alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Case No. 13,865.

#### THATCHER HEATING CO. v. DRUMMOND et al.

[3 Ban. & A. 138.] 1

Circuit Court, D. New Jersey.

Oct., 1877.

Patents — Inpeingements—Admissions.

Where complainants proved admissions of the defendants, (1) that they had sold a number of a certain article, and (2) that said article was substantially the same as the article described in the three claims of the complainant’s patent, and no testimony was offered by the defendants, *held,*that the infringement was sufficiently proved.

[For another case involving this patent, see Thatcher Heating Co. v. Burtis, 12 Fed. 669.]

[This was a bill in equity by the Thatcher Heating Company against William H. Drum-mond and others.]

F. C. Bowman, for complainant

A. J. Todd, for defendants.

NIXON, District Judge.

This suit is brought for the alleged infringement of letters patent No.. 104,376, dated June 14, 1870, granted to John M. Thatcher for “improvement in fire-place heaters.” The answer of the defendants denies that the said Thatcher was the original and first inventor of the improvement described in said letters patent; and claims that the substantial matters and things set forth therein, were described in various patents and printed publications, specifically enumerated in said answer, and were in public use long anterior to the date of the said letters patent.

The complainant proved its incorporation; the issuing of letters patent to John M. Thatcher; various mesne assignments to the corporation; and the admissions of the defendants, that they had sold a number of the Burtis heaters, and that the Burtis heater was substantially the same as the heater described in the three claims of the complainant’s patent, and then rested its case. No testimony has been offered by the defendants.

The letters patent owned by the complainant are prima facie good, and the infringement is proved. There must be a decree for the complainant, an injunction, and a reference for an account.
#### John R. PECKHAM and W.T. Woolum v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD AND ALLIED TRADES UNION and Industry National Pension Fund.

No. 82-1640.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

Dec. 16, 1983.

Before SETH, Chief Judge, and HOLLOWAY, McWilliams, barrett, doyle, McKAY, LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.

Before SETH, Chief Judge, and LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING

In its petition for rehearing the Board of Trustees for the first time raises the issue whether we have jurisdiction to consider this case. We hold that we do have authority to grant the relief ordered. We need not decide whether an employer, *qua*employer, may bring an action to enforce a return of contributions mistakenly paid. *Compare Fenton Industries, Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund,*674 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.1982), *with Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. Teamsters Pension Fund,*549 F.Supp. 307 (E.D.Pa.1982), *aff’d mem.*720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir.1983). *See also Pressrooms Unions*—Printers *League Income Security Fund v. Continental Assurance Co.,*700 F.2d 889 (2d Cir.1983). Plaintiffs Peckham and Woolum were named participants in the trust; they brought suit to recover pension rights in their capacities as partici*101pants. Although our earlier opinion held they were not entitled to retirement benefits, we are satisfied that we retain jurisdiction to prevent unjust enrichment of the fund for the amounts these individuals paid into the fund for their own accounts. *See*Prop.Treas.Reg. § 1.401(a)-3, Ex. (1).

Relying on Prop.Treas.Reg. § 1.401(a)-3(6)(2)(ii)(A), the Board also challenges our award of interest on the mistaken contributions we have ordered refunded. This proposed tax regulation states that plans may not return earnings attributable to excess contributions or over-payments. The purpose of the regulation being promulgated is to establish uniform rules applicable to all qualified retirement plans. The prohibition against refunding earnings attributable to excess contributions or overpayments is apparently aimed at discouraging excess contributions and recognizes that the plan incurs administrative costs in calculating overpayments and making refunds. Acknowledging that our order requiring the payment of interest is inconsistent with the proposed treasury regulation, we bow to the expertise of the Service and its desire for uniform rules. We therefore rescind that portion of our opinion directing the Board to pay the plaintiffs interest on the mistaken contributions that we ordered refunded. With this modification, the opinion is reaffirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 8559 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 8559

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to protect small businesses 
  from unemployment insurance premium increases by reason of unrepaid 
                            State advances.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 23, 2024

Mrs. Steel (for herself and Ms. Tenney) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to protect small businesses 
  from unemployment insurance premium increases by reason of unrepaid 
                            State advances.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. PROTECTION OF SMALL BUSINESS FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 
              PREMIUM INCREASES BY REASON OF UNREPAID STATE ADVANCES.

    (a) In General.--Section 3302(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
    ``(4) Credits of Small Businesses Not Reduced by Reason of Unrepaid 
Advances.--
            ``(A) In general.--Paragraph (2) shall not apply with 
        respect to any specified small business.
            ``(B) Specified small business.--For purposes of this 
        paragraph, the term `specified small business' means any 
        taxpayer if such taxpayer employs fewer than 500 employees as 
        of the close of the third quarter of the calendar year 
        immediately preceding the second consecutive January 1 referred 
        to in paragraph (2)(A)(i).''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

QUY DINH NGUYEN, AKA The Boss,

AKA The Godfather, AKA The Old Man,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-30079

D.C. No. 2:09-cr-00062-RSM-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 9, 2013

Seattle, Washington

Before: D.W. NELSON, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

Quy Dinh Nguyen appeals from the denial of his motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and dismiss the appeal

pursuant to the appellate waiver included in Nguyen’s plea agreement. In the

FILED

APR 26 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

alternative, we affirm on the merits the district court’s denial of Nguyen’s motion

to withdraw. 

1. “A defendant’s waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable if (1) the

language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, and

(2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v. Jeronimo, 398

F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v.

Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Nguyen argues only

that his waiver is ambiguous as to whether he retained the right to pursue the

instant appeal, thus effectively conceding that his federal waiver was knowing and

voluntary. Pursuant to his plea agreement, however, Nguyen unambiguously

waived the right to appeal both the finding of his guilt (i.e., his conviction) and his

sentence. See United States v. Rahman, 642 F.3d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Nguyen’s appeal is thus dismissed. 

2. Even if Nguyen had not waived his right to appeal, the district court

properly denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Pursuant to Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B), “[a] defendant may withdraw a guilty plea . . .

after the court accepts the plea, but before it imposes sentence if . . . the defendant

can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” The standard is

applied liberally. See United States v. Nagra, 147 F.3d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1998). 
3

“Fair and just reasons for withdrawal include inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies,

newly discovered evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for

withdrawing the plea that did not exist when the defendant entered the plea.” 

United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2004).

Nothing in the record indicates the district court applied an incorrect

standard in rejecting Nguyen’s motion. Moreover, Nguyen points to no flaws in

the federal proceedings. We thus conclude that Nguyen did not show a fair and

just reason to withdraw his plea. We do not reach his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, which is better reserved for a habeas proceeding. United States v.

Simas, 937 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DISMISSED.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 94-5777

CHRISTOPHER WAYNE CHAMBERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

Robert D. Potter, Senior District Judge.

(CR-94-29-P)

Submitted: January 28, 1997

Decided: February 24, 1997

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and WILKINS,

Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Randolph Marshall Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte,

North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Wayne Chambers pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West Supp. 1996). He was sentenced to

151 months imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised

release. The district court imposed a $3000 fine. Chambers's attorney

has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738 (1967), raising one potential jurisdictional claim but concluding

that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Chambers was notified of his right to file a supplemental brief, but has not done so. We

affirm.

Counsel claims that the district court should not have asserted jurisdiction over Chambers because he was not yet eighteen years old during his early participation in the conspiracy. But counsel concedes

that Chambers was eighteen when he committed some overt acts in

furtherance of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is a continuing crime, and

the fact that Chambers may have become involved in the conspiracy

before his eighteenth birthday does not protect him from being prosecuted as an adult as long as his participation continued after his eighteenth birthday. United States v. Spoone, 741 F.2d 680, 687 (4th Cir.

1984). Therefore, this claim lacks merit.

In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire record in

this case and find no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore

affirm the conviction and sentence. We deny counsel's motion to

withdraw at this time. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the

United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition

be filed but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served

on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the record and briefs, and oral argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 2
No. 47969.

#### Protests 978583-G, etc., of G. A. Westphal & Co. (New York).

*385Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

It was stipulated that certain of the figures in question are not toys, and that they are similar in all material respects (except component material of chief value and that they are not manger sets) to the small figures the subject of decision in *Joseph Schmidt, Inc.*v. *United States*(9 Cust. Ct.188, C. D. 690). In accordance therewith, the figures in question were held not subject to countervailing duty. Protests sustained as to certain items.
Exhibit 32.4

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C.§1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of the Currency Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund on Form 10-Q for the
period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned hereby certifies, to the best of his knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Currency Series.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                                                                                                               
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Robert J. Enck                                                                                                                             
|Robert J. Enck                                                                                                                                 
|President and Chief Executive Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC, the Managing Owner of the Currency Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund
|                                                                                                                                               
|/s/ Brent Bales                                                                                                                                
|Brent Bales                                                                                                                                    
|Chief Financial Officer of Equinox Fund Management, LLC, the Managing Owner of the Currency Series, a Series of The Frontier Fund              

Date: August 14, 2009
#### Commonwealth *v.*Storch, Appellant.

Submitted September 29, 1969.

Before Bell, C. J., Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts and Pomeroy, JJ.

*640
      *Ernest Earl Storeh,*appellant, in propria persona.

*Robert F. Hawh,*Assistant District Attorney, and *John H. Brydon,*District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.

November 11, 1969:

Opinion

Pee Curiam,

The case is remanded for counsel previously appointed below to proceed in accordance with Rule 1503(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.
1 

### James Battaglia

From: Lord, Richard CCS [ mailto:Richard.Lord@carrier.utc.com ] Sent: Thursday, July 25, 2013 7:27 AM
To: James Battaglia; Rabbia, Mark R Cc: Whitwell, Robert Subject: RE: Manufacturer Interview Follow Up



### I can answer this. I was the person who developed all the justification and backup for the IEER equat ion. The IEER equation is a metric for the annualized effici ency of the refrigeration system. It is not a metr ic for the rooftop system taking into account added features l ike economizers, energy recovery, etc. Goal was to have a metric that better represents the mechanical effici ency of the refrigeration system including the indo or fan.

It was developed by look at several buildings acros s all 17 ASHRAE 90.1 climate zones. When we determ ined the weighting factors we only used the hours where the compressor is running and excluded hours where only the airside economizer is running. Keep in mind th e ASHRAE 90.1 requirements are to have integrated economizers where the compressor supplements the ec onomizer. We did include these hours.

This is consistent with the DOE basic model group d efinitions that are being finalized as we speak wer e when develop ratings for full load and verification test ing is done the economizer is not factored into the ratings.

ASHRAE 90.1 is working on a new alternate path for a systems level approach that will include the economizers, energy recovery and all the aspects of a complete rooftop building HVAC system.

Feel free to use the above for explanation in your report to DOE. It is not exactly what you describe d below where the factors were reduced. They were just bas ed on hours of operation where mechanical cooling w as active. Also note that the ambient rebalance was a lso developed based on mechanical cooling operating
hours.

Let me know if you have questions.

Richard Lord Carrier Corporation

From: James Battaglia Sent: Wednesday, July 24, 2013 3:38 PM
To: Whitwell, Robert Cc: Lord, Richard CCS; Rabbia, Mark R; Laura Degitz Subject: RE: Manufacturer Interview Follow Up

Hi Bob,

During the team’s visit with you, it was discussed that for the IEER metric, the lower part-load measu rement levels use lower weighting factors that take into account econ omizing, since for lower ambient conditions, econom izers handle
more of the load. Since we weren’t involved in the development process of AHRI 340/360, would it be ok ay if we referenced that information publicly?2 Just let us know if it would be okay, or if you hav e any questions or concerns.

Best Regards,

James

___________________________________________________ ______ James Battaglia | Managing Consultant | Energy | Navigant
__________________________________

C This decision is rendered by a quorum due to the retirement of then-Chief Judge Hatchett

on May 14, 1999. See, 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 95-6960

________________________

D. C. Docket No. CR-95-AR-91-S

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ROY MACK WEST, a.k.a. Teeny Man, etc.,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

_________________________

(January 26, 2000)

ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Before GODBOLD and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judges.*

PER CURIAM:
2

This case comes before us by order of the United States Supreme Court, which

has vacated the judgment of this Court as to appellant Roy Mack West, and remanded

the case for our reconsideration in light of Richardson v. United States, 119 S.Ct.

1707(1999). See United States v. West, 142 F.3d 1408 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated and

remanded, 119 S.Ct. 2042 (1999). In Richardson, the Supreme Court held that “a jury

in a federal criminal case brought under [21 U.S.C.] § 848 must unanimously agree

not only that the defendant committed some ‘continuing series of violations’ but also

that the defendant committed each of the individual ‘violations’ necessary to make

up that ‘continuing series.’” 119 S.Ct. at 1709. 

West was convicted of both conducting a continuing criminal enterprise

(“CCE”)(Count 1) and being a member of the underlying drug conspiracy (Count 2).

At sentencing, the court vacated Count 2 as a lesser included offense of the CCE

conviction. See United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 908 (11th Cir. 1990) (when

defendant convicted on both a CCE count and a conspiracy county, the Court will

merge the two offenses by vacating the conviction of the lesser included conspiracy

count). The government concedes that the jury instruction given was not in accord

with the requirements of Richardson and that West’s conviction on the CCE count

cannot stand, see also United States v. Riley, No. 96-4653 (11th
3

Cir.1999)(unpublished), and requests that this Court remand to the district court with

instructions to reinstate the vacated drug conspiracy count and resentence West. 

Accordingly, we vacate West’s conviction for engaging in a continuing criminal

enterprise. Since the conspiracy conviction under Count 2 was vacated only because

it was a lesser included offense of the CCE conviction, and the CCE conviction no

longer stands, we remand this case to the district court with instructions to reinstate

West’s conspiracy conviction under Count 2 and resentence him. 

VACATED AND REMANDED.
Exhibit 32.2

 

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

 

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the undersigned officer of Schrödinger, Inc. (the “Company”) hereby certifies, to his knowledge, that:

 

|   | (i) | the accompanying Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2019 (the “Report”) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and |
|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

|   | (ii) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|--------|------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

Date: March 16, 2020 

 

|                                                             |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|
| /s/ Joel Lebowitz                                           |
|  Chief Financial Officer (Principal Financial Officer) |
#### Hudson G. Bottum *et al.,*Resp’ts, *v.*John Scott, App’lt.

*Walter 8. Logan,*for resp’ts; *Ira JD. Warren,*for app’.t.

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

All concur.

Affirming 11 N. Y. State Rep., 514.