### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MCKESSON CORPORATION, etal., ) ) 

### Plaintiffs, ) ) 

### v. ) Civil Case No. 82-220 (RJL) ) 

### ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OFIRAN, etal., ) ) 

### Defendants.**~** 

### ) MEMORANDUM OPINION (March2:/2013) [Dkts. ##960, 961, 969] The Court welcomes the opportunity to conclude this protracted litigation, which has resulted in two lengthy bench trials and a dozen Circuit and District Court opinions
on dispositive issues. 1 After almostthirty years, the end ofthis "Sisyphean labor" is finally in sight. 

### McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 

### ("McKesson Vf').
1The six Circuit Court opinions are: 

### Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 905 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990) 

### ("McKessonf'); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 52 F.3d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

### ("McKesson If'); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 271 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 

### ("McKesson Ilf'); McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 320 F.3d 280 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 

### ("McKesson IV''); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 539 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 

### ("McKesson V''); and

### McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 672 F.3d 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 

### ("McKesson Vf'). The sixDistrict Court opinions are: 

### ForemostMcKesson Inc. v. Islamic Republic of/ran,No. 82-220, 1989 WL 44086 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 1989) 

### ("McKesson 1989"); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 82-220, 1997 WL 361177 (D.D.C. June 23, 1997) 

### ("McKesson 1997''); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 116 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2000) 

### ("McKesson 2000"); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of/ran, 520 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2007) 

### ("McKesson 2007''); McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 82-220, 2009 WL 4250767 (D.D.C. Nov. 23, 2009) 

### ("McKesson 2009"); and

### McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 752 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2010) 

### ("McKesson 2010").

### BACKGROUND In 1982, plaintiffs McKesson Corporation, et. al., ("McKesson" orplaintiffs) sued defendants Islamic Republic ofIran, et. al., ("Iran" or defendants), claiming that, after the Iranian Revolution, Iran expropriated McKesson's equity interest in an Iranian dairy and withheld McKesson's dividend payments. On November 19, 2010, this Court entered judgmentin favor ofMcKesson, awarding $43,980,205.58 in damages and compound prejudgment interest. 

### McKesson 2010, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 14. Iran appealed. OnFebruary 29, 2012, McKesson prevailed over Iran when our Circuit affirmed that "(1) the act ofstate doctrine does notpreclude adjudication ofthis case; (2) McKesson has a private right ofaction against Iran underthe Treaty ofAmity as construed under Iranian law; and (3) Iran is liable for the expropriation ofMcKesson's interest in [Pak D]airy and the withholding ofMcKesson's dividends." 

### McKesson Corp.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 

### ("McKesson Vf'). This Court's award ofcompound interestwas, however, reversed, and the action remanded "forthe calculation ofan award based on the value ofMcKesson's expropriated equity interest and withheld dividends, plus simple interest calculated at 9 percent from August 12, 1981 to the present day." 

### !d. Nowbefore the Court is plaintiffs' Motion for Entry ofFinal Judgment awarding: (1) damages for expropriated equity and dividends, including simple prejudgment interest; and (2) attorneys' fees and expenses. [Dkts. ##961, 969]. The Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in partplaintiffs' Motion for Entry ofFinal Judgement.

2

### ANALYSIS I. Damages and PrejudgmentInterest Pursuantto our Circuit Court's directive, see McKesson VI, 672 F.3d at 1072, plaintiffs request $7,619,205.29 in damages for expropriated equity and dividends plus prejudgment simple interest calculated at 9 percent from August 12, 1981 to the date of entry offinaljudgment, Pis.' Corrected Mot., Aug. 3, 2012, pp. 1-2 [Dkt. #969]. Using the online simple interest calculatorrelied upon by the parties in theirjoint stipulation on July 23, 2012, [Dkt. #959], to calculateprejudgment simple interest from August 12, 1981 to the present day, March 27, 2013, the Court calculates the appropriate amount of interestto be $21,699,079.18. Thus, the Court now enters finaljudgment for the plaintiffs, for damages andprejudgment interest, in the amount of$29,318,284.47. 

### II. Attorneys' Fees Plaintiffs also seek a total of$11,144,550.00 in compensation for attorneys' fees and expenses they already paid to Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP ("MorganLewis") and Winston & StrawnLLP ("Winston & Strawn") for workperformed between July 2000 and June 30, 2012. See Pis.' Reply, Aug. 22, 2012, p. 2 [Dkt. #976]. This amount is comprised ofattorneys' fees actually incurred and paid by McKesson2 during the relevant period, as well as an enhancement3 to compensate for delay in recovery. /d. at 10, 18-20; Pis.' Reply Ex. 13 ("Summary ofMcKesson's Revised Fee Claim").

2McKessonpaid $7,996,776.00 in attorneys' fees between July 2000 and June 30, 2012. Pis.' Reply Ex. 13 ("Summary ofMcKesson's Revised Fee Claim") [Dkt. #976-1]. 3In addition to its actual attorneys' fees, McKessonrequests an additional $3,147,774.00 3Predictably, defendants oppose plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees, expenses, and enhancement. Iran's Opp'nto Pis.' Mot. for Entry ofFinal 

### J. ("Defs.' Opp'n"), Aug. 14, 2012, pp. 4-20 [Dkt. #973]. Forthe following reasons, I disagree with the defendants and will award all three. 

### A. McKesson's Entitlementto Recover Attorneys' Fees Plaintiffs argue that Iranian law authorizes the Courtto award attorneys' fees and expenses to McKesson as the prevailing party on a Treaty ofAmity ("Treaty") claim as construed under Iranian law. Pis.' Corrected Mem. 4-5 [Dkt. #970]; Pis.' Reply 4-7. Defendants dispute that Iranian lawpermits this Courtto award McKesson the attorneys' fees and expenses that it requests. Defs.' Opp'n4-8. Plaintiffs are correct. Because our Circuitheld that Iran is liable to McKesson for expropriated equity and dividends underthe Treaty as construed under Iranian law, the issue ofwhether attorneys' fees may be awarded to McKesson is also governed by Iranian law. McKesson VI, 672 F.3d at 1072; see Mem. Op., Nov. 30, 2000, p. 4 [Dkt #548] ("[W]here claims are governed by the law ofa foreign state, courts have applied the law ofthat state to determine whetherto award fees to the prevailingparty."). Both ofthe experts who testified in the trial before the Court agreed that Iranian law permits recovery of attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. Indeed, Iran's own expert, Dr. Sanaei, conceded that aprevailingparty "could seekreimbursement oflitigation costs including attorney fees." Legal Op. ofDr. M.E. Sanaei ("Sanaei Op."), May 14, 2010, p. 14 [Dkt. #927-2], in enhancement to compensate for delay in payment. Pis.' Reply Ex. 13 ("Summary of McKesson's Revised Fee Claim").
4English Translation; see also id. at 8 ("
... [T]he Treaty sufficientlyprovides McKesson with a cause ofaction and the remedy thereto. Furthermore, McKesson's sole remedy in this Case is the value ofits property and interest and attorney fees."). This expert testimony, not surprisingly, comports with Judge Flannery's November 30, 2000 Judgment [Dkt. #546] granting McKesson's request for an award of attorneys' fees and costs incurred from Apri11986 to July 2000. Judge Flannery was clearly correct when he noted in his memorandum opinion that, "Iranian law provide[s] for the award oflegal costs as part ofthe remedy for expropriation" and "[i]n Iranian courts, the losing party in civil litigation pays both the court costs and the attorneys' fees ofthewinning party." Mem. Op., Nov. 30,2000,pp. 14-15 [Dkt#548]. In addition, Judge Flannery held thatthe Treaty authorizes awarding legal costs to a partyprevailing
on an expropriation claim. See id. at 8. In particular, the Treaty expressly provides that a party whoseproperty has been expropriated shall receive aremedy which is "inno case less than thatrequired by international law." Treaty ofAmity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights Betweenthe United States and Iran ("Treaty") art. IV, para. 2, Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899. Not surprisingly, Judge Flannery, therefore, concluded that this provision ofthe Treaty authorized fee shifting because the "loserpays"principle is "so well-accepted that it may be viewed as a general principle ofinternational law." Mem. Op., Nov. 30, 2000, pp. 10-11 (quotations and citations omitted) [Dkt. #548].

5

### B. Reasonable Award ofAttorneys' Fees Thus, since this Court clearly has the authority to award attorneys' fees and expenses, it must determine what exactly constitutes areasonable award ofattorneys' fees. Copelandv. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880,901 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc).4 In doing so, the Court must determine two variables: (1) a reasonable hourly rate; and (2) a reasonable number ofhours expended on the litigation. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); Covington v. Districtof Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Theproduct of these two variables is calledthe "lodestar" amount, which ispresumedto represent a reasonable fee. BoardofTrustees oftheHotel &RestaurantEmployeesLoca/25v. JPR Inc., 136 F.3d 794, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Miller v. Holzman, 575 F. Supp. 2d. 2, 11 (D.D.C. 2008), rev 'dinpart, aff'dinpartby US. ex rei. Miller v. BillHarbertInt'l Constr., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011). Indeed, the Supreme Court itselfhas endorsed the "lodestar" approach to determining a reasonable award ofattorneys' fees,

seeHensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983), and federal courts follow the approach in most cases where "fees [are] properly shiftedto the los[ingparty] in the litigation," see Gisbrechtv. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 801-802 (2002). Whatthen, are a reasonable hourly rate and a reasonable number ofhours?

4 In Iran, reimbursable attorneys' fees are set by tariffin certain types ofcases. 2d Supp. Katirai Op. 21 [Dkt. 929-1]. These tariffs have no bearing, however, onthis Court's discretion to determine a reasonable award ofattorney's fees to compensate McKesson. See id. at 21-24; see alsoNovakv. CapitalMgmt. & Dev. Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D.D.C. 2007) ("[T]here is no standard rate for attorneys in the District of Columbia.") (quotation marks and citations omitted).
61. Reasonable Hourly Rate McKesson contends that the standard billing rates charged byMorgan Lewis and Winston & Strawn should supply the rates usedto calculate the lodestar. Pis.' Corrected Mem. 7; Pis.' Reply 7-14. Iran, not surprisingly, contends thatthe rates used to calculate the lodestar should be derived from theLaffeyMatrix. Defs.' Opp'n 8-10. Moreover, McKesson argues that 2012 rates should be applied to workperformedpriorto 2012 as a
means to compensate McKesson for delay in payment. Pis.' Reply 18-21. Iran, predictably, argues that McKesson is not entitled to any enhancement for delay. Defs.' Opp'n 17-19. Forthe following reasons, I agree with McKesson thatthe 2012 standard billing rates charged by Morgan Lewis and Winston & Strawn are the reasonable hourly rates the Court should use to calculate the lodestar. The Supreme Courthas endorsed a market-based approachto calculating attorneys' fees. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989) ("[W]e have consistently looked to the marketplace as our guide to what is 'reasonable."') (citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly, our Circuitpresumes "an attorney's usual billing rate" to be "thereasonable rate, provided thatthis rate is 'in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers ofreasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation."' Kaftan ex ref. Kaftan v. Districtof Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quotingBlum, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n.11); see also Copeland, 641 F.2d. at 892 ("The reasonable hourly rate is thatprevailing in the community for similar work."). Using a firm's establishedbilling scale to calculate the lodestar amount is fair because

7"[t]he established rates represent the opportunity cost ofwhat the firm turned away in order to take the litigation
...." Laffey v. NorthwestAirlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original), overruledon othergrounds by Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane). In Covington v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996), our Circuit Court outlined the elements that a fee applicant must show to establish a reasonable hourly rate, namely: "the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community." Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107; see also Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11 ("[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence-in addition to the attorney's own affidavits-thatthe requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers ofreasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation."). There is no question here that McKesson has established the first Covington elementpertaining to the billing practices ofMorgan Lewis and Winston & Strawn. McKesson's lead counsel, Mark Bravin, submitted three declarations avowing that Morgan Lewis and Winston & Strawn charged McKesson according to their standard billing scales. See 2012 Bravin Decl. [Dkt. #971]; 2011 Bravin Decl. [Dkt. #946]; 2007 Bravin Decl. [Dkt. #889]. 5 McKesson has also satisfied its evidentiary burden with respectto the second Covington elementby setting forth in its various fee applications the impressive credentials ofeach attorney who worked on this case. See Pls.' Corrected

5 Mr. Bravin is currently a partner at Winston & Strawn and was apartner at Morgan Lewis until January 26, 2011. 2012 Bravin Decl.**~** 4 [Dkt. #971]. He now leads Winston & Strawn's International Arbitration practice. Pis.' CorrectedMem. 9 [Dkt. # 970]. 8Mot. Ex. 1, July 31, 2012 (Biographies ofMorganLewis Attorneys) [Dkt. #968-1]; id. at Ex. 2 (Biographies ofWinston 

### & Strawn Attorneys) [Dkt. #968-2]; 2011 Fee Application Ex. 3 (Biographies ofMorganLewis Attorneys) [Dkt. #945-3]; 2007 Fee Application Ex. 3 (Biographies ofMorganLewis Attorneys) [Dkt. #891]. Mr. Bravin, for example, a graduate ofthe Harvard Law School, has over 30 years ofexperience in the field of international dispute resolution, and has been consistently recognized as a nationwide leader in that field. Pis.' CorrectedMem. Ex. 2 (Biographies ofWinston & Strawn Attorneys) [Dkt. #968-2]. With respect to the third Covington element, however, McKesson and Iran disagree on "theprevailing marketrates in the relevant community." Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. Inthatregard, McKesson has submitted affidavits as well as survey data. See, e.g., Gavin Decl., July 30, 2012 [Dkt. #963]; Supp. Gavin Decl., Aug. 22, 2012 [Dkt. #976-1]; 2011 Fee Application Ex. 6 (NationalLawJournal Billing Rates Publication for 2007 to 2010) [Dkt. #945-6]; id. at Ex. 7 (OfCounselbillingrates publication for 2007- 2010) [Dkt#945-7]; id. at Ex. 8 (NationalLawJournal billingrates for associates by class) [Dkt. #945-8]; 2007 Fee Application Ex. 5 (NationalLawJournal BillingRates Publication, Dec. 18, 2000 ) [Dkt. #891]; id. atEx. 6 (OfCounselbilling rates publication, Nov. 2000); id. at Ex. 7 (NationalLawJournal billingrates for associates by class). Iran, once again, strongly objects to McKesson's survey data and argues thatthe

9appropriate benchmark should be the so-calledLaffeymatrix.6 Defs.' Opp'n 8-10. I disagree. The resolution ofthe parties' dispute as to the third Covington element is squarely within this Court's discretion. Our Circuit Court in Covington specificallyprovided that "[i]n orderto demonstrate this third element, plaintiffs may pointto ...their own survey ofprevailing market rates in the community." 57 F.3d at 1109 (emphases added). In a
case ofthis nature involvingtwo private litigants, I find that "the best measure of[the rates] the marketwill allow are the rates actually charged." Yazdani v. AccessATM, 474 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138 (D.D.C. 2007). TheLaffeyMatrix, by contrast, provides an indicator oftherates to which the government will not object when fees are sought under
a fee shifting statue. SeeNovakv. CapitalMgmt. &Dev. Corp., 496 F. Supp. 2d 156, 159 (D.D.C. 2007) (notingthatthe Civil Division ofthe United States Attorney's Office promulgatedtheLaffeyMatrix "to indicate to the barthose rates to which the government will not object"). As evidence ofthe market rate in the District ofColumbia during the relevant period, McKesson submitted billingrate survey data for 2000 to 2010 preparedby the NationalLawJournal and Of Counsel, both ofwhich are reliable publications. See 2011 Fee Application Exs. 6-8; 2007 FeeApplication Exs. 5-7. McKesson also submitted data from the 2010, 2011, and 2012 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP BillingRate and

6 TheLaffey Matrix was first approved inLaffeyv. NorthwestAirlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354, 371-375 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruledinparton othergrounds by Save Our CumberlandMountains v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en bane). 10Salary Surveys (BRASS) for AmLawlOO and other large firms in the Washington, D.C. legal market. See Gavin Decl.; Supp. Gavin Decl. The Court finds thatthis survey data adequately corroborates the standardbilling rates claimedby MorganLewis and Winston & Strawn during this period. Indeed, other courts in ourCircuithave relied on such datato assess the reasonableness ofstandard billingrates charged by large law firms with offices in the District ofColumbia. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Sisson, No. 02-1455, 2006 WL 1443981, at *2 (D.D.C. May 25, 2006) (holding rates charged by Williams & Connolly LLP to be reasonable based on the HelderAssociates' 2004 Law Firm Billing Rate Survey); Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d. at 12- 13 (finding rates chargedby Wilmer CutlerPickering Hale and Dorr LLP ("Wilmer Hale") to be reasonable based ontwo attorney declarations and The NationalLaw Journal's 2006 annual survey ofbilling rates). In the final analysis, Iran has failed to rebut thepresumption thatthe standard billing rates Morgan Lewis and Winston & Strawn charged McKesson are reasonable. Iran's "simplereference to theLaffey matrix cannot defeat the presumption of reasonableness." Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d. at 15. In fact, in our Circuit, standard billing rates are presumedto be reasonable where they align with prevailing market rates for similar services by similarly situated lawyers, even ifthey do not correspond with the Laffey matrix. Kattan, 995 F.2d at 278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d. at 15-16 (holding rates charged by WilmerHale to be reasonable despite 38 percent variance withLaffey Matrix); Woodlandv. Viacom, Inc., 255 F.R.D. 278, 281 (D.D.C.

112008) (granting fee petition submittedby Morgan Lewis notwithstanding thatthe figures in theLaffeyMatrix "areunquestionably lower"). McKesson, however, asks the Courtto go one step further and use 2012 billing rates to calculate the lodestar for 2000 through 2012 in order to provide an enhancement for delay in payment. Pis.' Reply 18-20. Iran, ofcourse, opposes any enhancement, reasoning thatthe delay wasjustified and "each appeal resulted in at least some portion ofthe appealedjudgmentbeingreversed or remanded for additional proceedings." Defs.' Opp'n 18. Once again, I disagree. When legal services have beenprovided over a multiple-yearperiod, enhancement for delay in payment is part ofa reasonable attorneys' fee. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 282. As Judge Flannery himselfnoted in this case, "courts often award fees at counsel's currentrates instead oftheir historical rates" to account for "the loss ofthe time value of their money." Mem. Op. Nov. 30, 2000, p. 23, n.2 [Dkt #548]. The rationale for the current-rate enhancement method is basic economics: "one dollar received today is more valuable than it would be ifreceived five years from now for two reasons-first, because it will buy more now than it will after five years ofprice inflation, and second, because of the interest that can be earned from it in the interim." Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d. at 20. Boththe Supreme Court and our Circuit have endorsed this "current-rate" enhancement method as a means to compensate aprevailing party for harm resulting from delay in receiving payment. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 282; Copeland, 641 F.2d. at 893 n.23; see also Muldrow v. Re-directInc., 397 F. Supp. 2d I, 4 n.4 (D.D.C. 2005). Here,

12McKesson has conservatively applied the method in a mannerthattakes into accountthe various attorneys' levels ofexperience when they performed the work. 

### See Pis.' Reply 19 ("[F]ees
... for workperformed in 2009 by a third-year associate are enhanced using the 2012 rate for a third-year."). Accordingly, I will exercise my discretion to compensate McKesson for this delay in paymentby applying 2012 rates in calculating the lodestar. 

### 2. Reasonable Number ofHours To establish the second component ofthe lodestar-thenumber ofhours reasonably expended onthe litigation-a fee applicant mustproduce evidence that supports the hours worked. 

### Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The time records submitted must be sufficiently detailed to permitthe District Courtto make an independent determinationwhether the "activities they purportto describe were ... reasonable" and "the hours claimed arejustified." 

### Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d. at 21 (citations and quotations omitted); 

### see also Cobellv. Norton, 231 F. Supp. 2d 295, 306 (D.D.C. 2002);

### Nat'!Ass 'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec yofDef, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The time records need not, however, "presentthe exact number of minutes spent northe precise activity to which each hour was devoted," 

### Cabell, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 306, and "it is the law ofthis Circuitthatthe requirement ofsubmitting detailed records should not be applied in a Draconian manner,"

### Novak, 496 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59.

13Unproductive tasks performedby counsel and professional staff, ofcourse, are not compensable. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891. "For example, where three attorneys are present at a hearing when one would suffice, compensation shouldbe denied for the
excess time." /d. Accordingly, a fee applicant should exercise good billingjudgment and exclude from its fee application any "hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." Miller, 575 F. Supp. 2d. at 21. Similarly, "time spent litigating claims upon which the party seeking the fee did not ultimately prevail" is noncompensable and should be excluded from a fee application. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891-92, n.18 (citations and quotations omitted). Ifa Court determines thatthe workperformed was duplicative orwasteful, it may "simplyreduc[e] the proposed 'lodestar' fee by a reasonable amount withoutperforming
an item-by-item accounting." LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Copeland, 641 F.2d at 903 ("We thinkthat the District Court Judge in this case-recognizing, as he did, that some duplication orwaste ofeffort had occurred-didnot err in simply reducing the proposed 'lodestar' fee by a reasonable amount withoutperforming an item-by-item accounting."). Indeed, the Court may also reject hours associated with vague work descriptions from which it cannot ascertain the reasonableness ofthe time claimed. Wilcox v. Sisson, No. 02-1455, 2006 WL 1443981, at *3 (D.D.C. May 25, 2006). Here, McKessonhas submitted time records accounting for 18,537.5 hours of workperformed over a 12 yearperiod. The time records describe the nature ofthe work performed, the attorney performing the work, and the hours spent on the task. See Pis.'
14Corrected Mot. Ex. 4 ("Morgan Lewis Time Records and Fees, Sept. 1, 2010- Jan. 25, 2011) [Dkt. #968-4]; id. at Ex. 5 ("Winston & Strawn Time Records and Fees, Jan. 26, 2011- June 30, 2011") [Dkt. #968-5]; 2011 Fee Application Ex. 9 ("MorganLewis Time Records and Fees Billedto Plaintifffor Aug. 1, 2007 through August 31, 2010") [Dkt. #945-9]; 2007 Fee Application Ex. 14 [Dkt. #981]. Defendants' objections to McKesson's claimed hours fall into three categories. First, defendants contend that work descriptions continued in the time records submitted by McKesson are "vague ortoo generalized to allow meaningful scrutiny as to their reasonableness." Defs.' Opp'n 11-12. Second, defendants contendthat McKesson cannotrecover for time expended on redundant and unnecessary tasks and time expended due to inefficient staffing. 

### /d. at 12-14. Third, defendants contend McKesson cannot
recover for time spent litigating claims upon which McKesson did not ultimately prevail. 

### /d. at 14-16. Defendants argue thatthese flawsjustify either a total disallowance offees
or a 50 percent across-the-board reduction in a lodestar amount calculated using rates derived from the Laffeymatrix. 

### /d. at 16-17. I disagree. Iran's arguments regarding McKesson's prevailing party status are, to saythe least, unpersuasive. McKesson is in no way guilty, as Iran suggests, of"'piggybacking' fees incurred for work done on losing claims onto unrelated winning issues." Goos, 997 F.2d at 1569 (quoting George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1537 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). McKesson sought damages for expropriation ofits equity interest in Pak Dairy and for the withholding ofits dividends. McKesson ultimately prevailed on its Treaty claim, entitling McKesson to very substantial damage award. McKesson did not
15fail to prevail on any claims thatwere unrelatedto the Treaty claim. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,434 (noting that lodestar should be adjusted downward where the plaintiff"fail[s] to prevail on claims that were unrelatedto the claims on which he succeeded") (emphasis added). All ofMcKesson's claims for reliefwere based on a "common core offacts" and "related legal theories." Goos v. Nat'/Ass 'n of Realtors, 997 F.2d 1565, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Such claims "cannotbe viewed as a series ofdiscrete claims." 

### ld. Defendants, however, do raise a few legitimate objections regarding inefficiencies createdbyMcKesson's counsel in running and staffingthe case. For example, McKesson concedes and the Court agrees thatthe award should be reducedto reflectthe time oftwo, ratherthan four, attorneys at the McKesson VIoral argument on October 14, 2011. Pls.' Reply 18. Excluding these inappropriate time entries reduces the requested lodestar amount of$11,144,550.00 by $2,202.00. Id. In addition, McKesson concedes that it should not have requested reimbursement for 1.3 hours ofMr. Bravin'stime spent responding to the media on October 19, 2011. ld. Excluding this time reduces the requested lodestar amount by an additional $975.00. Id. In addition to striking these specific time entries, the Court concludes that reducing the requested lodestar amount by a percentage is warranted because various time entries contain vague descriptions ofthe workperformed. For example, multiple time entries for June 2011 contain vague and generalized descriptions such as "[ w]ork on appeal brief." See, e.g., Pls.' Corrected Mot. Ex. 5 (6/17/11 time entry for Mark Bravin)

16[Dkt. #968-5]. The Court cannot ascertain from this type ofdescription whether the time
was reasonably expended by counsel. In addition, thepractice ofblockbilling (i.e., grouping into one time entry all the tasks a timekeeperperformed on a given day) precludes the Court from assessing the reasonableness ofthe time expended eachtask. RoleModelsAm., Inc., 353 F.3d at 971. Based onthe extent ofgeneric and ambiguous narrative descriptions andthe use ofblockbilling, the Courtbelieves a 10 percent reduction to be reasonable and appropriate here. 

### CfMiller v. Holzman, 575 F. Supp. 2d. at 36 (reducing compensationby 10 percentbecause "counsel'stime records are simply rife with ambiguous and nugatory entries"); RoleModelsAm., Inc., 353 F.3d at 973 (reducing compensationby 50 percent due to "inadequate documentation, failure to justifythe number ofhours sought, inconsistencies, and improper billing entries"). Accordingly, in calculating the lodestar in this amount, I will reduce the amount requested by McKessonby $3,177.00 associated with specific time entries and then by 10 percent for the ambiguous nature ofvarious time entries. Subtracting $3,177.00 from the requested lodestar amount of$11,144,550.00 and applying the 10 percentwholesale reduction yields a reasonable lodestarvalue of$10,027,235.70. 

### III. McKesson's Costs OtherThan Attorneys' Fees In addition to attorneys' fees, McKesson has also incurred various other costs in connection with this litigation, ranging from copying costs to fees paidto experts. McKesson seeks to recoup $31,013.94 in taxable costs incurred from August 1, 2000 through July 31,2007. Pl.'sReply Ex. 9 [Dkt. #976-1]. McKesson also seeks to recover

17$1,174,466.29 as compensation for nontaxable costs other than attorneys' fees incurred from August 1, 2000 through June 30, 2012. Id. atEx. 13. This amount is comprised of actual expenses of$1,005,007.28 andprejudgment interest of$169,459.01 to compensate for delay in payment. Id. at Ex. 15. Forthe following reasons, both requests are perfectly appropriate and fair. 

### A. Taxable Costs Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 54(d)(1) permits a "prevailingparty" to recover costs otherthan attorneys' fees from a private defendant. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). Categories ofrecoverable taxable costs are delineated in 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1920. Those costs may include witness fees pursuantto 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) as well as witness travel and subsistence costs under 18 U.S.C. 

### §§ 1821(c) and (d). See 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1920(3); see also L. Cv. R. 54(1)(d)(10). A prevailingparty may also recover costs for "exemplification and
... copies necessarily obtained for use in the case." 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1920(4); see also L. Cv. R. 54(1)(d)(8)-(9). Moreover, the Court is authorized to tax costs for "fees ofthe courtreporter for all or any part ofthe stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for
use in the case." 28 U.S.C. 

### § 1920(2); see also L. Cv. R. 54.l(d)(7). Local Civil Rule 54(1)(d)(6) also provides for taxation of"the cost, atthe reporter's standardrate, ofthe original and one copy ofany deposition noticed bythe prevailingparty, and ofone copy ofany deposition noticedby any otherparty, ifthe deposition was used on the record, at
a hearing, ortrial.
..." Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1920(6) allows taxation ofcosts for "compensation ofinterpreters."

18Here, McKessonprovided a Bill ofCosts [Dkt. #886] and a supporting declaration by lead counsel Mark Bravin [Dkt. #887] attaching relevant documentation [Dkt. #887-1] to support its request for $31,013.94 in taxable costs incurred from mid-2000 through July 31, 2007. McKesson requests total witness costs of$1,689.60. 2007 BravinDecl.
onPls.' Bill ofCosts, Tab A-1 [Dkt. # 887-1]. McKesson seeks $201.00 for copies of exhibits introducedby McKesson at trial, 

### id. at Tab B [Dkt. #887-3], $135.84 for copies ofdeposition exhibits admitted into evidence at trial, 

### id. at Tab C [Dkt. #887-4], and $300.00 in otherphotocopying costs, 

### id. at Tab D [Dkt. #887-5]. McKesson seeks court reporter fees for trial transcripts in the amount of$8,303.88, 

### id. at Tab E [Dkt. #887-6], and deposition transcripts in the amount of$8,715.44, 

### id. at Tab F [Dkt. #887-7]. McKesson seeks $11,668.18 in translation costs for four Farsi-speaking witnesses deposed atthe Hague who latertestified at trial. 

### !d. at Tab G [Dkt. #887-8]. McKesson's Bill ofCosts is well-supported factually and legally and conforms to the guidelines previously establishedbythis Court. 

### See Mem. Op. & Order, Sept. 13, 2000 [Dkt. #529]. Accordingly, I conclude that McKesson's total costs in the amount of $31,013.94 are properly taxable, and should indeed be taxed against Iran. 

### B. Nontaxable Costs Pursuantto Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 54(d)(2), the companionprovision to Rule 54(d)( 1 ), a prevailingparty mayrecover "relatednon-taxable expenses" in addition to taxable costs where the controlling substantive law permits. Mem. Op., Nov. 30, 2000, p. 20 [Dkt. #548]. Here, Iranian lawpermits recovery oflegal costs; therefore,

19McKesson may receive "relatednon-taxable expenses" in this action. In fact, our Circuit has construed "non-taxable expenses" as "reasonable out-of-pocket expenses ... normally chargedto a fee-paying client." 

### Laffey, 746 F.2d at 30. To support its request for $1,174,466 in compensation for nontaxable costs, McKesson has provided multiple declarations by lead counsel MarkBravin itemizing costs invoiced by MorganLewis and Winston & Strawn as well as costs invoiced directly to McKesson. 

### See 2012 BravinDecl. Exs. E, F [Dkt. #971-1]; 2011 BravinDecl. Exs. G, H [Dkts. ##946-7; 946-8]; 2007 BravinDecl. Exs. I, J. [Dkts. ##889-9; 889-10]. The costs claimedby McKesson, which include costs for travel, translation services, and legal research, among others, are typical ofthe costs that large firms incur and charge to their clients in this type ofcomplex and protracted litigation. McKesson has established that all claimed expenses were in fact charged to andpaidby McKesson. Defendants make
no serious challenge to eitherthe categories orthe amounts ofexpense, both ofwhich the Court finds to be reasonable in light ofthe length and complexity ofthe case. The Court therefore will award McKesson $1,174,466.29 in compensation for nontaxable costs CONCLUSION For all ofthe foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part plaintiffs' Motion for Entry ofFinal Judgment. [Dkts. ##961, 969]. The Court shall ORDERdefendants to payplaintiffs $29,318,284.47 in damages and interest for expropriated equity and dividends, $10,027,235.70 in reasonable attorneys' fees, $31,013.94 in taxable costs, and $1,174,466.29 in enhanced expenses-intotal



### 20$40,551,000.40. Furthermore, the Court DENIES as MOOT defendants' July 30,2012 Motion. [Dkt. #960]._ An order consistent with this decision accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

RICHARD 

### J. L 

### N1 United States District Judge

21