```

[Senate Executive Report 108-1]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

108th Congress                                               Exec. Rpt.
                                 SENATE
 1st Session                                                      108-1

======================================================================

 
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
  ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON MAY 24, 2002 
                        (``THE MOSCOW TREATY'')

                                _______
                                

               February 20, 2003.--Ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

          Mr. Lugar, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                    [To accompany Treaty Doc. 107-8]

    The Committee on Foreign Relations to which was referred 
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed at Moscow 
on May 24, 2002 (hereafter, ``the Moscow Treaty'' or ``the 
Treaty''), having considered the same, reports favorably 
thereon subject to two conditions and six declarations set 
forth in this report and the accompanying resolution of 
ratification and recommends that the Senate give its advice and 
consent to ratification thereof.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

  I. Purpose..........................................................1
 II. Summary of the Treaty............................................8
III. Background.......................................................9
 IV. Views of the Armed Services Committee...........................10
  V. Committee Action................................................17
 VI. Resolution of Ratification......................................23
VII. Article-by-Article Analysis.....................................26
VIII.CBO Cost Estimate...............................................30

                               I. Purpose

    Since the end of the Cold War the United States and Russia 
have had an opportunity for a new approach to arms control. The 
distrust and suspicion that resulted in years of acrimonious 
negotiation, lengthy agreements and accountability which rested 
on doubt, not trust, has given way to a new relationship with 
the Russian Federation that is based on more friendship and 
trust than in the past. The Moscow Treaty represents a new 
approach to strategic arms control, based on the changed 
relationship between the United States and the Russian 
Federation. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, in 
testimony to the Committee on July 17, 2002, held up the Treaty 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction 
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) of 1991 and 
the Moscow Treaty. START, he said, ``is 700 pages long, and 
took 9 years to negotiate. The Moscow Treaty, concluded this 
summer by President Bush and President Putin, is three pages 
long, and took 6 months to negotiate.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, July 17, 
2002, ``Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions: The Moscow Treaty,'' 
S. Hrg. 107-622, p. 86. Hereafter, Hearings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the height of the Cold War, arms control agreements such 
as SALT I, the ABM Treaty, and the Limited and Threshold Test-
Ban Treaties were negotiated to manage the arms race in ways 
that would increase stability during times of potential crisis. 
These agreements were written with an eye toward the terrible 
prospect that U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would be used 
against each other. Agreements were limited by deep and mutual 
distrust that led to an emphasis on detailed drafting and 
extensive verification measures.
    Today, our countries are no longer mortal enemies engaged 
in a global ideological and military struggle. The Russian 
Federation and the United States work to build a strong 
military and security partnership on issues ranging from the 
war on terrorism to keeping the peace in the Balkans. The 
Moscow Treaty reflects the changed nature of our relationship.
    In the early post-Cold War years, arms control agreements 
were drafted to eliminate or reduce strategic nuclear weapons, 
to limit conventional forces in Europe and open them to 
international observation, and to lead other nations by example 
in the pursuit of peace. The range of agreements that could be 
reached was significantly broadened in these years, but the 
decades' long legacy of distrust resulted in continued concern 
for far-reaching provisions, definitions and increasingly 
intrusive methods of verification. The price of such agreements 
was the lengthy negotiations and dense texts to which Secretary 
Rumsfeld referred.
    The Committee received testimony from the Administration 
suggesting that the Moscow Treaty is a product of the new U.S.-
Russian relationship. The world has become more unpredictable, 
not the least because of the intersecting threats of 
international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. Officials explained that such an 
unpredictable world requires flexibility in U.S. and Russian 
force structure and options that allow adaptability in the face 
of these new and shared threats. Our new foes do not need 
armies, air forces, or navies, nor do they intend to adhere to 
a rule-governed international system.
    Given the threats it faces, and the greatly improved 
relationship with Moscow, the United States sought to move 
beyond agreements that tightly constrained U.S. and Russian 
strategic forces. Accordingly, the President stated his 
intention ``to reduce to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed 
strategic nuclear warheads before the Moscow Treaty was 
negotiated, regardless of what the Russians opted to do.'' \2\ 
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell testified to the Committee 
on July 9, 2002, that President Bush had told Russian President 
Putin:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Written answer of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the 
Committee's question for the record , July 9, 2002, Hearings, p. 52.

        This is where we are going. We are going there 
        unilaterally. Come with us or not. Stay where you are 
        or not. This is what the United States needs and it 
        does not need it because you are an enemy; it needs 
        this because of the nature of the world we live in, and 
        we see you as a partner.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Hearings, p. 10.

    The Treaty resulted from this atmosphere of cooperation and 
is a legally binding text that reflects U.S. and Russian intent 
to reduce strategic nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700 to 
2,200 by December 31, 2012. The Treaty is meant to be 
representative of the new U.S.-Russian relationship. The U.S. 
objective in concluding the Treaty was to provide maximum 
flexibility in achieving strategic offensive reductions 
consistent with what the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, issued in 
2002, had determined to be the lowest levels possible, 
consistent with U.S. national security requirements and given 
current uncertainties about future strategic trends.
    The Treaty creates neither a new verification regime nor 
accounting rules. The Administration explained that 
verification under the Treaty does not reflect Cold War 
animosity. During the Cold War, such measures were seen as 
necessary for the purpose of providing confidence between two 
sides that sought further means to verify compliance with 
obligations under agreements. A decade after the Cold War, such 
measures do not necessarily provide more trust or further 
verification, but rather become ends unto themselves instead of 
a means by which obligations might be verified and, if 
maintained from the standpoint of the Cold War, could be seen 
as stressing process over results.
    As the Moscow Treaty codifies the intent of each Party to 
make reductions in force levels that it had already decided 
upon, irrespective of the other Party's force levels, it was 
determined that there was no need to codify the units of 
account or modes of reduction. Each Party may determine for 
itself what are its ``strategic nuclear warheads'' and how they 
are to be reduced. This absence of accounting or verification 
provisions does not, from the standpoint of a new relationship 
with the Russian Federation, represent an abandonment of U.S. 
leadership, but rather signifies productive change in U.S.-
Russian relations. Additionally, verification under the START 
Treaty will continue at least through 2009.
    The Committee believes that the absence of verification 
provisions in the Moscow Treaty makes confidence and 
transparency a high-priority issue. The Committee commends the 
statements made by Administration officials in its hearings 
that negotiators were mindful of this fact, and that there will 
be efforts aimed at increasing verification measures if the 
Parties decide not to extend the START verification regime 
beyond 2009, when that treaty is scheduled to expire. The 
United States should not only practice transparency, but also 
promote it, in close coordination with the Russian Federation. 
This principle is in keeping with the new relationship that 
Presidents Bush and Putin are forging. Greater transparency 
regarding Moscow Treaty implementation may lead, moreover, to 
similar advances in other areas of great concern to the United 
States, such as compliance with nonproliferation regimes. The 
Committee urges the President to use implementation of the 
Moscow Treaty as a means to foster greater U.S.-Russian 
interaction and mutual confidence in the national security 
field.
    The Treaty does not provide for the destruction of 
withdrawn warheads or delivery systems. In the briefings and 
hearings provided to the Senate, the Administration pointed out 
that while the Moscow Treaty does not mandate the destruction 
of withdrawn warheads, neither did previous arms control 
agreements with the Russian Federation or the Soviet Union. As 
Secretary Rumsfeld stated in testimony on the Treaty before the 
Committee on July 17, 2002, ``no previous arms control 
agreement, not SALT, not START, not the INF [Treaty], has 
required the destruction of warheads, and no one offered 
objections to those treaties on the basis that they did not 
require . . . the destruction of warheads.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Hearings, p. 79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Treaty does not place restrictions on either Party's 
force structure before December 31, 2012. The Committee was 
assured that the United States will continue to implement 
strategic force reductions along the path outlined in the 
Defense Department's 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. Specifically, 
that the United States will:

        retire 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, remove four Trident 
        submarines from strategic service, and no longer 
        maintain the ability to return the B-1 to nuclear 
        service. This will reduce the number of operationally 
        deployed strategic nuclear warheads by about 1,100 
        warheads by the end of Fiscal Year 2007 in a manner 
        that as a practical matter would be very difficult to 
        reverse.

        . . . Some warheads that are to be removed will be used 
        as spares, some will be stored, and others will be 
        destroyed or dismantled.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Hearings, p. 51.

    Thus, although the Treaty does not require the destruction 
or dismantlement of any strategic delivery vehicles or 
warheads, some of the U.S. forces to be reduced by 2007 are, in 
fact, slated for destruction or dismantlement. The Russian 
Federation, for its part, may revamp its force planning in 
light of the flexibility afforded by this Treaty. Equally 
important, Moscow has expressed its intention to continue to 
reduce various weapons platforms and warhead levels, and to 
continue dismantling weapons systems with U.S. assistance under 
the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program.
    Unlike the START II treaty, which would have required that 
the Russian Federation no longer deploy land-based ICBMs with 
multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the 
Moscow Treaty would permit Russia to retain such systems. START 
II was received by the Senate on January 15, 1993, and approved 
by the Senate on January 26, 1996. But START II never entered 
into force because the Russian Duma, in its April 14, 2000 
Federal Law on Ratification, linked the agreement's entry into 
force with retention of the ABM Treaty by the United States and 
the modifications of that treaty signed in 1997. The ABM Treaty 
modifications were never submitted to the Senate for its advice 
and consent, and thus instruments of ratification were never 
exchanged.
    The Administration noted the concern that allowing the 
Russian Federation to maintain multiple-warhead ICBMs had the 
potential to undermine ``crisis stability'' and increase the 
risk of war due to miscalculation, but stated that this view is 
based on Cold War deterrence calculations that are no longer 
relevant. Secretary of State Powell stated in response to a 
Committee question for the record from its July 9, 2002 
hearing:

          Our new strategic relationship with Russia is no 
        longer based on a nuclear balance of terror. Because of 
        this new relationship, we cannot conceive of any 
        credible scenario in which we would threaten to launch 
        our strategic forces at Russia. The scenario . . . of 
        Russia believing it faced a ``use it or lose it'' 
        situation with its force of MIRVed ICBMs is therefore 
        not a credible concern.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Hearings, p. 52.

    The Administration points to the profoundly close and 
friendly relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin and 
their continued statements that the United States and the 
Russian Federation are no longer enemies as a further proof 
that Russia's weapons do not necessarily threaten the United 
States. Furthermore, Russian actions in the past year on issues 
ranging from the war against terrorism in Afghanistan to NATO 
enlargement and last summer's joint operation to repatriate 
Russian-supplied weapons-usable uranium in a Yugoslavian 
research reactor are viewed by Administration officials as 
demonstrations of this new relationship.
    Despite the reassurance provided by Administration 
witnesses, former Senator Sam Nunn and other outside witnesses 
urged continued attention beyond the Treaty to improving crisis 
stability, notably by giving U.S. and Russian leaders more 
decision time in a crisis. In testimony before the Committee, 
General Eugene E. Habiger, USAF (Ret.), the former Commander in 
Chief of U.S. Strategic Command, made a suggestion in this 
regard:

        In the past, we have relied on the military 
        establishment and arms control community for ways to 
        reduce the alert status, and they have not provided 
        viable options. I would strongly recommend that the 
        teams working on this matter be led in large measure by 
        the people who build the weapons systems. They built 
        them; they understand them, and they are the key to 
        designing a system that moves weapons off alert status 
        in ways that make sense, are transparent but non-
        intrusive, and do not compromise our security.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Hearings, p. 140.

    Members of the Committee do not know whether any ideas for 
increasing decision time are, in fact, practicable, and share 
General Habiger's view that options for reducing alert status 
should be evaluated by those with significant expertise on the 
specific weapons systems in question. If the President does not 
order the preparation of such analyses, Congress could require 
the analyses or establish a commission of weapons systems 
experts to undertake this task. Such commissions have been 
created before, some under the auspices of the National Academy 
of Sciences, and have proven useful in considering issues of 
such a technical nature.
    The Administration has allowed that the Treaty will not be 
verifiable under the standards imposed during the Cold War. 
Instead, the START verification regime will be utilized and 
continue to operate through December 2009, when it expires 
unless extended by mutual agreement of the Parties. The 
Bilateral Implementation Commission created in Article III of 
the Treaty will provide a forum in which each Party can discuss 
its implementation plans and activities and raise any concerns 
about the other Party's forces. The Administration pointed out 
that the United States and the Russian Federation could always 
adopt additional verification or transparency measures. A U.S.-
Russian working group did discuss a possible verification 
regime during negotiations on the Treaty, and a transparency 
committee has been created by the Consultative Group for 
Strategic Security established pursuant to the Joint 
Declaration of May 24, 2002, on the New Strategic Relationship. 
The Administration said additional verification could be added, 
but that ``specific additional transparency measures are not 
needed, and will not be sought, at this time. We recognize, 
however, that more contacts and exchanges of information could 
be useful and that the Parties could decide to develop 
additional transparency measures in the future.'' \8\ This does 
not foreclose the possibility that START could be extended or 
that, as issues arise in the context of the Moscow Treaty, 
measures could be implemented to solve any potential problems, 
and therefore, does not necessarily mean that the agreement is 
flawed. As Secretary Rumsfeld testified before the Committee on 
July 17, 2002:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Hearings, p. 58.

          [B]etween now and 2009 . . . there is plenty of time 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        to sort through what we will do thereafter.

          Second, we do have national technical means.

          Third, we have agreed we will meet and work through 
        improved transparency and predictability with the 
        Russians.

          Now, will we be able to do something better than the 
        START Treaty? I hope so. Do we have a number of years 
        that we can work on that? Yes. . . . So I think that is 
        not something that ought to in any way stand in the way 
        of approving this treaty[.] \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Hearings, p. 79.

    The Treaty embodies each Party's sincere and legally 
binding commitment to substantial reductions in strategic 
nuclear weapons, with an eye toward flexibility and trust in 
the light of new threats and our new relationship with each 
other. Again, the Administration cites this circumstance as the 
driving force behind the withdrawal clause contained in Article 
IV of the Treaty. The withdrawal clause requires only three 
months' notice and contains no requirements regarding the 
reasons for withdrawal. In briefings and hearings, the 
Administration stated that the flexible withdrawal provision in 
this agreement is not seen by the Parties as necessary for 
reasons related to the agreement or the U.S.-Russian 
relationship. Instead, the withdrawal clause was drafted in 
light of ``the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be 
prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our 
bilateral relationship.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Written answer of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell to the 
Committee's question for the record, July 9, 2002, Hearings, p. 67.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even if the Treaty is implemented faithfully, there is some 
risk that the Russian Federation's implementation of it could 
result in the relatively insecure storage of large numbers of 
currently deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Given the 
rightful concern that Russian nuclear weapons-usable materials 
be securely stored (and, as appropriate, be made less useable 
in nuclear weapons) so as to limit the risk of their theft or 
diversion, both members and outside experts highlighted the 
need for increased Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and 
non-proliferation assistance to the Russian Federation. 
Administration officials did not view insecure storage of 
nuclear materials as a likely consequence of the Treaty, but 
envisioned the possibility of increased U.S. assistance as a 
reasonable form of insurance.
    It is the view of the Committee that the role of Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance, 
while not directly mentioned in the Treaty, is nevertheless 
essential for continued strategic offensive reductions in 
Russia, particularly with respect to Russia's heavy ICBM force, 
bombers and submarines. Today, when the intersection of 
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and related 
technology presents one of the greatest challenges to 
international peace and stability, the role of Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction and other nonproliferation 
programs as the foundation for preventive measures against 
terrorists' use of weapons of mass destruction and of a 
positive relationship with Russia cannot be doubted.
    The Committee, in recommending that the Senate advise and 
consent to ratification of the Moscow Treaty, accepts the 
Administration's view of improved U.S.-Russian relations as a 
working objective. Many members agree with the Administration 
that such a radically changed context is a reality, and the 
Committee commends the Administration for codifying this in 
treaty form and submitting it to the Senate for its advice and 
consent.
    The Committee also believes, however, that the Senate and 
the Administration should take steps to promote closer U.S.-
Russian relations, to smooth the way toward each Party meeting 
its Treaty obligations, and to reduce any risks to world peace 
and U.S. national security that may result from the manner in 
which the Russian Federation uses the exceptional force 
flexibility that this Treaty provides. The Committee therefore 
recommends that the Senate include in its resolution of 
ratification 2 conditions and 6 declarations. As is explained 
later in this report, these provisions are intended to ensure 
the success of this Treaty and to preserve the constitutional 
role of the United States Senate.

                       II. Summary of the Treaty

    The Moscow Treaty, signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002, 
requires the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce 
their respective aggregate numbers of strategic nuclear 
warheads to a range of 1,700 to 2,200 by December 31, 2012. The 
Treaty shall remain in force until this same date, unless both 
Parties agree to an extension or a superseding agreement. No 
obligations are imposed by the Treaty on either Party prior to 
December 31, 2012, except that the Parties shall hold meetings 
at least twice a year of the Bilateral Implementation 
Commission. Accordingly, no interim reduction levels are 
specified, and either Party may increase its numbers of 
strategic nuclear warheads prior to December 31, 2012, so long 
as they each manifest a force level of deployed strategic 
nuclear warheads that does not exceed 2,200 on that date.
    The United States shall consider the unit of account, for 
the purposes of its implementation of this Treaty, to be 
``operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads,'' which it 
defines as ``reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) in their launchers, reentry vehicles on 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their 
launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on 
heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy 
bomber bases.'' According to the Administration, the Russian 
Federation will establish its own definition of ``strategic 
nuclear warhead'' as it carries out its reductions under the 
Treaty.
    Article II of the Treaty provides that the Parties agree 
that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance with its 
terms. According to the Administration's article-by-article 
analysis submitted with the Treaty, this article ``makes clear 
that the Moscow Treaty and the START Treaty are separate,'' and 
the provisions of either treaty do not apply to the other.
    The Moscow Treaty does not contain the traditional 
transparency or verification provisions associated with past 
arms control agreements. The Administration plans to rely upon 
existing verification provisions under the START Treaty, in 
addition to national technical means, to monitor Russian 
compliance with the Moscow Treaty, even though the two treaties 
use different counting rules in measuring strategic force 
reductions. Administration officials have stated that because 
the United States will carry out the reductions required under 
the Moscow Treaty without regard to Russian actions, additional 
transparency provisions are not required. Article III of the 
Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), 
which shall meet at least twice a year ``for purposes of 
implementing this Treaty.''
    Article IV establishes the expiration date of the Treaty: 
it provides that the Treaty remains in force until December 31, 
2012. Article IV also allows the Treaty to be extended by 
mutual agreement or superseded by a subsequent agreement, and 
provides a national sovereignty clause on withdrawal that 
provides for three months' notice in such an event. Article V 
requires that the Treaty be registered with the United Nations.

                            III. Background

    President George W. Bush entered office in January 2001 
with a promise to change the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. 
national security policy. He sought to move away from the 
framework of mutually assured destruction (MAD) which had 
defined relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union (and then the Russian Federation) for over forty years. 
One element of the President's vision of a new strategic 
framework for U.S.-Russian relations involved withdrawal from 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and expanded research and 
development on missile defense, but another element involved 
reductions to U.S. strategic nuclear forces.
    On May 1, 2001, President Bush delivered a speech at the 
National Defense University, in which he declared:

          Nuclear weapons still have a vital role to play in 
        our security and that of our allies. We can, and will, 
        change the size, the composition, the character of our 
        nuclear forces in a way that reflects the reality that 
        the Cold War is over. I am committed to achieving a 
        credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of 
        nuclear weapons consistent with our national security 
        needs, including our obligations to our allies. My goal 
        is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. The United 
        States will lead by example to achieve our interests 
        and the interests for peace in the world.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at the 
National Defense University, May 1, 2001, (available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.html).

    In 2001, the Department of Defense completed the 
congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review, a report 
calling for an evaluation of the size and structure of U.S. 
strategic nuclear forces in light of changes in the 
international strategic environment. Such a review had not been 
conducted since 1994. In November 2001, the President announced 
that the United States would seek to reduce its operationally 
deployed strategic nuclear warheads from a current level of 
approximately 6,000 to a range between 1,700 and 2,200 over the 
next ten years. President Bush informed Russian President 
Vladimir Putin and made a public announcement regarding this 
intention when the two leaders met at the White House on 
November 13, 2001.
    For a number of years, President Putin, as well as his 
predecessor, President Boris Yeltsin, had recognized that the 
changed strategic environment and economic constraints would 
prevent the Russian Federation from indefinitely maintaining a 
START-sized strategic nuclear force. The START Treaty's limit 
of 6,000 deployed strategic nuclear delivery systems was no 
longer a realistic force level in the present circumstance. 
Nevertheless, both Putin and Yeltsin sought to maintain a 
semblance of strategic parity with the United States through 
the completion of further arms control agreements imposing 
required reductions upon both nations. Accordingly, one month 
after President Bush's announcement of planned U.S. cuts, 
President Putin declared on December 13, 2001, the Russian 
Federation's intention to reach a legal agreement with the 
United States for ``irreversible, and verifiable reductions in 
strategic offensive arms, which we believe should be at the 
level of 1,500 to 2,200 nuclear warheads for each side.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 
13, 2001, Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United 
States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 
1972, December 14, 2001. (available at http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/
5B16EB2FE9DCDAD943256B22002F6436?OpenDocument).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    According to press reports, these negotiations quickly 
bogged down over four central issues. The definition of the 
unit of account was difficult to resolve since the United 
States preferred the term ``operationally deployed strategic 
nuclear warhead,'' while the Russian Federation sought to 
continue to use the counting rules employed in the START 
Treaty, where reductions applied to the dismantlement of 
delivery vehicles and launchers, which in turn were counted as 
containing a specified number of warheads. Secondly, the need 
for new transparency and verification measures also proved hard 
to reconcile for the purposes of an overall agreement. Thirdly, 
there were different approaches as to whether the final 
agreement would be in the form of an executive agreement, as 
the United States preferred, or a treaty, which the Russian 
Federation favored. Finally, the Russian government insisted on 
general language limiting future U.S. missile defense 
deployments. The Administration contends that such disputes 
represent the lingering doubts of the past, not an indication 
of incompleteness on the part of the resulting agreement. By 
resolving these disputes and agreeing to disagree where 
necessary, Presidents Bush and Putin were able to sign the 
Moscow Treaty on May 24, 2002.
    On June 20, 2002, the two Presidents submitted this Treaty 
to the United States Senate and to the Russian Duma, 
respectively, for their advice and consent to each country's 
ratification.

               IV. Views of the Armed Services Committee

    The Committee on Armed Services examined the military 
implications of the Moscow Treaty. Senators Levin and Warner 
submitted the following letters to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. Both letters appear in this report:

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                  October 21, 2002.

Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman
Honorable Jesse Helms, Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

    Dear Senator Biden and Senator Helms:

    Thank you for the opportunity to express my views 
concerning the national security implications of the Treaty on 
Strategic Offensive Reductions, also known as the Moscow 
Treaty, which was signed by President Bush and Russian 
President Putin on May 24, 2002 in Moscow.
    I strongly support the Moscow Treaty and recommend that the 
Senate provide its advice and consent to ratification to the 
Treaty with no changes and with no conditions on the resolution 
of ratification. The Moscow Treaty is a simple, straightforward 
document which provides for the largest reductions in strategic 
nuclear weapons--over two-thirds from current levels--in arms 
control history. This Treaty should proceed through Senate 
consideration unencumbered by reservations, understandings or 
declarations.
    Throughout its history, the Senate Armed Services Committee 
has played a critical role in assessing the national security 
impact and military implications of arms control agreements 
negotiated by the Executive Branch. In July and August, the 
Armed Services Committee conducted two hearings on the national 
security implications of the Moscow Treaty. The Administration 
witnesses at these hearings have direct responsibility for 
critical national security issues related to the Moscow Treaty. 
These witnesses included Secretary of Defense Donald H. 
Rumsfeld; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
Richard B. Myers, USAF; Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic 
Command, Admiral James 0. Ellis, Jr., USN; and Deputy 
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration 
of the Department of Energy, Dr. Everet H. Beckner. In 
addition, the Committee received testimony from two outside 
witnesses.
    The witnesses at the Armed Services Committee hearings 
unanimously supported ratification of the Moscow Treaty. 
According to Joint Chiefs Chairman, General Myers, ``The 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I all support the 
Moscow Treaty. We believe it provides for the long-term 
security interests of our Nation. We also believe that it 
preserves our flexibility in an uncertain strategic 
environment. Moreover, the treaty allows us to implement the 
recommendations that came out of our Nuclear Posture Review.'' 
Admiral Ellis testified that ``The Moscow Treaty is a positive 
step early in our strategic journey toward a new partnership 
with Russia . . . I fully support this Treaty.'' Nongovernment 
witnesses also strongly supported the Treaty. Mr. Charles B. 
Curtis, formerly Deputy Secretary of Energy and now the 
President and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, testified that ``The Strategic Offensive Reductions 
Treaty, which is sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Moscow, 
is a truly remarkable document. I believe it deserves the 
Senate's endorsement. It should be ratified without amendment 
or, in my judgment, without reservation.''
    In my view, the strength of the Moscow Treaty is in its 
simplicity. This Treaty is not like any that we have seen 
before. It is the first arms control treaty to embody the post-
Cold War U.S.-Russian relationship. In negotiating this Treaty, 
both sides consciously rejected the Cold War mentality of 
distrust and hostility that previously had required lengthy 
negotiations, and extensive legal structures and detailed 
verification regimes to ensure that both sides would abide by 
their obligations. This simplicity puts the focus where it 
belongs--on the deep, equitable reductions to strategic nuclear 
warheads which are the centerpiece of the Moscow Treaty.
    The Moscow Treaty is the right agreement at the right time. 
There are three unique features of this Treaty which are key to 
the strength of this document: 1) it achieves deep reductions 
in offensive strategic nuclear arsenals; 2) it provides the 
flexibility to meet new security challenges; and 3) it both 
takes advantage of, and provides the opportunity to, expand our 
new closer relationship with Russia.
    The most important feature of the Moscow Treaty is the deep 
redictions the Treaty will achieve in operationally deployed 
warheads. This breakthrough Treaty--negotiated in a period of 
just several months--will reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear 
arsenals from their present levels of about 6,000 strategic 
warheads to 1700 to 2200 operationally deployed strategic 
warheads over the next decade. These reductions--which amount 
to about two thirds of the warheads in the Russian and U.S. 
arsenals--are the most dramatic in the history of arms control 
agreements.
    Such reductions are clearly in our national security 
interest. Russia is no longer an enemy. Our strategic arsenals, 
swollen by Cold War hostility with the Soviet Union, no longer 
need to be sustained at such high levels. According to 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in his testimony before the 
Armed Services Committee on July 25, 2002: ``The reductions 
characterized in this Treaty will help eliminate the debris of 
past hostility that has been blocking our way as we build a new 
relationship. The Treaty President Bush has fashioned and the 
process by which he fashioned it, I believe, are both models 
for future cooperation between our two countries. We've 
achieved deep reductions and enhanced the security of both our 
countries without perpetuating Cold War ways of thinking that 
hinder a desire for better relations.''
    The second great strength of this Treaty is the flexibility 
it accords our leaders to meet the uncertainties both in the 
international security environment and in the technological 
status of our nuclear stockpile. September 11 was a vivid 
reminder that we are vulnerable to attack--in ways we never 
imagined. It is critical to our national security that our 
leaders retain the maximum flexibility to respond to emerging 
threats and changes in the world scene.
    Many observers have correctly noted that the Moscow Treaty 
does not contain features that were typical of past bilateral 
arms control agreements, most of which were signed by the 
United States and the Soviet Union. For example, the Moscow 
Treaty does not establish interim warhead reduction goals or a 
detailed schedule for achieving warhead reductions. It does not 
define warhead ``counting rules,'' require destruction of 
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or launchers, or include 
limits or sublimits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or 
launchers.
    The lack of detailed schedules, sub-limits, and counting 
rules, and the absence of any requirement to destroy warheads 
have been criticized by some. Yet the witnesses before our 
Committee consistently praised the flexibility inherent in this 
Treaty. Admiral Ellis addressed this issue before our Committee 
at some length. According to Admiral Ellis in testimony before 
the Armed Services Committee on August 1: ``This treaty allows 
me, as the Commander of the Nation's Strategic Forces, the 
latitude to structure our strategic forces to better support 
the national security pillars of assuring our allies, 
dissuading those who might wish us ill, deterring potential 
adversaries and, if necessary, defending the nation. . . . [I]n 
my judgment, this treaty provides me the ability to prudently 
meet those national security needs and to provide a range of 
deterrent options to the Secretary and the President for their 
consideration should the need arise.
    The Admiral continued: ``[The Treaty] gives me the 
flexibility to deal with the uncertainty that's an inherent 
part . . . [of] the future. It gives me flexibility with regard 
to the specific details of that draw down, to the composition 
of our nation's nuclear stockpile as we draw it down in size, 
to hedge against the possibility of technological surprise as 
our stockpile ages in the future, [and] to deal with the 
potential for change in the international security environment 
should it arise. It also gives me the flexibility to take the 
dual use platforms, these strategic platforms that have such 
important tactical applications, and transform them in support 
of the nation's security needs in a broader way.''
    Dr. Beckner, the official in our government most directly 
responsible for assuring that the U.S. nuclear weapons 
stockpile remains safe, reliable, and effective, confirmed that 
the flexibility inherent in the Moscow Treaty is critical to 
our effort to maintain the stockpile. ``The Treaty,'' he said 
during the August 1 hearing, ``provides the United States with 
the flexibility to maintain an important hedge against 
unforeseen . . . technical issues in the smaller enduring 
nuclear weapons stockpile.''
    This flexibility is particularly important in light of the 
fact that the U.S. active nuclear stockpile is composed of only 
a limited number of warhead types--only two types of warheads 
for our land based intercontinental ballistic missiles, two 
types for our sea launched missiles, and two types of bombs for 
our bombers. These warheads have not been tested in over a 
decade. The average age of warheads in the U.S. stockpile is 
approaching 20 years--and some warheads are much older. While 
Administration officials, such as Dr. Beckner, are pursuing 
vigorous efforts to monitor the health of the stockpile and 
assure its effectiveness, on occasion these efforts reveal 
problems in the stockpile.
    All of us on the Armed Services Committee understand that 
our experience with very old warheads is limited and, although 
no one can predict when, we can predict with certainty that 
problems will arise. The Administration witnesses who testified 
before the Armed Services Committee on the Moscow Treaty 
clearly believe that sustaining a substantial number of 
warheads in a responsive reserve, in a status that would allow 
the nation to address such problems as might arise, is in our 
national security interest.
    The third great strength of this Treaty, in my view, is how 
it reflects the new relationship between the United States and 
Russia. This Treaty is fully consistent with the policy goals 
that President Bush outlined shortly after he took office. In a 
landmark speech at the National Defense University in May 2001, 
President Bush called for a new strategic relationship with 
Russia. ``Today's Russia is not yesterday's Soviet Union. This 
new cooperative relationship should look to the future, not to 
the past. It should be reassuring rather than threatening. It 
should be premised on openness, mutual confidence and real 
opportunities for cooperation . . . I want to complete the work 
of changing our relationship from one based on a nuclear 
balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and 
common interests.''
    President Bush has engaged Russian President Putin on a 
regular and intensive basis to move the Russian-American 
relationship beyond Cold War hostility to a relationship built 
on openness, shared goals, and shared responsibility. The 
Moscow Treaty is one important measure of President Bush's 
extraordinary success in building this new relationship.
    As unique as the Moscow Treaty is, the Treaty also reflects 
the success and the heritage of past arms control agreements. 
First, the Moscow Treaty is a legally binding document. I 
commend President Bush for deciding to put these strategic 
nuclear reductions in the form of a legally binding treaty. 
This assures that the agreement will survive the personal 
relationship between Presidents Bush and Putin, and that it has 
the weight of law. Second, in order to achieve the required 
reductions, nuclear warheads will be physically removed from 
missiles and bombers, rendering them unusable for any near-term 
military contingencies. Third, the Treaty provides the 
mechanisms and atmosphere to assure compliance with its 
provisions and resolution of future issues related to Treaty 
implementation. The terms of the Moscow Treaty--which recognize 
that the START I Treaty verification regime remains in force 
and which establish a Bilateral Implementation Commission--
provide the basis for the predictability, transparency, and 
confidence needed to assure that both sides achieve the 
required reductions.
    A number of my colleagues in the Senate have raised 
concerns about what the Moscow Treaty does not do. The Treaty 
does not address warhead dismantlement or tactical nuclear 
arsenals. No strategic arms control agreement has ever 
addressed these concerns. I would also note that all the 
witnesses before the Armed Services Committee agreed that the 
Moscow Treaty is but a first step. Secretary Rumsfeld confirmed 
in his testimony that tactical nuclear arsenals are a concern 
that the U.S. Government will continue to address with the 
Russian Federation. Further arms control steps, including 
verification issues and dismantlement, will be discussed on a 
continuing basis.
    Based on the hearings conducted by the Armed Services 
Committees and subsequent analysis, I believe that the Moscow 
Treaty clearly advances the national security interests of the 
United States and deserves the Senate's unqualified support. I 
strongly recommend your Committee's approval of a resolution of 
ratification for the Moscow Treaty that is free of any 
conditions.
    With kind regards, I am

            Sincerely,
                               John Warner, Ranking Member.

                                ------                                

                              United States Senate,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                                                   October 7, 2002.

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman
The Honorable Jesse Helms, Ranking Member
Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

    Dear Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Helms:

    As requested, this letter is to provide you with my views 
on the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed on 
May 24th, 2002, between the United States and the Russian 
Federation, and to offer my suggestions for issues the Foreign 
Relations Committee should consider in preparing a resolution 
of ratification for the Treaty.
    After the President submitted the SORT Treaty to the Senate 
on June 20th, the Armed Services Committee held two hearings on 
the Treaty. The first hearing took place on July 25th and 
included Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General 
Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the 
witnesses. We held our second hearing on August 1 and had two 
panels of witnesses. The first panel consisted of Mr. Charles 
Curtis, former Deputy Secretary of Energy and currently 
President and Chief Operating Officer of the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative, and Dr. Ashton Carter, former Assistant Secretary 
of Defense and currently Professor of Science and International 
Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University. The second panel consisted of Admiral James Ellis, 
Commander in Chief of the United States Strategic Command, and 
Dr. Everet Beckner, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs 
of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
    I believe the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty is a 
positive step forward in U.S -Russian relations. I think it is 
particularly important to have a treaty that will be legally 
binding on all parties, rather than unilateral steps that are 
not binding on future administrations. In addition, a treaty 
will ensure that the Senate fulfills its constitutional role in 
matters of foreign relations by giving due consideration to any 
treaty, and providing its advice and consent before 
ratification.
    I see this treaty as a starting point for further arms 
control and an important element in our new relationship with 
Russia. But there is much more work to be done to continue 
improving mutual security and trust with Russia, work that 
includes further reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons, 
reducing nuclear proliferation dangers, and improving 
confidence, transparency and cooperation with Russia.
    Although a positive symbolic step forward, it is an unusual 
treaty. Its central obligation is that both nations will reduce 
their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a 
level between 1700 and 2200 some 10 years from now, for one 
day. Then the treaty expires. Contrary to numerous media 
reports, this treaty does not require reductions in either 
nuclear warhead stockpiles or delivery systems. It does not 
require elimination of a single warhead. Under this treaty, 
both sides need only remove warheads from land-based or 
submarine-based missiles and from bombers. Both sides are free 
to keep every warhead so removed and to store these warheads 
for possible redeployment.
    Given the unusual features of this Treaty, I recommend a 
number of items be considered for inclusion in the resolution 
of ratification, as follows:
    1. Unlike previous arms control treaties, the SORT Treaty 
withdrawal clause would allow each party, ``in exercising its 
national sovereignty'', to withdraw from the Treaty upon three 
months' written notice. There is no mention of supreme national 
interest. This makes it appear as though the President could 
withdraw from the Treaty for any reason short of a supreme 
national interest.
    The U.S. should not enter into or withdraw from a treaty 
lightly; both should be done only with the utmost seriousness 
of purpose and with the involvement of the Senate, which must 
give its advice and consent to permit ratification. 
Consequently, I would urge the Committee to consider a 
condition to the resolution of ratification that would require 
the President to consult with and obtain approval from the 
Senate prior to a U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty.
    2. The Treaty is a starting point for further nuclear arms 
reductions. The Senate should encourage the President to pursue 
additional reductions of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, 
both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons and delivery 
vehicles, to the lowest possible levels consistent with our 
security, and to encourage the elimination of excess nuclear 
warheads, rather than their long-term storage. The Senate 
should also encourage the President to consider accelerating 
the reductions required in the Treaty so they are achieved in 
less than 10 years, if possible.
    3. The Treaty includes no provisions for verification or 
transparency that would provide confidence that both parties 
are implementing their obligations. It is in our national and 
mutual security interests to increase and improve such 
transparency and ensure such confidence. The Senate should 
therefore encourage the President to pursue such steps, 
including an exchange of detailed information with the Russian 
Federation on their respective stockpiles of nuclear warheads 
and fissile material, and on their safety and security.
    4. Although the Treaty makes reference in Article III to 
``a Bilateral Implementation Commission'', it does not provide 
any detail about such a Commission, other than to specify that 
it shall meet at least twice a year. The Senate should require 
the President to provide details on a regular basis on the 
Bilateral Implementation Commission and its deliberations.
    5. The treaty does not establish any milestones or schedule 
for reductions, other than the requirement to reach the 
permitted limit on warheads by December 31, 2012. As a 
condition for the resolution of ratification, I believe the 
Senate should require an annual report from the President 
explaining in detail the steps taken and planned to implement 
the SORT Treaty. This report should include the planned 
schedule and milestones to achieve the treaty's obligations; 
the strategic nuclear force levels (warheads and delivery 
systems) of both parties; and any measures to increase 
transparency or provide confidence that each party will 
implement its obligations under the Treaty.
    6. The Treaty does not require the elimination of any 
nuclear warheads, and permits their indefinite storage if 
removed from operationally deployed status. The storage of 
potentially thousands of nuclear warheads could lead to an 
increased risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons or 
materials, especially if the storage facilities are not 
sufficiently secure. As a condition to the resolution of 
ratification, I believe the Senate should require a report from 
the President on how our Cooperative Threat Reduction and other 
nonproliferation programs could best be used to reduce this 
risk of proliferation and to assist the Russian Federation in 
implementing the Treaty.
    I hope you find these recommendations useful as you prepare 
to mark up the resolution of ratification for the SORT Treaty. 
I appreciate the opportunity to share my views with you.

            Sincerely,
                                      Carl Levin, Chairman.

                          V. Committee Action

    The Committee held four open hearings on the Moscow Treaty, 
on July 9, July 17, July 23 and September 12, 2002. The witness 
at the hearing on July 9, 2002, was the Honorable Colin L. 
Powell, Secretary of State. The witnesses at the hearing on 
July 17, 2002, were the Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary 
of Defense, and General Richard B. Myers, USAF, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    The witnesses at the hearing on July 23, 2002, were: the 
Honorable Sam Nunn, former chairman of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, now co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative; the Honorable Kenneth L. Adelman, former Director 
of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; General Eugene 
E. Habiger, USAF (Ret.), former Commander in Chief of U.S. 
Strategic Command; Fr. Drew Christiansen, S.J., counselor on 
international affairs to the U.S. Conference of Catholic 
Bishops; Mr. Christopher E. Paine, co-director of the Nuclear 
Warhead Elimination and Nonproliferation Project of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council; and Mr. Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., 
president of the Center for Security Policy.
    The witnesses at the hearing on September 12, 2002, were: 
the Honorable William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense, 
now at Stanford University; the Honorable Fred Charles Ikle, 
former Under Secretary of Defense and Director of the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, now at the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies; the Honorable Rose Gottemoeller, 
former Deputy Under Secretary of Energy for Defense Nuclear 
Nonproliferation, now a Senior Associate at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace; Ambassador James E. Goodby, 
a former arms control negotiator, now at the Brookings 
Institution; Dr. John P. Holdren of Harvard University, chair 
of the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of 
the National Academy of Sciences; and Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, 
executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education 
Center.
    At a business meeting on February 5, 2003, the Committee 
considered a draft resolution of ratification including 2 
conditions and 6 declarations. After discussion and debate, 
this resolution was approved by a vote of 19 in favor to 0 
against.
    The conditions and declarations and the Committee rationale 
in approving them are as follows:

Condition (1). Report on the Role of Cooperative Threat Reduction and 
        Nonproliferation Assistance

    The Committee included in its recommended resolution of 
ratification a Condition (1) requiring a report on the role of 
Cooperative Threat Reduction and nonproliferation assistance. 
This condition requires the President to submit to the Foreign 
Relations and the Armed Services Committees an annual report on 
the amount of Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
assistance that the Russian Federation will need to meet its 
obligations under the Treaty.
    In Secretary Powell's testimony before the Committee on 
July 9, 2002, and in his answers to the Committee's questions 
for the record, the need for Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction and nonproliferation programs was continually 
highlighted as the primary means with which to prevent weapons, 
weapons-usable materials and expertise in the Russian 
Federation from falling into the hands of terrorists. As the 
Administration stated in response to a question for the record, 
the CTR program will be used ``to make [Russia's] warhead 
storage facilities more secure. Such U.S. assistance will also 
increase the security of the Russian warheads made excess as 
provided in the Moscow Treaty.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Hearings, p. 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Committee members and many witnesses stressed that Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and non-proliferation 
assistance to the Russian Federation could play a crucial role 
in helping Russia to implement the reductions required by 
Article I of the Moscow Treaty. Senator Lugar made the point 
that U.S. assistance might well affect Russian decisions 
regarding the disposition of warheads or of strategic delivery 
vehicles. Executive branch witnesses stated the 
Administration's policy that ``Cooperative Threat Reduction 
efforts are in the national security interests of the United 
States'' and ``it is in our own security interests to help 
ensure that remaining warheads are stored as safely and 
securely as possible to protect them from terrorists or third-
country theft.'' \14\ The Secretary of State added, ``Even if 
Russia decides to store additional warheads under the Moscow 
Treaty, however, we are confident U.S. assistance will continue 
to increase the security of such weapons.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Hearings, pp. 54-55.
    \15\ Hearings, p. 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee intends that the reports required by this 
condition will cover both CTR activities per se and those non-
CTR program activities that could contribute to Russian 
Federation implementation of the Treaty. For example, it could 
be the case that some activities in the nuclear Materials, 
Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program of the 
Department of Energy would be relevant to that purpose. If so, 
they should be taken into account and discussed in the report 
required by this condition.

Condition (2). Annual Implementation Report

    One of the major themes of discussion in the Committee's 
hearings on the Moscow Treaty was the great flexibility allowed 
to the Parties in implementing the reductions required by 
Article I of the Treaty. Executive branch witnesses explained 
that, in fact, the Administration has not yet decided how to 
effect all of the reductions required by the Treaty. Neither 
has it determined what transparency measures might be needed to 
assure each Party that the other Party will meet the force 
reduction requirement by December 31, 2012. On the Russian 
side, it is unclear how the Russian Federation will define its 
reduction obligations or how it will fulfill them.
    A sensible way to preserve the Senate's role in treaty 
implementation is to require regular reporting to the Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services Committees regarding force levels, 
reduction plans, verification and transparency. This condition 
requires such reporting on an annual basis. It is similar in 
this regard to the annual reporting requirement established by 
the Chemical Weapons Convention resolution of ratification, 
which has made a valuable contribution to the Senate's ability 
to monitor progress in CWC implementation.
    The report required by this condition must be submitted 
within 60 days of the exchange of instruments of ratification 
of the Treaty and thereafter by April 15 of each year. It will 
also discuss any information, insufficiency of information, or 
other situation that may call into question the intent or the 
ability of either Party to live up to its obligations, as well 
as any actions that have been taken or are being considered to 
address such concerns or to improve the implementation and 
effectiveness of the Treaty. Annual reporting of such 
information should ensure that the Senate fulfills its role and 
lessen the likelihood of miscommunication.
    Requirements for reports after the exchange of instruments 
of ratification are common and have assisted the Senate greatly 
in its oversight of treaty implementation. Such requirements 
were enacted in the resolutions of ratification for the START 
Treaty, START II, the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty.

Declaration (1). Treaty Interpretation

    The Foreign Relations Committee has taken pains to maintain 
the constitutional role of the United States Senate in the 
treaty-making process. To that end, the resolution of 
ratification of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 
approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988, included an important 
condition (1) that has been cited by reference in every 
subsequent resolution of ratification of an arms control 
treaty:

          (A) the United States shall interpret a treaty in 
        accordance with the common understanding of the Treaty 
        shared by the President and the Senate at the time the 
        Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification;

          (B) Such common understanding is based on:

                  (i) first, the text of the Treaty and the 
                provisions of this resolution of ratification; 
                and

                  (ii) second, the authoritative 
                representations which were provided by the 
                President and his representatives to the Senate 
                and its Committees, in seeking Senate consent 
                to ratification, insofar as such 
                representations were directed to the meaning 
                and legal effect of the text of the Treaty;

          (C) the United States shall not agree to or adopt an 
        interpretation different from that common understanding 
        except pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a 
        subsequent treaty or protocol, or the enactment of a 
        statute; and

          (D) if, subsequent to ratification of the Treaty, a 
        question arises as to the interpretation of a provision 
        of the Treaty on which no common understanding was 
        reached in accordance with paragraph (B), that 
        provision shall be interpreted in accordance with 
        applicable United States law.

    In 1997, a similarly important condition was added to the 
resolution of ratification of the Flank Document Agreement to 
the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which condition 
has also been cited by reference in subsequent resolutions of 
ratification for arms control treaties:

          Nothing in condition (1) of the resolution of 
        ratification of the INF Treaty, approved by the Senate 
        on May 27, 1988, shall be construed as authorizing the 
        President to obtain legislative approval for 
        modifications or amendments to treaties through 
        majority approval of both Houses.

    Each of these conditions applies to all treaties. For this 
reason, the Senate has not needed to restate them as conditions 
in subsequent resolutions of ratification. Rather, it has cited 
them by reference in declarations of its intent, as Declaration 
(1) does, so as to remind subsequent administrations of the 
continuing obligations imposed by the Senate's treaty-making 
role under the United States Constitution.

Declaration (2). Further Strategic Arms Reductions

    Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, signed on July 1, 1968, requires all Parties 
``to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament and on a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control.'' Given the significant reductions in U.S. and Russian 
deployed strategic force levels in the Moscow Treaty, a 
reduction of nearly two-thirds below the level permitted by the 
START Treaty, the Secretary of State testified that ``the 
Moscow Treaty represent[s] significant progress in meeting the 
obligations set forth in Article VI of the NPT.'' \16\ 
Cognizant of that obligation, Presidents Bush and Putin, in 
their Joint Declaration of May 24, 2002, affirmed their intent 
``to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the lowest 
possible levels consistent with their national security 
requirements and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new 
nature of their strategic relations,'' and called the Moscow 
Treaty ``a major step in this direction.'' \17\ The presidents 
consciously left the door open to further reductions in the 
future. Declaration (2) encourages the President to continue 
strategic offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels 
consistent with national security requirements and alliance 
obligations of the United States. This is similar to 
declarations in the resolutions of ratification for the START 
and START II treaties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Prepared Statement of Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, 
Hearings, p. 18.
    \17\ Joint Declaration, May 24, 2002, (available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-2.html).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Declaration (3). Bilateral Implementation Issues

    Because of the new nature of the Moscow Treaty, the need 
for confidence and transparency and the absence of traditional 
verification or transparency provisions in the Treaty, the 
Bilateral Implementation Commission established by Article III 
of the Treaty may play a major role in building confidence in 
each Party's ability to meet its obligations and in maintaining 
confidence that the reductions required by Article I will be 
completed on time. When the Senate considered the START II 
Treaty, it stated its expectation that the executive branch 
would offer to brief the Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
Committees before and after each meeting of the Joint 
Consultative and Inspection Commission (JCIC), which is the 
analogous body under the START regime. Those briefings have 
proved very useful to the Committees. This declaration 
therefore states a similar expectation of consultations and 
briefings regarding meetings of the Bilateral Implementation 
Commission under this Treaty, as well as any Moscow Treaty 
issues that are raised in the Consultative Group for Strategic 
Security or in other channels.

Declaration (4). Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons

    The United States has sought for over a decade to limit and 
secure non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons--
sometimes known as ``tactical'' or ``theater'' nuclear 
weapons--threaten to erode the distinction between conventional 
and nuclear war. If not properly secured, they also threaten 
international peace and security by virtue of their small size 
and mobility. Numerous concerns have been expressed about the 
possibility that they could be stolen and used by a terrorist 
group. Last year, the Committee on Foreign Relations was 
briefed in closed session on that risk.
    The Secretary of State argued strongly that a formal, 
verifiable agreement on reductions in non-strategic nuclear 
weapons was not feasible at this time. While members differ in 
their views on whether the United States should pursue such an 
agreement in view of the difficulties, the Committee is united 
in sharing the Secretary's concern regarding Russian 
implementation of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-
1992 and, as the Secretary noted in an answer for the record to 
the Committee, ``how best to assist Russia to secure its NSNW 
from proliferation threats.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Hearings, p. 56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Committee was pleased to receive the Secretary of 
State's assurance that, ``We plan to pursue transparency 
discussions on tactical nuclear weapons as a priority matter in 
the Consultative Group for Strategic Security'' (which then met 
in September 2002 and established a working group on these 
weapons) and that this issue will also be pursued ``in the 
NATO-Russia channel.'' \19\ To underscore the importance of 
these discussions, the Committee recommends that the Senate add 
to the resolution of ratification a declaration supporting 
efforts to achieve ``improved confidence regarding the accurate 
accounting and security of non-strategic nuclear weapons'' of 
each Party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Declaration (5). Achieving Reductions

    Several witnesses testified to the Committee that achieving 
strategic offensive reductions in fewer than the 10 years 
provided in the Moscow Treaty was both feasible and desirable. 
Accelerated reductions could contribute greatly to transparency 
and verification, by removing any concern over whether the 
reductions required by Article I will be completed in time. 
Witnesses argued that if such reductions were to be achieved 
largely through down-loading warheads and airborne systems from 
their launchers, there was no reason why the time line for 
reductions could not be reduced significantly. The Committee 
does not know how readily swifter reductions could be achieved, 
but it does note the President's statement that ``current 
levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect today's strategic 
realities.'' It recommends a declaration calling for 
accelerated force reductions, therefore, but only ``where 
feasible and consistent with U.S. national security 
requirements and alliance obligations.''

Declaration (6). Consultations

    The Senate and this Committee have an institutional 
interest in the close observation of arms control negotiations 
and the successful implementation of resulting agreements. Past 
Administrations have recognized that consultations with the 
Senate prior to taking actions relating to signing, amending or 
withdrawing from such agreements may avert serious 
disagreements.
    In briefing the members and staff of this Committee on the 
discussions that led to the signing of the Moscow Treaty, the 
present Administration has continued to act in the spirit of 
past arms control agreements, in which the Senate has been kept 
informed of all negotiations. In order that the Committee may 
continue to be assured of the complete and full implementation 
of the Treaty, two reports have been included in the 
recommended resolution of ratification. The report required by 
Condition (2) will include information on the intent and 
ability of the Parties to execute their obligations under 
Article I of the Treaty by December 31, 2012, and any actions 
taken or proposed to be taken to address any concerns that may 
arise.
    Should it become necessary for a Party to withdraw from the 
Treaty, Article IV provides for three months' notice of such a 
decision. Events could well occur between submissions of the 
annual report required in Condition (2) that would warrant 
informing and consulting the Senate. In any circumstance, the 
Senate would desire notification and consultation.
    Secretary Powell stated in an answer for the record that 
such consultation would be forthcoming. He stated: ``While it 
is the President who withdraws from treaties, the 
Administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the 
Treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.'' 
\20\ The Committee commends the Secretary's answer and believes 
future Administrations should adopt this policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Hearings, p. 68.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To provide a formal expression of the Senate's concerns and 
expectations regarding action to extend, modify or withdraw 
from the Treaty, the Committee recommends a resolution of 
ratification containing Declaration (6), which urges the 
President to consult with the Senate prior to actions relevant 
to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article IV. The Committee recognizes 
that this declaration cannot affect any authority the 
Constitution grants in this regard.
    Should a circumstance arise where prior consultation with 
the Senate on a decision to modify, extend or withdraw from the 
Treaty is not feasible, notably if the Senate were out of 
session, the Committee hopes that the President, to the extent 
that it is feasible, will consult the leadership of the Senate 
and Committee. Declaration (6), while not binding on the 
President, is a formal request that the executive branch 
maintain the consultation policy enunciated in the Secretary of 
State's answer to the question for the record (cited above).

                     VI. Resolution of Ratification

    Resolved, (two thirds of the Senators present concurring 
therein),

SECTION 1. SENATE ADVICE AND CONSENT SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AND 
                    DECLARATIONS.

      The Senate advises and consents to the ratification of 
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian 
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (T. Doc. 107-8, in 
this resolution referred to as the ``Moscow Treaty'' or 
``Treaty''), subject to the conditions in section 2 and 
declarations in section 3.

SEC. 2. CONDITIONS.

        The advice and consent of the Senate to the 
ratification of the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following 
conditions, which shall be binding on the President:
            (1) Report on the role of cooperative threat 
        reduction and nonproliferation assistance.--Recognizing 
        that implementation of the Moscow Treaty is the sole 
        responsibility of each party, not later than 60 days 
        after the exchange of instruments of ratification of 
        the Treaty, and annually thereafter on February 15, the 
        President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate a report and recommendations on how United 
        States Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance to the 
        Russian Federation can best contribute to enabling the 
        Russian Federation to implement the Treaty efficiently 
        and maintain the security and accurate accounting of 
        its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and 
        material in the current year. The report shall be 
        submitted in both unclassified and, as necessary, 
        classified form.
            (2) Annual implementation report.--Not later than 
        60 days after exchange of instruments of ratification 
        of the Treaty, and annually thereafter on April 15, the 
        President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign 
        Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate a report on implementation of the Treaty by the 
        United States and the Russian Federation. This report 
        shall be submitted in both unclassified and, as 
        necessary, classified form and shall include--
                    (A) a listing of strategic nuclear weapons 
                force levels of the United States, and a best 
                estimate of the strategic nuclear weapons force 
                levels of the Russian Federation, as of 
                December 31 of the preceding calendar year;
                    (B) a detailed description, to the extent 
                possible, of strategic offensive reductions 
                planned by each party for the current calendar 
                year;
                    (C) to the extent possible, the plans of 
                each party for achieving by December 31, 2012, 
                the strategic offensive reductions required by 
                Article I of the Treaty;
                    (D) measures, including any verification or 
                transparency measures, that have been taken or 
                have been proposed by a party to assure each 
                party of the other party's continued intent and 
                ability to achieve by December 31, 2012, the 
                strategic offensive reductions required by 
                Article I of the Treaty;
                    (E) information relevant to implementation 
                of this Treaty that has been learned as a 
                result of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
                (START) verification measures, and the status 
                of consideration of extending the START 
                verification regime beyond December 2009;
                    (F) any information, insufficiency of 
                information, or other situation that may call 
                into question the intent or the ability of 
                either party to achieve by December 31, 2012, 
                the strategic offensive reductions required by 
                Article I of the Treaty; and
                    (G) any actions that have been taken or 
                have been proposed by a party to address 
                concerns listed pursuant to subparagraph (F) or 
                to improve the implementation and effectiveness 
                of the Treaty.

SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS.

      The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification 
of the Moscow Treaty is subject to the following declarations, 
which express the intent of the Senate:
            (1) Treaty interpretation.--The Senate reaffirms 
        condition (8) of the resolution of ratification of the 
        Document Agreed Among the States Parties to the Treaty 
        on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) of 
        November 19, 1990 (adopted at Vienna on May 31, 1996), 
        approved by the Senate on May 14, 1997, relating to 
        condition (1) of the resolution of ratification of the 
        Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 
        approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988.
            (2) Further strategic arms reductions.--The Senate 
        encourages the President to continue strategic 
        offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels 
        consistent with national security requirements and 
        alliance obligations of the United States.
            (3) Bilateral implementation issues.--The Senate 
        expects the executive branch of the Government to offer 
        regular briefings, including consultations before 
        meetings of the Bilateral Implementation Commission, to 
        the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on 
        Armed Services of the Senate on any implementation 
        issues related to the Moscow Treaty. Such briefings 
        shall include a description of all efforts by the 
        United States in bilateral forums and through 
        diplomatic channels with the Russian Federation to 
        resolve any such issues and shall include a description 
        of--
                    (A) the issues raised at the Bilateral 
                Implementation Commission, within 30 days after 
                such meetings;
                    (B) any issues related to implementation of 
                this Treaty that the United States is pursuing 
                in other channels, including the Consultative 
                Group for Strategic Security established 
                pursuant to the Joint Declaration of May 24, 
                2002, by the Presidents of the United States 
                and the Russian Federation; and
                    (C) any Presidential determination with 
                respect to issues described in subparagraphs 
                (A) and (B).
            (4) Nonstrategic nuclear weapons.--Recognizing the 
        difficulty the United States has faced in ascertaining 
        with confidence the number of nonstrategic nuclear 
        weapons maintained by the Russian Federation and the 
        security of those weapons, the Senate urges the 
        President to engage the Russian Federation with the 
        objectives of--
                    (A) establishing cooperative measures to 
                give each party to the Treaty improved 
                confidence regarding the accurate accounting 
                and security of nonstrategic nuclear weapons 
                maintained by the other party; and
                    (B) providing United States or other 
                international assiance to help the Russian 
                Federation ensure the accurate accounting and 
                security of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
            (5) Achieving reductions.--Recognizing the 
        transformed relationship between the United States and 
        the Russian Federation and the significantly decreased 
        threat posed to the United States by the Russian 
        Federation's strategic nuclear arsenal, the Senate 
        encourages the President to accelerate United States 
        strategic force reductions, to the extent feasible and 
        consistent with United States national security 
        requirements and alliance obligations, in order that 
        the reductions required by Article I of the Treaty may 
        be achieved prior to December 31, 2012.
            (6) Consultations.--Given the Senate's continuing 
        interest in this Treaty and in continuing strategic 
        offensive reductions to the lowest possible levels 
        consistent with national security requirements and 
        alliance obligations of the United States, the Senate 
        urges the President to consult with the Senate prior to 
        taking actions relevant to paragraphs 2 or 3 of Article 
        IV of the Treaty.

                    VII. Article-by-Article Analysis

    The President submitted an Article by Article Analysis of 
the Treaty to the Senate on June 20, 2002. The text of this 
analysis, which was also published by the Senate in Treaty 
Document 107-8, pages 5-10, is as follows:

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 
  AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS

    The Treaty Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed at 
Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the Moscow Treaty) consists of a 
Preamble and five Articles.

                           TITLE AND PREAMBLE

    The title of the Moscow Treaty is ``Treaty Between the 
United States of America and the Russian Federation on 
Strategic Offensive Reductions.'' This title was deliberately 
chosen to reflect the fact that this Treaty focuses on 
reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, rather than on 
``strategic offensive arms,'' which traditionally have been 
considered to be delivery vehicles and launchers. For 
linguistic reasons, the title of the Russian language version 
of the Treaty is ``. . . on Reductions in Strategic Offensive 
Potential.'' The English language text of the Treaty was agreed 
first, but the phrase ``strategic offensive reductions'' could 
not be literally translated into Russian. The substantive 
meanings of the titles are the same.
    The Preamble to the Moscow Treaty sets forth the intentions 
of the Parties in broad terms. The first preambular paragraph 
designates the United States and Russia as ``the Parties'' to 
obviate the use of their full names throughout the Treaty. The 
second, third and fourth preambular paragraphs set forth the 
Parties' shared commitment to conducting their relations in the 
new century on a fundamentally different and more cooperative 
basis than had characterized their relations in the past. The 
reference to ``mutual security'' in the fourth paragraph refers 
to the non-threatening nature of the Parties' new strategic 
relationship; it does not imply a specific relationship between 
the Parties' forces. The fifth paragraph reaffirms the Parties' 
general, longstanding commitment to implementing significant 
reductions in strategic offensive arms. This paragraph 
introduces references to specific prior commitments and 
obligations by the Parties in the sixth, seventh and eighth 
paragraphs that immediately follow, including those in the 
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty) 
and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 
1, 1968 (the NPT). The sixth paragraph recognizes Joint 
Statements made by Presidents Bush and Putin in Genoa on July 
22, 2001 and in Washington, DC on November 13, 2001 that detail 
the new basis for relations between the United States and 
Russia. This preambular language does not imply any 
restrictions or obligations relating to defensive programs. The 
seventh and eighth paragraphs make reference to two existing 
agreements of the Parties with regard to nuclear weapons, the 
START Treaty and Article VI of the NPT. The final paragraph 
sets forth the Parties' conviction that this Treaty will 
establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting 
security and cooperation and enhancing international security.

                               ARTICLE I

    Article I contains the central obligation of the Moscow 
Treaty. The first sentence of this paragraph obligates the 
Parties to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads, 
as stated by the President of the United States of America on 
November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian 
Federation on November 13 and December 13, 2001, respectively, 
so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such 
warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. The Moscow 
Treaty's limits relate solely to the number of each Party's 
strategic nuclear warheads. The Moscow Treaty does not limit 
the number of U.S. or Russian inter-continental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) or their associated launchers, or heavy bombers. 
Article I, by referencing the statements of both Presidents, 
makes clear that the Parties need not implement their 
reductions in an identical manner.
    The United States will implement Article I as stated by 
President Bush on November 13, 2001: ``. . . the United States 
will reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next 
decade, a level fully consistent with American security.'' \21\ 
U.S. negotiators noted to their Russian counterparts that, in 
carrying out the reductions provided for in this Treaty, in 
using the term ``operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads'' the United States means reentry vehicles on ICBMs in 
their launchers, reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers 
onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy 
bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber 
bases. The United States also made clear that a small number of 
spare strategic nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM 
warheads) would be located at heavy bomber bases and that the 
United States would not consider these warheads to be 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The United 
States intends to reduce its operationally deployed strategic 
nuclear warheads in a manner consistent with these statements. 
In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only 
``nuclear'' reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are 
subject to the 1700-2200 limit.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Press conference by President Bush and Russian President 
Vladimir Putin. The East Room, on November 13, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The method by which U.S. warhead numbers will be determined 
under the Moscow Treaty differs from the START Treaty 
methodology. The START Treaty contains counting rules that 
attribute specific numbers of warheads to each type of ICBM, 
SLBM or heavy bomber regardless of the actual number of 
warheads on the missile or bomber. These numbers may be 
different from both the actual capacity of the specific system 
and the number actually carried by the system.
    Under the U.S. approach, certain strategic nuclear 
warheads, such as those nominally associated with submarines in 
overhaul or submarines modified for other purposes, those 
downloaded from ICBMs and SLBMs, and those nominally associated 
with deactivated Peacekeeper ICBMs, will continue to be subject 
to the START Treaty unless such ICBMs or SLBMS and their 
associated launchers are eliminated or converted in accordance 
with START Treaty procedures. At the same time, however, under 
the Moscow Treaty, once such warheads are no longer in 
operationally-deployed status, they will be included as part of 
the United States' reductions. Thus, among other things, 
missiles from which some warheads have been removed will be 
considered for purposes of the START Treaty as carrying more 
warheads than they in fact carry. By contrast, under the Moscow 
Treaty, the United States will limit its strategic nuclear 
warheads based on the actual number of warheads on missiles in 
their launchers and at bomber bases (other than spare 
warheads).
    President Putin. for his part, stated at the Russian 
Embassy in Washington, DC on November 13, 2001:

        Russia is stating its readiness to proceed with 
        significant reductions of strategic offensive arms. 
        That is why today we are proposing a radical program of 
        further reductions of SOA--at the least, by a factor of 
        three--to the minimum level necessary to maintain 
        strategic equilibrium in the world.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Speech of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to 
representatives of the American public and U.S. politicians, November 
13, 2001, Russian Embassy in Washington [Official U.S. translation].

---------------------------------------------------------------------------
and in a statement on December 13, 2001:

        a particularly important task in these conditions is to 
        legally formalize the agreements that have been reached 
        on further drastic, irreversible, and verifiable 
        reductions in strategic offensive arms, which we 
        believe should be at the level of 1,500-2,200 nuclear 
        warheads for each side.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 
2001, regarding the decision of the U.S. Administration to withdraw 
from the 1972 ABM Treaty [Official U.S. translation].

    President Putin did not state explicitly how Russia intends 
to implement its reductions. During the negotiations the 
Russians suggested that they anticipated reducing warheads by 
eliminating or converting missiles, launchers and heavy 
bombers. As noted above, Russia, like the United States, may 
reduce its strategic nuclear warheads by any method it chooses. 
Russia did not state conclusively during the negotiations how 
it intends to carry out its reductions.
    The Moscow Treaty does not provide for sublimits or interim 
reduction levels or require a Party to reach the final 
reduction level prior to December 31, 2012. Therefore, prior to 
December 31, 2012, each Party is free to maintain whatever 
level of strategic nuclear warheads it deems appropriate, 
consistent with its obligations under the START Treaty and its 
obligation to meet the specified limit by the specified date.
    The second sentence of Article I states that each Party 
shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its 
strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate 
limit for the number of such warheads. As noted earlier, the 
Moscow Treaty does not limit the total number of strategic 
offensive arms, or contain either numerical sublimits or bans 
on categories of forces. Under the Moscow Treaty, each Party 
will thus have flexibility in structuring its forces to reach 
these new low levels for strategic nuclear warheads. The Treaty 
does not restrict a Party's decisions regarding how it will 
implement the required reductions.

                               ARTICLE II

    In Article II, the Parties recognize that the START Treaty 
remains in force in accordance with its terms. The purpose of 
this Article is to make clear that the Moscow Treaty and the 
START Treaty are separate. The START Treaty's provisions do not 
extend to the Moscow Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty does not 
terminate, extend or in any other way affect the status of the 
START Treaty. The START Treaty will remain in force until 
December 5, 2009, unless it is superseded by a subsequent 
agreement or extended.

                              ARTICLE III

    Article III establishes a Bilateral Implementation 
Commission (BIC), a diplomatic consultative forum which shall 
meet at least twice a year, to discuss issues related to 
implementation of the Moscow Treaty.

                               ARTICLE IV

    Article IV consists of three paragraphs covering 
ratification, entry into force, duration and withdrawal.
    Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty 
shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the 
constitutional procedures of each Party and shall enter into 
force on the date of the exchange of instruments of 
ratification.
    Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty 
shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and may be 
extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a 
subsequent agreement. Extension of the Treaty is not automatic 
but must be done by agreement of the Parties. Since such an 
extension is authorized by the Treaty, it would constitute an 
agreement pursuant to the Treaty and would accordingly not be 
subject to Senate advice and consent.
    Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that each Party, in 
exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw from the 
Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party. 
Unlike some other arms control agreements, this withdrawal 
clause is not tied to a Party's determination that 
extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national 
interests exist. Rather, the Moscow Treaty includes a more 
general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each 
Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.
    Unlike several earlier arms control agreements, including 
the START Treaty, there are no specific provisions for either 
amending the Moscow Treaty or for making ``viability and 
effectiveness'' changes to the Treaty. Such provisions were not 
seen as necessary given the structure and content of this 
Treaty.
    For international agreements submitted to the Senate that 
do not have specific amendment procedures, U.S. practice has 
been to submit amendments to the Senate for its advice and 
consent unless the Senate agrees that submission is not 
required.

                               ARTICLE V

    Article V sets forth standard provisions for registration 
of the Treaty pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.

                        VIII. CBO Cost Estimates

    In response to a request from Senator Biden, the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) supplied the Committee with 
information on the possible budgetary impact of implementing 
the reductions mandated by Article I of the Moscow Treaty. In 
addition, the CBO responded to a request for estimates of the 
cost of various alternative strategic force structures and 
reduction rates. This correspondence is included in this 
section.
    The CBO estimates the Administration would need to remove 
over the next ten years approximately 2,600 to 3,100 warheads 
from U.S. strategic offensive forces in order to meet the 
Treaty requirement of 1,700 to 2,200 deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads by December 31, 2012. Because the Administration has 
not yet determined how to achieve these reductions, the CBO 
looked at two possible paths.
    Under the first path, the Administration would not retire 
any strategic platforms (beyond those already announced in the 
FY 2003-2007 defense planning), but instead remove warheads 
from Minuteman missiles, Trident submarines, and military bases 
where bombers are deployed. CBO estimates that these actions 
would cost $105 or $115 million through 2012, depending upon 
whether the final level is 2,200 or 1,700 warheads. Under the 
second path, the Administration would remove both warheads and 
delivery platforms from the U.S. strategic inventory, including 
retiring 150 Minuteman missiles and two of the oldest Trident 
submarines, and converting B-2 bombers to a conventional role 
only. Although costs would be incurred in the removal of 
warheads and the retirement of certain delivery systems, these 
costs would be more than offset by the savings from forgoing 
development and procurement of new systems to upgrade the two 
Trident submarines and 150 Minuteman missiles. Accordingly, the 
estimated net savings associated with this path are 
approximately $5.1 billion through 2012.
    The Committee recommends that the President give particular 
attention, as Moscow Treaty implementation proceeds, to the 
possibility that modest further reductions in strategic 
delivery systems after 2007 could lead to significant cost 
savings without endangering the national security.

                                       U.S. Senate,
                            Committee on Foreign Relations,
                                      Washington, DC, July 8, 2002.

Mr. Dan L. Crippen
Director, Congressional Budget Office,
U.S. Congress, Washington, DC 20515

    Dear Mr. Crippen:

    The Committee on Foreign Relations will begin in July its 
hearing process on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive 
Reductions, which the President submitted to the Senate on June 
20 for its advice and consent to ratification. The Committee 
would appreciate an analysis by the Congressional Budget Office 
of the costs associated with the implementation of this treaty.
    In particular, I ask your Office to include in its analysis 
the following information:

   Costs that the United States will incur or avoid by 
        taking the steps required under this treaty. Does the 
        treaty require any steps which the Administration had 
        not already planned?

   Projected costs of the various options the United 
        States may choose in order to reach a level of 1,700 to 
        2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads 
        by December 31, 2012.

   Projected costs of possible verification and 
        transparency measures, beyond those utilized under the 
        START Treaty, that may be incurred in association with 
        this treaty. One example of such a measure would be the 
        separation of spare warheads from non- deployed 
        warheads currently co-located at heavy bomber bases.

   Projected costs to the United States if all of the 
        U.S. warheads taken out of operational deployment to 
        meet the Treaty's reduction requirement are placed in 
        storage, with half those warheads maintained in 
        readiness for a speedy re-armament. What are the 
        projected costs if all of these warheads are 
        eliminated? If half are eliminated? Please include in 
        this analysis the impact of warhead reductions on the 
        costs associated with the Department of Energy's 
        requirements for warhead re-manufacturing and tritium 
        production.

   Projected costs of increasing U.S. assistance under 
        the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and/or 
        nonproliferation assistance programs to help Russia 
        eliminate warheads that are removed from deployment 
        pursuant to this treaty and secure any resulting 
        fissile material. How will these projected costs change 
        if Russia stores its downloaded warheads and U.S. 
        assistance focuses on the security of the warheads?

   Costs to the United States of converting U.S. 
        strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines to 
        non-nuclear missions, but maintaining a ready 
        capability to revert to nuclear missions. What are the 
        alternative costs of eliminating these delivery 
        vehicles or irreversibly converting them to 
        conventional capability?

   Implications for overall costs if the United States 
        reduces its operationally deployed warheads to a level 
        of 1,700 to 2,200 by 2007 instead of 2012, as called 
        for under the treaty.

   Implications for overall costs if the United States, 
        within 1-2 years of the treaty's entry into force, 
        lowers the operational status of forces scheduled for 
        reduction by 2012.

    I look forward to receiving a cost analysis by your Office 
on the implementation of this treaty by September 3, 2002, so 
that the Committee can make its recommendations regarding 
action on the treaty during this legislative session.
    If you have any questions regarding this request, please 
feel free to contact the Committee's staff director, Mr. Antony 
Blinken, or professional staff members Edward Levine or Jofi 
Joseph, at 224-4651. I understand that Committee staff have 
already discussed our needs with staff of the Defense, 
International Affairs, and Veterans' Affairs Cost Estimates 
Unit in your Budget Analysis Division.

            Sincerely,
                            Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman.

                                     U.S. Congress,
                                Congressonal Budget Office,
                                Washington, DC, September 24, 2002.

Honorable Joseph R. Biden Jr., Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

    Dear Mr. Chairman:

    As you requested, the Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the attached estimate of the budgetary impact from 
implementing The Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 
signed at the Moscow Summit on May 24, 2002. Under that treaty, 
the United States and Russia would reduce their number of 
strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200, about 
two-thirds below current levels, by December 31, 2012.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we would be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contacts are Raymond J. 
Hall (in the Budget Analysis Division), and J. Michael Gilmore 
(in the National Security Division).

            Sincerely,
                                  Dan L. Crippen, Director.

    Attachment.

    Estimated Costs and Savings from Implementing the Moscow Treaty

                                SUMMARY

    The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) limits the 
United States and the former countries of the Soviet Union 
(Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) to 6,000 accountable 
warheads. The Treaty Between the United States of America and 
the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions 
(informally known as the ``Moscow Treaty'') calls for both 
countries to reduce that number of warheads to between 1,700 
and 2,200 by 2012. The Administration first announced its 
intention to pursue those reductions at the conclusion of the 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in January 2002. That review also 
set an interim goal of reducing the number of warheads 
available for immediate use to approximately 3,800 by 2007.
    To meet the interim goal set by the NPR, the Administration 
would need to remove about 2,100 warheads from U.S. strategic 
offensive forces. The Administration's fiscal year 2003-2007 
defense plan would partially achieve that goal by retiring all 
50 Peacekeeper missiles, removing four Trident submarines from 
strategic service and converting them to a conventional (non-
nuclear) role, and permanently converting all 81 B-1 bombers to 
a conventional role. In total, about 1,100 warheads would be 
removed by implementing that plan. To fully attain the NPR 
goal, however, the Department of Defense (DoD) would need to 
remove about 1,000 more warheads from delivery platforms. The 
Congressional Budget OFfice (CBO) estimates that the costs to 
remove those additional warheads would amount to roughly $25 
million over the 2003-2007 period and $55 million over the 
2003-2012 period. (Costs and savings provided in this estimate 
are expressed relative to the costs of operating strategic 
offensive nuclear forces and supporting activities under the 
Aiministration's fiscal year 2003-2007 defense plan. All cost 
estimates are in current dollars of budget authority.)
    Achieving the Moscow Treaty goal of having no more than 
1,700 to 2,200 warheads available for immediate use by 2012 
would require the Administration to remove a total of 2,600 to 
3,100 warheads from service. Those reductions could be achieved 
in many ways. In the absence of definitive plans from the 
Administration, CBO has examined two paths for achieving those 
reductions. The first path would keep most of the delivery 
platforms that were planned to be in place in 2007, whereas the 
second path would remove or retire some missiles and 
submarines. Implementing the first path would cost about $25 
million over the 2003-2007 period and about $105 million over 
the 2003-2012 period, CBO estimates, if the United States 
reduced warheads to the 2,200 level (see Summary Table 1). 
Removing or retiring delivery platforms, in contrast, offers 
the potential for significant savings. CBO estimates that the 
second path would save about $2.2 billion over the 2003-2007 
period and $5.1 billion through 2012. Reducing the number of 
available warheads to the lower level of 1,700 would not 
necessarily result in significant costs or savings beyond those 
estimated for the 2,200-warhead level, CBO estimates. 
Accelerating the warhead reductions to achieve the Moscow 
Treaty target by 2007 might necessitate some additional 
spending beyond that estimated for the paths mentioned above.

   Summary Table 1.--Costs or Savings (-) of Two Paths to Achieve the
                 Moscow Treaty's Warhead-Reduction Goal
                        [In millions of dollars]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Total, 2003- Total, 2008- Total, 2003-
                                       2007         2012         2012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduce warheads to Moscow Treaty
 Levels by 2012:
  Without Retiring Delivery                 25           80          105
   Platforms.....................

Reduce warheads to Moscow Treaty
 Levels by 2012:
  By Retiring Some Delivery             -2,165       -2,920       -5,085
   Platforms.....................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Costs and savings shown in this table are associated with
  approaches to reduce the number of warheads to the Moscow Treaty goal
  of 2,200.Reducing the number of warheads to 1,700 would not
  necessarily result in significant additional costs or savings.

    CBO also investigated the possible budgetary impact of 
dismantling, instead of storing, weapons removed from service. 
Because warheads stored in a status preventing their immediate 
use by strategic forces would not count against the Moscow 
Treaty's numerical limitations, no warheads would need to be 
destroyed. Dismantling one-half or more of the warheads removed 
to meet Moscow Treaty requirements could have substantial 
costs, dcpending on when the efforts might be scheduled. 
According to information provided by the National Nuclear 
Security Administration (NNSA) of the Department of Energy, 
dismantling one-half of the warheads by 2012 would exceed the 
planned capacity at its Pantex nuclear weapons production 
facility in Amarillo, Texas. If completion of dismantlement 
could be delayed until the 2020-2025 period, the planned 
capacity at Pantex would probably be sufficient.
    CBO currently has insufficient information to estimate the 
effects that dismantling (instead of storing and maintaining) 
warheads might have on needed tritium and pit production 
capacities.\1\ But because the NNSA's current plans are based 
on maintaining an inventory consistent with levels under START, 
dismantling a significant fraction of that inventory ought to 
imply a concomitant reduction in needed steady-state tritium 
and pit production capacities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ A modern thermonuclear weapon consists of a primary and a 
secondary. The primary uses fission (the splitting of atoms) to create 
enough energy to start a fission reaction in the secondary. The pit is 
a key component of the primary and is composed of fissionable material 
such as plutonium.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBO also examined issues relating to treaty verification. 
According to statements made by the Administration, the Moscow 
Treaty contains no additional verification provisions beyond 
those implemented for START. Other supplementary measures, 
including transparency measures, could be agreed to in the 
future, but CBO has no basis for predicting the nature or cost 
of such additional measures.
    As part of this cost estimate, CBO also looked at the costs 
of converting strategic bombers and submarines to conventional 
missions while maintaining a ready capability to revert to a 
strategic role. The Administration has announced no plans for 
converting bombers and submarines to a conventional-only 
configuration while retaining the option to restore their 
nuclear capability. The details of such plans would be key in 
determining the costs for initial conversion as well as those 
to restore nuclear capability. Without that information, CBO 
has no basis for definitively estimating those costs, which 
could be either negligible or significant depending on the 
approach taken.
    Lastly, CBO examined the possible savings from lowering the 
operational status of, or taking off high alert, strategic 
forces scheduled for retirement. The Administration has 
announced no plans to retire any delivery platforms beyond the 
Peacekeeper missiles that would be retired by 2005. The savings 
associated with lowering the operational status of such forces 
would probably be small.

                              INTRODUCTION

    For most of the past 40 years, the Department of Defense 
has maintained a triad of strategic offensive nuclear forces 
consisting of missiles, submarines, and bombers. Those forces 
have been subject to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty since 
it took effect on December 5, 1994. That treaty limits the 
United States and the former countries of the Soviet Union 
(Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) to 6,000 accountable 
warheads following the seven-year reduction period that ended 
on December 4, 2001.
    Under START, the size of U.S. strategic offensive nuclear 
forces declinedsignificantly, from over 8,800 accountable 
warheads at the treaty's inception to fewer than 6,000 warheads 
today. The declared force structure consists of 1,200 warheads 
on 500 Minuteman III missiles, 500 warheads on 50 Peacekeeper 
missiles, about 3,200 warheads on C4 and D5 missiles carried on 
18 Trident submarines, and roughly 1,000 nuclear bombs and 
cruise missiles deployed on nearly 200 strategic bombers (see 
Table 1).

                           Table 1.--Comparison of Various Strategic Offensive Forces
                            (In numbers of delivery platforms and deployed warheads)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                      Forces Planned for Deployment in 2007
                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Strategic Forces Under  The Administration's FY   An Approach to Achieve
                Weapon                   START Counting Rules    2003-2007 Defense Plan        the NPR Goal
                                      --------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Quantity  Warheads \1\   Quantity  Warheads \2\   Quantity  Warheads \3\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs:
  Minuteman III......................        500        1,200         500        1,200         500          800
  Peacekeeper........................         50          500           0            0           0            0

SLBMs:
  Trident Submarines
    Carrying C4 Missiles.............          6          864           0            0           0            0

  Trident Submarines
    Carrying D5 Missiles.............         12        2,304          14        2,304          14        1,656

Bombers:
  B-1................................         81           81       (\4\)            0       (\4\)            0
  B-2................................         21           21          21          256          21          256
  B-52...............................         94          940          76        1,056          76        1,056
                                                 --------------           --------------           -------------

      Total..........................  .........        5,910   .........        4,816   .........        3,768
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.

Note: FY = fiscal year; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; NPR = Nuclear Posture Review; SLBM =
  submarine-launched ballistic missile; START = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
\1\ Under START, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 350 Minuteman missiles and one
  warhead on each of the remaining 150 Minuteman missiles; 10 warheads on each Peacekeeper missile; six warheads
  on each C4 missile and eight warheads on each D5 missile (each Trident submarine carries either 24 C4 missiles
  or 24 D5 missiles); one warhead on each B-1 and B-2 bomber and 10 warheads on each B-52 bomber.
\2\ Under the Administration's plan, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 350 Minuteman
  missiles and one warhead on each of the remaining 150 Minuteman missiles; eight warheads on each D5 missile
  (for a total of 192 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); 16 nuclear bombs on
  each of the 16 operationally deployed B-2 bombers; and from 12 to 20 cruise missiles on each of the 56
  operationally deployed B-52 bombers.
\3\ Under this approach, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 150 Minuteman missiles and a
  single warhead on each of the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles; either five or six warheads on each D5 missile
  (for a total of 138 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); 16 nuclear bombs on
  each of the operationally deployed 16 B-2 bombers; and 12 to 20 cruise missiles on each of the 56
  operationally deployed B-52 bombers.
\4\ All B-1 bombers would be permanently converted to a conventional role.

    The total number of accountable warheads on ballistic 
missiles is determined by the number of missiles, submarines, 
and bombers as well as the number of warheads declared on each 
of them. The original declarations were announced during the 
December 1987 Washington Summit between Presidents Reagan and 
Gorbachev. Since that time, the number of warheads on two 
missiles (the C4 and the Minuteman III) has been lowered; 
warhead counts on the other strategic platforms remain 
unchanged. Currently, the older C4 ballistic missile is 
declared to carry six warheads, and the newer D5 missile has 
eight warheads. The land-based Minuteman III ballistic missile 
currently has one or three warheads, depending on the Air Force 
base at which it is deployed, while the Peacekeeper missile 
carries 10 warheads. Under the provisions of START, warheads on 
strategic bombers are counted in one of two ways. Strategic 
bombers that are declared to carry long-range air-launched 
cruise missiles (the B-52s) count as 10 warheads each. 
Strategic bombers that are declared to not carry cruise 
missiles (the B-1s and B-2s) count as one warhead each.

The Administration's 2003-2007 Defense Plan

    The Administration's fiscal year 2003-2007 defense plan 
would reduce the number of nuclear warheads, compared with 
today's levels, immediately available to U.S. strategic forces. 
The plan would lower the warhead count to about 4,800 by 2007 
(see Table 1). The intent to pursue those reductions was first 
announced at the conclusion of the Nuclear Posture Review in 
January 2002. That review concluded that strategic forces 
equipped with between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads would be 
sufficient to maintain the security of the United States. The 
review also set an interim goal of reducing the number of 
nuclear warheads to approximately 3,800 by 2007. According to 
information provided by DoD, the fiscal year 2003-2007 defense 
plan would partially achieve that interim goal through:

   The retirement of all Peacekeeper missiles,

   The conversion of the four oldest Trident submarines 
        to a conventional role, and

   The elimination of the capability to return the B-1 
        bombers to a nuclear role.

The Moscow Treaty

    President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin 
signed the Moscow Treaty on May 24, 2002. That treaty, which is 
consistent with the results of the NPR, calls for both 
countries, by 2012, to maintain no more than 1,700 to 2,200 
warheads in a status such that they are capable of immediate 
use by strategic offensive forces. (DoD and the National 
Nuclear Security Administration refer to warheads in that 
status as ``operationally deployed warheads.'') Under the terms 
of the treaty, each country would determine the numbers and 
types of bombers, submarines, and missile launchers that would 
constitute its strategic offensive forces and determine the 
number of warheads on each type of delivery platform. Warheads 
stored in a status preventing their immediate use by strategic 
forces would not count toward the treaty's numerical limits. 
Thus, there is no requirement for any warheads to be destroyed 
under the terms of the Moscow Treaty. That treaty would also 
use the verification procedures of START to provide confidence 
and transparency in warhead reductions.

         THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING THE MOSCOW TREATY

    CBO has prepared estimates of the costs and savings that 
would result from reducing the U.S. arsenal of strategic 
weapons to comply with the Moscow Treaty. Specifically, CBO has 
estimated:

   The costs of reducing the U.S. arsenal to achieve 
        the Administration's goal to deploy about 3,800 
        warheads by 2007, and

   The costs and savings of reducing the U.S. arsenal 
        to achieve the Moscow Treaty's goal of between 1,700 
        and 2,200 warheads by 2012.

    This paper also discusses the potential to accelerate the 
reductions in the number of warheads to achieve the Moscow 
Treaty's goal by 2007. CBO's estimates do not include any costs 
to build additional facilities to store the warheads and 
nuclear weapons that would be removed from delivery platforms 
because, according to DoD, the available storage capacity would 
be sufficient to accommodate all warheads removed from service.

Costs of Meeting the Administration's Goal of 3,800 Nuclear Warheads by 
        2007

    Achieving the goal of having about 3,800 warheads available 
for immediate use by 2007 wDuld require that the Administration 
reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal below the levels set forth in 
its fiscal year 2003-2007 defense program. On the basis of 
information provided by DoD, CBO assumes that those reductions 
would be achieved by removing about 1,000 warheads from 
Minuteman and D5 missiles (see Table 1). The costs to remove 
those warheads would amount to about $25 million over the 2003-
2007 period and $55 million over the 2003-2012 period, CBO 
estimates.
    Remove Warheads from Minuteman Missiles. Today, the Air 
Force deploys 500 Minuteman III missiles at three bases: 150 
missiles at F.E. Warren Air Force Base (AFB) in Wyoming, 200 
missiles at Malmstrom AFB in Montana, and 150 missiles at Minot 
AFB in North Dakota. Under START, the missiles at F.E. Warren 
AFB each carry a single warhead, whereas the missiles at the 
other two bases each carry three warheads, for a total of 1,200 
warheads.
    To reduce the number of warheads deployed on Minuteman 
missiles, the Air Force would convert an additional 200 
missiles to a single-warhead configuration, CBO assumes. In 
all, 400 warheads would need to be removed and transported to 
storage facilities. According to the Air Force, it would need 
to replace the existing hardware on the missiles (primarily 
hardware called bulkheads that would be used to deploy the 
warheads on the missiles) with new hardware to accommodate the 
single warhead. It would need to augment squadron personnel 
with contractor support to accomplish that effort. The costs to 
remove the 400 warheads would total about $15 million over the 
2003-2007 period, CBO etimates--about $10 million to replace 
the bulkheads and about $5 million to place the warheads in 
shipping and storage containers and then transport them to 
storage facilities. The estimate does not include any costs to 
buy the new bulkheads because the Air Force has already 
purchased that hardware. Also, it does not include any costs to 
buy shipping and storage containers because the Air Force now 
has about 620 of those containers available for use and plans 
to purchase an additional 250 containers.
    The Air Force has indicated that the number of personnel at 
the storage locations might need to be increased to support the 
maintenance activities associated with the storage of 
additional warheads, but it has not provided CBO with estimates 
of those staffing requirements. CBO believes that those costs 
would be negligible, however.
    Remove Warheads from D5 Missiles. Today, the Navy deploys 
432 C4 and D5 missiles containing roughly 3,200 warheads on 18 
Trident submarines. Eight of those submarines are based at the 
Naval Submarine Base (NSB) in Bangor, Washington, and the other 
10 are stationed at the NSB in Kings Bay, Georgia. The Navy 
plans to convert four of the Trident submarines to a 
conventional role. By 2007, under the Administration's plan, 
each of the remaining 14 Trident submarines would be equipped 
to carry 24 D5 missiles and--assuming that eight warheads were 
loaded on each D5 missile--could carry a total of 192 warheads. 
According to the Navy, an average of two submarines a year 
would undergo a major overhaul and thus would not carry any 
missiles. The 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines 
would carry a total of 2,304 warheads (see Table 1). The C4 
missiles that would be removed from the submarines would be 
transported to a DoD facility for disposal. The warheads that 
would be removed from those missiles would either be reloaded 
onto the newer D5 missiles or stored at a DoD facility.
    In order to achieve the NPR goal, CBO expects that the Navy 
would reduce the number of warheads on the D5 missiles. CBO 
assumes that the 12 operationally deployed sthmarines would 
each be equipped with 18 missiles loaded with six older 
warheads (these older warheads are deployed on Mk4 reentry 
vehicles) and six missiles loaded with five newer warheads 
(these warheads are deployed on Mk5 reentry vehicles), for a 
total of 138 warheads on each vessel. In all, CBO estimates 
that 648 warheads would need to be removed from those vessels--
54 warheads from each of the 12 Trident submarines. On the 
basis of information provided by the Navy, CBO estimates that 
removing the warheads from the missiles would not involve 
additional costs because that task would be accomplished by 
existing personnel as part of regular periodic maintenance. CBO 
also estimates that storing more warheads would not result in 
any significant additional costs. Finally, the estimate does 
not include any costs for modifying the existing missiles 
because, according to the Navy, the missiles can accommodate a 
load of five or six warheads without modifications.
    As stated in the NPR, the Administration aims to retain the 
capability to reconstitute U.S. strategic forces with larger 
numbers of warheads than the Moscow Treaty permits. This means 
that the Navy must have the capability to take all of the Mk4 
reentry vehicles that would be removed from the C4 and D5 
missiles and placed in storage and reload them back onto the D5 
missiles quickly. The hardware used to put the Mk4 reentry 
vehicles on D5 missiles is called a release assembly. The Navy 
has purchased sufficient quantities of Mk4 release assemblies 
to support the lower number of deployed warheads but not enough 
to support a higher level of reconstituted warheads. To provide 
this reconstitution capability, the Navy has indicated that 
roughly 600 Mk4 assemblies would need to be purchased over the 
2004-2012 period. CBO estimates that the costs for those 
assemblies would total about $40 million through 2012.

Costs and Savings from Meeting the Moscow Treaty's Goal of 1,700 to 
        2,200 Nuclear Warheads by 2012

    Achieving the goal of having no more than 1,700 to 2,200 
warheads available for immediate use by 2012 would require the 
Administration to remove another 1,600 to 2,100 warheads from 
service by that date. CBO has examined two paths for achieving 
those additional reductions. The first path (see Option 1, 
below) would keep all of the strategic delivery platforms that 
were planned to be in place in 2007--500 Minuteman missiles, 14 
Trident submarines, 76 B-52 bombers, and 21 B-2 bombers. That 
path is consistent with the goals outlined by the 
Administration in the NPR. The second path (see Option 2, 
below) would remove or retire some warheads and delivery 
platforms: it retires 150 Minuteman missiles and two additional 
Trident submarines, and it converts the B-2 bombers to a 
conventional role, removing them from the arsenal of U.S. 
strategic offensive nuclear forces. Table 2 shows the delivery 
platforms associated with the Administration's plan and the two 
options.

        Table 2.--Comparison of CBO's Options to Achieve the Moscow Treaty Goal of 2,200 Warheads by 2012
                            (In numbers of delivery platforms and deployed warheads)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     The Administration's FY       Option 1: 2,200           Option 2: 2,200
                                      2003-2007 Defense Plan  Warheads, No Retirements       Warheads, Fewer
               Weapon               -------------------------            \1\                  Platforms \1\
                                                             ---------------------------------------------------
                                      Quantity   Warhead \2\   Quantity   Warheads \3\   Quantity   Warheads \4\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs:
  Minuteman III....................         500        1,200         500          500          350          650
  Peacekeeper......................           0            0           0            0            0            0

SLBMs:
  Trident Submarines
    Carrying C4 Missiles...........           0            0           0            0            0            0

  Trident Submarines
    Carrying D5 Missiles...........          14        2,304          14        1,152           12        1,110

Bombers:
  B-1..............................       (\5\)            0       (\5\)            0        (\5\)            0
  B-2..............................          21          256          21          128        (\5\)            0
  B-52.............................          76        1,056          76          420           76          420
                                                -------------            --------------            -------------

    Total..........................  ..........        4,816  ..........        2,200   ..........        2,180
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.
Notes: FY = fiscal year; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.

\1\ CBO has also postulated approaches to achieving the 1,700-warhead level in the Moscow Treaty. See Appendix A
  for detailed descriptions of the force structure for those approaches.
\2\ Under the Administration's plan, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 350 Minuteman
  missiles and one warhead on each of the remaining 150 Minuteman missiles; eight warheads on each of the 24 D5
  missiles (for a total of 192 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); 16 nuclear
  bombs on each of the 16 operationally deployed B-2 bombers; and from 12 to 20 cruise missiles on each of the
  56 operationally deployed B-52 bombers.
\3\ Under Option 1, warheads are counted as follows: one warhead on each of 500 Minuteman missiles; four
  warheads on each of the 24 D5 missiles (for a total of 96 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed
  Trident submarines); eight nuclear bombs on each of the 16 operationally deployed B-2 bombers; and about eight
  cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B-52 bombers.
\4\ Under Option 2, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 150 Minuteman missiles and a
  single warhead on each of the remaining 200 Minuteman missiles; either four or five warheads on each of the 24
  D5 missiles (for a total of 111 warheads on each of the 10 operationally deployed Trident submarines); and
  about eight cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B-52 bombers.
\5\ All B-1 bombers would be permanently converted to a conventional role. Under Option 2, all B-2 bombers would
  also be permanently converted to a conventional role.

    Specific information about those two paths, which would 
reduce the number of warheads available for immediate use to 
2,200, is presented below. Similar paths to reduce the number 
of available warheads to 1,700, which are discussed in detail 
in Appendix A, would have almost identical budgetary 
consequences.
    Option 1: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 1,700 or 2,200 
Without Retiring Delivery Platforms from the Strategic 
Inventory. This option illustrates how the Administration could 
reduce the nuclear arsenal to either 1,700 or 2,200 warheads 
available for immediate use without retiring any strategic 
platforms beyond those changes already set out in the 2003-2007 
defense program. One way of reducing the nuclear arsenal to 
2,200 warheads could involve the following actions:

   Reconfigure the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles to 
        carry one warhead instead of three.

   Deploy only 96 warheads on each of the 12 
        operational Trident submarines (four warheads for each 
        of the 24 missiles), and

   Remove warheads from military bases where bombers 
        are deployed so that only eight nuclear weapons are 
        available for immediate use on each operational 
        strategic bomber.

    CBO estimates that the costs to take those actions would 
amount to about $25 million over the 2003-2007 period and $105 
million through 2012 (see Table 3). That estimate includes the 
$55 million in costs to meet the Administration's goal of 3,800 
warheads by 2007. The details are outlined below.
    In another version of this option, the United States could 
reduce the number of nuclear warheads further, to about 1,700, 
if it deployed only 72 warheads on each Trident submarine, 
instead of the 96 warheads indicated above, and converted the 
B-2 bombers to a conventional non-nuclear role. CBO estimates 
that the costs to achieve this lower warhead level would amount 
to $115 million through 2012. (See Appendix A for details of 
this estimate, which is labeled Option 1A.)
    Missiles. CBO assumes that the Air Force would reconfigure 
the remaining 350 missiles that currently carry multiple 
warheads to a single-warhead configuration by replacing the 
existing bulkheads with new ones. After that, the warheads 
would need to be prepared for transport to storage sites. The 
costs to remove the 700 warheads would total about $25 million 
over the 2003-2012 period, CBO estimates--about $15 million to 
replace the bulkheads and about $10 million to place the 
warheads in shipping and storage containers and to transport 
them to storage facilities.
    Submarines. In order to achieve the 2,200-warhead level, 
CBO assumes that by 2012 the Navy would load only four warheads 
on each of the 24 D5 missiles on each Trident submarine, for a 
total of 96 warheads per submarine. In total, 1,152 warheads 
would need to be removed. The cost to remove missiles from the 
submarines and warheads from the missiles would be negligible, 
CBO estimated, because these actions could be done as part of 
regular maintenance.

    Table 3.--Costs or Savings (-) of Various Approaches to Achieving the Moscow Treaty Goal Relative to the
                             Administration's Fiscal Year 2003-2007 Defense Program
                                            (In millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                           Canceled
                                                                    Warhead     Reduced    Upgrades/    Total,
                                                                    Removal   Operations   Purchases   2003-2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Achieve Nuclear Posture Review Goal of 3,800 Warheads by 2007:
    ICBMs.......................................................          15           0           0          15
    SLBMs.......................................................          40           0           0          40
    Bombers.....................................................           0           0           0           0
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Subtotal..................................................          55           0           0          55

Option 1: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 2,200 by 2012 Without
 Retiring Delivery Platforms \1\
    ICBMs.......................................................          25           0           0          25
    SLBMs.......................................................          40           0           0          40
    Bombers.....................................................          40           0           0          40
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Subtotal..................................................         105           0           0         105

Option 2: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 2,200 by 2012 by
 Retiring Some Delivery Platforms \1\
    ICBMs.......................................................         245      -1,760      -1,000      -2,515
    SLBMs.......................................................         260        -730      -2,150      -2,620
    Bombers.....................................................          50           0           0          50
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
      Subtotal..................................................         550      -2,490      -3,150      -5,085
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile. Numbers may not
  add up to totals because of rounding.

\1\ Costs and savings displayed reflect approaches to reducing current levels of warheads to the Moscow Treaty
  goal of 2,200 warheads. The costs to remove the warheads for Option 1 and 2 include the $55 million to achieve
  the Nuclear Posture Review goal of 3,800 warheads by 2007. CBO estimates that reducing the number of warheads
  to the 1,700 level would not necessarily result in significant additional costs or savings beyond those
  estimated for reducing to the 2,200-warhead level. See Appendix A for a breakdown of those costs.

    As mentioned above, to comply with the NPR, the Navy would 
need to purchase additional equipment to maintain the 
capability to reload eight warheads on each missile at some 
future time. The costs of that equipment would total about $40 
million over the 2003-2012 period, CBO estimates.
    Bombers. CBO assumes that the Air Force would retain for 
immediate use on its bomber bases only eight nuclear weapons 
for each of the 16 operational B-2 bombers and 56 operational 
B-52 bombers to achieve the overall warhead level of 2,200. In 
that ease, 128 nuclear bombs and the warheads on 636 cruise 
missiles would need to be removed from bomber bases. CBO 
estimates that the costs to remove the warheads and bombs, to 
purchase containers to place them in, and to transport them to 
facilities away from the bases would total about $40 million in 
2012. That estimate does not include any additional costs for 
shipping and storing the cruise missiles because, as under 
current Air Force plans, those missiles would be stored at the 
bases. (If the Air Force chose to store the cruise missiles 
away from the bomber bases, CBO estimates that shipping and 
storage costs for those cruise missiles would total about $5 
million in 2012.)
    Option 2: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 1,700 or 2,200 
by Removing Delivery Platforms from the Strategic Inventory. 
Another way to reduce the nuclear arsenal to 1,700 or 2,200 
warheads would be to remove some warheads and delivery 
platforms from the strategic inventory. One approach for 
achieving the 2,200-warhead level could involve the following 
actions:

   Retire 150 Minuteman missiles,

   Reconfigure 200 of the remaining 350 Minuteman 
        missiles to a single-warhead configuration,

   Retire two of the oldest Trident submarines,

   Deploy only 111 warheads on each of the remaining 10 
        operational Trident submarines,

   Convert the B-2 bombers to a conventional role, and

   Provide only eight nuclear weapons for use on each 
        operational B-52 bomber.

    CBO estimates that the costs to remove the warheads and 
nuclear weapons from the missiles, submarines, and bombers; 
transport the warheads and weapons to storage facilities; and 
retire 150 missiles and two submarines would amount to about 
$370 million over the 2003-2007 period and $550 million through 
2012 (see Table 3). However, those costs would be more than 
offset by the $5.6 billion in savings over 10 years that would 
result from forgoing development and procurement of new systems 
to upgrade the two Trident submarines and 150 Minuteman 
missiles retired under this option (saving $3.1 billion) and 
from reduced operations costs (saving $2.5 billion). In total, 
the net savings associated with this option would be about $5.1 
billion over the 2003-2012 period, CBO estimates. (That 
estimate is relative to the Administration's fiscal year 2003-
2007 defense plan and includes the $55 million in costs to meet 
an interim goal of 3,800 warheads by 2007.) The details of this 
estimate are outlined below.
    In a similar manner, the United States could reduce the 
nuclear warhead levels further, to about 1,700, if it equipped 
all 350 remaining Minuteman missiles to carry only one warhead 
and deployed only 96 warheads on each of the 10 operational 
Trident submarines, instead of the 111 warheads indicated 
above. CBO estimates that, relative to the Administration's 
2003-2007 defense plan, the net savings associated with 
attaining that level would also total $5.1 billion over the 
2003-2012 period. (See Appendix A for further information about 
the details of this estimate, which is labeled Option 2A.)
    Missiles. CBO assumes that the Air Force would retire the 
Minuteman wing that is currently composed of 150 single-warhead 
missiles starting in 2005 and that the retirements would be 
completed by the end of 2007. The savings from retiring those 
missiles would total about $2.5 billion over the 2003-2012 
period, CBO estimates. Of that sum, savings of $1.8 billion 
would result from reduced operations costs over the 2005-2012 
period, or about $225 million a year. That estimate of savings 
includes the offsetting costs associated with securing and 
maintaining the empty silos. An additional $1 billion in 
savings over the 2003-2007 period would result from canceling 
planned propulsion upgrades (about $450 million) and guidance 
system upgrades (about $550 million) for those 150 missiles 
(see Table 3). (If the upgrades were canceled for the 150 
missiles, those missiles could not be reconstituted at some 
future time.)
    However, those savings would be partially offset by one-
time costs of about $230 million for two activities. First, to 
retire the missiles, the Air Force would have to remove the 
warheads and guidance sets from the missiles and then dismantle 
the booster stages. According to the Air Force, it would need 
to augment squadron personnel with contractor support to 
accomplish that effort and prepare the components to be moved 
from the launch site. On the basis of information provided by 
the Air Force, CBO estimates that the costs to dismantle the 
missiles would total about $90 million over the 2005-2007 
period. Second, the Air Force would need to transport the 
warheads, guidance sets, and booster stages to storage sites. 
CBO assumes that the Air Force would transport the boosters and 
guidance sets to Hill AFB in Utah and the Utah Test Range and 
that the Air Force would reimburse the Department of Energy's 
National Nuclear Security Administration to transport the 
warheads to DoD storage facilities. The costs for 
transportation and storage would total about $140 million over 
the 2005-2012 period, CBO estimates. Alternatively, the Air 
Force could choose to destroy the guidance sets. In that case, 
the Air Force would transport the guidance sets to the Boeing 
Guidance Repair Center in Ohio for their eventual destruction. 
CBO has not included those additional costs in the estimate 
because the Moscow Treaty does not require that the guidance 
sets be destroyed.
    CBO also assumes that the Air Force would convert an 
additional 200 missiles with multiple warheads to a single-
warhead configuration, removing 400 warheads as a result of 
that conversion. According to the Air Force, it would need to 
supplement squadron personnel with contractor support to 
accomplish that effort. CBO estimates that removing those 
warheads would cost about $15 million over the 2004-2007 
period, reflecting the costs of replacing the bulkheads (about 
$10 million) and transporting the warheads to DoD storage 
facilities (about $5 million). The estimate does not include 
any costs for buying the replacement bulkheads and buying more 
containers to ship and store the warheads because these items 
have already been purchased.
    Submarines. By retiring two Trident submarines carrying the 
older C4 missiles when they would otherwise enter an overhaul 
(one in 2005 and another one the following year), the Navy 
would remove a total of 288 warheads (144 warheads for each 
submarine) from operational status.\2\ The savings from 
retiring the submarines would total about $730 million in 
reduced operations costs through 2012, CBO estimates, although 
those savings would be offset somewhat by one-time costs of 
about $220 million to retire the submarines. CBO estimates no 
additional costs to transport the C4 missiles to DoD storage 
locations and eventually dispose of them because those missiles 
would be eliminated under the Administration's defense plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Under the Administration's defense plan, these submarines would 
be upgraded to carry D5 missiles, with a total of 384 warheads on the 
two vessels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Retiring two Trident submarines by 2007 would save an 
additional $2.2 billion in planned upgrades and purchases (see 
Table 3). Not overhauling the two submarines to accommodate the 
newer D5 missiles would save about $0.9 billion over the 2003-
2007 period, and not buying the 48 D5 missiles that would be 
deployed on the overhauled submarines would save about $1.3 
billion through 2012.
    Alternatively, the Navy could choose to convert those two 
Trident submarines to a conventional role instead of retiring 
them. Based on recent experience, the conversion costs, which 
also include the cost to equip the submarines with 154 Tomahawk 
missiles, would total about $2 billion, or roughly $1 billion 
for each submarine, CBO estimates.
    As in Option 1, CBO assumes an average of two submarines a 
year would undergo a major overhaul and thus not carry any 
missiles. Each of the 10 operationally deployed Trident 
submarines would deploy 111 warheads, or four to five warheads 
on each submarine's 24 D5 missiles as part of the approach to 
achieve the treaty's 2,200 level. (CBO assumes that 15 of the 
missiles would carry five W76 warheads and nine missiles would 
carry four W88 warheads.) In total, CBO calculates that 810 
warheads would be removed from service, and the costs to remove 
them would be negligible.
    To maintain the capability to redeploy eight warheads on 
each missile at some future time, the Navy would need to 
purchase additional hardware. CBO estimates that the costs of 
that hardware would total about $40 million over the 2003-2012 
period.
    Bombers. Under this option, CBO assumes that the Air Force 
would convert all 21 B-2 bombers to a conventional role by the 
end of 2012. In that case, 256 nuclear bombs would be moved 
from the B-2 bases to storage facilities, at a total cost of 
about $10 million in 2012, CBO estimates. But because the 
aircraft would continue to be used for non-nuclear missions, 
CBO estimates that there would be no savings from reduced 
operations.
    As in Option 1, CBO assumes that the Air Force would retain 
for immediate use on its bomber bases only eight nuclear 
weapons for each of its 56 operational B-52 bombers. CBO 
estimates that the costs to remove the 636 warheads from 
service, purchase the containers to place them in, and store 
nuclear warheads at facilities away from the bases would total 
about $40 million in 2012.

Accelerating Warhead Reductions to Achieve Moscow Treaty Goals by 2007

    The United States might be able to download warheads from 
strategic platforms more quickly than envisioned in either 
Options 1 or 2 described above (or Options 1A or 2A, which are 
described in Appendix A) to achieve Moscow Treaty goals by 
2007. However, both the Air Force and the NNSA have indicated 
that accelerating the downloading of warheads could be 
difficult given current plans to retire Peacekeeper missiles 
and current capacity to transport warheads. Any resources 
required to overcome those constraints would increase the 
estimated costs of options that simply download warheads 
(Options 1 and 1A) and decrease the savings attributed to 
options that both download warheads and retire delivery 
platforms (Options 2 and 2A). In the absence of specific plans 
from the Air Force and the NNSA describing how they might work 
to achieve this accelerated goal, CBO has no basis for 
independently estimating those additional resource 
requirements.
    In particular, the Air Force has indicated that current 
plans to retire the Peacekeeper missiles and upload the 
warheads from those missiles onto Minuteman missiles at F.E. 
Warren AFB would probably fully utilize all personnel at that 
base through 2007. Thus, additional efforts to download 
warheads from Minuteman missiles to achieve reductions five 
years earlier than assumed by CBO could prove difficult. The 
Air Force has also indicated that there may be insufficient 
space available to temporarily store the warheads while 
awaiting removal by the NNSA. That potential shortage of space 
could require either that DoD build more storage space or that 
the NNSA expand its fleet of transport vehicles.
    Currently, the NNSA has about 25 transport trailers, around 
56 armored tractors (for pulling the trailers), and 86 escort 
vehicles (for security). In addition, about 210 trained federal 
agents support those transport efforts. The NNSA plans to 
double those resources by 2008 to support refurbishing the 
arsenal of nuclear warheads and transporting plutonium from the 
Hanford Site in Washington and the Idaho Laboratory to the 
Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Therefore, efforts to 
meet the Administration's current plan and accelerate the 
warhead reductions to achieve Moscow Treaty goals by 2007 might 
require the NNSA to purchase more vehicles and hire more 
agents. Moreover, the 2,200-warhead goal established by the NPR 
is predicated on DoD and NNSA completing several other 
infrastructure initiatives. CBO does not have sufficient 
information to independently determine if those initiatives 
could be completed by 2007 or to estimate the costs to 
accelerate those efforts.

                         OTHER BUDGETARY ISSUES

    CBO has also reviewed:

   The impact on the nuclear weapons production complex 
        of dismantling, instead of storing, weapons removed 
        from service;

   The costs of additional transparency measures 
        associated with the Moscow Treaty, beyond those 
        measures existing under START;

   The costs of converting strategic bombers and 
        submarines to conventional missions but maintaining a 
        ready capability to revert to a strategic role; and

   The savings from lowering the operational status of 
        (taking off high alert) strategic forces scheduled for 
        retirement by 2012.

Impact on the Nuclear Weapons Production Complex of Dismantling 
        Warheads

    Tie NNSA's plans for inspecting and refurbishing warheads 
and producing tritium and pits are based on maintaining an 
inventory of nuclear warheads consistent with the U.S. nuclear 
forces permitted under START and the Administration's fiscal 
year 2003-2007 defense plan. There might not be any additional 
costs to maintain those warheads in a condition for speedy 
redeployment should they be removed from the missiles and 
stored at a DoD facility to meet the Moscow Treaty's reduction 
requirements. Such an approach to implementing the treaty would 
simply change the locations of warheads, not the total number 
that must be maintained.
    But dismantling, instead of storing, one-half or more of 
the warheads removed to meet the Moscow Treaty requirements 
could have substantial costs depending on when that task was 
performed. According to the NNSA, dismantling by 2012 one-half 
of the warheads that might be removed would cause a significant 
increase in workload at its Pantex facility. That increase 
would place the workload above current projections and beyond 
the capacity that will be provided once the three currently 
planned capital construction projects at Pantex are completed 
in 2007. If, however, completion of dismantlement could be 
delayed until the 2020-2025 period, the planned capacity at 
Pantex would probably be sufficient. The NNSA has not provided 
a specific estimate of the additional capacity that would be 
needed to complete dismantlement by 2012, and CBO currently 
lacks sufficient information to independently estimate that 
needed additional capacity and its cost.
    Also according to the NNSA, changes in the nuclear 
stockpile associated with implementing the Moscow Treaty should 
have no significant effect on its current plans for pit and 
tritium production. That conclusion is not surprising because 
the total number of warheads stored and maintained under the 
Moscow Treaty would probably not differ significantly from the 
number maintained under START. The NNSA states that ``the 
modern plutonium pit production facility that is planned to be 
operational by 2018 will provide a minimum single-shift 
capacity of 250 pits per year.'' \3\ The NNSA states further 
that ``this minimum capacity will be needed to support the 
stockpile associated with the Moscow Treaty.'' Similarly, the 
NNSA states that ``there will be no near-term reduction in the 
immediate demand for tritium.'' Thus, it is ``committed to its 
plan to begin tritium production in Tennessee Valley Authority 
reactors in fall 2003, and to complete construction and begin 
operations of a new tritium extraction facility at the Savannah 
River Site so that tritium can be delivered to the stockpile in 
advance of need and maintain the five-year reserve.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ NNSA's written responses to questions asked by CBO staff on 
July 22, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBO currently lacks sufficient information to estimate in 
detail the effects that dismantling warheads instead of storing 
and maintaining them might have on needed tritium and plutonium 
pit production capacities. But if the NNSA's current plans are 
based on maintaining a START inventory, dismantling some 
fraction of that inventory ought to imply a concomitant 
reduction in needed steady-state tritium and pit production 
capacities. If all or one-half of the warheads removed from 
operational status under the Moscow Treaty were dismantled, the 
resulting inventories would be about one-third to two-thirds of 
the START inventory. This implies that the capacity needed to 
produce pits and tritium might be one-third to two-thirds of 
currently planned levels. Under those circumstances, the NNSA's 
current plans for the modern plutonium pit production facility 
and the tritium extraction facility might need to be 
reevaluated. Any savings that might be achieved by redesigning 
these facilities could be offset by the costs to expand the 
capacity at the Pantex facility to ensure that warheads could 
be dismantled in a timely manner, however.

Transparency Measures

    The Moscow Treaty contains no additional verification 
provisions beyond those in START because, according to the 
Administration, U.S. security and the new strategic 
relationship with Russia do not require them. On the basis of 
funding levels for START program activities over the 1997-2002 
period, CBO estimates that the costs for future transparency 
measures associated with the Moscow Treaty would total about 
$50 million a year, assuming no change in the scope of 
verification efforts. CBO has no basis for estimating the costs 
of any additional measures that might be agreed to in the 
future.

Costs of Converting Bombers and Submarines to Non-Nuclear Missions But 
        Retaining the Option to Restore Nuclear Capability

    Apart from its previously announced intent to convert four 
Trident submarines to a conventional role and to retire the 
Peacekeeper missiles, the Administration has not yet developed 
detailed plans for implementing the reductions called for in 
the Moscow Treaty. In particular, it has announced no plans for 
converting bombers and submarines to a conventional-only 
configuration while retaining the option to restore their 
nuclear capability. The details of such plans would be 
important in determining both the costs for initial conversion 
as well as the costs to restore nuclear capability.
    For example, as mentioned under Option 2, converting two 
additional Trident submarines equipped with C4 missiles to the 
conventional configuration now planned for four of the 18 
submarines would cost about $1 billion per submarine. Those 
conversions would modify space currently used for other 
purposes to accommodate special operations forces and would 
alter the existing missile tubes to accommodate missiles armed 
with conventional warheads, including Tomahawk cruise missiles. 
Although those modifications could probably be reversed, CBO 
has no basis for estimating the costs of doing so.
    Converting existing nuclear-armed Trident submarines to a 
conventional configuration could also be accomplished in other 
ways. The Administration has requested funds to explore 
converting the nuclear-armed, intercontinental range Trident 
ballistic missile to a version armed with a conventional 
warhead. Equipping Trident submarines with such a missile might 
require minimal modifications to the submarines. But again, CBO 
has no basis for estimating the costs to develop, modify, and 
test such a missile.
    Similarly, the costs of converting bombers to a 
conventional-only configuration and subsequently restoring 
their nuclear capability depend on details not yet provided by 
the Administration. For example, one way that conversion could 
proceed in accordance with the Moscow Treaty would be to leave 
the existing physical configurations of the bombers unchanged 
while halting the training and other activities associated with 
nuclear missions and removing to remote storage all bomber-
delivered nuclear warheads. In that case, costs associated with 
the subsequent restoration of nuclear capability would probably 
be negligible. But if the Administration decided to convert all 
B-52 bombers to a conventional-only configuration by removing 
the physical and electronic interfaces they now have for 
carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles, conversion and 
restoration costs would probably be significant.

Lowering the Operational Status of Strategic Forces Scheduled for 
        Retirement by 2012

    Today, the United States and Russia keep hundreds of 
nuclear warheads in inventory, ready to launch within minutes. 
Lowering the operational status--sometimes called 
``dealerting''--increases the time that both countries have 
before they must decide whether to launch missiles in response 
to an attack. In general, lowering the operational status of 
strategic offensive forces would involve measures such as 
keeping the Trident submarines in patrol areas that are not 
within range of Russian targets, shutting off the switches in 
Minuteman missile silos, and keeping the strategic bombers off 
high alert. CBO expects that inplementing any of those actions 
would not significantly change the current deployment schedule 
of those forces and, therefore, would have a negligible impact 
on the costs of operations.

                               APPENDIX A

    CBO has also assessed the budgetary impact of reducing the 
number of warheads to about 1,700 under two scenarios--one 
without retiring delivery platforms and the other assuming 
retirement of 150 Minuteman missiles and two Trident 
submarines. Table A-1 shows the delivery platforms associated 
with the Administration's plan and these two scenarios. The 
costs or savings are very similar to those that would result 
from a reduction to 2,200 warheads. This appendix describes the 
basis for that estimate.
    Option 1A: Reduce the Number of Warheads to about 1,700 
Without Retiring Delivery Platforms from the Strategic 
Inventory. The Administration could reduce the number of 
warheads to about 1,700 by taking the following actions:

   Reconfigure the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles to 
        a single-warhead configuration,

   Deploy only 72 warheads on each of the 12 
        operational Trident submarines,

   Convert the B-2 bombers to a conventional role, and

   Remove operational weapons from storage areas at the 
        bomber bases so that only eight nuclear weapons would 
        be available for use on each operational bomber.

    CBO estimates that the costs to implement those reductions 
would total about $115 million over the 2003-2012 period, 
including the $55 million necessary to meet an interim goal of 
3,800 warheads by 2007 (see Table A-2). This cost is about $10 
million higher than the cost of Option 1, because it involves 
the removal of an additional 128 nuclear bombs from B-2 
bombers. The costs for removing the additional 288 warheads 
from the Trident submarines would be negligible.
    Missiles. The Air Force would remove 700 warheads by 
converting the 350 missiles that are currently configured to 
carry multiple warheads to a single-warhead configuration. The 
costs to remove those warheads would total about $25 million 
over the 2003-2012 period, CBO estimates.
    Submarines. Under this scenario, CBO assumes that the Navy 
would remove six D5 missiles from each Trident submarine, 
leaving only 18 D5 missiles per submarine, and would deploy 
four warheads on each of those missiles, for a total of 72 
warheads on each submarine. In all, CBO calculates that 1,440 
warheads would be removed. The costs to remove the missiles 
from the submarines and the warheads from the missiles would be 
negligible, CBO estimates, because those tasks could be done as 
part of regular maintenance activities.
    To maintain the capability to reload eight warheads on each 
missile at some future time, the Navy would need to purchase 
additional equipment. CBO estimates that the costs of that 
equipment would total about $40 million over the 2003-2012 
period.
    Bombers. As in Option 2, CBO assumes that the Air Force 
would convert all 21 B-2 bombers to a non-nuclear role in 2012. 
Removing 256 nuclear bombs, buying the containers to place them 
in, and transporting them to storage facilities would cost 
about $10 million in 2012, CBO estimates. The Air Force would 
retain on its bomber bases for immediate use only eight nuclear 
weapons for each of its 56 operational B-52 bombers. CBO 
estimates that the costs to remove and store the 636 warheads 
at facilities away from the bomber bases would total about $40 
million in 2012.
    Option 2A: Reduce the Number of Warheads to About 1,700 by 
Removing Delivery Platforms from the Strategic Inventory. 
Another way to reduce the number of warheads to 1,700 would be 
to remove some existing delivery platforms from the strategic 
inventory. One approach for implementing this option could 
involve the following actions:

   Retire 150 Minuteman missiles,

   Equip all remaining Minuteman missiles to carry only 
        one warhead instead of three,

   Retire two of the oldest Trident submarines,

   Deploy only 96 warheads on each of the 10 
        operational Trident submarines,

   Convert the B-2 bombers to a conventional role, and

   Provide only eight nuclear weapons for use on each 
        operational B-52 bomber.

This approach involves the same number of delivery platforms as 
Option 2, but 450 fewer warheads.
    CBO estimates that the costs to remove the warheads and 
nuclear weapons from the launchers and bomber bases, transport 
the warheads and weapons to storage facilities, and retire 150 
Minuteman missiles and two Trident submarines would total about 
$560 million over the 2003-2012 period. Those costs would be 
more than offset, however, by the significant savings from 
reduced operations costs and from canceling upgrades and 
purchases for the submarines and missiles that would be retired 
under this option. As with Option 2, CBO estimates that the net 
savings associated with this option would total about $5.1 
billion over 10 years (see Table A-2).
    Missiles. CBO assumes that the Air Force would retire 150 
Minuteman missiles starting in 2005 (as in Option 2) and that 
the retirements would be completed by the end of 2007. The net 
savings from retiring the missiles would total about $2.5 
billion through 2012, CBO etimates. CBO also assumes that the 
Air Force would convert the remaining 350 Minuteman missiles to 
a single-warhead configuration. Removing the 700 warheads would 
cost an estimated $25 million over the 2003-2012 period.
    Submarines. CBO estimates that the net savings from 
retiring two Trident submarines, one in 2005 and another one 
the following year, would amount to about $0.9 billion over the 
2003-2007 period and about $2.6 billion through 20l2.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Under the Administration's defense plan, these submarines would 
be upgraded to carry D5 missiles, with a total of 384 warheads on the 
two vessels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Assuming that the Navy would deploy 96 warheads on each 
remaining Trident submarine, or four warheads on each of the 
submarine's 24 D5 missiles, CBO calculates that 960 warheads 
would be removed. The costs to remove those warheads would be 
negligible. However, to maintain the capability to redeploy 
eight warheads on each missile at some future time, the Navy 
would need to purchase additional equipment, which CBO 
estimates would cost about $40 million over the 2003-2012 
period.
    Bombers. As in Option 2, CBO assumes that the Air Force 
would convert all 21 B-2 bombers to a conventional role in 
2012, resulting in costs of $10 million in that year to remove 
256 bombs, buy the containers to place them in, and transport 
them to storage facilities. Similarly, the Air Force would 
provide only eight nuclear weapons for each of its 56 
operational B-52 bombers. CBO estimates that the costs to 
remove the 636 nuclear weapons, purchase containers to place 
them in, and store them at facilities away from the bomber 
bases would total about $40 million in 2012.

       Table A-1.--Comparison of CBO's Options to Achieve the Moscow Treaty Goal of 1,700 Warheads by 2012
                            (In numbers of delivery platforms and deployed warheads)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   The Administration's FY       Option 1A: 1,700           Option 2A: 1,700
                                   2003-2007 Defense Plan    Warheads, No Retirements  Warheads, Fewer Platforms
             Weapon              --------------------------            \1\                        \1\
                                                  Warhead  -----------------------------------------------------
                                    Quantity       \2\        Quantity   Warheads \3\    Quantity   Warheads \4\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICBMs:
  Minuteman III.................          500        1,200          500           500          350           350
  Peacekeeper...................            0            0            0             0            0             0

SLBMs:
  Trident Submarines
    Carrying C4 Missiles........            0            0            0             0            0             0

  Trident Submarines
    Carrying D5 Missiles........           14        2,304           14           864           12           960

Bombers:
  B-1...........................        (\5\)            0        (\5\)             0        (\5\)             0
  B-2...........................           21          256        (\5\)             0        (\5\)             0
  B-52..........................           76        1,056           76           420           76           420
                                              -------------             --------------             -------------
    Total.......................  ...........        4,816  ...........         1,784  ...........         1,730
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Department of Defense.
Notes: FY = fiscal year; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile.

\1\ CBO has also postulated approaches to achieving the 2,200-warhead level in the Moscow Treaty. See Table 2
  for detailed descriptions of the force structure for those approaches.
\2\ Under the Administration's plan, warheads are counted as follows: three warheads on each of 350 Minuteman
  missiles and one warhead on each of the remaining 150 Minuteman missiles; eight warheads on each of the 24 D5
  missiles (for a total of 192 warheads on each of the 12 operationally deployed Trident submarines); 16 nuclear
  bombs on each ofthe 16 operationally deployed B-2 bombers; and from 12 to 20 cruise missiles on each of the 56
  operationally deployed B-52 bombers.
\3\ Under Option 1A, warheads are counted as follows: a single warhead on each of the 500 Minuteman missiles;
  four warheads on each of the 18 D5 missiles (for a total of 72 warheads on each of the 12 operationally
  deployed Trident submarines); and about eight cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B-52
  bombers.
\4\ Under Option 2A, warheads are counted as follows: a single warhead on each of the 350 Minuteman missiles;
  four warheads on each of the 24 D5 missiles (for a total of 96 warheads on each of the 10 operationally
  deployed Trident submarines); and about eight cruise missiles on each of the 56 operationally deployed B-52
  bombers.
\5\ All B-1 bombers would be permanently converted to a conventional role. Under Options 1A and 2A, all B-2
  bombers would be permanently converted to a conventional role.

 Table A-2.--Costs and Savings (-) of Alternative Approaches to Achieving the Moscow Treaty Goal Relative to the
                             Administration's Fiscal Year 2003-2007 Defense Program
                                            (In millions of dollars)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                             Canceled
                                                                      Warhead     Reduced   Upgrades/    Total,
                                                                      Removal   Operations  Purchases  2003-2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Option 1A: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 1,700 by 2012 Without
 Retiring Delivery Platforms: \1\
    ICBMs..........................................................         25           0          0         25
    SLBMs..........................................................         40           0          0         40
    Bombers........................................................         50           0          0         50
                                                                    --------------------------------------------
      Subtotal.....................................................        115           0          0        115

Option 2A: Reduce the Number of Warheads to 1,700 by 2012 by
 Retiring Delivery Platforms: \1\
    ICBMs..........................................................        250      -1,760     -1,000     -2,510
    SLBMs..........................................................        260        -730     -2,150     -2,620
    Bombers........................................................         50           0          0         50
      Subtotal.....................................................        560      -2,490     -3,150    --5,080
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Note: ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile. Numbers may not
  add up to totals because of rounding.

\1\ Costs and savings displayed reflect approaches to reducing current levels of warheads to the Moscow Treaty
  goal of 1,700 warheads. CBO has also postulated approaches to achieving the 2,200-warhead level in the Moscow
  Treaty. CBOs estimates for achieving that level are not significantly different in total from the costs
  displayed above.


```