[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Bradford v. Bowen, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-1105.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-1105

THE STATE EX REL. BRADFORD, APPELLANT, v. BOWEN, WARDEN, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Bradford v. Bowen, Slip Opinion No. 

2023-Ohio-1105.]

Habeas corpus—Court of appeals properly considered certified copy of habeas 

petitioner’s birth certificate and did not err in concluding that birth 

certificate was the most probative evidence of petitioner’s age—Habeas 

petitioner has not shown that adult court lacked jurisdiction over his 

criminal case—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed.

(No. 2022-0545—Submitted January 10, 2023—Decided April 5, 2023.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County, No. 20 MA 0025.

__________________

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In State ex rel. Bradford v. Bowen, 167 Ohio St.3d 477, 2022-Ohio351, 194 N.E.3d 345, ¶ 16, we reversed the Seventh District Court of Appeals’ 

judgment dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by appellant, Pele K. 
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Bradford. We remanded the cause to the court of appeals, ordering it “to allow the 

writ, to require [appellee, Warden Richard A. Bowen Jr.,] to make a return, and to 

determine whether Bradford was under 18 years old on January 2, 2004.” Id. On 

remand, the court of appeals “allow[ed] the writ” but directed the warden “to [only] 

file and supplement the record with a certified copy of Bradford’s birth certificate.” 

After the warden submitted a certified copy of Bradford’s birth certificate, the court 

of appeals denied the writ. Bradford appeals to this court as of right.

{¶ 2} Although the court of appeals did not precisely follow our mandate in 

Bradford and the warden did not file a return of writ, precedent allowed the court of 

appeals to treat the newly filed birth certificate, together with the warden’s previously 

filed dispositive motion, as a return. Because the evidence shows that Bradford was 

over 18 years old on January 2, 2004, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment.

Background

{¶ 3} We set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case in 

Bradford:

In 2004, a jury found Bradford guilty of aggravated murder, 

having a weapon while under a disability, and two firearm 

specifications for an incident that occurred on January 2, 2004. The 

firearm specifications were merged for sentencing. Bradford was 

sentenced to life in prison with parole eligibility after 20 years for 

aggravated murder, one year in prison for having a weapon while 

under a disability, and three years in prison for the firearm 

specification. The prison terms were ordered to be served 

consecutively. In 2007, he was convicted of escape, for which he 

received an additional two-year prison sentence.

In February 2020, Bradford filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus in the court of appeals alleging that his 2004 convictions are 
January Term, 2023

3

void because he was 17 years old at the time of the offenses and was 

not bound over from a juvenile court. He relies on a form 1099-C he 

received in 2011 from the United States Department of Education 

reporting the cancellation of debt on a student loan and a notice he 

received from the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) in 2017, both of 

which list his date of birth as November 25, 1986. He also purports 

to rely on a “Christian Baptismal Certificate” that allegedly lists the 

same birthdate, but he did not file a baptismal certificate with his 

petition.

The warden filed a “motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, 

motion for summary judgment,” arguing, among other things, that 

Bradford had not offered “the best evidence to support his factual 

assertion of his birthdate.” The warden attached to his motion a copy 

of a birth certificate that lists Bradford’s birthdate as November 25, 

1978. In his motion, the warden stated that he had “obtained a birth 

certificate from Bradford’s file” and that he was “submit[ting] an 

authenticated copy thereof that establishes Bradford’s birth date 

several years prior to the birthdate Bradford is claiming in his 

petition.” The document the warden filed with his motion does not 

contain the original signature of the local registrar who certified the

document, nor does it include a seal. The warden did not authenticate 

the document by affidavit; he simply attached it to his motion.

Id. at ¶ 2-4.

{¶ 4} We reversed the court of appeals’ decision granting summary judgment 

in the warden’s favor, because the court of appeals had improperly considered the 

copy of the birth certificate attached to the warden’s motion for summary judgment 

in violation of Civ.R. 56(C). Bradford, 167 Ohio St.3d 477, 2022-Ohio-351, 194 
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N.E.3d 345, at ¶ 10-11, 16. We remanded the cause to the court of appeals, ordering 

it “to allow the writ, to require the warden to make a return, and to determine whether 

Bradford was under 18 years old on January 2, 2004.” Id. at ¶ 16.

{¶ 5} Under R.C. 2725.14(B), a person making a return of writ, among other 

things, “shall set forth, at large, the authority, and the true and whole cause, of such 

imprisonment and restraint, with a copy of the writ, warrant, or other process upon 

which the prisoner is detained.” R.C. 2725.15 provides that “[t]he return or 

statement referred to in [R.C. 2725.14] shall be signed by the person who makes it, 

and shall be sworn to by him, unless he is a sworn public officer and makes the 

return in his official capacity.”

{¶ 6} On remand from our decision in Bradford, the court of appeals 

ordered the following:

IT IS ORDERED by the Court that the writ is allowed. 

Allowing the writ means only that a return is ordered. Watkins v. 

Collins, 110 Ohio St.3d 1477, 2006-Ohio-4578, 853 N.E.2d 672. 

And, in this instance, the return is limited only to a determination of 

whether Bradford was under 18 years old on January 2, 2004. 

[Bradford at ¶ 16.] More precisely, the warden is directed to file 

and supplement the record with a certified copy of Bradford’s birth 

certificate—one which bears an appropriate certification, including 

an original signature and a seal. Id.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the warden shall file a 

return of writ within 14 days of service of the petition, and Bradford 

may file a response within 14 days after the return is filed. The 

warden shall provide a copy of the return to Bradford on the same 

date that the return is filed. Bradford’s physical presence before the 
January Term, 2023

5

court is not required. Reed v. Kinkela, 84 Ohio St.3d 1427, 702 

N.E.2d 903 (1998).

(Capitalization sic.)

{¶ 7} On March 28, 2022, the warden filed in the court of appeals a 

document labeled as a “return of writ,” in which he stated that he had served a 

subpoena duces tecum on the Ohio Department of Health (“ODH”) in seeking a 

certified copy of Bradford’s birth certificate. The warden did not include with that

filing any documents showing why Bradford was incarcerated, and the filing was 

signed by the warden’s counsel but not by the warden himself. Bradford filed a 

response to the warden’s filing, along with motions to strike the filing for failure to 

comply with R.C. 2725.14(B) and 2725.15 and a motion to quash the warden’s 

subpoena for failure to comply with the filing and service requirements of Civ.R. 

45(A)(3) and (B). The warden then filed a certified copy of Bradford’s birth 

certificate, which shows that Bradford’s birthdate is November 25, 1978.

{¶ 8} In denying the writ, the court of appeals found that “[t]he warden 

ha[d] filed a return of the writ along with a certified copy of Bradford’s birth 

certificate” and concluded that the certified copy of the birth certificate “is a selfauthenticated public record under Evid.R. 902(4)” that is “more reliable and 

credible evidence of [Bradford’s] date of birth” than the documents attached to his

petition. 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 20 MA 0025, at 3 (Apr. 27, 2022). The court also 

denied Bradford’s motions. Id. at 4.

{¶ 9} Bradford appeals to this court as of right.

Analysis

{¶ 10} Bradford argues that the court of appeals “improperly consider[ed] 

the warden’s return of writ” and that the warden’s March 28, 2022 filing should 

have been stricken because the warden did not provide copies of any documents 

justifying Bradford’s incarceration, see R.C. 2725.14(B), or sign and swear to the 
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statements in the filing, see R.C. 2725.15. The warden, for his part, does not argue 

that his March 28 filing complied with R.C. 2725.14(B) and 2725.15. He simply 

argues that the court of appeals properly considered the certified copy of Bradford’s 

birth certificate and that the birth certificate is more reliable and credible evidence 

of Bradford’s birthdate than the documents Bradford submitted.

{¶ 11} Bradford is correct that the warden’s March 28 filing did not include 

the statutorily required contents of a return of writ. But in Bradford, we recognized 

that under certain circumstances, a court may “treat[] a dispositive motion as a 

return and weigh[] the evidence.” 167 Ohio St.3d 477, 2022-Ohio-351, 194 N.E.3d 

345, at ¶ 15; see also McIntyre v. Hooks, 162 Ohio St.3d 213, 2020-Ohio-3529, 165 

N.E.3d 229, ¶ 7; Hammond v. Dallman, 63 Ohio St.3d 666, 667, 590 N.E.2d 744 

(1992). That is what happened here. The warden had already filed a dispositive 

motion, and on remand from this court’s decision in Bradford, the court of appeals 

directed the warden to “supplement the record with a certified copy of Bradford’s 

birth certificate.”

{¶ 12} In Bradford, we determined that the court of appeals had erred by 

considering a document that had not been submitted in compliance with Civ.R. 

56(C). Bradford at ¶ 11. That limitation did not apply to the court of appeals’ 

decision on remand, however, because the court of appeals did not purport to grant 

summary judgment. On remand, the court of appeals denied the writ after weighing 

the evidence. See id. at ¶ 15 (“On remand, after the warden makes a return, the 

court of appeals must weigh the parties’ evidence”). Therefore, it was proper for 

the court of appeals to weigh the evidence after treating the warden’s dispositive 

motion and supplemental filing as a return.

{¶ 13} Bradford suggests that the court of appeals should not have 

considered the certified copy of the birth certificate, because the warden allegedly 

did not serve the subpoena for the certificate on Bradford as required under Civ.R. 

45(A)(3) and did not file a return of the subpoena as required under Civ.R. 45(B). 
January Term, 2023

7

But these arguments relate to the court of appeals’ denial of Bradford’s motion to 

quash the subpoena, which was rendered moot when ODH complied with the 

subpoena. See Tadross v. Ikladious, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102531, 2015-Ohio3147, ¶ 8. Bradford has not shown that the warden’s alleged noncompliance with 

Civ.R. 45 precluded the court of appeals from considering the warden’s evidence.

{¶ 14} The court of appeals properly considered the certified copy of 

Bradford’s birth certificate and did not err in concluding that the birth certificate is 

the most probative evidence of Bradford’s age. Because that evidence shows that 

Bradford was 25 years old on January 2, 2004, Bradford has not shown that the 

adult court lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case. Accordingly, the court of 

appeals correctly denied Bradford’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Conclusion

{¶ 15} Because the court of appeals properly weighed the evidence after 

treating the warden’s filing as a return of writ, we affirm the court of appeals’ 

judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur.

KENNEDY, C.J., dissents, with an opinion joined by FISCHER, J.

_________________

KENNEDY, C.J., dissenting.

{¶ 16} Because the Seventh District Court of Appeals failed to comply with 

our mandate directing it to order a return of the writ in this habeas case, I would 

reverse its judgment denying the writ. The majority does not. I therefore dissent.

{¶ 17} We previously addressed an appeal in this matter by appellant, Pele 

K. Bradford, in State ex rel. Bradford v. Bowen, 167 Ohio St.3d 477, 2022-Ohio351, 194 N.E.3d 345 (“Bradford I”). Bradford had petitioned the Seventh District 

for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to 

convict and sentence him because he was less than 18 years old at the time of the 
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offenses and there had been no bindover from a juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 8. The court 

of appeals dismissed Bradford’s petition, relying on an unauthenticated copy of his 

birth certificate indicating that he was 18 years old at the time of the offenses. Id. 

at ¶ 1, 4-5. This court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded 

the matter to that court, ordering it “to allow the writ, to require [appellee, Warden 

Richard A. Bowen Jr.,] to make a return, and to determine whether Bradford was 

under 18 years old on January 2, 2004.” Id. at ¶ 16. Importantly, this court 

determined that the motion to dismiss filed by Bowen could not be treated as a 

return of the writ. Id. at ¶ 15.

{¶ 18} On remand, the Seventh District “allow[ed] the writ,” but rather than 

order a return of the writ, it instructed Bowen “to file and supplement the record

with a certified copy of Bradford’s birth certificate.” The court of appeals then 

denied the writ after Bowen presented a certified copy of Bradford’s birth 

certificate, which showed that Bradford was an adult at the time he committed the 

offenses. According to the court of appeals, this date-of-birth evidence meant that 

Bradford’s claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentences that 

he is serving was without merit.

{¶ 19} At issue in this appeal is whether the court of appeals complied with 

our mandate in Bradford I. We have explained that “[an inferior] court is without 

authority to extend or vary the mandate issued by a superior court.” Giancola v. 

Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594, 2018-Ohio-1694, 109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 16. “[A]bsent 

extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by this court, an 

inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a 

prior appeal in the same case.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 462 N.E.2d 410 

(1984).

{¶ 20} Our mandate in Bradford I, 167 Ohio St.3d 477, 2022-Ohio-351, 194 

N.E.3d 345, directed the court of appeals to order Bowen to file a return of the writ. 

However, the court of appeals did not do that. It therefore failed to comply with 
January Term, 2023

9

our mandate, and reversal of its judgment is required “to preserve the structure of 

superior and inferior courts as designed by the Ohio Constitution,” Nolan at 3.

{¶ 21} The majority treats Bowen’s motion to dismiss as the functional 

equivalent of a return of the writ. That is error.

{¶ 22} R.C. 2725.14(B) mandates that a person making a return of the writ

“shall set forth, at large, the authority, and the true and whole cause, of such 

imprisonment and restraint, with a copy of the writ, warrant, or other process upon 

which the prisoner is detained.” R.C. 2725.15 requires a return of the writ to “be 

signed by the person who makes it [and] be sworn to by him, unless he is a sworn 

public officer and makes the return in his official capacity.” As the majority 

acknowledges, “[t]he warden did not include with [his initial, postremand filing, 

which he labeled a ‘return of writ’] any documents showing why Bradford was 

incarcerated, and the filing was signed by the warden’s counsel but not by the 

warden himself.” Majority opinion, ¶ 7. Bowen’s motion to dismiss is not a return 

of the writ.

{¶ 23} The majority relies on our suggestion in Bradford I that a court may 

“treat[] a dispositive motion as a return and weigh[] the evidence,” 167 Ohio St.3d 

477, 2022-Ohio-351, 194 N.E.3d 345, at ¶ 15. The majority also cites two cases,

McIntyre v. Hooks, 162 Ohio St.3d 213, 2020-Ohio-3529, 165 N.E.3d 229, and

Hammond v. Dallman, 63 Ohio St.3d 666, 590 N.E.2d 744 (1992), in support of its 

position.

{¶ 24} The majority’s reliance on our decision in Bradford I is puzzling. In 

that decision, we stated that we could not treat Bowen’s motion to dismiss as a 

return of the writ, “because the warden’s motion ‘did not contain a sworn statement 

concerning [Bradford’s] age at the time of the offenses or properly authenticated 

documents establishing such age.’ ” (Brackets added in Bradford I.) Id. at ¶ 15, 

quoting State ex rel. Harris v. Anderson, 76 Ohio St.3d 193, 196, 667 N.E.2d 1 

(1996). And in Bradford I, we distinguished this court’s decision in Hammond to 
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treat a dispositive motion as a return on the basis that the “dispositive motion [in 

Hammond] was ‘supported by the proper authenticated documents.’ ” Bradford I

at ¶ 15, quoting Hammond at 667. The dispositive motion filed by Bowen in this 

case was not similarly supported.

{¶ 25} It is unclear whether McIntyre actually supports the majority’s 

position. In that case, this court, citing Hammond, did say that “[w]e may treat a 

motion to dismiss as a return of writ,” McIntyre at ¶ 7. But this court in McIntyre

did not describe the contents of the motion to dismiss at issue, so it is not possible 

to say that the motion to dismiss was the equivalent of a return of the writ.

{¶ 26} In any event, if this court could not treat Bowen’s motion to dismiss 

as a return of the writ in Bradford I, then the court of appeals on remand from 

Bradford I likewise could not treat the same motion to dismiss as a return. “[W]here 

at a rehearing following remand [an inferior] court is confronted with substantially 

the same facts and issues as were involved in the prior appeal, the court is bound to 

adhere to the appellate court’s determination of the applicable law.” Nolan, 11 

Ohio St.3d at 3, 462 N.E.2d 410. Nor should we disregard the law of the case 

established by our prior decision. “[T]he law of the case is applicable to subsequent 

proceedings in the reviewing court as well as the [inferior] court.” Id. at 4.

{¶ 27} The Seventh District disregarded our mandate and failed to follow 

the law of the case. For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals and remand this matter to that court with instructions for it to order a return 

of the writ. Because the majority does not, I dissent.

FISCHER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________

Pele K. Bradford, pro se.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and William H. Lamb, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

_________________