Christina Granados McCauley v. State of Maryland, No. 340, September Term, 2018. 

Opinion by Nazarian, J.

CRIMINAL LAW – INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER – GROSS 

NEGLIGENCE

The evidence was sufficient to support a finding of gross negligence where the defendant 

who sold drugs to the victim was an experienced drug dealer who knew the dangerousness 

of the drugs she sold.

CRIMINAL LAW – RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT – MANUFACTURE, 

PRODUCTION, OR SALE OF A PRODUCT OR COMMODITY

Carfentanil, a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, is not a “product or commodity” 

as envisioned by the General Assembly when it enacted Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. 

Vol.), § 3-204(c)(1)(ii) of the Criminal Law Article exempting the sale of a product or 

commodity from the crime of reckless endangerment.
Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County

Case No. C-18-CR-17-000044

REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 340

September Term, 2018

______________________________________

CHRISTINA GRANADOS MCCAULEY

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Nazarian,

Beachley,

Adkins, Sally D. 

 (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Nazarian, J.

______________________________________

Filed: April 29, 2020
Christina Granados McCauley was a drug dealer who knew the products she sold. 

On June 23, 2017, Ms. McCauley sold carfentanil to Joshua Wrightson and Mary Nell 

Miller. Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller both overdosed that night, and Ms. Miller died.

Ms. McCauley was charged and convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for 

St. Mary’s County of involuntary manslaughter, reckless endangerment, distribution of 

carfentanil, and possession of carfentanil. She was sentenced to ten years of incarceration 

(none suspended) for involuntary manslaughter, five years for reckless endangerment 

(merged into the involuntary manslaughter sentence), eight years for distribution of 

carfentanil (all suspended), and one year for possession of carfentanil (merged into the 

distribution sentence). Ms. McCauley argues on appeal1that the evidence was insufficient 

to support her conviction for involuntary manslaughter because the State failed to prove 

she had acted with gross negligence and there were superseding causes for Ms. Miller’s 

death. She argues, relatedly, that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to dismiss 

the involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Events That Led To Ms. Miller’s Carfentanil Overdose and 

Death.

Joshua Wrightson and Ms. McCauley had known each other for two years before 

the night Mr. Wrightson’s friend, Mary Nell Miller, died. Mr. Wrightson and 

Ms. McCauley met at a methadone clinic. Eventually, he became one of her buyers, and 

1 This Court stayed the appeal pending the Court of Appeals’s decision in State v. Thomas, 

464 Md. 133 (2019).
2

she would sell him what she said was a mixture of heroin and fentanyl. 

On June 23, 2017, Mr. Wrightson was experiencing bad withdrawal symptoms and 

sought drugs to tide him over. He sent a message to Ms. McCauley through Facebook 

Messenger and told her that he “could use a break” from withdrawal. She wrote back that 

she wouldn’t be home until 2:30 p.m., but that if he could find a ride to her place later, she 

had “a little” she would give him. At 5:16 p.m., Mr. Wrightson messaged Ms. McCauley 

and said that “Mary” was driving him over and they would be there in “45 minutes to an 

hour.” Ms. McCauley testified that she didn’t recall seeing the 5:16 p.m. message and that 

she didn’t respond.

According to Mr. Wrightson, he and Mary Miller went to Ms. McCauley’s house 

that day and they picked up what he believed to be “[s]ome of the heroin/Fentanyl.” He 

said that Ms. Miller understood that the drugs were going to be “obtained for the both of” 

them and she knew what they “were going to obtain.” After picking up the drugs, 

Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller drove back to the apartment Mr. Wrightson shared with 

Mark Bowers. Ms. McCauley disputes that any sale or transaction occurred. She testified 

that she didn’t meet Mr. Wrightson on June 23 and that she didn’t give Ms. Miller any 

drugs.

When Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller got back to Mr. Wrightson’s apartment, the 

pair “went into [his] bedroom and put the powder on the chest of drawers.” Immediately 

after “snorting some” of the drugs, Mr. Wrightson collapsed to the ground, hitting his head 

on the chest as he fell. Mr. Wrightson overdosed and passed out, rendering his remaining 

testimony on what happened that night unclear. He testified that he was unconscious for 
3

“five hours.” He then gave conflicting testimony: he said on direct that when he came to, 

he saw that “Mary was standing at the doorway to [his] bedroom,” and then on crossexamination that when he awoke, Ms. Miller was dabbing his forehead. Regardless, some

time after Mr. Wrightson awoke, he testified that he “called out for Mary” to ask where she 

was. When he didn’t hear a response, he went to the bathroom door, knocked, and after not 

hearing a response, entered the room. He found her lying on the floor by the toilet,

unconscious.

What happened next is unclear. Ultimately, Mr. Wrightson, his roommate Mark 

Bowers, and their neighbor John “Jack” Tangradi attempted to revive Ms. Miller. 

Mr. Bowers testified that he had been on an evening walk, and when he returned around 

10 p.m., he witnessed “pandemonium” as Mr. Tangradi and Mr. Wrightson tried to 

resuscitate Ms. Miller. Mr. Bowers asked Mr. Wrightson how long Ms. Miller had been on 

the floor, and he responded ten minutes. Mr. Bowers, who at that time was sober, testified 

that he thought Ms. Miller had been on the floor “much more than ten minutes” because 

she was “starting to turn gray.” Mr. Wrightson and Mr. Bowers administered Naloxone, 

but Ms. Miller didn’t wake up. Mr. Bowers called 911, and medical personnel declared 

Ms. Miller dead at 10:56 p.m.

B. Ms. McCauley’s Drug Transactions With Other Buyers.

The State presented evidence of Ms. McCauley’s prior drug transactions. The 

testimony focused on Ms. McCauley’s prior relationship with Mr. Wrightson, 

Mr. Tangradi, Melissa Boswell, and Sergeant William Heath, a Maryland State Police 

officer who bought drugs from Ms. McCauley twice while undercover. 
4

First, Mr. Wrightson and Ms. McCauley had used fentanyl and overdosed together

in 2017. Mr. Wrightson testified that he had overdosed from fentanyl that he had bought 

from Ms. McCauley four times. When he told Ms. McCauley about his overdoses, she told 

him “that’s horrible,” “be careful,” “don’t do too much,” and “it’s strong.” Next, 

Mr. Tangradi, Mr. Wrightson and Mr. Bowers’s neighbor, testified that he had bought 

heroin from Ms. McCauley before Ms. Miller died and that Ms. McCauley “said that it was 

not Fentanyl.” He stated that he overdosed from those drugs “for about 12 hours.” 

Melissa Boswell testified about unrelated drug purchases she made from 

Ms. McCauley. She met Ms. McCauley at a methadone clinic a year before Ms. Miller 

died. On June 18, 2017, five days before Ms. Miller’s death, Ms. Boswell sought drugs to 

use with her friends. She bought a mix of “pink Percosets” [sic] and what Ms. McCauley 

told her was fentanyl, but later was tested and found to be carfentanil. Ms. McCauley 

warned her to “be careful” and not do “too much.” Then Ms. Boswell brought the drugs to 

her friends and echoed Ms. McCauley’s warning that the drugs contained fentanyl and not 

to “take too much.” Her friends took “a little scoop [of the drugs] out with a straw.” After 

her friends didn’t feel anything initially, Ms. Boswell gave them a bit more. Soon after, her 

two friends fell to the ground, “started seizing,” and became unresponsive, and 

Ms. Boswell called 911. The friends were revived after several attempts. Ms. Boswell 

reached an agreement with the State to work with the police and testify at Ms. McCauley’s 

trial.

Finally, Ms. Boswell testified that she coordinated with Sergeant William Heath to 

purchase drugs. On June 21, 2017, Sgt. Heath and Ms. Boswell drove to Ms. McCauley’s 
5

house to buy fentanyl. After Sgt. Heath, working undercover, was introduced to 

Ms. McCauley, she “immediately” told him “to be careful while using the [] Fentanyl, 

which she was about to provide.” She warned that he should “just start with a little bit,” 

“just a fucking flake,” because the drugs were “that strong.” She said, “please don’t die,” 

and gave him the drugs. Sgt. Heath testified that he believed she told him to use a “flake” 

of the fentanyl because the drugs were “so strong,” and if he “were to use what she believed 

to be [his] normal amount, that would certainly lead to an overdose.” Sgt. Heath and 

Ms. Boswell arranged one more buy on June 30, 2017, after Ms. Miller died. Sgt. Heath 

bought $30 worth of what he and Ms. McCauley agreed was fentanyl.

C. Expert Testimony at Trial

Amber Burns, the State’s expert witness in forensic chemistry, testified that she 

tested the drugs Ms. McCauley sold to Ms. Boswell on June 18 that resulted in the overdose 

of two of Ms. Boswell’s friends. Ms. Burns stated that she found “a net weight of 0.66 

grams of Carfentanil,” and that carfentanil is one of “45 known analogs” of fentanyl. 

The State’s Medical Examiner, Dr. Russell Alexander, testified about Ms. Miller. 

He stated that her cause of death was “Carfentanil intoxication.” He also described the 

differences between fentanyl and carfentanil:

Well Carfentanil and Fentanyl are both narcotics. Fentanyl is a 

very potent or very strong narcotic and Carfentanil is an even 

stronger or more potent narcotic. I’ve heard it estimated that 

Carfentanil is approximately 100 times more potent than 

Fentanyl, but the bottom line is Carfentanil is an analog or a 

variant of Fentanyl that is extremely potent.

He stated that “there are no approved uses for Carfentanil in [] humans in this country” and 
6

that it’s only approved for “veterinary purposes.” 

Ms. McCauley moved for acquittal, which the court denied. The jury convicted 

Ms. McCauley of all charges. She appeals. We supply additional facts as needed below.

II. DISCUSSION

Ms. McCauley raises three questions on appeal that we rephrase.2 First, was the 

evidence sufficient for a jury to find Ms. McCauley guilty of involuntary manslaughter? 

Second, did the trial court err when it denied Ms. McCauley’s motion to dismiss the

involuntary manslaughter charge? Third, did the court err when it denied Ms. McCauley’s 

motion to dismiss the reckless endangerment charge?

A. The Evidence Was Sufficient To Support A Finding That 

Ms. McCauley Acted With Gross Negligence.

First, Ms. McCauley argues that under the Court of Appeals’s decision in State v. 

Thomas, 464 Md. 133 (2019), her sale of carfentanil to Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller does

2 Ms. McCauley raised three Questions Presented:

1. Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Appellant’s 

conviction for involuntary manslaughter?

2. Was it error to deny the motion to dismiss the charges of 

involuntary manslaughter?

3. Was it error to deny the motion to dismiss the charge of 

reckless endangerment?

The State rephrased those Questions Presented as:

1. Was the evidence sufficient to support McCauley’s 

conviction for grossly negligent involuntary manslaughter?

2. Did the circuit court properly deny McCauley’s motion to 

dismiss the charge of reckless endangerment?
7

not rise to the level of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter. Second, she argues 

further that Ms. Miller, not Ms. McCauley, “knowingly and recklessly play[ed] the narcotic 

version of Russian Roulette.” Finally, she argues that Ms. Miller’s life could have been 

saved by Mr. Wrightson, Mr. Bowers, and Mr. Tangradi, after she overdosed, and their 

failure to save her life was a superseding cause that interrupted the causal connection 

between Ms. McCauley’s drug sale and Ms. Miller’s death. The State responds that “there 

was substantial evidence that Ms. McCauley was aware of the extraordinarily dangerous 

nature of the substance she was distributing” and that the evidence was sufficient to find 

her guilty. The State is correct.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we ask

“whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Roes v. State, 236 Md. App. 569, 582 (2018) (quoting Grimm v. State, 

447 Md. 482, 494–95 (2016)) (emphasis added). We don’t have to believe that the evidence 

establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—we determine instead whether there was 

enough evidence for a jury to come to that conclusion. The jury, as the trier of fact, weighs 

the evidence, and we don’t question its conclusions “where there are competing rational 

inferences available.” Roes, 236 Md. App. at 583 (quoting Smith v. State, 415 Md. 174, 

183 (2010)). Accordingly, for sufficiency of the evidence, we review “(1) the ‘essential 

elements’ of the crime; and, (2) whether the State has met its burden of production.” Id. 

The elements of involuntary manslaughter were met. State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133 

(2019), is the seminal Maryland case on the standard for gross negligence involuntary 
8

manslaughter resulting from a fatal heroin overdose. This Court applied Thomas for the

first time in Johnson v. State, 245 Md. App. 46, No. 109, Sept. Term 2018 (filed Jan. 31, 

2020). Thomas held that to support a conviction for gross negligence involuntary 

manslaughter from the sale of heroin,

(1) the defendant must have known, or should have known 

under the reasonably prudent person standard, that the 

underlying act of selling heroin carried a severe risk of harm, 

and (2) the sale of heroin must be the actual and legal cause of 

the victim’s death. Id. at 171, 173. The first half of the analysis 

itself has two components: the activity must be inherently 

dangerous and environmental risk factors must elevate that risk 

to rise to gross negligence.

Johnson, 245 Md. App. at 57-58 (citing Thomas, 464 Md. at 171, 173). The Court of 

Appeals’s analysis in Thomas began from the premise that selling heroin is inherently 

dangerous. Thomas, 464 Md. at 169. But selling heroin is not enough in itself to support a 

finding of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter, and the Court of Appeals declined 

to recognize “a per se rule providing that all heroin distribution resulting in death 

constitutes gross negligence . . . .” Id. at 167, 169 (“[D]istribution, alone, does not always 

amount to gross negligence.”). Instead, Thomas weighed “the inherent dangerousness of 

the act and environmental risk factors” to decide whether the sale amounts to a “high 

degree of risk to human life.” Id. at 161 (emphasis added).

The evidence adduced at trial in this case included environmental risk factors that a 

reasonable jury could find had raised the baseline risk from a mere drug sale to a grossly
9

negligent sale.

3 The environmental risk factors discussed in Thomas fell into two groups:

the vulnerability of the buyer and the dealer’s experience and knowledge. Johnson, 245 

Md. App. at 59-60. But the risk factors discussed in Thomas were not intended to be allinclusive—environmental risk factors have to be assessed case-by-case and in context. 

Thomas, 464 Md. at 167; Johnson, 245 Md.App. at 62-63.

In this case, Ms. McCauley’s knowledge and experience as a dealer increased the 

risk of the sale substantially. And her knowledge of the high level of danger was sufficient 

for a jury to elevate to a finding of gross negligence.

Dealer’s Knowledge/Experience:

• Ms. McCauley sold Mr. Wrightson what she said was a 

mixture of heroin and fentanyl;

• On June 23, 2017, she knew that Mr. Wrightson and Ms.

Miller were traveling together to pick up what Mr. 

Wrightson called “[s]ome of the heroin/Fentanyl” from 

Ms. McCauley’s home;

• In 2017, Ms. McCauley and Mr. Wrightson had 

overdosed from fentanyl together;

• She was a routine dealer, selling to at least five

individuals: Ms. Miller, Mr. Wrightson, Ms. Boswell, 

Sgt. Heath, and Mr. Tangradi;

• She knew that Mr. Wrightson had overdosed four times 

from fentanyl she sold him and, when told, she said,

“that’s horrible,” “be careful,” “don’t do too much,” and 

“it’s strong”;

• On June 18, she sold Ms. Boswell carfentanil, but told 

her it was fentanyl, and warned her to “be careful” and 

“don’t do too much”;

• On June 21, 2017, when she sold Sgt. Heath fentanyl,

3 We are not asked, and therefore don’t address, whether the sale of carfentanil alone, as 

opposed to the sale of heroin, constitutes gross negligence. 
10

she “immediately” cautioned him “to be careful” and to 

start with “just a fucking flake” of the fentanyl because 

it was “that strong.” She also told him, “please don’t 

die.”

• On June 30, 2017, Ms. McCauley sold Sgt. Heath what 

she acknowledged to be fentanyl.

The record in this case demonstrated that Ms. McCauley knew that the drugs she 

sold had caused multiple people, including herself, to overdose. She knew the actual and 

highly dangerous contents of the drugs she sold. In the past, she knowingly sold heroin 

containing fentanyl, a dangerous analog of heroin, and knew or should have known that 

she sold drugs containing carfentanil, a tranquilizer significantly more potent than Fentanyl

used to sedate rhinos and other large animals. She knew the drugs she sold were so 

dangerous that she warned many of her buyers of their potency. Ms. McCauley’s 

knowledge of the extreme dangerousness of the drugs she sold raised the risk level from 

her transaction with Ms. Miller to one in which a jury could find a reckless, wanton 

disregard for human life. 

Comparing Ms. McCauley’s knowledge to that of the defendant in Johnson v. State 

places this case in stark relief. Mr. Johnson was not a “systematic and sustained heroin 

distributor.” Johnson, 245 Md. App. at 62. The State in that case presented evidence that 

he sold drugs once—and that one sale led to the death of Brandon Roe. Id. And perhaps 

because he wasn’t a routine dealer, there was no evidence that he knew the particular

contents of the drugs he shared with Mr. Roe. Id. On the other hand, Ms. McCauley knew, 

at the very least, that the drugs she was selling contained fentanyl. She knew how 

dangerous the drugs were, warning people to be careful and not to die. Where Mr. Johnson 
11

lacked knowledge as a dealer, Ms. McCauley had it.

With the first element of the gross negligence involuntary manslaughter standard 

met, we turn next to whether Ms. McCauley’s sale of carfentanil to Mr. Wrightson and 

Ms. Miller was the actual and legal cause of Ms. Miller’s death. First, actual cause, or 

cause-in-fact, “concerns the threshold inquiry of ‘whether defendant’s conduct actually 

produced an injury.’” Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 244 (2009) (quoting Peterson 

v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16–17 (1970)). There is no dispute here that Ms. McCauley’s 

sale of carfentanil to Ms. Miller led directly to her death—but for the sale of the lethal 

drugs and Ms. Miller’s ingestion of them, she would not have died. 

Second, legal cause “requires us to consider whether the actual harm to a[n 

individual] falls within a general field of danger that the actor should have anticipated or 

expected.” Id. at 243. “The question of legal causation most often involves a determination 

of whether the injuries were a foreseeable result of the negligent conduct.” Id. at 246. Here, 

it was foreseeable that Ms. McCauley’s sale of carfentanil to Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller 

could cause one or both to overdose and potentially die. At trial, the medical examiner 

testified that carfentanil is “approximately 100 times more potent than Fentanyl,” itself “a 

very potent” narcotic. And Ms. McCauley knew of the danger because, again, she warned 

her buyers “it’s strong,” “be careful,” “don’t do too much,” and “please don’t die.” The 

jury readily could have found it foreseeable that Ms. McCauley’s sale of such a dangerous 

narcotic, which has “no approved uses . . . in humans in this country,” could have caused

Ms. Miller’s death.

Ms. McCauley argues next that Ms. Miller’s decision to use such a dangerous drug, 
12

along with the failure of Mr. Wrightson, Mr. Tangradi, and Mr. Bowers to save her life 

after she overdosed, served as intervening and superseding causes to her death, breaking 

the chain of causation from Ms. McCauley’s initial drug sale. We are unconvinced. 

An intervening cause is not enough to avoid liability; the act must rise to the level 

of a superseding cause. Pittway Corp., 409 Md. at 248. “[A] superseding cause arises 

primarily when ‘unusual’ and ‘extraordinary’ independent intervening negligent acts occur 

that could not have been anticipated by the original tortfeasor.” Id. at 249. There were no 

such acts here. First, Ms. Miller’s use of the drugs was not a superseding cause. It was 

entirely foreseeable when Mr. Wrightson and Ms. Miller drove together and met

Ms. McCauley to buy drugs that she would use them. And shifting the “recklessness” 

analysis to Ms. Miller, as Ms. McCauley argues, is foreclosed by Thomas. 464 Md. 133 

(2019).

Second, the fact that Mr. Wrightson, Mr. Bowers, and Mr. Tangradi failed to revive 

Ms. Miller after she overdosed is not a superseding cause either. “[T]here is no affirmative 

legal duty to rescue someone in peril. ‘The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that 

action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon 

him a duty to take such action.’” Fried v. Archer, 139 Md. App. 229, 244 (2001) (quoting 

Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 242 (1985)). And even putting aside the absence of a duty, 

Ms. McCauley could easily have anticipated their inability to resuscitate Ms. Miller. She 

herself has overdosed with another addict in the past, and she knew the risk of relying on

someone else to intervene. Their failure to save her was neither unusual or extraordinary, 

and it was not a superseding cause. See Pittway Corp., 409 Md. at 249. The evidence was 
13

sufficient to support the jury’s finding of actual and legal causation.

Finally, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence we ask whether the State has 

met its burden of production. Roes, 236 Md. App. at 583.

In a criminal case, no issue is more important than whether the 

State has satisfied its burden of production. The concern is with 

production, as a matter of law, and not with persuasion, as a 

matter of fact. The appellate assessment of the burden of 

production is made by measuring the evidence that has been 

admitted into the trial objectively and then determining 

whether that body of evidence is legally sufficient to permit a 

verdict of guilty. In a jury trial, a motion for a judgment of 

acquittal at the end of the entire case initiates the examination 

of the satisfaction of the burden of production. If that burden 

of production is not satisfied, the trial judge is wrong, as a 

matter of law, for denying the motion and for allowing the case 

even to go to the jury. 

Chisum v. State, 227 Md. App. 118, 130 (2016). And as explained more fully above, the 

State presented ample evidence regarding the sale and Ms. McCauley’s knowledge of its 

dangerousness. A rational jury could conclude, based on the evidence presented in a light 

most favorable to the State, that Ms. McCauley was guilty of gross negligence involuntary 

manslaughter.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Denied Ms. McCauley’s 

Motion To Dismiss The Involuntary Manslaughter Charge Or 

The Reckless Endangerment Charge.

Next, Ms. McCauley argues that the trial court erred when it denied her motions to 

dismiss the involuntary manslaughter and reckless endangerment charges. “Generally, the 

‘standard of review of the grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is whether the trial court 

was legally correct.’” Blackstone v. Sharma, 461 Md. 87, 110 (2018) (quoting Davis v. 

Frostburg Facility Operations, LLC, 457 Md 275, 284 (2018)). The resolution of this 
14

question depends in part upon the interpretation of the statute defining reckless 

endangerment. We defer to the “policy decisions enacted into law by the General 

Assembly” and “assume that the legislature’s intent is expressed in the statutory language.” 

Blackstone, 461 Md. at 113. We start with the “plain language of the statute, and ordinary, 

popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology.” 

Id. (quoting Schreyer v. Chaplain, 416 Md. 94, 101 (2010)). If the statutory language is 

“unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to 

the legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written without resort to 

other rules of construction.” Merchant v. State, 448 Md. 75, 94 (2016) (quoting Gardner 

v. State, 420 Md. 1, 8 (2011)). Finally, we “consider the consequences resulting from one 

meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or 

unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense.” Blackstone, 461 

Md. at 114.

1. Involuntary Manslaughter

Ms. McCauley argues first that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to 

dismiss the involuntary manslaughter charge because Maryland has not adopted a specific 

“statute creating a drug-induced homicide offense” and sound public health policy and 

good Samaritan legislation explain why. Ms. McCauley submitted her original brief 

containing this argument before State v. Thomas was decided by the Court of Appeals, but 

she didn’t modify this argument when she filed a supplemental brief after Thomas came 

out.

Thomas answers directly the question of whether the State may bring an involuntary 
15

manslaughter charge following a fatal overdose, and it resolves Ms. McCauley’s policy 

arguments against her. The Court of Appeals now has recognized that a dealer can be 

criminally responsible for gross negligence involuntary manslaughter even though the 

legislature has not passed a statute criminalizing drug-induced manslaughter specifically.

See generally State v. Thomas, 464 Md. 133 (2019).

2. Reckless Endangerment

Next, Ms. McCauley argues that the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss the 

reckless endangerment charge because under the plain language of the applicable statute, 

her conduct, i.e. the sale of illicit drugs, is exempted. Maryland Code (2002, 2012 Repl. 

Vol.), § 3-204 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”) outlines the crime of reckless 

endangerment:

(a) Prohibited. – A person may not recklessly:

(1) engage in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death 

or serious physical injury to another . . . .

Ms. McCauley argues that the sale of carfentanil is exempted from the reckless 

endangerment statute because it is a “product”:

(c) Exceptions. – (1) Subsection (a)(1) of this section does not 

apply to conduct involving: . . . (ii) the manufacture, 

production, or sale of a product or commodity. 

CR § 3-204(c)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). The State responds that the exception in CR § 3-

204(c)(1)(ii) does not apply to the sale of controlled dangerous substances. The State is 

correct.

The terms “product” and “commodity” are not defined in the Criminal Law Article. 

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “product” as:
16

Something that is distributed commercially for use or 

consumption that is [usually] (1) tangible personal property, 

(2) the result of fabrication or processing, and (3) an item that 

has passed through a chain of commercial distribution before 

ultimate use or consumption.

Product, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). “Commodity,” on the other hand, is 

defined as:

1. An article of trade or commerce. The term embraces only 

tangible goods, such as products or merchandise, as 

distinguished from services. 2. An economic good, [especially]

a raw material or an agricultural product.

Commodity, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Under a plain meaning reading of 

the statute, CR § 3-204(c)(1)(ii) creates an exception to the crime of reckless endangerment 

when a person’s “conduct” involves “the sale of a product or commodity.” But Ms. 

McCauley argues that this statute creates a “broad ‘exception’” and that the sale of 

carfentanil falls within it. We disagree.

Even under the plain meaning doctrine, we apply a reasonable interpretation 

compatible with common sense. Merchant, 448 Md. at 95. Carfentanil is a drug with no 

approved use in humans, and the sale of carfentanil is illegal. See CR §§ 5-101(g)(1), 5-

403(c)(1)(v), 5-602. Accordingly, dealers engaged in selling carfentanil are not allowed to 

sell the purported “product” or “commodity,” and the exception doesn’t apply. It is 

inconceivable that the General Assembly enacted CR § 3-204(c)(1)(ii) to protect drug 

dealers engaged in the illicit sale of controlled dangerous substances. The trial court, after 

acknowledging the lack of case law on this point, came soundly to the same conclusion:

As far as the issue about products and commodities and such 

like that under reckless endangerment, I didn’t find any case 
17

law on it. But in what I was reading and what I was 

understanding, I believe the purpose of that exception is that 

people who are doing legitimate and legal things, like a doctor 

who prescribes opioids but not excessively – that’s a different 

story – a John Deere who make a tractor that could potentially 

be harmful to somebody if it’s driven wrong or whatever, 

produces something else. 

That is to protect legitimate manufacturers, producers, 

sellers of products or commodities, in my opinion. And that 

this exception is not an exception for somebody that is 

dealing illegal drugs. Illegal drugs that are known to be 

dangerous and that doesn’t – it wouldn’t be entitled to the 

protections of this exception under reckless endangerment. 

So I think that that doesn’t apply in this case at all. So I’m 

going to deny your motion to dismiss . . . . 

We agree and find no error in the trial court’s denial of Ms. McCauley’s motion to dismiss 

the reckless endangerment charge.

JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 

FOR ST. MARY’S COUNTY AFFIRMED. 

APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.