Ocean Margin Drilling

May 1980

NTIS order #PB80-198302
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-600083

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock No. 052-003-00754-1
PREFACE

This Technical Memorandum was prepared in response to a request from

the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the HUD-Independent

Agencies Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. The

Committee requested that OTA conduct an evaluation of the Ocean Margin

Drilling Program, a major new public-private cooperative research effort

in marine geology proposed by the National Science Foundation. They were

particularly interested in the scientific merits of the program and

whether other, less costly alternatives could yield the same or greater

scientific return.

Because OTA already had a more general ongoing study of ocean

research technology, the agency was able to respond quickly to this

request. The Memorandum was prepared with the advice and assistance of a

small panel of scientists plus a much broader group of scientists,

engineers, petroleum company representatives, and others who submitted

material for our use and reviewed our draft report. The study discusses

the scientific merit of the program, possible alternatives to the present

program plan, problems associated with technology development, aspects of

petroleum company participation in the program, and government management

considerations. There are also appendices including specific alternatives

proposed by the OTA panel members and historical factors leading to the

present plans.

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

i i i
OTA Staff for

Review of the Ocean Margin Drilling Program

Robert Niblock, Ocean Program Manager

Peter A. Johnson, Project Director

Prudence S. Adler

Kathleen Beil

Carolyn Gilmore

Consultants

John Andelin

Denzil Pauli

Robert Taggart

Advisory Panel for Review of the Ocean Margin Drilling Program

Dr. Joseph Curray Mr. Feenan Jennings

Scripps Institution of Oceanography Director, Sea Grant Program

University of California Texas A & M University

La Jolla, California 92039 College Station, Texas 77843

Dr. Charles Drake Dr. John Sclater

Dean of Graduate Studies Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences

Dartmouth College Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Hanover, New Hampshire 03755 Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

Dr. James Hays Dr. Tjeerd H. van Andel

Professor of Geology Geology Department

Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory of Stanford University

Columbia University Stanford, California 94305

Palisades, New York 10964

Dr. John Imbrie

Department of Geological Sciences

Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island 02912

v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The staff wishes to acknowledge the help and cooperation of the following groups and

individuals during the preparation and review of this study:

Dr. Albert Bally

Shell Oil Company

Dr. Kevin Burke

State University of New York at Albany

Mr. Joseph Carter

Gulf Oil Company

Mr. John H. Clotworthy

Joint Oceanographic Institutions Inc.

Dr. Edgar S. Driver

Gulf Research & Development Company

Dr. Howard Ellinwood

Standard Oil of California

Mr. John I. Ewing

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Dr. Terry N. Gardner

Exxon Production Research Company

Dr. Glen Hager

Continental Oil Company

Dr. William Hay

Joint Oceanographic Institutions Inc.

Dr. Hollis Hedberg

Princeton University

Dr. Claude Hocott

Gulf Universities Research Consortium

Dr. Charles D. Hollister

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Dr. Doyle Marrs

Mobil Oil Corporation

Dr. Arthur E. Maxwell

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Dr. Donald McIvor

Exxon Corporation

Dr. H. William Menard

U.S. Geological Survey

Dr. Theodore C. Moore, Jr.

University of Rhode Island

Dr. George B. Pichel

Union Oil of California

Dr. Allan Riley

Standard Oil of California

Mr. Wilbur G. Sherwood

National Science Foundation

Dr. William H. Silcox

Standard Oil of California

Mr. W. H. Smith

Phillips Petroleum Company

Dr. Walt W. Steiner

Atlantic Richfield Company

Mr. James Thompson

Sunmark Exploration Company

Dr. Peter Vail

Exxon Production Research Company

Dr. Peter Wilkness

National Science Foundation

Dr. Edward L. Winterer

Scripps Institution of Oceanography
A Review of the Ocean Margin Drilling Program

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

II. Summary of Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

III. Scientific Merit of the Planned Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Scientific Objectives and Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Discussion of Science Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IV. Alternatives Proposed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

A. Alternatives with Greater Science Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B. Alternatives with Greater Resource Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . .

V. Anticipated Technological Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VI. Industry Participation in the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VII. Program Management Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Principal References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendices:

1

4

8

8

13

18

18

20

22

37

46

53

A. Alternatives to the Ocean Margin Drilling Program Suggested by

OTA Panel Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. Background on Deep Ocean Drilling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

c. The Hedberg Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

D. Petroleum Company Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

vii
1. Introduction

An important new scientific endeavor

of the nature and origin of the earth has

past several years. And now the National

prepared to begin a $700 million, 10-year

to improve our basic understanding

been under consideration for the

Science Foundation (NSF) is

program of marine geologic

investigations. This effort, known as the ocean margin drilling (OMD)

program, resulted from years of planning and evaluation by

government-sponsored committees and represents an innovative approach to

mutual efforts by government, universities, and the industry. The program

is both a continuation of deep ocean drilling under NSF earth sciences and a

new thrust to investigate the geology of continental margins and ocean crust

where very deep drilling is necessary to penetrate unknown regions. Some of

the margin regions, which are the borders between continental shelves and

the deep ocean, could contain substantial oil and gas resources, but very

little evidence has yet been collected.

Early planning for an ocean margin drilling program began in 1973 and

continued with the Conference on the Future of Scientific Ocean Drilling

(FUSOD) held in Woods Hole, Massachusetts in 1977. In 1978, an NSF advisory

group reviewed the scientific merit of a margin drilling program and in 1979

an NSF “blue ribbon” committee addressed the national interest in such an

effort. Recently, an NSF sponsored meeting was held in Houston during the

week of March 3, 1980, and included scientists and engineers from academic

institutions, petroleum companies, and government agencies. At this

meeting, an ocean margin drilling model program plan was developed. That

plan, the principal current description of NSF’s ocean margin drilling

program, is what this report addresses. Engineering considerations and

scientific objectives were evaluated in that plan. A model program that
would consist of six years of drilling and four years of pre-drilling

preparation was presented. The plan also presented an estimate of program

costs* The model drilling program includes 10 sites and 15 holes. The

deepest holes in the model program are about 21,000 feet below the sea floor

in about 11,000 feet of water. Two sites are in the Pacific, one in

Antarctica’s Weddell Sea, and the others in the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico.

The scientific objectives stated in the plan are to investigate: (1)

passive and active continental margins; (2) the earth’s crust beneath the

deep ocean and (3) the deep sea sediments which could yield historic

environmental information on the earth, especially the opening of the

Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico.

It is planned that the program will be jointly funded by the Federal

government and the petroleum industry, each sharing 50 percent of the costs

over the 10 year period. Eight major petroleum companies have expressed

interest in participating and they are expected to commit funds for FY81

following a July 1980 meeting to detail NSF’s technology plans. These

technology plans include the conversion of the government-owned Glomar

Explorer to a deep drilling ship and the development of a riser system* for

controlled drilling in up to 13,000 feet water depths and up to 20,000 feet

below the sea floor. There are some differences between the water and

drilling depth goals stated for the model drilling program and for the

technology development but these are not considered significant.

*A riser is a large diameter pipe extending from the sea floor to the

drilling ship on the surface through which the drill pipe is inserted. The

riser acts as a conduit for drilling fluid which is pumped down the pipe and

flows back up to the ship between the pipe and riser. The riser is also

used to help control pressure in the well and support blowout prevention

(see Chapter VI).

2
This Technical Memorandum reviews the present plans for the Ocean

Margin Drilling program and addresses questions on the merits of the program

and alternatives to it. It analyzes problems associated with the approach

proposed by NSF and suggests possible improvements. It also discusses the

institutional capability of the Federal agencies which are to manage this

program; the technology development aspects, and the problems and

opportunities associated with industry participation.

3
II. Summary of Findings

OTA analyzed the National Science Foundation’s plans for its ocean

margin drilling program. These plans are not yet complete, but they have

resulted from a substantial effort over the past several years by

government, industry and academia to develop a major, important new thrust

in earth and ocean sciences. The OTA findings are based on a relatively

brief review of these plans, and rely heavily upon the advice of scientific

and industry specialists having considerable experience in the field.

The following are principal findings derived from our review.

1. The NSF plan for ocean margin drilling developed in March 1980

contains many worthwhile scientific objectives; the drilling plan and sites

chosen encompass significant scientific investigations and are in keeping

with past committees’ recommendations. It is a distinct improvement over

previous ocean margin drilling plans. The plan is, however, a considered

compromise which was developed considering such constraints as the use of an

Explorer-type vessel and drilling only in water deeper than 6,000 feet.

While most scientists agree that the compromise is a reasonable one given

the constraints, many question the wisdom of the constraints.

2. The ocean margin drilling plan is supported by NSF and the Joint

Oceanographic Institutions (JOI) who assisted in its development. However,

there is not a broad scientific consensus on the present program. Since it

has been less than three months since the March 1980 NSF plan was prepared,

4
neither a detailed document nor a peer review process has been developed. A

more explicitly defined and executed peer review process in the future would

help to build a consensus. Holes, sites and objectives are likely to change

as the technology and other plans are developed in the future, and

additional scientific review will be necessary to assure broad support and

proper attention to high priority scientific problems.

3. A major concern of many scientists is the lack of specific plans

for geophysical investigations that must preceed the drilling. However, a

planning effort did begin after the March 1980 meeting.

4. The probability of achieving the scientific objectives through

the holes drilled and information collected will, in large part, be

determined by the capabilities of the technology developed. The technology

for controlled drilling 20,000 feet beneath the ocean bottom in about 13,000

feet of water is not yet developed. Some of the deep holes may not be

completed as planned because of the technological uncertainty associated

with deep ocean drilling in as yet unknown environments. Engineers and

scientists will undoubtedly need to make compromises as the program proceeds

which may result in either lowering of the ultimate scientific objectives or

significant cost escalations. Both academic and industrial scientists are

concerned that additional costs to develop deep drilling technology could be

diverted from other science funds which are not yet fully defined or from

other NSF ocean science programs.

5. The potential for oil and gas resources in the continental

margins is a subject of much speculation, but competent geologists claim

5
that these areas hold significant promise at least to the extent that they

should be carefully explored. The ocean margin drilling program would

provide better scientific information on which to base further speculation

on oil and gas resources, but it is not a logical oil and gas exploration

program. Some petroleum companies have claimed that they are not

participating because the program is not adequately directed toward

assessing commercial resources. Others claim they expect the scientific

benefits to help them in the long run.

6. The National Science Foundation has successfully

deep sea drilling project over the past ten years, however,

directed the

NSF has used an

established oceanographic institution to carry out the day-to-day

management. The ocean margin drilling program represents a major increase

in money and a new thrust in technology development, not a simple expansion

of previous efforts. The capability and appropriateness of NSF in managing

such a program has been questioned by some scientists and engineers. Their

questions include: whether NSF can effectively manage the considerable

technology development work; whether the oil and gas resource aspects would

dictate more direct involvement by DOE or USGS; whether the science benefits

are overshadowed by the technology development benefits and whether the

relative contribution of each participant is equitable.

7. The petroleum company participants are expected to decide this

July whether to support the first year’s efforts. Most of these

participants support the program because they believe it will result in

progress in science and have some secondary benefit to their interest in
subsea hydrocarbon resources. Many companies are concerned about their

liability as participants in the program, about anti-trust problems that may

develop and about the level of funding required by each. They believe that

more companies need to be involved if they are to support the effort past

the first year. Some believe the cost estimates are too low for the

technology now planned.

8. A more sharply focused science program with fewer options than

the present plan is advocated by several of the scientists OTA contacted.

They have suggested alternatives which might result in lower initial costs

and a postponement of the decision to fund major technology developments.

Many of these alternatives include an approach to first identify those

drilling targets which are within present technical capabilities. Other

alternatives could be developed with a greater emphasis on hydrocarbon

resources (and thus industry involvement) but would probably require

considerable changes in government practices in leasing offshore lands for

oil and gas exploration (see Section IV and Appendix A and C).

7
III. Scientific Merit of the Planned Program

A. Scientific Objectives and Priorities

The proposed ocean margin drilling (OMD) program is large and

monolithic compared to most earth (oceans and solid earth) science programs

run by the National Science Foundation (NSF). Even if the total annual

expenditure is not so large compared with the aggregate of all other

programs that could be labeled earth science, the others are divided in many

packages and supported by individual constituencies. While oceanographers,

geologists, geophysicists, and other earth scientists should agree that this

program be assigned very high priority, no such consensus has apparently yet

been achieved.

The present plans, developed March 3-6, 1980, are based on advice from

expert representative groups of scientists and engineers. But questions

have been raised relating to determining scientific objectives and to the

inevitable compromises that result from trying to satisfy many interests

within budget constraints.

Most scientists agree that the presently planned program is a good

compromise given the constraints that appear to be governing. The

constraints were developed by the program planners from the following

assumptions:

o The Glomar Explorer is a valuable national asset and it should be

a cost-effective platform for deep ocean drilling.

8
- —

0 The passive ocean margins should

scientific investigation because

receive high priority for

they are a geological frontier

that might contain oil and gas resources.

o The petroleum industry and NSF will share in funding and program

planning.

The scientific experts planning the Explorer

asked “what is the most important science we need

geology and geophysics.” Rather, it was “what is

you can do with an Explorer-type vessel given the

of the work is on passive margins; b) drilling is

drilling

to do in

the most

program were

the field of

not

important science

constraints that: a) most

deeper than 6,000 feet

water depth (but not much deeper in the early phases); and c) most of the

margin drilling is on U.S. margins.” These are different questions, and the

implication that a new program had to be done according to these constraints

was given to those who prepared the most recent scientific plans.

Many believe that the recently developed plan contains many worthwhile

scientific objectives -- the drilling plan and sites chosen encompass

significant scientific investigations that are in keeping with past

committees’ recommendations. It is a first step towards defining of a

complete program that was lacking in previous plans. However, some are

concerned that the entire program is too diffuse and attempts to accomplish

too many goals -- these scientists advocate a more narrowly concentrated

effort.

Many scientists agree that the present OMD program is probably the

broadest scientific program that could be put together using the Glomar

9

63-314 0 - 80 - 2
Explorer in an industry-academic-government cooperative venture. However,

many scientists believe that it may not be the best, the most appropriate,

or the most important scientific program that could be proposed for

exploring the oceans floor.

Whether scientific objectives can be achieved from the holes drilled

and information collected will, in large part, depend on by the capabilities

of the technology developed. Some deep holes may not be completed as

planned because of the uncertainty associated with deep drilling in as yet

unknown materials. Engineers have estimated a 50 percent probability of

completing all the planned holes. As the technology is developed, better

estimates of success probabilities for each hole can be made, but it is

likely that some deep drilling goals will not be reached.

Also, many scientists see the present program as being too much at the

instigation of NSF administrators rather than in response to the requests of

the scientific community. They argue that it may result in good technology

and give rise to good science, but it does not result in a good or

cost-effective scientific program.

However, other scientists argue that, in general, the present plan is 

worthy of complete support. They state that the scientific objectives are

of high priority and that if the petroleum industry provides 50 percent of

the funds, the program will be a bargain for science. Some claim that even

allowing for the predicted chances of technological failure, each hole or

site will offer partial answers to many of the questions asked. They also

note that much of the success of past deep-sea drilling has been from

unanticipated results.

10
Because scientists disagree on the program’s goals and scope, it

appears important that the peer review process for the scientific program

should be more explicitly defined in the future. Since the holes, sites,

and objectives are likely to change as the technology and plans are

developed, additional review is necessary to assure broad support and proper

attention to high-priority scientific problems.

Since neither a document nor a process for scientific peer review of

the program is yet available, OTA identified through its panel some of the

more important and specific criticisms of the scientific plan. These fall

into three categories:

o

0

Although many good scientific questions are posed, the resources

to attack them appear to be spread so thin that important

breakthroughs are unlikely to occur. The plan represents a

compromise and the product of a large workshop attended by a

group of respected scientists.

The requirement that drilling occur only in water deeper than

2000 meters may rule out relatively simple approaches to

important scientific questions and may stifle research in areas

of the sea floor having an economically realistic resource

potential. Neither the existence of nor the reason for this

minimum depth has been made clear. However, OTA has found that

the limitation was proposed by the industry participants. This

depth limitation is considered by some to be a barrier to

developing an effective research strategy.

11
——————

0 To some, the present program gives too little support to academic

geophysics and submarine geology. This shortcoming particularly

disturbs academic scientists who believe that submarine geology

and geophysics led the way to the present revolution in earth

sciences. They point out that the academic research fleet is in

a crisis state because of budget cuts and the soaring fuel

prices, and important new research enterprises in oceanography,

including the upgrading of multi-channel seismic programs,

hydraulic piston coring, and acoustic tomography lack adequate

support.

There is wide agreement, even among those who support the present

program, that more emphasis on geophysical surveys is needed. While funds

are reserved for “other science,” the plan for a science program is lacking.

A JOI committee is now planning a geophysics program that includes

provisions for scientists to compete for specific projects.

For the program to succeed, the most advanced state-of-the-art

geophysical surveying methods and experiments will be needed. If the

drilling program is delayed because of reduced funding in the next fiscal

year, geophysical research could continue as was proposed in 1979 by the

National Academy of Sciences. The NAS report -- “Continental Margins

Geological and Geophysical Research Needs and Problems” (known as the

“Bally” report) -- recommended that academic institutions should have at

least one modern, thoroughly-equipped, state-of-the-art geophysical

surveying vessel, as well as the supplementary equipment aboard existing

oceanographic ships for conducting multi-ship surveys.

12
Between now and when the Explorer is ready to begin drilling, the

selection of sites and holes should not be frozen. The Houston document

presents a drilling plan based on present knowledge. Additional surveying,

both as part of and outside this program, will change ideas, concepts,

precise drilling sites, and even general drilling regions. Just as the

International Phase of Ocean Drilling (IPOD) program remained flexible and

evolved with time, so should the OMD program.

B. Discussion of Science Objectives

Some scientists are concerned about past and possible future

compromises. The program plan from the recent Houston meeting on ocean

margin drilling is a considered compromise. While a major truncation of the

recommendations from the 1977 Woods llole conference on the Future of

Scientific Ocean Drilling (FUSOD), it takes into account costs, engineering

and technology, and the details of associated scientific investigations to a

much greater degree. The four areas of investigation -- passive margins,

active margins , ocean crust, and paleoenvironment -- raise fundamental

scientific questions that drilling could address. As a compromise, the plan

provides for a few holes to be drilled in each area type. While the

probability of achieving all objectives in each hole is no better than even,

that of accomplishing some of the objectives is considerably higher. While,

in general, the importance of the scientific results will depend on how deep

the holes are drilled, the probability of producing significant results are

quite high.

The conclusion that significant scientific results will be achieved

depends on several assumptions. These are:

13
o That the schedule will be slowed down in view of budget

considerations.

o That the regional geophysical and

define a problem area, as well as

investigations needed to pinpoint

geological studies necessary to

more detailed site

specific targets for drilling

will also have been completed. This is not guaranteed, but if

the funding is available, the lead time before drilling is such

that they could be

o That technological

up by taking funds

done.

cost overruns, if they occur will not be made

away from the scientific investigations.

o That the program is greeted with enthusiasm by the ocean

.

scientists, especially younger ones who will be working with the

data.

o That the primary objective of drilling is to gain scientific

knowledge rather than to assess commercial resources.

o That the program will not be possible without

government-industry-academia cooperation. Given the actions that

have taken place to date, this is not an unreasonable

assumption. Accepting these three constituencies, the program

needs to respond within its budget to their needs.

It would be fair to conclude that the four problem areas -- active

margins, passive margins, ocean crust, and paleoenvironment -- have the

highest scientific priority in marine geology and geophysics. However,
“there are other significant problems, particularly processes in ocean rifts

and the nature of very deep continental margins. To sample these regions

would require even more advanced technology than that proposed for the OMD

program.

Some more specific concerns about the program include:

o

0

The total budget of about $692 million includes $43 million for

scientific activities on board the drilling vessel and $118

million for scientific support and site surveys. The $43 million

obviously has to be tied closely to drilling operations, but the

$118 million does not. The latter sum could be used to meet

technological cost overruns. Most scientists OTA contacted

believe that a system is needed to make sure that science funds

are not diverted.

Acceptance of the program poses some risks for oceanographic

institutions and individual scientists. Many now receive annual

support from the petroleum industry. Because of their

participation in this program, industry might transfer funds from

direct support of oceanographic institutions or individuals to

indirect support through the NSF program. The oceanographic

institutions may receive ocean margin drilling funds at some cost

to their other programs.

o USGS is enthusiastic about the program, but is not providing

financial support. USGS is charged with learning about the

nation’s geology and making resource assessments. It also owns

15
much of the existing marine geophysical data. It is not clear

why USGS is not funding the program.

o The Department of Energy (DOE) is not yet participating

financially in the program. Given its responsibilities for

energy resources, DOE should be interested in information

relevant to industry. The problem

apprehensions about the government

business.

may be accentuated by industry

getting into the oil and gas

o

0

One might question the scheduling of the OMD program and what it

would be if the Glomar Explorer were not now government owned and

idle. No one is apparently against drilling in the four areas

selected, but there are major questions of when to drill and what

ought to be done first. Considerable lead time is involved in

preparing the Glomar Explorer. Even if all of the geophysical and

site survey information were available, drilling would not begin

for some years. On the other hand, given the present state of

geophysical knowledge, a stretching of

years in times of tight budgets may be

Some also argue that NSF should not be

the schedule for a few

acceptable.

too deeply involved in a

major marine engineering development program. The goal of this

program would be a riser and well control system capable of

operating in very deep water. Despite extensive industrial

experience with ocean drilling, nothing like this has been

attempted before. All of the engineering studies anticipate

difficulties that are severe but not insurmountable.

16
Such an engineering program represents a far greater

technological leap than anything accomplished in the Glomar

Challenger program, and the type of engineering problems involved

in mounting an all-weather, open-ocean operation are very

different from NSF’s experience with large scientific technology

projects on land. The risks to NSF -- and to the scientific

community at large -- are substantial. Some view this as a major

shortcoming of the program. There is also the view, however, that

a major technological push is good for future scientific

advancements despite the risks.

17
I V . Alternatives Proposed

OTA asked its scientific panel to consider whether alternatives to the

present ocean margins dril1ing program could increase its scientific value ,

decrease the costs , or both. Several alternate approaches are included in

Appendix A. Nest alternatives first quest ion the basic assumptions or

constraints that helped mold the present program : industry participation ,

technology development, the variety of scientific problems addressed , and

the budgetary considerations. The interaction between these factors has

produced certain compromises evident in the present program.

Among the alternatives suggested are two genera 1 approaches -- those

that place greater focus on the science and those that give greater enphasis

to resources.

A. Alternatives With Greater Science Focus

Most alternatives focus on the scientific efforts and recommend a delay

in developing the technology , and thus the very deep drilling. While these

alternatives luck the scientific variety as the present plan, they suggest

focus on a few principal areas of research. Most advocate using the NAS‘

Bally report, which is broadly supported as addressing important problems,

for initiating a program. Some, such as that proposed by Dr. John Imbrie,

advocate making a direct connect ion between specific science goals and

national needs for future oi1 and gas resources.

The principal elements in an alternative approach with a greater

science focus would be to:

18
o Plan and conduct extensive geophysical surveys as the initial

effort and delay decisions on the technology and operations for

very deep drilling.

o

0

0

Identify targets that are within the capability of existing

technology for the early drilling efforts.

Define the goals of the very deep drilling phase after the

initial work is completed, assuming the possibility of

substantially improved technology by that time developed by

industry.

Seek broad scientific support for specific program plans

commensurate with the size of the effort before each phase of the

program.

This approach appears to have the following effect on other aspects of

the program.

Industry Participation: Some petroleum companies may be more willing to

support this approach, others may not if

drilling is proposed in water depths of less

than 6,000 feet.

Technology Development: This would be done in steps with lower risk at

each step.

Budget: Less funding would be required in the early

years. More emphasis would be placed on

geophysical studies and less on developing

19
hardware. A decision to spend alot more money

for the drilling ship may be delayed. Also, it

may be possible to estimate more accurately the

costs at each phase.

B. Alternatives with Greater Resource Focus

Industry and some academic scientists adovocate the need for a greater

understanding of potential hydrocarbon resources in offshore continental

margins. The present program offers very little for assessing commercial

resources. Some petroleum companies want the government to refrain from any

greater involvement in attempts to locate offshore oil and gas resources.

However, there is some support for a program that would include some

government and industry cooperation with a focus on assessing commercial

resources. (See Section VI for industry views and Appendix C for the

Hedberg proposal.)

An alternative for this approach would probably contain the following

elements:

o The petroleum industry would take the lead in planning and

conducting a program to assess the commercial resources on the

U.S. continental margins.

o The government would offer incentives to allow industry funding

of the program.

o Scientific studies would be conducted both as an adjunct to the

industry program and separately in those areas that industry

20
would not cover.

The approach appears to have the following effect on other aspects of

the program:

Science: A new science plan would have to be developed in

conjunction with an industry plan. It would be important

to get broad support for this as well.

Technology: The Glomar Explorer may be an appropriate vessel for this

program, but, if so, the goverment would not be involved in

developing advanced drilling and well control technology.

Budget: The government’s ocean margin drilling budget would

probably be substantially reduced and industry would

probably assume the large financial risks.

21
v. Anticipated Technological Problems

OTA reviewed the effort that will be required to develop the technology

for meeting the goals of NSF's current plant for drilling in the ocean

margins. Heavy reliance was placed on an April 1980 report by the Marine

Board of the National Research Council titled “Engineering for Deep Sea

Drilling for Scientific Purposes.” That report should be referred to for

more detailed evaluations of future engineering problems and uncertainties

associated with the NSF program.

The technology to drill 20,000 feet below the ocean bottom in 13,000

feet of water in the continental margin is not yet developed. The ocean

margin drilling program contains a significant element of technology

development. Engineers and scientists must compromise as the program

proceeds, which may lower the ultimate scientific objectives.

The 13,000-foot riser pipe required for some deep margin sites is about

twice the depth of existing technology. A major effort will be needed to

develop such pipes along with the entire deep drilling and well control

system. Basic designs of this system have not been completed or carefully

reviewed. The probability of completing the deep hole targets has been

estimated at 50 to 60 percent by NSF engineering consultants given existing

data. While this will be improved as planning proceeds, it may also be that

some holes will not be completed.

22
Since the technology is uncertain, so are the cost estimates. Because

extremely deep holes are very costly, the sites have to be selected with

great care and attention to engineering conditions as well as scientific

objectives.

A drilling system for the ocean margins will include a large number of

complex and interrelated components. All system elements will probably

require some modification from present practices to perform at the extreme

water depth and penetration goals of the program. Figure 1 outlines the

extent of development for major equipment.

The Selection of a Drilling Platform

The ocean margin drilling program needs to develop a suitable drilling

platform for controlled deep ocean drilling. The Glomar Explorer, with its

very heavy lift capability, has been tentatively chosen as the best platform

following studies of its cost effectiveness as well as that of alternatives.

The Glomar Explorer is owned by the government. Further work is necessary,

however, to design the Explorer conversion and evaluate its suitability more

specifically.

Some petroleum companies and other are still concerned that the

Explorer may not be the best or most cost-effective ship to use. One

concern relates to the extensive conversions necessary to install a complete

deep drilling system. When this conversion is done, some of Explorer’s

present capabilities will be significantly altered and much of its value as

a deep-sea, heavy-lift ship will be lost. The engineering trade-offs on

23
Figure 1

DEEP WATER DRILLING TECHNOLOGY/WATER DEPTH SPECTRUM

Today

To 4000-5000’ WD To 13,000’ WD

Large Shipshap (Glomar ExplorerXE)

To 30&350' WD

Vessel: Bottom Founded

Jock-Up or Submersible or Shipshape

Vessel Fixed

Positioning:

To 2000-3000’ WD

Floater, Semisubmersible

01 Shipshape

Conventionally Moored Dynamically Positioned

Riser: Extended Casing Buoyed

Max. Top Tension: 1 Million Ibs.

Buoyed (E)

Max. Top Tension: About 1.5

Million Ibs. (D)

Storm Survival Procedures

Necessary (U)

lmpractical*

Necessary(F)

Bore to 1500’

Buoyed beyond 1500’

Storage Hangoff Procedure

Multiple Riser Trips Undesirable

Riser Handling System Desirable

Extension of Depth Capability(E)

Well Reentry N/A Guidelines Guidelines Remote Re-entry

with TV end/or Sonar

Requires Stronger CIamps (U)&

Connectors end/or BOP Frame(F)

Subsea - Redundant BOP’S

Direct Hydraulic Control

BOP: Surface

MultipIex ElectropHydraulic Control Subsea Accumulators,

Rechargeable from Surface

Acoustic Bock-Up Control

Subsea Hydraulic Power: Source

Probably Necessary (U)

Extension of Depth Capability (E)

Wellhead

Foundation:

Sensitive tO Pullout & Side Loads

from Riser

Critical (E)

Well Control: Surface Choke

Adequate

Seafloor Choke for Circulating Gas

Kick Desirable (D)

Pressure Equalzation Volvo Probably Necessary (D)

(Available)

Key: U - Undeveloped; D - Developed but not field tested; E - Extension of existing technology; F - Field tested

“ Solution dependent on cosing program and feasibility of extending drilling shallow hole without riser

Source: National Academy of Science, Marine Board, National Resource Council,

Engineering for Deep Sea Drilling for Scientific Purposes, Washington,

D.C. : 1980

24
drilling platforms need careful evaluation as soon as the overall system is

designed.

General Requirements

Deep sea drilling efforts considered to date could encounter a wide

spectrum of unanticipated problems. For example, site selection will be

based on minimizing the likelihood of encountering pressurized hydrocarbon

formations. However, the drilling system must be fully capable of dealing

with such an occurrence with complete safety since geophysical data are not

completely reliable.

A basic casing program (i.e. , a series of various lengths of different

diameter tubes), wellhead, blowout preventer, and riser will have to be

selected. Deep penetration and the anticipation of numerous well-control

problems plus the constraint of a minimum core diameter all suggest a

large-diameter riser/blowout preventer system. On the other hand, a larger

riser is heavy and bulky to handle and incurs great horizontal forces from

the current and waves. These must be compensated for by the ship and the

wellhead.

Deepwater drillships now use 16-3/4” diameter blowout preventers and

associated riser and wellhead systems. This arrangement permits a maximum

of 4 casing strings to be run through the riser starting with a 13-3/8”

diameter. In the ocean margins drilling program, the 30” and 20” strings

have to be run without the protection of a blowout preventer; this is

currently standard offshore operating procedure. The Glomar Explorer may

25

63-314 0 - 80 - 3
— —

allow for storing and handling an 18-3/4” riser, which would permit running

an additional casing string through the riser. Use of the larger riser,

however, would most likely involve a more elaborate wellhead system to

support the heavier stack and greater loads from the riser.

Drilling for Surface (Structural) Casings

In deep water, drilling with a 30” or a 20” casing (and a 16” casing if

it is used) is often done without a riser. Prior to setting a 30” casing,

the riser has no foundation and the casing is usually not sufficiently

founded to support the riser loads alone. A small pilot hole is usually

drilled prior to drilling to emplace these large casings to determine if

shallow gas or other geological hazards are present.

Nonetheless, in U.S. continental shelf waters and those of some other

countries, regulations require running the riser for all drilling operations

after the largest surface casing is set. In 13,000 feet (approximately 4

km) of water, it will probably be almost impossible to set a 30” casing

capable of supporting the riser loads. Should this occur, the riser may

have to be mounted on a pile-founded support on the seafloor, a problem with

no precedent in these water depths.

A packer or downhole blowout preventer in the drillstring can also be

used to protect against shallow gas during drilling. Should shallow gas be

encountered while drilling without a riser, the packer can be inflated to

shut off the flow. A heavy “kill” fluid or “mud” mixture can then be

26
Figure 2

Diagram of a Typical Deep Water Riser Drilling System

12,000 FT

Source: Project Contributions Program Review for Director NSF Presented

April 3, 1978. Deep Sea Drilling Project IPOD.

27
circulated behind the packer to set the casing or to cement and abandon the

hole. Some development work has been done on such a device, but it is not

nearly to a state of field readiness.

Another problem associated with surface casings is that they are too

large to go through the riser. If the riser is run for the drilling

operation, it must be pulled while the casing is run into the hole. In

13,000 feet of water, this is a time-consuming and expensive procedure. An

attractive but untried technique would be to set the riser aside; i.e. , have

a means of physically moving the riser off to one side, support it there,

and running the casing into the hole without bringing the riser onboard the

ship.

Riser Handling (See Figure 2)

Handling the riser correctly becomes critical in extreme water depths.

For example, deploying and retrieving the riser -- usually a simple

procedure -- may be extremely difficult if there is even a mild current over

most of the depth. As the riser is deployed deeper and its sail area

increases, it tends to get pushed to the side by the currents.

The requirement for a thorough understanding of environmental

conditions that may impinge on design and handling of the riser can be

supported by several operational scenarios. An example is the almost

imperceptible, long-period swells to be expected in some areas, such as

extreme southern latitudes, where major and unpredictable axial loading of
the riser can result. Adequate advanced surveys, predictive capability, and

monitoring while operating will alleviate such potential problems.

As currently designed, deepwater risers are nearly neutrally buoyant.

If a buoyant riser is used, a variable buoyancy system will probably be

necessary to make the riser less than neutrally buoyant as it is being run

and so that it can be lightened after it is connected at the wellhead. On

the other hand, the Glomar Explorer can support a non-buoyant riser. This

is an extremely attractive possibility for the ocean margins drilling

program.

Moving the vessel away from the wellhead also presents problems. In

the event of a severe storm, the ship’s safety would be jeopardized if it

had to maneuver with a 13,000-foot riser hung from the moonpool. Generally,

there will not be enough time to pull the entire riser up and store it

aboard the ship. Thus, even with a buoyant riser, an upper disconnect

platform may be needed several hundred feet below the surface. The riser

could be disconnected at this point, with the remainder becoming positively

buoyant.

This approach has been considered before, but has not yet become

operational. Much needs to be done to provide high reliability in the

re-connection process. Two important components -- an underwater electrical

connector and controllable buoyancy -- are being developed by the petroleum

industry, but are not fully operational.

29
Well Control

In drilling into the earth, a drilling fluid (often termed “mud”) is

circulated down the drillstring and back up the annulus between the

drillstring and the drilled hole. The mud cools and lubricates the drill

bit, prevents formation fluids from entering the hole by controlling the

pressure at the bottom to keep the hole from collapsing, and carries the

formation cuttings made by the drill up to the surface. The bottom-hole

pressure is controlled by variations in either the mud weight (usually

expressed in pounds per gallon), the pressure applied by the mud pump on the

surface,

The

o

0

0

or both.

mud pressure at the bottom of the hole must be:

Greater than the hydrostatic and formation pressures to prevent

formation fluids from flowing into the hole; and

Enough greater than the hydrostatic pressure to provide

sufficient velocity of flow back up the annulus to carry the

cuttings to the surface; but

Less than the fracture pressure to prevent “lost returns,” where

the mud breaks up the formation and flows into it rather than

back up the annulus.

A “gas kick” occurs when the drill enters a portion of the formation

where appreciable geopressure exists (e.g., because of the presence of gas).

When this occurs, the mud weight or pressure must be changed rapidly and

30
accurately to withstand the sudden increase in pressure and prevent a

blowout or uncontrolled flow out of the formation and up the hole.

Herein lies the basis for some of the major problems with deepwater

drilling. When drilling on land (see Figure 3), the hydrostatic and

lithostatic pressures increase simultaneously from the same starting point.

The difference between these two pressures continually increases. This

provides room to work between the two pressures in controlling well pressure

and potential blowouts.

In deep water, however, the lithostatic pressure begins to increase at

the ocean floor where an appreciable hydrostatic pressure already exists.

Therefore, the hole must be lined with a structural shell or casing for some

depth to provide a “spread” between the hydrostatic and lithostatic

pressures. This allows the mud or some other drilling fluid to be used to

control lost returns and blowouts. Further, the deeper the water the

greater will be the length of structural casing required to provide “working

room” between the hydrostatic and lithostatic pressures. The structural

casing is also required to provide foundation to support the wellhead,

blowout preventer, and riser base.

A widely accepted basic rule of drilling safety is that the drilling

mud is the first line of defense against a kick or sudden flow of gas or

formation fluid into the hole. In very deep water, much of the mud column

required to maintain control is in the riser. If the riser must be

disconnected, part of the downhole pressure is lost. In some cases, the mud

remaining in the hole is insufficient to prevent a potential kick with

31
Figure 3

, /

Sfotucur

Pws8ulo —

ON LAND

WATER

scwuciw

PWBW1O —

AT MA

GENERAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG PRESSURES THAT

ARE RELEVANT TO DRILLING AND WELL CONTROL

●

Source: Marine Board, National Research Council, “Engineering for Deep Sea

Drilling for Scientific purposes.” National Academy of Sciences

April 1980, p. 27
systems now in use. Closing the blowout preventers would provide the extra

protection required.

With the deepwater system envisioned, the extra protection may

eventually be provided by one or more of the following items:

o Downhole instrumentation to provide more immediate surface

warning of undue pressure increases, coupled with a pause in

drilling to provide time for more precise adjustment of mud

weight.

o

0

Deeper or more frequent casing settings.

A secondary downhole blowout preventer or inflatable packer run

in the drillstring that could be activated to seal the hole near

the bit.

Because these systems may need modification to adapt them to deepwater

use, there is a need for intensive engineering evaluation and testing.

Also, the probable greater dependence on the blowout preventer in the

well-control system emphasizes the need to ensure blowout preventer/control

system reliability. The greatly increased cost of pulling the blowout

preventer up to the ship for servicing during long drilling operations

sufficient incentive to improve reliability.

is

33
Circulation of Gas Kick

The conventional method of circulating a gas kick is to bypass the

riser using the choke or kill line (a small-diameter line located adjacent

to the riser) to direct the gas flow to a controlling choke (valve) at the

surface. In very deep water, this method is difficult and time consuming

because of time lag in the flow through the small diameter line. A constant

downhole pressure must be maintained as the gas comes up this

small-diameter line instead of the riser; this is often difficult to do. An

alternative technique involves a seafloor choke that controls the gas flow

at the wellhead. A prototype choke has been developed, but has never been

field tested.

Drilling and Well-Control Simulators

Computer-based simulators can help prevent blowouts, control wells, and

circulate the gas kick. Computer simulations can help to check out

equipment concepts and operational procedures prior to design completion.

Although sometimes considered to be simply training aids, they also permit

early qualification testing of instruments, control station layouts, and

many items of equipment

Reentry and Seafloor Manipulation

Many drilling rig operations use a manned submersible to land the

blowout preventer, to land the riser on the blowout preventer, and to do

34
-

routine operations and maintenance essential to continued drilling. Other

rigs depend entirely on remote reentry systems and on manipulating devices

that can be handled on the end of a drillstring and watched with a remote

television camera.

The decision whether or not to use a submersible in the NSF program

will affect program time and cost. No manned or remote controlled

submersible now being used by industry can dive to more than half the depth

called for by the NSF drilling program. The one exception is the Alvin, a

deep-diving research submersible.

The development of a submersible could cost $10 million to $20 million

and take 3 to 4 years to build and test. Operating without it, however,

might be extremely costly should seafloor problems cause the loss of a well

after many months of drilling. This decision will probably be based on an

extensive examination of the operating experience of deep-water rigs.

Blowout Preventer Pressure Integrity and Wellhead Structure

Greater water depths lead to higher hydrodynamic lateral loads on the

riser, simply due to its greater profile area. Furthermore, the blowout

preventer will probably be taller than those now used, which extend more

than 40 feet above the seafloor. Because of this height, the blowout

preventer, wellhead connector, and wellhead structure could become bent at

times. Higher bending moments will substantially reduce the ability of the

clamps that tie the segments of the blowout preventer together to withstand

35
pressure. These clamps are already marginal at present deepwater

conditions, and will

require upgrading.

A careful check

have to be strengthened. Wellhead connectors will also

of the wellhead

performed at each new site. It will

site. The high bending moments that

structure strength will have to be

depend on soil measurements at each

must be tolerated will likely require

wellhead structures larger than those now used to distribute the load over a

broader area. These checks should be made early because of the time needed

to design and build special wellhead structures.

36
VI. Industry Participation in the Program

The potential of oil and gas resources in the continental margins is

subject to much speculation, but competent geologists claim that these areas

hold significant promise at least to the extent that they should be

carefully explored. The ocean margin drilling program would help establish

better scientific information on which to base further speculation on

hydrocarbon resources, but as designed it falls far short of a logical

program to explore for oil and gas. Some petroleum companies claim that

they are not participating because it is not directed more toward assessing

commercial resources. Others claim that they are participating because they

expect the scientific benefits to help them in the long run. The U.S.

Geological Survey expects to benefit in their efforts to evaluate long range

oil and gas potential in offshore regions.

Eight petroleum company participants will decide whether they will help

fund first year efforts in July 1980. Most of these participants are

supporting the program because they believe it will produce valuable basic

science and have some secondary benefit to their interest in possible future

oil and gas resources in the ocean.

OTA contacted representatives of the petroleum company participants and

some additional companies who declined to participate in the NSF program.

In these discussions, many companies expressed their concern about their

liability as participants in the program if they have no management control

over the operations. Several companies are also concerned about the level

of funding required by each and believe that more companies need to be

involved to assure the program’s future viability.

37
While technology for very deep drilling is considered by all of the

petroleum company participants to need significant development, some are

concerned that either the cost estimates are too low or that the chances of

reaching all the deep holes are not good. It appears, in general, that

industry participants will force future decisions on realistic technology

development goals and cost estimates.

Industry support for the ocean margin drilling program is tempered by

the above factors. One reason for this is that only 5 of a hoped for 20

companies are actively participating as of May 1980. NSF hopes that a total

of 8 will be participating by July. This does not place a severe financial

burden on those companies during the first year. Many feel, however, that

greater participation is needed in subsequent years when a much higher level

of funding is necessary.

Closely connected with some apprehension by industry participants is

the manner in which most companies evaluate the benefits of the program. In

general, the funds which each of the companies would commit are not “new”

funds but would be reprogrammed from present industry research and

development budgets. Thus, some are concerned about giving up some company

research and exploration in exchange for participation in the NSF

program. Some non-participating companies are keeping close watch over the

program and, if the program benefits change, they may decide to join.

Benefits to Industry

The companies that OTA surveyed expressed a variety of reasons for

participating. Some that do not have extensive technology development
programs themselves, felt that will be the principal benefit. Riser

technology and well control were two specific areas mentioned. None of the

companies felt that information on potential commercial resources would be a

great benefit.

However, some foresaw benefits related to the science of sedimentary

geology. Very few felt that there were specific, substantial benefits to

industry. However, they felt that there would be long term intangible

benefits, similar to those from the deep sea drilling program, and from new

ideas that are derived from the results.

Perceptions of Industry as to the Science and Technology Quality of the

Program

With respect to industry views on the scientific merits of NSF’s ocean

margin drilling program, several industrial members stated: 1) it will fill

gaps in knowledge, 2) good scientific talent is on it and thus the program

must be good, and 3) it will result in a scientific enrichment similar to

that achieved earlier by the deep sea drilling program.

Other industry views in questioning the program include:

1) “Too little attention is being given to initial survey work and

to reflection seismology.”

2) “It is good science, but whether it is an effective use of the

money to get the information is debatable.”

39
3) “The science is being developed backwards. the scientists are

narrowing themselves down to one option too soon. They need to

develop better regional data.”

4) “The program is unfocused and has too much of the attitude of

let’s drill and see what we find out; the deep sea drilling

program was much better focused on specific scientific

questions.”

Several industry participants expect the program to advance riser

technology, well control, and metallurgy. They feel they have the

technology in hand to drill in 6,000 feet of water and that the capability

increases at about 600 feet per year. This program could provide technology

to drill in 13,000 feet of water, which oil and gas companies would not

otherwise pursue in the near future. Also, industry involvement is

considered important for advancing the technology in this program.

Increase in Resource Potential Knowledge

Most industry participants agree that the program will not generate

significant assessment of commercial resources, but only bits of boundary

information from which some inferences might be drawn.

Other comments from industry included:

1) “Resource knowledge would be gained in an indirect way. New

ideas may be generated with respect to source rocks or settings

that might be conducive to production. However, the program

40
would not provide the information necessary to define any

reservoir.”

2) “The program can result in a better geological picture of

sediments and thus aid in the analysis of basins.”

3) “We expect to gain knowledge concerning sediments in the areas

being studied and will be able to draw some conclusions

regarding specific areas of opportunity.”

4) “As for improving the knowledge of oil reserves, the ocean

margin drilling program would not be the way to go about it.”

Additionally, several petroleum companies are concerned that government

leasing decisions might be made as a result of the small amount of

information gained in the ocean margin drilling program. However, a much

larger data base would be desirable than will result from this program.

Problems Identified by Industry

Industry participants believe that program costs may escalate due to

unrealistic goals set by some scientists. They think that compromises will

be necessary between science and technology in the future, particularly with

regard to very deep riser drilling.

To satisfy scientific goals, there will be difficulties in developing

satisfactory instrumentation for well logging, according to some industry

representatives. Also, the drilling system will have to address some major

problems, including riser development and the adequacy of metallurgical

materials used to drill where high temperatures will be encountered.

63-314 0 - 80 - 4
There is also concern as to the adequacy of the technology for

controlling wells and the on-site management of drilling operations.

Drilling at sites where there is no backup to kill a blowout is particularly

disconcerting. If the Glomar Explorer is the only ship capable of deep

water drilling with a riser and a blowout preventing system, no other vessel

could be engaged to kill a blowout if one occurred.

Some participating companies question their liability in case of a

blowout. Parallel to that is a concern about antitrust considerations.

Presumably, geological data and information on new technology will be

published. Non-participants might ask whether it is published in a timely

fashion with respect to any leasing on adjacent tracts.

The resolution of these various problems will be required for

industrial participation in the drilling program as will the determination

of technical feasibility and accurate cost estimates.

Alternative Suggestions

Some industry representatives surveyed by OTA suggested alternative

approaches to the program. In general, these emphasized the need for

academic scientists to undertake a large seismic program prior to defining a

drilling program and then to consider alternatives such as using available

drill ships instead of refitting the Glomar Explorer for drilling the holes

in shallower water depths. One specific suggestion for the technology

development was to outfit the Glomar Explorer only for setting deep risers

and not convert it to a drilling ship. It could then be possible to use any

42
of a number of available commercial platforms for the drilling operation.

Some other alternatives suggested were:

1. Undertake the research in conjunction with industry’s normal

progression of technological development using available ships

as required. A large part

present riser technology.

20 Keep the Glomar Challenger

of the slopes can be evaluated with

Conduct the deeper drilling later.

program active for several more

years. There are significant benefits to be derived from

additional holes along the edges of the sediment slopes.

3. Provide academic scientists with advanced geophysical equipment

(arrays and processes) and a ship for work in research related

to sediment stratigraphy and crustal formations. Undertake a

significant seismology program before

margin drilling program.

undertaking the ocean

4. Undertake a drilling program on the continental slopes of North

America using available technology and, simultaneously,

undertake a worldwide, multi-phase seismic survey. Follow this

with a deep drilling program in prospective areas defined by

the seismic surveys.

One industry scientist asked whether it is actually necessary to go to

a 13,000-foot water depth to gain the required scientific information. He

also asked whether sites around the world could be found at lesser depths

that would still represent critical geological formations of interest.

43
Industry recognizes that geophysical seismic reflection work has to be

followed up by drilling, which is the only way to gain some of the most

significant information.However, some industry members

program did not reflect the need of scientists to review

margin geology during its first year.

Program Costs

said that NSF’s

priorities in

Industry’s view of the accuracy of projected costs varies. Some feel

that the costs allocated for ship modifications are low and that it would be

less costly to build a different ship.Others say that until the first

phase studies are over, it is not possible to project costs with any

accuracy. Still others conclude that they are getting good estimates.

Since the costs are based on specific holes and drilling time allowed (not

required) they are probably about right.

Cost estimates are an important output of the program’s first phase and

will be of extreme importance to both government and industry.

Funding Reduction with Program Extension

In general,most of the industrial participants feel that a funding

reduction and program time extension would be beneficial and probably more

realistic. Some believe that the technology will take longer to develop

than scheduled. From a scientific point of view, some felt that extending

the program by delaying the drilling phase would result in a better

definition of both the program and the modifications required to the Glomar

Explorer. It could also allow NSF to select another drill ship.

44
—

One industry scientist particularly felt that reduced funding and a

stretched out program would be excellent in that it would enable a proper

program progression. Academic scientists could gain greater capability

through acquiring advanced seismological equipment, could conduct the

necessary reflection seismology, and thus could make a more judicious

selection of the sites to be drilled (the main program cost).

45
VII. Program Management Considerations

The National Science Foundation has successfully directed the deep sea

drilling program over the past 10 years using oceanographic institutions to

manage the scientific effort. The ocean margin drilling program is a major

increase in money and complexity from previous efforts and thus the

capability and appropriateness of NSF to manage it is subject to question.

Several problems have been noted and should be considered. These include:

whether NSF can effectively manage the considerable technology development

work, whether extra funds that could be needed for technology would be taken

from other programs, whether the possibility of finding oil and gas

resources should bring DOE or USGS into more direct involvement, and whether

the science is

The ocean

overshadowed by

margin drilling

project and other programs NSF

the technology.

program is similar to the deep sea drilling

has directed. Similarities include operating

a drill ship, a drilling operation, site selection, and site surveys.

Management experience gained from earlier projects will be particularly

helpful in developing a management structure at NSF for the ocean margin

drilling program.

The proposed management structure for the program relies on the current

staff for the deep sea drilling project, a systems support contractor,

science support contracts with JOI Inc. , and a future systems integration

contractor. As in the deep sea drilling project, JOI Inc. is scheduled to

organize a number of panels, which will provide the scientific direction for

the program. The systems integration contractor, who will be responsible

for system design, construction, and operation, will be selected after the

46
program has been specified in sufficient detail to prepare formal

invitations to bid.

In addition to the basic program management, NSF plans to establish

outside groups to advise both the director and the ocean drilling program

team. A program advisory committee will comprise 40 percent industry

representatives, 40 percent from academia, and 20 percent from the public

sector. The Marine Board of the National Research Council has already

selected a smaller advisory group from among those who served on their

1978-1979 committee. The Navy is to be called upon for its expertise in

ship conversion inspection and supervision. Additional consultants from

government and industry will be used as required to assist various facets of

the program as it develops.

In managing the program, the three major aspects are operational

scientific, and technology development. Scientists are concerned because of

the current emphasis on the operational and technology development aspects.

The plan developed in March 1980 has not yet won wide support from the basic

research community. This may be because there has not been enough time for

everyone to become familiar with it. Or it may result from the fact that

earlier expectations can not be met within the financial, time, and

engineering constraints faced by the project. A more detailed, overall

management plan for science, such as spelling out the responsibilities and

authority of NSF, industry, JOI, Inc., and the panels, may answer some

concerns.

Since the 1977 FUSOD meeting in Woods Hole, planners and participating

scientists have stressed the need for extensive geological and geophysical

47
studies as a prerequisite to site selection and drilling. This is called

problem definition and goes beyond the specific site surveys that will be

needed before drilling begins. The fact that tentative sites were

identified at Houston in March 1980 does not negate the need for problem

definition. 

For example, OTA’S panel suggested that the tentative drilling site on

the eastern U.S. continental margin may not be the best place to drill to

obtain maximum scientific advances. Several years of intense geological and

geophysical research are still required before the regional setting for the

drill site will be adequately understood. The planning process for this

effort has just begun.

The funds identified for science in the Houston plan are listed under

“scientific program (survey).” We must assume that these funds are not only

for site surveys but also are for problem definition, scientific

participation in the drilling phase, interpretation of logging, etc. If SO,

it would be reassuring to the scientific community to have a detailed

breakdown and plans for use. Another point that needs to be addressed in

science funding is the program for the routine analysis and scientific

studies of core samples once they are in core laboratories. No allowance

was made for this research in the deepsea drilling program. Careful

consideration should be given to this issue now.

The site surveys will require equipment that is not now available on

academic research vessels, like narrow beam echo sounding. Many

institutions are planning to use academic research ships for site surveys.

If that is the case, the NSF Office for Oceanographic Facilities and

48
Support and university ships coordinating groups should be brought into the

planning at the earliest possible stage. Another possibility, however, is

to charter ships from industry. This may appear more cost effective, but

its impact on the academic fleet could be severe.

The possibility that operational funds will have higher priority than

scientific funds during the program concerns many scientists. Some means is

required for assuring that funds for science will be protected against the

overwhelming demands of logistics and operations. Although some safeguards

are built into the ocean margin drilling program, such as industry agreement

to share overruns and funds from international participation, more adequate

arrangements are needed. NSF could consider assigning administration of

science dollars to one of the other divisions. Both earth sciences and

ocean science would be suitable. Adoption of this procedure would assure

strong guardianship of the science funds as well as good scientific overview

and administration within NSF without having to hire additional science

administrators.

Another major concern of scientists is that, because of the very large

budget for ocean margin drilling, the budgets for all other earth and ocean

sciences programs within NSF will suffer. This is a real possibility

despite the fact that the ocean margin drilling budget is an add-on to NSF’s

present budget and the petroleum companies are providing half the funds.

Unforseen cost increases in later years will probably affect the

internal budgeting of NSF’s earth and ocean sciences rather than any other

part of the Foundation. NSF will need to make a special effort to avoid

such a negative impact on the other earth and ocean science programs. And

49
Congress may wish to keep this problem in mind in its annual review of the

NSF budget.

Also, because of its size and the involvement of such a large segment

of the geology and geophysics community, the ocean margin drilling program

might skew the field sufficiently that it would impede progress in other

areas of geology and geophysics. In a similar vein, ocean margin drilling

might skew NSF’s science management at the administration and division

levels to the point where other earth and oceans programs might be

neglected.

NSF is currently preparing an environmental impact assessment of its

program, including possible impacts of riser and riserless drilling. The

importance of science and resource evaluation are the rationale cited for

performing the program. The assessment covers alternatives to the program

ranging from abandoning it because the anticipated impacts are too severe,

to limiting the drilling depth.

Because the program’s impacts on the “oceans” cannot be determined, a

generic statement will be issued and yearly environmental impact statements

will be released after each new site is chosen. The supplemental statement

will be based on geophysical surveys and samplings performed at each drill

site. Impacts or possible environmental consequences of the program that

have been identified and will be studied include possible

water quality, disposal of cuttings, and possible oil and

changes in air and

gas “accidents.”

50
 

Other government agencies, including USGS and the Coast Guard, and

environmental groups have been contacted and their suggestions incorporated

into the assessments.

Regarding the appropriateness of NSF to manage the ocean margin

drilling program, several factors suggest that it should be the lead agency.

These are:

o

0

0

0

0

0

Efficient and successful experience with the scientific,

engineering and operational aspects of the deep sea drilling

project and the Glomar Challenger.

Basic research aspects of ocean margin drilling dovetail with

NSF’S mission and will benefit from its other scientific

programs.

The basic research orientation of the program will probably

continue to be emphasized.

NSF has the respect of scientists and other government agencies

for handling basic research. It may be the only agency

acceptable to all parties for handling this kind of program.

NSF’ may be the most stable agency, with regard to its mission and

orientation, for the life of the program.

Ocean margin drilling would be a major program of NSF and would

have the continued attention of the agency.
There are also several factors that suggest another agency lead and or

support from other agencies like DOE or USGS. These are:

o The National Science Board appears to have a slight bias against

big science. The administration is more comfortable with small

science programs.

o

0

0

0

NSF has had little experience with joint industry-academic

programs.

NSF is still a relatively small agency and may get caught in a

squeeze between industry, the Department of Energy, and the

Department of the Interior.

If the program objectives change from basic research, NSF may not

be the appropriate agency.

The large amount of technology development in the program may be

difficult for NSF to manage.

o Assessing resources is not part of the NSF charter.

In conclusion, the details of the overall management plan for science,

like the responsibilities and authorities of NSF, industry, JOI Inc. and the

panels, are not yet well spelled out. Furthermore, neither the new ocean

margin drilling division nor the JOI Inc. staff yet appear to have

sufficient scientific or technical strength for proper management of the

scientific aspects of ocean margin drilling.

52
Principal References

1.

2.

3.

4.

5*

6.

7.

8.

9*

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

Ad Hoc Advisory Group for Future Scientific Ocean Drilling, Report to

National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.: National Science

Foundation, 1978.

Donhasier Marine, Inc., Ocean Margin Drilling Program, "Glomar

Explorer" Modifications and Marine Research Development, EAR78-18238

Phase III, November 1978.

Global Marine Development Inc., Conversion of the Glomar Explorer for

Research Drilling and Coring, Newport Beach, Ca.: GMDI, February 1977.

JOIDES, The Future of Scientific Ocean Drilling, Seattle, Wa.: JOIDES,

1977.

JOI, Inc., Draft Report of the Meeting of the Ocean Margin Drilling

Interim Planning Committee with Academic, Industry and Government

Scientists and Engineers, Houston, Texas, March 3-7, 1980.

JOI, Inc. , The Ocean Crustal Dynamics Program Plan for the 1980’s,

Draft, n.d.

National Academy of Sciences, Ad Hoc Panel to Investigate Geological

and Geophysical Research Needs and Problems of Continental Margins ,

Continental Margins Geological and Geophysical Research Needs and

Problems, Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979.

National Academy of Sciences, Marine Board, National Research Council,

Engineering for Deep Sea Drilling for Scientific Purposes, Washington,

D.C.: 1980.

National Science Foundation, “Draft Agreement of Cooperation and

Initial Agreement of Cooperation.” Washington, D.C., March 1980.

National Science Foundation, The Merits and Potential of a Proposed

Ocean Drilling Program for the 1980’s, The Report of the Committee on

Post-IPOD Science, Washington, D.C. : National Science Foundation, July

1979.

Ocean Resources Engineering, Inc. , Oceanographic and Vessel Evaluation

for IPOD Ocean Margins Study, September 1975.

Sante Fe Engineering Services Company, Alternate Drilling Platform for

the Ocean Margin Drilling Program, 1980.

Sante Fe Engineering Services Company, National Science Foundation

Ocean Margin Drilling Program, Program Cost as a Function of Variations

in the Drilling and Coring Program, March 1980.

Sante Fe Engineering Services Company, Ocean Margin Drilling Program

Cost and Schedule Estimates, October 29, 1979.

53
15. U.S. Congress, Committee on Science and Technology, Hearings before the

Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology on Ocean Margin

Drilling, February 6, 1980.

Letter from Frank Pagnotta, Director, Office of the Secretary,

DOE, to Stephen Lanes, Subcommittee on Energy Research and

Production, Science and Technology, March 18, 1980.

Letter from Philip Smith, OSTP, to Congressman George Brown, Ca. ,

March 11, 1980.

Letter from Francis Johnson, NSF, to Congressman George Brown,

Ca., March 12, 1980.

Letter from Dr. James Hays, Lamont Doherty Geological Observatory

to Congressman George Brown, Ca. , February 4, 1980.

Letter from Bill Hay, JOI, Inc. to Congressman George Brown, Ca.,

March 18, 1980.

Letter from A. W. Bally to Congressman George Brown, Ca., March

12, 1980.

Letter from John Sclater to Congressman George Brown, Ca.,

February 24, 1980.

54
APPENDIX A

Alternatives To The Ocean Margin Drilling Program

Suggested by

OTA Panel Members

Dr. Joseph R. Curray

Dr. Charles L. Drake

Dr. James D. Hays

Dr. John Imbrie

Dr. John G. Sclater

Dr. Tj. H. Van Andel

A-1
Alternative Suggested by

Dr. Joseph R. Curray

Scripps Institution of Oceanography

Extension of the program schedule appears to be already occurring, and

I consider it a good thing. My personal and scientific preference would be

for some additional delays in the conversion of Glomar Explorer and

development of a riser capability, with the intervening years to be filled

in by continued Glomar Challenger drilling, utilizing the exciting

capabilities of the hydraulic piston corer. In addition, during these

intervening years, extensive geophysical work should be funded on

continental margins and in other prospective drilling areas.

Glomar Challenger

has a finite remaining

cannot continue indefinitely. The ship apparently

economical life. A few more years of operating with

the hydraulic piston corer, however, would be strongly supported by the

scientific community but I certainly do not advocate eliminating the OMD

Program.

In summary, I advocate a slightly modified program, as outlined briefly

above: some delays in development of Glomar Explorer capability, with

funding of additional Challenger HPC work and extensive geophysical

surveying, both on continental margins and in other parts of the world.

Ideally, this alternative program would simply delay the major part of the

OMD Program, but would provide time for additional utilization of HPC for

stratigraphic and climatological purposes and for much more extensive

geophysical surveying. The stratigraphic and climatological objectives with

HPC are important, but in my mind are no more important or of higher

A-2
priority than the deep-drilling objectives of OMD. Instead, they represent

an attempt at refinement and an opportunity to gain more data points in the

shallow part of the section; whereas OMD offers the first-ever opportunity

for deep drilling, both deepwater and deep-penetration, on continental

slopes and rises.

There is a great deal of concern in the marine geological community

that will preclude optimal utilization of HPC. The alternative program

described briefly is a compromise, trading increased support of HPC

geophysics for delay in timing of OMD.

63-314 0 - 80 - 5 A-3
Alternatives Suggested by

Dr. Charles L. Drake

Dartmouth College

Alternative Scenarios

There are a number of alternative scenarios that could be suggested,

some productive, many destructive. In any of these it should be recognized

that no one is against the fact of drilling, for drilling provides the

moment of truth - the hard data that confirms or denies the geophysical

interpretations. There may well be, on the other hand, differences of

opinion on methodology, on timing, on focus, and on how the costs should be

borne.

a. We might start with the Luddite approach, eliminate the drilling

because of its very high cost compared to other options. The emotions

behind this approach are real and stong, but they presume that the

funds exist for application to other purposes. In the no bottom line

budgeting process this is not really true. If there is a real limit to

the budget of NSF, it may be true. This alternative cannot be

appraised realistically unless one knows whether there are trade offs

and what they are.

b. The Hedberg approach suggests that industry play a more important

-even a major- role. This is an appealing option, but there is no

free lunch. I doubt whether the Congress is prepared at this time to

lease the large tracts that industry would need to justify the major

investment. I would also have some qualms, were I in industry, about

A-4
-

how far I could go with cooperative ventures of this sort before there

were the anti-trust problems.

co The present program is an NSF program with NSF as the prime

agency for footing the bill. The rationale is that it is a science

program and NSF is the primary science support agency. This could be

argued. The present program is at least as much a technology program

as a science program, and many of the industry people hint that they

are looking for appreciable technological fallout from it. The

limitation to water depths greater than 2,000 meters supports this

suggestion.

Industry probably would not move into riser drilling at abyssal depths

for a decade or so. What a splendid opportunity OMD presents for

letting someone else pick up the tabs for mistakes. This should not be

construed as an argument against drilling, but might well be taken as

an agrument for DOE participating in the funding. DOE is throwing all

sorts of money at other technologies. One also has the gnawing feeling

that the relevance of OMD to specific USGS missions ought to create

more enthusiasm for funding from this source than has been obvious to

date.

d. Many of the scientific objectives in the continental margins

could be reached by drilling vessels in existence or nearly so. If the

whole drilling program spelled out by FUSOD were to be carried out,

obviously it would be necessary to have a vessel with the capability of

drilling in abyssal depths. If the focus is on the continental

margins, and ocean crust and paleoenvironment can be shoved under the
rug, perhaps some reappraisal is in order. I submit , and Bally has

submitted in some of his statements, that proper geophysical and

geological investigations can locate drilling sites on the continental

margins that are responsive to the scientific questions and that could

be drilled using existing vessels. The scientific rationale for the

Glomar Explorer weakens markedly as the emphasis on the continental

margins grows stronger. If this approach were followed, to drill with

leased vessels on the margins, then the possibility of continuing the

Glomar Challenger or a suitable replacement to carry on abyssal

drilling should be examined carefully.

e. The HOUSOD report provides a few crumbs for all, but satisfies no

one. Perhaps it would be more productive to bite the bullet and

concentrate efforts in one area, such as the East Coast or the Gulf

Coast. This concentration would keep the vessel near good logistic

ports would minimize drilling time lost in steaming from one location

to another, and would greatly increase the chances of solving the

problems in that area. If this alternative were followed, it would

again be desirable to remove the 2,000 meter restriction and to drill

in the place with the greatest promise of providing answers to the

scientific questions. Again, this would abandon abyssal drilling and

the question of continuing Glomar Challenger type drilling should be

reexamined.

f. Finally, it seems to me that the crux of the problem is whether

this is a science program or a technology program. If it is the

latter, then I do not think that it should be financed by the National

A-6
Science Foundation. If it is the former, then the focus should be on

how to do best science in the best place with the best available

technology. If it is a mix, as it is reputed to be, let us be sure we

are doing the science with the best technology and that the costs are

equitable borned by those institutions which have, or should have, a

stake in the game.

A-7
Alternatives Suggested by

Dr. James D. Hays

Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory

Alternatives to the Program

The most appealing alternative to the present program, one that could

address exciting first order scientific problems, stimulate the broad

interest of the scientific community and not cost the taxpayer much more

than the present deep sea drilling program would be a program that had two

major thrusts. The first would involve a continuation of the present Glomar

Challenger drilling program, the second a Continental margin geophysical

survey program.

Continuation of Glomar Challenger Drilling

During the last two years a major technological advance has occurred in

the recovery of soft sediments from the ocean floor. A hydraulically driven

piston coring device (the Hydraulic Piston Corer, HPC) has successfully

recovered hundreds of meters of undisturbed sediment and has proven that it

is possible to obtain continuous sequences of this length. This device

opens the way to a whole series of exciting studies including (1) the

evolution of global climate measured on time scales of a decade to millions

of years. (2) the evolutionary development of marine plankton during the

last 10-15 million years. (3) the sedimentary structure of deep-sea fans

deposits which are the most probable reservoirs of any deep-water

hydrocarbons. (4) the suitability of various types of deep-sea deposits as

repositories for nuclear wastes.

A-8
There is no doubt in my mind that these studies plus margin and crustal

drilling by a Challenger type vessel would produce far more good science

than the OMD program at a fraction of the cost. I’m also sure these studies

would have wide International support.

Continental Margin Geophysical Program

Continental margins can be studied in a variety of ways. Drilling is

only one way and it happens to be the most expensive. So it should be used

only after all other means of gathering information have been utilized. It

is clear that the more one knows about a margin the more likely one is to

make a wise choice in choosing a drill site.

Information about the evolution of Continental Margins can be gained by

studying rocks of ancient margins that are now on land. This kind of work

should be encouraged. The submerged modern margins can be studied with

geophysical techniques and much can be learned from deep-penetration seismic

reflection work. I propose that this be the heart of the academic ocean

margin program during the next decade (much as proposed in the Bally

report). In the meantime Industry will continue to drill wells on the

shelves and data from these wells will become part of the public domain.

Industry will also continue to develop increased skill for drilling in

deeper and deeper water. If in the future after an academic geophysical

program and additional Industry shelf drilling, it is judged that there is

great scientific merit in a deep-water, deep-penetration scientific drilling

program, it will be

deep-water drilling

and perhaps cheaper

possible to design it in a thoughtful way. Since

technology will have advanced, it will be far less risky

than the proposed OMD program.

A-9
I recognize there are other aspects to the program such as resource

assessment and technology development. However, these are always billed as

bi-products of the scientific effort. I’m not able to judge their value but

if they turn out to be the main driving force behind the program then the

National Science Foundation should not be the lead agency.

A-10
Alternatives Suggested by

Dr. John Imbrie

Brown University

An Alternative Program

A. Setting priorities. What is needed to transform the present,

diffuse plan into effective research strategy is an overriding principle

that can be used to set scientific priorities. Such a principle emerges

naturally from a consideration of the present status of the earth sciences

in the context of the national energy crisis. This principle can be

expressed as follows: Our first scientific objective should be to

understand the structure and history of the continental

States. Moreover, this research should be conducted in

attention is given first to water depths shallower than

the practical prospects for exploiting any reserve that

margin of the United

such a way that

2000 meters -- where

may exist are

relatively good -- and then proceed gradually into deeper water where

exploitation prospects are now much poorer. As time and resources permit,

other scientific objectives should be addressed later in the program.

B. Some guidelines for a restructured program.

1. Geophysical program. The geophysical part of the program

should be funded at a higher level and given more prominence than it is in

the Houston plan. At all depths, extensive, modern geophysical surveys,

conducted by or in collaboration with academic scientists, should precede

the planning for the drilling program. Surveys should include both

A-n
wide-aperture arrays to explore depths greater than can be reached by the

drill, as well as narrow-aperture multi-channel arrays that will provide

testable models for the drilling program. Funding of the geophysical

program should be administered separately from the drilling program.

2. OMD drilling program. Planning for drilling operations

should follow extensive geophysical surveying. Drilling should commence in

waters shallower than 2000 meters, and use existing drilling vessels with

riser capability. Coring should aim at 100 percent coverage.

use or not to use the Glomar Explorer for depths greater than

should be deferred until several years into the program, when

A decision to

2000 meters

both the

scientific and engineering problems will be better defined. Hopefully, the

normal progress of

abyssal drilling a

industrial drilling would by that time make the leap to

less risky enterprise.

3. Phasing. The first phase of the OMD program would not be

concluded until substantial progress has been made along three East Coast

transects. A second phase, involving riser drilling to address scientific

problems away from the U.S. continental margins, would then begin.

4. Challenger program.

should be continued, at least during

addition to hydraulic piston coring,

The Challenger-based coring effort

the early years of the OMD program. I

this effort might well include crustal

drilling and the investigation of non-U.S. continental margins. Research 

this kind is now planned for Challenger Legs 76-82. As a continuation of

the IPOD program, a renewal of financial contributions from foreign

countries can be anticipated.

A-12
Alternatives Suggested by

by

Dr. John G. Sclater

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Background

The Challenger Project has been a great success and has had a new lease

of life with the hydraulic piston core program and the deep and still open

hole drilled about 500 m into ocean crust in the area of the Galapagos

spreading center.

I view the OMD drilling program proposed at the Houston meeting as

basically a continuation of this Challenger program onto the passive and

active margins of the oceans and an attempt to extend crustal drilling to

greater depths. This extension of the program to the margins and into

thicker accumulations of sediments will require a major advance in

technology and have a much greater cost. In view of the technology .

advancement and the cost it is necessary to re-evaluate carefully the

scientific basis of the program.

I think the margins are an important area to study at this time.

First, most continents are covered by over two kilometers of sediment and

these sediments were deposited by processes analogous to those taking place

at the margins today. As we believe we can tackle these margins in a

quantitative rather than

of scientific endeavour.

accumulations of oil and

a qualitative fashion they are an exciting new area

Secondly, as there is a possibility of large

gas any well posed study investigating how these

A-13
margins were created would improve our chances of finding if and where such

accumulations could be found. With the present shortage of oil and natural

gas such research is obviously in the national interest.

Clearly eight major oil companies agree with this position. Given that

they continue to support 50% of the project I think the science as proposed

by the Houston group with certain qualifications worth the cost. As a

result of these qualifications I would like

administrative improvements to the project.

to suggest substantial

1). The Program should be extended over a longer period and start later.

For budgetary reasons this appears to be happening already. However,

there are other equally good reasons for slowing it down:

(1) it will enable completion of 2 years of hydraulic piston core

drilling on the Challenger and a reentry and completion to maximum depth of

the still open ocean crustal hole near the Galapagos spreading center,

(2) it will enable more and better studies to be carried out on the

conversion costs of the Explorer, and

(3) it will enable a geophysics program to be developed and partially

completed before any of the decisions are made as to where to drill the

deepest and most expensive holes.

2). The program should be restructured and also renamed.

It is not just an ocean margin drilling program. It is an attempt to

apply geophysical and drilling techniques to solve major problems on the

A-14
ocean margins and in the deep sea. I suggest that to reflect the importance

of the geophysics to the program that the $118 million for science be split

into two parts.

(1) $70 million should be separated completely from the present

budget and be given to another program to do the broad based scientific

geotraverse work necessary for picking good drilling sites. This project

should be given a separate name. Continental Margin Geotraverse (CMG) is an

obvious suggestion.

(2) $48 million should be left within the present project to cover

site specific geophysical work and other science.

3). The Continental Margin Geotraverse Project

This project allowing for 10% inflation over ten years would cost

around $5 million/year at 1980 dollars. It would have a slightly increased

budget early in the project when most of the geophysical data was being

gathered and a slightly reduced budget at the end when the project was

nearing termination.

At present one of the oceanographic institutions (Lament) has proposed

to the National Science Foundation and ONR to build and equip a 200 channel,

10 km long, multichannel array for the academic community. This array which

is a step beyond the state-of-the-art of industry will enable academic

scientists to tackle many problems not soluable with present equipment. The

budget estimate is on the order of $9 million dollars. It will cost a

further $.5 million to run and $.25 million in processing for each month at

sea (costs estimated from Continental Margins Report, page 16, line 10,

A-15
operating costs $18 million divided by 24 months). Five million dollars a

year plus what is already being put into acquiring this data by other

branches of NSF and ONR will enable the academic community to run a

state-of-the-art multi-channel system for six to eight months each year and

do other complementary geophysical surveys (seismic refraction and gravity)

in the same area.

Such a program if set up on a national basis (as is the present

Challenger program) would be able to tackle the margin geotraverses

mentioned by the Continental Margins Report as well as providing the basic

geophysics for future drilling. Further it is unlikely that the academic

community could handle a larger project than the one I have outlined due to

manpower and processing limitations. Thus this project would fulfill much

of the goals of the Continental Margins Report (Bally Report).

4)* The Drilling Program

The

(a)

(b)

(c)

drilling program should take place after:

the basic geotraverses necessary for adequate site selection have

been completed,

the cost wells now available on the slope and some industrial

wells that will be released

a reasonable and believable

has been worked out.

next year have been worked up and

estimate of the cost of the Explorer

A rough scenario in my own mind is that, if the project starts in 1981,

the multi-channel seismic ship for the geophysical community will take 3

A-16
years to complete and 2 years thereafter, in conjunction with other

geophysical programs, will have produced the necessary background data for

site specific geophysics and drilling. Thus drilling on the shelf or rise

would start around 1986 or 1987. I believe this represents a delay of two

years to the present program.

5) Possible political problems with present structure.

If the project goes ahead it could well founder in the near future

because of lack of industry support. With the present structure the whole

project would fold.

This does not have to be the case. If my suggestion of splitting the

program into two parts (it could be two separate projects or one project

with two clearly defined parts) were followed then, if the oil companies pull

out and half the money disappears, the project doesn’t have to fold. First,

the continental margins geotraverse project could continue. It will cost

significantly less per year than NSF is now contributing to the budget.

Second, what money is left in the NSF budget could be put towards drilling

holes in shallow depths with presently available conventional drilling

technology. Though this would be a blow to some of the major goals, the

program would not be completely wiped out. Personally, I view the

geophysical traverses on the margins to be as important scientifically as the

actual drill holes themselves. Thus I do not think the loss of the deepest

holes should be considered a mortal blow to the project.

A-17
Alternatives Suggested by

Dr. Tj. H. van Andel

Stanford University

My program alternatives are as follows:

1. Implement continental margin transect studies and associated

programs of the Bally report for the required amount of time.

2. Strengthen in a major way geophysical capabilities of the

oceanographic institutions with truly modern geophysical ships,

instrumentation and processing techniques including multibeam

echosounding and nearbottom survey instrumentation.

3 . Continue a Glomar Challenger (or similar ship) program of

drilling, with heavy emphasis on the HPC. This one, likely to be

the ultimate blossoming and reward of the DSDP I would regard as

one of the highest priorities in the marine sciences today.

4 . Close down DSDP in 2-3 years time with completion of 3).

5* Reassess the need for margin drilling and the state of available

technology toward the end of the 1980s when the program under 1

has been completed and digested.

This strikes me as a sensible and properly ordered program taking

advantage of the state of the technology, of our present ability to state in

operational terms what they key problems are, and logically continuing to

take the main trends to where they may lead. All this without extraordinary

A-18
strain on budgets and other resources. I would like to add that all

reference to the resource importance, whether energy or minerals, of the OMD

seems to me quite strained. All potential resources are just that, not

realities , something perhaps for 20-30 years from now. I do not believe

and, apparently, neither do the oil companies, that a real case can be made

that the OMD program will significantly advance our access to these

resources.

I believe that this approach maintains the momentum created by DSDP at

the point where it is greatest (where the questions have been most clearly

stated) , that it tackles the continental margin program where the largest

return can be found (see Bally report for justifications) and that the total

cost is commensurate with priorities of the total national earth sciences

program. It is futher a program of manageable size and one that should be

comfortably cost-effective. I DO NOT SEE IT AT ALL AS WHOLESALE NEGATION OF

The OMD; on the contrary, I believe that it is the essential transitional

step and that a responsible OMD is nhot possible without it. I am familiar

with the sayers of doom who claim that , once terminated, no marine drilling

program will ever by resurrected. I do not believe that that is true; after

all, such a program was once erected and that in the face of the Mohole

disaster, not actually a very invigorating climate. I believe that

insisting on the drilling phase now is equivalent to claiming that

continuity is more important than necessity or quality.

The NAE/Marine Board report has questioned the current timetables, and

the budget flap we are finding ourselves in is likely to lead to further

extension I do not think that extending the time table by a couple of

63-314 0 - 80 _ 6 A-19
years will help a lot , because these extensions will only yield the

budgetary relief required by higher than expected costs and larger than

anticipated national reductions in the investment in R&D. Consequently,

extending the calendar will not do what is necessary, namely to do some

other things first, and not begin this costly venture until we are surer of

what it is we need to do and have a better (and cheaper) handle on the

technology.

A-20
Appendix B

Background on Deep Ocean Drilling for Scientific Purposes
BACKGROUND ON DEEP OCEAN DRILLING FOR SCIENTIFIC PURPOSES

THE MOHOLE EXPERIMENTAL DRILLING PROGRAM ● PHASE I

Marine geologists and oceanographers have long desired to study samples

from deep in the sediments and rocks beneath the ocean floor in order to

extend man’s knowledge of the earth and its history. In 1957 a distinguished

group of these scientists joined together in an informal association known as

the American Miscellaneous Society (AMSOC). This group concluded that the

greatest advance in the earth sciences could be made by drilling through the

crust of the earth to the mantle. This boundary was known as the Mohorovici 

Discontinuity (MOHO) - hence the name MOHOLE. By continuous coring and

measurement of the characteristics of the sediments and rocks, many of the

theories developed by indirect methods could be tested against the direct

evidence obtained from the hole.

It soon became evident that the goal could be reached most expeditiously

by drilling in the deep ocean basins where the crust was known to be thinnest

(18000 to 12000 feet) and the least drill penetration would be required. However, in these locations the water depths ranged from 12000 to 18000 feet,

thus requiring a drill string length equal to or greater than 30000 feet to

reach the MOHO. This drill string requirement exceeded by 5000 feet the deepest penetration achieved on land up to that time and the then current offshore

drilling operations were limited to maximum water depths of about 600 feet.

Undaunted by the formidable challenge posed by major advances required

in the state-of-the-art of drilling at sea, the AMSOC group became a formal

committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and obtained funds from

the National Science Foundation (NSF) to investigate potential approaches to

the problem. In November 1959 a study group, comprising oil industry and

marine industry specialists, studied the possibility of conducting an experimental drilling program in deep water. This would involve drilling into the

soft sediments of the deep ocean floor from a dynamically positioned vessel

to establish whether it was feasible to extend such operations to greater

penetration depths and to maintain position of a floating drilling platform

for long periods under difficult environmental conditions. The conclusion,

reported in March 1960, was that the experimental program could be carried

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out , and would yield valuable information on which to build future plans;

the initial study group estimate for this Phase I Drilling Program was

$522,550.

NSF agreed to fund the program and engineering work and scientific

planning began in earnest. As a result, the Global Marine Exploration Company

drilling vessel CUSS I was drydocked for conversion on 14 February 1961 in

San Diego, and by 7 March the vessel was underway for test drilling in 3100

feet of water off La Jolla, California. Within the following week, five holes

were drilled, the deepest being 1035 feet which was drilled through a tapered

guide casing above the bottom and with casing extending about 100 feet into

the bottom.

After a week of refit and upgrading of some equipment in the San Diego

shipyard, the CUSS I proceeded to the deep water drilling site between

Guadalupe Island and Baja, California. On 28 March the bit touched down and

drilled into the deep sea floor for the first time; water depth was 11672

feet. Five holes were drilled, the greatest penetration being 600 feet below

the sea floor of which the lower 50 feet extended below the sediments and

into basalt. Collectively, the cores obtained represented almost 100%

sampling of the sediments and rock down to this penetration depth 12272 feet

below the ocean surface.

The Mohole Experimental Drilling Program was considered entirely successful, far exceeding the expectations of the AMSOC Committee and its sponsors. In addition to the scientific value of the cores obtained and the

measurements made, the following engineering and operational features were

proven:

o Dynamic positioning, or stationkeeping with controlled propulsory

instead of anchors, was an entirely acceptable means of keeping

“ a drilling vessel on station for extended periods.

o As long as a ship is headed into the principal swell, it is an

acceptably stable drilling platform.

o Constant pressure of the drill bit on the bottom can be maintained

with the proper combination of drill collars and bumper subs.

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o

0

0

0

0

Combined use of diamond bits and wire-line coring yields

satisfactory core samples from both bottom sediments and rocks.

Casing of the upper 200 feet of a hole is possible and permits

drilling to the above penetration depths without cuttings

falling back into the hole.

Standard logging techniques can be used to obtain geophysical

measurements in the strata of the hole walls.

Oceanic currents were less troublesome than anticipated.

Cuss I was a suitable vessel for the first experiments but

lacks many of the required characteristics of the drilling

vessel needed to drill the final MOHOLE.

In addition to these tangible achievements, the Phase I design, construction,

and operation program was the first time that the oil industry, offshore

operators, the marine industry, and earth scientists had an opportunity to

work closely together in the pursuit of a common goal. Each group learned

to appreciate the problems and aspirations of the others and a unique understanding and camaraderie developed that has formed the basis for many of the

cooperative efforts that have been undertaken in the ensueing years.

The total cost of this program was estimated to be $1,788,000. Of

this, $1,501,500 was funded by NSF. Additional government contributions

were $35,000 from the U. S. Army, $1,500 from ONR; $250,000 came from industry

and university or research organizations. This does not account for several

items of equipment that were transferred, without cost, to other projects.

For example, the four steering propellers ($130,000) used for dynamic positioning were first given to the Office of Naval Research for use in cable laying

in the ARTEMIS program and a number of the dynamic positioning control components were also used in their control systems aboard the YFNB-12. These

units and the controls were later transferred to Woods Hole Oceanographic

Institution and three of these constitute the propulsion system of LULU, the

tender for the submersible ALVIN. Thus, not only the scientific and engineering fall out from the Mohole Experimental Drilling Program remains as a highly

regarded heritage, but much of the hardware is still performing useful functions. Although a benefit/cost analysis was not performed, the ratio certainly far exceeds unity for this program.

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THE MOHOLE DRILLING PROGRAM - PHASE II

Based upon the success of Phase I, the National Science Foundation

moved rapidly into the initiation of Phase II of the Mohole Drilling Program -

the development of a drilling system that could reach the MOHO. Background

material was prepared and sent out and, on 27 July 1961, a briefing was given

to prospective contractors for the design, construction, and operation of a

drilling system capable of reaching the MOHO. Seven months later, in February

1962, NSF announced that the prime contractor was to be Brown & Root of

Houston, Texas.

The contractor selection process and the initial work performed by

Brown & Root gave rise to a considerable amount of speculation as to the

political influence that might have been exerted and the ability of NSF to

provide adequate management control over a project of this magnitude. Initial

expenditures far exceeded what might be anticipated for the progress made in

the design and construction of a deep ocean drilling system with the capability

of reaching the MOHO. Furthermore, the scientific community began to express

considerable concern over the amount of NSF expenditures for hardware in

proportion to the funds made available for science. The ultimate result of

the rumors of inordinate political influence, inefficient utilization of

funds, and financial neglect of scientific programs was the termination of

the project by Congress through the simple expedient of shutting off NSF funds

budgeted for the program. This occurred in September 1966.

However, despite the slow start of the prime contractor on the Mohole

program, there was a considerable amount of progress made in the last two

years that resulted in significant advances-in the engineering aspects of deep

water drilling technology. These include:

o Development of both short baseline and long baseline deep water

sonar location systems for application in ship dynamic positioning.

o Design of retractable, ducted steering propellers for dynamic

positioning thrusters.

o Concept, design, and model testing for propulsion and seakeeping

ability of the first semi-submersible drilling platform.

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o

0

0

Concept and design of a casing, reentry cone, and riser

system for deep water drilling.

Development of advanced types of drill bits and coring equipment for continuous coring of holes in the ocean floor.

Improvement in down hole logging techniques and development

of logging equipment.

One has only to look at

submersible drilling platforms

this innovation and technology

offshore oil industry.

the number of dynamically positioned, semiusing ducted steering propellers to see that

transfer has been of significant benefit to the

Other Mohole developments have proven of great value throughout the

world in the extraction of petroleum and associated resources from beneath

the floor of the ocean. Thus, although there may have been some waste of

funds, and their diversion from other scientific pursuits, the net outcome

of the Mohole Program has been beneficial to the nation and to the world.

THE DEEP SEA DRILLING PROJECT (DSDP)

The success of Phase I of Project Mohole in early 1961 demonstrated

the feasibility of extending the drilling techniques developed by the oil

industry both to very great water depths and to great distances beneath the

ocean floor. This success stimulated widespread discussion of possible

projects directed at sedimentary drilling as distinguished from the very

deep drilling objectives of Project Mohole itself. During the ensuing two

or three years several formal and informal proposals were made to the National

Science Foundation seeking financial support on behalf of individual institutions or groups of institutions to support sedimentary drilling projects, and

for a considerable interval of time there were various serious discussions of

the possibility of doing such drilling as an intermediate phase of Project.

Mohole.

It ultimately became clear that eventually two quite different types of

vessels would be required for deep rock and for sedimentary drilling - a large

stable platform to permit drilling in one place for a long period of time to

reach the deep mantle rock and a more modest ship that need stay on one station

only for sufficient time to penetrate and sample the ocean sediments. Realizing

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this, the National Science Foundation proposed, in Congressional testimony

given in the fall of 1963, that there be instituted an “Ocean Sediment Coring

Program” distinct from, but complementary to, the Mohole Project.

As a guide for the planning of such a program, the Foundation staff

had many discussions with knowledgeable scientists in the fields of oceanography, geophysics and geology and surveyed the means by which their cooperation could be obtained in carrying out the program. In the spring of 1964,

initiative was taken by four of the major oceanographic institutions that had

strong interests in these fields, and in May 1964 they formed the Joint Oceanographic Institutions for Deep Earth Sampling (JOIDES), a consortium that has

provided the focal point for setting up scientific advisory panels with broad

representation and for otherwise providing advisory planning and guidance to

the Project. This group, Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory; the Institute

of Marine Sciences, University of Miami; the Scripps Institution of Oceanography,

Universtiy of California at San Diego; and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, expressed an interest in undertaking scientific planning and guidance

of the sedimentary drilling program. It was the purpose of this group to

foster programs to investigate the sediments and rocks beneath the deep oceans

by drilling and coring. The membership of this original group was later

enlarged in 1968 when the University of Washington became a member.

Through discussions sponsored by the JOIDES organization, and support

from the National Science Foundation the Lamont-Doherty Geological Observatory operated a drilling program with Dr. J. Lamar Worzel as Principal

Investigator. This successful drilling effort early in the summer of 1965,

on the Blake plateau region off Jacksonville, Flordia, used the drilling

vessel, CALDRILL I. With this success in hand, planning began for a more

extensive deep sea effort. As the discussions and plans progressed indicating

the feasibility of such an effort, the Foundation provided for initial funding

for the Project in fiscal year 1965 and formally established the ‘National

Program” with funds made available in the fiscal year 1966 appropriation.

From among their group, the JOIDES consortium-selected Scripps as the best

situated and equipped to undertake the management of a continuing drilling

effort. Accordingly the Foundation, in the summer of 1966, awarded a contract

to the Scripps Institution of Oceanography to conduct the

Project. On 14 November 1967, a subcontract was executed

Deep Sea Drilling

between Scripps

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Institution of Oceanography, University of California and Global Marine, Inc.,

to supply a drilling ship capable of carrying out this drilling program at

sea. The ship, constructed especially for the purpose, is capable of drilling

in water depths up to 20,000 feet and with a penetration of about 2500 feet

into the sea floor. She was launched on 23 March 1968, and christened GLOMAR

CHALLENGER. The ship was completed and outfitted; drilling operations began

in the Gulf of Mexico in mid-August 1968.

The advent of GLOMAR CHALLENGER, with its deep-water drilling ability,

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was exceedingly timely. It came when geophysical investigation of the oceans

had matured through 20 to 30 years of vigorous growth to the point where we

had some knowledge about much of the formerly unknown oceanic areas of our

planet. About one million miles of traverses had been made which told us

much about the global pattern of gravity, magnetic and thermal anomalies,

and about the composition, thickness and stratification of the sedimentary

cover of the deep sea and continental margin. The coverage with such data

enabled the site selection panels to pick choice locations for drilling. The

knowledge gained from each hole could be extended into the surrounding area.

Detailed geophysical surveys were made for most of the selected locations

prior to drilling.

The earth sciences had recently matured from an empirical status to one

in which substantial theories and hypotheses about major tectonic processes

were flourishing. Theories about the origin of magnetic fields and magnetic

reversals, about ocean floor spreading, and continental drift, and about the

thermal history of our planet, had led to specific predictions that could be

tested best by an enlightened program of sampling of deep sea and continental

margin sediments and underlying rocks.

The first opportunity to sample the materials of the deep sea floor to

significant depths came when GLOMAR CHALLENGER drilled her first test hole in

the Gulf of Mexico. The many boreholes that have been drilled since that time

have made major contributions to better understanding of the nature of the

surface features of the earth, the chronology of tectonic and environmental

events, the nature of natural disasters, and the geological framework in which

economic concentrations of resources are located.

The plate tectonics model was developed from geophysical and geological

observations in the oceans and from earthquake seismology. Some of the strongest

evidence for its validity has been produced by the Deep Sea Drilling Project.

It implies the continuing generation of newly formed crust, primarily at oceanic

ridges, followed by lateral transport of the oceanic crust and sediments and

ultimate addition to existing continental crust. Along the line where continental and oceanic crust converge the interaction results in the formation of

great faults with associated earthquakes, but also, in some little understood

manner, the generation of volcanoes and deep seated molten rocks. These are the

loci both of natural hazards (volcanic activity and related earthquakes) and of

metallic mineral deposits.

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A second aspect of the plate tectonics model implies that the present

loci of new crust formation developed, in part, beneath a supercontinent some

200 million years ago. With the continued generation of new crust, the rifted

continental fragments moved apart toward the present continental configuration,

and indeed the relative motion of continents presumably continues today. As

the continents move about, circulation patterns in the oceans change, with

accompanying changes in weather and climate. The record of these changes is

preserved in the sedimentary column on the sea floor. In any case, the rifted

margins of the continents were initially thinned and faulted, and ultimately

sank beneath the newly formed ocean. All rifted margins show a complicated

structural history, leading to similarly complicated patterns of sedimentary

deposits. In the initial stages of rifting, isolated seas became the loci of

thick salt deposits. In this environment many giant deposits of oil and gas

have been found and this remains the most promising domain for the discovery

of large additional deposits.

The early phases of the Deep Sea Drilling Project completed a major

reconnaissance effort over the ocean areas of the world except the ice-covered

Arctic. The Deep Sea Drilling Project has been a relatively expensive earth

science effort, but in terms of contributing to a general synthesis of geological knowledge, it has been remarkably economical. Attempts at deeper penetration and additional operations on continental margins are needed to answer

important remaining questions and will require continued and increased financial support. This requirement is now being matched in part by the participation of other governments in the drilling effort and by the wish of many

scientists throughout the world to increase the scope of the effort.

The first meeting of the representatives of JOIDES with interested

foreign parties was held in Washington, D. C., in March 1972, to consider the

feasibility of a new international program. Later in that year the JOIDES

Planning Committee met to review drafts and prepare a final planning document

for an International Program of Ocean Drilling (IPOD).

Until the beginning of IPOD in 1975 the Deep Sea Drilling Project was

primarily a global reconnaissance drilling program of ocean sediments. Since

then the geographic scope has been limited to those areas in which specific

problems associated with ocean crust, margins, and sedimentary regimes can be

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resolved most definitively. Steaming time of the drilling vessel has been

minimized and drilling time maximized by drilling at only relatively few,

well-surveyed sites to solve specific problems.

During the IPOD drilling the composition of JOIDES has changed by the

addition of several more U. S. oceanographic institutions and by the addition

of several non-U. S. institutions. The JOIDES membership is now:

Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe

Federal Republic of Germany

University of California at San Diego

Scripps Institution of Oceanography

Centre National pour l'Exploitation des Oceans

Paris

Columbia University

Lament-Doherty Geological Observatory

University of Hawaii

Hawaii Institute of Geophysics

University of Miami

Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science

Natural Environment Research Council

London

Oregon State University

School of Oceanography

University of Rhode Island

Graduate School of Oceanography

Texas A&M University

Department of Oceanography

University of Tokyo

Ocean Research Institute

U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences

University of Washington

Department of Oceanography

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

Drilling with the GLOMAR CHALLENGER has been an outstanding scientific

success. The program has been well managed, it has continued and improved upon

the high degree of understanding and respect existing between the scientific,

offshore operations, and engineering communities, and it has fostered scientific

cooperation on an international scale. Yet, although the capabilities of the

CHALLENGER have been stretched to the maximum, the scientific goals that remain

demand a vessel that can work in greater depths of water, can stay more precisely

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— —

on station for deeper penetrations, and will have a greater carrying capacity.

Furthermore, much of the equipment aboard the CHALLENGER is reaching an age

where extensive maintenance, rework, or replacement is required. Thus, it

appears that the time is rapidly approaching when fulfillment of the expanding

scientific goals will call for a newer and more capable drilling vessel.

SCIENTIFIC INITIATIVES IN THE EVOLUTION

OF THE OCEAN MARGIN DRILLING PROGRAM

The International Phase of Ocean Drilling (IPOD) was scheduled to be

concluded in 1979. The JOIDES organization recognized the need to make a

critical examination of the status of scientific ocean drilling and to assess

plans for the future in its Executive Committee meeting in August 1976. An

ad-hoc Subcommittee on The Future of Scientific Ocean Drilling was appointed

and directed to hold a conference as soon as possible in order to provide

timely advice.

THE FUTURE OF SCIENTIFIC OCEAN DRILLING (FUSOD) REPORT

The FUSOD conference was held in March 1977 and prepared a report of

its deliberations~ conclusions, and recommendations. This report was revised

in April and, in July 1977, it was accepted by the JOIDES Executive Committee.

The report detailed a program of future work building upon the knowledge

gained in the DSOP and in the IPOD.

One of the more widely cited recommendations of the FUSOD report was

the need for extensive pre-drilling planning--geological and geophysical work

prior to drilling, and scientific analysis following a drilling program. The

committee concluded that any drilling program should proceed only if, "...

adequate funding is assured for scientific studies for, i) broad scale problem

definition, ii) small scale site examination and preparation, iii) sample

analysis and, iv) interpretation and synthesis, as well as logging for each

hole.”

Future drilling proposals were made by four panels: passive margins,

active margins, ocean crust, and paleoenvironment, Cost of the program and

equipment

All panel

drilling)

proposals

●

use and development were not initially considered by the four panels.

recommendations were divided into two phases: 1979-1981 (riserless

and from 1981 on (drilling with a riser). A summary of the panel

is given below.

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Summary of Proposals by Passive Margin Panel

“The objectives stated by the passive margin panel are:

o to relate the structural evolution, rifting, and early

sedimentation to the nature of ocean-continent boundary

and to early history of subsidence

o to test and improve existing models of passive margin

formation and development.

"It is recommended that the major focus of the program

Atlantic where there are excellent examples of two categories

margins:

be in the North

of passive

o mature margin, e.g., the east coast of the U. S.

o sediment-starved margin on both sides of the North Atlantic."

The initial phase of the drilling program called for shallow penetration drilling in a few carefully selected sites. The second phase involved

deep margin drilling with a riser for long periods with extensive advance

geophysical survey work.

Summary of proposal by Active Margin Panel

"The broad objectives of active margin drilling are to clarify the

process of subduction (collision is also important, but it will be the objective in a later stage). These objectives may be subclassified into the

following two:

1. Processes in the trench-arc zone

2. Origin and development of back-arc basins.

Current drilling program up to 1979 is designed to attack these objectives

with the GLOMAR CHALLENGER capabilities by placing transects over selected

active margins. The priorities of transects in the current (1977-79) program

are as follows:

Priority I Middle America Trench and South Philippine Sea Transect

Priority II Kuril-Okhotsk-Japan Transect

Priority III Northern Philippine Sea Transect

Priority IV Caribbean, New Hebrides, Tonga and Peru-Chile Transects

However, during the current IPOD program, only Priority I, II, and III transects will be attacked.”
The proposed first phase of the active margin panel proposal included

intensified geophysical site surveys, downhole instrumentation, “a more

detailed network of holes, and an integrated multidisciplinary approach with

land geology."

The post 1981 proposal envisioned a program with and without deep

drilling capability. Shallow drilling, primarily in the accretionary wedge

in subduction zones plus geophysical work was proposed. With a deep drilling

capability, a network of holes into the accretionary wedge and back-arc basin

drilling was designated in such areas as the Peru-Chile Trench, the Japan Arc

systems, and the Marianas Trench.

Summary of Proposa!s by Ocean Crust Panel

"The main objective of oceanic crust drilling is to learn in detail

about the geodynamic processes of the evolution of oceanic crust. Three major

sets of problems can be identified:

o geophysical problems, such as the interpretation of

heat flow, magnetic anomalies;

o physiochemical problems such as hydrothermal processes,

metrological differentiation, etc.;

o nature of the deep oceanic crust.”

The 1979-1981 proposed plans included hydrothermal processes, studying

crustal structures in the region of transform faults, and examination of the

area of Tuamotos. Post 1981 plans were directed at two objectives: to drill

into the deep ocean crust and investigate the ocean crust formed in the early

stages of spreading.

summary of Proposal by Paleoenvironment Panel

"For a first phase of drilling (1979-81) the South Atlantic has been

selected as the most suitable area to develop hypotheses to explain the problems posed by physiochemical changes which occur during the opening and

evolution of an ocean. It is proposed to focus on two major aspects of these

processes:

1) the transition from stagnant to well-oxygenated conditions

2) the transition from a warm to a cold ocean.

These two major problems can be approached in the South Atlantic in order to

understand the main processes involved. In the second phase, post 1981, a more

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generalized test of the concepts derived from the South Atlantic pilot study

should be attempted to elucidate the evolution of a world ocean.” Global

coverage was cited as crucial to reconstruct paleoceanographic evolution of

the world.

General Conclusions and Recommendations

When the FUSOD subcommittee undertook its work the availability of the

GLOMAR EXPLORER was anticipated in providing a candidate for a drilling vessel

with expanded drilling capabilities. Following the individual panel proposals,

the FUSOD committee selected overall options for a future ocean drilling

program with consideration of budgetary and equipment constraints but excluding EXPLORER conversion and riser development costs.

The preferred option included a continuous program of extended CHALLENGER

use (seven years), and six years of EXPLORER work which would fulfill many of

the panel proposals. The importance and advantage of a continuous drilling

program, from the CHALLENGER to the EXPLORER was emphasized as well as the

importance of performing non-drilling research.

THE AD-HOC ADVISORY GROUP FOR FUTURE SCIENTIFIC OCEAN DRILLING= GILETTI REPORT

The Ad-Hoc Group for Future Scientific Drilling (Giletti Group) was

established by the National Science Foundation to evaluate the Deep Sea

Drilling Project, review the FUSOD/JOIDES report as well as a Scripps proposal

for the continuation of deep sea drilling, examine other options for a marine

geosciences program which would not involve drilling, evaluate proposals

offered by the FUSOD subcommittee, and present scientific priorities for the

National Science Foundation directorate.

The Giletti Group, in its report of 2 May 1978, endorsed a scientific

drilling program designed to obtain both sedimentary and basement rock samples

employing riser technology and blow-out prevention coupled with geological,

geophysical, and follow-up research. The Group supported both the scientific

studies of the passive margin, active margin, oceanic crust, and paleoenvironment panels, and the general solutions presented by the FUSOD subcommittee.

Conversion of the GLOMAR EXPLORER or use of a similar type vessel was

recommended. As in the FUSOD report, the Group supported a continuous drilling

program until an EXPLORER-type vessel was available. The CHALLENGER could also

perform ancillary drilling at certain sites during this time.

63-314 0 - 80 - 7 B-14
—. .-

As in the USOD report, the Giletti Group concluded that a drilling

program is “not the end objective”. There should be extensive site surveys,

downhole logging and instrumentation, and other studies to complement the

drilling program. Drilling on the passive margins was considered to be of

great importance to assist in resource assessment and recommended that

“passive margin drilling, at least in the beginning, be off U. S. shores”.

THE AD-HOC PANEL TO INVESTIGATE THE GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH NEEDS AND

PROBLEMS OF CONTINENTAL MARGINS- BALLY REPORT

This ad-hoc panel was established in 1979 by the Ocean Sciences Board

of the National Research Council with support from the National Science Foundation, the Office of Naval Research, and the U. S. Geological Survey.

The report of this panel presented recommendations for research in the

1980's which would contribute to a greater understanding for major geological

processes of continental margins. Generally, the panel recommended focusing

on domestic continental work, greater utilization of existing technology, and

finally, a drilling program for “scientific purposes following detailed

geological and geophysical surveying”.

Three programs were designated as high priority work for the future: 

1. A sediment dynamics program to examine sediment transport, entrainment

and deposition on continental shelves, slopes, rises, and marginal basins.

2. A program of geophysical and geological traverses, both land and marine,

on domestic continental margins.

3. The outfitting of two geophysical research vessels, one for the East Coast

and Gulf, and one for the West Coast and the Alaskan margins.

Two programs were designated as second priority:

1. Geological and geophysical traverses of foreign continental margins.

2. Drilling on continental margins, "but only if adequate funding is assured

for scientific studies that include: 1) broad-scale problem definition, 2) small

scale site examination and preparation, 3) sample analysis and well logging, and

4) interpretation and synthesis".

The report summarized rough cost estimates for each major research

program described. The very high costs for drilling were used to emphasize the

need for funds directed towards the numerous related research projects.

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THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON POST-I POD SCIENCE

The Committee on Post -I POD Science was created by the National Science

Foundation in July 1979 to evaluate the proposed Ocean Margin Drilling Program,

principally as presented in the FUSOD report. The panel was asked to review

and critique: 1) the science to be performed, 2) the relation between the proposed science program and ‘national needs” -- resource assessment, and 3) the

drilling program.

The Committee endorsed the OMD program and recommended the program be

given “high priority” consideration in the FY81 budget process at the Foundation. They concluded that the OMD program should be funded through add-on

dollars or new money to the NSF budget to avoid competition with other science

projects. Other recommendations presented by the committee were:

1. The science proposed in the OMD program justified the costs of the project,

($600 million over ten years).

2. There is a ‘national need” to address resources potential of the continental margins. Geological and geophysical techniques allow only partial answers

and drilling is necessary. The program should not be considered to be only a

drilling project since “... drilling is but one of the tools to be used-albeit

the most spectacular and most expensive.”

3. Advances will be needed in technology but they are possible, e.g., riser

development; well control (blow out prevention), and improvements in ship

and drilling operations.

4. Foreign participation should be encouraged

fashion to the Deep Sea Drilling Project.

and be managed in a similar

ENGINEERING STUDIES IN SUPPORT OF ACHIEVING THE

OCEAN MARGIN DRILLING SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVES

Engineering studies have been conducted during the past several years to

determine the vehicle and systems needed to accomplish the drilling tasks and

associated work required by the scientific objectives. Although the first of

these studies was initiated prior to the establishment by JOIDES of the FUSOD

subcommittee, the drilling requirements and the principal characteristics

inherent in a drilling vessel have

period covered by these studies.

not been altered substantially over the

●

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BASIC ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC REQUIREMENTS

Central to these studies was the requirement for blowout prevention,

to provide the capability to control unwanted flows of formation fluids,

mainly possible reservoired oil and gas; this prudent necessity arises

because of the scientific requirement to drill and sample thick sediment

accumulations near the continents. The technical solution is a deep sea

riser, providing return circulation of drilling fluids and control access

to blowout prevention valves and shutoffs. This same system provides other

advantages, such as improved hole stability and improved drill cutting

removal; these advantages are applicable to other drilling than in thick

sediment sections.

Studies have so far been based on a series of sites to be drilled in

five broadly representative geographic areas. These areas (U. S. Atlantic

Coast off Cape Hatteras and Cape May, off Cape Flattery, Washington, off

Lisbon,. Portugal; off Spanish Sahara-Mauritania border; Sea of Okhotsk-Kurile

Island area) were chosen as a model drilling program from possible areas of

riser drilling interest. They were chosen to create a substantial latitudinal

range, (Okhotsk to Mauritania) and to place sites in the lee of major continents, (Okhotsk, Cape May and Cape Hatteras) and also in the lee of major

oceans, (Cape Flattery and Spanish Sahara/Mauritania), with respect to dominant weather patterns. The model entertained conditions of weather and sea

that would be neither unrealistically placid nor outrageously difficult. It

also realistically planned long distances between sites in a program spanning

more than one major ocean. Typical sites are shown in Figure 1.

The main conclusions of these studies are that development and use of a

deepwater riser are technically feasible, and that the work should be accomplished from a large single hull drilling ship of the order of a little less

than 600 feet length.

Recently, added to these inputs as a special technical solution, was the

feasibility of converting the GLOMAR EXPLORER from a heavy lift vessel to an

oceanographic research drilling vessel, having capability to drill and core

the deep ocean basins and margins. The resulting study was extensive, but did

not address in depth the necessity to define certain parameters which could

affect final design of the system or components. Certain selected systems

and components should be subjected to predesign analysis and, where applicable,

B-17
>

L-a-y- - ..——— — 9 b b b b

.

D

— 

, U

63-314 0 - 80 - 8
selected development testing should be accomplished, prior to final system

design.

These various engineering studies, and the general conclusions derived

in each study, are summarized in the following subsections of this paper.

THE OCEAN RESOURCES ENGINEERING, INC. REPORT

In December 1974, Scripps Institution of Oceanography authorized

Ocean Resources Engineering, Inc. to study the technical and economic feasibility of accomplishing the program objectives with conventional exploratory

drilling equipment. The scope of the study included:

(a) Determination of the minimum drilling vessel

requirements for this program.

(b) Evaluation of oceanographic conditions at

several geographical locations.

(c) Comparison of existing or planned drilling

vessels to determine what type of rig is

best suited for the Ocean Margins Program.

(d) Evaluation of existing marine riser equipment and concepts.

(e] Determination of areas which need development,

improvement or extension of existing technology.

(f) Definition of special requirements for logistic

support.

The executive summary of the O.R.E. report, “Oceanographic and

Vessel Evaluation for IPOD Ocean Margins Study”, issued on 26 September 1975,

is quoted in part below:

"It is technically and economically feasible to extend the State-Ofthe-art technology utilized in conventional exploration drilling operations

in order to satisfy these special requirements of the Ocean Margins Program.

This program can be accomplished most effectively with a large, dynamically

positioned drillship which has an overall length of about 570 feet, a beam

of 85 feet and a maximum draft of 24 feet. This unit has the maneuverability

needed for widely dispersed drilling areas and has sufficient capacity for

storage of riser, drill pipe and drilling expendable. This unit is more

suitable and less expensive for the Ocean Margins Program than a semisubmersible

or small drillship.

B-19
"The most critical item which requires analysis, design, and testing

is the marine riser. Existing technology can be extended to meet these

needs by commencing a long-range engineering effort in the Fall of 1975.

For optimum performance, the drillship should be specially designed with

components sized and located as appropriate for these specific operations.

This vessel would have the inherent ability to conduct future exploratory

oil and gas drilling in deep water. Design and construction of the drillship

should commence in February 1977, with mobilization of the vessel accomplished

by May 1981. The scientific drilling program can be accomplished in about

4.3 years.

"The Ocean Margins Program may be funded either as a contractor owned,

contractor operated program or a government owned, contractor operated program. . . . . The total program costs with the contractor owned equipment are

$283 million, while the total costs with the government owned equipment will

be only $227 million. Since significant savings can be effected, it is

strongly recommended that the drillship be government owned and operated by

an experienced offshore drilling contractor."

THE GLOBAL MARINE DEVELOPMENT, INC. REPORT

When the GLOMAR EXPLORER became available as a government owned vessel,

the Scripps Institution of Oceanography commissioned Global Marine Development,

Inc. to study the feasibility of converting this ship from a heavy lift platform to a drilling platform for use in the Ocean Margins Drilling Program.

The conclusions derived from this study were presented in a report ‘Conversion

of the GLOMAR EXPLORER into a Deep Water Drilling and Coring Vessel", 28 February 1977. These are summarized below: .

The demonstrated deep ocean performance of the GLOMAR EXPLORER, coupled

with the present lack of an operational assignment for the vessel, make the

U. S. government-owned GLOMAR EXPLORER an ideal candidate for the proposed

program. GMDI feels especially confident in the feasibility of using this

vessel for the proposed program. This confidence stems from our role as

prime contractor for this ship from its conception through detailed engineering and construction, subsequent "at sea” operations and ultimate lay-up in

the U. S. Reserve Fleet.

The versatility and flexibility of this ship due to its inherent size

advantage over the GLOMAR CHALLENGER is graphically depicted in Figure 2.

B-20
EXPLORER

DISPLACEMENT, LIGHT 21000 TONS

LENGTH

BEAM

DEPTH

HULL VOLUME

CHALLENGER

4303 TONS

618 FT. 400 FT.

116 FT. 65 FT.

51 FT. 27 FT.

3000000 CU FT. 600000 CU FT.

r

\ --

L . . -

1

lnlg l I 1

JL. .- - — —..—. .

ELEVATIONS \

GLOMAR CHALLENGER

EXPLORER

CHALLENGER

SIZE COMPARISON OF GLOMAR EXPLORER AND GLOMAR CHALLENGER

FIGURE2

B-21
Significant conclusions from this study are:

o

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

The GLOMAR EXPLORER can, with minor modifications, maintain position for deep water drilling as well as, or

better than, existing "large" drilling ships.

The vessel motions are less than those of “large”

drilling ships operating under the same environmental

conditions.

The vessel has more than adequate stowage capacity for

the specified operation. At sea resupply should not

be necessary for legs less than 150 days except for

crew change.

Weather downtime at the specified operating sites, is

expected to be less than two percent assuming operation does not take place during the favorable seasons

at the specified sites.

The large vessel size allows all specified laboratory

and scientific accommodations to be incorporated ‘

either in permanent spaces or temporary vans. There

is additional capacity available to increase these

facilities if desired.

The unique heave compensated gimbal system allows

support and tensioning of the riser such that the

riser will not require any type of flotation. This

capability obviously simplifies the riser itself as

well as all associated handling and support equipment.

Handling of the drill pipe sections from the storage

area to the moving gimballed rig floor at acceptable

rates can be accomplished.

The vessel is already in the U. S. Government inventory.

Therefore, the cost of operating the vessel, on a day

rate basis, is comparable to other contractor-owned

"large” drilling ships.

B-22
THE DONHAISER MARINE, INC. REPORTS

The National Science Foundation contracted with Donhaiser Marine, Inc.

(DMI) to conduct a comparative review of the O. R. E. report and the GMDI

report as well as to draw conclusions from these and other input information

regarding the engineering approach that should be taken by the Foundation

and to estimate the costs that would be incurred in the engineering aspects

of the program. DMI presented its conclusions in three reports issued from

July 1978 to November 1978.The conclusions of these reports are summarized

in abbreviated form below:

o The most cost effective method of carrying out the Ocean Margins

Drilling Program will be for the government to own a suitable drilling

vessel, riser and well control system, drill pipe and related equipment and contract for its operation. The total difference in cost

over a five year program utilizing the modified GLOMAR EXPLORER, contractor operated as compared to contracting for a contractor owned

new drillship will be in the order of magnitude of 160 millon dollars

based on 1978 dollars with an 8% per year escalation.

o The GLOMAR EXPLORER, with suitable modifications, appears to be a

feasible and financially attractive Ocean Margin Drilling vessel.

o Due to the large size (over twice the displacement of present

large drillships) the GLOMAR EXPLORER will have relatively low

motion response characteristics which should result in a low

percentage of operation downtime due to weather in most geographic

areas of the world.

o The vessel has ample storage capacity for the anticipated operation. With modification, the vessel will have a capacity for carrying expendable in excess of that required for carrying out the

proposed program missions.

o All of the initially specified laboratories and scientific

accommodations can be incorporated in the vessel with ample additional

capacity for expansion of these facilities if desired.

o The vessel can be readily modified to incorporate conventional

systems for storage, handling and deploying the necessary riser,

B-23
casing and drill pipe required for the proposed Ocean Margins

Drilling Program.

o The vessel has ample installed generating capacity to provide the necessary power requirements for drilling and stationkeeping. However, initial studies indicate marginal or possibly

inadequate stationkeeping performance during the passage of

weather fronts, squall lines, and thunderstorms due to limitations of present thrusters and main propellers but modifications

can be made to thrusters and main propellers to provide ample

thrust to maintain station for the short-term severe environmental

conditions.

o The vessel’s transit speed which is approximately 12 knots

is sufficient for carrying out a world-wide scientific coring

program.

o Generally, due to the GLOMAR EXPLORER’S size, present arrange-.

ment, elaborate equipment and recent construction, we see no 

reason why this vessel cannot be modified to provide one of the

finest dynamically positioned drillships afloat today. AIso,

due to the fact that structural, piping and electrical modifications necessary for installation of required drilling and

riser handling equipment will not be of a major nature, it

should be possible to convert the GLOMAR EXPLORER to a modern,

high capacity, drilling and coring vessel for a small fraction

of the cost of building a new drillship of comparable size and

capacity.

o Both the ORE buoyed riser concept and the GMDI non-buoyed riser

concept appear to be technically feasible; i.e., no insurmountable

technical problems have been identified to date. However, both

concepts would require additional design studies to arrive at an

optimized design and fully identify and correct potential problems.

The DMI preferred riser design concept is the buoyed riser.

B-24
— —

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL/MARINE BOARD REPORT

In the Spring of 1978, the National Science Foundation requested the

Marine Board-Assembly of Engineering of the National Research Council/National

Academy of Sciences to conduct an in-depth review of the background, scope,

and proposed plans for drilling into the deep reaches of the ocean for scientific purposes. Although the review was to be oriented primarily to the

engineering aspects of the problem, the committee formed to conduct the

review comprised individuals with expertise in ocean geology, seismology,

marine engineering, offshore resource recovery, ship design and navigation,

and political, environmental, and management matters.

Specifically, the committee was charged by NSF to:

o

0

0

0

0

0

Relate the technology for drilling and obtaining core samples

in the deep ocean to the objectives of the proposed scientific

program, (e.g., depth, penetration, environmental forces) with

particular emphasis on the technical feasibility, capability

and prospects of overcoming deficiencies.

Consider alternatives to drilling to achieve the program’s

objectives.

Examine particularly the riser and well control systems, and

related technology including the probable environmental

effects of system failure, and costs of these systems.

Assess the options and costs of alternative drilling platforms.

Compare the costs of various methods by which the program’s

objectives could be met.

Assess the relationships between the Federal government and

the drilling industry, as well as among government agencies,

as they relate to deep sea drilling.

Over the course of its review, the committee analyzed all of the scientific reports listed in the previous section and all of the engineering reports

described above. An interim report was issued in November 1978 and the final

report “Engineering for Deep Sea Drilling for Scientific Purposes” was delivered

to NSF in April 1980. The recommendations contained therein are quoted below:

"The committee developed several specific recommendations for NSF action

in its proposed continuation of deep sea drilling for scientific purposes.
These recommendations are generally couched in terms of the use of EXPLORER

and the goals of penetrating 20,000 feet of sediments at water depths of

13,000 feet. Despite this, the committee considers essentially all of the

recommendations to be equally pertinent to other possible platforms and

drilling-penetration or water depth goals. In essence, the committee reccomends that:

o

0

0

0

0

0

0

NSF establish a strong management team to control and

guide the program and to maintain close industry contacts

to ensure that the required technology is developed.

The program be operated and the equipment be developed

using a systems-engineering approach as outlined in this

report and its Appendix B.

Adequate time and funds be allocated for a thorough preliminary engineering study of at least two years duration

prior to converting the ship or fabricating any major

equipment.

In the drilling-system design, early attention be given to

the major critical design issues--well control, riser

handling, casing programs --enumerated in the body of the

report.

The budget be reviewed and modified to include the cost of

additional equipment, data gathering, acquiring and training a crew, and geophysical

more realistic estimates of

Increased effort be devoted

for engineering design use,

surveys, and to account for

inflation.

to collecting and analyzing,

as much meteorological,

oceanographic, and ocean-floor geotechnical data as

possible in the broad geographic areas of concern to the

program. Further, this effort should be extended as early

as possible to acquiring similar data for specific smaller

areas as the site-selection process narrows down the areas

under consideration.

Undertake adaptation of existing and development of new

--logging and downhole measurement equipment to improve the oo—__e -..–

B-26
—

0

0

safety of drilling operations and to lessen the scientific

impact of the anticipated reduction in core recovery from

deep-penetration holes.

Include funding for improved coring equipment and techniques for sedimentary and igneous rocks in the initial

system design and development effort.

Early attention be given to personnel recruitment and training, so that key operational personnel can help design and

develop both equipment and procedures. This includes the

concurrent development of computer-based drilling simulators

for initial use as design aids and training tools and later

use for problem-solving and continued training.”

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION MANAGEMENT

OF THE OCEAN MARGINS DRILLING PROGRAM

As the government manager of the Deep Sea Drilling Project, the National

Science Foundation encouraged, participated in, and funded the intial scientific

and engineering studies that resulted in the FUSOD report, the O. R. E. report

and the GMDI report. Similarly, the DSDP management, in response to the

recommendations of these reports, convened the Ad-Hoc Group for Future

Scientific Drilling and contracted with Donhaiser Marine, Inc. to review the

scientific and engineering aspects of the program. Additionally, with support

from ONR and USGS, the National Academy of Sciences Ocean Ociences Board was

requested to review the scientific program and the Marine Board was requested

to review the engineering program.

DEVELOPMENT OF A MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

The input that NSF received from all of these committees and advisory

groups not only helped to formulate the scientific” and engineering programs

but also provided suggestions as to the level of funding required and as to

how the OMD program should be managed. Finally, the Blue Ribbon Committee

report strongly supported the program and also recommended that it be funded

with add-on or new money in the NSF budget and that it be given high priority;

foreign participation was also encouraged.

B-27
A final impetus was given to the program when President Carter, at

the urging of his science advisor Dr. Frank press, invited members of the

oil industry to participate in the project on a cost sharing basis with

the government. Subsequent negotiations resulted in the agreement by

a number of oil companies to share 50% of the total program costs for

the initial phases with the option to continue for the total program.

Thus, if the oil companies remain satisfied with the program plans and

progress, the cost to the government will be only half what it otherwise

might have been.

As a result of the inputs from the scientific and engineering studies,

the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee, and the prospect of sharing the cost of the program with the oil industry, a revised management

structure was established within the NSF to adapt prior management concepts

to existing programs and to the Ocean Margins Drilling Program. This

structure is delineated in Figure 3. It should be noted that the Advisory

Committee to the Director and the Industry Oversight Committee, the latter

comprising oil company representatives, are in the process of being established. Using funds from the current budget, the Systems Support Contractor,

Santa Fe Engineering Service Company, is presently under contract to NSF;

the Systems Integration Contractor, who will be responsible for system

design, construction, and operation, will be selected after the program

has been specified in sufficient detail to prepare formal invitations to

bid. Scripps is presently under contract for the continuing DSDP/IPOD

project and JOI, Inc. is also formally participating in the project on a

contractual basis.

In addition to the basic program management by NSF, there are being

established groups of advisors who will advise both the Director and the

Ocean Program Drilling Team. The structure of these advisory bodies is

shown in Figure 4. The OMD Advisory Committee will be made up of 40%

industry representatives, 40% from academia, and 20% from the public sector.

The Marine Board of the National Research Council has already selected a

smaller advisory group from among those who served on the 1978-1979 Committee. The Navy is to be called upon for its expertise in ship conversion

inspection and supervision. Additional consultants from government and

industry will be called upon as required for assisting in various facets of

B-28
NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD H

AOVISORY

OIRECTOR COMMITTEE I

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR INDUSTRY

FOR ASTRONOMICAL, ATMOSPHERIC, EARTH OVERSIGHT

AND OCEAN SCIENCES COMMITTEE

FOUNDATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR OCEAN DRILLING PROGRA M

FIGURE 3

MARINE

BOARO

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUN DATIO N

NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD AOVISORY

DIRECTOR COMMITTEE

●

I

.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

FOR ASTRONOMICAL, ATMOSPHERIC, EARTH

AND OCEAN SCIENCES

I

OCEAN DRILLING

PROGRAM TEAM

U. S. NAVY

I

1

STRUCTURE FOR OCEAN PROGRAM

FIGURE 4

B-29
the program as it develops. Figure 5 illustrates the lines of responsibility

intended to apply to this combination of management, advisory, and performance

groups.

EVOLUTION OF THE OMD PROGRAM BUDGET

Although cost data were included in the FUSOD report, the O. R. E.

report, and the GMDI report, these costs rapidly became outdated as inflation

took hold, as the scope of the scientific program expanded, and as the

engineering ramifications of drilling in the selected sites became more

obvious. Revised cost estimates were made by Donhaiser Marine and the Marine

Board also made some cogent comments on the cost implications of drilling

with a

one of

budget

riser in 20,000 feet of water.

When Santa Fe, the NSF Systems Support Contractor, was brought aboar

their initial tasks was to conduct a more detailed review of the

picture and to relate expenditures to a realistic development and

drilling schedule and to anticipated rates of inflation.

As a. result of this review, the program cost through fiscal year 1989, at

a 7% escalation, was estimated to be $615 million which exceeded by $57 mi

NATIONAL

SCIENCE

FOUNDATION

OTHER

U.S. NAVY MARINE PARTICIPATING INDUSTRY

BOARD U.S.GOV’T DEPTS. LIAISON

& AGENCIES

SYSTEMS

INTEGRATION

CONTRACTOR

● .

1

I

DESIGN CONVERSION&

CONSTRUCTION

~

DIRECTION —

COORDINATlO N

----

OPERATlONS IFl 

OCEAN MARGINS DRILLING PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITY MATRIX

FIGURE 5

B-30
ESCALATION O 16%

PROGRAM

410.4

---- -

343.8

764.4

663.6

@73.@

600

100 +

BASE - S1979

A - 7% ESCALATION

B

10% ESCALATION 81-89

c - 15% Escalation

700

600

600

400

300

200

100

. ,

CY 90 81 u 63 64 6 6 66 87 66 89

OCEAN MARGINS DRILLING PROGRAM CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURES

FIGURE 6

the last previous cost estimate made. This was based upon a total cost in

1979 dollars of $410 million which is used in later cost comparisons. On

the other hand, if the escalation average out to 10%, the total cost would

be $694 million. Furthermore, if the escalation were initially 15% and

decreased within two years to 10%, the total cost would be $764 million.

The cumulative expenditures represented by these various hypothesized escalation rates are shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows the annual distribution

of the base cost of $410 million by calendar year and by program phases in

both graphic and tabular format.

B-31
8a

70

60

$ MILLIONS

m

40

30

20

10

LEGEND

SCIENCE OPS & MGMT

SCIENCE PROGRAM

SHIP OPERATIONS

CONSTRUCTION

6

DESIGN

4

6 6

4 4

3 3

3

2

4

2 1

1

2

CY 80 81 82 84 85 88 87 86 .88

— —

60—

4.2

.6

.5

—

53

—

86

30.7

11.6

83 84 85 TOTAL

31.8

14.3

86

31.8

150

4.2

83.7

210.8

111.7

1.1 PROGRAM

SUPPORT. 79S

1.2 EXPLORER

CONVERSION. 79S

1.3 DRILLING

OPERATIONS. 70S

14 SCIENTlFlC

PROGRAMS. 79S

1.0 OMD

PROGRAM. 79s

9.2

1.2

11.6

148

25.8

13.2

22.5

30.3

13.6

20.7

6.1

22.0 53.8 66.4 46.1 46.8 44.6 42.3 26.8 410.4

GRAPHIC AND TABULAR DISTRIBUTION OF PLANNED EXPENDITURES

FIGURE 7

Currently, the total program funding figure being used for discussion

is $700 million of which $350 million will be supplied by the government and

$350 million by industry. Although the curves of Figures 6 and 7 show these

expenditures being made over calendar years 1980 through 1989, it is anticipated that the program will move somewhat more slowly at the beginning with

a consequent stretch-out to calendar year 1990.

B-32
Appendix C

The Hedberg Proposal

Another approach to combining science and oil and gas exploration on

the continental margins has been proposed by Dr. Hollis Hedberg of Princeton

University in numerous journal and newspaper articles. The following is

excerpted from an article in AAPG

scientists that OTA has contacted

Explorer of November 1979. Several

believe this would be a viable approach.

“The program should be a cooperative effort among petroleum companies,

with government, and with whoever else can contribute to successful

exploration and development in the oceans. What I would recommend, as a

supplement to our present system, would be the

industry advice) of a number of large regional

promising offshore acreage, going far out into

selection by government (with

blocks of relatively

deep water to the base of the

continental slope. The size of the blocks would be not the present 5,760

acres, but on the order of millions of acres - still only a small fraction

of the nearly one thousand million acres of total U.S. offshore.

“These blocks would be offered to industry Consortiums, without bonus

payments, with rights of both exploration and exploitation, with suitable

government royalties, and with such exploration commitments for each block

as would seem necessary to assure conclusive results. Provisions for tax

benefits to offset unsuccessful ventures plus limitations to prevent

excessive returns from successful ones would be in order. The operational

management would be by the Consortium, working under much the same sort of

an arrangement as was used quite successfully by the consortium of companies

c-1
in Iran to meet the emergency of the 1950’s. There would be a stong central

operating unit, made up of selected personnel contributed by the constituent

entities and

production.

with advisory groups of the Members both for exploration and

"The members of the Consortium would each have equal shares and would

be entities with requisite experience in offshore Petroleum operations and

willing and able to commit to the Consortium as openers X million dollars

for exploration over a specified period. These would normally be major oil

companies or associations of smaller oil companies. (However, an exception

might be made to allow the Federal government (or an appropriately situated

state government) to also hold a single equal share under the same terms and

commitments as other entities.)

“Finally, a possible further provision might be made to bring into the

Consortium a unit composed of the major oceanographic research institutions.

The so-called Stever report of the National Science Foundation (1979) calls

for a 10-year 600-million-dollar program of drilling for science on the

ocean margins with the Glomar Explorer, and proposes that the U.S. petroleum

industry should help to foot the bill. (A contribution of about 50 percent

has been suggested.) Such a proposal, although indeed able to contribute

geological background useful in subsequent petroleum exploration, falls far

short of direct on-structure petroleum exploration drilling on already

granted lease acreage which, if successful, could be followed promptly by

production development. Much more pertinent to solving the country’s

petroleum problem, while at the same time highly effective in advancing the

scientific knowledge of its offshore margins, would be the idea of bringing

the combined major oceanographic institutions (JOIDES) into the proposed

c-2
Consortium programs as a participating Member at no monetary cost to them

and still under conditions where their research and it publication could be

strongly encouraged and supported.”

c-3
Appendix D

Responses From Two Petroleum Companies Which Illustrates

Stated Reasons For And Against Participating In The

Ocean Margin Drilling Program
Gulf Oil Exploration and Production Company

March 17, 1980

Joseph O.. Carter P. o. Box 2100

SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT

EXPLORATION h TECH NO LO(3Y Houston, TX 7700 1

Mr. Peter A. Johnson

Project Director

congress of the United States

Office of Technology Assessment

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Receipt of your letter of March 12, 1980, is acknowledged

wherein you ask for our views concerning the program and

aspects of the Margin Drilling Program proposed by the

National Science Foundation.

You should know that Gulf elected not to participate in

the Program after attending the several meetings with NSF

officials. In our view, the scope of the Program is too

thinly dispersed to add very much to the general knowledge

of our country’s resource base. We are certainly in

agreement that the resource base needs to be determined.

To date, the industry’s investigation has been mainly limited

to the continental shelves, whereas the continental slopes

are virtually untested. The slopes can be evaluated with

present drill riser technology. Development of riser technology to drill the abyssal deep within the next ten years

is much too soon in our opinion. We do not foresee the

industry being anywhere near ready to explore at such depths

much less to have the technology to produce hydrocarbons

from them in that time frame. Perhaps twenty or thirty

years is more realistic on the evolutionary scale since

economic feasibility plays a very large role in determining

when these things are possible.

I think we would much rather have seen a program in two phases.

Phase I would consist of a series of up to ten wells drilled

on the continental slope of the North American continent

using available technology with a simultaneous world-wide

multi-phase seismic survey. Phase II would consist of a

drilling program in those prospective areas defined by the

seismic survey that would perhaps include some abyssal deep

drilling.

Gulf

D-1

A DIvISION OF GULF OIL CORPORATION
Page 2

Mr. Peter A. Johnson

March 17, 1980

This is not to say that Gulf’s mind is closed to the concept

nor to the possibility of ever joining such a project. It

is simply that the costs cannot be equated with meaningful

results at this time.

1f you require further comment, please let me know. We would

be happy to meet with you or your staff at any time that is

mutually agreeable.

Very truly yours,

~_ J.O. CARTE R .

JOC : bf

D-2
April 3, 1980

Mr. Peter Johnson

Project Director

Office of Technology Assessment

Washington, D. C. 20510

RE: Ocean Margin Drilling

Program

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Your recent letter in regard to the Ocean Margin Drilling

Program is one that we feel merits careful attention, justifying a written response.

Although you did not state the time available in which

to complete your response to the HUD-Independent Agencies

Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, it is

assumed that you wish to move forward as promptly as possible.

Sunmark Exploration Company, a Division of Sun Oil Company

(Delaware), supports the program. We do have concerns regarding

industry level of support (only eight companies have committed

in principle to the program) and believe that greater participation by industry will be required to carry the project through.

Foreign participation may be available, but will probably be

limited.

Sunmark considers the program advantageous in that it combines scientific objectives with the development of new drilling

technology. In such a complex program, we feel that the joint

effort of government and industry combining knowledge and expertise,

while sharing expenses, will give greatest chance for safe and

economical progress. We do not expect the program to contribute

directly to our knowledge of hydrocarbon resources, as we will not

support on-structure drilling.

We do expect to gain knowledge concerning sediments in the

areas studied, and certainly will draw conclusions regarding

specific areas of opportunity.

If the program is carried out; however, this information will

be available to anyone, as results of the research will be published and released to the public shortly after acquisition. Geological and geophysical research that must accompany the program

D-3
Page Two

April 2, 1980

JET\wm

D-4