some other Federal agencies have come to the

same general conclusion about floating

nuclear powerplants. These staff judgments

are tentative and are not in any sense formal

endorsements of the concept or the construction plans. The Public Service proposal still

must work its way through a series of reviews,

public hearings, and decisions by State and

Federal agencies and meet challenges from environmental groups, New Jersey beach communities, and some nuclear scientists and

engineers who say that the systems are unnecessary and may be unworkable or unsafe.

Before an offshore nuclear plant can start

generating power it must clear three separate

stages of licensing. The first of these probably

will not come before 1977.

Nuclear Powerplant in the

The preliminary NRC staff reviews

nevertheless have provided enough encouragement to the companies involved in the

floating nuclear powerplants—the Atlantic

Generating Station Units 1 and 2—that they

have spent more than $120 million thus far for

plans, environmental studies, and in toolingup for production.

Nothing on the scale of the offshore complex of floating plants and protective breakwater has ever been built in ocean waters anywhere in the world. More cubic yards of rock

and concrete will go into the breakwater that

will create a lagoon of calm water for the

plants and shield them from the pounding of

ocean waves than went into many major dams

in the United States. The gantry crane in the

Florida shipyard where the plants will be built

could straddle the dome of the U.S. Capitol.

The powerplants will be assembled by

Offshore Power Systems, a subsidiary of

Westinghouse Electric Corp., at a shipyard on

a manmade island near Jacksonville, Fla., 8

miles up the St. John’s River from the east

coast.

The platform for each plant will be a steel

barge measuring nearly 400 feet square and 44

feet deep, reinforced with bulkheads to form a

honeycomb of watertight compartments. A

pressurized water reactor (PWR) similar to

Westinghouse reactors now operating in landbased powerplants will be mounted on each

barge inside a 17-story domed containment

structure with steam turbines, generators, and

office buildings clustered around it.

The domed containment structure will rise

nearly 18 stories above the ocean surface and

from the shore will look much like the distant

skyline of a small city.
] ‘) ,s I I { I [ ‘I{( ~1’( )> \ I 1 ( ~i; \ I I ~ ) \ [ I “\~ ‘\. \ ( I I \ [{ I ‘( J \ “1 I 1< I ‘ 1 \ \ I I ‘\ I 1 I I \ 1 I I ) \ I I \ ‘ . I I (

Figure IV-44. Size comparison of proposed Atlantic Generating Station

Source Public Service Electric& Gas Company and Off Ice of Technology Assessment

While the floating plants are being built,

construction workers will build the largest

structure ever placed in ocean waters-a

massive, curving breakwater of 5.6 million

tons of stone and cast concrete that will span

49 acres of ocean floor and rise 64 feet above

the water surface.

Powerplants will be towed at intervals of 2

years from Florida, moored, sealed in the

breakwater with a wall of concrete caissons,

and connected to 4 miles of underwater cable

leading to shore and the power distribution

grid, Public Service plans are to have the first

plant operational in 1985 and the second in

1987.

Each plant is designed to generate 1,150

megawatts (MWe) of power, a supply that

Public Service estimates will provide about

one-third of the additional power it must be

generating each year by 1987. The plants have

a design life of 40 years, after which they may

be shut down and decommissioned.

When Public Service began exploring the

offshore plant concept in the late 1960’s,

electrical energy consumption in its service

area had been increasing at an annual rate of

nearly 8 percent.1 The eastern blackout of

1965 still was a recent memory and there was

strong pressure not only to keep up with rising demand but also to maintain reserves of

power to prevent future blackouts and

brownouts,

There were counterpressures as well. Public

Service customers are in the most densely

populated wedge of land in the most densely

populated State in the Nation and the company had to compete with homes and other

industries for both land and water.

By the early 1970’s, environmental restric-
( I I ! \ \ J]<( I ~.’- 1( ) \ ( ) I 1 I i 1 ! ~ ~ 1 ‘ i ! ~ I , )(,

Figure IV-45. Visualization of a floating nuclear powerplant in comparison to the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt

Visualization of a floating nuclear powerplant

Roosevelt Source Public Service Electric & Gas Company
tions on air and water pollution also were taking effect, making the search for sites even

more difficult and adding months and, in

some cases, years to the lead times for

powerplant construction.

The 1973 oil embargo and four-fold rise in

prices that followed the embargo took some of

the pressure off Public Service. The price of

electricity rose sharply with the price of oil,

which was then being used to generate 77 percent of New Jersey’s power. Higher energy

prices coupled with a recession drove down

consumption so that by 1976, Public Service

estimated that the growth in consumption in

its area would be only slightly more than 4

percent a year through 1985, about two-thirds

of the preembargo growth rate. z

Even at this slower growth rate, New Jersey

will need the equivalent of four new 1,150

megawatt powerplants for baseload power

generation by 1995 in addition to the Atlantic

Generating Station (AGS) and other new

plants that are scheduled for operation by

1987. 3

During the period of steep growth in demand in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the

offshore plant was a critical element in Public

Service’s long-range plans for providing new

generation facilities. Its construction schedule

called for having large amounts of new

generating capacity in place by the early

1980’s. Two land-based nuclear plants near

Salem, N.J., were running 5 years behind

schedule. Construction of two more nuclear

units was delayed when objections to the use

of Newbold Island in the Delaware River

forced Public Service to relocate the project to

Hope Creek, just north of the Salem plants.

Lead times for land-based plants elsewhere in

the State were running between 8 and 12

years.

The sharp drop in electricity demand in

1974 and 1975 allowed the company to slip its

construction schedules. But by 1976, with lead

times for land-based plants expanding rather

Figure IV-46. Annual observed and forecast values for

energy consumption and peak-hour demand, 1963-

1987, for Public Service Electric & Gas Company area.

The planned generating capacity is also shown for 1975-

1987.

b I

1970 1975 1960 1965 1990

Source Draft Environmental Statement—Atlantic Gas Service

than shrinking, the AGS was seen by the company as its best hope of meeting projected demands for electricity with nuclear power.

The first design for a floating nuclear

powerplant was commissioned in the

mid-1960’s by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which was searching for a way to

insulate nuclear plants from earthquakes.4

The concept was endorsed by the Energy

Policy Staff of the President’s Office of Science

and Technology in August 1970. s The staff, in

cooperation with an interagency task force,

stated that, “The use of offshore siting adjacent to coastal cities would circumvent the

problems of land availability, objections on
esthetic grounds, and assure the adequacy of

cooling water. ”6

Public Service adapted the concept and

asked the Nation’s four reactor manufacturers

to test its feasibility. Westinghouse, General

Electric Co., and Babcock & Wilcox Corp. responded with proposals. In December 1970, a

Westinghouse study team concluded that the

floating plant could be built and the next year

Offshore Power Systems was created as a joint

venture of Westinghouse and Tenneco Inc. to

manufacture floating plants. Tenneco withdrew from the venture in early 1975. In September 1972, after conducting its own site surveys off the New Jersey coast, Public Service

contracted to buy the first two floating plants

to be produced by Offshore Power Systems. In

1973, Public Service signed a contract for two

more floating plants.

Several advantages of supplying electricity

from offshore stations have been advanced in

recent years by supporters and some analysts

of the concept. Promoters of offshore plants

take the position that:

. Unlimited supplies of cooling water are

available at ocean sites and the environmental consequences of discharging

heated water into the ocean will be

minimal compared with the consequences of discharging heated water into

rivers, lakes, and bays.

. Offshore construction eliminates the disruption of coastal marshlands and estuaries to a great extent.

. The floating powerplant concept moves

in the direction of standardized nuclear

plant designs, a goal the Nuclea r

Regulatory Commission (then the

Atomic Energy Commission) set in 1972.

. Shipyard construction of plants will

shorten the time required to put a nuclear

plant in operation after a decision is

made to build it.

. Volume production can cut costs and improve quality control.

Federal and State agencies have been

reviewing the offshore powerplant proposal

informally since late 1971 and formally since

July 1973, when the AEC docketed an

Offshore Power Systems application for a permit to build eight floating nuclea r

powerplants.

During that time, the AGS has received encouragement from the staff of the Council on

Environmental Quality, which views the proposal with “guarded optimism.”7 The NRC’s

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has

declared the project “generally acceptable” as

to environmental impact and risk. 8 The same

office concluded in a Safety Evaluation Report

published in September 1975 that with some

modifications in design “there is reasonable

assurance that . . . (the reactors could be installed) without undue risk to the health and

safety of the public.”9

On June 7, 1976, the NRC’s independent

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

(ACRS) issued an interim report on the floating nuclear plant saying that if a number of

issues were resolved “the floating nuclear

plant units can be constructed with reasonable

assurance that they can be operated without

undue risk to the health and safety of the

public.”10

Several major contentions challenging some

of these claims have been raised by intervenors11 in preheating conferences since 1974.

Among those admitted by the Atomic Safety

and Licensing Board (ASLB) for further consideration are:

. The plant will be vulnerable to external

hazards such as ship collisions, airplane

crashes, and severe storms, and damage

to the plant could result in dispersal of

radioactive materials injurious to human

health and aquatic life.
● Transportation and handling of radioactive fuel and wastes involve risks to

human safety and health and to the

marine and coastal environment.

. Evacuation in case of an accident will be

difficult, especially in summer months,

and there are no adequate plans or procedures for such emergencies.

● Fear of nuclear accidents will reduce the

appeal of the area for recreational uses

and have a detrimental effect on the

region’s tourist -based economy.

● Inadequate consideration has been given

in the environmental cost-benefit balance

to the adverse somatic and genetic consequences to marine, animal, and plant life.

● Inadequate attention has been given to

the radiological impact on humans who

may boat or swim in the vicinity of the

facility and to the cumulative effects of

radioactive substances injected along the

food chain from plankton through

humans.

● Operation of the plant will cause thermal

pollution and under some circumstances

could result in fish kills and other

damage to marine life.

● The breakwater may cause changes in

wave and tidal patterns and adversely

affect the shoreline.

. Other impacts that could be adverse include industrialization of the ocean

around the site, onshore support

facilities, dredging, and defects in underwater electrical transmission lines.

● NRC should prepare a comprehensive,

programmatic EIS on the construction of

floating nuclear powerplants located

offshore on or above the Continental

Shelf.

Among other contentions raised by the intervenors but not admitted by the ASLB are:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Radioactive discharges during the normal operation of the plant or from an accident would pose a risk to public health

and safety and cause damage to marine

organisms.

The floating nuclear powerplant is an untested technology and the coastal area of

Atlantic County will be a virtual testing

ground near major population centers.

One intervener urged full-scale prototype testing before any plant is installed.

There is uncertainty as to the reliability

of the safety systems, including the containment structure.

There are risks from the corrosive effects

of the marine environment on the plant’s

structure, and the effects of erosion and

shifting of the ocean floor on the stability

of the breakwater.

The plant will be vulnerable to sabotage.

There should be more thorough studies

of alternatives to the plant.

The State of New Jersey, which has not

sought official intervener status, has raised

the following points in a May 4, 1976, letter to

the NRC by Environmental Protection Commissioner David J. Bardin:

● The possible consequences of a “severe”

accident should be considered in the

licensing process.

● All safety risks from the plants should be

addressed.

New Jersey and Delaware residents who

took part in a public participation program

carried out as part of this study are generally

well aware that advantages and disadvantages

must be weighed in deciding whether to build

floating nuclear powerplants.

Information gathered in two regional
workshops, from 1,000 responses to an OTA

questionnaire, and from press reports and

statements at public hearings show that the

public sees the disadvantages as involving

questions of safety, environmental degradation, and high construction costs. The advantages include increased energy supplies with

resulting economic expansion and cheaper

power than would be possible with continued

use of oil-fired generating plants. Safety concerns include a perception that floating

nuclear powerplants are experimental and

that there is limited experience on which to

base estimates of risk and reliability.

Among the advantages cited in questionnaires and workshops are that nuclear

powerplants are less polluting generally than

fossil-fueled plants. In turn, participants saw

advantages in floating plants over land-based

plants in their distance from shore and the

elimination of pressures on New Jersey water

supplies for cooling water.

In this study, OTA has analyzed available

information on costs, benefits, environmental

impact, safety, waste disposal systems,

transportation, and decommissioning activities associated with the floating plants, The

study does not attempt to evaluate general

controversies about the safety and performance of nuclear plants; these are beyond the

scope of the coastal effects analysis. It concentrates, instead, on exploring differences between the designs of floating and land-based

plants and comparing the advantages and disadvantages of each.

As a result of this comparative analysis, the

study finds that:

● Although the costs of the first two floating nuclear plants, AGS 1 and 2, are

about the same as the costs of a similar

land-based plant, volume production and

standardization eventually could slow

down the rapid escalation of capital costs

of nuclear powerplants.

● Offshore siting of nuclear plants would

reduce thermal pollution and eliminate

disruption of marshlands and estuaries

that would be associated with land-based

or shoreline nuclear installations.

. Routine operations would produce less

air pollution than would routine operations of a coal-fired plant equipped with

flue gas desulfurization and other advanced pollution control equipment.

. The NRC has not evaluated and does not

plan to evaluate risks from accidents in

floating nuclear plants comprehensively

enough to permit either a general comparison of the relative risks from landbased and floating plants or an assessment of the specific risks associated with

deploying Atlantic Generating Station

Units 1 and 2.12

● Several technical problems of design and

operation remain to be resolved, including procedures for transporting nuclear

fuel to a floating plant and carrying

radioactive wastes to shore, the process

of decommissioning a floating plant, and

the techniques of towing plants from

Florida to the Mid-Atlantic coast.

● There do not seem to be any significant

differences between land-based and

floating powerplants as to releases of

radioactive material and other pollutants

during routine operations.

. Although the nuclear reactor steam supply and turbine generator systems and

the floating barge are, separately, proven

technologies, the combination is not. In

addition, there are unique features including the barge-to-cable connection,

the breakwater, and the mooring system

that have not been tested by experience.
TECHNOLOGY

The operating principle of all steam electric

plants is similar, whether the source of heat is

coal, oil, gas, or a nuclear chain reaction. In all

such plants, heat turns water to steam which

powers turbines to drive electric generators.

The steam is recondensed to water and

pumped back through the steam-generating

system.

In an AGS plant, the process will begin inside a reactor vessel, a steel tank five stories

high and weighing 550 tons. When thousands

of thin metal rods packed with uranium dioxide are clustered at the bottom of the reactor

vessel, atoms of uranium-235 begin splitting

in a chain reaction to produce the plant’s heat

source.

A closed loop of pipes—the coolant

system —in which water is pumped under

pressure through the reactor vessel and

around the fuel rods serves two purposes. The

water moderates the fission process and at the

same time draws off the heat energy and carries it through tubing in four steam-generator

tanks. The average temperature of water in the

cooling circuit is about 600°F. The system is

pressurized to prevent the water from boiling

at that high temperature.

If all cooling systems failed, the core would

rapidly overheat, reaching temperatures near

5000°F at its center within 30 minutes and falling in a molten mass to the bottom of the

pressure vessel within hours. An emergency

core cooling system (ECCS) is designed to prevent such a core-melt, which could produce

an accident with large public consequences.

A second closed loop of water turns to

steam when it flows along the hot tubes inside

the generator tanks which are some seven stories tall and 22 feet in diameter. There are four

steam-generators in the AGS plants.

In the final phase of the process, steam expands through turbines to drive generators

and into a chamber where a stream of water,

flowing through condensor tubes at a rate of 1

million gallons a minute, cools the expended

steam and condenses it to water which then is

pumped back through the steam-generating

cycle.

The open ocean provides a virtually

unlimited supply of water for cooling at least

small numbers of offshore plants.

Nuclear Reactor

The reactor vessel and steam-generating

tanks are enclosed in a steel-lined cylinder of

concrete 3 feet thick that has a domed top and

stands 169 feet tall—the containment structure. The domed containment building is

designed primarily to prevent steam and

radioactive materials from escaping into the

atmosphere as the result of a major accident

that might involve a rupture in the coolantwater loop or the steam-generating system.

Each AGS containment building will hold 2.5

million pounds of ice designed to condense

steam rapidly and reduce pressure on the

walls of the containment building in the event

of a major accident. One ice-condenser system

already has been installed as part of an operating land-based plant; ice condensers will be

used in nine other land-based plants now

under construction. Between the reactor vessel

and the containment building, steel and concrete shields are used to prevent the escape of

radiation produced in the fission process.

Steel buildings will be mounted on the platform around the containment structure to

house turbines, generators, power-transmission circuits, the reactor control center, and

office and living space for 120 plant personnel.

Platform

The powerplant is mounted on a steel

barge nearly 400 feet square and 44 feet deep

with watertight compartments, some of which
Figure IV-47. Cutaway diagram of a floating nuclear plant containment building

of the Steam-electric system

ICE CONDENSER

-% CONTAINMENT BUILDING

STEAM GENERATOR

STEAM LINES TO TURBINES

REACTOR

Simplified Flow Diagram - .

I

r

SECONDARY

COOLANT SYSTEM

r

TURBINES

IL

COOLANT “’---’ “

I H r

CONDENSERS

u

4 I

I i

Source (Top Diagram) Offshore Power Systems

(Bottom Diagram) Pages 3-7, Part 11, Draft Enwronmental Statement on the Manufacture of Floating Nuclear Powerplants
, ,

can be filled or drained for use as trim tanks to

keep the huge platform level,

Cooling water is drawn through six intake

screens on the landward side of the platform-each measuring 27 feet by 15 feet. A

corrosion-prevention system using sacrificial

anodes on the floor of the mooring basin will

be installed.

Breakwater

One massive, D-shaped breakwater will

shield both floating plants from ocean movement and from ships and will provide a basin

of calm water in which the platforms will

float.

In the first phrase of construction, 10 empty

concrete caissons about 200 feet long, 100 feet

wide, and 50 feet deep will be floated into a

semicircle and filled with sand to sink them to

the ocean floor. The caissons provide a base

against which some 3.5 million tons of rock

and a covering layer of 17,000 cast-concrete

forms called dolos will be piled to form the

seaward protection for the powerplants. Most

Figure IV-48. Offshore siting rubble mound breakwater, Atlantic Generating Station

.-—.... = .

Graded Rock

. Sea Level

.

.:

I STATIONARY CAISSON

:

BREAKWATER CROSS SECTION !~ — ~

I

‘ \

\

STATIONARY

CLOSURE

i Crown i! BREAKWATER

~ El. 32.0’

STATIONARY c

/

E

/ MAIN BREAKWATER

El. 0.0’ Paved Surface CAISSONS RUBBLE MOUND

3

Source Public Service Electric & Gas Company
of the dolos weigh 42 tons; some range up to

62 tons. Before the powerplants are moored

inside the semicircle, a straight line of seven

caissons will be sunk to the bottom on the

landward side of the mooring basin to complete the protective shield. Two of these will

be removed to float each barge into place and

then repositioned.

! I i’ ‘ ~ “

Power Transmission

The generating station’s combined output

of 2,300 megawatts of electricity, enough to

meet the needs of a community of more than 1

million people, will be transmitted to shore

through oil-cooled copper cables sheathed in

plastic and a lead-alloy casing and buried 10

feet beneath the stable ocean floor.

DEPLOYMENT

The Public Service schedule for the AGS

calls for one powerplant to start producing

electricity in 1985 and a second to be online in

1987. Between now and then, eight Federal

agencies and the State of New Jersey must approve one or another aspect of the project. The

crucial clearances are those required from the

NRC and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.

The NRC will make three separate licensing

decisions on the project. Clearance for construction of the barge-mounted plants will be

shared by the Commission and the U.S. Coast

Guard, which have signed a memorandum of

understanding under which approval of both

agencies will be required before a floating

plant may be moved to a generating site. Approval also will be required from the U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, the Environmental

Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Department of

Justice, and the Department of the Interior at

successive stages of the project.

Site

The minimum water depth for the floating

plants of the AGS is 45 feet. Some dredging

will be done to level the bottom to obtain this

depth. With less than 45 feet of water, there is

not enough clearance between the platform

and the basin bottom to assure the barge will

not be grounded in hurricane waves, a tidal

wave, or a tornado.13

The AGS will be inside the 3-mile limit,

which places the plants inside U.S. territorial

waters and under Federal jurisdiction, and

within the legal jurisdiction of the State of

New Jersey. Both powerplants will be

relatively close to existing transmission grids,

which both limits the costs of new transmission facilities and reduces the amount of

power lost in transmission. The generating

station will be about 15 to 20 miles from major ship traffic in the Atlantic coastal shipping

lanes. (Figure IV–49.)

Licenses

A series of more than 70 Federal, State, and

municipal licenses and permits will be issued

for the AGS in a review and decision process

that will span 12 years.

A steering committee of Federal agencies,

chaired by the NRC, has been created to monitor the licensing process and exchange information on various aspects of the project. 14

Represented on the committee are the Commission, the Coast Guard, the Corps of

Engineers, the Council on Environmental

Quality, the Department of the Interior, the

Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal

Aviation Administration, the Federal Energy

Administration, the Federal Power Commission, and the National Oceanic and At-
I

Source’ Off Ice of Technology Assessment and Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
CH l\’ —DISCUSSION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES 209

mospheric Administration.

The first-and the most important—Federal

license is a permit to manufacture the floating

powerplants. The Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation has been reviewing environmental

and safety aspects of the plants at the staff

level since mid-1973. The ACRS, an independent panel of scientists and engineers appointed by the Commission, is conducting an

independent appraisal of the project and

reviewing the work of the reactor licensing

staff. When these safety and environmental

reviews are completed, an Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board, also appointed by the Commission, will hold public hearings, review the

record on the project and recommend for or

against a license. The decision is subject to appeal before an Atomic Safety and Licensing

Appeal Board and may ultimately go before

the Commissioners for a final decision.

A license for Offshore Power Systems to

manufacture eight plants would be issued

under a policy adopted in April 1972 by the

Atomic Energy Commission, now the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission.15 Before that time,

all nuclear powerplant designs were reviewed

in detail, even in cases where a new plant

would be identical to designs that already had

been cleared by the Commission. The 1972

policy was adopted to move the nuclear

power industry toward a pattern of standardized powerplants to shorten the planning and

review process and, in turn, the lead time for

construction of nuclear plants. Under the

policy, a design for a plant that has been approved by the Commission can be used

repeatedly during at least a 5-year period

without further detailed review. Twenty-one

applications for approval of plants that duplicate earlier designs were on the Commission’s

docket as of December 31, 1975.16

The Coast Guard will review those aspects

of a floating plant design that relate to the

barge and must certify the barge as seaworthy

before a completed plant can be moved from

the Jacksonville shipyard to a permanent installation. Under a memorandum of understanding between the NRC and the Coast

Guard, a floating plant will not be cleared to

leave the shipyard without both Coast Guard

and NRC approval.17

A second round of Federal permits is required for Public Services Electric and Gas Co.

to construct a breakwater and prepare the site,

The NRC must approve the site for a nuclear

installation. The U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers must approve dredging and other

aspects of the project under the Rivers and

Harbors Act of 1899 and other acts.18

The NRC site-review process is similar to

that for a manufacturing license. A decision

will be made by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board after staff analysis of the plants and

public hearings in the Atlantic City area. A

decision is subject to appeal before an Atomic

Safety and Licensing Appeals Board and—in

some cases—to a final review and decision by

the Commission itself. A Commission decision can, in turn, be appealed in Federal court.

A third Federal permit, an operating

license, is required before fuel can be placed in

a reactor vessel to prepare a plant for operation. Public Service will initiate this final

review for the AGS about 3 years before its

first plant is scheduled for completion by submitting a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

and an Environmental Report. The Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation will conduct one

more analysis of the project, as will the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety. A public

hearing is mandatory if one is requested by

citizens in the construction region, The

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will approve or disapprove startup of the plant if

there is a hearing. If there is no hearing, NRC

staff issues the operating license. The same

avenues of appeal are available in the operating-license process as in the site-approval

process. 19
More than half of the licenses and permits

for the AGS must be issued by State and local

government in New Jersey.

The State of Florida must approve dredging

the St. John’s River that would link the

shipyard to the sea. It has approved water and

air quality control systems for the manufacturing plant site. The City of Jacksonville

already has issued permits for construction of

the manufacturing facility, which was underway in 1976.

Permits for construction of the AGS breakwater and burying of transmission cables to

shore must be issued by the Department of

Environmental Protection in New Jersey

which administers New Jersey riparian lands,

the State’s Wetlands Act, and the Coastal Area

Facilities Review Act.

The Department also must issue permits for

transmission lines that cross streams and for

any construction of onshore facilities in the

State’s coastal area.

The New Jersey Department of Labor and

Industry must issue a permit for construction

of the breakwater and installation of floating

powerplants. Local governments must approve onshore support facilities and laying of

underground cable between the coast and a

Tuckerton, N. J., switchyard. The State must

grant riparian rights to PSE&G for the site,

which may require the passage of special

legislation.

The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection also must issue a permit as

part of the final licensing process for loading

nuclear material into the floating plant’s reactor vessel.

Public Role in Licensing

Any citizen or group of citizens who can

demonstrate economic, environmental, or

other interests in the outcome of a licensing

case may petition for status as interveners. Intervenors, who also may include government

agencies, may petition either to support or oppose an application, and are present

throughout formal hearings, cross-examining

witnesses and presenting expert testimony of

their own. Interveners are selected from the

list of petitioners by the ASLB after a series of

preheating conferences on the basis of specific

areas of concern which they describe in their

petitions. A rejection of a petition to intervene

may be appealed to the Atomic Safety and

Licensing Appeals Board or to the courts.

Six interveners were chosen for hearings on

the Offshore Power Systems manufacturing

license after preheating conferences that

lasted from February 1974 to December 1975.

Formal hearings began in March 1976, in

Jacksonville, Fla., the site of the shipyard

where the floating powerplants would be

built. Because the licensing process for floating plants is unique in that plants will be built

in one location and installed in another, the

hearing was continued the following week in

Atlantic City, N.J.

In all formal hearings, the general public is

permitted at the outset to make brief statements either for or against a license. After

these opening statements, public participation

is limited to formal interveners.

Although the Atlantic City hearings were

technically confined to the environmental

effects of building floating plants in Florida,

Board Chairman Thomas Reilly opened the

Atlantic City hearings to a broad range of

questions and statements by the general

public.

Hearings on the manufacturing license will

proceed in four stages. The first hearings were

held in Jacksonville in late March. These hearings covered environmental aspects of the

manufacturing facility. Following the hearings in Jacksonville, two days of special hearings were held in Atlantic City to enable the

citizens of that area to make limited appearances before the ASLB.

.
The second phase of hearings was in

progress in Bethesda, Md., in mid-1976 covering radiological, safety, and health issues. The

third phase will also cover safety issues and

will follow the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s publication of its final Safety Evaluation

Report. The final hearings will cover general

environmental questions, including the findings of a Liquid Pathways Generic Study in

which the NRC will discuss the environmental impacts of a severe accident at the MidAtlantic Ocean sites which include the Atlantic Generating Station. These hearings will

begin in late fall of 1976 or early the following

year after the Liquid Pathways Generic Study

has been released.

A similar series of hearings will be held in

or near Atlantic City on the Public Service application to prepare an offshore site for two

floating nuclear plants (the Atlantic Generating Station). These hearings will probably not

begin before June of 1977.

Interveners in the manufacturing license

hearings are the Natural Resources Defense

Council, the Atlantic County Citizens Council

on the Environment, Atlantic County, N. J., the

city of Brigantine, N.J., the State of New

Jersey, which so far has not adopted a position

for or against the license, and Ken Walton, a

resident of Brigantine.

Interveners in the application by Public

Service for a license to prepare a site off the

New Jersey coast will include the six intervenors in the manufacturing license case as

well as a seventh, Ocean County, N.J.

costs

One argument in favor of floating nuclear

plants has been that the use of standardized

design and a centralized work force could

reduce the capital cost of floating plants below

that of land-based plants. However, any cost

advantages will be offset to some extent by the

additional expenses associated with a floating

plant, most importantly the massive break-

! ; ! ,

Figure IV-50. Cost estimates of nuclear units at time of

order vs. actual finished cost or estimate as of December 1975

Average Unit Cost,

$/kWe

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

12/75 EST. OF

FUTURE UNITS

R

AVERAGE OF THE

ORIGINALLY ANNOUNCED

1965 ’67 ’69 ’71 ’73 ’75

Source F.C Olds, “What Happened to the Nuclear Plant Program in 19757, ”

Power Engineering, 4/76, pp 83-85

water and buried transmission lines required

for an offshore site. Since the costs of constructing a land-based plant and of siting an

offshore plant depend heavily on specific sites,

it is difficult to make generalizations about the

possible overall cost advantages of the floating

plant.

An analysis for OTA concludes that the

capital costs of the AGS and a land-based

plant of identical capacity would be comparable.20 Assuming no unforeseen delays or overruns in either case, the AGS is expected to cost

$1.9 billion and a ‘comparable land-based

plant to cost $2.0 billion—a difference of
about 5 percent in a floating plant’s favor. The

possibility of error in forecasting could change

either or both of these figures as well as the

floating plant’s cost advantage.

The analysis also concludes that because of

the fixed-price contract that Public Service has

signed with Offshore Power Systems, delays

or overruns in construction costs would

widen the price advantage for the floating

system to about 10 percent.

About 80 percent of the total cost of the

AGS is represented by the floating plants.

Offshore Power Systems, and not Public Service, will be responsible for cost overruns in

plant construction. In the standard land-based

construction contract, a utility company has

only about 20 percent of its total costs fixed by

contract and is responsible for any overruns

in the remaining 80 percent of the total cost.

The largest additional costs that could be

associated with the AGS are for the breakwater and underwater power cables, which

are now estimated at $250 million without

escalation or overruns. Public Service would

be responsible for overruns on these items.

However, the floating plants would compare

favorably with land-based plants even if the

costs of a breakwater were to exceed the

budget by 50 percent.

Under the worst circumstances, the analysis

shows, the costs of the AGS probably will not

be higher than the costs of a comparable landbased plant.

Assembly

Offshore Power Systems has completed

Figure IV-51. Floating nuclear powerplants manufacturing facility, Jacksonville, Florida

Source Offshore Power Systems, Inc
several buildings at its Jacksonville, Fla.,

shipyard and begun dredging a graving dock

or drydock and a slipway some 415 feet wide

which will be the center of the assembly procedure for floating nuclear powerplants,

Fabrication of each floating plant begins

with construction of a barge in the graving

dock at the upper end of the slipway that runs

between a series of production shop areas.

When the barge is completed, it is floated,

towed along the slip, and moored at successive production areas where workers

assemble and mount elements of the

powerplant on the barge. The final stage of

construction takes place at the lower end of

the slip where the powerplant is tested, certified, and towed down the St. John’s River.

Offshore Power Systems estimates that the

first plant will take about 4 years to build but

that at peak production the facility could turn

out four to five plants a year with an average

construction time of 27 months per plant and

a peak work force of 13,800.21

Before a floating plant leaves the Jacksonville shipyard, it will be tested under NRC

supervision to verify that it meets design

standards. Coast Guard inspectors will inspect

the barge to certify its seaworthiness. Electrical systems, controls, and steam-generating

systems will be tested under simulated operating conditions. No nuclear fuel will be placed

aboard a floating plant until it is moored inside its breakwater.

Breakwater Construction

It will take a crew of about 350 offshore

workers 4 years to build the breakwater,

working around the clock in 8 hour shifts.

Less than half of these workers will actually

work at the site. On an average, two barges

will arrive each day from quarries in New

Jersey or New England, carrying rock for the

breakwater.

Dredges will prepare the breakwater site by

cutting away nearly 1 million tons of ocean

floor to expose more stable sediment than

now exists at the site, A layer of rock over the

dredged area will form the bottom of the

mooring basin. Mooring caissons will be

placed inside the breakwater before the first

floating plants are installed. To complete the

shield, a line of seven concrete caissons—

ranging in length from 100 to 300 feet—will

be floated into position behind the first

powerplant and filled with sand to settle them

to the bottom. Two caissons later will be

emptied, refloated, and moved out of the way

to allow installation of the second floating

plant.

A gap of about 180 feet between the rock

breakwater and the landward line of caissons

will permit a flow of cooling water to the

powerplant intakes and access for service

ships.

Transmission System

About 100 workers will be involved over a

period of more than 2 years in building a link

between the breakwater and Public Service’s

distribution network.

Fifteen cables will be laid between the

breakwater and the shore, buried 10 feet

beneath the stable ocean floor with jetting

devices that carve a trench in bottom sediment

with high pressure streams of water and compressed air directed through nozzles. Jetting is

a device commonly used in burying communication cables and pipelines. Between the

coast and a switchyard at Tuckerton, N. J., a

distance of about 7 miles, the cable will be

buried under Great Bay Boulevard. Overhead

transmission lines will carry the AGS power

from Tuckerton to Forked River where it will

be directed into the distribution network.

Plant Installation

After the breakwater and transmission

system are completed, the first floating plant

will start north from Jacksonville, towed by

four seagoing tugs at a speed of about 3 knots.

The trip, which will take 10 to 14 days, will be
,

i

1(1 ! > , , . , , , / , , , , ~, , I ‘\ .\ ‘, ‘, r

supervised by the Coast Guard in consultation

with the National Weather Service to reduce

the risk of encountering storms.

The final phase of preparing plants for

operation will involve mooring them to concrete caissons inside the breakwater with

metal struts about 72 feet long which have

double-action hinges at each end. Eight struts

run between the sides of a barge and the

caissons. The hinges permit the struts to hold

the barges in position but still accommodate a

rising and falling motion inside the breakwater.

When the barges are moored, six outfall

pipes-each nearly 8 feet in diameter and

curving at right angles to the barge platform—

will be positioned over catchment basins built

inside the breakwater. Cooling water will be

discharged through the pipes, into the catchment basin, and will flow into the open sea

around the breakwater through a culvert built

through the central closure caisson.

Operation

The procedures that will be followed in putting the floating plants into operation will be

similar to those used for land-based nuclear

plants.

Nuclear fuel will be placed aboard floating

plants after they are secured inside the breakwater and after final clearance from the NRC

and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. Arranging fuel rods to produce a critical mass of uranium within the

reactor vessel takes 4 to 6 months and is

monitored step-by-step by NRC inspectors.

During operations, two full crews, totaling

87 employees among the two plants, will be

aboard the floating plants for periods of 3

days, one manning the plant and the other on

standby, Personnel normally will commute

from shore by boat, although the breakwaters

or an adjacent site may have helicopter pads

to permit shuttling personnel or equipment by

air,

, ,

1, I \

Key powerplant personnel are licensed by

the NRC and any member of the plant crew

who will manipulate any of the reactor controls must pass a written NRC examination

before being licensed.

Fuel Supply

About 30 metric tons of fresh fuel will be

carried to each floating plant annually to

replace some 30 metric tons of spent fuel,

which will be temporarily stored on the plant

platform, and then carried to shore to be

stored until U.S. reprocessing plants are back

in operation.

The fission process which powers a nuclear

plant occurs when an atom of uranium-235 is

split apart (fissioned) by a slow neutron, discharging an average of 2.5 new neutrons,

which can in turn split other U-235 atoms to

continue the chain reaction and produce heat

for steam generation. Plutonium is created as

a byproduct of fission when slow neutrons

are captured by U-238 atoms rather than

U-235 atoms, the only fissionable uranium

isotope.

Over a period of a year, the fission process

in a reactor core depletes the U-235, much as a

burning coal becomes encased in ash, to the

point that one-third of the rods must be

replaced. The spent fuel rods are removed and

replaced with fresh rods.

Because a fuel rod continues to generate

heat, even after removal from a reactor core,

spent fuel is kept in storage pools of circulating water for several months until radioactive

isotopes have decayed enough to reduce the

output of heat. Spent fuel rods then should be

packed and shipped to reprocessing plants

where residual uranium-235 and plutonium

are removed for recycling into new fuel

pellets.

As of early 1976, no reprocessing plants

were operating in the United States. A new

plant in Barnwell, S. C., was nearing comple-
tion. A second plant in West Valley, N. Y., had

been closed since 1972 for modification and

expansion and was not scheduled to reopen

before 1978.22 Future operations depend on a

final decision on whether to recycle

plutonium.

Recent practice has been for nuclear plants

to hold spent fuel in storage basins at the plant

site until such time as the Barnwell and upstate New York reprocessing plants are open.

In its 1975 annual report, the NRC said that as

many as 10 nuclear plants would fill their

holding areas to capacity by 1978. 23 Landbased plants generally have the space to expand storage facilities, but a floating plant

would have limited space for expansion even

though storage pool capacity can be trebled if

storage racks are placed closer together.

An implicit assumption appears to have

been made in planning for floating nuclear

plants that the reprocessing system will be in

operation by 1985 and that the question of

space for long-term storage of spent fuel from

a floating plant will be moot. If, on the other

hand, no central storage area has been approved by the time the floating nuclear plants

are in operation, the storage question could

present an obstacle to operational licensing.

Waste Handling

Waste handling practices aboard a floating

nuclear plant will be similar to those required

by the NRC at land-based plants.

In addition to spent fuel, a nuclear

powerplant with a capacity of 1,150 MWe will

produce about 1,000, 55-gallon drums of other

radioactive waste a year. Bombardment of a

reactor vessel and its coolant system with

neutrons creates radioactive isotopes, particularly in material that enters the coolant

through wear or corrosion and is carried

through the fuel core. Radioactive gases also

are created in the coolant cycle. Other radioactive particles lodge in tools, laboratory

glassware, and protective clothing.

Radioactive particles are continuously

filtered from the coolant and steam-generating systems. Radionuclides with long lives are

separated from waste water and mixed with

cement and vermiculite to form a sludge

which is packed into 55-gallon drums for

shipment to shore and storage underground.

Figure IV-52. Annual shipments of radioactive materials

to and from the two-unit Atlantic Generating Station

OPERATION SHIPMENTS PER YEAR

Barge Land

to shore transfer

point.

2. Shore transfer point

to offshore powerplant.

Spent (irradiated) fuel: a

1. Offshore powerplant

to shore transfer

point.

2. Shore transfer point

to fuel reprocessing

facility.

4 to 10 bargesc

120 trucks or

20 rail cars

Solid radioactive wastes:

1.

2.

Offshore powerplant 4 to10 bargesc

to shore transfer

point.

Shore transfer point 92 trucks or 22

to licensed radio- rail cars

active waste

disposal facility.

aThe shipment of empty fuel casks and casks for irradiated fuel will require essentially the same number

of shipments as when loaded. However, the radioactivity hazard will be negligible.

b Initial loading of reactor requires about 18 truck-

~ loads of unirradiated fuel. Shipment of unirradiated ~

t

fuel by rail is usually ruled out because of length of ~

. transit time. 1

c Number depends on capacity of barge. { —

Source Atlantic Generating Station, Draft Environmental Statement
Water containing radionuclides with short

lives is stored in holding tanks until the particles have decayed and then is discharged into

the sea. Contaminated gases go through a

similar filtering and holding process. Contaminated clothing and other solid material

also are packed into 55-gallon drums for shipment to storage areas ashore.

Even with these filtering systems, trace

amounts of radioactivity remain in some of

the liquid discharged from nuclea r

powerplants. For example, tritium, a radioactive form of hydrogen, is released from

nuclear facilities after it combines with oxygen

in the form of water.

Tritium has a half-life of 12.3 years. It is extremely difficult to separate out from ordinary

water because water formed with tritium is

chemically indistinguishable from ordinary

water.

Nuclear fuel will be loaded into the floating

nuclear powerplants after each unit has been

towed to the AGS site, properly installed

within the protective breakwater, prepared for

operation and licensed to operate by the NRC.

All handling of fuel and radioactive waste

material within the plant and transportation

to and from the plant is the responsibility of

Public Service Electric and Gas Co. and regulated by NRC.

The potential environmental impact of

transporting fuel and radioactive wastes to

and from land-based nuclear powerplants has

been evaluated by NRC.24 As a result of that

study, major emphasis is placed on packaging

of radioactive materials because radioactive

materials could be involved in accidents between shore and an offshore plant. All

packaging must meet the regulatory standards

established by NRC, DOT, and State government. There are memoranda of understanding

between NRC and other government

organizations, drafted to avoid unnecessary

duplication of standards.

The potential environmental impact of

transporting fuel and radioactive waste to and

from the floating nuclear plant site is evaluated in similar language in environmental impact statements for both the manufacturing

license of Offshore Power Systems and the

construction permit of the AGS.

The standards and tests required by NRC

for shipping containers are both rigorous and

exhaustive. However, NRC has not specified

unique design and test requirements for casks

and drums for floating nuclear powerplants in

particular. Nor has it outlined special procedures for handling these casks and drums. A

sample survey of environmental and safety

operating license documents issued by NRC

for land-based nuclear powerplants finds that

hardware design criteria and procedural requirements are not described in more detail

than language in the NRC study of transport

of radioactive materials, which states that:

Safety in radioactive materials transport

is achieved through design standards on

packaging and implementation of a

quality assurance program, including

proof-testing and independent reviews,

to assure conformance, to correct

problems, and to help assure continued

satisfactory (design) performance over

the lifetime of the package under normal

and accident conditions.25

The draft environmental impact statement

for the AGS describes a most likely pattern for

the fuel and waste handling system. 26 The

casks and drums will be similar to those currently in use with land-based nuclear powerplants. Each shipment to or from AGS is expected to be by barge or ship. Current Coast

Guard requirements mandate that irradiated

fuel be carried in a type-A, or double-walled

and “less likely to sink” vessel. Casks must be

secured aboard a vessel so they will be easier

to find and recover in case the vessel sinks.

Ships and barges carrying radioactive wastes

are restricted—to the extent possible—to
operations where water depths do not exceed

150 meters. NRC regulations require a cask

design that will withstand an external

pressure equal to the pressure at a water depth

of 50 feet, but most designs will withstand

pressures at greater water depths.

About 30 metric tons of fresh nuclear fuel,

30 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, and

several hundred drums of solid radioactive

wastes must be transported annually either to

or from each floating reactor. The transfer of

nuclear fuel and radioactive materials to and

from floating plants will involve the transfer

of loaded casks to a barge or ship. A shore

facility or transfer point also will be required.

These transfer conditions are different from

those at land-based nuclear powerplants

where transportation is by truck or rail. Except for the transfer, shipments to a fuel

reprocessing plant or to a waste disposal

facility will follow the same pattern as those

for land-based nuclear powerplants.

The estimated number of shipments annually to and from AGS appears in figure

IV-52. The total number of shipments by

vessel range from 10 to 24 per year, depending

on the capacity of the vessel. The number of

truck and/or rail shipments depends upon the

method of transportation. Coast Guard

statistics are used in the NRC reports to estimate the probability of a barge accident, but it

is unclear how these may apply to the open

ocean site because those accident statistics are

based largely on inland waterways traffic.

However, the NRC conclusion is that there are

only small differences in the accident probabilities among truck, train, and barge. The

radiological impact on the general population

of transporting fuel and waste from the AGS is

expected to differ little from that associated

with a land-based plant.

OTA supplemented the NRC analysis by

making a detailed comparison of fuel-handling operations between AGS and two 1,150

MWe land-based nuclear powerplants—the

D.C. Cook and Sequoyah plants—that are

similar in many respects to the proposed

offshore plants.27 Topics included in the comparison were fuel type and radioactive inventory, transportation of new and irradiated

fuel, fuel handling in the plant, new fuel

storage, spent fuel storage, and fuel handling

accidents. No differences were found among

the three plants in terms of the amounts of

fuel handled or general fuel handling procedures. There are specific differences in fuel

and cask handling associated with the transfer

of a shipping cask from land to a transfer boat

or barge and between a barge and a nuclear

platform. There are differences, too, in handling fuel on a floating plant under a condition of one-half degree combined pitch and

roll.

There is insufficient information to verify

whether loading and unloading features

unique to the floating plant pose significantly

greater risks than fuel handling at a landbased nuclear plant, However, engineering

judgment suggests that cash transfers and the

other fuel-handling operations can be

designed and performed without undue risk.

Transportation of materials to and from

land-based nuclear plants involves trucks and

railroads. With a floating nuclear powerplant,

barge transportation will be added to the

logistic pattern.

There appears to be no inherent reason why

water transportation would involve greater

risks than truck or railroad transportation

provided that handling procedures are

analyzed and specified in advance. However,

no detailed procedures or system designs have

been prescribed for the segment of transportation of materials for floating nuclear plants

that will involve barges. The Department of

Transportation has responsibility to formulate

regulations for transportation of radioactive

materials.

This study concludes, however, that the
step-by-step analysis of transferring materials

from truck to barge or boat at a waterfront site

and the precautions that might be necessary to

protect a barge enroute to a floating nuclear

plant has not been made. By the same token,

there are no procedures that specify steps to

be taken, for example, in transferring spent

fuel from a floating plant to a barge and from

a barge to a truck or railroad car on shore.

Decommissioning

Earlier studies of methods for decommissioning a floating nuclear powerplant suggested that a plant might be sunk or

mothballed for 50 years until highly radioactive elements of the plant could be removed

manually.

The OTA analysis indicates that neither of

these options would be workable under present guidelines and that the plant’s radioactive

elements probably would have to be removed

with remotely controlled equipment on the

site.

The fuel elements are the only radioactive

material in a nuclear reactor when it begins

operations. However, bombardment by the

neutrons released in the nuclear fission process make other components of the reactor,

particularly the reactor vessel and its internal

parts, highly radioactive during the course of

operation. Because these levels of induced

radioactivity are dangerously high, the owner

of a nuclear powerplant must take steps to ensure that public health and safety are protected after the end of the plant’s useful life.

Forty years is the maximum period for

which a license to operate a nuclear plant is

issued by NRC.28 An operator then must

renew the license for an additional period or

apply for termination of the license and for

permission to dismantle a plant and dispose of

the radioactive components.29 If technical,

economic, or other factors dictate, the operator may elect to terminate operations earlier

than the expiration of the operating license.

The applicant must demonstrate when he applies for the original operating license that he

possesses “or has reasonable assurance of obtaining the funds necessary to cover the estimated costs of permanently shutting the

facility down and maintaining it in a safe condition.’’ 30 The activities of shutting down

operations and dismantling the plant-or

maintaining it in a safe condition—are

referred to as “decommissioning.”

Current NRC positions also require maintenance of a “possession-only” license for as

long as there is significant residual radioactivity in a decommissioned facility.31 The conditions of the license require plant protection

for public health and safety.

The NRC now acknowledges three basic

modes of decommissioning—mothballing, entombment, and dismantlement.32

Mothballing is sealing to prevent radioactive releases from the pressure vessel, the

biological shield, or other buildings. Protective maintenance is required as long as levels

of residual radiation within the plant exceed

specified criteria.

Entombment is a much more complete sealing, accomplished by encasing the pressure

vessel and all other residual activated

materials within a poured concrete structure

integral with the biological shield. The primary difference between mothballing and entombment is the degree of protection needed.

The mothballed plant may require a full-time

protective force until residual radiation no

longer poses a health and safety hazard. The

entombed plant may or may not require a protective force.

For dismantling, activated components are

cut up within the biological shield (including

the pressure vessel and its contents) and

deposited in a licensed burial site. A completely dismantled facility has no licensing requirements because it no longer contains

radioactive materials that could pose a hazard
Figure IV-53. Probable actions to be taken in decommissioning a floating nuclear powerplant by various

methods

—. .- - —.

PLANT COMPONENT

Barge

Biological shield

Equipment within

biological shield

Rest of plant on

the barge

METHOD 1.

Permanent Iay-upa

Seaworthiness must be

maintained

Sealed to prevent access

and loss of radioactive

materials and to reduce

deterioration of contents

Pressure vessel sealed

with inert gas or other

means to prevent corrosion; all other equipment

treated to prevent corrosion

and deterioration

Individual buildings sealed

with provisions for maintenance access; equipment

treated to reduce corrosion

and deteriorate ion

METHOD 2.

DismantIing and onshore

disposal b

Seaworthiness must be

maintained until plant is at

dismantling site

Sealed during transit from

offshore-site to dismantling site

Sealed during transit from

offshore site to dismantling site

Some equipment may be

salvaged or scrapped at

offshore site; remainder

of plant tied down for

transit to dismantling site

a If lay-up is at offshore site, the entrance to the breakwater would probably be

might be- installed on the barge to protect the plant from sea and storm action

b Breakwater has to be partly dismantled to permit barge egress

METHOD 3.

Decontamination and

sinkingb

Seaworthiness must be

maintained until plant is at

sea dumping site

Surfaces coated where

necessary to prevent loss of

radioactive material c

Pressure vessel probably

filled with concrete and

sealed to prevent exposure

to seawater at depth; all

other equipment treated to

reduce corrosion rate and

deteriorate ion

All salvageable material removed while plant is in

breakwater; nonsalvageable

material likely to float made

sinkable

closed. Additional structures

c Adequate protection against loss of radioactive materials after dumping may require extensive modification of

the biological shield and will have to be balanced against the almost negligible hazard of radioactivity released by

rusting reinforcing steel in the shield

Source Atlantlc Generating StatIon, Draft Enwronmental Impact Statement.

to the public health.

Three primary alternatives for decommissioning the floating plants have been proposed: permanent layup (mothballing), dismantling (with onshore disposal of the

radioactive materials), and decontamination

and sinking. A fourth option—a 50-year layup

followed by dismantling—also has been suggested.

Figure IV–53 summarizes the NRC’s view

of the actions that might be taken for each of

the three basic options, which are subsequently discussed in turn.

Decommissioning Alternatives

NRC studies suggest that all of the decommissioning options listed here may be possible. However, OTA’s brief analysis discloses

uncertainties about all alternatives except that

of dismantling and removing the radioactive

components on-site. It is the most expensive

of the options. The NRC environmental impact statement is based on an Offshore Power

System analysis which did not directly calculate the radioactive inventory that would be

found in the plant at the end of its life. It

simply used estimates derived by extrapolating the results from decommissioning small

(less than 50 MWe) power reactors.

PERMANENT LAYUP

A floating plant could be decommissioned

by placing it in permanent storage, either
within its breakwater or in an estuary or river.

A possession-only license would be required

as long as radioactive parts posed a public

health and safety threat. If the internal equipment were sealed and not entombed, this option would require protective custody for the

duration of a possession-only license.

If layup were undertaken at the original

breakwater site, the cost would include maintenance of the breakwater as well as a protective force. However, if the barge were seaworthy at the end of the life of the plant, it could

be towed to a specialized shore facility

(perhaps the original construction facility

modified to handle radioactive materials)

where the plant could be permanently stored

under surveillance.

Simple layup of a plant would not be

reasonable under present guidelines because

some long-life isotopes could be present

which would require guaranteed plant

security for not only the several hundred

years required by Ni63, but possibly for as

long as the 500,000 years that Ni59 would pose

a health hazard.

Layup with in-place entombment of the internals does not appear feasible either because

the integrity of the entombment structure containing the radioactive materials for such extended periods cannot be assured.

Past experience indicates that 200 years

may be the limit for structural integrity of an

entombed plant. For example, in entombing

one reactor that had been active for far less

than 40 years, a portion of the core internals

had to be removed and disposed of at a burial

site due to excessive Ni63 activity which would

have required structural integrity of the entombment for a period exceeding 200 years.

Consequently, some degree of dismantling appears necessary for decommissioning power

reactors of the size scheduled for floating

plants.

DISMANTLING AND ONSHORE DISPOSAL

OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

Unlike the layup option, dismantling would

entail removal of radioactive components,

their disposal at a licensed burial site onshore

and salvaging or scrapping the remainder of

the plant. The NRC environmental impact

statement suggests that this could be done for

a floating plant at less cost than for a landbased plant if a specialized onshore disassembly facility were available and if the floating

barge were seaworthy enough. However, it

also appears technically and economically.

feasible to dismantle and remove radioactive

components at the original plant site inside

the breakwater before towing to a drydock for

disassembly, this option probably would not

cost less than decommissioning a land-based

plant.

Immediate dismantling and removal of

radioactive components for disposal at a

licensed burial site appears to be a viable alternative for decommissioning floating plants. It

would require the same type of tooling

development as required for any land-based

light water reactor—the development of

remotely operated equipment such as a

plasma torch manipulator for cutting up the

pressure vessel and its internal parts. There

appear to be no unique risks or engineering

requirements associated with dismantling an

FNP as compared to a land-based plant.

Equivalent land-based disposal sites would be

required. OTA has compared recent cost

analyses for this option and concluded that

the cost of dismantling each floating nuclear

plant would be under $50 million.33

Technically speaking, dismantling could be

done either at the original plant site, or at a

specialized shore-based facility, as suggested

by the Offshore Power Systems. However,

dismantling at a location other than the plant

site would require towing the radioactive

plant which would, in turn, entail the risk that
the plant might sink enroute with all the

radioactive components in place.

The plant would be sealed before towing,

but even a completely entombed plant could

pose a hazard if sunk because of the long halflives of some elements in the radioactive inventory. Thus, there may be some risk associated with any of the options in which the

radioactive plant is towed. However, the NRC

environmental statement on the AGS concludes that it is most likely that decommissioning would be done at a site other than the

operating site.

The risks involved in towing a plant to a

nearby shore site may be small, but they could

be much greater if it were towed back to the

original construction facility in Jacksonville,

as has been suggested. The removal of the

radioactive components in place before towing the barge elsewhere for salvage appears to

be the most viable option until the level of risk

is properly assessed.

DECONTAMINATION AND SINKING

One possible option for decommissioning

floating plants not available for land-based

plants has been suggested by Offshore Power

Systems. It involves on-site salvage of all

materials of value and removal of all radioactive materials except the pressure vessel and

its internals. All remaining radioactive piping

and vessels then would be sealed and the plant

would be towed to a deepwater site and sunk.

Projected costs for this option are by far the

lowest, and land-burial site requirements are

much lower.

The problem of guaranteeing the integrity

of an entombed plant long enough for

radioactivity to decay to safe levels applies to

the sinking option as well. The problem may

be more severe with sinking because of the additional corrosive effect of seawater on the entombment structure.

NRC has not yet established any special

( I { l\ — I ‘)1’i L +\l( )K ( ~1

decommissioning criteria

clear whether integrity

maintained as long for a

for the FNP. It is not

would have to be

sunken plant as for

an onshore plant. The plant would

automatically be isolated from human contact

and would be shielded by the water, but other

problems may result from corrosion of

radioactive components if the seals were

breached. These uncertainties would have to

be resolved before sinking could be considered a viable option.

FIFTY-YEAR LAYUP FOLLOWED BY DISMANTLING

A combination of mothballing and later dismantling could reduce the overall decommissioning cost by cutting dismantling costs. The

plant would remain intact in the breakwater

or at another site for about 50 years by which

time Offshore Power Systems projects that induced radioactivity would have decayed

enough to considerably reduce the difficulty

in dismantling.

The Offshore Power Systems analysis indicates that a 50-year layup period would allow

the levels of radioactivity in the reactor to

decay enough to simplify the process of dismantling which would, in turn, reduce the

cost of decommissioning.

OTA’s analysis, based on the study of the

actual end-of-life inventory that could be expected in a reactor of the size used in a floating

plant, indicates that dismantling would be a

relatively simple operation only after a layup

period of about 110 years.

Under the combination layup-and-dismantling, the plant would be moved from a

storage site at the end of the layup period to a

facility where the barge and nonradioactive

parts of the plant could be scrapped or

salvaged (after dismantling the radioactive

components).

The extended layup period may present a

problem because of the difficulty of maintaining the barge in seaworthy condition for a
total of 150 years (40 years of operation plus

110 years of storage). Consequently, it appears

that immediate dismantling may be more

feasible, even though the cost is somewhat

higher. 34

In summary, there is doubt about some of

the principal options proposed for floating

plant decommissioning because of the size of

the end-of-life radioactive inventory of the

reactor and the very long half-lives of some of

the particular isotopes in the inventory. The

extremely long protective storage period that

is required before radioactive pressure vessel

internals decay to safe levels rules out permanent storage. Intentional sinking or alternatives that run the risk of accidental sinking of

the activated plant during towing may not be

acceptable because of the difficulty of guaranteeing the structural integrity of seals for more

than 200 years or so, far less than the time required for radioactivity to decay to acceptable

levels. However, the option of simply dismantling the radioactive internals at the plant site

and disposing of them appears to be technically feasible and economically viable.

River and Bay Sites

A floating nuclear powerplant can be located in a river, lake, bay, or inland lagoon as

well as at sea as long as there is a channel to

the site. An access channel must be at least 500

feet wide and 35 feet deep. This could require

dredging that would cause more environmental damage than would installing a plant in

the open ocean.

Installing a barge-mounted powerplant

near shore or in a lagoon would mean giving

up the advantage of unlimited supplies of

cooling water that an ocean site provides. If

cooling towers are required for a land-based

plant, they will be required for a floating plant

in the same general area.

Dredging will be necessary to tow a floating

nuclear plant to any near-shore site in

Delaware Bay.

A breakwater probably would be required,

but it will cost substantially less than a breakwater off the Atlantic coast. In many areas, a

causeway can provide access to a near-shore

floating plant as well as a base for overhead

transmission cables.

Licensing procedures for a near-shore or

lagoon-based plant are similar to those for an

offshore plant. One exception in Delaware Bay

is that the Delaware River Basin Commission

will be added to the list of licensing agencies.

EPA guidelines may require cooling towers

for all nuclear steam-electric plants in

Delaware Bay estuaries.

Conventional Nuclear Plants

New Jersey’s three major public utilities are

building or awaiting approval of six landbased nuclear powerplants, the last of which

would come on-line in 1984.

Two Salem County plants are scheduled for

completion by 1979. Two other plants are to

be built at Hope Creek, near the Salem plants,

the second plant to begin generating power in

1984. Jersey Central Power and Light Company is building one nuclear plant at Forked

River, N.J., on the Atlantic coast north of

Atlantic City. It is sharing the cost of building

a plant at Three-Mile Island in the Susquehan -

na River near Harrisburg, Pa. Both are

scheduled to start operating in 1982.

Population densities and limited water supplies in northern New Jersey probably will

dictate southern sites for any nuclear plants

built in addition to the six already planned.

Public Service and Atlantic City Electric

jointly own 5,400 acres of land near the community of Bayside about 10 miles south of the

Hope Creek site. In theory, the acreage could

accommodate at least four, 1,500 megawatt,

nuclear generating Plants.

.
Figure IV-54. Three siting alternatives for floating nuclear plants

1. Nearshore siting-open-cycle cooling

2. Inshore siting—cooling towers

3. Riverine siting-open-cycle cooling Source Offshore Power Systems, Inc
COASTAL EFFECTS

During this study, OTA analyzed the technical, safety, and environmental reports on

offshore nuclear plants published by Offshore

Power Systems, NRC, Council on Environmental Quality, Public Service Electric & Gas

Co., and others, and the comments of intervenors in the licensing process.

This critical review has been supplemented

by additional research on issues which earlier

studies did not explore in sufficient depth or

about which there were substantial

differences of opinion between interveners

and nuclear specialists.

This section discusses the effects of installing and operating offshore nuclear plants in

two categories: 1.) areas in which there seems

to be general technical agreement about the

con sequences o f installing offshore

powerplants, and 2.) areas in which OTA

research raises questions about some aspects

of published studies.

The first category includes such areas of

concern as the effects of an AGS on land use,

water supply, job opportunities, the ocean environment, traditional uses of the ocean, and

the New Jersey energy supply. It also includes

economic benefits which may occur from the

floating nuclear plant concept.

The second category includes issues of

safety, fuel handling, decommissioning, and

the particular relationship between AGS and

the coastal communities that depend heavily

on tourists for their livelihood.

NRC published a draft environmental statement in April 1976 covering the proposed

AGS project. The environmental statement includes a comprehensive analysis of energy

and economic benefits, monetary costs, and

environmental costs of the proposed projects.

The statement concludes that the project “will

have accrued economic and social benefits

that outweigh the economic, environmental,

and social” costs. ” Figures IV–55 and IV–56

are reproduced from this environmental statement,

Direct Benefits

The direct benefits estimated by NRC from

the proposed AGS include the production of

15.7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually, divided about equally among residential, industrial, and commercial users.35 Indirect benefits include employment of about

850 local workers with a $100 million payroll

during construction and 250 with a $5 million

payroll annually during operation of the

plants, taxes of about $80 million annually

distributed to municipalities, and about $10

million annually of local material purchases.

Construction of barge-mounted nuclear

plants offshore will provide substantially

fewer direct construction jobs in the New

Jersey region than would land-based plants.

As with any new generating plant, however,

the additional electricity would support existing jobs and make new job opportunities

available in the State.

The NRC uses a peak-employment figure

for land-based plants of slightly more than

2,000 employees.36 Peak local employment for

a floating nuclear station off Atlantic City estimated by Public Service is about 500 workers,

few of whom will be the kinds of skilled

workers, like welders and electricians, who

are needed for construction of a land-based

plant.

Public Service estimates for employment

are that about 350 workers will be required

over a 4-year period for construction of a

breakwater, including barge crewmembers.

About 100 workers will lay cables and build

the overhead transmission lines. About 50

workers will be required to build a staging
Figure IV-55. Benefits from the proposed Atlantic Generating Station

, DIRECT BENEFITS

, Electrical energy generation

Capacity

Annual electrical energy generation

(millions of kilowatt-hours)

At 0.78 plant factor

At 0.6 plant factor

Proportional distribution of electrical

energy

PSE&G

Residential

Industrial

Commercial

Other

State of New Jersey

Residential

Industrial and commercial

Other

INDIRECT BENEFITS

Employment

Construction (excluding FNP

manufacture)

Construction (total)

Operation (annual)

to municipalities annually, millions

of 1995 dollars

. Local material purchases, millions of

Construction (total)

Operation (annual)

2300 MWe

15,700

12,100

27%

4170

31 %

1%

32%

66.570

1.570

850

200-300

100

5

69-90

15

10

. . . . . . . . . .

Source Table 104, Draft Environmental Statement on the Atlantic Generating

Station

area. Other workers will be required to work

in a dolos casting yard which may be also located in New Jersey.

If all of the expanded generating capacity of

New Jersey were to be provided by offshore

powerplants between now and 1995, the State

could lose workers of certain skills to other

States in which land-based plants were being

built. On the other hand, there is presently a

shortage of certain skills such as welders in

New Jersey and other States today.

3

Figure IV–56

Economics

displays NRC’s estimates

compared to Public Service estimates of

capital and operating costs for the AGS. The

economic consequences of these costs compared to those of an equivalent land-based

plant were analyzed by OTA and are discussed in staff working paper No. 10. The conclusion of this analysis follows.

An absolute reduction in electricity prices

from nuclear reactors remains a hope rather

than an accomplishment because of continuing increases in the capital costs of nuclear

powerplants. The trend of actual capital costs

of land-based plants as the units come into

operation is consistently much higher than

original estimates. Costs of three times

original estimates have not been uncommon.

Cost increases for nuclear plants have consistently exceeded overall inflation rates.

Although the nuclear industry and even recent Government publications maintain that

this trend will not continue, there is no evidence that the constant dollar costs of nuclear

Figure IV-56. Monetary costs of construction and operation of the Atlantic Generating Station

,! ,, . . . .- -- ..-”...- -!.. ..... -- ..- ..-- —.-..-. . . . . . --- - -.

IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Applicant a

Capital costs, 1985 2285

Annual operating and main- 15.6

tenance costs (O&M)c

Annual fuel costsc

53.4

1985 present worth of fuel 649

and O&M costs

Total 1985 present worth 2934

aComputed by the staff from data in the Environmental Report

b

Derived independently by the staff

Staff b

2300

26.7

149

1659

3959

‘Operation at 0.78 plant factor

Source Table 105, Draft Environmental Statement on the Atlantic Generating

Station
powerplants have begun to stabilize. In fact, switchyard. Most of this land, however, will

all available evidence points clearly to further be under Great Bay Boulevard and will not inconstant dollar increases in nuclear plant volve additional disturbance of the marsh

capital costs. area.

As noted earlier, the floating plant concept WATER USE

may help resolve the problem of escalating

costs if the pattern of fixed-price contracts that The once-through cooling system proposed

has been established for the AGS is extended for the AGS will circulate more than 2 million

to all floating plants. By the same token, some gallons of seawater per minute through the

fixed-price contracts could probably be ap- two plants.

plied to all nuclear plants. They have in the

past, by means of turn-key projects, but vendors lost a great deal of money because of cost

overruns.

Environmental and Social Effects

The NRC summary of environmental

effects is displayed in figure IV–57. These

effects include the categories of land use,

water use, impacts on marine ecology, impacts

on land ecosystems, local community impacts,

and radiological impacts on man and other

life.

LAND USE

The largest requirements for onshore land

are for a 100-acre switchyard at Tuckerton,

N.J., and for 1,870 acres37 for rights-of-way

for overhead transmission lines through the

Pine Barrens between Tuckerton and Forked

River, some 22 miles to the north. However,

Public Service plans to build both of these

transmission facilities to move power from its

All 1,150-MWe plants run roughly 1

million gallons per minute through their condensers. Cooling towers make it possible to

recycle the cooling water and reduce thermal

pollution, but about 10,000 to 20,000 gallons

per minute is lost in cooling towers through

evaporation. 38

Discharge of cooling water at 16.1 degrees

above the intake water temperature will heat

surrounding ocean waters above normal in a

plume extending 200 or 250 feet from the

breakwater. Beyond 1,750 feet, mixing that

results from jet diffusion as well as wind and

wave action will dilute the plume to three

degrees- or less above normal temperatures.

The NRC’s draft environmental impact

statement estimated that under the worst

plausible conditions of wave and current, a

plume could reach the Great Bay Estuary at

temperatures 1 degree higher than ambient

water temperatures.

Salem and Hope Creek nuclear plants and the

land would be needed whether or not the AGS WATER USE CONFLICTS

is built. The most important conflict which the

Public Service anticipates that a 4-acre

waterfront site will be required for a staging

and support area during construction of the

offshore facility and for office space after the

plant is in operation.

A corridor through about 5.5 miles of salt

marsh between Great Bay Peninsula and

breakwater will pose with present ocean uses

is for shipping. Although Public Service estimates that there is only slightly more than 1

chance in 1,000 that a large ship would ram

the breakwater in any year, the breakwater

does represent a new potential for collision.

The Public Service estimate is based on comparisons of ship collision data in the Gulf of

Tuckerton will be required for buried cables to Mexico near offshore oil platforms and traffic

transmit power from the offshore plant to the in the New York area.39
The area in which the generating station is

to be built is a popular sport and commercial

fishing area. Because the breakwater will

preempt a relatively insignificant amount of

waters available for fishing and because reefs

tend to attract fish, the area around the breakwater eventually may increase fishing opportunity.

The NRC analysis (see figure IV–57) concludes that increased water surface traffic

associated with construction results in minor

constraints on other users.

The NRC summary estimates of environmental and community impacts from construction and normal operation of the AGS are

also given in figure IV–57.

Routine discharges of radioactive gas, liquids, and solids are similar for both bargemounted and land-based nuclear powerplants. As has been noted, the filtering

systems are the same for both designs.

Chlorine, chromates, phosphates, acids, hydroxide, hydrozine, and morpholine would be

used in various parts of floating plant systems,

but discharges into the open sea would be at

levels within standards imposed by EPA

regulations.

MARINE LIFE

The NRC environmental impact statement

estimates that about 287 tons of fish production will be lost each year—roughly 0.3 percent of the New Jersey catch—as a result of

zooplankton and larvae being caught (or

entrained) in the cooling water system.

Breakwater construction will destroy about

100 acres of burrowing marine life, and the

laying of transmission cables will disrupt

marine life over a 127-acre corridor of the

ocean floor. The NRC estimates that about 0.2

percent of the New Jersey commercial surf

clam fishery for 1974 will be destroyed but

that recolonization will take place 12 to 18

months after construction is completed. The

NRC reported that samples in the area

showed that the lowest density of surf clams

was at the breakwater site.

OTA has prepared an independent analysis

of the environmental effects of floating plants,

particularly the effects on marine life. The

purpose of this analysis was to determine

whether floating plants would have environmental effects significantly different from

those of shore-based plants with ocean, lake,

or river cooling. This analysis indicates that

floating plants located nearshore or in estuaries would have effects similar to those of

land-based plants in the same areas, with the

exception of the dredging required to bring a

floating plant to its site, while offshore breakwater siting could reduce the environmental

impacts. 40

MONITORING

The NRC requires a plant operator to monitor specific discharges and the general environment for radioactivity in the region

around a nuclear plant. The New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection conducts independent monitoring for radioactivity.

NRC and EPA inspectors visit nuclear

powerplants an average of four times a year to

appraise both safety systems and environmental conditions. Monitoring includes sampling fish, milk, and plant life in regions

where a nuclear plant is operating to measure

concentrations of radioactive particles.
1 ,. “1, ’ i , !

, , , I

I

Figure IV-57. Environmental costs of the proposed Atlantic Generating Station

Effect

LAND USE

Land required for station

Land required for underwater

transmission lines

Land required for underground transmission lines

and switchyard

Land required for overhead

transmission lines

Land required for personnel

WATER USE

Once-through cooling and

and auxil ary water require- i

ments, two units

Thermal discharge to ocean,

two units

Temperature rise

Thermal plume description

from physical model

1 F temperature rise

3 FO temperature rise

5 F° temperature rise

Chemical discharge to ocean

Chlorine

Copper

Nickel

Use of surface

Table 3.1,

Sect. 4.4

Sects, 3.12,4.4

Table 3.1,

Sect. 3.12

Sect. 3.12

Table 3.1,

Sect. 4.1

Table 3.1

Sect. 3.4

Sect. 3.4

Sect. 5.2,

Table 5.3

Sect. 5.3

Sect. 4.2

IMPACTS ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS

Construction

Dredging Sect. 4.4

Sedimental ion Sect. 4.4

Turbidity Sect, 4.4

Operation

Impingement Sect. 5.3

Entrainment Sect. 5.3

Thermal effects Sect. 5.3

Cold shock Sect. 5.3

Chemical discharges Sect. 5.3

Breakwater existence Sect. 4.4

Summary description I

47 acres of ocean surface and ocean bottom, 2.8 miles from shore,

removed from natural use

127 acres of ocean bottom disturbed in a 582-acre right-of-way

68 acres for cables: temporary disturbance and vegetation changes;

100 acres for switchyard: improves a former disturbed area

1870 acres altered, 95 acres cleared; primarily wooded

A few acres in urban area

4600 cfs (2,060,000 gpm)

15.5 X 10 Btu/hr at full power

16,1 F“

Does not impingeon shore

Distance from discharge1750 ft; area affected, 525 acres

Distance from discharge, 650 ft; area affected, 46 acres

0.1 ppm total residual for 2 hr/day per FNP unit. Acceptable

environmental impact: meetsPA standard E

Less than 7 ppb increment added to available 5.5 ppb average seawater concentration. No environmental effect expected due to

rapid dilution

Less than 1 ppb increment with no expected environmental effect

Increased water surface traffic associated with AGS construction

results in minor constraints on other users. This is localized,

temporary, and dispersed

Destruction of some blue mussels and surf clams, 339,000 lb valued

at $6000: less than 1 % of annual surf clam harvest in New Jersey

Little effect on benthic organisms

Temporary; insignificant impact on finfish

An occasional operational problem because of schooling fish but

will not affect fishery

Loss of less than 0.5% of plankton, fish e s, and fish larvae will

not alter aquatic population dynamics o f New Jersey coastal zone

Little or no effect on finfish or benthic communities

Expected occurrence of once per year. Impact on ecosystem is

negligible

Very little effect

Increased finfish production and diversity because of reef environment; potential benefit of more than 14 tons per year of increased

finfish production

——..— .

Source Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Atlantic Generating Station,
Figure IV-57. Continued

Effect

IMPACTS ON TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS

Construction

Shore support facility

Underground transmission

cables

Switchyard

Overhead transmission line

Operation

Underground transmission

cable

Switchyard

Overhead transmission line

COMMUNITY IMPACTS

Housing

Schools

Hospitals

Municipal services

Highway use

Economy

RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ON MAN

Cumulative population

Radioiodine and particulate dose

to thyroid from all pathways

Occupational

Sect. 4.3

Sect. 4.3

Sect. 4.3

Sect. 4.3

Sect. 5.1

Sect. 5.1

Sect. 5.5

Sect. 5.5

Sect. 5.5

-

Summary description

Negligible if in urban or industrial area

Destroys less than 0.1% of spartina marsh habitat within 10 miles. 

Temporary loss of bird nesting habitat. Alters upland habitat with 

little impact on animal life

May improve abandoned sandpit by stabilization of pit slopes and

planting of vegetation

Clearing corridor destroys some forest habitat but increases grass

ands rub habitat. Potential loss of rare white cedar bog h

environment

Little or no impact unless oil leak occurs; then, impact depends on

leak rate and quantity and speed of repair

Negligible

No herbicides will be used. Maintenance activities will use existing

roads, No ozone at ground level. Bird losses are not expected to

be severe

Very little

Very IittIe

None

Very little

intermittent local congestion near shore support facility; moderate

congestion along Great Bay Boulevard during underground cable

installation activ ties i

Slight increase due to local purchases of materials and input of new 

worker incomes

C 14 man-rems compared with 125,000 man-rems due to natural

environment

Adult at nearest residence, 0.05 millirem; child using milk from 

nearest dairy farm, 0.2 millirem

900 man-rems ,

RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE TO AQUATIC ORGANISMS

Barnacle on FNP hull Sect. 5.5 20 rads/year

Organisms in discharge plume Sect. 5.5 <1 millirad/year

RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE TO TERRESTRIAL ANIMALS

Birds feeding on food in discharge Sect. 5.5 <1 millirad/year

g

f plume

Animals on shore Sect. 5.5 Approximately the same as for man i

i

/

!
RISKS AND SAFETY

Accident Risks

The most serious accident possible in an

operating nuclear powerplant is overheating

that causes the fuel core to melt. If the upper

containment of a powerplant were to rupture

as a result of a core-melt, the radioactive

materials released into the atmosphere could

have severe health and economic impacts. No

core-melt accident has occurred in any commercial light water reactor and the 1975 Reactor Safety Study (WASH- 1400),41 commonly

known as the ‘Rasmussen Report, estimated

the probability of such an accident in a landbased reactor as 1 in 20,000 years of reactor

operation. WASH-1400 also concluded that

only about one in six pressurized water reactor core-melt accidents would lead to the

release of significant amounts of radioactive

materials to the open air.

Under current NRC policy, the possible

consequences of core-melt accidents are not

considered in reviewing and approving either

plant designs or proposed sites, although less

severe accidents are considered. The rationale

for this policy is the contention that the probability of severe accidents is judged to be so

small that the total risk from such accidents

(the probability of an accident multiplied by

the expected consequences of the accident) is

extremely low, so low that they can be safely

ignored even though the consequences could

be far worse than those of other malfunctions.

The low level of risk from core-melts calculated in WASH-1400 has been cited by the

Commission as a justification for concluding

that no immediate changes in its safety and

environmental regulations are required. 42

The validity of the conclusions of

WASH-1400 concerning the accident risks in

nuclear powerplants is a matter of controversy, as is the subject of reactor safety

generally. 43 Any resolution of the general

debate would be far beyond the scope of this

study of the onshore effects of offshore energy

systems. Recognizing that there is disagreement over whether the risks associated with

land-based plants are fully understood, OTA

focused on the question of whether there are

significant differences in the risks associated

with floating nuclear powerplants and landbased plants, either on a generic basis or as far

as deployment in the study area is concerned.

To determine whether there is adequate information available for such an analysis, OTA

commissioned a preliminary study which

compared the floating nuclear powerplant

with the pressurized water plant (the Surry

plant) examined in WASH-1400. 44 This comparison was designed to evaluate the applicability to the floating nuclear plant of

WASH-1400’S conclusions about the probabilities and consequences of core-melt accidents. In addition, the preliminary study

assessed the methodology being used in a Liquid Pathways Generic Study, a comparison

of the radiological consequences of release of

radioactive materials into water at land-based

and floating plants being conducted by the

NRC as a result of concern by the ACRS about

the unique safety issues posed by floating

nuclear plants. In examining both WASH- 1400

and the Liquid Pathways Generic Study, OTA

focused on their applicability either to a

generic comparison of the relative risks from

land-based and floating nuclear plants, or to

an assessment of the specific risks from

deploying floating plants in the study area.

The results of the analysis are summarized

below.

Probability of Core-Melt Accidents

Comparison of the floating nuclear

powerplant with the land-based pressurized

water plant studied in WASH-1400 reveals
three areas of difference

relative probabilities of

plants:

which could affect the

core-melts in the two

● External hazards, The floating plant will

face several unique external hazards, such as

the risk of ship collisions, which could increase the probability that an accident sequence would be initiated. At the same time, it

will be less sensitive to hazards posed to landbased plants by floods and earthquakes.

● Marine environment. Floating plants located in offshore breakwaters will be subjected to continued low-level stresses from

operation in the marine environment, such as

platform motion and corrosion from salt

spray and air. In addition, floating plants may

be subjected to unusual stresses while they are

being towed from the Florida manufacturing

facility to their operating sites,

● Design. The reactor system used in the

floating plant incorporates new features, such

as the ice-condenser pressure-suppression

system, some of which could decrease and

others increase the probability of a core-melt.

A more detailed discussion follows of the

areas of difference between floating and landbased plants which were addressed in the

OTA analysis.

EXTERNAL HAZARDS

Because floating plants may be located at

sea, they may be exposed to stresses that could

not occur on land. The most obvious hazards

are ship collisions, buffeting in storms, and

disturbance by tidal waves. NRC has dealt

with these hazards by establishing performance criteria for the plant and breakwater

designed to reduce the possibility that any

unusual stresses could trigger malfunctions in

the reactor system. OTA’s analysis indicates

that if the design criteria are met, such hazards

do not appear to have a significant potential

for initiating core-melt accidents. 45 At the

same time, because WASH- 1400 indicated that

earthquakes and floods are negligible contributors to core-melt probabilities, the fact

that floating plants are less subject to these

hazards than land-based plants would not

lead to any significant reduction in core-melt

probabilities for the floating plant.46

EFFECTS OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT

Floating nuclear powerplants will be subject to ocean-induced stresses both during

towing to their sites and during the 40 years of

operation. They will be exposed to salt water

and spray which could degrade the reliability

of exposed components such as external

valves, the links with the underwater cables,

and the mooring system. This exposure could

also adversely affect the electronic equipment,

even though there are provisions to limit the

exposure. They also will experience more or

less continuous motion because of wind and

currents. While the breakwater must be

designed to keep these motions within the

design limits of floating plants, they will be

subjected to open ocean conditions while

being towed from the manufacturing facility

to its site. The stresses of towing, combined

with the cumulative effect of the small stresses

of normal operation, may be sufficient to

affect the reliability of crucial parts of the

system. For this reason, the ACRS has recommended that instruments be installed in the

plant to monitor and record stresses in order

to verify structural behavior during towing

operations. 47

WASH-1400 concluded that the probability

of a core-melt is relatively insensitive even to

substantial variations in the reliability of individual components. However, exposure to

the marine environment could reduce the

reliability of enough components

simultaneously to increase the probability of

an accident. As with other features of floating

plants, this question cannot be answered

without an extensive risk analysis.

DIFFERENCES IN REACTOR DESIGN

The reactor design for floating powerplants

is different in several significant details from

the Surry plant on which WASH-2400’S con-
elusion about pressurized reactors was based.

Of the eight differences considered by OTA,

seven are also incorporated in land-based icecondenser plants using Westinghouse reactor

systems. Hence, they are relevant only to

determining the applicability of WASH– 1400’s

conclusions to the floating plant, rather than

to analyzing general differences in accident

probabilities between floating plants and

land-based plants.

OTA evaluated the implications of each

design difference by analyzing more than 60

accident sequences that could contribute to a

core-melt and then factoring the floating

plant’s design differences into each sequence

to the extent possible with the information at

hand. This evaluation indicates that these

design differences do not produce any significant difference in the probability of a coremelt in the floating nuclear plant as compared

to the Surry plant.

After OTA had completed this analysis, an

additional safety issue was raised at the beginning of the formal hearings on the manufacturing licens e for floating nuclea r

powerplants. Mr. Ernst Effenberger, a former

employee of Offshore Power Systems, alleged

that the turbine-generator on the floating

nuclear powerplant was the most dangerous

piece of equipment onboard and could disintegrate during destructive overspeed (180 percent of operating speed) thus producing

missiles that would tear the plant apart. In

response to these allegations, OTA conducted

a survey of the issue. The turbine missile

problem in general has been recognized by

Offshore Power Systems, the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, and the Advisory

Committee on Reactor Safeguards. In most

ways, there is no difference between landbased and floating nuclear powerplants in

terms of the relative dangers. For land-based

plants, the production of turbine missiles is

not considered to be a significant contributing

factor to the probability of a core-melt. For the

floating plant, missile barriers and special

speed control mechanisms have been designed

so that the probability of a safety system being

damaged by the turbine-generator during

destructive overspeed is within the low levels

prescribed by NRC. Specific responses to

Effenberger’s allegations will be made during

the* September 1976 hearings by Offshore

Power Systems and the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. Based on the information to

date, it does not appear that the production of

turbine missiles is an important issue that

would change the conclusion of OTA’s

analysis.

Taking all the differences that might alter

the probability of a core-meltdown into account, OTA’s preliminary analysis indicates

that the probability of a core-meltdown accident in a floating nuclear powerplant is comparable to the value of 1 in 20,000 per year of

reactor operation that was calculated for landbased plants in WASH– 1400, although substantial additional effort would be required to

validate that conclusion. The effects of a towing and continued operation in a marine environment were not analyzed in detail because

that would require an examination of. individual component failure rates that is

beyond the scope of this study.

Consequences of a Core-Melt

The most serious consequence of a coremelt in a land-based nuclear plant is the

release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. According to the analysis in

WASH-1400, even if a core-melt occurs in a

land-based PWR plant, it will rupture the upper containment structure and permit

radioactive materials to escape into the atmosphere only about one in seven times. How

such a release would affect public health and

safety would depend on weather conditions,

population density around a plant, the effectiveness of evacuation plans, and other factors.
The human consequences range from

deaths that would result within a matter of

days from direct exposure to relatively intense

radiation to deaths and illnesses over a period

of years as a result of low-level residual

radioactivity y. There also can be economic

losses, such as the costs of evacuation, loss of

contaminated crops, and loss of productive

use of lands placed under quarantine for extended periods.

The OTA analysis indicates that the consequences of a core-melt on a floating nuclear

plant may be significantly different from those

for a land-based plant. One reason is that in

the case of a core-melt on a floating plant the

core eventually would melt through the bottom of the barge hull and release large quantities of radioactive material directly into the

ocean, where it could contaminate beaches

and be taken up into the food chain. While a

core-melt in a land-based plant could also lead

to waterborne contamination, e.g., if the core

entered an aquifer after melting through the

bottom of the containment, such effects were

not considered in detail in WASH- 1400. Concern about this type of release prompted the

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards to

request a special study of the effects of accidental releases of radioactive materials into

water as part of its review of floating nuclear

powerplants. The NRC subsequently decided

to conduct a Liquid Pathways Generic Study

to analyze the effects of such releases from

both land-based and floating nuclear plants.

A second reason to expect different consequences for a floating plant is that it appears

that in case of a core-melt a release of

radioactive materials to the atmosphere is

about seven times more likely with the reactor

system used in the floating plant than with the

WASH-1400 land-based PWR plant. On the

other hand, this may be offset to some extent

by design features of floating plants which

could reduce the amount of radioactive

material released in case of an accident.

The following discussion will summarize

OTA’s critique of the methodology of the Liquid Pathways Generic Study and the scope of

its coverage, and an analysis of the atmospheric releases that could be expected

from a core-melt in a floating nuclear plant.

Liquid Pathways

The Liquid Pathways Generic Study is being

conducted jointly by Offshore Power Systems

and the NRC staff in an attempt to compare

the consequences of accidental releases of

radioactive materials into water for various

representative land-based and floating

nuclear powerplant sites.

The study was initiated by the Advisory

Committee on Reactor Safeguards to answer a

series of questions and concerns that were

raised during the Committee’s review of the

design concept and of plans submitted to support Offshore Power System’s application for

a manufacturing license for eight floating

nuclear powerplants.

In the first phase of the study, the Advisory

Committee asked Offshore Power Systems to

analyze the dispersal patterns of radioactive

material that might be released into the open

ocean as a result of a number of postulated

nuclear accidents on a floating powerplant.

After analyzing the OPS study, NRC decided

to conduct a generic study of the environmental effects of the release of radioactive

materials into water from either land-based or

floating plants.

The NRC staff is concentrating on landbased plants sited near rivers, the Great Lakes,

estuaries, and desert areas. The OPS staff is

continuing its study of hypothetical sites for

floating plants, including sites off the MidAtlantic States and the Gulf of Mexico. Both

the’ NRC and OPS studies are examining

possible methods of mitigating potential negative impacts.

The results of the Liquid Pathways Generic

Study will be incorporated into the licensing
processes for the manufacture of eight floating

nuclear plants and for construction of the AGS

in several ways. The analysis of the consequences of radioactive releases resulting from

so-called “design-basis accidents, ”48 which

must be considered in environmental and

safety reviews and which exclude coremeltdowns, will be included in new environmental statements for each licensing action. In

addition, the NRC will publish a separate

report containing the analysis of severe accidents (core-meltdowns) as well as designbasis accidents.

Because the study has not been completed,

OTA has reviewed only the methodology

being used by NRC and Offshore Power

Systems. The methodology appears to be valid

and based on conservative assumptions

which, if anything, will tend to overestimate

the consequences of a release. Furthermore,

the study is being subjected to extensive

review by a wide range of experts prior to

release. As a result, OTA expects the study to

produce adequate analysis of the questions it

has addressed.

Nevertheless, the Liquid Pathways Generic

Study has serious limitations in the range of

questions it addresses. Specifically, it does not

consider the full range of consequences

analyzed in WASH-1400. First, while it does

calculate the radiological-dose-to-population

resulting from releases into liquid pathways,

it does not translate the dose into health

effects such as illnesses and deaths. Second, it

does not attempt to estimate the economic

consequences of such releases, even though

these may be very great. A core-melt at an

offshore floating nuclear powerplant could

prohibit commercial and recreational fishing

for a wide area around a plant. It could lead to

an extended quarantine of nearby waters and

beaches for recreational uses, which could

have extremely serious economic consequences for Atlantic and Ocean Counties in

survey intended to estimate both positive and

negative effects of a nuclear powerplant on

tourism at various locations in the United

States including the Atlantic City area, it is

studying only the effects of the fear of an accident as a negative effect and is not assessing

the reduction in beach visitors that could

result if an accident actually occurred.

These restrictions in the scope of the Liquid

Pathways Generic Study mean that it will permit only a partial comparison of the consequences of accidental releases of radioactive

materials into water pathways in land-based

and water-based nuclear powerplants. The

range of consequences considered would have

to be expanded if the study is to be used in a

comprehensive comparison of the overall

risks associated with the two kinds of plants.

One additional feature of the Liquid Pathways Generic Study limits its usefulness, in its

present form, in a comprehensive comparison

of risks. Specifically, the study assumes that

all of the radioactive material that WASH-1400

indicates might be released into the atmosphere if the containment fails during a

core-meltdown would, with a floating plant,

be released directly into the water. While this

assumption gives a conservative estimate of

the consequences of liquid pathway releases, it

does not readily fit into a realistic assessment

of overall expected consequences of a coremelt, which would have to take into account

the probabilities and consequences of atmospheric releases as well. The question of atmospheric releases will be considered in the

next section.

ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE

The Liquid Pathways Generic Study

assumes that the consequences of the release

of radioactive materials into the atmosphere

are comparable for land-based and waterbased plants. This assumption may not be

valid. Even if a given quantity of radioactive

New Jersey. While NRC is sponsoring a material would have roughly the same conse-
quences whether it escaped to the air onshore

or offshore, it is not reasonable to assume that

the expected magnitude of atmospheric

releases would be the same for onshore and

offshore plants. Because there are significant

design differences between the reactor system

used in the floating nuclear plant and the

plant analyzed in WASH-1400, OTA examined

these differences to determine whether they

would significantly limit the applicability of

WASH-1400’S conclusions to floating plants.

This examination suggests that the probability

of atmospheric releases from a core-melt in a

reactor system of the design used in the floating nuclear powerplant would be significantly

greater than for the land-based PWR plant

considered in WASH-2400. At the same time,

the consequences of a release may be less

severe because lower amounts of radioactivity

may escape. For these reasons, the conclusions

of WASH-2400 about the expected consequences of atmospheric releases cannot be

directly applied to floating plants without

modification.

The source of these differences is the icecondenser, pressure-containment system used

in the floating nuclear powerplant, as well as

in one plant in operation and nine under construction onshore. This system, which uses 2.5

million pounds of berated ice as a heat sink to

condense steam and thereby reduce containment pressure in case of an accident, allows

the use of a smaller and lighter containment

building, a distinct advantage for a floating

plant. OTA’s comparison of this design with

the Surry plant indicates that the smaller

pressure containment used in the floating

plant ice-condenser system is about seven

times more likely to rupture in the case of a

core-melt than is the larger and heavier containment of the onshore plant analyzed in the

Rasmussen Report. In fact, it appears that every core-melt sequence on a floating plant is

likely to lead to a rupture of the containment

above the water line, while only one in seven

core-melt sequences in the Surry plant would

produce an above-ground containment

failure, The reason for this difference is that

the smaller volume and lower design-pressure

resistance of the floating plant containment

structure would make it much more vulnerable to the pressure pulses that would occur at

various points during any core-melt sequence

as the molten core fell into various pools of

water within the containment, and ultimately

reached the water under the plant. This higher

probability of an atmospheric release from a

core-melt on a floating plant would tend to

make the expected consequences of a coremelt proportionately greater for a floating

plant than for an onshore plant similar to the

Surry installation.

Despite the higher probability of a containment rupture, the ice-condenser system has

certain features which would tend to reduce

the amount of radioactive material released to

the air from the failed containment. The icecondenser itself would trap radioactive iodine,

one of the more dangerous radioactive

materials, while the higher ratio of surface

area to volume in the containment structure

might increase the amount of vaporized core

material that is deposited on surfaces within

the containment. These tentative conclusions

also require validation.

It should be emphasized that these findings

indicate that the analysis of atmospheric

releases in WASH- 1400 would require

modification before it could be applied to any

ice-condenser plant, whether located onshore

or offshore. These findings do not imply that

there is a generic difference between floating

and land-based plants as far as atmospheric

releases from containment failures are concerned, because Westinghouse ice-condenser

plants are under construction, and in one case

in operation, onshore. A comprehensive comparison of risks of floating and land-based

plants would have to examine differences between the same type of plants located in the

two environments.
While such a comprehensive analysis was

beyond the scope of this study, several generic

differences between floating and land-based

plants can be identified. First, in the case of a

core-melt in a floating plant the core would

eventually melt through the bottom of the

platform and contact the water on which the

plant was floating, This probably would produce large quantities of steam because boiling

conditions could be expected to exist at the

surface of the core for a day or more after melt

through, 49 50 This steam could in turn

transport into the atmosphere significant

quantities of radioactive material, including

fine particles produced in the interaction of

the molten core with water.51 While the possible interaction of a molten core with groundwater is a potential mechanism for similar secondary atmospheric releases in some landbased plants, there are some factors that may

lead to differences in the effects of such

releases on the generic risks of floating plants

as compared to land-based plants. For one

thing, the potential for such releases exists for

all plants located on water, and only for some

land-based plants, depending on the site. In

addition, the release would occur later in time

after initiation of a core-melt sequence in a

land-based plant because of the thicker containment base mat that the core would have to

melt through before encountering groundwater; this could reduce the population at risk

by allowing additional time for evacuation.

However, since WASH-1400 did not consider

this type of release, further analysis would be

needed to determine whether the potential for

such secondary releases leads to a difference

in the generic risks of land-based and floating

plants.

A second possible generic difference between land-based and floating plants is the

fact that floating plants can be located away

from shore, which guarantees a permanent

zone of zero resident population for several

miles around the plant. This could reduce the

expected consequences of an atmospheric

release compared to some onshore sites.

However, this difference applies only to

offshore sites, and would not affect nearshore

sites as compared to land-based plants located

near the coast.

In summary, OTA’s preliminary analysis

indicates that the conclusions of WASH-1400

about the expected consequences of atmospheric releases cannot be directly applied

to the floating nuclear powerplant. Furthermore, substantial additional analysis would

be required to enable a generic comparison of

the types and effects of atmospheric releases

resulting from core-melt accidents in landbased and floating nuclear plants.

Accident Risks in the Study Area

Because the objective of this study was to

assess the three offshore technologies by examining the potential impacts of their deployment in a specific geographic area, New Jersey

and Delaware, OTA’s analysis of the safety of

floating nuclear plants considered the risks

from an accident at the AGS, as well as the

generic risks of floating plants.

Several unique aspects of the AGS site could

lead to more severe consequences in the

unlikely event of a core-melt accident than

would be the case with many land-based

plants or floating plants at other sites. The first

of these is the fact that the economy of the area

around Atlantic City depends heavily on summer recreational use of the nearby beaches

and ocean. An accident that released large

quantities of radioactive materials into the

ocean could have a severe regional economic

impact.

The influx of summer tourists also greatly

increases the number of people who could be

exposed to radiation in case of an accident. For

example, the year-round population of Atlantic City, which is estimated by city officials to

be 43,000, increases to around 400,000 on

some summer weekends.52 The population of

Long Beach Island, whose southern tip is 2.8
miles north of the AGS site, increases from

10,000 to a summer daytime peak of more

than 100,000.53 In the unlikely event that a

severe accident occurred on a July weekend,

some 500,000 people, few of whom could be

expected to know emergency evacuation procedures, could be in the area.

Finally, the prevailing winds in the Atlantic

City area are from the south from April

through August, and could be expected to carry atmospheric radioactive releases from the

AGS directly towards Long Beach Island. 54

Because the winds average about 10 miles per

hour in those months,55 an accidental release

could be carried to populous beach areas on

the island within an hour. Furthermore, the

island is connected to the mainland by a single

four-lane bridge, which can delay motorists

leaving the island by as much as 2 hours in

traffic jams under normal summer conditions.

This suggests that evacuation procedures

would be only of limited usefulness in reducing the consequences of an accident during the

daytime in the summer.56

These peculiar aspects of the AGS site lead

to the conclusion that both the Liquid Pathways Generic Study and WASH-1400 have

only limited applicability in assessing the

overall risks from deploying floating nuclear

powerplants in the study area. As noted

earlier, the Liquid Pathways Generic Study is

not considering economic impacts, While

WASH-1400 did analyze economic impacts, its

calculations of the expected consequences of

accidents are based on site characteristics

developed by averaging the characteristics of

68 sites expected to be in use by 1981. The

averaging technique makes it impossible to

determine from WASH-1400 the effects of

peculiarities of particular sites such as the

AGS. For this reason, WASH-1400’S conclusions do not appear to be directly applicable to

analysis of the risks from locating a floating

nuclear powerplant at that site. A comprehensive risk assessment of the AGS would require

some modification of existing analytical techniques, since neither WASH-1400 or NRC

procedures for analyzing the consequences of

design-basis accidents take into account correlations between wind direction and seasonal

population peaks.

CONCLUSION

OTA’s review of NCR studies related to the

risks from accidents in floating nuclear

powerplants indicates that these studies are

not comprehensive enough to provide either a

generic comparison of the relative risks from

land-based and floating plants or an assessment of the specific risks from deploying

floating plants in the study area.

While substantial additional effort would

be required to perform these analyses, a

review of relevant literature indicates that

there exists a substantial amount of information applicable to assessing the consequences

of a core-melt in a floating nuclear

powerplant, and that research programs are

underway to provide additional relevant information. 57
Alternatives To Offshore Technologies

The Coastal Effects study has been concerned to this point with the consequences of

deploying any or all of three offshore energy

systems proposed for the waters off New

Jersey and Delaware.

This phase of the study examines the consequences of not deploying the offshore systems,

with particular attention to the question of

alternative sources of energy for New Jersey,

Delaware, and other Mid-Atlantic States.

Although the analysis includes a discussion

of a range of alternatives, it concentrates on

those that are judged to be realistic options

during the period 1976-90.

Based on analysis of existing and potential

energy sources and possibilities for reductions

in energy consumption, this assessment finds

that:

● Even if offshore Mid-Atlantic oil and

natural -gas systems and nuclear

powerplants are producing at presently

projected levels in the 1980’s and 1990’s,

the Mid-Atlantic States still will depend

on other sources for at least 80 percent of

their energy.

. It may be possible to develop conservation programs that would make up the

energy lost if the offshore systems are not

deployed, but such programs would need

strong national leadership and would

have to begin at once.

. Without strong national programs to

conserve energy and develop alternative

resources, the Mid-Atlantic States will be

locked into existing energy patterns well

into the next century.

● Utility managers will choose existing and

tested technologies that are most apt to

match the consumption levels in their

forecasts and will assign reliability of

power supply a higher priority than cost.

The most promising alternatives for

stretching out supplies of fossil fuels are

programs to improve insulation of

homes and offices, changes in automobile

design to increase mileage, and the use of

existing technologies to increase the

amount of power generated per unit of

fuel.

Coal is a potential substitute for every

basic fuel in the United States and supplies could last for more than a century,

even if consumption were to quadruple

without improvements in mining techniques. However, massive conversion to

use of coal would entail such major

changes as transportation networks,

some changes in air quality standards,

new mining techniques, and new miner

training and safety programs.

Utility companies and other energy suppliers in Mid-Atlantic States will not factor supplies of oil and natural gas from

the Baltimore Canyon Trough into their

future plans until exploration establishes

likely production levels.

No single new technology or change in

the way existing technologies are used is

likely to provide more than a small percentage of total energy requirements for

New Jersey and Delaware before the end

of the century. Solutions to energy

problems will be found by putting

together many relatively small conservation and supply programs.

Given existing laws, regulations, fuel

supplies, and technologies, New Jersey

utilities would favor building floating

nuclear powerplants as their first choice.

If these are not permitted, the utilities

would opt for shoreline floating plants,
land-based nuclear plants, and coal-fired

plants, in that order.

. Solar programs will not contribute much

to energy supplies before the end of the

—.

CONSTRAINTS ON ALTERNATIVES

century unless Federal programs to cut

solar installation costs and private plans

to market solar products are given higher

priorities than they now enjoy.

Without strong national leadership in conservation and fuel supply programs, the most

likely course for the Mid-Atlantic region over

the next 20 years is to expand and extend the

energy system that is already planned or in

place, including floating nuclear plants.

One likely sequence that emerges from an

examination of the study region is as follows:

In the case of electric power, only extensive conservation is likely to reduce the

growth in consumption below predicted

levels. Lacking assurance that growth in demand will be slowed down by new national

policies, utility executives will schedule

construction of new generating capacity according to their own forecasts, which factor

in relatively modest changes in consumption growth rates. Because of the long leadtimes for planning and building large

power-generating plants, this sequence

tends to lock regions into existing technologies for many years into the future. For

example, Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,

New Jersey’s largest public utility, signed a

contract in 1973 for two floating nuclear

powerplants it did not intend to put into

operation for 12 years. 1

In scheduling construction of new generating plants, utility managers choose technology

that is both available and time-tested. For at

least the next 15 years, that inclination is

likely to limit the choices to nuclear or coalfired powerplants for baseload generators.

Several options to present plans for expanding central generating capacity are being .

studied in New Jersey and Delaware. With

each alternative there are uncertainties as to

performance, questions about cost, or legal or

institutional barriers.

A June 1976 report concluded that enough

electricity could be generated in New Jersey as

a byproduct by producing steam or heat for

industrial purposes to postpone for 10 to 15

years a need for new baseload powerplants. 2

The report noted that 29 percent of the

electricity in West Germany is generated as a

byproduct of industrial operations and that

only 2 percent of the power supply i n New

Jersey involves joint production of steam and

electricity y. However, there has been no

detailed study of the cost of expanding joint

production in New Jersey. There is no inventory of plants that could be converted and,

therefore, no estimate of the potential output

for the State.

In theory, about 5 percent of baseload

power in the Public Service Electric & Gas Co.

service area could be generated by burning

municipal refuse. But the only attempt to

build a refuse-burning powerplant in New

Jersey has been delayed for more than a year

by problems of site selection, transportation,

and guarantees of delivery of refuse in suffi -

cient quantities to keep a plant operating. 3

New Jersey and Delaware utilities COuld increase purchases of power from the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Interconnection as an alternative to building new

central powerplants in either State. The Interconnection is a power pool that links 11
power companies and permits them to operate capacity to supply New Jersey and Delaware

as a single, integrated system.4 Beyond some on the grounds that both States would be takpoint, however, other Mid-Atlantic States ing the benefits of power without paying the

might balk at increasing their generating potential costs of pollution.

ENERGY PATTERNS IN THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES

Present plans call for a steep increase in

nuclear-generating capacity and a drop in the

share of energy supplied by petroleum to

bring basic changes in Mid-Atlantic energy

patterns over the next 20 years.

According to a 1976 Bureau of Mines

forecast, the share of energy supplied by

petroleum in the Mid-Atlantic States—New

York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—will

drop by the year 2000 from a present 57 percent, which is well above the national average

(46 percent), to just over 40 percents During

that time, nuclear generating capacity is planned to increase by about 85 percent. By the

turn of the century, nearly half of the region’s

total energy would be supplied by nuclear and

coal-fired powerplants.

The forecasts make several assumptions

about consumption and availability of fuels.

Because States in the Northeast and MidAtlantic are much more dependent on foreign

oil than are States in other regions, forecasts

probably are least reliable where they are

based on assumptions about availability of

petroleum. Sharp price increases, embargos,

or decisions by producing nations to cut back

output all could change the energy picture for

the Mid-Atlantic States more drastically than

for the Nation as a whole.

As with oil forecasts, several assumptions

in the projections of growth in nucleargenerating capacity are open to question.

New Jersey utility companies plan to use

nuclear power for virtually all of the increase

in their baseload generating capacity between

now and 1987.6 By 1987, about 70 percent of

the baseload capacity in New Jersey is expected to be nuclear powered, compared with

some 40 percent in 1975.

However, escalating costs, scarcity of

capital and questions about the availability of

uranium have held back completion of

nuclear plants to about two-thirds of the

levels that were forecast as recently as 1974.

Recent studies also raise questions about how

close nuclear plants come to operating at their

rated capacity. T Design changes in new plants

now under construction may increase on-line

generating time but there is no experience to

support a judgment.

Despite these potential problems, New

Jersey utilities have concluded that nuclear

power is the least expensive technology at

hand and have scheduled expansion accordingly.

OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ALTERNATIVES

The only direct substitute for oil and Trough during at least the next two decades is

natural gas from the Baltimore Canyon an increase in imports.
For the near term, conservation programs family homes can be cut by more than 50 percould reduce the rate of growth in foreign im - cent with better roof and sidewall insulation.

ports. Over a longer period of time, an accelerated switch from the usc of oil and gas to heat

buildings to the use of solar power could

achieve dramatic reductions in petroleum

consumption,

Based on present estimates of offshore

resources, substantial increases in oil imports

will be necessary over the next 20 years in addition to offshore production if nothing is

done to reduce projected increases in congumption. 8

Washington Natural Gas Co. found that attic insulation cut the fuel requirements for

heating a single-family home by 22.7 percent

and that wall insulation cut fuel requirements

by another 28 percent. 10 The firm also found

that appeals to conserve fuel were less effective than a marketing approach based on

promises of lower home-heating bills. In April

and May of 1974, while an insulating subsidiary of the company was stressing conservation, its crews insulated 17 homes. In the same

There are alternatives that could reduce de- 2 months of 1976, after the company began

mand for oil in Mid-Atlantic States without a emphasing lower fuel costs in its advertising,

need for new technologies. None of these can it installed insulation in 1,404 homes.

alleviate the problem by itself, but in com -

bination they could ease the strain on energy

supplies in New Jersey and Delaware, OTA is

assessing the potent i a 1 for conservation

programs in residences for a report to be

delivered to Congress in early 1977. The

assessment includes an examination of technology and institutional barriers to deploying

the technology. The following are some examples of such programs:

It is not possible to compare the

Washington experience with the potential for

New Jersey and Delaware without a detailed

study of insulation in those two States, but i f

the pattern of uninsulated homes in N e w

Jersey and Delaware is comparable to that in

Washington State, a widespread insulation

marketing program could cut consumption of

oil and gas for heating purposes by 24 to 40

percent.

Insulation Solar

About 32 percent of the oil consumed in

Mid-Atlantic States in 1974 was used for heating space and water. 9 That represented about

400,000 barrels of oil per day.

The promise of energy savings through

widespread insulation programs so far exists

largely on paper. No definitive studies of net

energy savings have been done. No workable

program to accelerate insulation on a national

scale has been devised. But there is at least one

program that seems to be working without

national leadership and using accepted

Solar heating systems probably coul d

replace many of the oil and gas systems now

used to heat Mid-Atlantic homes, apartment

houses, office buildings., and stores. But the

statistics that are emerging from research and

demonstration projects indicate that the use of

solar energy for heating will spread too slowly

to make a significant contribution to total

energy supplies before the turn of the century. 11

Automobile Efficiency

marketing techniques. That program, run by

Washington Natural Gas Co. of Seattle, could

Another alternative to offshore oil production and increased imports lies in increasing serve as a model for other regions. the energy-efficiency of automobiles. In 1974,

The results of that program indicate that more than 40 percent of petroleum products

consumption of energy for heating single - sold in the Mid-Atlantic were used for
. .

transportation. 12 Changes in design of direction by setting standards

automobiles could double the number of miles mileage in the Energy Policy

per gallon of fuel. Congress has moved in that tion Act of 1975.

for automobile

and Conserve -

FLOATING NUCLEAR PLANT ALTERNATIVES

Interconnection

The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland

(PJM) power pool is a clear alternative to construction of floating nuclear powerplants or to

shoreline or inland plants in New Jersey and

Delaware.

New Jersey already imports about half of its

electric power, either from PJM companies or

from powerplants located outside the State

but partially owned by New Jersey utilities.

Public Service plans to buy 650 megawatts

(MWe) of power from the pool in the early

1980’s to meet forecast demands until it can

bring new nuclear plants into operation.

The power pool includes 11 members and

affiliates, operating in five States and the District of Columbia. The members and affiliates

serve 21 million customers with a peak

generating capacity of 43,000 MWe. The

power pool’s 117 generating plants are linked

by 5,293 miles of transmission lines and are

controlled from a central computer complex

in such a way that power demands from

anywhere in the system are met by activating

the least-costly unit elsewhere in the system

that is not already operating at capacity.

Utility executives do not flatly rule out the

PJM power pool as an alternative to new

generating plants offshore or in the State.

However, their plans for new generating

plants are based, in part, on a conclusion that

lower operating costs of scheduled nuclear

plants will make it possible to reduce power

costs in the State, which now run about 60

percent higher than the national average.

Conservation

Neither insulation programs or solarheating systems would reduce electrical demand in the Mid-Atlantic region significantly

because only about 1 percent of all homes are

heated electrically.

Estimates of savings in consumption that

could be achieved by reduced levels of lighting, higher efficiency of electrical appliances,

and improved building design are largely extrapolated from a relatively small base of actual experience.

Reduction in electrical consumption also

will come slowly because of the long leadtimes for replacing existing equipment and

appliances with more energy-efficient equipment. The Energy Policy and Conservation

Act of 1975 requires that most appliances sold

in 1980 and thereafter be 20 percent more efficient than similar appliances sold in 1972.

However, the replacement cycle for some appliances is 16 years or more.

The California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission voted on

September 15, 1976, to require air-conditioners sold in the State* after 1979 to be 30

percent more energy-efficient than the

average existing models. 13

Technology is not a barrier to higher efficiency in air-conditioning. Several models

now on the market will meet the new California standards. But air-conditioning manufacturers oppose higher standards because they

mean higher price tags for air-conditioners

and a possible decrease in sales volume.
After a recent study, one New Jersey utility

company concluded that standards similar to

those set in California would reduce the company’s need for peak power-generating

capacity in 1990 by 7 percent. 14 Peak power is

generated largely with the most expensive

fuels-ail and natural gas—and its costs are

five to six times as high as baseload electricity.

The New Jersey company tried to persuade

the State legislature to write higher energyefficiency standards into law. Air-conditioning manufacturers in the State opposed the

law and the proposal was abandoned. 15

Cogeneration

Cogeneration of electricity refers to generating both electricity and heat for manufacturing processes in a single plant. This dual use of

energy is not a new concept in the United

States. About 4 percent of the Nation’s

electricity is generated by steam which is then

used in manufacturing.

A preliminary assessment of the potential

for cogeneration in New Jersey concludes that

somewhere between 10 and 90 percent of the

State’s electricity could be produced by plants

that already generate steam for industrial

use. 16 The actual number of plants that could

generate electricity as a byproduct would depend on the number of plants that could convert to cogeneration and projections of future

needs for steam or heat in manufacturing processes. The preliminary assessment prepared

by the Princeton University Center for Environmental Studies recommends an in-depth

survey of industry to determine the potential

for cogeneration.

A prime argument for cogeneration, according to the report, is that fuel costs for

electricity could be about half those for power

generated in central stations because fuel efficiency would be 62 percent compared with an

average 32 percent in existing powerplants.

one unit of fuel is used to perform two functions, power generation and production of

steam or heat for industrial use.

The study did not anlayze the costs of installing dual-purpose steam generators on a

large scale. Nor did it include a detailed study

of water and transportation needs that would

be involved in cogeneration on a large scale.

A common type of cogeneration already in

use involves piping waste steam from

powerplants to factories within a mile or so

where the steam is used for industrial purposes. Advocates of cogeneration propose to

reverse the process so that electricity would

become a byproduct of industrial steam and

heat generation.

Coal

Coal is a potential substitute for every basic

fuel in the U.S. energy system-oil, natural

gas, and uranium. There is enough coal in the

United States to last well over a century, even

if consumption were to quadruple and there

were no improvements in mining technoiogy.

.

However, any such increase in coal production would require major investments in new

mines, new transportation networks and

equipment, adjustments in air quality stan -

dards, new mining techniques, and improved

safety systems.

Coal can be converted to fuels like oil and

gas but existing technology for conversion is

relatively primitive and expensive and has not

been perfected for widespread commercial

use. OTA is assessing the coal technologies

that are or will be available between now and

1990 and evaluating methods of reducing environmental impacts of increased utilization

of coal. A report on the assessment will be

made to Congress in early 1977.

For at least a decade, coal could be used as a

substitute for offshore energy resources by

The higher efficiency results from the fact that burning in conventional powerplants or for
heating homes and commercial buildings. It is,

in fact, the last of the fallback fuels on the lists

of New Jersey utilities which are investing in

offshore nuclear powerplants.

According to the most recent estimate of the

Energy Research and Development Administration, new coal technologies that will

burn fuel much more efficiently and with far

less pollution will not be tested on a commercial scale before 1990. By that time, construction may already have begun on the last of

four floating nuclear plants which PSE&G has

RESEARCH

The foregoing examination has concentrated on near-term alternatives, those likely

to be available for widespread commercial

deployment within the 20-year time frame of

this assessment. They include alternatives that

would involve changing the patterns of

energy use and distribution and alternatives

which would adapt existing technology to

new uses.

Longer term alternatives could cover a

much broader range of possibilities and many

depend on research on new and promising

technologies. The research is now being conducted on many levels in government and private industry.

Major federally sponsored research is

being conducted on thermonuclear fusion as a

generator of electricity and many expect the

research will show fusion to be capable of providing long-term, environmentally safe

energy in large quantities. Other research is

directed toward more efficient conversion

systems for coal such as the magnetohydrodynamic generator.

Still other research efforts are directed

toward more effective use of solar energy, the

agreed to buy.

The coal technology most likely to serve as

an alternative to any of the proposed offshore

systems during the next 10 to 15 years is a

conventional powerplant. The capital cost of a

conventional plant currently is between $700

million and $900 million, including advanced

pollution control equipment. A 1,000

megawatt (MWe) plant

1,000 acres of land and

build.

would require about

take some 4 years to

most plentiful and long-lasting fuel known.

Technology already exists for using solar

energy to heat water and space. Similar technology is under development to power cooling systems that now are operated largely by

electricity y.

An OTA analysis has found that neither

public nor private programs in solar energy

are likely to lead to large-scale deployment of

solar equipment in the next 20 years unless

they are expanded and intensified.

The Energy Research and Development Administration estimates that at the present pace

of development less than 6 percent of the heating and cooling systems in U.S. homes will be

solar powered by the year 2000. The OTA

analysis concludes that the potential for solar

power is large enough to warrant more

emphasis on development and marketing. The

OTA study, which will be sent to Congress

early in 1977, focuses on barriers to more

widespread use of solar energy to generate

electricity for individual residences and small

cities and examines possible courses of action

for removing the barriers,
The stakes for

and Delaware are

solar power in New Jersey

high in energy terms. As ha’s

been noted, about 32 percent of all oil and

about 63 percent of all natural gas now consumed in those States is used for space heating

and water heating. A major shift to solar

power would make possible significant sav -

ings in both scarce fuels and in the need for

future imports.

The OTA analysis of energy alter-natives is

continuing beyond this and other studies.

One assessment now underway involves an

investigation of renewable ocean energy technology, including methods of extracting

useful energy from ocean tides, waves, winds,

currents, and thermal differences i n waterlayers.

The study will assess the amount of

research necessary to make such technology

commercially feasible and the consequences of

developing renewable ocean energy systems.

A preliminary assessment is to be completed

early in 1977.

CONCLUSION

No new alternative technology is likely to and Delaware, in which new energy options

provide a significant share of energy supplies may become available for both States.

in the Mid-Atlantic States between now and A very important policy question involves

the end of the century. The alternatives to the alternative energy sources for easing the

proposed offshore energy systems in that problems of transition from existing energy

time- frame are, by and large, restricted to ex - systems to more efficient and less polluting

tending the existing pattern of oil and gas im - systems. That transition can be difficult

ports and land-based coal and nuclear because of the long lead times and the long

powerplants. operating lives that are involved in existing

Two courses of action that are open to the

States, with or without Federal support, offersome hope of reducing the rate of growth of

oil imports and slowing the pace at which new

powerplants are built.

● Conservation n programs, including

widespread improvement of insulation of

homes, could reduce the rate at which oil

and natural gas imports grow over the

next 20 years.

energy systems, particularly in electric power

generators.

New Jersey public utilities have contracted

for four floating nuclear powerplants to be installed off the Mid-Atlantic coast. * The last of

these plants is scheduled for completion in

1992 and designed to operate for 40 years, un -

til the year 2032. Four land-based nuclear

plants already are under construction in New

Jersey, all of which would be operating past

● Cogeneration of electricity as a by-prod the turn of the century.

uct of industrial steam or heat could The more central powerplants that are built

reduce the rate at which new central using existing technology in the next 10 to 20

powerplants would be built. years, the more difficult it will be to replace

because they could buy time for New Jersey “cond pair Of plants
them with new technology that may be more

efficient and less polluting than may be commercially feasible after 1990. An analogy exists in the case of older coal-fired powerplants

that now are used primarily for generating intermediate loads of power in the two States.

Newer coal-fired systems already exist that

are more fuel efficient and less polluting. But

it is not economic to shut down the older

plants and replace them with new plants

because the older plants, most of them located

near urban areas, still have many years of

operating life.

Similar transition problems will exist in the

future as new technologies come online while

it is still economical to operate existing

systems. Conservation, cogeneration, a nd

other alternatives would ease the transition

problem and make it possible to put new technologies in place with less delay and difficulty

when they are ready.
!Il 11<

Footnotes: Chapter IV

DESCR1PTION OF STUDY AREA

1.

2.

<. 3

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

New Jersey and Delaware Statewide Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plans.

Council on Environmental Quality, 7’IIc

DtJlai(117)’t’ 1< ;?~cr R(7siI~: A II E}IZIi)OI~)}I(>IIt(71

A SSLYS))lCII t O( Three Ce)/t/{rics O( C/~/71~(S(>,

Au~ust 1975.

Jenny, Mar-y and Jo~Jl Goodman, A St~Id~/ ()[

t)lc S(l~-io-E~-ollo)}li(- [-~7ch)rs Rc/flti17(y h 1)~~~ Or(fcr

Co~~li~~c~/f~l/ .%cl( ()~ lhc )~~ id-A ll(71~f;1- CW751,

\rol. 1, p. 62.

Ibid, p. 62.

Ibid, p. 95.

Ibid, p. 95.

N. J. Testimony at Department of the interior, Draft En\riron mental Impact Statement Hearing, Atlantic City, N. J., Januar}r

27, 1976.

Ibid.

U.S. Department of Commerce, %cial and

Economic Statistics Administration, Sf~lf;sfica 1 A IIS frac f 01 /)71’ U} I I’ fd .$i~ fcs, 7 Q 74,

Wash in~ton: Go\~m-nment Printing Office,

1974.

Ibid.

Delaware Depart rncnt of Corn m u n itv

Affairs and Economic Development, 1974

EC()~Z(JIIIiL- A ~z(711/\i5 ()( T()~{l-i~f~ (717(f fl~() D()/(li(T(l/(]

Traz’1’l IIIi.siIIL’si.

Op. cit., Council on Environmental Quality.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, W(7fl’rlu)r~ll’

Conlnrucr 0( the Ullitc[i St f7tLJS.

Working Paper #2.

Virginia Institute of Marine Science, Special

Report #93, prepared for U.S. Fish and

Wildlife Service, A }1 ASSLJSSI)IC)II of Esl//(7ri/~(’

mId fNcarshorc M~ri/lc E}l~~i~’tl~~//~t’i~t, Marc h

1976, pp. 82-90,

U.S. Department of the Interior, final EI/-

Z)jrollllllvltfll lnl~wct Sffitr))lc}lf Sale #40.

Interviews with New Jersey officials.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFSHORE

PETROLEUM TECHNOLOGIES IN THE

MID-ATLANTIC

1. Council on Environment’jl Quality, Letter (Jt

Transmittal, p. 3. The Council’s report, OCS

Oil and Gas: An Environmental Assessment,

was issued in April 1974.

2. Secretary of Interior Morton’s statc~mc~nt

before the Joint Hearin~s, Serial NtJ. 94-1-1

(92-104), P. 42.

3. United States General Accounting Otficc~,

“Report to the Congress: Outlook for

Federal Goals to Accelerate Leasing of Oil

and Gas Resources On the Outer Continental Shelf,” March, 19, 1975, p. iii.

4, It is important to note that it was the C’~}unc i 1 on Env iron mental Qua I it}’, n ~Jt t hc

Department of the Interior which inir{~l~txl

the State governments and affected p,l rtic~+

in this year-long study.

5. U.S. Congress, Office of Technolog\ Assessment, “Feasibility of Separating Ex~~lc~ratit~n

from Production” of Oil and Gas on the

Outer Continental Shelf,” May 1975, p. 21.

6. Unpublished U.S. Geolt)gical Su rt~~}~ dat,l.

7. US. Department of the Interior, Bureau of

Land Management, Budget Office.

8. Interviews with Bureau of Land hlana~LJment officials, January and Februa r-}’, 1976.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Interviews with New Jersey and Del,l ~~arc~

officials, May and August, 1975, Fc’bruar\~,

1976.

13. Interviews with Interior officials, February,

1976.

14. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau (Jf

Land Management, (news rclcast.>) March,

1975.

15. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of

Land Management, (news releast’) August,

1975.

16. Interviews with Bureau of Land hla nagc~-

ment and State of ficia Is, Jan ua rv and f:c~bru -

ary, 1976,

17. Department of the Interior Manual 5 16–-

Release No. 1341—is issued 9/27/7 1; Burc~au

of Land Management manua 1 was r~’lc’as~d

5/4/72. A Bureau of Land Mi-inagcm~~~nt instructional memorandum dated 12/31 /75

makes some procedural changes i n the’ lc~t -

ter.

18. Inter\~iew’ with Bureau of Land Management

officials, Februaryr

, 1976.

19. I n t er ~’ i e w ~v i t h N e ~v J e rse v - Del a w a rc .

officials, February, 1976.

20. Interview with U.S. Department of the In-
,.

21,

22.

23,

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44. 1

1

1

1

terior, Office of Outer Continental Shelf

Coordinator, May 12, 1976.

Working Paper #5.

Working Paper #7.

Council on Environmental Quality Letter to

Department of the Interior, January 23,

1976, recommending a delay in the lease sale

in Alaska until certain environmental

studies are completed.

Personal conversations with State members

of the Outer Continen ta I Shelf Ad y’ is(~r~’

Committee on February 18, 1976. -

Interviews with New Jersey and Dt~l.~ ~t,l re

officials, Mav and August 1975 and f:ebru -

ary 1976, -

Interview with official of Department of the

Interior, Office of Outer Continental Shelf

Coordinator, May, 1976.

Interview with U.S. Department of C(Jmmerce, National Oceanic and Atm(Jsph~’ric

Administration, Office of Ct~astal Zt~ne

Management and Bureau of Land M,ln,~gement staff, Jan uarv and February, 1976.

Interviews with D-elaware t~fficials, Janll,lry

4, 1976.

Ibid.

Interview with Cape May County planning

staff, February 4, 1976.

U.S. Department of the Interior (news

release), December 1975.

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of

Land Management (news release), July 16,

1976.

Working Paper #1.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Mid-Atlantic Go\~crnors’ l)twiti[~n [),1 per,

Trenton, N. J., January 197S.

Ibid.

Testimony on Draft En\irt)nmental impact

Statement, Atlantic City, N. J., Januar} 29,

1976; intervicw?s with State t)tficia Is, January

~nd February, 1976.

[bid.

Reeves, H. W., A ~1 OT?(’rz)i[’[{1 of” 1)~~’ (Jf/~)/(Jr[’

Pl~I((~r//J l/~d//strI/, Novtm~ber 1975.

Working Paper #1.

Letter from U.S. En\’ironmcntal Prot~~cti(~n

Agency to Mr. Curtis J. Berklund, Director,

Bureau of Land Management, February 12,

1976.

Working Paper #6.

[nterviews with officials in New Jersey and

Delaware, January and February 1976.

45,

46.

47

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59,

60.

61.

62.

63.

i

)

Extrapolated from, Cazcno\~e & Cc)., TIIIJ

Nort)z !iell: TIIC ,1’[irc}~ for oil l?)zli G(ZS (l)lli t/Ic

l}~~plicfltio~~sft~r /~/tILYII~I(JI/f, September 1972,

p. 47.

Offshore Tech nology Con fercncc Paper,

‘

~ Deepwater Pipelining in the Central N(~rth

Sea”, 1973. Also, Santa Barbara Channel

Pipeline Project Environ mental 1 mpact

Statement, December 1974.

Offs h o r e Tech n 01 ox y C o n fe r e n c e,

“Electronic Survey Helps Assure Integrity t~t

Offshore Pipelines”, 197.7.

Working Paper #2.

Working Paper #?.

Miller, Martin C., Jerry C. Bacon, I\’an M.

Lissauer, Office of Research and De\clopment, U.S. Department of Tra nsp(~rtatit~n,

U.S. Coast Guard, A Ctll)ljlflt[’r .Si)ll//l(7fio\l

Tecl~~~iq~(t~ for Oil S~lills 01( f)r[’ N(~i(~ /(Irs(’!/-

Delaware Coastline, Report No. CG-D- l/1975,

Springfield: NTIS, September 1975.

Working Paper #3.

Op. cit., Miller, Martin C., et al.

Statement of Clayton D, McAuliffe, Chc\’r(~n

Oil Field Research Company, Januar} 1976.

Working Paper #2.

Dr. Norbert Psuty, director, Marine Sciences

Center, Rutgers Un ikrcrsity, tcstifving in

Trenton, N.J., Fd?ruary 14, 197!5. ‘

Major Guy F. Muziani, Wild\\’ (mcl, N. J., and

others i n testimony at Atlantic City, J,l n LI,l r}’

28, 1976. Also, N~]i(~ Y(Jrk Ti~~/[+, lanuar~’ 11,

1976.

Briefing by U.S. Geological Survey’s R&D

Office on December 15, 1975.

U.S. Department of the Interior, final Enzlironmwztnl zmpm/ Statement. Sale #40, July

1976, VO1. 2, pp. 334-38.

Sheen Technical Subcommittee, “Environmental Aspects of Produced Waters from LIi 1

and Gas Operations i n Offshore and Coasta I

Waters, ” September, 197s.

Gulf Universities Research C(~nsort ium

(1974), Fi/1[71 Pr~~jtYI Pl(~)///i,y,y C~~//}/ci/ C~J}IstIIISIIS R c~wrt, Offshore ECO1OSV 1 n \’cst i~a t ion,

Report No. 138, September 20.

Proceedings, 1975 Conference on Pr~wenLion and Control of Oil Pol Iuticln, Amt~rica n

Petroleum Institute, March, 1975.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Natic}nal

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,

“Report to the Congress on Oct~,ln Pollutit)n,

Overfish ing, a n d Of fsh LJ re De\’cl t~pm cm t,

January, 1975.

Working Paper #5.
\! Ii:,

64. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of

Land Management, Final Enz~ironmerzfal impact Stnfenre)rt, Proposed increase in Oil and Gas

Leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf, ” February 1975.

THE POSSIBILITY OF DEEPWATER PORTS IN

THE MID-ATLANTIC

1. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Oil Tr(?}l\~~i)rt/llioll/JI/ T(711kcrs.’ A 1 1

A tzlzl~/sis [)( ,Vl ITri\lc po//l, ~/())l (7/id .S(7((]I.V

Mc(7sl/rt>s, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975.

2. Jacobs, John, World Tanker Fleet Rez~ieul,

December 1975.

3. Op. cit., Office of Technolo~}r Assessment.

4. Interview with Interstate Oil Co. t~fficial.

5. Office of Technology Assessment, Tanker

Report and description of January 1975, collision of two tankers in the Delaware River

at Marcus Hook.

6. Op. cit., Office of Technology Assessment.

7. %)rros Assoc. Inc., O((slrtlr(> T~’r~tri}~[7/ SI/~fcItIs

COIICL>/IK, September 1972.

8. Ibid.

9. Delaware Bav Transportation Co., Project

Report, A Pro~M).sC~f D(70/~i(’(71(>r T~7/lk(]r T[>r~//i/l/71

(7)/ d 0/1 S)lorc Pi~l~’lill(’ Dish’ ihlltloll s~/5h’Hl,

April 4, 1968.

10. Statement by William T. Cahill, p. 1145,

Joint Senate Committee Hearings on Decpwater Ports Legislation, Ju Iy 23, 1973.

11. Deepwater Ports Project Office, Draft Environmental Impact Statement for proposed

offshore Texas terminal.

12. Ibid.

13. Personal conversation with representati~res

of LOOP Inc., July 1976.

14. Working Paper #1.

15. August 4, 1976 telephone conversation with

Jacksonville Division.

16. Federal Energy Administration, N(7ti(v1(71

bzergy O[{tlook, February 1976.

17. Working Paper #5.

18. Ibid.

19. Pen Jer Del Corp., “Oil Port Update,” May

1975.

20. Ibid.

21. Interview with industr}’ executi\’t’, hlarch

1976.

22. July 7, 1976 letter from John E. Lescroart,

Director of Dcepw’atcr Ports, U.S. Dc)phrtment of Transportation.

23. Ibid.

24. Working Paper #.;.

25. Op. cit., Office of Technology Ass~wn~cmt.

26. Miller, Martin C., Jerrv C. Bacon, Ikan M.

Lissauer, Office of Research and Dc\’cJlcJpment, U.S. Department of Transportation,

U.S. Coast Guard, A C[vII~)IIf~’r .Si)III/l~~IioI~

Techniql[c for oil 5)~ills o(I” fh[’ ,Nci(I /rr5cj/-

Delnuwre Comtli)~r, Report No. CG-D- 1 / 1975,

Springfield: NTIS, September 1975.

27. Op. cit., Office of Technology Assc~ssnl~mt.

28. Ibid.

29. Federnl Re<yistrr, vol. 41, No. 94, h!,l~~ 13 ,

1976.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

THE PROPOSAL FOR A FLOATING

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornrn ission, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Draft Environmental Statement Related to Construction of Atlantic Generating Station, Units I

and 2, Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Docket Nos. STN 50-477 and STN

50-478, NUREG-0058, April 1976, Table 8.3,

p. 8-8, Hereafter denoted as AGS-DES.

2. AGS-DES, P. 8-16.

3. Corn m u n icat i ons w i t h PL] bl i c Se r-i’ i ce

Electric and Gas company, AL1gust 1976.

4. Daniel, Mann, Johnson, & MendL~nh.~11, A

Flontill(y Et7rthqlff7kc \< L>S/Sf(711/ ~’1[(-1(’(7)’ /)( J[(’(’l’

Statio}i, Report No. 182-1-1, prep,lred tor

Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. At(~mic

Energy Commission, April 1968.

5. The Energy Policy Staff, Office of Scitmce

and Technology, Executive Office of the

President, Electric Power and the Enz’ironment,

in cooperation with the Atomic Energy

Commission, U.S. Department of Health,

Education, and Welfare, U.S. Department of

the Interior, Federal Power Commission,

Rural Electrification Administration, Tennessee Valley Authority, and Council on Environmental Quality, Washington: Government Printing Office, August 1970.

6. Ibid., p. 37.

7. Council on Environmental Quality, O~~shore

Nuclear Powerplank, A CEQllnteragmcy Tmk

Forc~~ Study, 1976, p. Il.

8. Op. cit., AGS-DES, p. iii.

9. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Safety

Evaluation Report related to Offshore Power

Systems Floating Nuclear Plants (l-8),

Docket No. STN 50-437, NUREG-75/100,
September 30, 1975, p. 156. Hereafter

denoted as SER.

10. Dade W. Moeller, Chairman, Advisory

Committee on Reactor Safeguards, “interim

Report on Floating Nuclear Plant, ” letter to

Marcus A. Rowden, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, June 7, 1976, p. .3.

11. The interveners are: City of Brigantine;

Kenneth Walton, Brigantine; Ocean County

Chosen Board of Freeholder; Atlantic

County Chosen Board of Freeholder-s;

Atlantic County Citizens Council on the Envi ron men t; a n d t h 6> N a t Li r a I R eso L] rcc~s

Defense Council, Inc.

12. A comprehensive study of risks associated

with land-based nuclear plant operation

was published in October 1975, entitled:

Reactor %ft’t!j Stlld~/: A II Assess)/l(vlt ()/” AccidL’IIt

Risks ill U.S. Cmllr?lercilll Nrlclf’f7r l>[)Z(lL’I’/ll[l);t5,

WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014. The report,

also known as the Rasmussen Reportt has

been criticized and defended by nuclear

scientists and others. For details of the controversy, see: U.S. House of Representatives,

Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,

Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Hearings on “Matters Pertaining to

the Reactor Safety Study (Rasmussen

Report)”, June 11, 1976, Transcripts to be

published.

13. SER, p. 31.

14, U .S, Nuclear Regulatory Corn m ission,

“Report of the Interagency Rcgu latorv

Steering Committee for the Coordination (~f

Federal regulatory Activities relative to the

Licensing of Floating Nuclear Powerplants ”,

July 1975.

15. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Regulation, Directorate of Licensing, [))’[),~r(7/)//)/(7fi(-

/)/(ornrf7tio)/ for //lc I.ic(vrsill,y 0/’ Sff7//ddr(fi2(’[i

N 1{ C- 1 c o r PO u’ t’ rj~ 1 (I )1 ts, W A S H -1 ,? 41,

Washington, August 1974, Amendment 1,

December 1974.

16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, AHHLMI Report 1975, pp. 20–24.

17. “Memorandum of Understanding Between

the United States Coast C,uard and the

United States Atomic Energy Commission

for Regulation o f FI oa t i n g N LI c1 ea r

Powerplants”, f-cdt>r~ll R~’,~is/rr, ~ol. 39, No .

12, Thursday, January 17, 1974, p. 2124.

18. “Memorandum of Understanding Bctw’een

the Corps of Engineers, United States Arm}~,

and the United Stattis Nuclear Re~u [atorv.

Commission for Regulation of Nuclear

Powerplants”, fcdcrol Rc,yish>r, Vol. 40, No.

165, August 25, 1975, p. 37110.

19. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office

of Public Affairs, “Licensing of Nuclear

Power Reactors”. Also, Annual Report 1975.

20. Working Paper #8.

21. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office

of Nuclear Reactor Re~ulation, Fi//(7l EI1 -

l}iro)l~~l(~jl f~/ st~tt~~~l(~jl t \<[~/(7/L~(f /() M (7jI l[fll(-tllr(~

of Fiooti/l<y Nl(clcnr P(n(v’r\Jl17/lts [J~/ ojfdlorc

Pouvr SI/stwIs, Pnrt 7, A}l E}lzji)’()/l//l~~~ltl7l Stntcmcl~t Co}lsilit~ri~~,q the O/wr17fio/l of the MIIIIIIf[Icturi~z,y Fncilihy ill )ilckso}~z~illc, Flori[in, NUREG

75/091, Docket No. STN 50-437, Springfield:

National Technical Information Sertice, October 1975, p. 3-24.

22. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, A) IHIIO1 Rtyort 197.5, p. 54.

23. Ibid., p. 58.

24. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Directorate of Regulatory Standards, E/r~~i)’()/r)~/t~}/t(71

S11 rz~e}/ 0( Trfl/lsportf7 tiolz ()( R f7fi io(7~-li l~r

Mnterr~ls to ll)ld froI~I N11cl(J17r Poi(ll~/’/)l(l)lf~,

WASH-1 238 (Dec. 1972) and U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Office of Standards

D e v e 10 p m e n t, S LI p p 1 e m e n t 1 t o

WASH-1238, NUREG-75/038. (April 1975).

25. Ibid., Wash-1238, p. 1.

26. Op. cit., AGS-DES, p. 5-74, and p. 7-3.

27. Working Paper #9.

28. 10 CFR 50-51.

29. Ibid,

30. Ibid.

31. Regulatory Guide 1.86.

32. Ibid.

33, Working Paper #9.

34. Ibid.

35. At 78 percent plant factor. If the plant were

in operation 60 percent of the time, which is

the present average for all U.S. nuclear

plants, this would be reduced to 12.1 billion

kilowatt-hours.

36, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Directorate of Regulatory Standards, Nf //clc(7r f)(n(~(’r

Fncility Pcr~orulo}lc~~ Cllnrnctl’ristics {or M17kiil,q

E )1 v i r o )1 ItI c }1 t 01 ! 1)1 j) 17 L- I A ss cssIII c II fs,

WASH-1 355, December 1974, p. 4-114.

37. Less than 50 acres of this would actually he

used for the placement of transmission

towers.

38. Op. cit., U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,

Directorate of Regulatory Standards.
39. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., Prelin~in-

~ry Sa~ehj Annlysis of Atlantic Generating Stafion.+—-llnits 1 & 2.

40. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comrn ission, RII[rt--

tor S~l(CtI/ S/IIdI/, A/~ AssL+s))/L~)/t ()~ Risks III /-1,.S.

Comwer;i(ll NI(L-1(’(7r /)07(1(])-)~l(7111s, \f’A.S}/- /400,”

(N UREG-75/0 14). Springfield Nationa I

Tech n i ca 1 I n formation S~~r\’ i CLJ, October

1975 .

41. U.S. Atomic Energy Commissi~~n, Interim

Statement of I>olic}’, “Protection Against Accidents in Nuclear Power Rc’actt~rs, ” l“t)(l(’r{7/

Rc,y Isk’)’, vol. 39, No. 167, Tut’sday, August

27, 1974, p. 30965.

42. A summary of the contrt~~rers}’ can be f[~und

in: Hearings on “Matters I>c~rta in ing tt~ the

Reactor %fcty Study (Rasmus\en Rc~port), ”

June 11, 1976, U.S. HOLIW of Rq3rcwmtati~es, Committee on Interic~r and insular

Affairs, subcommittee on Ener~v and the

Environ ment.

43. Working Paper #8.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Op. cit., Dade W. Moeller, p. 2.

47. These are accidents that are jud~ed to IN

likely enough to warrant a na I ysis. A

description c~f Nuclear Regulator-y Commission po] icv about the consideration of acci -

dents is f[~unci in the discussion of safety in

the ISSUC section.

48. Offshore Power S\rstems, C(~)~st’[~[/(’)/((IS ()(

1<(’lc~lscs ttl l.i{~[(i(i l;(lf)li(’(l?/~, Report No. TR

091 A89, June, 1976, p. 3-9.

49. Buston, Lawrence D. and Lloyd S. Nelson,

“Reactor Explosion Research”, E)~viro)~/)Ic)/t

Mn~azine, June 1976, p. 6-8.

50. Working Paper #8. A so Advisory Commit- r

tee on Reactor Safeguards, Minutes of the

Floating Nuclear Plant/Atlantic Generating

Station Subcommittee Meeting, February 4,

1975, Washington, D. C., p. 4.

51. Private communication from Atlantic Citv

officials.

52. Long Beach, N. J., Chamber of Commerce

estimate, August 12, 1976.

53. EG&G Environmental Consultants, S11}~1))1~7rIi

0( Ocef7tlo,qrf7ph ic (l17srriwtio)ls ill N(’i(l /1’rW 1/

Coastal Waters Near Latitude .39° 28’ N. and

Longitude 74° 15’ W. Durinx the Period May

1972 Through April 1973, A Report to Public

Service Electric and Gas Company, July

1974, Table T5-1, P. 5-50. ‘

54. Ibid.

55. A critique of the adt?quac~r 01 radi,ltion

emergency procedures is fOLI nd in: Gc~ncr,l I

Accounting Office, Cornptrollcr Gt~n~~r,~l t~i

the United States, .$fro~~(~rr f[’~f~’r~?l A ~>isf~~~~~-(’

to Stf7f~Ts Nc(’dcd (or 1< f7di~lf iol~ /./)l(’l-,yt’JrCI/

Rcsjul}lw’ PllzJl12ill,q, RED 76-73, (Alarch 18,

1976).

56. Working Paper #8.

ALTERNATIVES TO OFFSHORE

TECHNOLOGIES

1. Offshore Power Systems, Flontin$ Nuclear

Power Generation Editorial Fnct BOOk, 197s-77,

1976.

2. Williams, Robert H., Center ft~r En\’ironmental Studies, “The Potential t~~r El~~ctricit\

Generation as a Byproduct t~f Inciu>tri.il

Steam production in Netv Jw-se\~, ” Princ~~t~~n

University, 1976.

3. Transcript, Office of Technol(~~} Assc~ssmt.~nt

Seminar- on Energy Altm-nati\~w, PrincL~ton

University, June 25, 1976.

4. Handbook on Pennsyl\ran ia-Ne\\’ Jt~rsc~\-

Maryland interconnection, April, 1976. “

5. Working Paper #5.

6. Nuclear Regulator Commissit)n, Draft Environmental Statement, Relateci tc) CLJI1 -

struction of Atlantic C,enerat in; Stat ion

Units 1 and 2, Docket Nos. STN 50-477 and

STN 50-478.

7. For differing evaluations, scw Ct~mc~}’, D,~\’id

D., Bullrti}l ()( th~) A towi(- .’icitv~fisls, Nt~\’~~mber

1974; A tollzic ]lldlisfri~l~ F(lrI/J~I, [>LIbl ic Atfairs

and Information program pLI b] icd tion on

plant capacity factors, 1975.

8. Op. cit., Working Paper #5.

9. Ibid,

10. Report by Navarre, C. C., \’icc’ pr~~sidcnt (~f

marketing, Washington h’atu ral Gas Co.,

Seattle, Wash., to the Energy Etticic~ncv as a

National Priority Conference, Washil~gt(~n,

D. C., May 20-21, 1976.

11. Draft report, Office of Technol(~8}’ Assc~ss -

ment Solar Energy Project.

12. Op. cit.. Working Paper #5.

13. Private communication with staff, [~ner~~’

.,.

Resources Conservation and llwc~lt~pmcnt

Commission, Sacramento, Calit.

14. Op. cit., transcript, Office t)t’ Technology

Assessment ener~y seminar.

15. Ibid.

16. Op. cit., Center for E n \ iron m en ta I

Studies,
.

“..
Chapter V

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Public Participation: A Pilot Project

The public participation element of this

assessment was a n effort to bring about a n ex -

change of information between OTA and

citizens in the study region. This two-way

flow of information was intended to contribute to public understanding of the technologies being assessed, and to obtain information directly from the affected citizens .

about impacts of greatest public interest and

concern.

The data obtained from the public participation program helped OTA ensure that

factors which citizens consider relevant and

important were adequately addressed in the

study. The public participation program also

helped OTA to make the assessment as complete as possible so as to assist the Congress in

anticipating, understanding, and considering,

to the fullest extent possible, the consequences

of technological applications, as mandated by

the Technology Assessment Act of 1972.

In addition to contributing to the content of

this particular assessment, the public participation program was intended to help OTA

learn how the public could participate in a

meaningful way in the assessment of technology. The process of involving the public

and integrating the results of such an effort

into a technology assessment is an experimen -

.

tal one. There is virtually no practical experience upon which to draw, nor does the

process lend itself to standardized formulas,

models, or techniques. This pilot project was

therefore designed to evolve throughout the

coastal effects study so as to meet the needs of

the assessment team and of the public participants.

Overall, OTA learned through responses to

its public participation program that citizens

were most interested in the economic benefits

and losses, the social and environmental advantages and disadvantages, possible changes

in their way of life, and the possible risk of

major accidents associated with the three

energy systems or their alternatives.

With regard to the current system for information gathering and decisionmaking,

citizens were concerned that the States and the

public lack an effective partnership role and

that the various Federal agencies do not sufficiently coordinate their roles and activities.

Repeatedly, participants in the program

saw an urgent need for a national energy

policy in which each energy system could be

considered, and serious research and funding

could be given to determining conservation

measures, identifying alternative sources o f

clean and renewable energy, and developing

innovative energy systems.

The need for a national energy policy was

stressed by many respondents, and their collective views are well expressed by a respondent from Hillside, N. J., who put it this way:

Before these options are explored, the State

and the Nation must develop a comprehen -

255
sive energy conservation policy, including

development of mass transit and recycling of

all usable products. As a second step, all

minimum polluting forms of energy-—such as

solar, wind, and geothermal—-should be

utilized wherever possible. If offshore

facilities are eventually developed, legislation

should spell out clearly that they must conform to all existing environmental legislation.

This is especially important regarding

onshore development which will definitely

affect air quality maintenance planning. -

More than 15,000 persons were reached by

OTA during the project. Those who participated in the assessment by returning questionnaires, attending workshops, or communicanting with OTA in other ways, represented industry, trade associations, professional associations, consultant groups,

academic groups, citizen organizations, and

local, State, regional, and Federal officials, as

well as the general public.

Since no attempt was made to obtain a

representative sample, participants may or

may not be representative of the entire

population of the study area. Nor was any attempt made to conduct a public opinion poll

on support for, or opposition to, the technologies. OTA was seeking substantive information and as many points of view as possible

to ensure a thorough and reliable assessment

of offshore energy systems.

Participation in the assessment was in

response to OTA efforts to reach as many persons as possible in New Jersey and Delaware,

but the study was not confined exclusively to

that area.

The process of public participation was

facilitated by the following factors:

(1) the limited size of the study area; .

(2) the existence of actual proposals in the

area for:

-offshore oil and gas exploration and

development,

—a floating nuclear powerplant,

-deepwater ports; and

(3) the neutral position of OTA relative to

each of the technologies being studied.

Response to the public participation project

was mostly favorable. Participants indicated

they were pleased to be consulted by the

Government at a time when they felt their

opinions would make a difference in the

study. Dissemination of information to the

public was indicated as a major step toward

encouraging citizen involvement and OTA

was encouraged to find more ways of distributing information and involving the

public by the most efficient and least costly

method.

Responsibility for planning, directing, and

conducting the public participation project

was assigned to one member of the OTA

Oceans Program staff, but other members of

the assessment team, including the Program

Manager, also attended workshops, prepared

materials, and evaluated i n formation

received. Thus, all members of the team were

aware of the relevance of information being

generated and public participation activities

were integrated into the assessment process.

Instead of being viewed as a separate part of

the study, public participation was considered

by the entire Oceans Program staff to be a

necessary and integral part of the effort to

provide Congress with relevant information,

including public perceptions and views about

the consequences of the technologies being

assessed.

The following methods of communication

were used for this information exchange:

an initial OTA news release announcing

the study;

distribution of 100 copies of a staff-prepared briefing paper about the assessment;

three public workshops which drew a

total of about 90 participants;

attendance by OTA staff at public hear-
●

●

●

●

●

b

●

●

●

●

●

ings and at meetings sponsored by other

groups;

distribution of 15,000 i n formation

brochures, “Proposed New Technologies

Off the Shores of New Jersey and

Delaware”;

more than 1,000 responses to questionnaire i ncluded in brochure;

in-depth interviews conducted by the .

assessment team;

correspondence and position papers supplied to OTA by participants;

review of background papers by OTA advisory pane] members and public partici -

,

pants;

specially convened industry, govern -

, ment, and academic panel on alternatives

sponsored by OTA;

meetings with the OTA Coastal Effects

Advisory Panel and the Technology

Assessment Advisory Council;

review of OTA draft report by panel,

public participants, and government

officials involved in the technologies;

survey results and constituen t

correspondence supplied by congressional offices;

monitoring of press reports on the

assessment and the proposed offshore

technologies in Delaware, New Jersey,

New York , Philadelphia , and

Washington, D. C.; and

interaction with members of Congress

and their staffs.

The process of identifying and reaching potential participants was, by design, an evolutionary one. Initial contacts were expected to

provide additional names, and they did. Those

sources in turn provided more names. Lists of

potential participants were also obtained from

interested persons and organizations, con -

gressional offices, testimony at hearings, press

reports, and requests for information received

by OTA.

Supplementary sources of information,

such as testimony at Government hearings,

press reports on energy systems in genera],

and similar sources not generated by OTA,

were also used to determine whether there

were any major d inferences between views expressed in those forums and views being expressed to OTA, and to detrmine whether

relevant segments of the public were being

reached by the OTA effort.

The public participation project was a continuous loop of information exchange from

the assessment team to the public and back to

the team. The information exchange made it

possible for the OTA staff to confirm ongoing

work or modify or expand the study i n .

response to concerns and information needs

identified by participants.

The following sections of this chapter detail

major findings, the ways in which OTA made

use of the information gathered through the

public participation program, and how the

program was conducted. Throughout the discussion, the actual words of respondents are

often used to illustrate the level of public interest, understanding, and concern about the

energy systems being studied.

Major Findings for All Technologies

BACKGROUND of information: lists of the positive and nega -

From responses to a questionnaire (see tive impacts expected from the three energy

figure V-1 ) distributed during the public par- systems, and comments on all aspects of

ticipation program, OTA obtained two groups offshore energy development.

.
Figure V-1. Public participation questionnaire

such development, please note these below:

and Coastal Zone Assessment

Public — - -- — Participation

1. If you would like to be kept informed about the

Address —

2.

3.

City State Zip 5. If you or your organization have developed any information relative to

the subjects of this study that you would like to send along with this

questionnaire, please note below the nature or title of the materials:

If you belong to any organization(s) that would have an interest in the

assessment, please indicate

Organization

Address — —

City — State Zip

President

Organization Please mail this questionnaire, along with any other information

share with OTA to:

you wish to

City State Zip Please fold here

President

If offshore energy systems were developed off the coasts of New Jersey

and Delaware, what effects would you foresee for yourself, your comPOSTAGE AND FESS PAID

munity. and the nation? Do you think these effects would be generally

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

positive or generally negative?

Possible effects?

(Please Iist)

Offshore Drilling for Oil and Gas

1

2.

3.

Floating Nuclear Power Plants

2.

3.

Deepwater Ports for Supertankers

1.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR P RIVATE USE , $300

Positive Or Negative, 

( Please check)

Pos 

Pos c

Pos ❑

Pos. D

Pos. G

Po, (1

Pos. IJ

POS. p

P05. G

Emilia Govan

Public Participation, Oceans Project

Office of Technology Assessment

Untied States Congress

Washington, DC. 20510

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
The lists supplied by respondents allowed

OTA to determine which anticipated impacts

were most important to participants. They

also made it possible to compare responses

from various areas of New Jersey and

Delaware to determine if there were significant differences in views based on place of

residence.

The comments, which were made in

response to an open-ended question on the

questionnaire, provided the quotes used in

OVERALL FINDINGS

The public participation program showed

that:

. Questionnaire respondents attributed

more positive than negative effects to

offshore oil and gas systems and to floating nuclear powerplants, but more negative than positive effects to deepwater

ports.

● More respondents perceived mixed

effects—i e., some positive, some nega -

tive—from offshore drilling, than from

floating nuclear powerplants or deepwater ports.

. For all technologies, the important positive effects related to increased energy

supply, lowered energy costs, stimulus to

the economy, fiscal advantages, increased

employment, and environmental advantages.

● For all technologies, the primary negative

impacts related to degradation of the

onshore and marine environment, the

dangers and consequences of major accidents such as oil spills or nuclear malfunctions, adverse economic impacts—

especially potential losses to the touristrecreation industry—and adverse energy .

use impacts such as depletion of nonrenewable sources, disincentives to conservation and to alternative energy

source development.

this chapter and advised OTA of alternatives

and other actions which the respondents

believed important, relative to energy supplies.

The following pages give the overall findings from the questionnaires and the findings

for each of the three systems studied. For each

system, the findings are grouped as they relate

to anticipated effects, how the technologies

will be implemented, and preferences or alternatives expressed by respondents.

●

●

●

●

●

●

The major positive effect perceived for

offshore drilling was increased energy

availability y.

The major positive effect perceived for

floating nuclear powerplants was also increased energy availability.

The major positive effect perceived for

deepwater ports was lower energy costs,

The major negative effect perceived for

offshore drilling was undesirable

onshore impacts.

The major negative effect perceived for

deepwater ports was the possibility of

large oil spills.

The major negative effect perceived for

floating nuclear powerplants was potential nuclear hazards.

In addition, respondents expressed a

preference for alternatives other than nuclear

or oil-related offshore developments. These

can be summed up by the following statements by participants:

ConservatiOn of energy, wind, and solar

power should be used, not stepped-up production of oil or dangerous nuclear powerthe ocean belongs to the world and should be

protected at all costs. (From Paramus, N.J.)

More effort must be made to use solar energy.

Nuclear, fossil fuels are at best stop-gap

measures. (From Waldwich, N. J.)

The only real solution to the energy problem

is a commitment to development of SOurces
other than fossil fuels or nuclear fission. An

all out effort to develop solar, wind, geothermal sources, etc., would meet with public ac -

ceptance. (From Chatham, N. J.)

FINDINGS BY REGION

The number of respondents -who listed predominantly positive or predominantly negative effects for each technology was tabulated

and this i n formation was sorted according to

the counties in which the respondents live.

This analysis allowed the study team to determine whether residents of coastal counties

perceived effects which were significantly

different from those perceived by residents of

noncoastal areas. The major findings of this

analysis are as follows:

NEW JERSEY

Delaware River Counties of New Jersey

(Cumberland, Salem, Camden, Gloucester,

and parts of Cape May Counties):

● more positive than negative on nuclear

plants, offshore drilling for oil and gas,

and deepwater ports; but

. largest positive margin on oil and gas.

Southeastern New Jersey (Cape May, Atlantic, Ocean Counties):

●

●

●

positive on oil and gas, but by smaller

margin than other parts of New Jersey;

about evenly divided on nuclear, but

negative percentage larger than in other

parts of New Jersey;

more positive than negative on deepwater ports, but by fairly small margin.

Northeastern New Jersey (Monmouth,

Middlesex, Union and Essex Counties):

It’s time to develop new means of supplying

energy in the United States. ( From

Montclair, N. J.)

. largest number of respondents;

● more positive on oil and gas and nuclear;

● more negative on deepwater ports;

. more positive on floating plants than

Southeastern New Jersey or Delaware

River Counties;

Non-coastal New Jersey:

●

●

9

larger margin positive for oil and gas

than other New Jersey or Delaware

regions;

larger margin positive for floating

nuclear plants than other New Jersey or

Delaware regions;

larger margin negative on deepwater

ports than other New Jersey regions.

DELAWARE

New Castle County, Delaware:

● more positive for oil and gas;

● more positive for floating plants;

● more negative on deepwater ports.

Kent and Sussex County, Delaware:

●

●

●

●

smallest number of respondents;

more negative than positive on all three

technologies;

more negative on offshore development

and floating plants than deepwater ports;

margin of negative for all three technologies greater in Sussex than Kent.

OFFSHORE DRILLING FOR OIL AND GAS

Anticipated Effects. the perceived negative effects. The benefits of

The perceived positive effects of offshore OCS oil and gas were seen mainly as economic

drilling focused on very different factors from and energy-related, with emphasis on energy
self -sufficiency and employment oppor -

tun i ties; whereas the adverse effects were

associated main 1 y with anticipated degrada -

tion of the coastal and marine environment,

the quality of life, and the risks of major accidents causing losses to the economic base of

the region—the recreational industry which

depends on a clean environment. (See figure

v-2.)

Concerning the positive effects, a Bloomfield, N, J., resident saw offshore drilling as “a

positive step in the direction of providing this

country with the energy it needs. ” A

Montclair, N. J., respondent saw offshore drilling as “absolutely necessary for our future

economy. Another Bloomfield resident saw

OCS development as “good for the State in

that it provides much needed jobs and tax

revenue, and a Pompton Lakes, N .J., person

said that offshore drilling “should help the

very bad economic and unemployment situa -

tion now existing in New Jersey. ”

A Wilmington, Del., resident summed up

these responses by saying “I favor offshore

drilling as benefits seem to more than offset

the risks. ” Finally, a Basking Ridge, N. J., man

said, “The United States should do all it can to

develop energy supplies not related to other

countries. ”

In contrast, a respondent from Barnegat

Light, N. J., summed up many of the negative

perceptions by saying he felt that “such

developments would ruin the N.J. shore. ” A

Wilmington, Del., resident was “against such

development” because it “would supply very

limited amounts of oil over a very short commercial life but would radically alter the

ecology, both animal and human along the

coast” and “may impose additional taxes on

current residents. ” And a South Orange, N.J.,

resident said “Tourism is N.J. ’s number one

business. Unattractive onshore development

should not be allowed to damage this busi -

ness. ”

Process of Implementing the Technologies

The responses to an open-ended query on

the questionnaire distributed by OTA confirmed the findings of workshops and interviews that the manner and timing of Federal

decisions relating to offshore oil and gas

development, as well as the State and public

role in such decisions, are matters of concern.

The way in which the offshore drilling technology is managed and regulated was also

criticized by some, and the absence of adequate liability and compensation programs in

the event of major oil spills was noted. Proponents of offshore drilling were less critical of

the present system of implementation and

management and many felt that changes in

the process would cause undesirable delay in

developing offshore oil and gas sources.

GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT

There were some widely divergent views on

the nature and extent of appropriate government involvement in offshore oil and gas

development. Views ranged from those of the

Neshanic Station, N.J., resident who favored

“minimal government interference in the

develop merit,” that of a Westfield, N. J., respondent who said “offshore exploration and

production should be done by industry, not

Federal or State agencies, ” and the Mendham,

N. J., man who wanted “a minimum of necessary government controls, ” to those of a

Leonia, N.J., resident who said “nationalize all

energy industry, ” and the Bayone, N. J., resident who felt that “if offshore development

occurs it should be undertaken by the Federal

or State government for maximum public

benefit.”

There were some who said, as did a South

Orange, N. J., respondent that “the present

OCS leasing system works very well” and that

“pending OCS legislation looks like another

attempt to destroy private enterprise, and

substitute big government bureaucracies.” A

number of respondents cited the desirability
Figure V-2. Results of public participation questionnaire: offshore drilling for oil and gas

ANTICIPATED POSITIVE EFFECTS

Lower /

Availability

(1207 Positive Effects = 58% of Oil and

Gas Effects Listed)

ENERGY AVAILABILITY 47%

Increased supply of energy to 52%

the nation or region in general

Enhanced energy independence 4770

and national security

Other 1%

ECONOMIC/FISCAL ADVANTAGES 20%

Stimulate economy 57%

Increase tax revenues 17%

Industrial development 17%

Balance of payments, other 9%

INCREASED EMPLOYMENT 19%

(Increase employment -

decrease unemployment)

LOWER ENERGY COSTS 12%

(Cheaper oil and gas,

cheaper transport costs)

ENVIRONMENTAL ADVANTAGES 2%

(Less pollution from tankers, etc.)

Total Positive Effects: 100%

ANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EFFECTS

Gas Effects Listed) 1

ONSHORE IMPACTS 32%

Damaged beaches, shore 29%

Industrial development 21%

Increased support/service facilities 17%

Increased population 13%

Aesthetics 7%

Other quality of life impacts: Boom 13%

town, air pollution, traffic congestion, community dislocation

GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 21%

IMPACTS

Harm to environment/ecology 65%

Pollution 35%

OIL SPILLS 20%

Oil spills 69%

Accidents (including pipeline 31940

leaks, blowouts)

ADVERSE MARINE IMPACTS 15% I

Harm to ocean ecology in general 61 % I

Harm to wildlife, marine life 30%

Damage to wetlands 6%

Damage to ocean floor 3%

8%

Losses to tourist-recreation 64% - -

industry

Damage to fishing industry 24%

Other losses (property values, 12%

farmland)

ENERGY IMPACTS I

(Decrease conservation, further

dependence on oil, use up nonrenewable sources, delay

energy alternatives)

Total Negative Effects: 100%

I

I

i
of separating exploration from the development of offshore oil and gas or suggested

several related ways to change the present

leasing system. One respondent, from

Chatham, N. J., said that “the United States

should do its own exploration work to determine the oil and gas resources, then perhaps

lease lands. These are public resources and if

developed the public should receive a better

return than has been true in the past. ” A

Brookside, N. J., respondent said, “I think exploration for oil and gas is important in terms

of knowing our resources. However, development should not be undertaken until other

resources are exhausted. ”

And, finally, a Red Bank, N.J., respondent

summed up the views of many public partici -

pants as follows: “The development of OCS

oil resources must be done on a thoroughly

planned basis. This requires a preliminary exploratory phase. After the total resources are

known, then a rational national energy plan

can be developed which will match the Nation’s energy needs over the long term while

minimizing environmental impact. ”

STATE-LOCAL ROLES AND COMPENSATION

There were many general comments, relating to all technologies, that offshore developments should take place with adequate State

and local participation in decisions. One summation of this view is that of the Newark, Del.,

resident who said, “The States of Delaware

and New Jersey should have a strong voice in

all proceedings. No ‘Federal-experts-knowbest’ attitude, Some ‘experts’ simply are not

greatest authorities on all matters, especially

local ones.” Cooperation among levels of

governments was seen by a Dover, Del., respondent as especially needed with regard to

offshore drilling: “Department of the Interior

and the oil companies have a serious credibility problem. Top management is either insensitive or too arrogant. Offshore explora -

tive program between local, State, and Federal

govern merits.”

Several aspects of the State and local role in

OCS development were discussed by participants. A Glen Ridge, N. J., woman said “I

believe New Jersey should have a say as to

where the drilling will be done. . . .“ Several

respondents expressed views similar to that of

a Fanwood, N. J., man who felt that “New

Jersey should receive some compensation for

use of the the land and natural resources” and

the Selbyville, Del., resident who said, “If it is

necessary, the States should be financially

compensated to provide the facilities that will

be needed for the increase in population. ”

ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT

A recurring theme among questionnaire

responses was that development should be

preceded by proper planning and safeguards.

As a Highland, N.J., man put it, “The OCS

should be developed but with proper planning given to the many environmental im -

pacts that will result. ” A Fort Lee, N. J., respondent added, “1 cannot overemphasize the

need for careful environmental planning,

especially in regard to the effects on the local

communities. It must be dealt with as a complete ‘system’ including access roads, pollution abatement, and recreation for the increased population. ” A Wilmington, Del.,

woman wrote, “I would favor some offshore

energy development (excluding nuclear) if it

were undertaken with adequate safeguards for

the environment and in a time frame allowing

Delaware communities to plan for the resulting growth. ” On the other hand, a State

legislator from Centerville, Del., felt that

“Coastal zone management and statewide

land use plans must be developed with inputs

from the total community. ”

A Wilmington, Del., resident said, “I favor

offshore drilling with control to minimize

spills, ” and a Washington, D. C., respondent

tion can be speeded up with a ‘true’ coopera - saw the need for “strict adherence to environ-
mental protection measures—provision for

prompt remedies in case of spills, accidents,

etc. ” A Phillipsburg, N. J., resident, who expressed support for drilling, wrote: “The technology exists to control spills and leaks from

any oil-related activity. ”

Strict control over the technological systems

was also emphasized by respondents like one

from Wenonah, N. J., who saw a need for

“constant reliability check on equipment and

operators of vital equipment. Operators must

be very well selected for ability to accept

responsibility and to perform consistently. ”

A Westfield, N. J., man added that,

“Enforceable stiff rules on spill prevention

should be developed. ”

LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL SPILLS

Many respondents wanted, as did a

Wilmington, Del., resident, to “make sure

enough money is set aside to compensate for

spills and damages. ” A Belleville, N. J., resi-’

dent wrote, “People should have quick inexpensive recourse for restitution for damages

due to spillage. ” A Millville, N.J., resident

stated that “any private company should be

required to post bond of sufficient amount to

cover cost of spill cleanup and restoration of

wild life,” and the Belleville, N. J., respondent

added that “Legislation should include oil

companies to put up bond for cleanup and all

damages from an oil spill. ”

Preferences and Alternatives

Some of the respondents made choices

among the technologies.

For example, a Budd Lake, N. J., resident

said, “Oil and gas is necessary for development of the United States and has many and

varied uses. Nuclear power would make us

less dependent on oil, but radioactive waste is

a nearly prohibitive problem which should be

dealt with before any further nuclear industry

development. ” Similar views were expressed

by a Lawrenceville, N. J., respondent who said,

“Fossil fuels are a more sensible alternative to

nuclear energy development”, primarily

because of “nuclear debris generated during

production of fuel elements. ” A resident of

Wilmington, Del., stated: “I fully support

these developments based on oil and gas

energy. I’m concerned about nuclear-power

development because of its potential

hazards.” He cited disposal of radioactive

wastes and the potential for sabotage at sea

with offshore nuclear plants.

A resident of Ridgewood, N. J., added:

“Offshore energy should be developed in oil

and gas after full measures of the social and

environmental impact have been made. The

hazards of offshore nuclear facilities and

deepwater ports do not warrant their development at this time. ”

While most of the comments on energy

policy and energy alternatives were general to

all three technologies, some participants did

express specific views about oil resources in

general and offshore drilling in particular.

Some felt, as did a Mountain Lakes, N. J., resident, that “oil, at best, is a short-term solution

to our national energy needs. A concentrated

effort to develop suitable long-term solutions

is required. Why run the risk of environmental disaster to achieve a short-range solution?” A Lewes, Del., woman felt that “less

dependence on oil should be our first priority;

with more Federal money being spent on the

development of solar energy. ” A Pt. Pleasant,

N. J., respondent, on the other hand, said “This

offshore drilling for oil and gas is a short-term

solution to energy-source problems. Energy

sources other than burning of fossil fuels

(with the exception of coal which is in good

supply in this country) should be developed

(i.e., tidal, solar, nuclear).” A somewhat similar view was expressed by a Wilmington, Del.,

man who said, “Petroleum development is

only a stop-gap measure as supply will run

out shortly. I suggest increased support of
solar technology, wind power, and nuclear fusion supplies of energy. ”

In addition, the alternative of energy conservation was advocated by a large number of

participants. As a Montclair, N.J., woman put

it, “The proper alternative to offshore

develop men t is conservation .“ A West

Orange, N. J., man elaborated on these themes

as follows: “Devoting large amounts of capital

to oil and gas exploration will ‘lock us in’—it

will commit us to stick with these energy

sources, since investors will not allow their investment to yield no return. The only way to

escape from this development-consumption

cycle is to break away and concentrate on a

program o f conservation a n d alternate

sources .

Finally, the priority and nonpriority uses of

offshore oil were discussed by a Fanwood,

N. J., resident who asked, “Why offshore drilling? If this energy is going to be used for mass

transportation and industry, OK, but let’s not

do this to lower the price of automobile gas.

The only thing this alternative would do is

lower our undersea oil reserves. I say more

mass transportation. ” A Franklin Lakes, N. J.,

respondent said, “Rather than floundering

around for oil in the short term, we should tax

the stuff out of use as a fuel except for

aircraft-develop fusion, wind, and solar

power and start the withdrawal from our oil

jag before the whole world has to go ‘cold

turkey ’.”

A respondent from Chatham, N. J., summed

up the point of view of a number of participants by saying, “The total expected reserves

off New Jersey and Delaware represent a

small fraction of our energy needs. Developing it now will not bring us that much closer

to energy independence, but it will be depleting a valuable resource for future generations

who may, hopefully, use oil for more productive purposes than generation of power where

coal could be used instead. Oil is extremely

versatile and valuable as an organic building

block for drugs, plastics, synthetic food, etc. It

should be preserved where possible for these

uses. ”

DEEPWATER PORTS

Anticipated Effects

While many of the perceived effects of

deepwater ports focused on lower energy

costs, other economic advantages, increased

energy supply and more jobs, a significant

proportion of respondents saw such systems

as safer and less harmful to the environment

than the smaller tanker traffic closer to shore.

On the negative side, however, a large proportion of respondents were concerned about the

potential for larger oil spills from supertankers. Greater danger of accidents and

general offshore and onshore environmental

degradation were also seen as negative effects.

Many of these respondents saw such ports as

encouraging continued dependence on foreign

oil and therefore inconsistent with energy

self-sufficiency. (See figure V–3. )

A Florham Park, N. J., respondent summed

up many of the negative perceptions as

follows: “The use of deepwater ports for

supertankers would only marginally affect the

economics of oil delivery. While it may be

argued that the decrease in number of vessels

involved reduces the chances of accidental

spills, the increase in severity of one accident

offsets this consideration. ” A Sea Girt, N.J.,

resident said, “See no need for deepwater

ports, since these are intended principally for

import of foreign oil which we ought to be
Figure V-3. Results of public participation questionnaire: deepwater ports

ANTICIPATED POSITIVE EFFECTS

Environmental and

Safety Advantages

(770 Positive Effects = 48% of Deepwater

Ports Effects Listed)

LOWER ENERGY COSTS 30%

Cheaper oil, energy 61 %

Cheaper transportation costs 39%

ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETY

ADVANTAGES OVER

PRESENT METHODS 28%

Fewer spills, less water 4970

pollution

Less tanker traffic in rivers 29%

and ports

Less general environmental 13%

impact

Fewer collisions, port fires, 9%

other accidents

ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES 16%

Stimulate economy 40%

Industrial development 30%

Help business activity, refinery 24%

operation, shipbuilding

Tax revenue 6%

ENERGY AVAILABILITY 15%

(Increase needed energy

supplies)

EMPLOYMENT 11%

(Increase jobs)

Total Positive Effects: 100%

Source Office of Technology Assessment

ANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EFFECTS

Marine Environment

Other

(835 Negative Effects = 52%. of Deepwater

Ports Effects Listed)

OIL SPILLS AND

OTHER ACCIDENTS 38%

Larger oil spills 70%

Safety hazards, accidents 30%

including pipeline ruptures,

collisions, bad weather effects, fires

POLLUTION OF MARINE

ENVIRONMENT 24%

General pollution including water 76%.

Harm to marine life, wildlife, wet- 24%

lands, ocean ecosystem, ocean floor

ONSHORE IMPACTS 20%

Industrial development 29%

Damaged beaches 27%

Aesthetics 8%

Other land use impacts 36%

onshore support facilities,

increased population

ENERGY IMPACTS 10%

Encourage continued 71 %

dependence on imported oil

Postpone long-range 27%

alternatives, conservation

Other 2%

ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES 6%

Potential losses to tourist- 49?40

recreation industry

Expensive to build, higher 27%

energy costs

Other—lower property values, in- 24%

creased taxes, balance of payments

OTHER 2%

Use of supertankers, increase

ship traffic, target for sabotage

Total Negative Effects: 100%
curtailing, ” and a Ridgewood, N. J., resident

said, “Supertankers . . . are notorious spillers

of oil. ”

A Wilmington, Del., respondent S aw it

differently. “The present method of lightening

is more dangerous, potentially, than a deepwater port under controlled condition s.” put

another way, a Summit, N .J., resident stated,

“Offshore tanker ports would add an important safety increment to our east coast ports.

Much tanker traffic now operates in confined

bodies of water at greater hazards. ” Finally, a

Lincroft, N. J., man said, “The Northeastern

United States needs to be less dependent on

the other areas of the country for supplies of

gas and oil. ” He asked, “Would a deepwater

port give it an advantage over other areas?”

Process of Implementing the Technologies

Some respondents indicated that the risks

associated with this system should be eliminated or minimized before the technology is

deployed.

A Wilmington, Del., man put it this way:

“The supertanker ports would be unacceptable to me unless new regulations were enforced in order to reduce the chance of major

oil spills. At present, oil company policies are

lax and attempts at self-regulation have

seemed to fail. ” A Whitestone, Va., resident

pointed out that “we will lose small amounts

of surf clams” from offshore development but

proper precautions “will keep this to a

minimum. Pipelines buried from deepwater

terminals and from wells can circumnavigate

most shellfish areas. ”

The themes of State and local role, orderly

development, the assignment of responsibility y

for oil spills, and providing adequate compensation to persons and businesses damaged by

oil spills, were concerns also expressed by respondents with regard to deepwater port

development.

Preferences and Alternatives

Some respondents expressed preferences

among the three technologies as follows: A

Ridgewood, N. J., man said “We should proceed with offshore drilling and nuclear floating powerplants. Supertankers do not solve

the problem of foreign oil dependence. ” A

Wilmington, Del., respondent made a

different choice. “I favor offshore drilling ...1

oppose floating nuclear plants-risks of landbased plants seem less. I favor deepwater

unloading ports. This may reduce pollution

from spills. ”

A Washington, D. C., woman wrote, “Since I

question the efficiency of Project Independence I

believe the importation of oil to be the most

efficient policy, since the proposed projects

would increase capital costs, raising prices to

those of imported oil anyway. In the interim

period, we should explore the large-scale

development of large-scale solar energy more

fruitfully.”

Others saw alternative energy systems as

preferable to deepwater ports. A resident of

East Hanover, N. J., stated, “I am positively opposed to DWP’s [deepwater ports] as an interim solution. Only a total effort to cut dependence on petroleum makes any sense. That

means power rationing, efficient mass transit,

and properly engineered atomic-energy

plants.” A Silver Spring, Md., man saW

T it this

way: “Deepwater ports imply a continued

reliance on imported oil—this is self-defeating. . . . Atomic power alone goes in the right

direction, away from reliance on fossil fuels,

until alternative sources (solar, thermal, etc. )

can be developed.” A Cinnaminson, N. J., respondent concluded, “Reliance on oil should

be reduced. Increase use of coal and ration

gasoline. Reduce imports. ”
FLOATING NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS

Anticipated Effects

The major advantages of floating nuclear

powerplants perceived by public participants

were that such plants would increase the supply of needed energy, advance energy selfsufficiency, and provide electrical power at

lower costs than would otherwise be the case.

Increased employment and stimulus to the

economy were also seen as benefits. Some respondents indicated that these plants would

have less harmful environmental impact than

oil-related energy systems, that they were

clean and safe, that floating plants had environmental and safety advantages over those

built on land, that such plants contribute to a

good energy policy by helping to end dependence on oil and gas and by conserving fossil

fuels.

The major concern of respondents who

cited negative effects focused on the specific

hazards and problems that they associated

with such plants. Many of the participants

pointed to the risk of nuclear accidents and of

radioactive contamination with its attendant

dangers to the natural environment and to

human health, and to the unsolved problem of

disposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. Some

respondents said the plants were too experi -

mental and there were too many unknown

safety factors. Most of the other negative

effects involved adverse i m pacts on the

marine and onshore environment and, in particular, the potential thermal pollution from

such plants. Others saw economic disadvantages, including the high expense of such

plants and the potential losses to the tourist

and fishing industries. Some said investment

in these plants would take funding away from

safer alternatives. A small portion cited risks

of sabotage and theft. (See figure V–4. )

Some of the positive factors were mentioned by a Bloom field, N. J., resident who

said, “Nuclear power is our most efficient and

pollution-free source and should be utilized, ”

and a respondent from Cranford, N. J., who

wrote, “Floating nuclear powerplants appear

on the surface to be the safest short-term technology for development of New Jersey and

Delaware. I feel there is better technology and

fewer hazards with this development. ’ A

Woodbridge, N. J., man said, “The nuclear

energy proposal would result in the ‘cleanest’

way of helping to develop our resources. ”

Support for nuclear, but not for the floating

plants, came from a Cherry Hill, N.J., man

who said, “Nuclear powerplants are needed,

but building them at sea creates additional

design problems and risk which I do not think

are offset by the advantages. Additional

nuclear plants should be built on land. ”

On the negative side, a Wilmington, Del.,

respondent summed up many of the concerns

about the risks of such plants by saying, “1 am

opposed to the establishment of floating

nuclear powerplants because of the greater

safety hazards involved and the tremendous

potential impact of a nuclear accident. In addition, I would not like to have the first such

plant located near Delaware. ”

A Linden, N. J., man cited “heat and

radioactive waste problems. ” An East

Brunswick, N. J., man mentioned the “effect of

water-temperature rise on marine life and

migration behavior. ” A Marlton, N. J., respondent said that nuclear power stations “will

most likely negatively affect the ecological

balance of marine life and lead to the inevitable destruction of same. ” A Ridgewood, N, J.,

man said that, “Powerplants create an unnatural Gulf Stream water temperature to

which marine life becomes accustomed. If shut
Figure V-4. Results of public participation questionnaire: floating nuclear powerplants

$ ANTICIPATED POSITIVE EFFECTS

Lower Energy

costs Energy

Availability

Good

Energy

Policy

(977 positive effects =53% of FNP Effects Listed)

ENERGY AVAILABILITY 24%.

Increase energy supplies 81%

Advance energy self-sufficiency 19%

ENVIRONMENTAL AND

SAFETY ADVANTAGES 20%

Advantages over land-based 5070

plants (isolation from people,

reduced thermal pollution, less

risky,better land utilization,

unIimited supply of cooling water)

Clean and Safe 28%

(clean electricity, minimize air and

water pollution, safe, good for fish)

LOWER ENERGY COSTS 19%

ECONOMIC BENEFITS 11%

Stimulate economy 4170

Industrial development 37%

Other: higher standard of living, 22%

tax benefits. increased land values

GOOD ENERGY POLICY 9%

Stop dependence on oil and gas 7570

(save these for petrochemical industry, other)

Conservation of fossil fuels 25%.

8%

OTHER 9%

Total Positive Effects: 100%

ANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EFFECTS

Risk of

Sabotage/Theft

(872 negative effects = 47%. of FNP Effects Listed)

NUCLEAR HAZARDS

AND PROBLEMS 47%

Accidents 26%.

Safety risks (unsafe, too experi- 22%

mental, unknown safety factors)

Radiation contaminant ion (includ- 33%

ing leakage, fallout, health hazards)

Nuclear waste disposal 190/0

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 32%

Thermal pollution 29%.

Harm environment, ecology 21 %

Harm marine life, ecosystem 18%

Pollution (including air and water) 17%

Onshore impacts: industrial 1 20/0

development, increased population, service facilities, congestion

Aesthetics 3%

ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES 90/0

Expensive to build, drain on 46%.

capital funds

Losses to tourist/fishing industry 24%

Cheaper to build on land 15%

Take funding away from safer 100/0

alternatives

Lower property values; higher taxes 50/.

RISK OF SABOTAGE/THEFT 3%- ,-

OTHER 9%

Total Negative Effects: 1000/~

Source Office of Technology Assessment
down, the water temperature drops back to

normal and many thousands of species are

killed. Environmentally, a powerplant causes

more harm than good. ” A Bethany Beach,

Del., resident stressed the uncertainties by

saying “Nuclear power has yet to prove itself. ”

A Ridgewood, N. J., woman foresaw “total

destruction if terrorists were to sabotage an

energy system”, and a Sewell, N. J., resident

said the offshore plants “become extremely

vulnerable to an enemy. ”

And, finally, a local official in Brigantine,

N. J., stated: “Consider the vast tourist

development along the Jersey shore which

will be hurt by even the threat of offshore oil

or offshore nuclear development. Consider

the problems of evacuating huge crowds in

the event of a catastrophe. ”

Process of Implementing and Managing

the Technologies

If offshore nuclear plants were to be

deployed, some respondents want certain

safeguards included. These people, like a

Hockessin, Del., resident, believe that “with

careful design and operation, environmental

and safety problems can be circumvented. ” A

Sparta, N. J., man said, “Floating nuclear

powerplants pose slight risks from storm

damage and problems with underwater

transmission of electricity. Conservative

design would minimize these problems. ” And

a Washington, D. C., resident said it is “essential to build into the systems measures to prevent introduction of . . . nuclear waste into the

ocean, ”

One respondent, a visitor from Arizona,

had a specific technical suggestion, “Floating

nuclear powerplants could be serviced by

mobile shipboard fuel recycling factories. This

would eliminate the risk of high jacked or lost

nuclear fuel en route from a generator to a

land recycling factory. In effect, the factory

would go to the fuel. ”

The siting of offshore plants requires

rethinking, according to participants like a

Ridgewood, N. J., resident who asked, “Why

does it have to be Delaware and New Jersey?

Why not some remote area where human life

and marine life will not be affected?” and the

Brick Township, N. J., person who suggested,

“Select new site for offshore nuclear plant

away from estuary. ” A Pennsauken, N. J., man

pointed out, “The development is situated

directly in ‘hurricane alley’ (and) will be subject to hurricane damage. ”

There were also respondents who saw the

present risks and uncertainties about nuclear

plants so great as to make deployment undesirable until those problems have been

solved. A South Orange, N. J., man wrote,

“Nuclear powerplants are entirely out of the

question until feasible safety measures are

developed,” and a North Beach Haven, N. J.,

woman stated, “Until safe disposal of radioactive wastes is guaranteed, no more nuclear

plants should be put in anywhere. ” A

Phillipsburg, N. J., resident echoed this view:

“We still don’t know what to do about nuclear

wastes. I would . . . oppose any nuclear plant

until radioactive-waste disposal has been perfected.” A similar view was expressed by respondents such as the resident of Freehold,

N. J., who said of all three technologies, “environmental effects should be minimized now

to prevent opposition later. ” Finally, an

Elmer, N. J., resident said that “Dangers of

nuclear power have been overrated and exaggerated, ” but also expressed the view that we

“need more research on utilization and disposal of nuclear-power wastes.”

Preferences and Alternatives

Some respondents preferred nuclear plants

offshore to oil-related developments. A

Wilmington, Del., man stated, “Let’s push

nuclear so we don’t have to import oil. ” A

Florham Park, N. J., respondent said, “First

priority should be nuclear—step up oil and

gasoline conservation. ” An Essex Falls, N. J.,
resident said, “Nuclear energy should get

priority over all. ” On the other hand, an East

Brunswick, N. J., respondent said, “I prefer the

nuclear option, but cautious oil exploration

and development should be acceptable. ” A

Woodbridge, N. J., resident saw advantages of

the offshore plants in these terms: “The Jersey

coast offers recreation to millions and the

aesthetics of the shore line can best be

preserved by the floating plant, not oil rigs

and platforms. I have seen too many ‘tar balls’

on the sands of our coastline to allow encouragement of any offshore oil developmerit. ”

A respondent from Princeton, N. J., said,

“Offshore drilling and deepwater ports are

well developed and should cause no

problems. I doubt that our technology is a

match for the sea in the construction of

nuclear powerplants; thus, chances of nuclear

accidents are greater than in land-based

plant. ”

A Fords, N. J., resident saw it this way: “In

the present overall economic and energy

situation, offshore oil development should be

recommended. Floating nuclear powerplants

are undesirable due to various important

reasons. ” Some such reasons were expressed

in the form of questions by the Wilmington,

Del., resident who said, “I fully support those

developments based on oil and gas energy. I’m

concerned about nuclear power development

because of its potential hazards. What is the

plan for disposal of radioactive wastes?

Sabotage at sea more likely?” To answer these

and other questions, a Linden, N. J., resident

said that while “offshore drilling and loading

ports are a must and much needed . . . nuclear

powerplants still require more research into

their safety and hazards of handling wastes. ”

Aside from the alternative of siting the

plants on land, which was preferred by some

respondents, there were many participants

who wanted non-nuclear alternatives pursued.

A New Brunswick, N. J., man said, “Energy

conservation methods should be more greatly

stressed. Further pushing for nuclear power

without adequate safeguards is simply continuing madness. ” A Princeton, N. J., resident

wrote, “Should have a crash program in

renewable energy sources, solar, wind. Firmly

against nuclear power. ” A Wilmington, Del.,

man said, “Coal should be the number one

source of energy for the immediate future, ”

and an Ocean View, Del., resident said, “Accelerate methods to use coal in a non-polluting manner. Consider use of solar energy. ” A

Florham Park, N. J., man said, “Energy conservation should be the keystone of fulfilling

energy needs (and) would go hand-in-hand

with environmental needs. I believe there

should be priority over nuclear fuels in

developing needed new energy sources. ”

A Millingtown, N.J., respondent said, “I

believe that more attention (and funds)

should be allocated to energy conservation

such as solar heat, restrictions on cars, public

transportation. Any studies on fossil or

nuclear energy must include the full impact

on ecology and public welfare. If this is done,

the alternates become more attractive. ” And a

Roselle Park, N.J., man said, “Energy should

be conserved before offshore powerplants are

built. Incentives should be formulated to conserve energy and reduce automobile traffic. ”

A Roebling, N. J., respondent wrote, “More

research money can be spent on fusion, solar

power, wind power as alternates to nuclear

power.” A Wilmington, Del., resident asked:

“Have you considered using the strong tides

and currents in the Delaware River to generate energy?” A Townsend, Del., man also suggested “using tides to produce energy. ” A

Newark, Del., man suggested, in addition to

tidal sources to generate and store electrical

energy, that “thermal gradient between sur:

face water and ocean trough could be harnessed to generate power. ”

A Margate, N. J., resident who expressed opposition to nuclear powerplants said, “I prefer
safe alternatives. Prof. [William] Heronemous

has suggested a string of windmills either

offshore or along the Garden State Parkway.

Also, tidal power is a possibility worth

developing. And solar power is the cleanest,

safest method of power production. Government should finance it heavily. ” A Watchung,

N. J., resident added, as an alternative,

“development to burn garbage for energy. ”

A Westfield, N. J., resident saw this set of

alternatives as desirable: “Limit nuclear-plant

construction to demonstration plants for each

promising reactor system. In view of the accidents that have already occurred, I want at

least another decade of intense R&D and testing before widespread use. Fusion may then

be more practical too.” The same respondent

had these recommendations: “Conserve

petroleum for ultimate use in chemical synthesis. Build coal conversion plants for liquid

and gases and fuels. Expand solar energy

demonstration program—aim for solar and

space heating in all new buildings. Use wind,

geothermal, to the maximum extent feasible. ”

How Public Participation Affected the OTA Assessment

OTA responded to many of the specific concerns identified during the public participation program by redirecting ongoing work,

initiating additional studies, or broadening

studies already underway.

The following are key examples of how this

system worked:

1. Public Expressions—The potential adverse impacts of offshore oil development

have social as well as economic dimensions.

That is, increased industrialization of the

coastal zone with consequent increases in

population, transportation congestion, air

pollution and noise would make the area less

desirable for residents and tourists.

OTA Response to Expressions—OTA examined the types of facilities that would be required onshore for a range of estimates of

recoverable oil and gas, but found that existing data did not permit a precise prediction of

secondary land use and other impacts.

OTA Conslusion—Adequate information

about offshore oil and gas development is not

available and more involvement in the deci -

sionmaking process by the State and local

communities would enable them to better

plan for impacts.1

2. Public Expressions—Onshore facilities

and other aspects of offshore drilling may be a

financial burden on State and local communities.

OTA Response to Expressions—OTA expanded its examination of fiscal impacts of

offshore development.

OTA Conclusion—The capital-intensive

nature of most facilities might produce substantial sales and property tax statewide after

the first 2 or 3 years of development if OCS oil

and gas were landed in the same State in

which the main support bases were located.

However, there are many factors that could

make it possible that individual States or

localities within a State would experience adverse budgetary impacts during some period

of development. z

3. Public Expressions—Some thought the

nuclear powerplant would make more energy

available and that therefore costs of electricity

would go down. Others thought the high

capital costs of the floating nuclear

powerplant could have the effect of raising

energy prices.

OTA Response to Expressions—OTA investigated nuclear powerplant costs and ex -
plored the uncertainties involved in predicting the final cost of a floating nuclear plant.

OTA Conclusion—While the cost advantage of the Atlantic Generating Station over a

land-based facility of comparable generating

capacity is small, in the long run the floating

nuclear power plant concept may provide a

method of controlling the escalating costs of

nuclear powerplants. 3

4. Public Expressions—Pipelines and

pipeline leaks may harm the wetlands.

OTA Response to Expressions—OTA intensified its examination of the effects of

pipeline and pipeline leaks on estuaries and

wet lands.

OTA Conclusion—The placement of

pipelines i n coastal areas requires careful

planning and the lines should be routed to

avoid marshlands. The danger of an oil spill

striking a beach would increase if it occurred

as a result of a pipeline rupture near shore.

Special consideration of pipeline design and

installation is needed. q

5. Public Expressions—Air and water

quality may be lowered as a result of OCS and

deepwater port development.

OTA Response to Expression—OTA expanded its study of air and water quality

status and standards in the two States and the

relative impacts to be expected due to refinery

construction.

OTA Conclusion—Air quality in many potential locations already violates standards

and additional discharges would not be permitted under present guidelines. 5

6. Public Expressions—Offshore energy

development would provide needed jobs and

secondary employment from increased energy

would reduce unemployment, but many of

the employment opportunities may not accrue

to the New Jersey-Delaware region, and potential losses to fishermen and tourism could

offset employment and income gains.

.

OTA .Response to Expressions—OTA

followed up on this subject by talking to industry representatives about their practices

and by refining estimates of peak employment, proportion of jobs likely to accrue to the

region, and other aspects of the issue.

OTA Conclusion—Direct employment advantages would peak at about 4,500 jobs for a

medium-sized oil discovery. On the other

hand, it is not possible to predict accurately

either what secondary employment might

develop or what employment - losses might

take place.6

7. Public Expressions—There is a

possibility the NRC is not seriously investigat -

ing the risks of a major nuclear- accident and

its consequences.

OTA Response to Expressions—OTA

reviewed the work of the NRC on the subject

of accidents and initiated some special studies.

OTA Conclusion—The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission is not evaluating the risks from

accidents in floating nuclear plants com -

prehensively enough to permit either a

generic comparison of the relative risks from

land based and floating nuclear plants, or a-n

assessment of the specific risks from deploying floating plants off New Jersey.7

8. Public Expressions—The problem of disposing of nuclear wastes has not been solved.

OTA Response to Expressions-OTA examined the waste disposal plan for the floating nuclear plant.

OTA Conclusion—Fuel and waste handling

systems and the decommissioning procedures

for the floating plant have not yet been adequately analyzed and decommissioning

problems have not received the necessary attention.8

9. Public Expressions—The major advantages of offshore energy development may be

increased energy availability for the region

and lower energy costs.
OTA Response to Expressions—OTA expanded its study of the regional energy supply

and demand situation.

OTA Conclusion—Most supply networks

and prices are determined on a nationwide

basis and little change in regional supply or

prices can be expected. Lower transportation

costs might give New Jersey and Delaware a

price advantage compared with some other

region of the country, but future prices would

depend, in part, on oil and gas price-control

policies and on world prices. Transportation

of imported crude oil by supertanker to deepwater ports would similarly not create impor-

-. — — —

tant price cuts. For the floating nuclear plant,

it was found that cost and price changes could

not be predicted. g

10. General Concerns—In response to

more general concerns surfaced through the

public participation program, OTA also convened a panel of industry and government experts in New Jersey to discuss the need for

conservation and alternative energy sources

and to determine what actions industry and

government are taking to foster conservation

and to investigate possible alternatives to the

existing energy systems. 10

— —

Sources and Uses of Public Participation Data

The major sources of public participation

data were the OTA-sponsored workshops,

questionnaire responses, interviews and informal meetings, and review comments on

draft materials. Several of these activities were

conducted simultaneously and each yielded

somewhat different types of information.

The assessment began in the fall of 1974,

with a major data-gathering effort. This effort

produced descriptions of the technological

systems, deployment scenarios, legal-institutional systems and procedures, and the

ecological setting.

Workshops

During this phase of the assessment, OTA

held three public workshops (Washington,

D. C., in May; Newark, N. J., in June; Atlantic

County, N.J., in August, 1975). It also held

numerous informal meetings in the study

region to obtain preliminary information

from representatives of affected and interested

persons about potential positive and negative

impacts of priority concern, policy issues related to the technologies, and alternatives to

the technologies.

The Washington workshop was held for the

specific purpose of obtaining data from national environmental, civic, and sport fishing

associations, about potentially adverse and

beneficial environmental effects of the proposed systems. The two New Jersey

workshops were held to obtain data from a

broad and balanced representation of affected

and interested publics in the region (including

industry, utilities, labor, State and local

officials, academic, environmental, and consumer groups) on a wide range of impacts and

issues of regional as well as national relevance.

These workshops, held early in the assessment, provided timely information on areas of

inquiry and analysis considered most relevant

by persons with knowledge, interest and active involvement in these subjects. (See figure

v–5.)

In addition, workshop participants raised

questions about the process by which the technologies are implemented and managed at the

Federal, State and local level. These discussions helped OTA begin to identify factors

which participants felt were not being ade-
Figure V-5. Sites of OTA contacts during public participation program

..- ————— —

L

v

n

1

“-

L

. . 0

L

,.

,

Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
quately addressed through

cess, and the difficulties

citizens and local officials

the current proencountered by

who wished to

become involved in that process.

The workshops also provided information

about participants’ views of the scope ,

assumptions and methodology of this assessment. Some participants raised questions

which they wanted the assessment to address;

others suggested sources of additional information relevant to the assessment.

The workshop format, with its free-flowing

and informal exchange among participants

with diverse viewpoints and perceptions, provided OTA with a perspective not attainable

through questionnaires or interviews. The

give-and-take discussion enabled participants

as well as study-team members to address and

follow up on comments made by other participants. This helped OTA understand the extent

to which viewpoints were shared, the level of

differences in views, and the relative importance assigned to various factors by different

participants representing different elements of

the affected public.

Questionnaires

A questionnaire appended to an information brochure describing the assessment was

distributed from August through December,

1975. (See figure V– 1.) During this time, the

study team was starting the detailed analysis

of potential impacts and the preliminary identification of policy issues. The questionnaire

responses were examined periodically with a

view toward providing the assessment team

with more detailed data on impacts and issues

of importance as seen by respondents. These

data were useful in confirming, sharpening or

supplementing information already obtained

from workshops and from the study team’s

analysis.

One of the questions was:

If offshore energy systems were developed off

the coasts of New Jersey and Delaware, what

effcts WOUld you foresee for yourself, your

community, and the Nation ? ‘Do you think

these effects W ould be generally positive or

generally negative?

The responses to this question yielded the

most systematic information on anticipated

effects. The effects listed by respondents were

tabulated in order to provide some indication

of the frequency with which certain categories

of effects were mentioned and to indicate

which categories were viewed as positive or

negative.

This analysis helped OTA staff to identify

priorities among the anticipated positive and

negative effects attributed by respondents to

the three technologies.

The number of respondents who labeled the

effects which they listed as all positive, all

negative, or some of each, was also tabulated.

This analysis provided OTA with a comparison among the technologies of the proportion of respondents who saw impacts as positive, negative, or mixed.

Finally, a tabulation was made of the number of respondents who anticipated predominantly positive or predominantly negative

effects for each of the technologies. This information was used to identify the differences in

perceptions by residents of various parts of

the study region.

The quantification of responses in this

report must be read with the knowledge that

not all respondents answered all questions or

listed the same number of impacts for each

technology, and that some responses were not

tabulated because they were illegible, could

not be categorized, or did not indicate

whether effects listed were positive or negative.

Another item on the questionnaire said:

If you have other comments on any of the

Subjects related to offshore energy development in the New Jersey-Delaware area, or

alternatives to such developedopment, please note

these below,
While OTA did not ask for an indication of

support or opposition to the technologies,

many persons responded to this item of the

questionnaire with an indication of support or

o p position to the technologies. Man y

respondents expressed their opinion as to

whether one, some, or none of these systems

should be implemented. Some qualified their

support or opposition by saying that certain

things should be done before the energy

systems are implemented. Some expressed a

preference for alternative energy systems or

policies. Others gave their views on the process by which decisions to implement the

systems are made, and the manner in which

the technologies are managed. The role of

various levels of government and of the public

was addressed by some respondents.

Some of these statements illustrated and

elaborated upon the “anticipated effects”

replies. Other explained the reasons for respo n d en ts preferences among the technologies or preferences for alternatives to the

tech no logies. Many of the statements

paralleled the types of information obtained

from the workshops; some touched on

different points.

The questionnaire did not ask respondents

to indicate organizational affiliation. It did

permit respondents to indicate whether they

belonged to any organization that would have

an interest in this assessment. Very few respondents answered this question. No attempt

has been made, or could be made, to correlate

replies with affiliations.

Brochures and questionnaires were mailed

initially to nearly 2,000 persons and organizations on the preliminary mailing list compiled

by OTA. Additional brochures were sent upon

request for distribution by congressional

offices, libraries, and various government or

private organizations for a total distribution

of more than 15,000. The office of Senator

Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, distributed

6,100 copies, and another 100 copies were distributed by the office of Congresswoman

Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey. Four

hundred copies were distributed to New

Jersey libraries through the New Jersey Library Association. In addition, the following

organizations were among those who requested and presumably distributed more

than 100 copies of the brochure and questionnaire:

Many people who learned about the questionnaire from press reports, from newsletters

of various organizations, or from persons

who had received one in the initial distribu -

tion, requested copies.

The brochure and questionnaire enabled

the OTA team to reach and ot obtain information from a larger number of people than was

possible with other methods.

Followup

The findings of the workshops and the

questionnaires were supplemented with interviews and, in many cases, with further

detailed analysis by OTA staff, or by additional studies on specific subjects and issues

raised during the public participation activities.

Many of the issues relating to impacts or

process were pursued in interviews and meetings with industry and utility representatives,

citizen group leaders, and with Federal, State

and local government officials. interviews

were conducted throughout the assessment

but most intensive use of this method took
place just prior to identification and analysis

by OTA staff of the issues and options to be

emphasized in the assessment report (January

through July, 1976). During this period, OTA

staff also attended several public hearings and

other official proceedings of Federal decisionmaking agencies and advisory bodies in order

to obtain first-hand information on which to

base an evaluation of the process.

Finally, in order to examine energy projecJune, 1976. The review comments helped OTA

reevaluate, sharpen or expand upon the statements of findings, issues, and options. In some

cases, additional options were suggested, or

the potential consequences of options displayed in the draft reports were discussed by

reviewers. These comments were considered

in preparing the final report.

Summary

tions, energy alternatives and energy policies The public participation activities, which

more fully, OTA convened a day-long session included workshops, questionnaires, interwith government, industry, utility, and views, and review comment, were important

academic specialists. factors in this technology assessment. Information obtained from these activities was

Review of Draft Documents analyzed and evaluated throughout the

When background documents on technology, institutional and ecological descriptions were completed, OTA made a copy

available for study by the public in the OTA

library, and also sent copies for review as to

accuracy and completeness to persons

knowledgeable in the subject areas who had

participated in the assessment. This review

took place during the period of February

through April, 1976.

As OTA staff completed drafts of interim

reports on each part of the assessment, these

were sent out to the advisory panel for substantive review and, after release by the OTA

Board, to key participants in the assessment.

Summaries of the draft interim report were

assessment. These data provided valuable

guidance as to appropriate modification,

emphasis or elaboration of the analysis by the

OTA study team. The public participation

findings were one of the important elements

used by the OTA team for determining which

issues would be emphasized in the assessment.

The results of this public-participation

effort confirmed that such a program can add

a useful and essential dimension to the assessment of technology for the U.S. Congress. It

also confirmed that reliable information on

how citizens perceive they will be affected by

new technologies can best be obtained by

direct contact with those citizens.

distributed for review to those who had at- Finally, the public participation effort protended workshops, replied to questionnaires, vialed some experience on the basis of which

or requested copies. This review, for the oil public participation activities could be exand gas section, occurred in April, May, and tended to other OTA assessments.
Footnotes: Chapter V

1. Chapter IV, Development of Offshore Oil and Gas 6. Op. Cit., Chapter IV.

in the Mid-Atlantic. 7. Working Paper #8.

2. Working Paper #6. 8. Working Papers #9.

3. Working Paper #10. 9. Working Paper #5.

4. Working Papers #2 and #3. 10. Chapter IV, Alternatives to the Three Technologies

5. Working Papers #4. Studied.
.’
Chapter VI

GLOSSARY

Accident risk—The possibility of loss or injury to people or property. The risk of a

particular consequence during a period of

time is measured by the estimated frequency of the event over that period of time and

the magnitude of the consequences of that

event.

ACRS—The Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards.

Availability y—The percent of time that a plant

or an electric power system is actually capable of pet-forming its mission. Periods during which a plant is not available include

both forced outages (due to equipment malfunction, etc. ) and planned shutdowns

(notably for refueling and planned mainte- .

nance).

Ballasting—The taking on by tankers of water

to replace off-loaded oil and thereby improve stability.

Barrel—A unit of volume for petroleum products. One barrel is the equivalent of 42 U.S.

gallons, or 35 imperial gallons, or 159 liters.

One cubic meter equals 6.2897 barrels.

Blowout preventer—Equipment installed at

the wellhead for the purpose of controlling

pressures in the space between the casing

and drill pipe or in an open hole during

drilling and completion operations. The

blowout preventer is the first line of defense

against blowouts.

Capacity factor—The ratio of the average load

on a plant for the period of time considered,

to the load capacity for which the plant is

rated by the manufacturer. For an electric

generating unit, the capacity factor in a

given 1 -year period may be calculated by

dividing the total kilowatt-hours of electric

output for the year by the number of hours

in the year, and then dividing the average

kilowatts thus calculated by the generating

unit’s electric-kilowatt-capacity rating.

Christmas tree—The collection of valves,

pipes, and fittings, usually high pressure,

used to control the flow of oil and gas from

the well casing.

Class 9 accident —For analytical purposes, the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission divides

the spectrum of postulated nuclear

powerplant accidents into nine categories.

These categories are ordered according to

the severity of consequence ranging from

minor accidents (Class 1 ) to the potentially

catastrophic but highly improbable coremelt accident (Class 9).

Containment—A gas-tight shell or other

enclosure around a nuclear reactor to contain radioactive vapors that would otherwise be released to the atmosphere in the

event of a major reactor accident.

Cooling system—A method of dissipating

waste heat from nuclear (or other heatengine-based) electric generating units.

Cooling tower—A structure through which

water is circulated in order to reduce its

temperature. In a dry cooling tower, the water

283
is recycled after passing through tubes over

which cooling air flows, in a manner similar to that of an automobile radiator. In a

wet cooling tower, water cascades through the

tower, in which air is passed either by

mechanical or natural draft to cause partial

evaporation of the water. A wet-dry cooling

tower contains both dry-cooling and

evaporative systems; these can be used .

altern atively o r i n combination.

Core-melt accident—Any accident in a

nuclear reactor that leads to melting of the

fuel elements in the core. This type of accident has the most serious potential consequences of any accident that can occur in a .

nuclear reactor.

Dead weight—The difference, expressed in

tons, between a ship’s displacement at load

draft and at light draft. It is comprised of

cargo, bunkers, stores, fresh water, etc.

Decommissioning—The activities of shutting

down operations of a nuclear plant at the

end of its operational life and either dismantling the plant or maintaining it in a

safe condition.

Design-basis accident—NRC policy requires

that nuclear power reactors be designed to

include engineered safety features and protection systems to prevent or mitigate the

effects of design-basis accidents, which include accidents in the first eight accident

categories (see “Class 9 accident”). Class 9

accidents, i n vol v i ng melting of the co i-e, are

not included among design-basis accidents

on the grounds that their probability of ocCurrence is so low that they can be safely ignored.

Development and production—Basically,

development of an oil and gas field begins

after discovery o f accumulations i n com -

mercial quantities. It includes definition of

the extent of potential reserves, production

rate estimates, and construction and installation of facilities for production of the

field, including the means to deliver the

product to a loading point. Production of

the oil or gas begins only after a reasonable

estimate has been made of the approximate

amount and potential flow rates of the oil

or gas found and completion of the installation of necessary facilities and the drilling

of producing wells. (Oil and gas can occur

together in a field or separately. There is

usually some gas associated with all oil

fields, but there can be significant occurrences of gas with little or no oil. )

Development well—A well drilled in a

proven field for the purpose of completing

the desired pattern of production. Sometimes called an exploitation well.

Downhole safety equipment—Valve or other

devices installed below the Christmas tree

in production wells to prevent blowouts.

The blowout preventor is the first line of

defense against blowouts. The downhole

safety equipment is a second defense

system.

Drill pipe—In rotary drilling, the heavy

seamless tubing used to rotate the bit and

circulate the drilling fluid. Individual pipe

lengths are normally 30 feet and are

coupled together with tool joints.

Drill string—A “string” or column of drill

pipe.

Economic impact—The effects upon the production and consumption aspects of society

which introduction of an installation or

other innovation into the area is expected to

produce. These would include effects on the

labor force, industry, financial structure, infrastructure, tax rates, etc. - -

Environmental impact —The effects upon the

physical and biological characteristics of an

area which i nt rod uct ion o f a n i nst a l la t ion

or other innovation into the area is expected

to produce. As used in this report, environmental impact does not include the effects

upon human characteristics, except those
which are an indirect result of the physical

and biological effects.

Exploration—Simply defined, exploration involves two major steps: geophysical surv e y s a n d ex p lo ra t o ry drilling. More

broadly, exploration for oil and gas is the

entire process of broad and specific surveys

a n d collecyion o f indicative data o n an area

followed by detailed Geophysical delinea -

tion of geologic features and by drilling of

holes into potentially productive traps. Exploration is completed if oil or gas is found.

Additional exploration work—the drilling

of more holes—may be done after a disco\’-

ery to further delineate a field. Exploration

i n\’elves a high economic risk, since there is

the high probability that no discoveries will

be made, particularly in frontier areas. In

the offshore oil industry, even after detailed

Surveys are conducted, only one drill hole ,

in ten can be expected, on the average, to

show a commercial discovery, and there are

wide but unpredictable variations, in particular cases, from the average.

Exploratory drilling—Exploratory drilling is

the second phase of an expl o r a t i o n

progr m. In offshore areas it is accomplished by means of some type of

mobile drilling rig, which can be moved

from place to place to drill into traps located

by geophysical methods. The primary purpose of exploratory drilling is to get a “yes”

or “no” answer as to whether there is, in

fact, oil or gas in a given trap. Coring and

data logging techniques within the exploratory well may be necessary to make this

determination and to provide certain additional geologic information. Data logging

involves the lowering of a sensor (acoustic,

gamma-ray, etc.) down a drill hole to obtain formation data.

Fission—The splitting of a heavy nucleas

(such as uranium-235), accompanied by the .

release o f energy a n d two or more

neutrons. In a nuclear reactor, most of the

energy released in fission manifests itself as

heat, which is used to generate steam to

drive turbines.

Frontier areas—Frontier areas of the Outer

Continental Shelf are those which have not

yet been explored and are generally considered suitable for leasing. A number of

specific regions in the Atlantic, the Gulf of

Mexico, the Pacific, and around Alaska are

identified as frontier areas. The principal

ones are:

Georges Bank (North Atlantic)

Baltimore Canyon Trough (Mid-Atlantic)

South Atlantic

Gulf of Mexico (beyond all present discoveries)

Southern California Offshore

Washington and Oregon Offshore

Gulf of Alaska and Outer Cook Inlet

Bering Sea, Bristol Bay, and Norton

Sound (Alaska)

Chukchi Sea (Alaska)

Beaufort Sea (Alaska)

Fuel cycle—The sequence of steps through

which the nuclear fuel used i n nuclear reactors passes, including mining, milling, convers i on, enrichment, processing, fabrica -

tion, utilization, reprocessing, radioactive

waste management, and the storage of

radioactive waste products.

Fuel element—A rod, tube, plate, or other

mechanical shape or form into which the

fissionable material used to produce energy

in a reactor is fabricated. In prevalent

power-reactor practice, a fuel element is a

mechanical array or assembly of rods; the

rods contain the fissionable material.

Fuel reprocessing-Chemical treatment of

spent fuel to separate the uranium and

plutonium from the fission products cre -

ated as byproducts of the fission process.

Gathering lines—Flow lines which run from

several offshore oil wells to a single storage

system.

.
Geophysical surveys—Geophysical exploration is an indirect method of mapping

subbottom geological forms and features to

show submerged structures and interfaces.

The principal method used is the seismic

(or acoustic) survey, a technique of producing precise sounds (of discrete frequencies

and intensities) which are variously

reflected and refracted from underground

layers and then measured at the surface.

The measurement of natural gravity and

magnetic fields also helps define the

geology of an area. Having become a major

component in oil exploration, the seismic

survey is typically employed extensively in

any offshore area prior to drilling. Seismic

techniques have become much more

sophisticated in recent years and are used

both to identify good potential traps and to

locate the most promising site for drilling

an exploratory hole.

Ice condenser system—A pressure suppression system included in the floating nuclear

powerplant, as well as some onshore plants,

that uses millions of pounds of ice as a heat

sink to condense steam and thereby reduce

containment pressure in case of an accident

in the reactor.

Isotopes—Variant forms of a given chemical

element, differing from each other only in

the number of neutrons in their nuclei.

Jack-up rig—A mobile drilling platform with

extendible legs for support on the ocean

floor.

Lay barge—A barge used to lay underwater

pipelines.

Light-water reactor—(See PWR) The two

basic types of LWR are the pressurizedwater reactor (PWR) and boiling-water

reactor (BWR). Most U.S. power reactors in

existence or being built at this time are

LWRS.

Lightening—A method of offloading tankers

at sea or outside of ports, usually from large

tankers to smaller ones which, in turn, continue into a discharge port. Lightering is a

common practice at entrances to certain

ports which cannot handle the deep drafts

of large tankers.

LOCA—A Loss-of-Coolant Accident, involving a break in one of the lines carrying the

water that transfers heat from the reactor

core to the steam system. The LOCA is one

of the two possible initiating events for a

core-meltdown.

Megawatt (MW)—1000 kilowatts. The symbol

“MWe” is sometimes used to denote electrical power or capacity, in order to distinguish it from the thermal power of the

reactor (MWt), which is typically about

three times as high.

Mud—A water or oil based slurry used to

counteract pressure in oil or gas wells and

remove cuttings during drilling operations.

It is circulated by pumps.

MW, MWe—See Megawatt.

NRC—The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

OCS (Outer Continental Shelf)—The submerged lands extending from the seaward

limit of the territorial sea to some undefined

outer limit. In the United States, this is the

portion of the shelf under Federal jurisdiction.

Oil and gas reserves—Reserves of oil and gas

in any field are those quantities which have

been identified through drilling, sampling,

and calculating specific quantities.

“Proved” reserves are those quantities in a

field which can be recovered with reasona- -

ble certainty under existing economic and

operating conditions. Only a portion

(usually from 20 percent to 40 percent) of

the total reserves in place can be recovered.

PWR—Pressurized water reactor. A type of

power reactor that employs ordinary water

as coolant and moderator and i s
pressurized to keep the exit coolant stream

from boiling.

Radionuclides— Radioactive nuclei of

isotopes of various elements.

Rasmussen Report—See WASH– 1400.

Reliability y—The probability that a power

generating system will function without

failure over a specified time period or

amount of usage.

Segregated ballast—A term describing the

provision of separate tanks for ballast water

only, thus eliminating the need to carry

ballast in cargo oil tanks. Tankers must carry about one-third or more of their total

capacity in ballast when on an empty leg of

a voyage to improve stability and control

the draft of the ship. Usually sea water is

used for ballast.

Seismic-line mile—Seismic surveys are normally conducted from a ship equipped with

geophysical data-gathering instrumentation. The ship proceeds along predetermined lines following a grid on the surface

above a given area. Many miles of closely

spaced crossing lines are necessary to

survey a major area. A seismic-line mile is a

typical unit of measure of these survey

lines.

Seismic survey—A geophysical exploration

technique in which generated sound waves

are reflected or refracted from underlying

geologic strata and recorded for later

analysis.

Subsea completion—A production well in

which the Christmas tree assembly is located at or near the ocean bottom rather

than on a platform. The produced liquids

or gases are then transferred from the

wellhead either to a nearby fixed platform

or to a shore facility for processing. Some

subsea competitions are presently in use in

offshore U.S. water.

Subsea production system—A production

system in which the wellhead assembly and

all equipment for processing are located on

the sea floor. There are presently no complete subsea production systems in use in

U.S. offshore waters.

Supertanker —Tankers of great size and carrying capacity; generally considered to be any

tanker of over 100,000 deadweight tons.

Such tankers are typically more than 1,000

feet in length and 50 feet in draft. The

largest supertanker afloat (480,000 dwt) is

1,250 feet long, 203 feet wide, and 90 feet in

draft. Supertankers of 533,000 dwt are now

under construction.

Surry Plant—The pressurized water reactor

nuclear powerplant at Surry, Va., which

was the basis for calculations made in the

WASH– 1400 study. (See WASH– 2400).

Territorial sea—The sea area immediately adjacent to a coastal nation within which it

claims comprehensive jurisdiction.

Tract—An at-sea area of up to 5,760 acres (3

miles square), defined in the OCS Lands Act

of 1953 as the maximum unit offered in

each lease sale issued pursuant to the Act.

Trap and field--oil and gas are found i n

commercial quantities because these hydrocarbons tend, by geologic processes, to

concentrate in particular rock formations

over long periods of time. Certain kinds of

subterranean geologic features are known

to have acted as “traps” for oil and/or gas,

and such traps are commonly described by

geologists as having the potential of containing hydrocarbons. The process of exploring for oil and gas is thus focused on

finding traps where petroleum may have

been collected. When a trap has been identified and subsequently, through exploratory drilling, found to contain commercially producible quantities of oil or gas, it is

then designated a “field.” A field is thus a

single trap or many traps in which commercial amounts of oil or gas have been discovered.
WASH 1400-The formal NRC designation

of the Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of

Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear

Power Plants, published in final form in October, 1975. This study, which considered a

range of possible accidents including coremelt accidents, was performed under the

direction of Professor Norman Rasmussen

of Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

and is commonly known as the Rasmussen

Report. Only land-based, light water reactor plants were considered.

Waste disposal—The placement of radioactive waste in a locale where it can remain

indefinitely isolated, and from which

retrievability may or may not be considered

necessary.

Waste management—A program which involves all aspects of the transfer, and ultimate storage or disposal, of high-level

radioactive nuclear materials which are no

longer useful from the nuclear facilities in

which they are produced,

Waste storage—The holding of radioactive

waste in a locale from which it can be

removed or retrieved at some future time.

Wellhead—The equipment used to maintain surface control of a well. It is formed of

the casing head, tubing head, and

Christmas tree. Also refer to various

parameters as they exist at the wellhead:

Wellhead pressure, wellhead price of oil,

etc.