a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2002 MASS TRANSIT

Federal Action Could 

Help Transit Agencies 

Address Security 

Challenges

GAO-03-263
Transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of

their systems since September 11, such as conducting vulnerability

assessments, revising emergency plans, and training employees. Formidable

challenges, however, remain in securing transit systems. Obtaining

sufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit systems

as safe and secure as possible, according to GAO survey results and

interviews with transit agency officials. Funding security improvements is

problematic because of high security costs, competing budget priorities,

tight budget environments, and a provision precluding transit agencies that

serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using federal

urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. In addition to funding

challenges, certain characteristics of transit agencies make them both

vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership

and open access of some transit systems makes them attractive for terrorists

but also makes certain security measures, like metal detectors, impractical.

Moreover, because all levels of the government and the private sector are

involved in transit decisions, coordination among all the stakeholders can

pose challenges.

While transit agencies are pursuing security improvements, the federal

government’s role in transit security is expanding. For example, the Federal

Transit Administration (FTA) launched a multipart security initiative and

increased funding of its safety and security activities after September 11. In

addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act gave the

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) responsibility for the security

of all transportation modes, including transit. TSA anticipates issuing

national standards for transit security. As the federal government’s role

expands, goals, performance indicators, and funding criteria need to be

established to ensure accountability and results for the government’s efforts.

MASS TRANSIT

Federal Action Could Help Transit

Agencies Address Security Challenges

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-263.

To view the full report, including the scope

and methodology, click on the link above.

For more information, contact Peter Guerrero,

at (202) 512-2834 or guerrerop@gao.gov.

Highlights of GAO-03-263, a report to

Congressional Requesters

December 2002

About one-third of terrorist attacks

worldwide target transportation

systems, and transit systems are

the mode most commonly

attacked. In light of the history of

terrorism against mass transit and

the terrorist attacks on September

11, GAO was asked to examine

challenges in securing transit

systems, steps transit agencies

have taken to improve safety and

security, and the federal role in

transit safety and security. To

address these objectives, GAO

visited 10 transit agencies and

surveyed a representative sample

of transit agencies, among other

things.

To provide transit agencies greater

flexibility in paying for transit

security enhancements, GAO

recommends that the Secretary of

Transportation consider seeking a

legislative change to allow all

transit agencies to use federal

urbanized area formula funds for

security-related operating expenses.

GAO also makes several other

recommendations to the Secretary

of Transportation.

The Department of Transportation

generally agreed with the report’s

findings and agreed to carefully

consider GAO’s recommendations.
Page i GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

Transit Agencies Face Challenges in Making Transit Systems 

Secure 10

Transit Agencies Are Taking Steps to Enhance Security 16

Federal Government’s Role in Transit Security Is Evolving 21

Conclusions 33

Recommendations for Executive Action 34

Agency Comments 35

Appendixes

Appendix I: GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall Results 37

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology 63

Appendix III: Selected Survey Results 68

Services Provided by Transit Agencies Surveyed 68

Ridership of Transit Agencies Surveyed 69

Operating and Capital Budgets of Transit Agencies Surveyed 71

Security of Transit Agencies Surveyed 72

Funding Sources for Transit Safety and Security Needs of Transit 

Agencies Surveyed 73

Acts of Extreme Violence against Transit Agencies Surveyed 75

Surveyed Transit Agencies’ Safety and Security Assessments 78

Emergency Plans of Transit Agencies Surveyed 78

Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 82

GAO Contacts 82

Acknowledgments 82

Table Table 1: Profiles of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited, 2000 65

Figures Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000 5

Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital 

Expenses, 2000 7

Figure 3: Funding Authorized by TEA-21 for the Urbanized Area 

Formula Program and All Other Federal Transit 

Programs, 1998-2003 8

Figure 4: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation 

Systems Worldwide, 1997-2000 10
Contents

Page ii GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 5: Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems as 

Reported by Surveyed Agencies 12

Figure 6: Emergency Drill in Progress 18

Figure 7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s 

Training Tunnel 20

Figure 8: FTA’s Expenditures on Safety and Security Activities, 

2000-2003 24

Figure 9: Diagram of a Risk Management Approach 31

Figure 10: Location of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited 64

Figure 11: Types of Transit Services Offered by Surveyed Transit 

Agencies 69

Figure 12: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Number of 

Unlinked Passenger Trips in Fiscal Years 2000 - 2001 70

Figure 13: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Size of Their 

Operating and Capital Budgets, Fiscal Year 2001 72

Figure 14: Types of Security Used by Transit Agencies in Large and 

Small Urbanized Areas 73

Figure 15: Sources of Funds for Operating Expenses Used by Transit 

Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas 74

Figure 16: Sources of Funds for Capital Expenses Used by Transit 

Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas 75

Figure 17: Acts of Extreme Violence during the Past 5 Years at 

Transit Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas 77

Figure 18: Types of Assessments Performed by Transit Agencies 78

Figure 19: Types of Coordination Specified in Transit Agencies’

Emergency Plans 80

Figure 20: Types of Emergency Situations Addressed in Transit 

Agencies’ Emergency Plans 81

Abbreviations

APTA American Public Transportation Association

DOD Department of Defense

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FTA Federal Transit Administration

GAO General Accounting Office

ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century
Page 1 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

December 13, 2002 Letr

The Honorable Paul S. Sarbanes

Chairman, Committee on Banking, 

 Housing, and Urban Affairs

United States Senate 

The Honorable Jack Reed 

Chairman, Subcommittee on 

 Housing and Transportation

Committee on Banking, Housing,

and Urban Affairs

United States Senate 

Over a year has passed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

realigned our national priorities. While most of the early attention 

following these attacks focused on airport security, emphasis on the other 

modes of transportation has since grown. Moreover, terrorist events 

around the world have shown that mass transit systems, like other modes 

of transportation, are often targets of attack. For example, roughly onethird of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation systems, and 

transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked.1 In May 2002, the 

Department of Transportation issued a terrorist threat advisory to the 

transit industry indicating that subway systems were a possible target. The 

industry remains in a heightened state of alert.

Addressing transit safety and security concerns is complicated by the 

nature and scope of transit in the United States. About 6,000 agencies 

provide transit services, such as buses, subways, ferries, and light rail, in 

the United States. Each workday, about 14 million Americans ride on some 

form of transit. Because the effectiveness of transit systems depends on 

their accessibility, security measures common in aviation are difficult to 

apply. Furthermore, government agencies at the federal, state, and local 

levels and private companies share responsibility for transit safety and 

security and are involved in making transit decisions.

This report examines transit safety and security at the federal and local 

levels. In particular, the report describes (1) challenges in securing mass 

1

Congressional Research Service, Transportation Issues in the 107th Congress,

(Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002).
Page 2 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

transit systems, (2) steps transit agencies have taken to enhance safety and 

security, and (3) the federal role in transit safety and security. To address 

these issues, we visited 10 transit agencies across the country, including the 

Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority in Austin; Chicago Transit 

Authority; Central Florida Regional Transit Authority in Orlando; Los 

Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority; Minneapolis-St. 

Paul Metropolitan Council; New York City Transit; Regional Transportation 

District in Denver; San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit; San Francisco 

Municipal Railway; and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority in 

the District of Columbia. We selected these agencies because they 

represent different geographical areas and operate transit systems of 

different sizes and modes. In addition, we surveyed a random sample of all 

transit agencies throughout the nation that are eligible to receive federal 

urbanized area formula funds2

 to obtain additional information on safety 

and security issues. We received responses to our survey from 155 of 200 

transit agencies, for an overall response rate of 78 percent. Our survey 

results are generalizable to our sample population. The survey instrument 

and overall results are included in appendix I. (See app. II for a more 

detailed discussion of our report’s scope and methodology.) 

Results in Brief Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems secure 

because, in part, certain characteristics make them both vulnerable and 

difficult to secure. For example, the high ridership of some transit agencies 

makes them attractive targets for terrorists but also makes certain security 

measures, like metal detectors, impractical. The high cost of transit 

security improvements also creates challenges for transit agencies. 

Although some security improvements, such as closing bus doors at night, 

have little or no cost, most improvements require substantial funding. For 

example, the total estimated cost of the identified security improvements 

at 8 of the 10 transit agencies we visited is over $700 million. According to 

our survey results and our interviews with transit agency officials, 

insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making their transit 

systems as safe and secure as possible. Funding security improvements is 

challenging for a number of reasons including tight budget environments, 

competing budget priorities, and a prohibition on transit agencies that 

serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using federal 

2

The federal urbanized area formula program provides federal funds to urbanized areas 

(jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for transit capital investments, operating 

expenses, and transportation-related planning.
Page 3 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. This prohibition 

prevents transit agencies that serve large urbanized areas from using 

federal funds for security-related operating expenses, such as security 

personnel. Finally, our site visits and survey results show that coordination 

among all transit stakeholders pose challenges. Our discussions with 

transit agency and local government officials and our survey revealed 

substantial coordination on emergency planning among transit agencies 

and local governments; however, transit agencies reported some 

challenges, such as limited awareness of terrorist threats to transit and lack 

of coordination among various local agencies. Furthermore, coordination 

of emergency planning among transit agencies and governments at the 

regional, state, and federal levels appears to be minimal. 

Despite the formidable challenges in securing transit systems, transit 

agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of their 

systems. The transit agencies we visited were implementing strategies to 

improve both safety and security before September 11; however, the 

terrorist attacks on September 11 elevated the importance of securityrelated activities. As a result, the transit agencies we visited and surveyed 

have implemented new security initiatives or increased the frequency of 

existing activities since last September. For example, many agencies have 

assessed vulnerabilities, provided additional training on emergency 

preparedness, revised emergency plans, and conducted multiple 

emergency drills. Several agencies we visited have also implemented 

innovative practices to enhance safety and security, such as training police 

officers to drive buses and implementing an employee suggestion program 

to solicit ideas for improving security.

The federal government’s role in transit security is evolving. For example, 

although the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) has limited authority to 

oversee and regulate transit security, it launched a multipart security 

initiative after September 11. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

within the Department of Transportation and gave it responsibility for all 

modes of transportation; however, TSA has yet to exert full responsibility 

for the security of any transportation mode other than aviation. TSA and 

FTA are currently developing a memorandum of agreement that will define 

each agency’s roles and responsibilities for transit security. TSA will also be 

transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the 

recently passed Homeland Security Act (HR 5005). Although most of the 

transit agencies we visited said FTA’s security initiative has been useful, 

they would like the federal government to provide more assistance to 
Page 4 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

support transit security, such as more information, help in obtaining 

security clearances, increased funding, and more security-related research 

and development. When considering the federal government’s role in 

funding transit safety and security initiatives, policymakers will need to 

address several issues, including (1) determining the roles of stakeholders 

in funding transit security; (2) developing federal funding criteria; (3) 

establishing goals and performance indicators for federal efforts in transit 

security; and (4) selecting the appropriate federal policy instruments (e.g., 

grants and regulations) to deliver assistance that may be deemed necessary 

by policymakers.

To give transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit security 

improvements, we are recommending that the Secretary of Transportation 

consider seeking a legislative change to allow all transit agencies, 

regardless of the size of the urbanized area that they serve, to use 

urbanized area formula funds for security-related operating expenses. We 

are also making several other recommendations that are designed to 

promote accountability, direct finite federal resources to the areas of 

highest priority, and help transit agencies obtain intelligence information. 

We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report 

for their review and comment. Department of Transportation officials 

generally agreed with the report’s findings and conclusions and agreed to 

carefully consider the report’s recommendations as the Department 

continues working to improve transit security around the country.

Background In 2000, mass transit systems provided over 9 billion passenger trips and 

employed about 350,000 people in the United States.3

 The nation’s transit 

systems include all multiple-occupancy-vehicle services designed to 

transport customers on local and regional routes, such as bus, trolley bus, 

commuter rail, vanpool, ferry boat, and light rail services, and are valued at 

a trillion dollars. As figure 1 shows, buses are the most widely used form of 

transit, providing almost two-thirds of all passenger trips.

3

According to the American Public Transportation Association, its 2000 ridership data are 

preliminary.
Page 5 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 1: Ridership by Transit Mode, 2000

Note: Ridership data for 2000 are preliminary. Percentages do not add to 100 percent because of 

rounding.

a

Heavy rail is an electric railway that can carry a heavy volume of traffic. It is characterized by high 

speed and rapid acceleration, passenger rail cars operating singly or in multicar trains on fixed rails, 

separate rights-of-way from which all other vehicular and foot traffic are excluded, sophisticated 

signaling, and high-platform loading. Most subway systems are considered heavy rail.

b

“Other” includes a variety of transit modes such as ferryboat, vanpool, and demand response (i.e., 

paratransit).

A number of organizations are involved in the delivery of transit services in 

the United States, including federal, state, and local governments and the 

private sector:

• FTA provides financial assistance to transit agencies to plan and 

develop new transit systems and operate, maintain, and improve 

existing systems. FTA is responsible for ensuring that the recipients of 

federal transit funds follow federal mandates and administrative 

requirements. FTA’s Office of Safety and Security is the agency’s focal 
Page 6 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

point for transit safety (freedom from unintentional danger) and 

security (freedom from intentional danger).

• State and local governments also provide a significant amount of 

funding for transit services. As figure 2 shows, state and local 

governments provide funding for over 40 percent of transit agencies’

operating expenses and about a quarter of their capital expenses. 

According to statute,4

 states are also responsible for establishing State 

Safety Oversight Agencies to oversee the safety of transit agencies’ rail 

systems.

• Transit agencies, which can be public or private entities, are 

responsible for administering and managing transit activities and 

services. Transit agencies can directly operate transit service or contract 

for all or part of the total transit service provided. About 6,000 agencies 

provide transit services in the United States, and the majority of these 

agencies provide more than one mode of service. Although all levels of 

government are involved in transit security, the primary responsibility 

for securing transit systems has rested with the transit agencies.

4

49 U.S.C. Sec. 5330.
Page 7 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 2: Sources of Funding for Transit Operating and Capital Expenses, 2000

Note: Operating and capital expense data for 2000 are preliminary.

a

“Other” includes taxes levied directly by transit agencies and other dedicated funds, such as tolls and 

advertising.

b

Directly generated expenses include nongovernmental funding, subsidies from the nontransit sectors 

of a transit agency's operations, taxes levied directly by a transit agency, and bridge and tunnel tolls.

FTA administers a number of programs, both discretionary and formula 

based, that provide federal funding support to transit agencies. The largest 

of these programs is the urbanized area formula grant program, which 

provides federal funds to urbanized areas (jurisdictions with populations of 

50,000 or more) for transit capital investments, operating expenses, and 

transportation-related planning. As figure 3 shows, the urbanized area 

formula grant program accounts for almost one-half of the total authorized 

funds for all transit programs under the Transportation Equity Act for the
Page 8 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

21st Century (TEA-21). 5 Recipients of urbanized area formula funds are 

required to spend at least 1 percent of these funds to improve the security 

of existing or planned mass transportation systems unless the transit 

agencies certify that such expenditures are unnecessary.6

Figure 3: Funding Authorized by TEA-21 for the Urbanized Area Formula Program 

and All Other Federal Transit Programs, 1998-2003

Note: Totals represent guaranteed and nonguaranteed funding.

Restrictions on the use of urbanized area formula funds for operating 

expenses have changed over the years. When the urbanized area formula 

program was created in 1982,7

 funds could be used by transit agencies, 

regardless of an area’s population, for operating expenses with certain 

5

P.L. No. 105-178 (1998). TEA-21 is the current authorizing legislation for federal transit 

programs.

6

49 U.S.C. Sec. 5307 (d)(1)(J)(i) and (ii).

7

Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, P.L. 97-424.
Page 9 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

limitations.8 However, during fiscal years 1995 to 1997, an overall cap was 

placed on the total amount of these formula grants that could be used for 

operating expenses. In fiscal year 1995, the cap was $710 million, and in 

fiscal years 1996 and 1997 it was $400 million. With the passage of TEA-21 

in 1998, the restrictions on urbanized area formula funds were again 

changed. Specifically, TEA-21 prohibits transit agencies that serve 

urbanized areas with populations of 200,000 or more from using urbanized 

area formula funding for operating expenses. According to FTA officials, 

the prohibition was instituted because policymakers believed the federal 

government should only pay for the construction of mass transit systems, 

not their operations. The legislative history of TEA-21 indicates that the 

Congress allowed transit agencies serving urban areas with populations of 

less than 200,000 to continue to use urbanized area formula funds for 

operating expenses so that they would have sufficient funding flexibilities.

Throughout the world, public surface transportation systems have been 

targets of terrorist attacks. For example, the first large-scale terrorist use of 

a chemical weapon occurred in 1995 in the Tokyo subway system. In this 

attack, a terrorist group released sarin gas on a subway train, killing 11 

people and injuring about 5,500. In addition, according to the Mineta 

Transportation Institute,9

 surface transportation systems were the target of 

more than 195 terrorist attacks from 1997 through 2000. As figure 4 

illustrates, buses were the most common target during this period.

8

Specifically, urbanized areas with populations over 1 million could use up to 80 percent of 

their urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses; urbanized areas with 

populations between 200,000 and 1 million could use up to 90 percent; and urbanized areas 

with populations of less than 200,000 could use up to 95 percent. 

9

Congress, as part of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA), 

established the Mineta Transportation Institute. The Institute focuses on international 

surface transportation policy issues as related to three primary responsibilities: research, 

education, and technology transfer.
Page 10 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 4: Targets of Attacks on Public Surface Transportation Systems Worldwide, 

1997-2000

Transit Agencies Face 

Challenges in Making 

Transit Systems Secure

Transit agencies face significant challenges in making their systems secure. 

Certain characteristics of transit systems, such as their high ridership and 

open access, make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure. 

The high cost of transit security improvements, coupled with tight budgets, 

competing needs, and a restriction on using federal funds for operating 

expenses (including security-related operating expenses such as additional 

security patrols) in large urban areas creates an even greater challenge for 

transit agencies. Moreover, because of the numerous stakeholders involved 

in transit security, coordination can become a problem. 
Page 11 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Characteristics of Transit 

Systems Pose Security 

Challenges

According to transit officials and transit security experts, certain 

characteristics of mass transit systems make them inherently vulnerable to 

terrorist attacks and difficult to secure. By design, mass transit systems are 

open (i.e., have multiple access points and, in some cases, no barriers) so 

that they can move large numbers of people quickly. In contrast, the 

aviation system is housed in closed and controlled locations with few entry 

points. The openness of mass transit systems can leave them vulnerable 

because transit officials cannot monitor or control who enters or leaves the 

systems. In addition, other characteristics of some transit systems—high 

ridership, expensive infrastructure, economic importance, and location 

(e.g., large metropolitan areas or tourist destinations)—also make them 

attractive targets because of the potential for mass casualties and 

economic damage. Moreover, some of these same characteristics make 

transit agencies difficult to secure. For example, the number of riders that 

pass through a mass transit system—especially during peak hours—make 

some security measures, such as metal detectors, impractical. In addition, 

the multiple access points along extended routes make the costs of 

securing each location prohibitive.

Further complicating transit security is the need for transit agencies to 

balance security concerns with accessibility, convenience, and 

affordability. Because transit riders often could choose another means of 

transportation, such as a personal automobile, transit agencies must 

compete for riders. To remain competitive, transit agencies must offer 

convenient, inexpensive, and quality service. Therefore, security measures 

that limit accessibility, cause delays, increase fares, or otherwise cause 

inconvenience could push people away from transit and back into their 

cars. Our discussions with transit agency officials and our survey results 

indicate that striking the right balance between security and these other 

needs is difficult. For example, as shown in figure 5, 9 percent of survey 

respondents reported that the most significant barrier to making their 

transit systems as safe and secure as possible is balancing riders’ need for 

accessibility with security measures. 
Page 12 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 5: Most Significant Challenge to Securing Transit Systems as Reported by Surveyed Agencies

Note: Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
Page 13 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Funding Security 

Improvements Is a Key 

Challenge

Funding security improvements is a key challenge for transit agencies. Our 

survey results and our interviews with transit agency officials indicate that 

insufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit 

systems as safe and secure as possible. Moreover, our survey results 

indicate that the most common reason for not addressing items identified 

as needing attention through safety and security assessments is insufficient 

funding. Factors contributing to funding challenges include high security 

costs, tight budgets, competing budget priorities, and a provision 

prohibiting transit agencies in large urbanized areas from using federal 

urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses, such as security 

training.

Transit security investments can be quite expensive. While some security 

improvements are inexpensive, such as removing trash cans from subway 

platforms, most require substantial funding. For example, one transit 

agency estimated that an intrusion alarm and closed circuit television 

system for only one of its portals would cost approximately $250,000—an 

amount equal to at least a quarter of the capital budgets of more than half 

the transit agencies we surveyed. According to our survey results, the top 

three safety and security funding priorities of transit agencies regardless of 

size are enhanced communication systems, surveillance equipment, and 

additional training. The transit agencies we visited have identified or are 

identifying needed security improvements, such as upgraded 

communication systems, additional fencing, surveillance equipment, and 

redundant or mobile command centers. Of the 10 transit agencies we 

visited, 8 had developed cost estimates of their identified improvements. 

The total estimated cost of the identified security improvements at the 8 

agencies is about $711 million. The total cost of all needed transit security 

improvements throughout the country is unknown;10 however, given the 

scope of the nation’s transit systems and the cost estimate for 8 agencies, it 

could amount to billions of dollars.

Transit agency officials told us that they are facing tight budgets, which 

make it more difficult for their agencies to pay for expensive security 

improvements. According to most of the agencies we visited, the weakened 

economy has negatively affected their revenue base by lowering ridership, 

tax revenues dedicated to transit, or both. In particular, 8 of the 10 agencies 

10Because about 40 percent of the transit agencies we surveyed could not provide cost 

estimates for their identified safety and security needs, we cannot provide an aggregated 

estimate for the surveyed transit agencies.
Page 14 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

we visited reported that ridership has dropped this year, primarily because 

of the slow economy. The decreased ridership levels have lowered fare box 

revenue. In addition, state and local sales taxes, which provide revenue for 

many transit agencies, have declined with the weakened economy and 

reduced the transit agencies’ revenue, according to a number of transit 

agency officials. 

Other competing funding needs also present a challenge for transit 

agencies. Given the tight budget environment, transit agencies must make 

difficult trade-offs between security investments and other needs, such as 

service expansion and equipment upgrades. For example, an official at one 

transit agency stated that budget shortfalls and expenditures for security 

improvements have delayed some needed capital projects and reduced the 

budgets for all departments—except the safety and security budget. 

Similarly, an official at another agency reported that his agency is funding 

security improvements with money that was budgeted for nonsecurity 

projects. According to our analysis, 16 percent of the agencies we surveyed 

view balancing safety and security priorities against other priorities as the 

most significant challenge to making their systems as safe and secure as 

possible. 

Officials from some transit agencies we visited also reported that the 

funding challenges are exacerbated by the current statutory limitation on 

using urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses. The urbanized 

area formula program provides federal funds to urbanized areas 

(jurisdictions with populations of 50,000 or more) for transit capital 

investments, operating expenses, and transportation-related planning. The 

program is the largest source of federal transit funding. As mentioned 

earlier, TEA-21 prohibits transit agencies in large urbanized areas 

(jurisdictions with populations of 200,000 or more) from using urbanized 

area formula funding for most operating expenses. This prohibition limits 

many agencies’ ability to use FTA funds for security-related operating 

expenses. For example, transit agencies in large urbanized areas cannot 

use their urbanized area formula funds to pay for security training or 

salaries for security personnel, among other uses. Officials from a number 

of agencies we visited said this prohibition was a significant barrier to 

funding needed security improvements, although several agency officials 

also noted that the elimination of this prohibition would be helpful only if 

additional funding were provided. Given the declining revenue base of 

some transit agencies, however, the prohibition compounds the budgetary 

challenges of securing transit systems.
Page 15 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Coordination Is Key to 

Transit Security but 

Presents Challenges

Coordination among all stakeholders is integral to enhancing transit 

security, but it can create additional challenges. Numerous stakeholders 

are typically involved in decisions that affect transit security, such as 

decisions about its operations and funding. As we noted in our testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Transit and Housing in September and in 

previous reports, coordination among all levels of government and the 

private sector is critical to homeland security efforts, and a lack of 

coordination can create problems, such as duplication of effort.11 In 

addition, the national strategy for homeland security recognizes the 

challenges associated with intergovernmental coordination but emphasizes 

the need for such coordination. According to our site visits and our survey 

results, coordination of emergency planning is generally taking place 

between transit agencies and local governments, despite some challenges; 

however, such coordination appears to be minimal between transit 

agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal levels.

We found that transit agencies and local governments are coordinating 

their emergency planning efforts. Our survey results indicate that 77 

percent of transit agencies have directly coordinated emergency planning 

at the local level; moreover, 65 percent of agencies surveyed believe they 

have been sufficiently integrated into their local government’s emergency 

plans. Likewise, 9 of the 10 transit agencies we visited said they are 

integrated to at least a moderate extent into their local government’s 

emergency planning. Officials from these 9 transit agencies noted that their 

agencies are included in their local government’s emergency planning 

activities, such as emergency drills, tabletop exercises, planning meetings, 

and task forces. For example, when Minneapolis held an emergency drill 

that simulated a biological attack on the city, Metro Transit transported 

“victims” to hospitals, even taking some victims to out-of-state hospitals 

because the local hospitals were at capacity. Transit agency and local 

government officials said their past experiences with weather emergencies 

and special events, like Super Bowl celebrations, had helped establish good 

working relationships. According to the officials, these past experiences 

have demonstrated the types of support services transit agencies can 

11U.S. General Accounting Office, Mass Transit: Challenges in Securing Transit Systems, 

GAO-02-1075T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2002); U.S. General Accounting Office, 

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination Is Key to Success, GAO-02-

1011T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 20, 2002); and U.S. General Accounting Office, National 

Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to 

an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 11, 2002).
Page 16 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

provide during emergencies, including evacuations, triage centers, victim 

transport, and shelters. However, officials said these working relationships 

are usually informal and undocumented. For example, the majority of the 

transit agencies we visited did not have a memorandum of understanding 

with their local government. 

Although transit agencies are generally active participants in emergency 

planning at the local level, they nevertheless face some coordination 

challenges. According to our survey results, some of the most significant 

challenges in coordinating emergency planning at the local level are 

insufficient funding, limited awareness of terrorist threats to transit, and 

lack of time. Similar concerns were often raised during our meetings with 

transit agencies. For example, one agency official noted that his agency 

operates in over 40 jurisdictions and that coordinating with all of these 

local governments is very time consuming.

In contrast to the local level, coordination of emergency planning among 

transit agencies and governments at the regional, state, and federal levels 

appears to be minimal. Most of the transit agencies we visited reported 

limited coordination with governments other than their local government. 

Our survey results reveal a similar pattern. For example, 68 percent of 

transit agencies we surveyed have not directly coordinated emergency 

planning at the regional level; 84 percent have not directly coordinated 

emergency planning at the state level; and 87 percent have not directly 

coordinated emergency planning at the federal level. As we have noted in 

past reports on homeland security, the lack of coordination among 

stakeholders could result in communication problems, duplication, and 

fragmentation. Without coordination, transit agencies and governments 

also miss opportunities to systematically identify the unique resources and 

capacities that each can provide in emergencies.

Transit Agencies Are 

Taking Steps to 

Enhance Security

Prior to September 11, all 10 transit agencies we visited and many of the 

transit agencies we surveyed were implementing measures to enhance 

transit safety and security, such as revising emergency plans and training 

employees on emergency preparedness. Transit agency officials we 

interviewed often noted that the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway 

system or their agency’s experiences during natural disasters had served as 

catalysts for focusing on safety and security. Although safety and security 

were both priorities, the terrorist attacks on September 11 elevated the 

importance of security. (See app. III for select survey results, which 

includes information on the emergency planning and preparedness of the 
Page 17 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

transit agencies we surveyed. Differences and similarities of transit 

agencies in large urbanized areas to those in small urbanized areas are also 

presented.)

Since September 11, transit agencies have taken additional steps to 

improve transit safety and security. Officials from the agencies we visited 

told us their agencies have been operating at a heightened state of security 

since September 11. According to agency officials and our survey results, 

many transit agencies in large and small urbanized areas have implemented 

new safety and security measures or increased the frequency or intensity of 

existing activities, including the following:

• Vulnerability or security assessments: Many transit agencies have 

conducted vulnerability or security assessments. For example, all 10 of 

the agencies we visited and 54 percent of the agencies we surveyed said 

they had conducted a vulnerability or security assessment since 

September 11. The purpose of these assessments is to identify potential 

vulnerabilities and corrective actions or needed security improvements. 

Improved communication systems, more controlled access to facilities, 

and additional training were some of the needs identified in the 

assessments of the agencies we visited.

• Fast-track security improvements: Security improvements planned 

or in process prior to September 11 were moved up on the agenda or 

finished early. For example, one agency, which was putting alarms on 

access points to the subway ventilation system before September 11, 

completed the process early.

• Immediate, inexpensive security improvements: Removing bike 

lockers and trash cans from populated areas, locking underground 

restrooms, and closing bus doors at night were among the immediate 

and inexpensive improvements that agencies made.

• Intensified security presence: Many agencies have increased the 

number of police or security personnel who patrol their systems. 

Surveillance equipment, alarms, or security personnel have been placed 

at access points to subway tunnels, bus yards, and other nonpublic 

places. Employees have also been required to wear identification cards 

or brightly colored vests for increased visibility. For example, 41 percent 

of the transit agencies we surveyed have required their personnel to 

wear photo identification cards at all times since September 11.
Page 18 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

• Increased emergency drills: Many agencies have increased the 

frequency of emergency drilling—both full-scale drills and tabletop 

exercises. For example, one agency we visited has conducted four drills 

since September 11. Agencies stressed the importance of emergency 

drilling as a means to test their emergency plans, identify problems, and 

develop corrective actions. Figure 6 is a photograph from an annual 

emergency drill conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority.

Figure 6: Emergency Drill in Progress

• Revised emergency plans: Agencies reviewed their emergency plans 

to determine what changes, if any, needed to be made. For example, 48 

percent of the agencies we surveyed, regardless of the size of urbanized 

area served, created or revised their emergency plans after September 

11. In addition, some agencies we visited updated their emergency plans 

to include terrorist incident protocols and response plans.
Page 19 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

• Additional training: Agencies participated in and conducted 

additional training on antiterrorism. For example, all 10 of the agencies 

we visited had participated in the antiterrorism seminars sponsored by 

FTA or the American Public Transportation Association. Similarly, 59 

percent of all transit agencies we surveyed reported having attended 

security seminars or conferences since September 11. 

Transit Agencies Also Adopt 

Innovative Practices to 

Enhance Safety and 

Security

Some of the agencies we visited have also implemented innovative 

practices in recent years to increase their safety, security, and 

preparedness in emergency situations.12 Through our discussions with 

transit agencies, we identified some innovative safety and security 

measures, including the following: 

• Police officers trained to drive buses: Capital Metro in Austin, 

Texas, trained some of the city police officers to drive transit buses 

during emergencies. The police officers received driver training and 

were licensed to drive the buses. If emergencies require buses to enter a 

dangerous environment, these trained police officers, instead of transit 

agency employees, will drive the buses.

• Training tunnel constructed: The Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority constructed an off-site duplicate tunnel, complete with 

railcars, tracks, and switches, to simulate an emergency environment 

for training purposes. (See fig. 7.) 

• Employee suggestion program implemented: New York City Transit 

implemented an employee suggestion program to solicit security 

improvement ideas. If an employee’s suggestion is adopted, he or she 

receives a day of paid leave.

12All of these practices, except for New York’s program, were implemented before 

September 11, 2001.
Page 20 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 7: Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority’s Training Tunnel
Page 21 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Federal Government’s 

Role in Transit Security 

Is Evolving

The federal government’s role in transit security is evolving. FTA has 

expanded its role in transit security since September 11 by launching a 

multipart security initiative and increasing the funding for its safety and 

security activities. In addition, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act 

gave TSA responsibility for transit security; however, TSA’s role and 

responsibilities have not yet been defined. Although the transit agencies we 

visited were generally pleased with FTA’s assistance since September 11, 

they would like the federal government to provide more assistance, 

including more information and funding. As the federal government’s role 

in transit safety and security initiatives evolves, policymakers will need to 

address several issues, including (1) the roles of stakeholders in funding 

transit security, (2) federal funding criteria, (3) goals and performance 

indicators for the federal government’s efforts, and (4) the appropriate 

federal policy instrument to deliver assistance deemed appropriate.

FTA Has Limited Authority 

but Has Initiated a Variety of 

Transit Safety and Security 

Activities

FTA has limited authority to regulate and oversee safety and security at 

transit agencies. According to statute, FTA cannot regulate safety and 

security operations at transit agencies.13FTA may, however, institute 

nonregulatory safety and security activities, including safety- and securityrelated training, research, and demonstration projects. In addition, FTA 

may promote safety and security through its grant-making authority. 

Specifically, FTA may stipulate conditions of grants, such as certain safety 

and security statutory and regulatory requirements, and FTA may withhold 

funds for noncompliance with the conditions of a grant.14For example, 

transit agencies must spend 1 percent of their urbanized area formula funds 

on security improvements.15 FTA is to verify that agencies comply with this 

requirement and may withhold funding from agencies that it finds are not in 

compliance.16 FTA officials stated that FTA’s authority to sponsor 

1349 U.S.C. sec. 5324(c).

1449 U.S.C. sec. 5324(c) and 49 U.S.C. sec. 5330.

1549 U.S.C. sec. 5307(d) (1)(J)(i) and (ii).

16According to FTA officials, FTA verifies that agencies spend at least 1 percent of their 

urbanized area formula funds on security improvements during its triennial review. FTA’s 

triennial review is a full review and evaluation of grantees’ performance in carrying out 

projects, including specific references to compliance with statutory and administration 

requirements.
Page 22 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

nonregulatory activities and to stipulate the conditions of grants is 

sufficient for the safety and security work they need to accomplish.17

Despite its limited authority, FTA had established a number of safety and 

security programs before September 11. For example, FTA offered 

voluntary security assessments, sponsored training at the Transportation 

Safety Institute, issued written guidelines to improve emergency response 

planning, and partially funded a chemical detection demonstration project, 

called PROTECT, at the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. 

Although FTA maintained both safety and security programs before 

September 11, its primary focus was on the safety rather than the security 

programs. This focus changed after September 11.

In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, FTA launched a 

multipart transit security initiative last fall. The initiative includes security 

assessments, planning, drilling, training, and technology:

• Security assessments: FTA deployed teams to assess security at 36 

transit agencies. FTA chose the 36 agencies on the basis of their 

ridership, vulnerability, and the potential consequences of an attack.18 

Each assessment included a threat and vulnerability analysis, an 

evaluation of security and emergency plans, and a focused review of the 

agency’s unified command structure with external emergency 

responders. FTA completed the assessments in late summer 2002.

• Emergency response planning: FTA is providing technical assistance 

to 60 transit agencies on security and emergency plans and emergency 

response drills.

• Emergency response drills: FTA offered transit agencies grants up to 

$50,000 for organizing and conducting emergency preparedness drills. 

According to FTA officials, FTA has awarded $3.4 million to over 80 transit 

agencies through these grants. 

17FTA also has authority to enter into “other agreements” with transit agencies to introduce 

innovative methods for safety and security on negotiated terms and conditions more 

favorable to nonfederal participants than are authorized under FTA contracts, grants, or 

cooperative agreements under 49 U.S.C. sec. 5312(d), and FTA may work with other federal 

agencies in developing defenses and responses to terrorist incidents.

18A professional team of antiterrorism, transit operations, and emergency response experts 

conducted each assessment.
Page 23 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Security training: FTA is offering free emergency preparedness and 

security training to transit agencies through its Connecting Communities 

Forums. These forums are being offered throughout the country and are 

designed to bring together small- and medium-sized transit agency 

personnel with their local emergency responders, like local firefighters and 

police officers. The purpose of the forums is to give the participants a 

better understanding of the roles played by transit agencies and emergency 

responders and to allow the participants to begin developing the plans, 

tools, and relationships necessary to respond effectively in an emergency. 

In addition, FTA is working with the National Transit Institute and the 

Transportation Safety Institute to expand safety and security course 

offerings. For example, the National Transit Institute is now offering a 

security awareness course to front line transit employees free of charge.

Research and development: FTA increased the funding for its safety- and 

security-related technology research and has accelerated the deployment 

of the PROTECT system. 

FTA also increased expenditures on its safety and security activities after 

the attacks of September 11. To pay for its multipart security initiative, FTA 

reprioritized fiscal year 2002 funds from its other programs and used a 

portion of the Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act of 2002 (DOD supplemental), which provided $23.5 

million for transit security purposes.19 Specifically, FTA will put about $18.7 

million of the DOD supplemental toward its multipart security initiative.20

As a result of these actions, FTA’s expenditures on its safety and security 

activities has increased significantly in recent years. As figure 8 shows, if 

FTA receives the amount of funding it requested for fiscal year 2003, FTA’s

19Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Recovery from 

and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act 2002 (P.L. 107-117, H.R. 

Conference Report 107-350). The DOD supplemental also provided $39.1 million to the 

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority for region-wide security requirements, 

including $5 million for protective clothing and breathing apparatus, $2.2 million for 

completion of the fiber optic network project, $15 million for a chemical emergency sensor 

program, and $16.9 million for increased employee and facility security. On August 2, 2002, 

the President signed into law the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further 

Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States (P.L.107-206, H.R. 

4775), which set aside $15 million for grants to enhance security for intercity bus operations.

20The remaining $4.8 million of the DOD supplemental was dedicated to the replacement of 

buses and kiosks in New York destroyed in the terrorist attacks.
Page 24 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

expenditures on safety and security activities will more than double since 

fiscal year 2000—increasing from $8.1 million to $17.9 million.21

Figure 8: FTA’s Expenditures on Safety and Security Activities, 2000-2003

Note: Data include actual and planned expenditures on program activities and oversight. It does not 

include funding for grant programs.

TSA’s Role in Transit 

Security Is Evolving

TSA is responsible for the security of all modes of transportation, including 

transit. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act created TSA within the 

Department of Transportation and defined its primary responsibility as ensuring 

security in all modes of transportation.22 The act also gives TSA regulatory 

authority over transit security, which FTA does not possess. Since its creation last 

November, TSA has primarily focused on improving aviation security in order to 

meet the deadlines established in the Aviation and Transportation Security 

21Budget data include FTA’s actual and planned expenditures on program activities and 

oversight. It does not include funding for grant programs.

22P.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
Page 25 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Act. As a result, TSA has not yet exerted full responsibility for security in 

other modes of transportation, such as transit.

TSA’s role in transit security is evolving. For transit security, the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act does not specify TSA’s role and 

responsibilities as it did for aviation security.23 For example, the act does 

not set deadlines for TSA to implement certain transit security 

requirements. Similarly, although the President’s National Strategy for 

Homeland Security states that the federal government will work with the 

private sector to upgrade security in all modes of transportation and utilize 

existing modal relationships and systems to implement unified, national 

standards for transportation security, it does not outline TSA’s or the 

Department of Homeland Security’s role in transit security.24 TSA will be 

transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the 

recently passed Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).

To define its roles and responsibilities in transit security, TSA is currently 

working with FTA to develop a memorandum of agreement.25 According to 

FTA and TSA officials, the memorandum of agreement will define the roles 

and responsibilities of each agency as they relate to transit security and 

address a variety of issues, including separating safety and security 

activities, establishing national standards, interfacing with transit agencies, 

and establishing funding priorities. For example, TSA officials said they 

expect to mandate a set of national standards for transit security. 

Consequently, the memorandum of agreement would articulate the roles 

and responsibilities of TSA and FTA in establishing these standards.

TSA and FTA have not finalized the timetable for issuing the memorandum 

of agreement. TSA and FTA officials originally planned to issue the 

memorandum of agreement in September 2002. However, according to FTA 

officials, the issuance was delayed so that the memorandum could 

incorporate and reflect the administration’s fiscal year 2004 budget request. 

According to TSA officials, FTA and TSA would like to issue the 

23For more information on TSA’s role in aviation security, see U.S. General Accounting 

Office, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and 

Long-Term Challenges, GAO-02-971T(Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2002). 

24The strategy states that the Department of Homeland Security will coordinate closely with 

the Department of Transportation, which will remain responsible for transportation safety.

25TSA is developing memorandums of agreement with all modal administrations in the 

Department of Transportation.
Page 26 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

memorandum of agreement by January 2003. Although TSA and FTA are 

informally coordinating transit security issues, the memorandum of 

agreement will formalize their relationship, help prevent duplication of 

effort, and help TSA manage the shared responsibilities involved in 

securing the nation’s transportation system. 

Transit Agencies Said the 

Federal Government Should 

Provide More Information 

and Assistance

The transit agencies we visited were generally pleased with the assistance 

FTA has provided since September 11. Officials from these agencies added, 

however, that the federal government could do more in helping them 

secure their transit systems. They suggested, for example, that the federal 

government provide additional information on a number of issues, invest 

more in security-related research and development, help obtain security 

clearances, and supply increased funding for security improvements.

Officials from the transit agencies we visited reported a need for the federal 

government to disseminate additional information on topics ranging from 

available federal grants to appropriate security levels for individual 

agencies. A recurring theme was for the federal government to establish a 

clearinghouse or similar mechanism that maintains and disseminates this 

type of information. Specifically, officials expressed a need for the federal 

government to provide additional information on the following topics:

• Intelligence: Transit officials from a number of agencies stated that the 

federal government should provide additional information on threats to 

their transit agencies or cities. Officials also commented that “real time”

information on attacks against other transit agencies would be useful. 

• Best practices: A number of officials said that information on transit 

security best practices would be beneficial. According to FTA officials, 

the assessments of the 36 transit agencies are helping them identify best 

practices.

• Federal grants: Officials from several transit agencies suggested that 

information on available grants that can be used for transit safety and 

security improvements would be useful, noting that locating these 

grants is challenging and time consuming. For example, an assistant 

general manager stated that she spends too much of her time searching 

the Internet for grants available for transit.

• Level of security: Transit officials from a few agencies told us that it 

would be helpful for the federal government to provide information on 
Page 27 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

the appropriate level of security for their agencies. For example, 

officials at one agency questioned whether they needed to continue to 

post guards—24 hours a day, 7 days a week—at the entrance and exit of 

their tunnel, a practice instituted when the Department of 

Transportation issued a threat advisory to the transit industry in May 

2002. Similarly, our survey results indicate that determining the 

appropriate level of security is a challenge for transit agencies.

• Cutting-edge technology: Officials from a number of agencies said 

that the federal government should provide information on the latest 

security technologies. For example, officials from one agency said that 

such information is needed because they have been bombarded by 

vendors selling security technology since September 11; however, the 

officials said they were unsure about the quality of the products, 

whether the products were needed, or whether the products would be 

outdated next year. 

• Decontamination practices: Several transit agency officials expressed 

a need for information on decontamination protocols. For example, one 

agency official noted that information is needed on how to determine if 

the system is “clean” after a chemical or biological attack. 

According to FTA officials, FTA is developing two mechanisms to better 

disseminate information on intelligence, best practices, and securityrelated issues to transit agencies. First, FTA is launching a new secure Web 

site to post best practices and allow for the exchange of security-related 

information. In September 2002, FTA invited 100 transit agencies to register 

to use this Web site, which utilizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) secure Web site technology called Infragard. Second, FTA is funding 

the transit Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which will disseminate 

intelligence information to transit agencies. The Center will initially be 

available for the largest 50 agencies. The schedules for launching or 

expanding the Center to other transit agencies have not been established.

Officials from several of the agencies we met with also said that the federal 

government should be investing more in security-related research and 

development. Agency officials noted that individual transit agencies do not 

have the resources to devote to research and development. Moreover, the 

officials said this is an appropriate role for the federal government, since 

the products of research and development endeavors should benefit the 

entire transit community, not just individual agencies. FTA’s Office of 

Technology is currently the agency’s focal point for research and 
Page 28 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

development and is responsible for identifying and supporting 

technological innovations, including safety and security innovations. 

According to FTA documents, the Office of Technology’s obligations for 

safety and security technologies have increased from $680,000 in fiscal year 

2000 to an estimated $1.1 million in fiscal year 2002. FTA’s fiscal year 2003 

budget request includes about $4.2 million for the Office of Technology’s 

safety and security technologies, representing a 272-percent increase from 

fiscal year 2002. FTA is also conducting 13 research projects on a variety of 

security-related issues, such as updating its guide for security planning, 

developing material for a security awareness campaign, and working on 

decontamination procedures for public transportation.

A number of transit officials also expressed a need for the federal 

government to help them obtain security clearances. As we have reported 

in our previous work on homeland security, state and local officials have 

characterized their lack of security clearances as a barrier to obtaining 

critical intelligence information.26 The inability to receive any classified 

threat information could hamper transit agencies’ emergency preparedness 

capability as it apparently did at one of the transit agencies we visited. In 

this agency’s city, a bomb threat was made against a major building, but 

because the transit agency officials did not have the necessary security 

clearances, the FBI did not inform them of this threat until about 40 

minutes before the agency was asked to help evacuate the building. 

According to transit agency officials, the lack of advance notice negatively 

affected their agency’s ability to respond, even though, in this case, the 

threat was not carried out. Proposed legislation (H.R. 3483) provides that 

the Attorney General expeditiously grant security clearances to governors 

who apply for them and to state and local officials who participate in 

federal counterterrorism working groups or regional task forces. FTA has 

offered to help transit agencies join their local FBI Joint Terrorism Task 

Force to better access intelligence information, but it has not made

26U.S. General Accounting Office, Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in 

Making New Initiatives Successful, GAO-02-993T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2002); and U.S. 

General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and 

Partnership Sought, GAO-02-490T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 2002).
Page 29 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

assisting transit agencies with security clearances part of their security 

activities.27

Officials from the transit agencies we visited also said that additional 

federal funding is needed. As noted earlier, many of the transit agencies we 

visited are experiencing tightened budgets, which make it more difficult for 

them to fund safety and security needs. Moreover, according to our survey 

results, insufficient funding is the most significant obstacle agencies face in 

trying to make their systems more safe and secure. The Congress has 

already made additional funding available for transit security purposes—

about $23.5 million through the fiscal year 2002 DOD supplemental. FTA’s 

fiscal year 2003 budget request also includes $17.9 million for safety and 

security expenditures.

Critical Decisions Remain 

about the Federal 

Government’s Role in 

Funding Transit Security 

Improvements

Important funding decisions for transit safety and security initiatives 

remain. Due to the expense of security enhancements and transit agencies’

tight budget environments, the federal government is likely to be viewed as 

a source of funding for at least some of these enhancements. These 

improvements join the growing list of security initiatives competing for 

federal assistance. Based on our past work on homeland security issues, 

site visits to transit agencies, and survey results, we believe that several 

issues will need to be addressed when the federal government’s role in 

funding transit safety and security initiatives is considered. These issues 

include (1) determining the roles of stakeholders in funding transit security, 

(2) developing an approach to distribute federal funds, (3) establishing 

goals and performance indicators for the federal government’s efforts, and 

(4) selecting the appropriate federal policy instrument to deliver 

assistance. 

The roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in funding transit safety and 

security need to be determined. Since all levels of government and the 

private sector are concerned about transit safety and security, determining 

who should finance security activities may be difficult. Some of the 

benefits of transit systems, such as employment and reduced congestion, 

remain within the locality or region. In addition, private companies that 

27According to the Department of Transportation, the Aviation and Transportation Security 

Act gives TSA the authority to disclose sensitive security information to approved officials 

from federal, state, and local governments and the private sector on a “need to know” basis, 

even if the officials do not have clearances.
Page 30 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

own transit systems could directly benefit from security measures because 

steps designed to thwart terrorists could also prevent others from stealing 

goods or causing other kinds of economic damage. Given the importance of 

transit to our nation’s economic infrastructure, some have argued that the 

federal government should help pay for protective measures for transit. 

Transit officials we spoke with said that the federal government should 

provide additional funding for security needs. Fifty-nine percent of transit 

agencies in large- and small-urbanized areas responding to our survey said 

they plan to use federal funds to pay for their top three security priorities. 

Additionally, TSA and FTA officials said they would seek additional 

resources for transit security.28 The current authorizing legislation for 

federal surface transportation programs, TEA-21, expires on September 30, 

2003. The reauthorization of TEA-21 provides an opportunity to examine 

stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities for transit security, including 

federal funding responsibilities.

Since requests for funding transit security improvements will likely exceed 

available resources, an approach for distributing the federal dollars is 

needed. Transit agency officials we met with identified a number of 

possible federal funding criteria, including ridership levels, the population 

of the city the transit agency serves, identified vulnerabilities of the agency, 

the potential for mass casualties, and assets of the agency (e.g., tunnels and 

bridges). In general, the transit agency officials we spoke with believed the 

federal government should direct its dollars to agencies that are most at 

risk or most vulnerable to a terrorist attack—a criterion consistent with a 

risk management approach. A risk management approach is a systematic 

process to analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and the criticality (or relative 

importance) of assets to better support key decisions linking resources 

with prioritized efforts for results. Figure 9 illustrates that the highest risks 

and priorities emerge where the three parts of a risk management approach 

overlap. For example, transit infrastructure that is determined to be a 

critical asset, vulnerable to attack, and a likely target would be at most risk 

and therefore would be a higher priority for funding compared with 

infrastructure that was only vulnerable to attack.

28TSA will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the 

recently enacted Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).
Page 31 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 9: Diagram of a Risk Management Approach 

We have advocated using a risk management approach to guide federal 

programs and responses to better prepare against terrorism and other 

threats and to better direct finite national resources to areas of highest 
Page 32 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

priority.29 FTA and TSA have not developed funding criteria or an approach 

to distribute funding for transit security. However, the agencies have the 

needed information to apply a risk management approach. For example, 

FTA obtains threat information from a variety of sources, including the FBI, 

and is in the process of identifying the most critical transit infrastructure. 

In addition, FTA has vulnerability information from the security 

assessments it recently performed. Moreover, according to TSA officials, 

TSA used a risk management approach to recently distribute grants to 

seaports and is researching best practices for using risk management 

assessments. 

In addition to a funding approach, goals and performance indicators need 

to be established to guide the federal government’s efforts in transit 

security. These critical components can influence all decisions—from 

launching new initiatives to allocating resources—as well as measure 

progress and ensure accountability. The Congress has long recognized the 

need to objectively assess the results of federal programs, passing the 

Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (commonly referred to 

as the Results Act). The Results Act required agencies to set strategic and 

annual goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which 

goals are met. However, goals or outcomes of where the nation should be in 

terms of transit security or other national security programs have yet to be 

defined. For example, as we reported this summer, the National Strategy 

for Homeland Security does not establish a baseline set of performance 

goals and measures for assessing and improving preparedness.30 Moreover, 

the goals and measures for transit safety and security in the Department of 

Transportation’s current strategic plan were developed before September 

11 and focus more on safety and crime than on terrorism. Consequently, 

they do not reflect today’s realities or the changing role of the federal 

government in transit security. Given the recent and proposed increases in 

security funding, such as the DOD supplemental that provided about $23.5 

million for transit security, as well as the need for real and meaningful 

improvements in preparedness, establishing clear goals is critical to 

ensuring both a successful and a fiscally responsible effort. Moreover, 

29U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can 

Guide Preparedness Efforts, GAO-02-208T (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001); and U.S. 

General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help 

Prioritize and Target Program Investments, GAO/NSIAD-98-74. (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 

1998).

30GAO-02-1011T.
Page 33 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

performance indicators are needed to track progress toward these 

established goals. 

Another important consideration is the design of policy instruments to 

deliver assistance. Our previous work on federal programs suggests that 

the choice and design of policy instruments have important consequences 

for performance and accountability. The federal government has a variety 

of policy tools, including grants, loan guarantees, regulations, tax 

incentives, and partnerships, to motivate or mandate state and local 

governments or the private sector to help address security concerns. The 

choice and design of policy tools can enhance the government’s capacity to 

(1) target the areas of highest risk to better ensure that scarce federal 

resources address the most pressing needs, (2) promote the sharing of 

responsibilities among all parties, and (3) track and assess progress toward 

achieving national goals. Regardless of the tool selected, specific 

safeguards and clear accountability requirements, such as documentation 

of the terms and conditions of federal participation, are needed to protect 

federal interests.

Conclusions Securing the nation’s transit system is not a short-term or easy task. Many 

challenges must be overcome. FTA and the transit agencies we visited have 

made a good start in enhancing transit security, but more work is needed. 

Transit agencies’ calls for increased federal funding for security needs join 

the list of competing claims for federal dollars and, as a result, difficult 

trade-offs will have to be made. Since requests for federal assistance will 

undoubtedly exceed available resources, criteria will be needed for determining 

which transit security improvements merit any additional federal funds. To 

ensure that finite resources are directed to the areas of highest priority, the 

criteria should be in line with a risk management approach. In addition to 

helping distribute funds, establishing a risk-based funding approach would 

inform congressional decision making and demonstrate to the Congress 

that the funds will be managed efficiently. Moreover, as the federal 

government’s role in transit security expands—whether through additional 

funding or the setting of national standards by TSA—it is important that 

goals and performance indicators are established to guide the government’s 

efforts in transit security.31 These components are needed to ensure 

accountability and results. 

31TSA will be transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security as part of the 

recently enacted Homeland Security Act (HR 5005).
Page 34 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

The upcoming reauthorization of the surface transportation authorizing 

legislation provides an opportunity to examine the role of the federal 

government, including its funding responsibilities, in transit security. 

However, transit agencies cannot wait for the new authorizing legislation to 

implement transit security improvements and are moving forward with 

improvements to enhance the security of their system and passengers. The 

federal government could assist transit agencies as they press forward with 

their security initiatives by allowing all transit agencies, regardless of the 

size of the population it serves, to use urbanized area formula funds for 

security-related operating expenses. Although eliminating the prohibition 

on urbanized area funds would not provide additional funding, it would 

give agencies increased flexibility in financing transit security 

enhancements so that they could decide, for example, to use their federal 

dollars to pay for additional security patrols instead of a new rail car. This 

additional flexibility would be especially helpful given the high costs of 

transit security improvements and the declining revenues of many 

agencies. Additionally, the Department of Transportation could help transit 

agency officials obtain timely intelligence information so that they can 

make better informed decisions about their agency’s emergency planning 

and response. The transit Information Sharing and Analysis Center is a 

positive step in providing some transit agencies timely intelligence 

information. The Department of Transportation could take other steps as 

well, including helping transit agency officials obtain security clearances, 

to further enhance the sharing of critical intelligence information to transit 

agencies. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To provide transit agencies greater flexibility in paying for transit security 

improvements, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation 

consider seeking a legislative change to allow all transit agencies, 

regardless of the size of the urbanized area they serve, to use federal 

urbanized area formula funds for security-related operating expenses. To 

discourage the replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, any 

legislative change should include a requirement that transit agencies 

maintain their level of previous funding.

To help transit agencies enhance transit security, to guide federal dollars to 

the highest priority, and to ensure accountability and results of the federal 

government’s efforts in transit security, we also recommend that the 

Secretary of Transportation take the following actions:
Page 35 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

• Develop and implement strategies to help transit agency officials obtain 

timely intelligence information, including helping transit agency officials 

obtain security clearances.

• Develop clear, concise, transparent criteria for distributing federal funds 

to transit agencies for security improvements. The criteria should 

correspond to a risk management approach so that federal dollars are 

directed to the areas of highest priority. 

• Establish goals and performance indicators for the department’s transit 

security efforts in order to promote accountability and ensure results.

Agency Comments We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report 

for review and comment. Department of Transportation officials, including 

the Deputy Administrator of the Federal Transit Administration, provided 

oral comments on the draft on November 22, 2002. The officials generally 

concurred with the report’s findings and conclusions. Moreover, they stated 

that the Department of Transportation will carefully consider our 

recommendations as it continues working to improve transit security. The 

officials also provided two minor clarifications on TSA’s authority over 

transit security and the expected issuance date of the memorandum of 

agreement between TSA and FTA, which we incorporated into the report.

We conducted our review from May through October 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 

of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the 

Secretary of Transportation, the Administrator of the Federal Transit 

Administration, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and 

interested congressional committees. We will make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 

on our Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 36 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

on (202) 512-2834. Individuals making key contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV.

Peter Guerrero

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
Page 37 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall Results ApApenednxidexiIs

This appendix presents our survey instrument and overall results. Unless 

otherwise noted, we report the number of respondents for each question 

and the weighted percentage of respondents who selected each answer for 

each question.
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 38 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

United States General Accounting Office

Survey of Transit Safety and Security

Introduction

The U.S. General Accounting Office, an agency of

Congress, has been asked to examine transit safety

and security in the United States. As part of our

review, we are surveying a representative sample of

transit agencies as well as conducting site visits at

selected agencies.

Results from this survey will help inform Congress

about transit agencies’ safety and security efforts,

challenges agencies face in making their systems as

safe and secure as possible, and funding needs. This

information will be critical as Congress considers the

reauthorization of the Transportation Equity Act for

the 21st Century. We are collecting data solely for

statistical purposes, and our report will present

results in summary form.

The questionnaire should be completed by the

person(s) most knowledgeable about your transit

property’s safety and security activities and needs.

Please complete and mail your questionnaire by July

25, 2002. A pre-addressed postage-paid return

envelope has been included.

If you have any questions, please contact Karin

Bolwahnn in Washington, D.C., at (202) 512-8515 or

bolwahnnk@gao.gov or Michelle Dresben in Los

Angeles at (213) 830-1039 or dresbenm@gao.gov.

Should the enclosed envelope be misplaced, please

mail the questionnaire to:

 U.S. General Accounting Office

 Attn: Michelle Dresben

 350 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1010

 Los Angeles, CA 90071

We recognize that there are great demands on your

time; however, your cooperation is critical to our

ability to provide current and complete information to

Congress.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 39 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

2

Instructions

 This questionnaire asks for information about your transit property’s safety and security

activities.

 Please use the following definitions for terms used throughout this questionnaire.

Acts of extreme violence: Sabotage; the use of bombs, chemical or biological agents, or nuclear or

radiological materials; or armed assault with firearms or other weapons by a terrorist or another actor

that causes or may cause substantial damage or injury to persons or property in any manner.

Emergency plan: Document that details an organization’s operating procedures, including the

responsibilities of professionals for any event, human-caused or natural, that requires responsive action

to protect life or property.

Transit property: Also known as a transit agency, transit system, or transit authority. Includes all

transit assets such as facilities, stations, and rolling stock.

Total number of unlinked passenger trips: The number of passengers who board public

transportation vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they board a vehicle no matter how many

vehicles they use to travel from their origin to their destination.
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 40 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

3

Section: Transit Property Characteristics

1. What transit services does your agency provide?

 (Check all that apply.) N=146

1. [5%] Subway

2. [11%] Rail other than subway (e.g., commuter or light rail)

3. [90%] Bus

4. [3%] Ferryboat

5. [62%] Customized Community Transport (e.g., demand response or paratransit)

6. [10%] Other- Please specify: ________________________________________

2. Please provide the total number of unlinked passenger trips your transit property provided (for all

modes) in FY 2000 and FY 2001. (Enter number of trips. See definition of “total number of

unlinked passenger trips” on page 1.)

 FY 2000 (Oct. 1, 1999 - Sept. 30, 2000): N= 141

0-999,999: 45%

1,000,000-9,999,999: 38%

10,000,000-99,999,999: 13%

100,000,000 and above: 5%

_________________________trips

 FY 2001 (Oct. 1, 2000 - Sept. 30, 2001): N= 140

0-999,999: 44%

1,000,000-9,999,999: 38%

10,000,000-99,999,999: 14%

100,000,000 and above: 4%

 _______ trips

3. Who provides security for your transit property? (Check all that apply.) N=146

1. [8%] Transit police department (i.e., sworn officers)

2. [34%] Established agreement/understanding with local or state police (beyond routine city

services)

3. [35%] Contract with security service (i.e., nonsworn officers)

4. [19%] Other - Please describe: _______________________________________

---------------------------------

5. [33%] No security personnel
Appendix I

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Results

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4

Section: Transit Properties and Acts of Extreme Violence

4. Which of the following, if any, has your transit property experienced in the past 5 years? (Check

all that apply.) N=146

 1. [22%] Reported bomb threat on transit property

 2. [19%] Reported chemical or biological substance on transit property

 3. [4%] Explosive device on transit property

 4. [2%] Chemical or biological substance on transit property

 5. [1%] Nuclear device on transit property

 6. [1%] Detonation of explosive on transit property

 7. [5%] Vehicle hijacking

 8. [7%] Attempted or actual sabotage by employee or nonemployee

 9. [1%] Breach of essential computer system

 10. [2%] Shooting with multiple victims on transit property

11. [8%] Other - Please specify: _______________________________________

------------------------------------

12. [66%] Experienced none of the above

5. In your opinion, what is the likelihood of an act of extreme violence occurring on your transit

property in the next 5 years? (Check one. See definition of “acts of extreme violence” on page

1.) N=145

1. [2%] Very likely

2. [5%] Likely

3. [31%] As likely as not

4. [37%] Unlikely

5. [25%] Very unlikely

6. Which of the following assessments of safety and security, if any, has been carried out for your

transit property during the last 5 years? (Check all that apply.) N=146

1. [23%] Assessment of transit system’s vulnerabilities to an act of extreme violence

2. [19%] Assessment of system’s ability to sustain operations during an act of extreme violence

3. [21%] Assessment of threat of extreme violence to key transit infrastructure (i.e. stations,

power stations, bridges, tunnels, control centers, vehicles)

4. [66%] Assessment of safety and security but not specifically for acts of extreme violence

5. [5%] Other - Please specify: ________________________________________

------------------------------------

6. [25%] Have not assessed safety and security Please skip to Question 9.
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5

7. Have the safety and security assessments identified items needing action? (Check one.) N=107

1. [77%] Yes Continue.

2. [23%] No Skip to Question 10.

8. Which of the following factors, if any, have limited your ability to complete or resolve action

items identified by the assessment(s)? (Check all that apply.) N=82*

 1. [15%] Lack of available technology or information on technology

 2. [14%] Inadequate information on terrorist threats

 3. [53%] Balancing security and safety priorities against other priorities

 4. [36%] Insufficient staff time or availability to complete

 5. [15%] Insufficient time since assessment

 6. [28%] Balancing riders’ needs for accessibility with safety and security measures

 7. [23%] Limited staff knowledge

 8. [10%] Lengthy process to gain approval for action

 9. [64%] Insufficient funding

10. [6%] Other - Please specify: _____________________

--------------------

11. [13%] No limiting factors, all action items are completed or resolved

*Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have larger sampling errors than for other

questions. For this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus 12 percent.

If a safety and security assessment has been carried out,

 skip to question 10; if not, answer question 9.

9. For which of the following reasons has your transit property not yet conducted a safety and

security assessment? (Check all that apply.) N=37

1. [*] Do not think the transit system is at risk

2. [*] Did not think the transit system was at risk in the past

3. [*] Low priority given to assessments

4. [*] Inadequate information on how to assess safety and security

5. [*] Limited staff knowledge

6. [*] Lack of staff time or availability

7. [*] Insufficient funding

8. [*] Limited availability of consultants

9. [*] Other - Please describe: ________________________________________

*Because only 25 percent of respondents had not yet conducted a safety and security assessment, we cannot

provide representative data for this question.
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GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

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6

10. In your opinion, what is the most significant challenge in making your transit property as safe and

secure as possible? (Check one.) N=142

 1. [1%] Lack of available technology or information on technology

 2. [4%] Inadequate information on terrorist threats

 3. [16%] Balancing security and safety priorities against other priorities

 4. [4%] Insufficient staff time or availability to devote to safety and security

 5. [9%] Balancing riders’ need for accessibility with safety and security measures

 6. [4%] Limited staff knowledge

 7. [1%] Lengthy process to gain approval for safety and security measures

 8. [44%] Insufficient funding

 9. [12%] Unsure about what level of security is appropriate

10. [2%] Other - Please specify: ________________________________________

----------------------------

11. [4%] No challenges to making system safe and secure

Section: Coordination with Local, State and Federal Entities

11. To what extent, if at all, have the local governments you serve incorporated your agency into their

emergency plan(s)? (Check one. See definition of “emergency plan” on page 1.) N=146

1. [15%] Very great extent

2. [21%] Great extent

3. [29%] Moderate extent

4. [21%] Some extent

5. [8%] Little or no extent

6. [6%] No basis to judge/Don’t know

12. Has your agency directly coordinated emergency planning at the local level (e.g., coordinated

with local government emergency management agency or local law enforcement)? (Check one.)

N=146

1. [77%] Yes Continue.

2. [23%] No Skip to question 14.
Appendix I

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Results

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7

13. To what extent, if at all, has your transit property encountered the following challenges when

trying to coordinate emergency planning at the local level, including with law enforcement?

(Check one box in each row.)

Very

great

challenge

(1)

Great

challenge

(2)

Moderate

challenge

(3)

Some

challenge

(4)

Little or

no

challenge

(5)

Lack of information sharing (N=111) 1% 9% 22% 30% 39%

Difficulty establishing joint emergency protocol

(N=111)

1% 7% 18% 26% 49%

Inadequate information to identify appropriate counterparts

(N=111)

1% 2% 16% 17% 65%

Lack of interest to coordinate (N=112) 0% 4% 10% 18% 68%

Lack of time to coordinate (N=111) 1% 11% 21% 26% 42%

Disagreement on funding priorities (N=111) 1% 5% 17% 20% 57%

Limited awareness of terrorist threat to transit (N=112) 5% 10% 22% 23% 40%

Lack of coordination among various local agencies

(N=111)

2% 11% 12% 24% 51%

Insufficient funding (N=110) 9% 27% 24% 15% 24%

Other - Please describe: _________________________

___________________________________________
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 45 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

8

14. Has your agency directly coordinated emergency planning at the state level (e.g., coordinated

with state emergency management agency or state law enforcement)? (Check one.) N=146

1. [16%] Yes Continue.

2. [84%] No Skip to question 16.

15. To what extent, if at all, has your transit property encountered the following challenges when

trying to coordinate emergency planning at the state level, including with law enforcement?

(Check one box in each row.)

Very

great

challenge

(1)

Great

challenge

(2)

Moderate

challenge

(3)

Some

challenge

(4)

Little or

no

challenge

(5)

Lack of information sharing (N=21) *** **

Difficulty establishing joint emergency protocol (N=22) *** **

Inadequate information to identify appropriate counterparts

(N=22)

*** **

Lack of interest to coordinate (N=22) *** **

Lack of time to coordinate (N=22) *** **

Disagreement on funding priorities (N=22) *** **

Limited awareness of terrorist threat to transit (N=22) *** **

Lack of coordination among various state agencies

(N=22)

*** **

Insufficient funding (N=21) *** **

Other - Please describe: _________________________

___________________________________________

*Because most respondents had not coordinated emergency planning at the state level, we cannot provide

representative data for this question.
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 46 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

9

16. Has your agency directly coordinated emergency planning at the regional level (e.g., coordinated

with government entities or law enforcement agencies in your region)? (Check one.) N=146

1. [31%] Yes Continue.

2. [63%] No Skip to question 18.

3. [6%] Not applicable Skip to question 18.

17. To what extent, if at all, has your transit property encountered the following challenges when

trying to coordinate emergency planning at the regional level, including with law enforcement?

(Check one box in each row.)

Very

great

challenge

(1)

Great

challenge

(2)

Moderate

challenge

(3)

Some

challenge

(4)

Little or

no

challenge

(5)

Lack of information sharing (N=43) * * * **

Difficulty establishing joint emergency protocol (N=43) * * * **

Inadequate information to identify appropriate counterparts

(N=43)

* * * **

Lack of interest to coordinate (N=43) * * * **

Lack of time to coordinate (N=43) * * * **

Disagreement on funding priorities (N=43) * * * **

Limited awareness of terrorist threat to transit (N=43) * * * **

Lack of coordination among various regional agencies

(N=43)

* * * **

Insufficient funding (N=43) * * * **

Other - Please describe: _________________________

____________________________________________

*Because most respondents had not coordinated emergency planning at the regional level, we cannot provide

representative data for this question.
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 47 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

10

18. Has your agency directly coordinated emergency planning at the federal level (e.g., coordinated

with federal emergency management agency or federal law enforcement)? (Check one.) N=146

1. [13%] Yes Continue.

2. [87%] No Skip to question 20.

19. To what extent, if at all, has your transit property encountered the following challenges when

trying to coordinate emergency planning at the federal level, including with law enforcement?

(Check one box in each row.)

Very

great

challenge

(1)

Great

challenge

(2)

Moderate

challenge

(3)

Some

challenge

(4)

Little or

no

challenge

(5)

Lack of information sharing (N=18) *****

Difficulty establishing joint emergency protocol

(N=18)

*****

Inadequate information to identify appropriate

counterparts (N=18)

*****

Lack of interest to coordinate (N=18) *****

Lack of time to coordinate (N=18) *****

Disagreement on funding priorities (N=18) *****

Limited awareness of terrorist threat to transit

(N=18)

*****

Lack of coordination among various federal agencies

(N=17)

*****

Insufficient funding (N=17) *****

Other - Please describe: _________________________

____________________________________________

*Because most respondents had not coordinated emergency planning at the federal level, we cannot provide

representative data for this question.
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 48 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

11

Section: Your Transit Property’s Emergency Planning

20. Does your transit property have an emergency plan(s) or emergency operating procedures?

(Check one. See definition of “emergency plan” on page 1.) N=146

1. [66%] Yes Continue.

2. [34%] No Skip to Question 26.

21. Which of the following situations does your transit property’s emergency plan(s) specifically

address? (Check all that apply.) N=96*

 1. [27 %] Hostage barricade situation

 2. [16%] Control center defense

 3. [75%] Reported bomb threat on transit property

 4. [53%] Reported chemical or biological substance on transit property

 5. [61%] Explosive device on transit property

 6. [38%] Chemical or biological substance on transit property

 7. [11%] Nuclear device on transit property

 8. [23%] Detonation of explosive on transit property

 9. [46%] Vehicle hijacking

 10. [23%] Attempted or actual sabotage by employee or nonemployee

11. [16%] Breach of essential computer system

12. [25%] Shooting with multiple victims on transit property

13. [85%] Natural disaster

14. [13%] Other - Please describe: __________________________________

*Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have larger sampling errors than for other

questions. For this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus 11 percent.

22. About what proportion of your agency’s personnel have received formal training, such as in-class

training, on the emergency plan? (Check one box in each row.)

All have

received

formal

training

(1)

Most have

received

formal

training

(2)

Some have

received

formal

training

(3)

Few or none

 have

received

formal

training

(4)

Not applicable

(5)

a. Security/safety personnel

(N=96)*

26% 21% 15% 18% 19%

b. All other personnel

(N=95)*

7% 17% 34% 38% 3%

*Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have larger sampling errors than for other

questions. For this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus 11 percent.
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 49 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

12

23. In general, about how often do agency personnel receive refresher training or updates on new

procedures concerning your emergency plan? (Check one box in each row.)

Every 2

years

(1)

Annually

(2)

Semiannually

(3)

On as-needed

basis

(4)

Never

(5)

Not applicable

(6)

a. Security/safety personnel

(N=96)

2% 20% 3% 49% 7% 18%

b. All other personnel

(N=95)

3% 16% 2% 61% 10% 9%

24. Does your transit property’s emergency plan specify coordination with any of the following

agencies?

(Check all that apply.) N=96*

 1. [91%] Local police departments

 2. [88%] Local fire/emergency medical service

 3. [74%] Local government (e.g., mayor’s or city administrator’s office)

 4. [42%] Local hospitals

 5. [22%] Local support/charity services

 6. [36%] Other transit agencies

 7. [38%] Other local transportation providers

 8. [21%] State law enforcement

 9. [59%] State/local emergency management agencies

10. [28%] State/local environmental protection agencies

11. [17%] Federal law enforcement (e.g., FBI)

12. [20%] Federal emergency management agencies

13. [28%] Federal transportation agencies (e.g., Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit

Administration)

14. [47%] Media

15. [5%] Other - Please describe: ___________________

 ______________________________________

-------------------------------

16. [5%] As of this date, have not specified coordination with other agencies

*Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have larger sampling errors than for other

questions. For this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus 11 percent.
Appendix I

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25. Have you shared your transit property’s emergency plans with any of the following entities?

(Check all that apply.) N=96

 1. [51%] Local police departments

 2. [54%] Local fire/emergency medical service

 3. [47%] Local government (e.g., mayor’s or city administrator’s office)

 4. [13%] Local hospitals

 5. [6%] Local support/charity services

 6. [25%] Other transit agencies

 7. [14%] Other local transportation providers

 8. [9%] State law enforcement

 9. [29%] State/local emergency management agencies

10. [12%] State/local environmental protection agencies

11. [7%] Federal law enforcement (e.g., FBI)

12. [9%] Federal emergency management agencies

13. [24%] Federal transportation agencies (e.g., Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit

Administration)

14. [5%] Media

15. [8%] Other - Please describe: ___________________

 ______________________________________

----------------------------------

16. [23%] As of this date, have not shared plans with any other entities

If your transit property has an emergency plan, skip to question 27; if not, answer question 26.

26. For which of the following reasons has your transit property not yet developed an emergency

plan?

 (Check all that apply.) N=50*

 1. [22%] Do not think the transit system is at risk

 2. [52%] Did not think transit system was at risk in the past

 3. [16%] Low priority given to emergency planning

 4. [36%] Inadequate information on how to do an

 emergency plan

 5. [46%] Limited staff knowledge

 6. [57%] Lack of staff time or availability

 7. [43%] Insufficient funding

 8. [2%] Limited availability of consultants

 9. [30%] Transit agency covered by local government plan

10. [10%] Other - Please describe: ___________________

*Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates for this question have larger sampling

errors than for other questions. For this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus 15

percent.
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

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Section: Funding Sources for Safety and Security Activities

27. Is your transit property allowed to use Federal Transit Administration (FTA) funds for operations?

(Check one.) N=145

1. [68%] Yes

2. [32%] No

28. Please indicate the cycle of your agency’s fiscal year. (Check one.) N=146

1. [26%] January 1 to December 31

2. [2%] April 1 to March 31

3. [49%] July 1 to June 30

4. [20%] October 1 to September 30

5. [3%] Other - Specify: ______/_______ to ______/_______

 (MM/DD) (MM/DD)
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29. Please provide the following information about your total operating expenses and total

operating funds spent on safety and security activities (e.g., administrative costs and

personnel). (Round amount to the nearest dollar. If an estimate is provided, please check box.)

Fiscal Year Total operating expenses Total operating funds spent on safety and security

activities

1999 N=123

$ 0-1,000,000: 15%

$1,000,000-10,000,000: 52%

$10,000,000-25,000,000: 15%

$25,000,000-100,000,000: 10%

$100,000,000-1,000,000,000: 7%

$1,000,000,000 and above: 1%

[22%] Estimate

N=121

$ *

[40%] Estimate

2000 N=128

$ 0-1,000,000: 15%

$1,000,000-10,000,000: 51%

$10,000,000-25,000,000: 15%

$25,000,000-100,000,000: 11%

$100,000,000-1,000,000,000: 7%

$1,000,000,000 and above: 1%

[22%] Estimate

N=122

$ *

[40%] Estimate

2001

N=130

$ 0-1,000,000: 13%

$1,000,000-10,000,000: 52%

$10,000,000-25,000,000: 14%

$25,000,000-100,000,000: 13%

$100,000,000-1,000,000,000: 7%

$1,000,000,000 and above: 2%

[21%] Estimate

N=124

$ *

[40%] Estimate

2002 N=128

$ *

[70%] Estimate

N=126

$ *

[65%] Estimate

2003

(projected) N=120

$ *

[79%] Estimate

N=120

$ *

[73%] Estimate

*Because 40 percent or more of respondents were only able to provide estimates, we are unable to present reliable

data for these questions. In addition, subsequent analyses raised other questions about data reliability.
Appendix I

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30. What sources does your transit agency use to fund your safety and security operating expenses?

(Check all that apply.) N=146

1. [40%] FTA funds

2. [1%] Other federal funds (i.e., non-FTA funds)

3. [48%] State funds

4. [70%] Local funds

5. [41%] Other (e.g., fare box revenue, loans) - Specify: ________________________________

31. What FTA programs, if any, does your transit property currently use to fund safety and security

operating expenses? (Check all that apply.) N=144

 1. [62%] Do not use FTA programs for safety and security operating expenses

 -------------------------------

 2. [32%] Urbanized Area Formula Program

 3. [6%] Nonurbanized Area Formula Program

 4. [1%] Elderly and Persons with Disabilities Program

 5. [0%] Clean Fuels Formula Program

 6. [0%] Over the Road Bus Accessibility Program

 7. [0%] Alaska Railroad Program

 8. [2%] Bus and Bus-Related Program

 9. [0%] Fixed Guideway Modernization Program

10. [1%] New Starts Program

11. [5%] Job Access and Reverse Commute Program

12. [2%] Metropolitan Planning Program

13. [0%] State Planning and Research Program

14. [0%] National Planning and Research Program

15. [4%] Rural Transit Assistance Program

16. [1%] Other - Please describe: _____________________________________
Appendix I

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Results

Page 54 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

17

32. Please provide the following information about your total capital expenses and total capital

funds spent on safety and security activities (e.g., surveillance equipment and fencing). (Round

amount to the nearest dollar. If an estimate is provided, please check box.)

Fiscal Year Total capital expenses Total capital funds spent on safety and security

activities

1999 N=109

$ 0-100,000: 25%

$100,000-1,000,000: 28%

$1,000,000-10,000,000: 32%

$10,000,000-100,000,000: 8%

$100,000,000-1,000,000,000: 5%

$1,000,000,000 and above: 1%

[19%] Estimate

N=113

$ *

[27%]Estimate

2000 N=114

$ 0-100,000: 25%

$100,000-1,000,000: 29%

$1,000,000-10,000,000: 27%

$10,000,000-100,000,000: 12%

$100,000,000-1,000,000,000: 6%

$1,000,000,000 and above: 1%

[16%] Estimate

N=117

$ * 

[28%] Estimate

2001 N=115

$ 0-100,000: 25%

$100,000-1,000,000: 27%

$1,000,000-10,000,000: 31%

$10,000,000-100,000,000: 10%

$100,000,000-1,000,000,000: 6%

$1,000,000,000 and above: 1%

[16%] Estimate

N=117

$ * 

[30%] Estimate

2002 N=112

$ * 

[56%] Estimate

N=115

$ * 

[43%]Estimate

2003

(projected) N=108

$ * 

[73%] Estimate

N=111

$ *

[54%]Estimate

*Because about 30 percent or more of respondents were only able to provide estimates, we are unable to provide

reliable data for these questions. In addition, subsequent analyses raised questions about data reliability.
Appendix I

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Results

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18

33. What sources does your transit agency use to fund your safety and security capital expenses?

N=143

1. [63%] FTA funds

2. [7%] Other federal funds (i.e., non-FTA funds)

3. [40%] State funds

4. [51%] Local funds

5. [15%] Other (e.g., fare box revenue, loans) - Specify: ________________________________
Appendix I

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Results

Page 56 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

19

34 What FTA programs, if any, does your transit property currently use to fund safety

 and security capital expenses? (Check all that apply.) N=144

 1. [39%] Do not use FTA programs for safety and security capital expenses

 -------------------------------

 2. [53%] Urbanized Area Formula Program

 3. [4%] Nonurbanized Area Formula Program

 4. [1%] Elderly and Persons with Disabilities Program

 5. [0%] Clean Fuels Formula Program

 6. [0%] Over the Road Bus Accessibility Program

 7. [0%] Alaska Railroad Program

 8. [11%] Bus and Bus-Related Program

 9. [5%] Fixed Guideway Modernization Program

10. [4%] New Starts Program

11. [1%] Job Access and Reverse Commute Program

12. [2%] Metropolitan Planning Program

13. [0%] State Planning and Research Program

14. [0%] National Planning and Research Program

15. [3%] Rural Transit Assistance Program

16. [5%] Other - Please describe: _____________________________________

35. Has your transit property identified funding needed for safety and security projects in the near

future? (Check one.) N=146

1. [51%] Yes Continue.

2. [49%] No Skip to Question 37.

36. What is the estimated total dollar amount of these identified needs over the next 3 years? N=73

$ * or [41%] Do not know**

*Because about 40 percent of the respondents could not estimate a total dollar amount for their identified needs,

we cannot provide representative data for this question.

**Because not all respondents answered this question, the estimates have larger sampling errors than for other

questions. For this question, sampling errors are less than plus or minus 12 percent.
Appendix I

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Results

Page 57 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

20

37. Currently, how much of a funding priority is each of the following safety and security needs?

(Check one box in each row.)

Very

high

(1)

Somewhat

high

(2)

Neither

high nor

low

(3)

Somewhat

low

(4)

Very

low

(5)

Not

Applicable

or Not sure

(6)

a. Enhanced communication system(s) (e.g., 2-way radios)

N=146

35 29 16 4 9 8

b. Surveillance equipment N=145 29 37 11 8 11 4

c. Chemical, biological, or radiological detection systems

N=144

4 4 11 15 47 19

d. Clear, impact-resistant sheeting for transit vehicle windows

N=145

0 7 18 21 36 18

e. Trespasser intrusion detection systems for tunnel environments

N=145

4 2 3 4 12 76

f. Application of Crime Prevention Through Environmental

Design (CPTED) engineering concepts into new facilities and

retrofitting existing facilities N=145

7 19 21 5 14 34

g. Additional fencing N=145 13 24 21 4 23 15

h. Additional lighting N=145 17 32 21 5 13 12

i. Security system or security card entrance system at facilities

N=145

24 31 15 8 14 8

j. Employee and vendor/contractor identification cards

N=145

23 20 23 8 19 8

k. Disposable gas masks/respirators for employees N=145 1 5 18 14 45 16

l. Auxiliary operations control centers in the event of emergency

N=144

10 16 16 15 26 17

m. Emergency generator N=145 17 20 25 8 16 14

n. Additional or enhanced training N=145 26 37 23 6 3 5

o. Emergency drills N=145 23 30 25 10 7 5

p. Additional personnel N=145 10 18 30 11 19 12

q. K-9 dogs trained to detect bombs or other devices N=145 3 4 5 4 43 40

r. Development of emergency plans N=145 26 29 22 7 5 10

s. Assessing vulnerabilities N=145 28 33 21 7 6 6

t. Back-up computer system N=145 14 20 32 3 17 15

u. Regional crime mapping N=144 1 4 20 11 31 33

v. Other - Please describe:

Other - Please describe:
Appendix I

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Results

Page 58 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

21

38. If you had to select three of the above safety and security needs as your top funding priorities,

which three would they be? (Please enter the letter designation, a through x, of the need from

question 37.)

1st priority: A (31%) (N=142)

2nd priority: B (16%) (N=142)

3rd priority: N (17%) (N=141)

39. What is the approximate total dollar amount of the top three safety and security funding priorities

that you indicated above?

1st priority: $ * or [47%] Do not know (N=140)

2nd priority: $ * or [53%] Do not know (N=142)

3rd priority: $ * or [55%] Do not know (N=142)

*Because about half of the respondents could not estimate the total dollar amount for their top three safety and

security funding priorities, we cannot provide representative dollar amounts.

40. Considering your transit property’s current funding situation, what sources (e.g., federal, state, or

local) do you think you will use to fund the top safety and security priorities that you identified in

question 38? (Check all that apply.) N=144

1. [59%] Federal funds

2. [39%] State funds

3. [42%] Local funds

4. [10%] Other (e.g., fare box revenue, loans) - Specify: ________________________________

5. [24%] Will probably not fund because of inadequate funds from above sources

6. [25%] Have not determined
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 59 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

22

Section: Transit Agency Preparation

41. Please provide an answer in each column:

a. Prior to September 11, 2001, what steps had your transit property taken to improve its safety

and security?

b. Since September 11, 2001, what steps has your transit property taken to improve its safety and

security?

 (Check “yes” or “no” in each column.)

Column A Column B

Step was taken

prior to

September 11

Step has been

taken since

September 11

Emergency planning and assessments

 Revised/created emergency plans, including acts of extreme

violence

[40%] Yes

[60%] No

N=146

[48%] Yes

[52%] No

N=146

 Had outside entity (i.e., FTA, FBI, state police, professional

organization) review your emergency plans [24%] Yes

[76%] No

N=145

[32%] Yes

[68%] No

N=146

Reviewed city or regional plans to ensure integration of transit

property

[46%] Yes

[54%] No

N=146

[50%] Yes

[50%] No

N=145

 Conducted security vulnerability assessments [33%] Yes

[67%] No

N=145

[54%] Yes

[46%] No

N=146

 Developed levels of threat [12%] Yes

[88%] No

N=146

[25%] Yes

[75%] No

N=146

 Participated in FTA’s security audits [15%] Yes

[85%] No

N=145

[20%] Yes

[80%] No

N=145

 Participated in the American Public Transportation

Association’s (APTA) safety audits [17%] Yes

[83%] No

N=144

[15%] Yes

[85%] No

N=145

Training

 Conducted or participated in emergency drills [58%] Yes

[42%] No

N=145

[59%] Yes

[41%] No

N=146
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GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

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23

 Conducted or participated in table top exercises [39%] Yes

[61%] No

N=145

[42%] Yes

[58%] No

N=146

 Trained personnel on emergency plans or procedures [66%] Yes

[34%] No

N=145

[64%] Yes

[36%] No

N=145

 Participated in seminars/conferences on security [42%] Yes

[58%] No

N=145

[59%] Yes

[41%] No

N=146

 Reviewed reports on transit security and terrorism [44%] Yes

[56%] No

N=144

[73%] Yes

[27%] No

N=145

 Created special operations response teams [14%] Yes

[86%] No

N=145

[23%] Yes

[77%] No

N=146

Coordination with local, state, and federal entities

 Participated in antiterrorism taskforces [8%] Yes

[93%] No

N=145

[21%] Yes

[79%] No

N=146

 Developed procedures with local, state, and federal agencies

regarding emergency response [51%] Yes

[49%] No

N=146

[59%] Yes

[41%] No

N=145

 Coordinated with federal agencies [16%] Yes

[84%] No

N=145

[24%] Yes

[76%] No

N=146

 Coordinated with local and state government entities, including

law enforcement [65%] Yes

[35%] No

N=146

[71%] Yes

[29%] No

N=146

 Coordinated with other transit agencies [25%] Yes

[75%] No

N=145

[29%] Yes

[71%] No

N=146

Activities involving staff

 Conducted background checks on all employees [74%] Yes

[26%] No

N=146

[74%] Yes

[26%] No

N=145

 Increased visibility of facility personnel (e.g., personnel wear

brightly colored vests) [18%] Yes

[82%] No

N=146

[25%] Yes

[75%] No

N=145
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 61 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

24

 Required staff to display photo ID at all times [21%] Yes

[79%] No

N=146

[41%] Yes

[59%] No

N=144

 Tracked employee sick days as an indicator of potential hazards [18%] Yes

[82%] No

N=144

[19%] Yes

[81%] No

N=144

Other activities

 Purchased security technology (e.g., surveillance equipment) [50%] Yes

[50%] No

N=146

[44%] Yes

[56%] No

N=145

 Purchased security infrastructure (e.g., fencing, lighting) [54%] Yes

[46%] No

N=145

[41%] Yes

[59%] No

N=145

 Made computer system more secure (“hardened” computer

system)

[49%] Yes

[51%] No

N=144

[44%] Yes

[56%] No

N=145

 Conducted public education/awareness campaign for transit

safety/security

[18%] Yes

[82%] No

N=146

[23%] Yes

[77%] No

N=146

 Developed after-event media relations protocol [34%] Yes

[66%] No

N=145

[37%] Yes

[64%] No

N=146

 Tracked reports of sick riders as an indicator of potential

hazards

[4%] Yes

[96%] No

N=145

[6%] Yes

[94%] No

N=145

 Other(s) - Please describe:

____________________________________________________
Appendix I

GAO’s Survey Instrument and Overall 

Results

Page 62 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

25

42. Please use the space below to provide any additional comments regarding the survey or your

system’s transit safety and security.

Thank you very much for your assistance.
Page 63 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Appendix II

Scope and Methodology ApendxiI

To address our objectives, we visited 10 transit agencies across the country, 

including the Capital Metropolitan Transportation Authority in Austin; 

Chicago Transit Authority; Central Florida Regional Transit Authority in 

Orlando; Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority; 

Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Council; New York City Transit; Regional 

Transportation District in Denver; San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit; 

San Francisco Municipal Railway; and Washington Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority in the District of Columbia. We selected these agencies 

because they represent different geographical areas and operate transit 

systems of different sizes and modes. (See fig. 10 and table 1.) During our 

site visits, we interviewed key officials from the transit agencies and the 

respective city governments and reviewed the transit agencies’ emergency 

plans. 
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 64 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 10: Location of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited 

Source: GAO presentation.

Denver

Los Angeles

Oakland

San Francisco

Austin

Orlando

New York

City

Washington

D.C.

Chicago

Minneapolis
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 65 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Table 1: Profiles of the 10 Transit Agencies Visited, 2000 

a

Population information comes from 1990 census data.

b

“Other” includes trolleybus, cable car, demand response, and vanpool.

c

Unlinked trips are the number of passengers who board public transportation vehicles. Passengers 

are counted each time they board vehicles no matter how many vehicles they use to travel from their 

origin to their destination. 

Source: National Transit Database.

In addition to our site visits, we surveyed a sample of 200 transit agencies. 

The sample from which we drew our population consisted of all transit 

agencies throughout the nation that are eligible to receive federal 

urbanized area formula funding, according to the most up-to-date list of 

Services provided

Transit agency

Urban area 

served

Population

serveda

Service area

(sq. miles) Heavy rail Light rail Bus Otherb

Average weekday

unlinked tripsc

Capital Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority 

(CMTA)

Austin, TX 604,621 572 x x 130,640

Central Florida 

Regional Transportation 

Authority (LYNX)

Orlando, FL 1,357,852 2,538 x x 70,546

Chicago Transit 

Authority (CTA)

Chicago, IL--

Northwestern IN

3,708,773 356 x x x 1,562,105

Los Angeles County 

Metropolitan 

Transportation Authority 

(LACMTA)

Los Angeles, CA 8,450,001 1,423 x x x 1,281,375

Minneapolis-St. Paul 

Metropolitan Council 

(Metro Transit)

Minneapolis--St. 

Paul, MN

2,265,788 1,105 x 243,987

New York City Transit 

(NYCT)

New York, NY--

Northeastern NJ

7,322,000 322 x x x 8,206,391

Regional Transportation 

District (RTD)

Denver, CO 2,400,000 2,406 x x x 259,703

San Francisco Bay 

Area Rapid Transit 

District (BART)

San Francisco--

Oakland, CA

829,156 103 x 310,268

San Francisco 

Municipal Railway 

(MUNI)

San Francisco--

Oakland, CA

792,049 49 x x x 713,266

Washington 

Metropolitan Area 

Transit Authority 

(WMATA)

Washington, D.C.--

MD--VA

3,363,031 945 x x x 1,169,806
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 66 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

eligible agencies provided by the National Transit Database. The results of 

our mail survey are generalizable to this population, which we refer to as 

our sample population. 

We stratified our sample population into two groups—agencies that serve 

urbanized areas with a population of 200,000 or more (large urbanized 

areas); and agencies that serve urbanized areas with a population of 50,000 

to 199,999 (small urbanized areas). We distinguished between these two 

strata because agencies that operate in large urbanized areas are prohibited 

from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses, 

whereas agencies in small urbanized areas are not prohibited from using 

FTA funds for operating expenses. We randomly selected 100 agencies from 

each stratum to survey.

Our overall survey response rate was 78 percent. However, we excluded 9 

surveys from our analysis after determining that these transit agencies 

were outside the scope of our review for one of the following reasons: they 

had gone out of business (3); they were subsidiaries of other agencies 

included in our sample (2); or they did not provide bus, customized 

community transport, rail, subway, or ferryboat services (e.g., they only 

provide vanpool service) (4). The reported survey results are based on the 

responses of the subpopulation of 146 agencies within the scope of our 

review. 

To help design our survey instrument, we reviewed surveys on transit 

safety and security conducted by FTA, the American Public Transportation 

Association (APTA), and the Transportation Cooperative Research 

Program. We also obtained input from Department of Transportation, FTA, 

and transit agency officials; and representatives from APTA and the Mineta 

Transportation Institute. After developing the survey instrument, we 

pretested the content and format of the survey with officials from several 

transit agencies and made necessary revisions. All returned 

questionnaires were reviewed, and we called respondents to obtain 

information when questions were not answered or clarification was 

needed. All data were double-keyed and verified during data entry, and 

computer analyses were performed to identify any inconsistencies or other 

indications of error. A copy of the mail questionnaire is included in 

appendix I.

All sample surveys are subject to sampling error—that is, the extent to 

which the survey results differ from what would have been obtained if the 

whole population had been observed. Measures of sampling error are 
Appendix II

Scope and Methodology

Page 67 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

defined by two elements, the width of the confidence intervals around the 

estimate (sometimes called the precision of the estimate) and the 

confidence level at which the intervals are computed. Because we followed 

a probability procedure based on random selections, our sample is only 

one of a large number of samples that we might have drawn. Moreover, 

because each sample could have provided different estimates, we express 

our confidence in the precision of our particular sample’s results as a 95-

percent confidence interval (e.g., plus or minus 5 percentage points). This 

is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent 

of the samples we could have drawn. As a result, we are 95-percent 

confident that the confidence intervals for each of the mail survey 

questions includes the true values in the sample population.

All percentage estimates from the mail survey have sampling errors of plus 

or minus 10 percentage points or less, unless otherwise noted. In addition, 

other potential sources of error associated with surveys, such as 

misinterpretation of a question and nonresponse, may be present, although 

nonresponse errors should be minimal.

Finally, in addition to our site visits and survey, we analyzed agency 

documents and interviewed transit agency officials, industry 

representatives, and academic experts. We analyzed FTA budget data, 

safety and security documents, and applicable statutes and regulations. We 

reviewed research on terrorism and attended transit security forums 

sponsored by APTA and FTA. Finally, we interviewed FTA, TSA, and 

Department of Transportation officials and representatives from APTA, the 

National Governors Association, the Mineta Transportation Institute, 

RAND Corporation, the University of California at Los Angeles, and the 

Amalgamated Transit Union.

We conducted our review from May through October 2002 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Page 68 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Appendix III

Selected Survey Results ApendxiI

This appendix provides our analysis of the responses we received to 

selected questions from our survey of 200 transit agencies in the United 

States. (See app. I for the overall survey results and our survey instrument.) 

This analysis provides information about the characteristics, including 

both general and safety- and security-related characteristics, of the transit 

agencies surveyed. Differences in the characteristics of transit agencies in 

large urbanized areas (populations of 200,000 or more) and transit agencies 

in small urbanized areas (populations between 50,0000 to 199,999) are also 

presented.32

Services Provided by 

Transit Agencies 

Surveyed

The transit agencies we surveyed provide a variety of transit services, 

including bus, rail, and ferryboat. Although a mix of services is provided by 

the surveyed transit agencies, bus is by far the most common transit 

service provided. (See fig. 11.) Our survey results also indicate that there 

are some differences between transit agencies in large urbanized areas and 

transit agencies in small urbanized areas. For example, transit agencies in 

large urbanized areas offer more types of services than transit agencies in 

small urbanized areas. Additionally, transit agencies in large urbanized 

areas were more likely to provide rail services than transit agencies in 

small urbanized areas and were the only agencies to provide subway 

service.

32Unless otherwise noted, all estimates by size of agency have sampling errors of plus or 

minus 13 percentage points or less.
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 69 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 11: Types of Transit Services Offered by Surveyed Transit Agencies

a

Customized community transport is characterized by (1) vehicles that do not usually operate over a 

fixed route or on a fixed schedule and (2) vehicles that may be dispatched to pick up several 

passengers at different pick-up points before taking them to their respective destinations and may even 

be interrupted en route to these destinations to pick up other passengers. For our survey, we classified 

paratransit and demand response as forms of customized community transport.

b

“Other” includes inclined plane service, connecting shuttle service, vanpools, and special events 

service.

Ridership of Transit 

Agencies Surveyed

The transit agencies we surveyed reported that they provided almost 10 

billion unlinked passenger trips33 in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Specifically, 

according to the agencies, they provided a total of 4.7 billion unlinked 

passenger trips in fiscal year 2000 and 4.9 billion trips in fiscal year 2001. 

Our survey results also indicate that transit agencies in large urbanized 

areas carry more passengers than transit agencies in small urbanized areas. 

For example, the majority of transit agencies in small urbanized areas 

33Unlinked passenger trips are the number of passengers who board public transportation 

vehicles. Passengers are counted each time they board vehicles no matter how many 

vehicles they use to travel from their origin to their destination.
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 70 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

reported that they provided fewer than 1 million passenger trips in fiscal 

year 2001, while the majority of transit agencies in large urbanized areas 

provided more than 1 million passenger trips. Moreover, 7 percent of the 

transit agencies in large urbanized areas stated that they provided more 

than 100 million passenger trips in fiscal year 2001. No transit agency that 

we surveyed in a small urbanized area served that number of passengers. 

(See fig. 12.) 

Figure 12: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Number of Unlinked Passenger Trips in Fiscal Years 2000 - 2001

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding.
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 71 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Operating and Capital 

Budgets of Transit 

Agencies Surveyed

According to our survey results, transit agencies in large urbanized areas 

typically have bigger operating and capital budgets than transit agencies in 

small urbanized areas. (See fig. 13.) In particular, 57 percent of the transit 

agencies in large urbanized areas have operating budgets of more than $10 

million, while 10 percent of transit agencies in small urbanized areas have 

operating budgets of comparable size. Additionally, 32 percent of the 

transit agencies in large urbanized areas have capital budgets of more than 

$10 million. In comparison, none of the transit agencies in small urbanized 

areas that we surveyed had capital budgets of that magnitude.34

34Depending on the fiscal year, between about one-third and two-thirds of the agencies we 

surveyed could only provide estimates of the amount of their total operating and capital 

funds that were spent on safety and security activities. Furthermore, additional analysis 

raised questions about data reliability. Therefore, we cannot reliably determine the 

percentage of the agencies’ capital and operating budgets that are used for safety and 

security activities.
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 72 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 13: Distribution of Transit Agencies by the Size of Their Operating and Capital Budgets, Fiscal Year 2001

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

Security of Transit 

Agencies Surveyed 

Most transit agencies we surveyed either contract with a security service 

(35 percent) and/or have established agreements with local or state police 

(34 percent) to provide security for their property. However, our survey did 

reveal some differences between transit agencies in large and small 

urbanized areas in terms of their transit properties’ security, as shown in 

figure 14. For example, of the transit agencies we surveyed, only those 

agencies in large urbanized areas had their own transit police officers. 
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 73 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 14: Types of Security Used by Transit Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized 

Areas

Funding Sources for 

Transit Safety and 

Security Needs of 

Transit Agencies 

Surveyed

Our survey results show that all transit agencies we surveyed rely on a 

variety of federal, state, and local sources to fund safety and security 

expenses. As figure 15 shows, transit agencies in large and small urbanized 

areas identified local funds as the most common source of funding for 

safety and security operating expenses. A notable difference between 

transit agencies in large and small urbanized areas appears in their use of 

FTA funds. In particular, 62 percent of agencies in small urbanized areas 

identified FTA funds as a source of funds for safety and security operating 

expenses, while 23 percent of agencies in large urbanized areas identified 

this as a source. In contrast to safety and security operating expenses, we 
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 74 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

found that the most common source of funds for safety and security capital 

expenses is FTA funds. (See fig. 16.) 

Figure 15: Sources of Funds for Operating Expenses Used by Transit Agencies in 

Large and Small Urbanized Areas
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 75 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 16: Sources of Funds for Capital Expenses Used by Transit Agencies in 

Large and Small Urbanized Areas

Acts of Extreme 

Violence against 

Transit Agencies 

Surveyed

The majority of the transit agencies we surveyed do not believe they are 

likely targets for acts of extreme violence. In particular, 62 percent of 

transit agencies we surveyed believe they are unlikely or very unlikely to be 

the target of an act of extreme violence in the next 5 years. By contrast, 6 

percent of the transit agencies we surveyed consider the likelihood of an 

act of extreme violence on their property likely or very likely. Thirty-one 

percent of the transit agencies we surveyed believe they are as likely as not 

to experience an act of extreme violence on their property in the next 5 

years.
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 76 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

In addition, the majority of the transit agencies we surveyed have not 

experienced an act of extreme violence on their property in the past 5 

years. Specifically, 66 percent of the transit agencies we surveyed said that 

they have not experienced acts of extreme violence on their systems. 

However, the agencies that have experienced acts of extreme violence have 

encountered a variety of situations. (See fig. 17.)
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 77 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 17: Acts of Extreme Violence during the Past 5 Years at Transit Agencies in Large and Small Urbanized Areas
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 78 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Surveyed Transit 

Agencies’ Safety and 

Security Assessments 

Seventy-five percent of the transit agencies we surveyed have conducted an 

assessment of their transit system. As figure 18 shows, the majority of the 

assessments have focused on general safety and security issues, not 

necessarily on the transit systems vulnerability to a terrorist threat or act of 

extreme violence. Seventy-seven percent of the agencies reported that their 

assessments have identified items needing action; however, the majority of 

these agencies indicated that a variety of factors have limited their ability 

to resolve the identified problems. According to these transit agencies, 

insufficient funding, the need to balance security and safety priorities with 

other priorities, and insufficient staff time or availability to complete action 

items were the top reasons why identified needs have not been addressed. 

Figure 18: Types of Assessments Performed by Transit Agencies

Emergency Plans of 

Transit Agencies 

Surveyed

Sixty-six percent of all surveyed agencies have emergency plans. In 

general, our survey results indicate that the majority of the agencies’

emergency plans describe protocols for a number of emergency situations, 

such as natural disasters, reported bomb threats, and explosive devices. 

Moreover, our survey results also indicate that the majority of all agencies’
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 79 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

plans specify coordination with other entities, such as local police 

departments, and most agencies have shared their plans with other entities. 

However, our survey results reveal that transit agencies in large urbanized 

areas have more comprehensive emergency plans than agencies in small 

urbanized areas, in terms of both the level of coordination with other 

entities and the number of scenarios addressed by the plans.35 For example, 

as figure 19 shows, the emergency plans of agencies in large urbanized 

areas specify coordination with the media more often than plans of 

agencies in small urbanized areas. Furthermore, as figure 20 shows, the 

emergency plans of agencies in large urbanized areas address more 

emergency situations—such as an explosive device on the transit 

property—than the emergency plans of agencies in small urbanized areas. 

35In this section, estimates by size of agency have sampling errors of plus or minus 16 

percentage points or less.
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 80 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 19: Types of Coordination Specified in Transit Agencies’ Emergency Plans
Appendix III

Selected Survey Results

Page 81 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Figure 20: Types of Emergency Situations Addressed in Transit Agencies’ Emergency Plans
Page 82 GAO-03-263 Mass Transit

Appendix IV

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contacts Peter Guerrero, (202) 512-2834

Susan Fleming, (202) 512-4431

Acknowledgments In addition to those named above, Karin Bolwahnn, Nikki Clowers, 

Michelle Dresben, Elizabeth Eisenstadt, Michele Fejfar, David Hooper, 

Wyatt R. Hundrup, Hiroshi Ishikawa, and Sara Ann Moessbauer made key 

contributions to this report.

(545022)
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