In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 10-2238

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DERRICK L. BULLOCK,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Indiana, Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:09-cr-10-TLS—Theresa L. Springmann, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 28, 2010—DECIDED FEBRUARY 1, 2011

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and SYKES and

TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. Derrick Bullock pleaded guilty

to possession with intent to distribute at least five grams

but less than fifty grams of cocaine base (“crack”) in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). His plea was conditioned on his ability to appeal the district court’s denial

of his motion to suppress evidence of the crack that

led to his conviction. The events giving rise to Bullock’s
2 No. 10-2238

arrest began when Detective John Greenlee of the Fort

Wayne Police Department received an anonymous tip

that someone by the name of “Quick” was selling

cocaine from a residence on Euclid Street. Based on the

information provided by the tipster, Greenlee was able

to determine the address of the residence and that

“Quick” was Bullock. Greenlee began surveillance of the

residence and corroborated the tip by observing Bullock

leaving the residence on several occasions and engaging

in activity indicative of drug dealing. Armed with this

information, Greenlee obtained a warrant to search the

Euclid Street address.

Prior to execution of the warrant, during pre-raid

surveillance, Greenlee observed Bullock leaving the

residence in a vehicle driven by Sabrina Wilhelm, the

lessee of the residence. Greenlee was aware that

Wilhelm did not have a valid driver’s license, so he

instructed uniformed officers to stop the vehicle.

Officers made the stop, transported Bullock back to the

residence, and detained him in the squad car while

they executed the search warrant. Upon finding marijuana in plain view on the dining room table in the residence, along with sandwich baggies containing a small

amount of crack and a scale in another part of the residence, officers arrested Bullock for visiting a common

nuisance under Indiana Code § 35-48-4-13(a). Bullock was

taken to the police station where a search of his person

revealed sixteen individually wrapped baggies of crack.

On appeal, Bullock claims that the crack was obtained

as the result of an unlawful detention without reasonable
No. 10-2238 3

suspicion and subsequent unlawful arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The

district court disagreed and found that there was reasonable suspicion to detain Bullock during the search,

relying on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), where

the Court held that police lawfully detained the

defendant (who was leaving his residence as officers

approached) while they executed a valid search warrant

of the residence. The district court further found that

probable cause existed to arrest Bullock for visiting a

common nuisance under Indiana law after officers

found marijuana in plain view and other evidence of

more widespread, continuous, and recurrent drug

activity within the residence. We affirm. Bullock’s detention was lawful under the principles set forth in Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and for similar reasons was

justified under Summers. We also find that his subsequent arrest was supported by probable cause.

I.

Detective Greenlee, who has been in the Vice and

Narcotics Division for eleven years, testified that on

November 3, 2008, he received an anonymous tip that

an individual using the name “Quick” was selling

narcotics out of a house on Euclid Street. The anonymous caller had purportedly been to the house, had

spoken with “Quick” on several occasions, and was

aware that “Quick” was selling cocaine from that location. The caller did not know the address of the
4 No. 10-2238

house, but he described it to Greenlee, informed him

what side of the street it was on, and that red and blue

chairs were out front.

Because neither Greenlee nor other officers had

worked with the caller before, Greenlee took efforts to

corroborate the caller’s information. Through the police

department’s computer system, Greenlee discovered

that “Quick” was Derrick Bullock; Greenlee also testified

that he had prior knowledge that a subject by the name

of Derrick Bullock used the nickname “Quick.” Greenlee

was also able to determine that the address of the

house described by the caller was 2815 Euclid Street in

Fort Wayne, Indiana.

Greenlee began surveilling the residence. Officers

later learned that the residence was leased by Sabrina

Wilhelm, but Bullock was the main target of their investigation. Although disputed evidence was introduced

during the motion to suppress hearing, the district court

did not find that Bullock lived there with Wilhelm.

Rather, the two were dating and Bullock visited the

residence. Between November 21, 2008, and December 2,

2008, Greenlee observed Bullock leave the residence on

four occasions.

On November 21, 2008, Greenlee followed Bullock and

a female (who officers later learned was Wilhelm) after

they left the residence in a vehicle. Bullock was driving.

Officers stopped the vehicle and arrested Bullock (the

basis for the stop and arrest is not evident from the

record). During the stop, officers discovered that

Wilhelm’s driver’s license was suspended. Pursuant to a
No. 10-2238 5

search incident to arrest, officers found $500 on Bullock,

mostly in $20 denominations. Greenlee testified that

Bullock lied about his employment and that his investigation indicated that Bullock was unemployed. Because

Bullock was unemployed and had a significant amount

of cash in small denominations, Greenlee, based on his

training and experience, believed that the money was

obtained from drug sales. No drugs were found during

the search.

Greenlee next observed Bullock leave the residence

sometime between November 21 and December 1. Because

he was helping with another investigation, Greenlee

was unable to follow Bullock on that occasion. On December 1, Greenlee again followed Bullock after observing

him leave the residence. Both times that Greenlee followed Bullock—on November 21 and December 1—

Greenlee described Bullock’s activity as follows:

[T]he vehicle makes several short stops, sometimes meeting people as they were waiting on the

porch. The person would come off the porch, they

would turn into an alley. The person would get

in the back seat of the car, the person would be

in the car two to five minutes, and then get out

of the vehicle on foot, stop in the house and

the vehicle would leave. 

The vehicle would pull up along a side street, the

person would approach it, be at the window for a

up to a minute, a very short period of time and

then walk away. The vehicle would leave again. 

Greenlee did not see anything pass between Bullock and

the other individuals during these short stops. Based on
6 No. 10-2238

his experience and training, Greenlee testified that such

activity is indicative of drug dealing.

On December 2, 2008, officers obtained a search warrant for the Euclid Street address to search for evidence

of narcotics, which they proceeded to execute that

same day. Greenlee was responsible for the pre-raid

surveillance before execution of the warrant. The

search warrant was based on the anonymous tip

and Greenlee’s corroboration of that information.

During pre-raid surveillance, Greenlee observed Wilhelm, her children, and Bullock leave the residence in

a vehicle; Wilhelm was driving. Greenlee was aware

from the November 21 stop that Wilhelm’s driver’s

license was suspended. Greenlee began following

the vehicle. Because he was not in uniform and had an

undercover vehicle with no lights or sirens, he radioed

other uniformed officers, who were positioned near the

residence as part of the search warrant team, to make

the stop. Uniformed officers Jean Gigli, Mark Deshaies,

and Angie Reed followed the vehicle and executed a

stop about ten to fifteen blocks from the residence (within

about three minutes of the car leaving the premises).

Greenlee waited for Wilhelm and Bullock to get out

of the car; he then returned to the residence to prepare

for execution of the warrant.

Greenlee instructed Gigli to place Bullock in custody

once he made the stop. Greenlee testified that his intention was to bring Bullock back to the residence during

execution of the search warrant. Gigli approached

Bullock on the passenger’s side of the vehicle and Reed
No. 10-2238 7

approached Wilhelm on the driver’s side. Bullock testified

that an officer pulled Wilhelm aside and said, “I have

a search warrant to search your house. Where [are] your

keys at?” Wilhelm reached in her purse and gave the

officer a key to the house. Greenlee was informed that a

key was obtained during the traffic stop, but was not

sure if it came from Bullock or Wilhelm. Officers used

the key to gain entry into the residence.

Either Reed or Deshaies asked if there were any drugs

in the house, and Wilhelm responded that there was

marijuana in the dining room. Greenlee testified that

“from things that Ms. Wilhelm had told us at the traffic

stop, [we] . . . wanted to keep a hold of [Bullock] to talk

to him further about drugs that were in the house that

she had told us about.” Bullock was handcuffed, patted

down, and placed in the back of Gigli’s squad car. Bullock

was advised that he was being detained for further investigation. The officers did not find drugs in the car or

on Bullock (at that time). About ten or twenty minutes

after the stop (the officers could not testify to exact

times, but gave approximations), Gigli transported

Bullock back to the residence, where he stayed in the

squad car. The search was underway. Wilhelm remained

at the scene of the traffic stop with her children until

their father could come get them.

During the search, officers found a lighter next to a

box that contained marijuana on a table located in a

central part of the house, a large ball of plastic baggies

that contained small amounts of crack cocaine, a gun in

the upstairs bedroom, and a digital scale. (Bullock
8 No. 10-2238

does not challenge the justification for the residence

search.) Greenlee did not testify where the baggies and

scale were found, but it appears, from the photographs

introduced at the hearing, that they were in a kitchen

cabinet. With respect to the marijuana, Greenlee testified

that “you could not have walked through the house

without seeing the drugs there in plain view, as the

photos depicted on the kitchen table.” (Some of the witnesses described the table as a “kitchen” table and others

as a “dining room” table but they were all talking about

the same table in a central and open part of the house.)

Photographs taken during the search confirm that the

marijuana was in an open box on the table. Greenlee

opined, based on his experience and training, that the

items seized during the search were consistent with both

drug use and distribution. Bullock remained at the residence for about twenty minutes before he was transported

to the station and charged with visiting a common nuisance under Indiana Code § 35-48-4-13(a). Wilhelm was

charged with maintaining a common nuisance under

Indiana Code § 35-48-4-13(b).

After transporting Bullock to the police station, officers

conducted a strip search of Bullock and discovered

sixteen individually wrapped baggies of crack cocaine

concealed “in” his buttocks. (The record is not clear how

probing a search was required to locate the crack cocaine.

Obviously, the earlier pat-down did not reveal the drugs.

Bullock, however, does not complain about the conduct

of the station house search.) These drugs provided the

basis for the government’s indictment and Bullock’s

plea of guilty for knowingly possessing crack with

intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
No. 10-2238 9

II.

Bullock moved to suppress the crack found on him,

arguing that officers unlawfully detained him during

the search and lacked probable cause to arrest him.

After holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court

found Bullock’s detention lawful under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), even though he was a visitor of the residence and was detained after leaving the

premises. The district court reasoned that Bullock was

pulled over a short distance from the residence and

was the subject of the officers’ investigation; thus, his

detention was based on the officers’ articulable and

individualized suspicion that Bullock was engaged in

criminal activity in connection with the residence. The

court also reasoned that upon discovering that a warrant had been issued, Bullock became a flight risk.

Further, the court found that there was probable cause

to arrest Bullock for visiting a common nuisance after

officers found marijuana in the residence in plain view,

along with baggies (containing a small amount of crack)

and a scale in another location. The court explained that

a common-sense view of the everyday realities of life

would suggest to police that Bullock was aware that

Wilhelm used drugs inside her home. Bullock appeals

these findings.

On a motion to suppress, we review questions of law

de novo and questions of fact for clear error. United States

v. Clinton, 591 F.3d 968, 971 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied,

131 S. Ct. 246 (Oct. 4, 2010). Where there are mixed questions of law and fact, our review is de novo. United States
10 No. 10-2238

v. Burnside, 588 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2009). Under clear

error review, “we will not overturn the district court’s

factual findings unless left with a definite and firm conviction that the district court was mistaken.” Clinton, 591

F.3d at 971 (quotation omitted). We give special deference

to the district court’s credibility determinations. Burnside,

588 F.3d at 517.

A. Seizure of Bullock

Bullock does not dispute that the officers had probable

cause to stop Wilhelm for driving on a suspended license.

He argues, though, that after officers patted him down

and searched the vehicle, he should have been free to

leave the scene because they had no reasonable suspicion

to continue detaining him while they searched Wilhelm’s

residence. He had already left the premises of the search

and was not living at the residence, but was merely a

visitor. Accordingly, Bullock contends that his detention

was not proper under the principles set forth in Summers.

We disagree. Bullock’s approach overlooks the authority that law enforcement had to detain him under Terry

based on information the police possessed at the time of

the stop. Bullock was the target of the officers’ investigation and his association with the residence led to

a finding of probable cause for the search warrant.

Based on the information obtained from the anonymous

tipster and Greenlee’s subsequent investigation, officers

had an articulable basis for suspecting that Bullock was

engaged in drug activity from that residence. Further,

once Wilhelm informed officers that she had marijuana
No. 10-2238 11

in her dining room, they had reasonable suspicion to

believe that Bullock was visiting a common nuisance.

Officers, therefore, could detain Bullock during the

search warrant even though he was not living at the

Euclid Street address and had left the premises before

the search was underway. Further, when officers

stopped the vehicle, they reasonably informed Wilhelm

of the search warrant so they could obtain keys to the

residence. At that time, Bullock was made aware of the

warrant and officers had an interest in preventing

Bullock’s flight in the event incriminating evidence was

found during the search and in minimizing risk of harm

to the officers.

The length of detention—thirty to forty minutes—was

limited to the legitimate needs of the officers in conducting

further investigation. The manner of detention—being

handcuffed, placed in the back of a squad car, and transported to the residence—while undoubtedly intrusive,

was not unreasonable under these circumstances. Even

if the manner of detention was too intrusive, officers

were reasonable in detaining Bullock during the search,

and he would have inevitably been arrested (either at

the scene of the traffic stop or at the residence) after

officers located the contraband in the house. Bullock

does not dispute that after being arrested and taken

into custody, the crack on his person would have been

discovered.

For many of the same reasons, we find Bullock’s detention also justified under Summers. Given the facts known

to the officers at the time, they had the authority to
12 No. 10-2238

detain Bullock during execution of the search warrant;

he was the subject of the officers’ investigation, had just

left the premises, was pulled over as soon as reasonably

practicable, and once informed of the warrant, became

a flight risk and posed a potential danger to the officers

conducting the search. The detention of Bullock was

warranted because the additional intrusion caused

by detention was slight and the justifications were substantial.

1. Investigative Detention under Terry 

The government argues that reasonable suspicion

under Terry existed to detain Bullock. We agree. “Although an officer does not need probable cause to

conduct an investigatory stop, the brief detention must

be based on reasonable suspicion that the stopped individual has or is about to commit a crime.” United States

v. Booker, 579 F.3d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 2009). When determining if seizure exceeds the bounds of Terry, the court

should ask: “(1) whether the police were aware of

specific and articulable facts giving rise to reasonable

suspicion; and (2) whether the degree of intrusion was

reasonably related to the known facts.” United States v.

Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994).

An investigatory stop is proper “if the officer making

the stop is ‘able to point to specific and articulable facts’

that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. at 1224 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). “Reasonable suspicion is a lower threshold than probable cause

and does not deal with hard certainties, but with proba-
No. 10-2238 13

bilities.” Booker, 579 F.3d at 839 (quotation omitted). It

“requires more than a hunch but less than probable

cause and considerably less than preponderance of the

evidence.” Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir.

2010) (quotations omitted). Because “[r]easonable

suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable

cause[,] . . . [it] can arise from information that is less

reliable . . . .” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

The reasonableness of the stop is based on an objective

standard: “would the facts available to the officer at the

moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of

reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken

was appropriate?” Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224 (quoting

Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). “When determining whether an

officer had reasonable suspicion, courts examine the

totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the

time of the stop, including the experience of the officer

and the behavior and characteristics of the suspect.”

United States v. Lawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 2006).

The officer’s subjective motivations for stopping and

detaining a suspect are not relevant to the reasonableness inquiry. United States v. Barnett, 505 F.3d 637, 640

(7th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Van Dreel, 155

F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1998) (subjective intentions play

no role in Fourth Amendment analysis).

The officers had reasonable suspicion of Bullock’s

criminal activity and could detain him briefly while they

investigated their suspicion, i.e., while they searched the

Euclid Street residence. Greenlee received an anonymous

tip that an individual using the name “Quick” was
14 No. 10-2238

selling narcotics out of a house on Euclid Street. The

anonymous caller had purportedly been to the house, had

spoken with “Quick”, and was aware that “Quick” was

selling cocaine from that location. The caller did not

know the address of the house, but described it to

Greenlee, informed him what side of the street it was on,

and that red and blue chairs were out front. The anonymous tip alone would not justify a Terry stop. See, e.g.,

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2000) (holding that

an anonymous tip, without more, was not sufficient to

justify an officer’s stop and frisk); see also United States v.

Robinson, 537 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2008) (anonymous

sources are less reliable because officers “have no way

to hold the source responsible if the information turns

out to be fabricated”). However, an anonymous tip,

adequately corroborated, may provide sufficient indicia

of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. J.L., 529 U.S. at 270.

After receiving the anonymous tip, Greenlee undertook

efforts to corroborate the caller’s information. Greenlee

identified “Quick” as Bullock through the police department’s computer system, located the address of the

residence based on the caller’s description, observed

Bullock leave the residence on four occasions during

the course of eleven days, and observed Bullock on two

occasions engage in behavior consistent with a drug

courier or distributor upon leaving the residence. Specifically, Greenlee followed Bullock and observed him

engage in short stay visits at various residences; individuals would get into Bullock’s car for two to five

minutes or they would approach the vehicle’s window for
No. 10-2238 15

a short period (up to a minute) and then walk away. Based

on his training and experience, Greenlee testified that such

actions were indicative of drug dealing. See, e.g., Burnside,

588 F.3d at 518 (“In forming a reasonable belief that a

drug transaction occurred, [police] were permitted to

view the events through the prism of their training and

experience.”); United States v. Funches, 327 F.3d 582, 584,

586-87 (7th Cir. 2003) (Drug Enforcement Administration

(“DEA”) agents had probable cause to believe that drug

transaction had occurred based on their experience in

narcotics enforcement; agents observed the exchange

of shopping bags under circumstances they recognized

as having common characteristics of drug transactions).

On November 21, after observing these short-stay

visits, officers pulled over Bullock and, during a

search incident to arrest, found $500 on his person,

mostly in $20 denominations. Upon investigation,

Greenlee discovered that Bullock was unemployed.

Greenlee testified that based on his training and experience, he believed the cash found on Bullock was from

drug sales even though no drugs were found. “In forming

his suspicions, [Greenlee] was entitled to assess the

circumstances and the defendant[’s] behavior in light of

his experience as a police officer and his knowledge of

drug courier activity.” United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275,

1280 (7th Cir. 1996). Although a wad of cash is not itself

suspicious, it becomes suspicious when found in the

“hands of a person who the police have good reason to

believe just received it in exchange for a delivery of

illegal drugs[.]” United States v. Cervantes, 19 F.3d 1151,

1153 (7th Cir. 1994).
16 No. 10-2238

Even though Greenlee did not observe drug-dealing

activity taking place at the residence, Bullock’s

suspicious activity upon leaving the residence on two

occasions, including the discovery of a relatively large

sum of money on Bullock, corroborated the anonymous

caller’s tip of drug-dealing activity. In fact, it was

Bullock’s association with the Euclid Street residence

that led to the search warrant. At the time of the stop,

officers had reasonable suspicion that Bullock was and

had been engaged in criminal activity and could detain

him for a brief period upon further investigation. See, e.g.,

United States v. Vega, 72 F.3d 507, 515 (7th Cir. 1995)

(finding reasonable suspicion where officers knew that

500 kilograms of cocaine was in garage, and they

observed defendant enter the garage, stay for ten

minutes and drive out); United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d

1193, 1199 (7th Cir. 1991) (reasonable suspicion existed

where agents received tip from reliable informant that

defendant was major heroin dealer, defendant’s name

came up in other drug investigations, and police

observed defendant driving evasively, engaging in brief

and furtive meetings, scurrying in and out of restaurants

known to be frequented by drug dealers, and carrying

a plastic bag used in the drug trade); see also United

States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (7th Cir. 1990)

(finding higher standard of probable cause met where

officers observed known drug dealer make and receive

phone calls and a message on his pager before meeting

with defendant for about 30 seconds, during which time

they got inside defendant’s car and passed a tote bag

back and forth).
No. 10-2238 17

In fact, a good argument could have been asserted that the 1

officers had probable cause to arrest Bullock for drug distribu-

(continued...)

Bullock contends that for officers to detain him

pursuant to Terry there must be “a basis for believing

that the person is engaging (present tense) in criminal

activity or is about to be engaged (future tense) in criminal

activity.” Reply Br. 3. However, officers can stop and

detain a suspect for reasonable suspicion that the

suspect has engaged in a completed felony. United States

v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (“[I]f police have a

reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable

facts, that a person they encounter was involved in . . . a

completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to

investigate that suspicion.”); Booker, 579 F.3d at 838-39

(reasonable suspicion existed to stop and detain

defendant who was suspected of having committed

battery).

While it is true that during the stop and pat-down

officers did not find evidence of ongoing criminal activity,

Wilhelm told them that she had marijuana in her

house in the dining room, providing further reasonable

suspicion to detain Bullock during the search. Bullock

had just left the residence and had been there on at

least three prior occasions. The officers could reasonably

suspect that he was aware of the marijuana. The officers

therefore had this information, along with their reasonable suspicion that Bullock was a drug dealer and

had sold drugs on previous occasions upon leaving the

residence.1
18 No. 10-2238

(...continued) 1

tion even before the stop based on the same information

officers used to obtain the search warrant for the residence.

Even though officers ultimately arrested Bullock for visiting

a common nuisance, not drug distribution, their “subjective

reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense

as to which the known facts provide probable cause.” Devenpeck

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-56 (2004); see also United States

v. Tinnie, No. 09-4082, 2011 WL 135715, at *3 (7th Cir. Jan. 18,

2011) (stating that when judging the constitutionality of a

search or seizure, “we are not limited to what the stopping

officer says or to evidence of his subjective rationale”) (citation

omitted). Further, when Wilhelm admitted during the traffic

stop that she had marijuana in her dining room, the police may

have had probable cause to arrest Bullock for the common

nuisance violation. We do not address these issues though

because the government did not argue that there was probable

cause to justify the pre-search detention, and so, it has forfeited that argument.

We acknowledge that unlike in this case, the police in

Hensley had been unable to locate the suspect. 469 U.S.

at 229. But that difference does not lessen the government’s strong interest in detaining Bullock to prevent

flight while they conducted their search. Further, Bullock’s

suspected drug-dealing activity was not completed in

the sense that he was engaging in ongoing criminal behavior that posed an ongoing threat to the public.

The next question is whether the degree of intrusion

was reasonably related to the known facts. “The reasonableness of the stop may depend, in part, on the extent of

the intrusion.” United States v. Ienco, 182 F.3d 517, 523 (7th
No. 10-2238 19

Cir. 1999). A Terry investigative stop is “a brief detention

which gives officers a chance to verify (or dispel) wellfounded suspicions that a person has been, is, or is about

to be engaged in criminal activity.” Vega, 72 F.3d at 515

(quotation omitted). “For an investigative stop based on

reasonable suspicion to pass constitutional muster, the

investigation following it must be reasonably related

in scope and duration to the circumstances that justified

the stop in the first instance so that it is a minimal

intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests.” United States v. Robinson, 30 F.3d 774, 784 (7th Cir.

1994) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 657, 685-86

(1985)). We use a sliding-scale approach when addressing

the reasonableness of an investigatory stop. Tilmon, 19

F.3d at 1226. “[S]tops too intrusive to be justified by

suspicion under Terry, but short of custodial arrest, are

reasonable when the degree of suspicion is adequate

in light of the degree and the duration of restraint.”

Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1198. A Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion can ripen into a de facto arrest that must

be based on probable cause if it continues too long or

becomes unreasonably intrusive. Robinson, 30 F.3d at 784.

The “detention must be temporary and last no longer

than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). There is no rigid

time limit placed on Terry stops; “common sense and

ordinary human experience must govern over rigid

criteria.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685. When determining the

reasonableness of the length of detention, the court

should consider the law enforcement purposes to be

served by the stop, the time reasonably needed to effectu-
20 No. 10-2238

ate those purposes, and whether the police diligently

pursued their investigation. Id. at 685-87.

Before being taken to the police station, Bullock was

detained for thirty to forty minutes. The police diligently

pursued their investigation in executing the search warrant. Bullock was taken to the residence ten to twenty

minutes after the stop and when he arrived, the search

was underway. When the search was complete, officers

transported Bullock to the station. Nothing in the

record suggests that the officers unnecessarily prolonged the search or acted less than diligently. Bullock’s

detention while officers investigated his suspected

criminal activity was reasonable and justified under the

circumstances. See, e.g., Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687 (twentyminute delay waiting for DEA agent to arrive and investigate was not unreasonable); United States v. Adamson,

441 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2006) (twenty-five minute

delay reasonable to investigate whether defendant was

taking part in drug activity in hotel room given number

of subjects and their reluctance to reveal their names

and why they were at motel); Robinson, 30 F.3d at 784

(twenty-minute detention reasonable while officers questioned suspects about their identities and activities,

contacted other officers to inform them of the encounter,

and made a number of calls to verify co-defendant’s

identity); Vega, 72 F.3d at 515-16 (sixty-two minute delay

was reasonable given that defendant initially consented

to search of garage but then changed his mind and drugsniffing dog was called to examine the defendant’s car);

cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983) (ninetyminute detention of luggage while police arranged
No. 10-2238 21

for dog sniff was unreasonable where police did not

diligently pursue investigation); Ienco, 182 F.3d at 525

(thirty-minute detention in locked squad car was too

long where reasonable suspicion was weak and suspects

were not dangerous).

Whether Bullock’s seizure amounted to a de facto arrest

when he was handcuffed, placed in the squad car, and

transported to the residence is a closer question. Admittedly, the facts here approach the outer boundaries of a

permissible Terry stop. “Subtle, and perhaps tenuous,

distinctions exist between a Terry stop, a Terry stop

rapidly evolving into an arrest and a de facto arrest.”

Tilmon, 19 F.3d at 1224. Police restraint may become

so intrusive that, while not technically an “arrest,” it

becomes “tantamount” to an arrest requiring probable

cause. Id. (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-

16 (1979)). “Given the ‘endless variations in the facts

and circumstances,’ there is no ‘litmus-paper test for

determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an

investigative stop’ and becomes an arrest.” Id. (quoting

Royer, 460 U.S. at 506). The question is whether the

officer’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and whether the surrounding circumstances

gave rise to a justifiable fear for personal safety on the

part of the officer. Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 824 (7th

Cir. 2008).

We have previously found that using handcuffs, placing

suspects in police cars, drawing weapons, and other

measures of force more traditionally associated with

arrests may be proper during an investigatory deten-
22 No. 10-2238

tion, depending on the circumstances. Tilmon, 19 F.3d at

1224-25, 1228; see also United States v. Shoals, 478 F.3d

850, 853 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that police officers do not

convert Terry stop into full custodial arrest by drawing

their weapons or handcuffing the subject, particularly

where the situation is inherently dangerous); Chaidez,

919 F.2d at 1198-99 (detention did not turn into arrest

even though agents drew guns, took car keys, gave

Miranda warnings, took one defendant to police van to

sign consent-to-search form, and detained defendants

for ten to fifteen minutes during search of house; the

intrusion was less than that involved in an arrest).

Given that officers were conducting a search for drugs,

it was reasonable to place Bullock in handcuffs and in

the squad car for their safety while they pursued their

investigation. Even though officers patted down Bullock

and did not discover any weapons, the officers could take

precautions against potentially violent behavior. Drug

crimes are associated with dangerous and violent

behavior and warrant a higher degree of precaution.

United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 508 (7th Cir. 2005)

(“Drug arrests can warrant intrusive tactics because of

their inherent danger.”). Officers could reasonably believe

that Bullock was potentially dangerous and a flight

risk because of his awareness of the search warrant,

his association with the residence, and the officers’ reasonable suspicion that he was involved in narcotics

distribution. His detention in the squad car was therefore reasonable.

This is not a case where officers attempted to exploit

the situation by asking Bullock questions or requesting
No. 10-2238 23

to search his belongings. Cf. Royer, 460 U.S. at 504-05

(holding legitimate law enforcement purposes which

justified detention in the first instance were not

furthered by removing suspect to small interrogationtype room in an apparent effort to obtain his consent to

search his luggage). Rather, the restraints were used to

meet the officers’ legitimate interest in safety and

security while briefly investigating suspected drug activity.

Under the circumstances, Bullock’s short transport

back to the residence was also proper. Bullock had just

left the residence and was ten to fifteen blocks away at

the time of the traffic stop. It was logical to take him

back to the residence where other officers were performing a search that could implicate him in criminal

activity. See, e.g., United States v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940, 950

(7th Cir. 2002) (transportation from airport tarmac to

international terminal did not transform stop for

suspected drug activity into arrest where it was of short

duration and necessary to confirm the officer’s suspicion

given that drug-testing equipment was at the customs

office); Vega, 72 F.3d at 515-16 (holding that defendant’s

stop was “not tantamount to an arrest” even though “the

officers drew their weapons, asked [defendant] to accompany them [back to the crime scene] in one of their

cars,” and kept him in “the officer’s vehicle for a little

over an hour” where officers had reasonable suspicion

that the defendant was involved in massive cocaine

importation conspiracy). In fact, returning Bullock to the

private residence he just left was less intrusive than

continuing to detain him roadside in public view. The

manner of seizure in this case was reasonable in light

of the circumstances.
24 No. 10-2238

As previously stated in footnote 1, the government chose not 2

to assert viable arguments that the police had probable cause

to arrest Bullock for drug distribution and visiting a common nuisance before they detained him.

Even assuming the manner of seizure was overly intrusive, the length of Bullock’s detention was reasonable

and the officers would have inevitably arrested him

after the residence search. As further discussed below,

once officers searched the house, they had probable cause

to arrest Bullock for visiting a common nuisance, at

which point they could take Bullock to the station and

search him. He would have been arrested and searched 2

even if merely detained at the traffic stop without restraints.

In United States v. Swift, 220 F.3d 502, 504 (7th Cir. 2000),

officers stopped the defendants in their vehicle and

seized them, having reasonable suspicion to believe they

just committed bank robbery. The officers contacted

Captain Sherbun who said the names of the suspects

“rang a bell” and believed they were involved in past

robberies that were carried out in a similar pattern. Id. at

504-05. Sherbun directed the officers to take the

defendants to the station where police confiscated a

pager that later led to evidence linking the defendants to

the robbery. Id. at 505. Shortly after the defendants were

taken to the station, Sherbun arrived at the scene of the

stop, looked inside the vehicle, and discovered items

connecting the defendants to the crime. Id.

We stated in Swift that when the defendants were taken

to the station they were under arrest, arguably without
No. 10-2238 25

probable cause. Id. at 508. The information the officers

had, though, provided a sufficient basis to continue

detaining the defendants until Sherbun showed up at the

scene of the stop. Probable cause was established once

Sherbun saw the incriminating evidence in the vehicle.

Id. We noted that at the time the defendants were taken

to the station, officers were continuing to investigate

the crime and if the defendants had been held at the

scene, they would have been lawfully detained for thirtytwo minutes under an investigatory stop. Id. at 509.

We reasoned that in some situations, “maintaining the

status quo while obtaining more information . . . might

be the most reasonable action to take.” Id. We determined that if the defendants had been detained at the

scene, the police would have inevitably seized the

pager. Therefore, “[t]he pager and the evidence to which

it led [were] not fruit of the poisonous tree” and should

not have been suppressed. Id. at 510; see also United States

v. Simms, 626 F.3d 966, 971 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that

even if the police did not have probable cause to

search defendant’s car, defendant was about to

be arrested and jailed indefinitely, his car would

have eventually been impounded by the police and

subject to an inventory search, so the discovery of the

gun therein was inevitable).

We find the reasoning in Swift instructive here. Officers

could have detained Bullock at the scene of the traffic

stop to maintain the status quo while they continued

their brief investigation. They had the search warrant

in hand and within about ten minutes of the stop, the
26 No. 10-2238

search was underway. The length of Bullock’s detention

was reasonable and the officers acted diligently. If

Bullock had been detained at the scene without

restraints, instead of placed in the squad car and taken

to the residence, officers would still have found the

marijuana and evidence of drug-dealing activity, thereby

providing (if not bolstering) probable cause to arrest

Bullock. Once arrested, a search of his person would

have revealed the crack.

Accordingly, Bullock’s detention was reasonable

under Terry; officers acted diligently in searching the

residence to investigate their well-founded suspicions

of his criminal activity. 

2. Detention during Execution of Warrant under

Summers

For many of the same reasons outlined above,

Bullock’s detention was also justified under Michigan

v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981). The Court in Summers

extended Terry beyond the “momentary, on-the-street

detention” to the detainment of a resident or occupant

who is on the premises while a search pursuant to a

warrant is conducted. Summers, 452 U.S. at 700-05. A

detention under Summers is analogous in certain respects

to a Terry stop. See United States v. Burns, 37 F.3d 276,

281 (7th Cir. 1995) (“While detention during the execution of a search warrant is not a traditional Terry stop, it

is sufficiently analogous for us to conclude that, in the

usual case, Miranda warnings are not required.”).
No. 10-2238 27

The Court in Summers held that officers executing a

search warrant for contraband have “the limited

authority to detain the occupants of the premises while

a proper search is conducted.” Summers, 452 U.S. at 705.

The detention of an occupant is warranted “because

the character of the additional intrusion caused by detention is slight and because the justifications for detention

are substantial.” Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005)

(citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 701-05) (observing that

an “officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is

categorical”). The Court indicated three legitimate law

enforcement justifications for detention during execution of a search warrant: (1) to prevent flight in the

event incriminating evidence is discovered; (2) to

minimize the risk of harm to the officers; and (3) to facilitate the orderly completion of the search. Summers, 452

U.S. at 702-03.

In Summers, police officers were about to execute a

warrant to search a house for narcotics when they encountered the defendant descending the front steps. Id. at

693. The officers detained the defendant, who was the

resident of the premises, during the search. The Court

found that defendant’s detention in his home was “surely

less intrusive than the search itself[,]” because it “could

add only minimally to the public stigma associated

with the search . . . and would involve neither the inconvenience nor the indignity associated with a compelled

visit to the police station.” Id. at 701-02. The Court

further reasoned that once “[a] judicial officer has determined that police have probable cause to believe that

someone in the home is committing a crime[,]” . . . “[t]he
28 No. 10-2238

connection of an occupant to that home gives the

police officer an easily identifiable and certain basis for

determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifies

a detention of that occupant.” Id. at 703-04.

We have extended the rationale of Summers to visitors

of a home. See United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1239 (7th

Cir. 1990) (reasoning that defendants’ connection as

visitors “to the condominium gave the officers ‘an easily

identifiable and certain basis’ ” for detaining them during

the search) (quoting Summers, 452 U.S. at 703-04); see

also United States v. Jennings, 544 F.3d 815, 818-19 (7th

Cir. 2008) (relying on Summers to find lawful the

brief detainment of defendant who had entered security

perimeter surrounding targeted apartment where

narcotics search was underway). The issue here is

whether the reasoning in Summers should be extended

to an individual who has left the residence before execution of the search warrant, is pulled over a few blocks

away, and is detained during the search. Under

the particular facts of this case, we find that it should.

Bullock’s detention was reasonable given his suspected

criminal activity in connection with the residence, his

risk of flight, and the potential danger he posed to

officers if not detained. He was detained for thirty or

forty minutes at a residence he had just left and had

visited on multiple occasions; the officers’ interests in

detaining him during the search were not outweighed

by this rather limited intrusion on his freedom.

Other circuits have extended Summers in similar circumstances. In United States v. Cochran, 939 F.2d 337, 338
No. 10-2238 29

(6th Cir. 1991), police officers went to the defendant’s

residence to execute a search warrant and observed the

defendant leaving the premises. Id. Officers did not

want to forcibly enter the premises knowing that there

was a guard dog inside. Id. Accordingly, the officers

stopped the defendant shortly after he exited the

premises and requested assistance in entering the

house. Id. The court, relying on Summers, found that his

detention was reasonable. Id. at 339. The court explained

that “Summers does not impose upon police a duty

based on geographic proximity (i.e., defendant must be

detained while still on his premises); rather, the focus is

upon police performance, that is, whether the police

detained defendant as soon as practicable after departing from his residence.” Id.

The Fifth Circuit similarly extended Summers. In

United States v. Cavazos, 288 F.3d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 2002),

officers were conducting surveillance of a residence in

preparation of executing a search warrant. The defendant

and two others left the residence in a truck, pulled up

closely to the officers’ vehicle and peered inside. Id. The

truck drove away and the officers followed. Id. The

truck then made a U-turn, approached the officers, and

crossed over into the officers’ lane, creating a standoff.

Id. Both vehicles stopped, and the officers exited their

vehicle with guns drawn. Id. The officers took defendant back to the residence and detained him

during the search. Id.

The court in Cavazos found the officers’ actions lawful

under Summers. Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711. The defendant’s
30 No. 10-2238

connection to the residence gave officers an “ ‘easily

identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity justifie[d] a detention of that

occupant.’ ” Cavazos, 288 F.3d at 711 (quoting Summers,

452 U.S. at 703-04). The officers also had reason to

believe that he was performing some type of countersurveillance when he drove the truck toward them in

a threatening manner. Id. “This conduct warranted the

belief that [the defendant] would have fled or alerted

the other occupants of the residence about the agents

nearby if he were released immediately after the stop

and frisk.” Id. The court noted that while “[t]he

proximity between an occupant of a residence and the

residence itself may be relevant in deciding whether to

apply Summers, . . . it is by no means controlling.” Id. at 712.

Other circuits have declined to extend Summers to a

resident or occupant who has left the residence to be

searched. In United States v. Sherrill, 27 F.3d 344, 345 (8th

Cir. 1994), officers obtained a search warrant based on

reliable information that defendant was dealing drugs

from his residence. Id. Before execution of the warrant,

the defendant left the premises and officers stopped him

a block away, informed him that they had the warrant,

and detained him during the search. Id. Officers handcuffed him, read him his rights, and took him back to the

residence. Id. at 345-46. The court found that Summers did

not apply because the defendant had already left the

premises, so “the intrusiveness of the officers’ stop and

detention on the street was much greater.” Id. at 346.

Further, although the defendant helped the officers

conduct the search, when they stopped defendant, they
No. 10-2238 31

did not have any interest in preventing flight or minimizing the search’s risk because the defendant had left

the area and was unaware of the warrant. Id.

In United States v. Edwards, 103 F.3d 90, 91 (10th Cir.

1996), police prepared to execute a search warrant of a

suspected “drug house.” The defendant, an ex-convict in

a drug rehabilitation program, was a frequent visitor

of the house. Before the search, police observed the defendant leave the house. They pulled him over,

suspecting that the vehicle contained drugs and that

he might be armed and dangerous. Id. The defendant

was detained street-side for forty-five minutes, during

which time officers drew their guns and handcuffed

him. Id. The officers did not find contraband or drugs

on him or in the vehicle, but he did have keys to the

house. Id. at 91-92. The forty-five minute detention, the

court found, was unreasonable because by the conclusion of the search of the house, the officers no longer

possessed the “reasonable suspicion” that initially

justified the stop. Id. at 93. The court also declined to

extend Summers because prior to the stop the defendant

was unaware that a warrant was being executed so he

had no reason to flee. Id. at 94. Further, the defendant

did not pose a risk of harm to the officers and his detention played no part in facilitating the orderly completion of the search. Id.

Unlike in Sherrill and Edwards, the particular facts of this

case warrant extension of Summers. The officers had

probable cause to pull Wilhelm over for driving on a

suspended license. Although they pulled her over ten to
32 No. 10-2238

fifteen blocks from the residence, Greenlee testified that

he had to radio uniformed officers to make the stop and

there is nothing to suggest that the vehicle was not

pulled over as soon as practicable. During the stop,

officers reasonably informed Wilhelm of the search warrant, at which point Bullock became aware of the warrant. Once aware of the warrant, he became a flight risk

and a potential risk to the officers’ safety in executing

the warrant given his suspected illegal association with

the residence. See Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 (recognizing

the execution of a warrant to search for drugs “may

give rise to sudden violence or frantic efforts to

conceal or destroy evidence”).

Bullock’s detention was not unreasonably prolonged.

He was at the traffic stop scene for ten to twenty minutes

before he was taken to the residence and by the time

he returned to the residence, the search was underway. See, e.g., Muehler, 544 U.S. at 100 (finding two- to

three-hour detainment of occupant in handcuffs reasonable while police searched premises because such

restraints did not outweigh government’s continuing

safety interests). Officers did not exploit the detention by

trying to obtain additional evidence from Bullock during

execution of the search warrant. See Summers, 452 U.S. at

701 (stating that detaining an occupant during execution

of a search warrant is “not likely to be exploited by the

officer or unduly prolonged in order to gain more information, because the information the officers seek

normally will be obtained through the search and not

through the detention”); see also Pace, 898 F.2d at 1239

(finding detention of visitors in home during execution
No. 10-2238 33

As previously noted, the government confined its justification 3

for the arrest to the common nuisance charge about which

Bullock complains. What both parties apparently fail to recognize is that under our Supreme Court’s holding in Devenpeck

(continued...)

of search warrant reasonable in part because the police

did not exploit the detentions to obtain information

or search them except for performing a pat-down).

Further, the use of handcuffs was reasonable. “Inherent

in Summers’ authorization to detain an occupant of the

place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable

force to effectuate the detention.” Muehler, 544 U.S. at

98-99. While a roadside detention followed by handcuffs and placement in a squad car certainly carries

more stigma than a detention in one’s home, the facts

in this case warranted the additional intrusions for the

limited time to execute the search warrant.

B. Probable Cause to Arrest

After execution of the search warrant, officers arrested

Bullock for visiting a common nuisance under Indiana

Code § 35-48-4-13(a). Bullock contends that officers did

not have probable cause to arrest him for this crime

because there was nothing to indicate he was aware of

the marijuana in the dining room or that drugs had been

used at the residence on multiple occasions. The government responds that there was probable cause to

arrest Bullock for visiting a common nuisance.3
34 No. 10-2238

(...continued) 3

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153-56 (2004), the Fourth Amendment

reasonableness inquiry is not driven by the police’s subjective reasons for arresting an individual.

Although officers stated that they arrested Bullock for

visiting a common nuisance, they had probable cause to arrest

him for drug distribution, possibly before, but certainly after,

execution of the search warrant. “[A]n arrest is reasonable

under the Fourth Amendment so long as there is probable

cause to believe that some criminal offense has been or is

being committed, even if it is not the crime with which the

officers initially charge the suspect.” Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d

819, 837 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 153-56).

In Devenpeck, the Supreme Court rejected “[t]he rule that the

offense establishing probable cause must be ‘closely related’ to,

and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by

the arresting officer at the time of arrest.” 543 U.S. at 153

(“[T]he fact that the officer does not have the state of mind

which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the

legal justification for the officer’s action does not invalidate

the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”) (citations omitted). “[T]he issue

is whether a reasonable officer, with the same information

known . . . at the time, would have had probable cause to

arrest [the defendant] for any offense.” Williams v. Rodriquez,

509 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added). But we

will limit our analysis to the common nuisance charge because the government chose to defend the arrest on that basis.

A determination of probable cause is based on probabilities and “does not require evidence sufficient to

support a conviction, nor even evidence demonstrating

that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed
No. 10-2238 35

a crime.” Funches, 327 F.3d at 586 (quoting United States

v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 2001)). As such,

“standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or

by a preponderance of the evidence, useful in formal

trials, have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983). To find probable

cause, there need only be a probability or a substantial

chance that criminal activity exists. Purvis v. Oest, 614

F.3d 713, 722-23 (7th Cir. 2010).

Probable cause is a “commonsense, nontechnical conception that deal[s] with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and

prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Ornelas v. United

States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (quotations omitted). In

determining whether suspicious circumstances rise to

the level of probable cause, officers are entitled to draw

reasonable inferences based on their training and experience. Funches, 327 F.3d at 586.

“A police officer’s probable cause determination depends

on the elements of the applicable criminal statute.” Stokes

v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617, 622

(7th Cir. 2010). After being detained at the residence,

officers arrested Bullock for violating Indiana’s common

nuisance statute, which makes it a Class B misdemeanor

for any person to “knowingly or intentionally visit[ ] a

building, structure, vehicle, or other place that is used

by any person to unlawfully use a controlled substance.”

Ind. Code § 35-48-4-13(a). To convict a person of this

offense, the state must prove that the defendant knew

the residence was used for the unlawful use of con-
36 No. 10-2238

trolled substances. Bass v. State, 517 N.E.2d 1238, 1239-40

(Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam). The state must also

prove that the residence has been used for the unlawful use

of controlled substances on more than one occasion. Id.

Indiana courts have found insufficient evidence to

convict a defendant of visiting a common nuisance

where drugs were not in plain view of the defendant. See

id. (holding that the state did not introduce sufficient

evidence to establish defendants knew residence was

used for unlawful use of controlled substances because

there was nothing to show that drugs were visible from

defendants’ viewpoint even though officers found drug

paraphernalia—a bong with residue containing hashish

and marijuana—on table next to where they were sitting); see also Braster v. State, 596 N.E.2d 278, 279 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1992) (stating that court “cannot assume from the

evidence presented at trial that defendant knew that a

controlled substance was being used at the residence”;

there was no evidence that paraphernalia was found in

kitchen where defendant was present or within his

plain view).

Conversely, where drugs are in plain view of the defendant, courts have found sufficient evidence to show that

the defendant had knowledge of drug use. Hale v. State,

785 N.E.2d 641, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“We cannot

say that [defendant], who was sitting within plain view

of the shoebox full of marijuana did not have knowledge that [the] residence was being used for the

unlawful use of a controlled substance.”); see also Zuniga v.

State, 815 N.E.2d 197, 200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (sufficient

evidence existed to show knowledge of drug use where
No. 10-2238 37

defendant stepped inside garage; detectives smelled

burnt marijuana in there; and detectives found smoking

devices, rolling papers, a rolling machine, residue of

marijuana and blunt cigars in garage).

As noted, the statute also requires a showing of drug

use on more than one occasion. Hale, 785 N.E.2d at 643

(quoting Bass v. State, 512 N.E.2d 460, 464 (Ind. Ct. App.

1987)). “[T]he term ‘common nuisance’ as used within

the statute . . . requires proof of a continuous or recurrent

violation.” Id. The court in Traylor v. State, 817 N.E.2d

611, 620 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), held that the residence

defendant visited was a “common nuisance” where

officers found a briefcase containing baggies of methamphetamine and a glass pipe used for the consumption of

methamphetamine, and found glass pipes, some with

burnt residue, in other parts of the residence. There was

also evidence that the defendant was producing, preparing, and processing methamphetamine within the

residence. The court held that “it was reasonable for the

jury to infer from the evidence . . . that the . . . . residence

was used more than once for the consumption of methamphetamine.” Id.

The above cases discuss what evidence is needed to

support a conviction for visiting a common nuisance. As

stated, the government need only show that officers had

probable cause to make an arrest, which requires only a

probability or a substantial chance that criminal activity

exists, not a showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Based on all the facts known to the officers at the time,

we conclude that they had probable cause to arrest
38 No. 10-2238

Bullock for visiting a common nuisance. On the day of

the search, officers found marijuana in a box in plain

view on the dining room table and a lighter next to the

marijuana, leading to the inference that it had been

smoked inside. Greenlee testified that “you could not

have walked through the house without seeing the

drugs there in plain view.” Bullock had just left the residence and had been inside on multiple occasions.

During the search, officers also found a large ball of

plastic baggies that contained a small amount of crack

cocaine and a scale in another location. Greenlee opined,

based on his experience and training, that the items

seized during the search were consistent with both drug

distribution and (more importantly, with respect to the

common nuisance charge) use. Bullock does not assert

that the search was invalid. The discovery of these items

corroborated the tipster’s information of drug activity

within the residence.

As the district court found, a common-sense view of

the everyday realities of life would lead officers to reasonably believe that Bullock was aware that drug use

had occurred inside the residence, and there was evidence that it occurred on more than one occasion.

While the officers could not have been certain that

Bullock was aware of the marijuana in the dining room

or the other evidence of drug activity found in the residence, they had probable cause to believe so based on

Bullock’s presence in the house that day and his prior

association with the residence that led officers to obtain a search warrant for the premises.
No. 10-2238 39

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the judgment of

the district court is AFFIRMED.

2-1-11