J-S21044-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KESHON LAMAR CANYON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 10 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-54-CR-0001291-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED: JULY 19, 2022

Keshon Lamar Canyon (Canyon) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed by the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County (trial court) after 

a jury found him guilty of two counts of possession with intent to deliver a 

controlled substance (PWID), three counts of possession of a controlled 

substance and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.1 On appeal, he

challenges (1) the sufficiency of evidence for his PWID convictions, (2) the 

denial of his suppression motion, (3) the jury instructions about the Medical 

Marijuana Act (MMA),2 (4) his expert being barred from testifying about 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (a)(16) and (a)(32), respectively.

2 35 P.S. §§ 10231.101-10231.2110.
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certain matters, and (5) the trial court correcting defense counsel during 

cross-examination of a witness. We affirm.

I.

On May 3, 2020, Minersville Police applied for a warrant to search 

Canyon’s home. According to the affidavit:

During the month of February of 2020, [police] received 

multiple complaints of suspected drug activity from 214 Lewis 

Street, Minersville, Pa. Neighbors report seeing a large volume of 

stop and go traffic both in vehicle and on foot. Reports include 

vehicles parking outside and occupants exiting the vehicle, 

entering 214 Lewis Street and emerging a short later and leaving 

in vehicles. Neighbors also report a very strong odor of marijuana 

emitting from the home and it can be detected in the street and 

adjacent areas.

On March 3, 2020, [police] conducted a trash pull from 

outside 214 Lewis Street, Minersville. During the operation, five 

(5) white trash bags and one (1) black trash bag were taken from 

curbside in front of 214 Lewis Street, Minersville and returned to 

the Minersville Police Headquarters. A search of the trash 

revealed medium and large glassine and vacuum style bags 

containing green leafy residue that field tested positive for 

marijuana, [and] mail addressed to Keshon Canyon and Samantha 

Lynn Ellex, 214 Lewis Street, Minersville.

[Police] conducted a check on Canyon through the

Pennsylvania State Police Central Repository. Result of this check 

indicated that Canyon had multiple arrests for trafficking of 

controlled substances and weapons violations, mainly originating 

from the Shenandoah Police Department.

Upon reaching out to Shenandoah Police Chief George 

Carado concerning Canyon, Chief Carado advised that while living 

in Shenandoah, Canyon was involved in a shooting, was known to 

illegally possess firearms and was heavily involved in the 

trafficking of heroin. These investigations resulted in Canyon’s 

arrest for the aforementioned violations.
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After the warrant was issued, police executed it the same day. At the 

time of the search, Canyon was in the home with his father, his girlfriend and 

their two children. Inside the kitchen, police found 5.5 ounces of marijuana 

broken down into several smaller bags; a digital scale; a heat vacuum sealer;

and a cell phone in a U.S. postage box. Inside a bedroom, police found a 

vacuumed sealed pouch containing 212 Tylenol with codeine pills; 29 

hydrocodone pills; another digital scale; a safe; two more cell phones; silver 

aluminum packaging materials; a glass bong; a box of rolling materials; and 

$440 cash in Canyon’s wallet. Inside the basement, police found 394 codeine 

pills hidden in the wall of the basement steps. Finally, the police found a 

medical marijuana card for Canyon but nothing else showing that the 

marijuana in the kitchen was prescribed by a doctor. Canyon repeatedly told

the officers : “All the stuff in here is mine, nobody else’s.”

After being charged with the above offenses,

3 Canyon moved to 

suppress the items found in his home. When his motion was denied, he

proceeded to an October 2021 jury trial. At trial, the Commonwealth 

presented Agent Leo Securda (Agent Securda) of the Pennsylvania Office of 

the Attorney General as an expert in “drug law investigation, identification, 

enforcement, packaging, and distribution.” He concluded that Canyon 

____________________________________________

3 Canyon was also charged with endangering the welfare of children, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 4304, but the Commonwealth dropped the charge before trial.
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intended to deliver the marijuana because of the way it was packaged. He 

stated the same about the codeine pills because of the large number (over 

600) that were found. Canyon did not testify but presented David Leff (Leff),

who testified as an expert on drug usage, packaging, methodology and drug 

trafficking, and opined that Canyon possessed the drugs for personal use. 

Aside from his medical marijuana card, however, Canyon presented no 

evidence that he was prescribed the marijuana.

The jury found Canyon guilty on all offenses, and the trial court 

sentenced him to an aggregate term of 2 to 8 years’ imprisonment.4 After the 

trial court denied his post-sentence motion, Canyon filed this appeal and raises 

eight issues for review, which we have reordered:

1. Did the evidence presented at trial establish beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Canyon was guilty of [PWID] marijuana and

codeine in the form of Tylenol III.

2. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress the fruits of the

search of [Canyon’s] residence as the search warrant was not 

supported by probable cause.

3. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury in accordance 

with Section 405 of the [MMA] that the Act limits the amount of 

marijuana that may be dispensed to a patient or caregiver to a 

thirty-day supply but does not limit the amount of marijuana that 

may be dispensed as a thirty-day supply, nor does it limit the

amount that may be possessed by a patient or caregiver.

____________________________________________

4 The trial court sentenced Canyon to 1 to 4 years’ imprisonment for each 

PWID count and merged their corresponding simple possession counts. The 

trial court imposed concurrent sentences on the remaining counts.
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4. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury that while

Section 303(6) of the [MMA] provides that unused medical 

marijuana shall be kept in the original package in which it was 

dispensed, it does not limit the amount of medical marijuana that 

may be possessed by a patient or caregiver.

5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in instructing the jury 

that defense counsel misstated the law in opening to the jury.

6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in barring Canyon’s

expert from testifying regarding the existence of different strains 

of marijuana, thereby preventing defense counsel from arguing 

that the medical marijuana was in different packaging due to the 

different strains and not for purpose of distributing the same.

7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in barring Canyon’s

witness from identifying documents which tended to show that

Canyon was gainfully employed, thereby preventing defense

counsel from arguing that the fact that Canyon was employed was 

evidence that he did not intend to distribute controlled

substances.

8. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in criticizing defense 

counsel for not being accurate in describing the denominations of 

cash while cross-examining the Commonwealth’s expert.

Canyon’s Brief at 4-5.

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

Canyon contends that the Commonwealth presented insufficient 

evidence for both of his PWID convictions. Like he did at trial, Canyon 

concedes possession but asserts there was not enough evidence that he 

intended to distribute any of the substances. Addressing the marijuana first, 

he emphasizes that the amount recovered (5.5 ounces) was not a large 

amount. He notes the same about the cash found in his wallet ($440), 

characterizing it as not an “excessive” amount of cash. Consistent with
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personal use of marijuana, he observes that the police found a glass smoking 

device and a box of rolling papers. As for the codeine, he emphasizes only 

that the pills were not packaged for resale.5

Section 780-113 of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and 

Cosmetic Act defines PWID as follows: “Except as authorized by this act, the 

manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a 

controlled substance by a person not registered under this act, or a 

practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or 

knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a 

counterfeit controlled substance.” 35 P.S. 780-113(a)(30). To sustain a 

conviction for PWID, “the Commonwealth must prove both the possession of 

the controlled substance and the intent to deliver the controlled substance.” 

____________________________________________

5 Our standard of review of a sufficiency challenge is well-settled:

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all reasonable 

inferences drawn from that evidence, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, was 

sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that the 

Commonwealth established all of the elements of the offense 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth may sustain its 

burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Further, the 

trier of fact is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 A.3d 1049, 1054 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted).
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Commonwealth v. Lee, 956 A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations 

omitted).

“[T]he intent to deliver may be inferred from possession of a large 

quantity of controlled substances. It follows that possession of a small amount 

of a controlled substance supports the conclusion that there is an absence of 

intent to deliver.” Id. If the quantity of the controlled substance is not 

dispositive as to the intent, the court may look to other factors. Id.

Other factors to consider when determining whether a defendant 

intended to deliver a controlled substance include the manner in 

which the controlled substance was packaged, the behavior of the 

defendant, the presence of drug paraphernalia, and ... [the] sums 

of cash found in possession of the defendant. The final factor to 

be considered is expert testimony. Expert opinion testimony is 

admissible concerning whether the facts surrounding the 

possession of controlled substances are consistent with an intent 

to deliver rather than with an intent to possess it for personal use.

Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1237–38 (Pa. 2007) 

(quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).

We first address the PWID conviction for marijuana. At trial, Officer 

Jeffrey Bowers of the Minersville Police testified that the 5.5 ounces of 

marijuana in the kitchen was “prepackaged” and “broken down into smaller 

bags.” N.T., 10/21/21, at 28. He also found a heat vacuum sealer, new 

vacuum seal bags and a digital scale near where he found the marijuana. Id. 

at 29. Based on these facts, Agent Securda concluded that the marijuana was 

packaged or for resale rather than for personal use. Id. at 147. He explained:

So the factors that came into play were the glassine baggies 

that were found that were not used, did not have any residue in 
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them, are commonly used when a person obtains a larger amount 

or larger amounts of marijuana. It’s broken up into gram, half 

gram, eighth ounce, however they want to break it up and sell it.

When it’s broken up, it’s weighed out on a scale, which there 

was a scale located in this case. The weight of the drug is how 

they set their pricing. It’s different in marijuana than it is in 

tablets. Tablets are usually done by milligram, how many 

milligrams there are. There’s a dollar amount set to it.

The marijuana or any other – cocaine, methamphetamine is 

all set by the weight of the substance. So the glassine baggies 

would have been used to repackage the substance, weighed out; 

and then pricing would be set for sale.

Id. at 148-49.

When asked about the weight of the marijuana, Agent Securda conceded 

it was not a large amount but iterated that did not preclude him from 

concluding the packaging showed an intent to distribute.

Q. In terms of the overall weight of the marijuana, did that play a 

role into the basis for your opinion?

A. It’s not a large amount of marijuana. I have 145.93 grams. 

But the way it was packaged, it was packaged in smaller amounts 

that, like I had stated earlier, that usually when they repackage 

them, they set it for a sale amount.

Id. at 149.

As noted, how a controlled substance is packaged is a factor when

determining whether a defendant intended to deliver a controlled substance. 

Here, the marijuana was broken down and packaged in smaller bags and found

near a digital scale. The jury was presented with competing expert opinions 

about whether Canyon possessed the marijuana for personal use or 

distribution. After hearing both experts, the jury credited Agent Securda’s
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opinion over that of Canyon’s expert and found that Canyon possessed the 

marijuana with an intent to distribute, a determination that they were free to 

make. Thus, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence to support PWID for marijuana.

We conclude the same about Canyon’s PWID conviction for the codeine 

pills found in his bedroom and the basement. Unlike the small amount of 

marijuana, Agent Securda found the large number of codeine pills found 

dispositive in concluding that Canyon intended to distribute them. He 

explained:

The Tylenol with codeine I believe was possessed with the 

intent to deliver because there was a bulk amount. 607 is a rather 

large amount to have. Typically, when you go to the doctor and 

they prescribe you such a pill, you only get maybe a 90-day 

supply, which if he was hoarding them, the doctor would have 

been – you only get a refill so many times.

I’m sure everyone here has had a prescription. You don’t 

get unlimited refills. And doctors are trained, oddly enough, by 

the Attorney General’s Office to look for what they call drugseeking culture or drug-seeking behavior. And they are told to 

not prescribe if they come across that. The amount of the pills, 

usually its set to $1 a milligram. These were, I believe, 30 

milligram tablets, if I recall. So you’re looking at a substantial 

gain of money that he could have incurred from this.

The way that the officers found the drugs, that they were in 

a hidden compartment in the house or just behind the wall – I 

know I store my meds in a medicine cabinet. If he didn’t have 

one, maybe that safe in his room would been a better spot for it.

Id. at 149-50.

The Commonwealth followed up about the street value. Since each 

tablet contained 30 milligrams, and with a street value of $1 per milligram, 
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that meant each tablet would be $30. Id. at 151. Because the police 

recovered over 600 tablets during the search, the total street value of the pills 

was over $18,000 according to Agent Securda. Id. at 154.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

this was more than enough to support the PWID conviction for the codeine 

pills. While conceding possession and that he did not have a prescription for 

the pills, Canyon argues there was not enough evidence to establish that the 

pills were not for personal use. Through Agent Securda’s expert testimony, 

however, the Commonwealth presented evidence that the sheer number of 

pills that Canyon possessed (over 600) expressed an intent to distribute, not 

to mention that nearly two thirds of the pills were hidden in the basement. 

Again, like its determination about the marijuana, the jury was free to credit 

Agent Securda’s opinion over that of Canyon’s expert that Canyon possessed 

the pills with an intent to distribute. We, thus, hold that his sufficiency 

challenge to his PWID conviction for the codeine pills fails as well.

III. Suppression

Canyon also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress. He emphasizes that the police never conducted surveillance of his 

home to verify the neighbors’ complaints about the suspected drug activity. 

The same is true of the neighboring borough’s police chief’s claim that he was 

involved in trafficking heroin. Because neither was corroborated, Canyon 

asserts that they should have been disregarded by the magistrate. As for the 
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trash pull, he emphasizes that, after the passage of the MMA, the mere 

presence of marijuana residue in someone’s trash should not provide enough 

probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, citing our Supreme 

Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25, 44 (Pa. 2021)

(holding that, following the enactment of the MMA, “the odor of marijuana 

alone does not amount to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of 

a vehicle but, rather, may be considered as a factor in examining the totality 

of the circumstances.”).6

In reviewing a challenge to a search warrant based on an affidavit of 

probable cause, our review is limited to “the information within the four 

corners of the affidavit.” Commonwealth v. Batista, 219 A.3d 1199, 1202 

(Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rogers, 615 A.2d 55, 62 (Pa. 

____________________________________________

6 Our standard of review on suppression issues is well-settled:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court’s 

denial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are 

supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn 

from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a 

suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the 

prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as 

remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record. 

Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, 

we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Heidelberg, 267 A.3d 492, 498-99 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bumbarger, 231 A.3d 10 (Pa. Super.

2020)).
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Super. 1992), and citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 203(D)). A reviewing court ensures 

that the issuing authority “had a substantial basis for concluding that probable 

cause existed” instead of reviewing de novo that determination. Id. (quoting 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983), and Commonwealth v. 

Huntington, 924 A.2d 1252, 1259 (Pa. Super. 2007)). “Probable cause exists 

where the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which 

he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in and of themselves 

to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should 

be conducted.” Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1081–82 (Pa. 

2017). A search should be conducted when “the police officers have a 

reasonable belief that the items to be seized are related to criminal conduct 

and that those items are presently located in the place to be searched.” 

Commonwealth v. Waltson, 724 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. 1998) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 337 A.2d 582 (Pa. 1975)).

Moreover, unlike tips from confidential informants that require 

independent corroboration, Pennsylvania courts do not require an averment 

of facts to establish the credibility and reliability of an ordinary citizen. See 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1064–65; accord 

Commonwealth v. Brogdon, 220 A.3d 592, 600 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“[A] 

citizen informer, identified eyewitness[,] or ordinary citizen reporting his or 

her observations of a crime stands on a different ground than a police 

informer.”
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Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that the issuing 

magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed 

for the search warrant for Canyon’s home. First, rather that receiving a single 

report from one neighbor, the affidavit relates that the police received multiple 

reports about Canyon’s home. Whereas a single report would tend to be less 

reliable, multiple reports of the same complaint inherently tend to bolster each 

other, making it less likely that the complaints are not accurate, not to 

mention that the reports are received from ordinary citizens as opposed to 

confidential informants.

Second, contrary to Canyon’s assertions, the police corroborated the 

neighbors’ complaints by conducting a trash pull of Canyon’s trash. As noted, 

the police found Canyon’s mail in the trash, confirming that it was, in fact, his 

trash. Moreover, the police discovered “medium and large glassine and 

vacuum style bags containing green leafy residue that field tested positive for 

marijuana.” Thus, police substantiated the neighbors’ complaints about not 

only the smell of marijuana coming from the home but also that Canyon was 

possibly distributing, at the very least, marijuana out of the home. On top of 

that, the police conducted the trash pull on the same day that they applied for 

the search warrant, thus avoiding any complaints the information was stale.

Third, the police went on to independently check the Pennsylvania State 

Police Central Repository and confirm that Canyon had multiple arrests for 

trafficking of controlled substances and weapons violations, which they 
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confirmed with a neighboring police chief. Whatever weight the magistrate 

afforded to this information in no way diminished the fact that police had 

corroborated the neighbors’ complaints through the trash pull. Thus, under 

the totality of the circumstances, based on the facts within the four corners of 

the affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that probable 

cause existed that Canyon was distributing, at the very least, marijuana from 

his home.

Finally, our Supreme Court’s decision in Barr does not compel a 

different result. This Court has previously summarized the facts of that case:

In [Barr], Pennsylvania State Police troopers pulled over a 

vehicle driven by the defendant’s wife for a Vehicle Code violation 

and they detected the smell of burnt marijuana as they 

approached the vehicle. The troopers stated their intention to 

search the vehicle based upon probable cause from the odor of 

marijuana, whereupon the defendant, who was in the passenger 

seat of the vehicle, presented a medical marijuana identification 

card. After the troopers recovered a firearm and marijuana from 

the vehicle, the defendant was charged with person not to possess 

a firearm and possession of a small amount of marijuana.

In analyzing the impact of the MMA on probable cause 

assessments, the Court found “that the MMA makes abundantly 

clear that marijuana no longer is per se illegal in this 

Commonwealth. Accordingly, the enactment of the MMA 

eliminated this main pillar supporting the ‘plain smell’ doctrine as 

applied to the possession or use of marijuana.” [Barr, 266 A.3d]

at 41. However,

the [Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act,

35 P.S. §§ 780-101—144] still renders possession of 

marijuana illegal for those not qualified under the MMA. 

Thus, the smell of marijuana indisputably can still signal 

the possibility of criminal activity. Given this dichotomy, 

we conclude that the odor of marijuana may be a factor, 

but not a stand-alone one, in evaluating the totality of the 
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circumstances for purposes of determining whether police 

had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search.

In so doing, we emphasize that the realization that a 

particular factor contributing to probable cause may 

involve legal conduct does not render consideration of the

factor per se impermissible, so long as the factor is 

considered along with other factors that, in combination, 

suggest that criminal activity is afoot. As recognized by 

the Commonwealth, the totality-of-the-circumstances 

analysis encompasses the consideration of factors that 

may arguably be innocent in nature.

Id. at 42 (case citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571, 578-79 (Pa. Super. February 14,

2022).

Thus, that the marijuana residue found in the trash pull from Canyon’s

home may have been legally obtained does not mean that it could not still be

considered. More importantly, that the marijuana may have been legally

obtained does not explain the neighbors’ complaints of suspected drug activity

at Canyon’s home, which was the impetus for the trash pull in the first place. 

Accordingly, having found that Barr does not compel a different result, we

conclude the trial court properly denied Canyon’ motion to suppress.

IV. Jury Instructions

Canyon next raises three issues with the trial court’s jury instructions

concerning the MMA. First, he claims that the trial court instructed the jury 

that medical marijuana users are limited to a 30-day supply but did not explain 

that the MMA does not quantify how much that would be. Second, he faults

the trial court’s instruction that medical marijuana must be maintained in its 
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original packaging or it was otherwise possessed illegally. Third, he criticizes 

the trial court for pointing out that defense counsel misstated the law in his 

opening that the Commonwealth must show that it chemically tested the 

marijuana for different strains. None of these issues, however, were

preserved for appeal.

To preserve a challenge to the adequacy or omission of a particular jury 

instruction, the defendant must make a specific and timely objection to the 

instruction at trial before the jury deliberates. See Commonwealth v.

Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 564 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(b) (“A 

general exception to the charge to the jury will not preserve an issue for 

appeal. Specific exception shall be taken to the language or omission 

complained of.”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C) (“No portions of the charge nor 

omissions from the charge may be assigned as error, unless specific objections 

are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.”). A specific and timely 

objection must be made to preserve a challenge to a particular jury 

instruction; failure to do so results in waiver. See Commonwealth v.

Forbes, 867 A.2d 1268, 1274 (Pa. Super. 2005).

After the trial court gave its jury charge, Canyon did not raise a specific 

and timely objection to the instructions about the MMA, even when the trial 
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court asked him if he wished to raise anything before the jury deliberated. 

See N.T., 10/22/21, at 373-374. As a result, his challenges are waived.

7

Even if properly preserved, we would find his challenges meritless. The 

trial court’s instructions about the MMA were limited to this:

And before I go on to talk about the possession with intent 

to deliver, I think I should talk to you about the Medical Marijuana 

Act since that was brought up in this case and it’s not something 

that a layperson would be aware of if it’s a law of Pennsylvania. 

The possession of marijuana is against the law in Pennsylvania, 

unless it’s possessed in accordance with the Medical Marijuana 

Act, which would require that a person have a medical marijuana 

card and that the marijuana be prescribed by a doctor and 

dispensed by an authorized dispensary.

But it also requires that the marijuana has to be stored –

whatever is not immediately used has to be stored in the same 

packaging as it was dispensed, the same package that it came 

from the dispensary. It can’t be stored otherwise. If it’s stored 

otherwise, it becomes an illegally possession of marijuana. And it 

cannot – also, if it’s dispensed in the leaf form, it cannot be 

burned.

So you should consider that in terms of the charge of 

possession of marijuana, whether or not you believe the 

Defendant possessed the marijuana, whether he possessed it 

lawfully. That’s how the medical marijuana card comes into play

in this act. It’s not a lawful possession if you change the 

packaging, even if you obtain it originally lawfully from an 

authorized dispensary.

Id. at 371-72.

____________________________________________

7 Canyon also waived his second challenge about the packaging by failing to 

include it in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)

(“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with 

the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).
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First, contrary to Canyon’s claims, the trial court never instructed the 

jury that medical marijuana users are limited to a 30-day supply, nor does he

point us to where he believes the trial court made the alleged misstatement. 

Second, the trial court correctly instructed the jury about the packaging of 

marijuana: a condition for the “lawful use of medical marijuana” is that it 

“shall be kept in the original package in which it was dispensed.” 35 P.S. 

§ 10231.303(b)(6). Third, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court 

clarifying that the Commonwealth had no burden of showing that the 

marijuana was chemically tested for different strains; we are unaware of any 

case law for such a proposition, nor does Canyon point us to any. Thus, all 

three of his jury instruction challenges fail.

V. Defense Expert

Canyon raises two issues with the trial court precluding Leff from 

testifying about certain matters concerning his expert opinion. First, Canyon 

asserts that the trial court erred in barring Leff from testifying that there are 

different strains of marijuana which can be prescribed for different medical 

conditions, which would explain why Canyon had the marijuana broken down 

into different bags. Second, Canyon argues that Leff should have been 

allowed to testify about reviewing Canyon’s federal tax returns as part of his 
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review of the case, the purpose being to show that Canyon was employed and 

less likely to distribute controlled substances.8

First, the trial court explained its reasoning for barring Canyon’s expert 

from testifying about different strands of marijuana:

...Defense counsel sought to have Mr. Leff testify that the 

individual bags of marijuana contained different strains and were 

separated by Canyon much the same way one might place 

different medications in different containers. To bolster the 

proposed testimony, counsel proposed allowing Leff to inform the 

jury that Canyon had a “DSM-5 diagnosis.” There are several 

reasons Mr. Leff was not permitted to do so.

Canyon chose not to testify. No medical testimony was 

proposed by Canyon to establish a diagnosis. Whatever 

documents there may been to support such a diagnosis would 

have been hearsay, and Mr. Leff was not qualified to render 

medical opinions. Furthermore, defense counsel acknowledged he 

had no evidence regarding the strain or strains of marijuana in the 

bags found in Canyon’s house. Mr. Leff would have testified that 

the marijuana in the bags did not appear to be the same strain, 

but there was no evidence as to what strain or strains may have 

been prescribed for Canyon. In fact, there was no evidence that 

Canyon had obtained any marijuana from a dispensary.

Testimony about what strains of marijuana are generally 

prescribed to treat specific ailments would require medical 

expertise, which Canyon’s expert did not possess. It would also 

have been irrelevant without evidence of the strain or strains 

____________________________________________

8 As this Court has explained concerning expert testimony:

Our standard of review in cases involving the admission of expert 

testimony is broad: Generally speaking, the admission of expert 

testimony is a matter left largely to the discretion of the trial court, 

and its rulings thereon will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

discretion. An expert’s testimony is admissible when it is based 

on facts of record and will not cause confusion or prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Watson, 945 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal 

citations omitted).
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present in the marijuana found in Canyon’s residence and without 

competent evidence that Canyon suffered from a particular 

ailment. If counsel wanted to pursue this line of defense, he could 

have had the recovered marijuana independently tested and 

presented testimony from Canyon’s treating physician.

Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 11/30/21, at 5-6.

We agree with this analysis. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 702, 

an expert witness can testify when “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other 

specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or 

to determine a fact in issue.” Pa.R.E. 702(b). There was no evidence that the 

marijuana found was prescribed, let alone that Canyon was prescribed 

different strains of marijuana for different medical diagnosis. Instead, Canyon 

was hoping to have the expert testify about how sometimes different strains 

of medical marijuana are prescribed for different reasons, and that this was 

the reason the marijuana found was packaged in different bags, even though 

there was no record evidence of that being the case. As a result, we find no 

abuse of discretion in the trial court precluding Canyon’s expert from testifying 

about something for which there was no evidence.

We next address the trial court precluding Leff from testifying about

Canyon’s tax returns, which Canyon did not otherwise admit into evidence. 

As our Supreme Court has explained:

An expert opinion may be based on inadmissible facts or facts not 

in evidence, including other expert opinions and hearsay 

statements, as long as such facts are of a type reasonably relied 

on by experts in that profession. See Pa.R.E. 703; see also

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 528 Pa. 558, 599 A.2d 630, 639

(1991) (citations omitted). Implicit in Rule 703 is the trial court’s 
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sound discretion under Pa.R.E. 104(a) to make a preliminary 

determination as to whether the particular underlying facts are of 

a kind reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.

See id., 703 cmt. Rule 705 of Pennsylvania's Rules of Evidence 

mandates, “If an expert states an opinion[,] the expert must state 

the facts or data on which the opinion is based.” Id., 705. 

However, an expert may not act as a mere conduit of hearsay or 

transmitter of extrajudicial information. See id., 703 cmt. (“An 

expert witness cannot be a mere conduit for the opinion of another 

... [and] may not relate the opinion of a non-testifying expert[.]”).

Commonwealth v. Towles, 106 A.3d 591, 605-06 (Pa. 2014).

In this case, Leff was going to state that the tax returns had been filed, 

without any detail as to who or how much Canyon made, to opine that Canyon

was gainfully employed and less likely to be a street drug dealer.

We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding 

Canyon from having Leff testify that he had filed tax returns that Canyon made 

no effort to admit at trial or, for that matter, offer any evidence that he was 

gainfully employed. While expert opinion may be based on inadmissible facts 

or facts not in evidence, the expert may not be a conduit of direct evidence to 

avoid having to prove essential facts particular to the case at issue necessary 

to render the opinion. As the trial court determined, Canyon was merely trying 

to use his expert as a means of admitting non-record facts that he was 

otherwise unwilling to independently admit. As a result, we will not disturb 

the trial court’s discretion in precluding Canyon from introducing inadmissible 

hearsay through his expert.
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VI. Admonishment of Defense Counsel

In his final issue, Canyon faults the trial court for correcting defense 

counsel during his cross-examination of a witness about the denominations of

the bills found in Canyon’s wallet. See N.T., 10/21/21, at 172-73. He does 

not dispute that his counsel inadvertently misstated the bills but nonetheless 

argues that the trial court should have allowed the witness to correct him 

rather than single him out in front of the jury.

Canyon waived this issue by not including it in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). Regardless, as the trial court 

stated:

The testimony regarding the denominations of the currency 

found in Canyon’s wallet came during Officer Bowers’ testimony. 

In that cross-examination counsel was making the point that the 

police did not find small bills consistent with street sales and

specifically referred to the absence of any five-dollar bills and the 

presence of only one ten-dollar bill. In the above quoted crossexamination, defense counsel was stating his questions in a 

manner suggesting he was not at that time sure of his recollection 

about the number of tens and fives found. The Court was merely 

helping him to recall the denominations which were not in dispute 

by reminding him that he had previously made the point that there 

were no fives found. In no way was he reprimanded.

TCO at 9. We have little to add to this other than Canyon cites no case law 

for the proposition that a trial court can commit reversible abuse of discretion 

by correcting a misstatement of fact made by counsel. After reviewing the 

relevant exchange, we find no error in the trial court correcting counsel’s 

misstatement of fact.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 07/19/2022