alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, *ETC.,*PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WILDLIFE PRESERVES, INC., *ETC.,*DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, *ETC.,*PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. TROY HILLS GAME ASSOCIATION, INC., DEFENDANT, AND WILDLIFE PRESERVES, INC., *ETC.,*DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, *ETC.,*PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. FRANK SENA, Jr., DEFENDANT, AND WILDLIFE PRESERVES, INC., *ETC.,*DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. TEXAS EASTERN TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, *ETC.,*PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. CLAUDE HABBERSTAD, DEFENDANT, AND WILDLIFE PRESERVES, INC., *ETC.,*DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Argued June 5, 1967

Decided June 14, 1967.

*404
      *Mr. Francis E. P~ McCarter*argued the cause for appellant *(Mr. Stuart A. Young, Jr.,*attorney; *Mr. Francis E. P. McCarter*of counsel and on the brief).

*Mr. Robert J. Del Tufo*argued the cause for respondent *(Messrs. Jeffers and Dillon,*attorneys).

The opinion of the court was delivered

Per Curiam.

Plaintiff sought to acquire by condemnation a right of way across property of defendant Wildlife Preserves, Inc. Defendant’s property is devoted to the conservation and preservation of wildlife. In answer to the complaint, defendant alleged that the land was not subject to condemnation because it was devoted to a prior public use. Defendant claimed also that the plaintiff’s selection of the particular right of way was arbitrary and capricious because there was available on defendant’s land an adequate and serviceable alternate route, acceptance and use of which would avoid the devastating and irreparable damage the preserve would suffer if the demanded route was approved by the court’s judgment. On plaintiff’s motion, the trial court struck defendant’s answer as insufficient in law and appointed commissioners to fix the value of the right of way to be taken. 89 *N. J. Super.*1 *(Law Div.*1965). The Appellate Division affirmed on the trial court’s opinion. 90 *N. J. Super.*385 *(App. Div.*1966). This Court granted certification, 47 *N. J.*91 (1966). Thereafter we approved so much of the lower courts’ view as held the doctrine of prior public use inapplicable, but we reversed the summary judgment and remanded the matter for a plenary trial on defendant’s claim that the route selected by plaintiff was arbitrary. 48 *N. J.*261 (1966).

Subsequently a plenary trial of that issue was had. The disputing parties produced their respective lay and expert witnesses on the subject of the reasonableness of plaintiff’s choice of route over defendant’s land. After hearing all of the proof, the trial court concluded that plaintiff’s action *405was not arbitrary or capricious, and that the right of way sought by plaintiff represented a reasonable exercise of judgment. Our examination of the record satisfies us that the evidence was ample to sustain the trial court’s finding. Accordingly the judgment is affirmed.

*For*affirmance—Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Prancis, Proctor, Hall, Sohettino and Haneman—7.

*For*reversal—None.
#### William S. Livingston, Jr., and another, *Executors, etc., Respondents, v.*The Society for the Relief of the Destitute, Blind, etc., and others, *Appellants.*

— Order modified as directed in opinion, and affirmed as modified, without costs. Opinion by Daniels, J.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T ORLAND O G ON ZALE Z- M ARTINEZ, P et i t i on er , v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 08- 74476 A ge nc yN o. A 095- 725- 814 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

an O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d June 29, 2010 ** B efo re: A L A R C Ó N , L E A V Y , an dG R A B E R , C i rcu i tJu d g es. O r l ando G onz a l e z - M art i ne z , ana t i ve and c i t i z e n of E l S a l va dor , pe t i t i ons pr o s e f orr e vi e w of

the B oar d of

I m m i gr a t i on A ppe a l s ’ or de rs um m ar i l ya f f i rm i ng an i m m i grat i on j ud ge’ s ( “ IJ ”) order denyi ng hi s m ot i on t o reopen rem ov al pr oc e e di ngs c onduc t e d i n abs e nt i a . O urj ur i s di c t i on i s gove rne d by 

# FI LED JU L 19 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 74476 2 8 U .S .C . § 1 2 5 2 . W e r e v ie w f o rab u s e o f

d is c r e tio n th e d e n ia l o f am o tio n to r e o p e n . C e lis - Ca s te lla n o v . A s h c r o ft , 298 F . 3d 888, 890 ( 9th C i r . 2002) . W e de ny i n p artan dd i s m i s s i n p artth e p e t i t i o n f o rr e v i e w. T he I Jdi d notabus e hi s di s c r e t i on i n de ny i ng G onz a l e z - M art i ne z ’ s m ot i on t o reopen as unt i m el y w here he fi l ed i tm ore than 1 6 m on ths af t erhe w as ordered r e m o v e din ab s e n tia . See 8 U . S . C . § 1 22 9a(b)( 5)(C )( i ). W e la c kju r is d ic tio n to c o n s id e rG o n z a le z - M artin e z ’s c o n te n tio n th a t h e is e nt i t l e d t o e qui t abl e t ol l i ng be c aus e he f a i l e d t o e xhaus tthi s c ont e nt i on be f or e the a g e n c y . Se e B a rr o n v . A s h c r o ft , 3 5 8 F .3 d6 7 4 , 6 7 8 ( 9 th C ir . 2 0 0 4 ) ( g e n e r a lly re qu i ri ng exhaust i on of cl ai m s bef ore the agency) . G onz a l e z - M art i ne z ’ s r e m a i ni ng c ont e nt i ons ar e una va i l i ng. P E T IT IO N F O R R E V IE W D E N IE D i n p art; D IS M IS S E D i n p art.
### Source Categories Emissions (tons/yr)%Cumulative %
Hazardous Waste Incineration 1.59E-02 65.09 65.09 Industrial Boilers 1.15E-03 4.71 69.80 Municipal Landfills 3.46E-04 1.42 71.22 Other Solid Waste Incineration 8.20E-05 0.34 71.55 Other Source Categories (PCBs) 9.94E-05 0.41 71.96 Portland Cement Manufacture (Combined) 5.40E-04 2.21 74.17 Refuse Systems 6.00E-04 2.46 76.62 Scrap and Waste Materials 1.34E-03 5.49 82.11 Sewage Sludge Incineration 4.37E-03 17.89100.00

Total Emissions 0.02 100.00

Foot Notes [1] PCB emissions were not included in the May 1999 Inventory Report 

### Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB) [1]
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ESTEBAN DUQUE AVILES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Argued March 20, 1967

Decided April 24, 1967.

*193
      *Mr. Bolert W. Criscuolo*argued the cause for appellant.

*Mr. Martin J. Queenan,*Prosecutor of Burlington County, submitted a brief as attorney for respondent and did not appear due to illness.

The opinion of the court was delivered

Pee Cubiam.

This is an appeal by defendant from a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree. He had previously been tried and a similar verdict had been rendered by the jury. We followed the ruling in *Griffin v. State of California,*380 *U. S.*609, 85 *S. Ct.*1229, 14 *L. Ed. 2d*106 (1965), and reversed his first conviction on the ground that the trial court erred in charging the jury that defendant’s failure to take the stand justified an inference that defendant could not deny some of the evidence presented by the State. 45 *N. J.*152 (1965).

At his second trial, defendant did not request a charge with respect to his failure to testify, and none was given. Defendant, through his appellate attorney, claims plain error, stating that the trial judge should have charged, even without any request by defendant, that no adverse inference could be drawn from defendant’s failure to testify. We find no constitutional or other basis for defendant’s contention nor do we find any basis for applying the plain error rule. *R. R.*1:5-1 (a).

Defendant’s second ground for reversal is that the jury’s verdict, insofar as it was based upon a finding that defendant was sane when he committed the crime, was against *194the weight of the evidence. A jury’s verdict will not be set aside “as against the weight of the evidence unless it clearly and convincingly appears that the verdict was the result of mistake,' partiality, prejudice or passion.” *R. R.*1:5-1 (a). We-cannot find any basis for disturbing the jury’s finding.

Affirmed.

*For affirmance*— Chief Justice Weintratjb and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor, Hall, Schettino and Hane man — 7.

*For reversal*— None.
#### Henry R. Cassels and others, *Respondents, v.*Daniel C. Fisk and others, *Appellants.*

Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. Opinion by Daniels, J.
I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 8528 

To increase the criminal penalties for assaulting a Bureau of Prisons 

correctional officer. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 23, 2024 

Mr. D’ESPOSITO introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To increase the criminal penalties for assaulting a Bureau 

of Prisons correctional officer. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Safer Prisons Act of 

5 2024’’. 

6 SEC. 2. ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR ASSAULT ON BUREAU 

7 OF PRISONS CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS. 

8 Section 111 of title 18, United States Code, is 

9 amended— 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 8528 IH

1 (1) by redesignating subsection (c) as sub2 section (d); and 

3 (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘(c) ENHANCED PENALTIES FOR ASSAULT ON BU6 REAU OF PRISONS CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS.—In the 

7 case of any violation of this section against a correctional 

8 officer of the Bureau of Prisons, the applicable maximum 

9 term of imprisonment under this section shall be doubled, 

10 and the applicable maximum fine shall be adjusted accord11 ingly.’’. 

Æ 


ssavage on LAPJG3WLY3PROD with BILLS
**Exhibit 31.2**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

I, Stephen A. Aanderud, Chief Financial Officer of DayStar Technologies, Inc., certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of DayStar Technologies, Inc. for the nine months ended September 30, 2006; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsiblefor establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, includingits consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation, tothe registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financial information; and 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Date:November 14, 2006
<PAGE>
                                                               Exhibit 18.1


February 5, 2002

Board of Directors
Knowles Electronics Holdings Inc.
1151 Maplewood Drive
Itasca, Illinois, 60143


Dear Sirs:

Note 1 of Notes to consolidated financial statements of Knowles Electronics
Holdings, Inc. included in its Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2001
describes a change in the method of determining the cost of inventories from
LIFO, the old method, to FIFO, the new method. We conclude that such change in
the method of accounting is to an acceptable alternative method, which, based
on your business judgment to make this change and for the stated reasons, is
preferable in your circumstances.


                                        Very truly yours,



                                        Ernst & Young LLP
                                        Chicago, Illinois
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ELIAS SANCHEZ,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D2023-0195

[July 3, 2024]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Hon. Andrew L. Siegel, Judge; L.T. Case No. 

18015336CF10A. 

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Benjamin H. Eisenberg, 

Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

GERBER, CONNER and ARTAU, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER OF

UNIVERSAL CITY DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, LTD.

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the quarterly report of Universal City Development Partners, Ltd. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 29, 2009 filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Tracey L. Stockwell, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
        pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





| | (1) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





| | (2) | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Dated: May 8, 2009



> By:
> 
>                                                                                         
> 
>                                                                                         /s/ Tracey L. StockwellTracey L. Stockwell
> 
>                                                                                             Principal Financial Officer
No. 48592.

#### Protests 620391-G, etc., of Holland Food Corp. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

It was stipulated that the cheese in question is similar to that the subject of Abstract 48269. The protests were therefore sustained.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eduardo Barrales, Appellant.

[633 NYS2d 368]

—Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Orange County (Byrne, J.), rendered January 27, 1994, convicting him of burglary in the first degree (two counts), robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

Prior to the defendant’s arrest, he made a statement regarding details of the crime that had not yet been released by the police. This statement was admitted into evidence. The defendant contends that this statement, which could have had more than one meaning, was too ambiguous to have been admitted into evidence. The defendant also challenges the prosecutor’s summation remarks regarding this statement. The defendant did not preserve these claims for appellate review *(see,*CPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Udzinski,*146 AD2d 245; *People v Tarábanla,*72 NY2d 852). In any event, the statement was properly admitted and its meaning and probative value were matters properly left for the jury *(see, People v Vargas,*125 AD2d 429; *People v Rowley,*160 AD2d 963).

We also reject the defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s treatment of this statement during summation constituted reversible error. The prosecutor accurately restated the evidence presented by the testifying witnesses and made reasonable inferences from this evidence within the bounds of rhetorical comment permitted during closing arguments *(see, People v Galloway,*54 NY2d 396).

In addition, the sentence imposed was not excessive in light of the violent nature of these crimes *(see,*Penal Law § 70.02 [3]; § 70.15; *People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Balletta, J. P., O’Brien, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ANTHONY DEAN JACKSON,

Plaintiff

- Appellant

,

v.

COUNTY OF MARICOPA; MARICOPA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, named as: Maricopa Superior Court,

Defendants

- Appellees. No. 15

- 15061

D.C. No. 2:14

- cv

- 01293

- ESW

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona Eileen S. Willett, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **

Submitted September 13, 2016 ** *

Before: HAWKINS, N.R. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Anthony Dean Jackson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

** * The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

SEP 19 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 15

- 15061

dismissing his action alleging claims arising from defendant s ’ allegedly wrongful

conduct leading to his 1996 criminal conviction and defendants’ continued

recognition of that conviction. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Crum v. Circus Circus Enters. , 231 F.3d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). We affirm.

The district cour t properly dismissed Jackson’s action for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction , because Jackson failed to allege facts sufficient to show that

diversity jurisdiction exists. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); Kuntz v. Lamar Corp.

,

385 F.3d 1177, 1181

- 83 (9th Cir. 2004) (addressing diversity of citizenship under

§ 1332). Furthe r, to the extent that Jackso n alleged claims arising from

constitutional errors by the Maricopa County Superior Court during his criminal

prosecution, these claims are barred under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine because

they constitute a “de facto appeal” of the criminal conviction or are “inextricably

intertwined” with that conviction

. See Noel v. Hall , 341 F.3d 1148, 1154

- 57 (9th

Cir. 2003) (discussing Rooker

- Feldman doctrine); see also Henrichs v. Valley View

Dev. , 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) ( Rooker

- Feldman doctrine barred

plaintiff’ s claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to

determine the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”).3 15

- 15061

We do not con sider any claims that Jackson did not properly raise before the

district court. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Jackson’s motion for appointment of counsel, filed on December 18, 2015

,

an d motion s to dismiss, filed on March 1 1, 2016 , and August 26, 2016 , are denied

.

We lack jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s motion under Fed. R. Civ. P . 60(3),

filed on April 21, 2016

. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257

.

AFFIRMED.
Case BTo. 5,394.

#### GIBSON v. DOBIE et al.

[5 Biss. 198; 1 14 N. B. R. 156.]

Circuit Court, E. D. Wisconsin.

July, 1871.

Puefeuexce — Conveyance to Wife.

1. A conveyance by an insolvent debtor of liis real estate to his wife, without consideration, she giving a mortgage thereon to creditors who knew the debtor to be insolvent, is a preference under the bankrupt act [of 1807 (14 Stat. 517)], and void as against creditors.

2. The mortgage of the wife is the same, in legal effect, as the mortgage of. the husband.

In equity. Bill by [N. S. Gibson] the as-signee against John N. Dobie, Hannah R. Dobie, his wife, John T. Burhyte and Henry *317N. Glening, to set aside conveyance as fraudulent under the bankrupt act.

J. W. Pinter, for complainant.

J. M. Jillett, for defendants.

MILLER. District Judge.

John N. Dobie, as guardian of Andrew B. Cary, his step-son, became indebted to his .ward about seventeen hundred dollars, early in the spring of 1SGS, and embarrassed pecuniarily. Burhyte, his surety on the guardianship bond, demanded security or indemnity. Dobie gave Bur-hyte a mortgage on his homestead. By a subsequent arrangement, Dobie was discharged as guardian, and his wife, Hannah R. Dobie, the mother of the child, was appointed guardian in his stead. In April, 1SGS, Dobie and wife conveyed two tracts of land to the defendant Glening, who, with his wife, conveyed the same premises to Hannah R. Dobie. These conveyances were made for the purpose of vesting the title to the two tracts of land in Mrs. DoDie, and enabling her to secure Burhyte, her brother, as the surety of Dobie. The mortgage of Dobie to Burkj'te on the homestead was satisfied of record, and Mrs. Dobie gave him a mortgage on the two farms in lieu of the former mortgage. Dobie also assigned to Burhyte a mortgage of three hundred dollars on other property.

Proceedings in bankruptcy against Dobie by his creditors were instituted in July, 1SG8. Prior to such proceedings, on the 14th of July, 1SGS, Dobie assigned to Burhyte the three hundred dollar mortgage, and also, on the same day, Mrs. Dobie gave him the mortgage. Burhyte had abundant reason to believe that Dobie was insolvent at the time he accepted these securities, and he also knew that Mrs. Dobie became the alienee of ■ the lands without any consideration, and that Dobie, at the date of these conveyances, was largely indebted.

The mortgage of Mrs. Dobie to Burhyte is the same in legal effect as if Dobie and his wife had given it directly to him. The mortgage of Mrs. Dobie was a mere device to relieve the homestead of the debtor, and to shift the lien upon the land. These col-laterals were given and accepted by Burhyte as a preferred creditor, in disregard of the provisions of the bankrupt act A decree is ordered for the complainant.