Ceauverworti Papers Numbe( 1
FOREWORD

Director and Professor of Combined Arms Warfare

Dr. Roger J. Spiller

John F. Morrison Professor of Military History

Dr. Donald R. Hickey

Instructor Team I

LTC Robert D. Ramsey III, Chief MAJ George J. Mordica II

LTC James R. McLean MAJ Gary D. Rhay

MAJ Bruce Alsup Dr. George W. Gawrych

MAJ Robert E. Connor Dr. Samuel J. Lewis

Dr. Michael D. Pearlman

Coordinating Instructor

MAJ Neil V. Lamont

Instructor Team II

LTC Richard L. Kiper, Chief MAJ Matthew S. Klimow

LTC Frank E. Galati MAJ George E. Knapp

MAJ Stephen D. Coats Dr. Robert F. Baumann

MAJ Kenneth R. Dombroski Dr. Gary J. Bjorge

Dr. Thomas M. Huber

Instructor Team III

Dr. William G. Robertson, Chief MAJ Scott R. McMeen

LTC Edward P. Shanahan MAJ Terry L. Siems

MAJ Thomas E. Christianson Dr. Jerold E. Brown

MAJ Christopher D. Clark Dr. Christopher R. Gabel

Dr. Jack J. Gifford

Historical Services Committee

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, Chief Donald L. Gilmore, Editor

Marilyn Edwards, Editor Carolyn D. Conway, Editorial Assistant

Robbin D. Kern, Editorial Assistant

Staff

SGT Weldon D. Manroe Sharon E. Torres

Orlene R. Parker

Most Americans associate U.S. military operations in Korea with the Korean War, 1950-53. This is understandable in that the

war, although limited in scope and objectives, was fought primarily with the weapons and tactics identified with conventional

warfare. The Korean War is also remembered for the civil-military crisis it precipitated between the president of the United States,

Harry Truman, and the commander of United Nations forces in Korea, General Douglas MacArthur. The Truman-MacArthur controversy is still capable of generating passionate discussion, even though the president, with the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, had little choice but to relieve the general of command if civilian control of the

military was to be secured.

Less known to most Americans is the extended period of low-intensity conflict that North Korea conducted against South Korea

in the mid to late 1960s. This period of hostilities had its dramatic moments, such as the seizure of the USS Pueblo, but for the

most part, the tactics consisted of propaganda, infiltration, assassination plots, and guerrilla warfare. Because the war in Vietnam

overshadowed these developments, the "unfinished war" in Korea has largely been ignored by military officers studying the nature

and demands of modern warfare. In this sense, the label "forgotten war," often applied to the conventional war of the early 1950s,

is much more applicable to the conflict on the peninsula from 1966 to 1969.

In Leavenworth Paper No. 19, Major Daniel P. Bolger, USA, has subjected the events and evolution of this more recent Korean

conflict to close analytical scrutiny. The results of his effort require careful study. He not only describes in detail the vast range of

military operations short of war that an adversary can employ against countries supported by the United States, but he also assesses

how allied forces can adapt to the unexpected and devise countermeasures that, if not completely effective, can at least disrupt the

designs of the adversary so he cannot obtain his primary objectives. Through the exemplary leadership of General Charles H.

Bonesteel III, Bolger also demonstrates the importance of personality in warfare and the essential need for officers to recognize the

dominance of political considerations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. In short, Bolger's study reinforces current doctrine,

which states emphatically that commanders and staff officers "must adopt courses of action which legally support those [political

considerations] even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox or outside what traditional doctrine had contemplated."

July 1991 LEONARD P. WISHART III

Lieutenant General, USA

Commandant

Leavenworth Papers are published by the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,

KS 66027-6900. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of

Defense or any element thereof. Leavenworth Papers are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing

Office, Washington, DC 20402.

Leavenworth Papers US ISSN 0195 3451

·

- I I · II

- · -I I

I I I I I , I - - I
eavewvworti Papers

Scenes from an Unfinished War:

Low-Intensity Conflict in

1966- 1969

by Major Daniel P. Bolger

Combat Studies Institute

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

Numw 19

Korea,

_ L· I I I -·I· L·

I , I .
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bolger, Daniel P., 1957-

Scenes from an unfinished war : low-intensity conflict in Korea,

1966-1969 / by Daniel P. Bolger.

p. cm. - (Leavenworth papers, ISSN 0195-3451 ; no. 19)

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Korean Demilitarized Zone (Korea) 2. Low-intensity conflicts

(Military science)-United States. I. Title. II. Series.

DS921.7.B64 1991

951.904'3-dc20 91-16086

CIP

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402

This publication, where noted, contains copyrighted materials reproduced by special permission, and

these may not be reproduced, in any manner, without the express permission of the copyright owners.

I--L·'--Il I- I'Lr -- · · I-- le I -  · I
Contents -

Illustrations .............................................................. v

Tables ............................................................. . vii

P reface ................................................................... ix

Introduction .............................................................. xi

Chapter

1. The Land of the Morning Calm ................................... 1

2. Concrete Actions ................................................. 33

3. A Continuous Nightmare ......................................... 61

4. Isolated Provocations ............................................. 89

5. What Went Right ................................................ 111

Appendix 1. The Second Korean ConflictA Chronology of Key Events .......................... 127

Appendix 2. U.S. Forces, Korea, Order of Battle, 1 January 1968 ...... 131

Appendix 3. Annex 1, Tactical Disposition of Korean People's Army

Maneuver Forces, 1 January 1968 ..................... 133

Annex 2, Tactical Disposition of U.S. Eighth Army

Maneuver Forces, 1 January 1968 ..................... 135

Appendix 4. Significant U.S.-KPA Firefights, November

1966-December 1969 .................................. 137

N otes .................................................................... 141

G lossary ................................................................ 153

B ibliography ............................................................ 155

iii

Illustrations

Figures

1. United Nations Command-U.S. Forces, Korea-U.S. Eighth Army

operational chains of command ................................. 6

2. United States' objectives in Korea, 1966--69 ....................... 11

3. Korean People's Army and associated forces along the U.S.-held

segment of the DMZ, 1 January 1968 .......................... 16

4. DPRK campaign plan (new military line), announced

5- 12 October 1966 ............................................. 34

5. The spectrum of conflict in Korea, 1966-69 ................. ..... 43

6. UNC anti-infiltration dispositions (idealized example) .............. 48

7. U.S. maneuver battalion DMZ training and rotation plan .......... 54

8. The United States' military response to the seizure of the USS

Pueblo, January through March 1968 ......................... 72

9. American maneuver battalion deployment as of 30 April 1969

(typical after 21 M arch 1968) ................................... 81

10. U.S. combat forces deployed for Exercise Focus Retina,

M arch 1969 .................................................. 99

11. The United States' response to the downing of the

EC-121M , April 1969 .......................................... 106

12. DMZ incidents involving casualties to U.S. forces

(since 3 December 1969) ....................................... 125

Maps

1. Korea, 1966-69 ................................................. 19

2. The DMZ, U.S. sector, 1966-69 ..................................... 22

v

Tables

1. Balance of conventional military power in Korea,

November 1966 .................... ............................. 14

2. Strength of U.S. divisions in Korea, 1 January 1968 ................ 26

3. The Second Korean Conflict: A statistical summary, 1966-69 ...... 112

4. Republic of Korea population and gross national product,

1962- 72 ............................................... ....... 114

vii

Preface

When I was a young lieutenant, a battle-wise infantry officer named

Colonel Walter B. Clark told me about a war that most Americans, including

me, had never heard about. At the time, I listened to his stories with interest;

there were so many provocative ideas and useful lessons to be considered,

even for an inexperienced soldier. At one point in our discussions, I recall

saying to the colonel that some day, someone should tell the story of this

second Korean war.

This is my attempt to tell that story in a way that professional soldiers

might find useful. I make no pretense of providing the complete account of

the undeclared, unconventional struggle that gripped Korea between 1966

and 1969, although this effort may serve to refocus attention on a most

intriguing chapter in the annals of American and Korean arms. Accordingly,

this work is dedicated to Colonel Clark and all the other American and

Korean veterans of the Second Korean Conflict. I would like also to thank

Dr. Samuel Lewis, Dr. Lawrence A. Yates, Dr. Robert Berlin, Mr. Don

Gilmore, and the diligent CSI staff for their kind assistance in this project.

ix

Introduction

... this strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place,

at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.

- Omar N. Bradley

General of the Army,

May 1951

Can Americans fight a successful counterguerrilla war? Thirty years

ago, most American soldiers would have answered "yes." The more historically minded might have justified that assertion by pointing to decades

of U.S. Indian fighting, years in the Philippines battling Moros and Huks,

several Marine Corps "Banana Wars" in Latin America, and the successful

anti-Communist struggle in post-1945 Greece. "Any good soldier can handle

guerrillas," Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker told President

John F. Kennedy.' Kennedy and his brain trust decided to test Decker's

claim in a place called Vietnam.

America's leaders, however, failed in their confused, tragic confrontation

with insurgency in Southeast Asia-with plenty of blame to spare for all

involved. A consensus emerged, both in the armed forces and in the wider

body of interested citizenry: U.S. troops could not, would not, and should

not become involved in any situations variously termed as counterguerrilla,

cold war, counterinsurgency, stability, or (the current favorite) low-intensity

conflict (LIC).

This idea persists virtually unchallenged. Contemporary operations in

El Salvador, Panama, and the Philippines notwithstanding, few American

professional soldiers have much stomach for counterguerrilla fighting. In a

recent study, a high-level joint-service team concluded: "The United States

does not understand low-intensity conflict nor does it display the capability

to adequately defend against it."2 LIC is the "wrong war" for Americans

and Vietnam seemed the proof that brooked no argument.

Still, the argument needs to be pursued, as its very premise may be

based too much on one sad case. Accepting for the moment that Vietnam

was indeed largely an insurgency (a contentious matter in its own right),

one can still take issue with prevailing opinions. Does Vietnam prove that

Americans cannot conduct successful LIC?

xi
Before confronting this issue, it is critical to get definitions straight.

Low-intensity conflict is war, deadly as any, but different in that its adherents stress the achievement of political goals by insurgency, terrorism,

and provocation rather than traditional force-on-force military operations.

Small countries can risk such bold efforts, even against the great powers

and their allies, thanks to the paralyzing effects of the U.S.-USSR nuclear

stalemate.

Nuclear weaponry places a definite brake on the superpowers. No matter

how vital the interests involved, it is important for the superpowers to keep

confrontations localized and small in scale, lest the United States and Soviet

Union slip from confrontation into the maelstrom of high-intensity nuclear

war. For superpowers, severely limited means, rather than limited ends,

distinguish LIC from midintensity struggles. Means are now the only real

variable; wars of unlimited aims are no longer much of an option for nuclear

giants.

That explains why these shadow wars have found such favor among

minor states. In their seemingly endless jockeying for advantage under the

frustrating nuclear standoff, both superpowers have routinely backed their

enemy's enemies. This has only strengthened the hands of determined local

belligerents. A well-prosecuted guerrilla movement or terror campaign places

an involved great power on the horns of a dilemma: should the great power

increase its aims and risk nuclear war against the small power's sponsor

or increase its means and risk diversions from more important areas?

America's adversaries have a built-in edge in that the Soviet Union

and its allies espouse anti-American insurrection as a matter of basic philosophy. By Marxist lights, struggling against the capitalist United States

is inevitable, and so adherents of communism have sound theoretical and

practical foundations to support their fight. As America discovered in Africa,

Asia, and Latin America, Communist ideology, in both its Leninist and

Maoist strains, provides an especially potent blueprint for countries interested

in engaging and defeating the United States in a protracted struggle.

From the American perpective, LIC occurs when the U.S. military seeks

limited aims with a relatively modest number of available regular forces.

The "low" aspect of LIC refers directly to the degree of American commitment (certainly not to the level of violence or degree of enemy commitment). A few selected U.S. reserves may participate, but there is essentially

no mobilization. Even a partial mobilization, whether formal (as in the

Korean War) or informal (as in Vietnam), elevates the conflict to the midintensity realm, with all the resultant political hazards both at home and

abroad.

Given this comprehensive definition, LIC necessarily comprises more

than counterinsurgency. It entails almost any restrained use of U.S. military

force to advance its interests in the Third World, to include peacekeeping,

combating terrorism, and handling peacetime contingencies.3 Yet it is typical

of the rather muddled views on this subject that many experts employ the

terms "LIC" and "counterinsurgency" interchangeably. Whatever the Vietxii
nam experience suggests about U.S. abilities to battle insurgents, it offers

little insight into American capacities for peacekeeping, fighting terrorists,

or handling a diverse grab bag of "contingencies" (i.e., everything from

punitive bombings and rescue efforts to shows of force).

Even focusing on counterinsurgency, the historical record still does not

support the commonplace pessimism about recent U.S. military performance.

Vietnam was only one of several American counterguerrilla wars of the

1960s. U.S. operations in the Congo (1960-65), Thailand (1964-74), the

Dominican Republic (1965-66), and Bolivia (1966-67) proceeded and concluded differently than the Vietnam War. Some work has been done to resurrect interest in these unique small wars, but in general, they have been

forgotten in the continuing fascination with the much more massive, conventional, and unsuccessful Southeast Asian undertaking.

Perhaps the most interesting "other" LIC of the 1960s occurred in Korea.

There, an understrength, conventionally trained force of Americans, in company with their Republic of Korea (ROK) allies, fought and won a lowintensity war on the Asian mainland. There was nothing unusual about

the soldiers involved: the unusual thing proved to be the imaginative,

thoughtful ways in which they were used.

The Second Korean Conflict flared up in November 1966. By the time

it sputtered to an ill-defined end more than three years later, the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea had challenged the allies in every category of

low-intensity conflict and failed. One would think that this case might merit

a great deal of study-if only as a possible counterpoint to the usual litany

of lessons about Vietnam.

Yet to understand why the Second Korean Conflict has been so rarely

addressed, one would do well to return to Bradley's quotation. Only in this

case, one must give a new twist to Bradley. Korea in 1968-69 was again

the wrong war, but this time, it was wrong in a different way.

First, unlike the earlier war, the war in Korea in 1966-69 was not a

conventional, stand-up war. By standard American doctrine, it was all wrong.

The sporadic combat mainly devolved upon the ROK forces and population.

While American leaders made most of the key decisions and provided certain

absolutely critical combat forces and battlefield multipliers, the ROKs did

the overwhelming bulk of the work. Shrewd U.S. officers ensured that the

ROKs got the credit for decisions and plans, too. This was right and proper

for a LIC environment, but it did not make for much popular excitement in

the United States, especially compared with the concurrent American bigunit war in Vietnam.

Second, Korea was no more the preferred battlefield in the late 1960s

than it had been in 1951. Korea constituted an economy-of-force theater.

The "right place" was Southeast Asia. American commanders in Korea faced

the difficult prospect of defending their area without daring to engender a

second major Asian war. Only if the U.S. generals erred would they garner

any special notice. The more they succeeded, the less attention they received.

By the time it became evident that the Second Korean Conflict had been

xiii
won, it was equally obvious that the Vietnam War had been lost. Interest

focused there and has remained so ever since.

Thus, the Second Korean Conflict has drifted into obscurity, a curious

episode, a footnote to the Vietnam era. In light of the ongoing LIC debate,

this Korean experience deserves exhumation and examination. Because smart

U.S. commanders risked fighting the "wrong kind" of war in Korea from

1966-69, the situation did not boil up into the other wrong kind of war

everyone feared most-the dreaded second land war in Asia. Thus, the story

of the Second Korean Conflict is the story of a wrong war that turned out

right.

xiv

I I · _
The Land of the

Morning Calm

Weapons are tools of ill omen.

-Sun-tzu

Chinese military theorist,

ca. 350 B.C.

Background

The Korean Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953 suspended large-scale

conventional fighting in Korea after more than three years of bloody warfare. This instrument, "purely military in character" by its own verbiage,

sought to "insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed

forces in Korea until a final peaceful settlement [was] achieved."' The 1954

Geneva Conference ended without a political settlement on Korea. To date,

only the most tentative steps have been taken toward peaceful resolution of

the impasse.

During most of the decade after the armistice, both the North Korean

Communists and the Republic of Korea continued to press claims for reunification under their respective banners. Premier Kim Il-sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) presented many proposals for a

united peninsula, each predicated upon termination of the existing South

Korean government. President Syngman Rhee preferred to talk of "unification by marching northward." Each Korea rejected the other's plans.2 Due

to wartime damage and the moderating influence of their powerful Chinese

and American allies, neither the north nor the south attempted to take

serious steps toward implementing their reunification schemes.

This relatively stable situation began to change by the start of the

second postwar decade. For both Koreas, but especially for the militant

north, the mid-1960s represented a period of particular opportunities and

perils. A succession of interrelated events in the two states laid the foundation for the Second Korean Conflict.

In the DPRK, the departure of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army by

October 1958 gave Kim Il-sung a free hand to do things his way. Thus, he

completed the consolidation of his domestic authority in a series of discrete

1
2

purges in the upper echelons of his Korean Workers' Party (KWP). Kim

followed the Chinese model for his Chollima (Flying Horse) plan, a crash

program of collectivized agriculture and forced industrialization. His goal,

simply stated, was "the fortification of the entire country" as a base for

reunifying Korea by force.

But Kim could not do the job alone. He needed advanced Soviet

technology and advice to build a powerful industrial state, but he depended

on the Chinese for more immediate agricultural assistance. Reliance on

these two sources became especially difficult in light of the increasingly

heated disagreements between the two Communist giants. Like the rest of

the lesser Communist states, the DPRK felt pressured to take a side in the

ideological bickering between Nikita S. Khrushchev of the USSR and Mao

Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) of China.

Given North Korea's pivotal geographic position, recent role in the

struggle against the Americans, and economic requirements, Kim Il-sung

could not afford to alienate either of his mighty sponsors. Although he

attempted to chart a middle course, he failed. The Soviets suspended aid to

him in December 1962, charging that the DPRK had leaned too far toward

the Chinese. 3

While Kim Il-sung tried to build a mobilization base with the help of

squabbling allies, Syngman Rhee of the ROK dealt with his own challenges.

Aid from the United States and other United Nations countries allowed

Premier Kim Il-sung of the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea

I-I II

-I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-- · II , I I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
3

South Korea to rebuild rapidly. Its gross national product grew at an

annual rate of 5.5 percent during the mid-1950s. Industry led the way,

expanding at an astounding 14 percent yearly. The elderly Rhee proved

unable to cope with the social upheavals caused by this economic upsurge.

Charged with electoral corruption in April 1960, Rhee resigned in the face

of widespread civil disorder, popularized as the Student Revolution.

Following a brief, confused period of rule by fragmented opposition

factions, Major General Park Chung Hee assumed power through a coup

d'etat in May 1961. Park and his junta exercised supreme powers until

August 1963, when Park was elected president. Despite the political turnover, the ROK economy continued to burgeon, led by the industrial sector.4

What did the northern Communist leadership make of these developments? As far as can be told from available open sources, Kim Il-sung

drew three conclusions as early as December 1962. First, the ROK economy

and population were already twice as large as those of North Korea.

Obvious trend lines indicated that the disparity, especially in the economic

realm, would increase over time. Second, the Park government represented

a unique threat. Although nominally "civil" after the 1963 elections, Park

and his circle of military men could be expected to display strategic vision

far beyond that of the Rhee administration. Park's emphasis on accelerated

industrial growth underscored his commitment to military strength. In

league with the ROK's already expanding economic advantage over the

DPRK, Park's calculated catalysis of industry promised to furnish the

means for South Korea to conduct the march to the north so often

threatened by Rhee. Third, the economic boom in the south had spawned

serious dissent in the Republic of Korea. In 1960-61, the DPRK had been

unready to exploit the unsettled situation or take direct action.5 Because

the Soviet aid needed for conventional combat was suspended, Kim Il-sung

wondered if there was an opportunity for him to bring about reunification

through unconventional war.

Kim thought so. On 10 December 1962, he propounded a new "military

line" to the Fifth Plenum of the KWP's Central Committee. Kim's ideas

were somewhat original, but the tone was definitely Maoist. Because the

Soviet Union had temporarily cut Kim Il-sung adrift, this embrace of some

aspects of Chinese thought was not surprising. More to the point, Maoist

guerrilla concepts suited what Kim considered to be the "objective circumstances" on the Korean peninsula.

Kim advocated a politically aware "army of cadres" (revolutionary

agitators), the arming of his entire populace, completion of nationwide

military industrialization, and modernization of his conventional armed

forces. Rejecting his army's almost wholly conventional Soviet-style

doctrine, the DPRK premier directed an emphasis on irregular warfare

drawn from studies of his own operations against the Japanese during

World War II. Finally, he began to manipulate key party and military

appointments to favor his former guerrilla comrades, the Kapsan faction. 6
4

President Park Chung Hee of South

Korea

Qa

":

-

ca

Kim ordered immediate agitation-propaganda efforts to throw sand into

the gears of ROK progress while he created his new unconventional military

machine. He demanded fast action, but even so, he anticipated that it might

take until the completion of the current Seven Year Plan (1960-67) for the

DPRK to be fully ready for an unconventional campaign. 7

Events of 1965-66 caused Kim Il-sung to accelerate his timetable. ROK

diplomatic and military initiatives served notice that the south no longer

felt mortally threatened by its Communist northern neighbor. When President Park signed a treaty with Japan in 1965, the Republic of Korea

publicly entered the community of Asian states. This normalized relations

between the South Koreans and their former overlords, with Japan finally

recognizing an independent ROK. With this recognition came greatly

increased Japanese loans, investments, and trade-all fueling the already

humming ROK economic engine.

In the wake of this Japanese agreement, President Park moved to consolidate his country's position as an emerging Asian power. In June 1966,

he hosted the Asian Pacific Council (Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, and Laos) in Seoul. It seemed

like a "coming out party" for the ROK. Diplomatic recognition of South

Korea doubled during 1966.

·II ----- pl---·-*4· -·-9sllll··-a ·ILBIILIIL"sl
5

A month later, Park's government signed a Status of Forces Agreement

with the United States. For the first time, the two countries treated each

other as equals at the bargaining table. A United Nations Command (UNC)

headquarters team studied ways to reflect this new relationship in the U.S.-

dominated military chain of command in Korea.8

These diplomatic achievements signaled that Park's improvements were

already bearing valuable fruit. The DPRK could not wait until 1967 to act.

Fortunately for the North Koreans, the second major development of those

years provided what looked like an opening for a serious effort to destabilize

the south. In March 1965, the United States deployed ground forces into

South Vietnam, thereby joining that forlorn war. By September of that same

year, ROK Army units had joined their American allies in Vietnam. Park

dispatched some 46,000 ROK soldiers and marines, with the final contingent

under way on 15 October 1966. 9 The Korean forces provided substantial

combat power to the allied endeavors in Southeast Asia.

From Kim Il-sung's perspective, however, this situation offered the

chance he needed. While he knew that the ROK forces would certainly

benefit from combat experience and issues of new American weaponry, he

also recognized an important military point: for the first time since 1953,

the Republic of Korea had divided its military effort. The fact that the

United States had at last turned its sights to another Asian country also

might benefit the DPRK.1 0 Even as the last few men of the ROK 9th

"White Horse" Infantry Division left for Vietnam, Kim Il-sung decided to

act. To the south, the Americans and their Korean allies maintained their

lonely, boring vigil. The Second Korean Conflict was about to begin.

Organization

To appreciate the American-ROK performance in the fighting of

1966-69, one must begin with an understanding of the overall military

organizational structure. "Convoluted" might be the kindest term describing

the chain of command in Korea. There were actually two major chains,

one for combined U.S.-ROK operations and the other primarily concerned

with U.S. joint-service efforts (see figure 1).

The United Nations Command, a combined headquarters, existed as a

legacy of the Korean War. In accordance with the July 1950 Security

Council decision, the United States acted as the executive power for United

Nations military interests in Korea. UNC operated directly under the supervision of the U.S. secretary of defense and the coordination of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Although he did not hold precisely the same status

as a unified commander in chief like that of U.S. Pacific Command or U.S.

European Command, Commander in Chief, UNC (CINCUNC), enjoyed direct

access to the national command authorities through the JCS.

By 1966, the UNC seemed to be a symbolic entity. The U.S. troops in

country, an oversized company from Thailand, and a few ceremonial squads

comprised the only significant remnants of the multinational UN forces of
6

President of the United States

Secretary of Defense

Joint Chiefs of Staff'

-- a

U.S. Pacific Command

U.S. Ar

I U.S. Forces, Korea 2

I

United Nations Command2

m 0~~~~~~~

my, Pacific | · I |Military Armistice Commission

? ~I I I _____ .-:- -

I ROK Armed Forces 1i

U.S. Eighth Army 2

I Corps (Group)-U.S.-ROK

U.S. Air Forces, Korea

r

-l U.S. Naval Forces, Korea I

*1 ROK Army

ROK First Army

ROK Second Army

Logistical Base Command

ROK Air Force

· J ROK Navy

Source: Finley, The US Military Experience in Korea, 136-37.

LEGEND

Command

---.- I Operational control during wartime

·* · · · Administrative channel (command less operational control)

'The JCS by statute "assist the secretary" in his direction of U.S. armed forces. Although

designated as a channel for communications only, the JCS in fact have often functioned, particularly

in the 1960s, as an executive agent for the secretary of defense.

2These positions were held concurrently by the same officer, General Charles H. Bonesteel IIl.

Figure 1. United Nations Command-U.S. Forces, Korea-U.S. Eighth Army operational chains of

command (as of 1 November 1968 but representative of the 1968-69 period)

1950-53, although in theory, the other participants would come back if

war broke out again. The principal UN military activity in Korea involved

participation in the interminable series of fruitless armistice meetings at

Panmunjom.

The UNC mantle, however, gave its holder one important power. Since

no formal peace treaty superseded the battlefield truce of 1953, UNC

retained operational control over the ROK military, which had been granted

by Syngman Rhee back in July 1950.11 Thus, the American general who

bore the title of CINCUNC could direct the tactical employment of ROK

forces, even in the absence of overt, large-scale hostilities.

This degree of American authority over foreign forces contrasted

markedly with the provisions in other theaters under U.S. command. In

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the American serving as Supreme

Allied Commander, Europe, commanded the vast bulk of his multinational

I -

IL. m .I_

I I - imlmlI ---- - I

a I aI 

I

I

I

I

I

6

*

I *

0 *

mm m m m m
7

fighting forces only in wartime-and then only if those units' parent

countries chose to participate. In Southeast Asia, the Commander, U.S.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, exercised no formal powers over

the South Vietnamese armed forces. 12 While U.S. commanders in Europe

and Vietnam had access to far more powerful forces than the Commander

in Chief, UNC, the American general in Korea actually directed his

combined organization.

The joint-service United States Forces, Korea (USFK) plugged into the

second major chain of command in the theater. USFK functioned as a subordinate unified command under the U.S. Pacific Command. The USFK

headquarters commanded all American land (U.S. Eighth Army), air, and

sea forces on the Korean peninsula proper. It exercised no authority over

the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the waters around Korea, nor could it command

the U.S. Fifth Air Force in the airspaces adjacent to Korea. All was fine

as long as conditions in Korea conformed to those envisioned when the

UN joined the war in 1950. In that case, UNC commanded USFK and the

ROK armed forces.

It took no great imagination to conceive of conditions in Korea that

might entail the use of armed forces outside the purview of the United

Nations. These included certain routine peacetime exercises, bilateral U.S.-

ROK concerns like Vietnam, incidents of interest only to the United States

or the ROK, or a new Korean war that did not concern the steadily more

radical rank-and-file states of the UN General Assembly. In those all too

likely cases, USFK reverted to U.S. Pacific Command control. Yet operations

outside the UNC structure forfeited the advantage of U.S. operational

control over the ROK military, leaving the allies to hash out these delicate

matters, perhaps in the teeth of a crisis or even a full-blown war.

The United States military evolved a clever solution to this potential

quandary: giving one man multiple "hats" (posts). The same U.S. Army

four-star general concurrently held the posts of Commander in Chief, United

Nations Command; Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea; and Commanding

General, U.S. Eighth Army (EUSA). Regardless of the nature of events in

Korea, this ensured that USFK complied with the immediate needs of UNC

rather than the distant Pacific Command (PACOM). In his capacity as

Commander in Chief, UNC, this general assigned operational control of

the ROK Army to the Commanding General, EUSA (himself).13

Even with this neat bureaucratic trick, some problems remained. First,

the U.S. commander had operational control over his combined and joint

U.S. forces (through his UNC and USFK hat). These elements answered to

the U.S. general for task organization and tactical missions but not for

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.1 4 The

American general could use the capabilities of the forces, but he could only

do so much to create new capabilities or modify old ones in his combined

and joint units. The exception, of course, was his own outfit, U.S. Eighth

Army.
8

Second, PACOM component headquarters (U.S. Army, Pacific; U.S. Pacific Air Forces; U.S. Pacific Fleet) had authority to bypass UNC and

exercise administrative control over their service elements in U.S. Forces, Korea. Such control meant the ability to dictate allocations of trained men

and valuable equipment.15 This became problematic as these headquarters sought to divert maximum resources to the ongoing war in Vietnam.

The U.S. Army four-star general could deal with the steady spate of Army requisitions, thanks to his concurrent UNC-USFK-EUSA roles and

consequent direct access to the JCS and the secretary of defense. But the American commander's air and naval subordinates had no such luxury, and USFK could not help them much due to the limits implied by opera- tional control. As a result, with only junior flag officers to shield them, the

U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force contributions in Korea grew more and more

hollow as the Vietnam War dragged on.

Finally, along with his three principal hats, the senior U.S. Army general in Korea performed several other important duties. He supervised the extensive U.S. military advisory and assistance program (which fell

under the ambassador's control in most other countries). He also provided military expertise to the U.S. ambassador in Seoul. In addition, he presented military opinions and ideas to the president of the ROK and his ministers.

These added responsibilities could give a smart U.S. commander important leverage over the U.S. embassy staff and ROK politicians. At times, however, each of the extra roles threatened to turn into full-time jobs and divert

attention from the general's three other equally full-time commands.

The U.S. organization in Korea was hardly ideal, but it promised a clever, hard-working commander one absolutely vital attribute: unity of command-if he had the drive and talents to exercise it. Under the usual

circumstances, a U.S. general commanding the Korean theater could hope to muddle through, focusing on whatever jobs he did best and leaving the

rest to good deputies and chiefs of staff. But the years 1966 through 1969

were not marked by usual circumstances.

Luckily for the U.S.-ROK side, General Charles H. "Tick" Bonesteel III

turned out to be a man as unusual as his times demanded. Bonesteel, a fourth-generation West Point graduate (class of 1931) and son of a general, served in World War II as a staff engineer and operations planner at army

group and War Department level. In Washington, Bonesteel worked with

the rising stars of America's power elite, including an old Oxford

University roommate, a wartime colonel named Dean Rusk. By odd coincidence, Bonesteel was one of those who selected the 38th parallel to divide

Korea for what was presumed to be temporary postwar occupation by Soviet

and American troops.

After 1945, Bonesteel helped administer the economic recovery of postwar Europe, served with the Department of State and the National Security Council, and performed strategic planning as a special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After a brief stint as commanding general of a division and a corps stationed in Germany, he returned to
9

General Charles H. Bonesteel III, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, U.S.

Forces, Korea; Commander, U.S. Eighth Army

Washington as director of special studies for the U.S. Army chief of staff.

He also represented the United States on the United Nations Military Staff

Committee.1 6 Despite these sterling credentials, Bonesteel lacked combat

experience.
10

Perhaps because of his repeated high-level staff tours, he did not display

any intuitive sense for inspiring soldiers. Indeed, many who knew him

stated that he felt awkward talking to enlisted soldiers and so avoided

visiting units in the field. Although tall, gray haired, thin, and sporting a

rakish eye patch over his left eye (the result of a detached retina), Bonesteel

did little to capitalize on his imposing patrician appearance. Impressing his troops simply was not important to him. "I used to have to drag him

off to get a haircut; otherwise he'd just let it grow," an officer on his

personal staff recalled. 17 In brief, Bonesteel was no Patton.

Still, his lack of charismatic leadership mattered little, partly because

his position did not require such displays, but mainly because his other

abilities proved so formidable. Bonesteel possessed a brilliant mind, honed

by his education at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and broadened by his

unusual assignments. 18 He knew a lot, but more important, he knew how

to use his store of data for creative thinking.

Bonesteel displayed five distinct intellectual talents. Any one of these

abilities would have marked him as an extraordinary officer. Together, these

traits suited him admirably for his demanding role in Korea and marked

him as a rarity in the U.S. Army. Of his contemporaries, only a handful of

men, such as Andrew J. Goodpaster, Bernard Rogers, George M. Seignious, and Vernon Walters, displayed similar political-military prowess.

First, Bonesteel could process an immense amount of information in a

short time. Like Napoleon Bonaparte, Bonesteel showed a flair for juggling his many duties. He had the mental discipline to do several things at once

and yet keep them straight in his mind. Without this skill, he would have

been unable to use the full range of powers granted to him by his three

hats.

Second, from the seemingly discordant mass of incoming information

that came to him daily, Bonesteel repeatedly discerned subtle connections.

Similar to Frederick the Great, Bonesteel often proved his own best analyst of this influx of intelligence. He refused to be limited by the circumscribed

military information delivered by his dutiful intelligence staff. As he put it, he "swung the bolo knife around a bit" and "tried to put intelligence on a

more direct basis." 19 Bonesteel requested and received a plethora of raw

political, economic, social, and personal details. Working with his typically blinding speed, he drew his own conclusions. He was almost always correct.

Third, Bonesteel demonstrated impressive political acumen. His informed

perception gave him an uncanny sense for the delicate political-military balances that constrain the operational level of war. He recognized the difference between the possible and the ideal, and he declined to prejudice the

former while pursuing the latter. 20 In this, he resembled General Matthew

Ridgway, although Bonesteel went well beyond that estimable old soldier

with regard to achieving maximum cooperation from the Republic of Korea.

Bonesteel was always able to do more with less, so much so that harried

superiors occasionally expected him to do everything with nothing.
11

Fourth, Bonesteel embraced the unorthodox. Probably due to his own

atypical professional experience, he did not feel bound by traditional U.S.

Army doctrine, practices, or customs. In this, he resembled such selfeducated soldiers as Daniel Morgan or Nathan Bedford Forrest. Bonesteel

emphasized "good old-fashioned horse sense" instead of doctrinal rules or

high technology. "I was anxious to get ideas from anybody," said Bonesteel,

"from a shoe black to a senior officer, or anybody else."21 This attitude

allowed Bonesteel to meet unique challenges with unique solutions.

Finally, making hard choices is the hallmark of able generals from

Alexander to Douglas MacArthur. In the words of his aide, Bonesteel "knew

how to make decisions, and he made them without hesitation."22 This ability

permitted the general to translate his brilliance into positive actions. The

Second Korean Conflict required a man willing to use the full range of

formal and informal political-military powers available to him. When

General Bonesteel took charge of his three commands on 1 September 1966,

he had both the authority and the inclination to act as an American

proconsul.

Mission

Bonesteel and his U.S.-ROK combined forces had one clear strategic

objective: defense of the Republic of Korea (see figure 2). Until late 1966,

that implied defense against a repetition of the June 1950 invasion from

the north. Since any big invasion would come by land through the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), alertness in carrying out armistice duties appeared

to offer some chance at early warning. In the meantime, the allies did their

part to uphold the UN part of the cease-fire agreement. If U.S.-ROK guards

in the DMZ and ROK coastal patrols could scoop up an occasional infiltrator

from the north in the process, so much the better.

Unconventional war did not appear to be a special danger. True, both

Koreas probed and tested each other, but they generally restricted their

Strategic objective: Defend the Republic of Korea against aggression by the Democratic Republic

of Korea (North Korea).

Operational objectives:

* Defend against conventional invasion.

* Defend against unconventional operations/insurgencies.

- Anti-infiltration (DMZ/coast).

- Counterinsurgency (interior).

Strategic objectives:

* Restrain Republic of Korea actions.

* Conduct operations in an economy-of-force role (do not dilute the U.S. Vietnam War effort).

Sources: United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, "Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, Period

Ending 30 April 1969 (U)," UNCLASSIFIED, 1-2; General Charles H. Bonesteel III, United States Army (ret.), Interview with Lieutenant

Colonel Robert St. Louis, 333-34, Senior Officers Oral History Program Project 73-2, 1973, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; and Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair (New York:

Coward McCann, 1970), 275-77.

Figure 2. United States' objectives in Korea, 1966-69
12

actual penetrations to intelligence-gathering efforts. Bonesteel characterized

these northern agents as the "cornball military intelligence type, writing down the names of units from signs over the entrance gate and so on." A

few firefights had erupted when such spies ran into ROK and U.S. forces.

On the whole, however, casualties since the Korean War had been

minimal.2 3 Had anyone been in the mind to notice, they might have charted

a small but important upsurge in violent incidents throughout 1965 and

into 1966.

The defense of the ROK against midintensity and low-intensity threats

carried one dangerous contradiction. If confronted with unconventional

pressures, the U.S.-ROK combined forces would undoubtedly turn to meet

the new problems. The allies had to be careful, though, lest their zest for

low-intensity conflict undermine their capacities to resist a conventional

invasion. By the same token, excessive unwillingness to alter conventional

defense postures in order to meet and stop unconventional enemies might allow DPRK agitators to create enough instability to subvert the ROK

government. Bonesteel would have to be very discriminating in handling

LIC situations. Ultimately, he would have to create the proper combination

of defenses, or Korea might collapse into war or anarchy.

America's strategic aim in Korea did not make Bonesteel's task any easier. With its forces fully engaged in Vietnam, the United States wished

to prevent a renewal of the Korean War. The ROKs, hoping for eventual

reunification, only grudgingly shared this American strategic objective.

Senior U.S. officers rarely discussed this issue in public for fear of alienating their ROK counterparts, although the southern leaders certainly knew

of the American concern; it pervaded all U.S.-ROK discussions about

responses to North Korean provocations.

Bonesteel's responsibility weighed heavily on him. He knew that

Americans preferred a quiet Korea-even if the country stayed divided. That

might mean restraining the South Koreans, as Bonesteel understood. It also

meant restraining himself. He vowed "not to take one damned thing from

Vietnam."24 The military term for this was "economy of force." Economy

of force necessitates "the measured allocation of available combat power to

the primary task as well as secondary tasks."2 5 The United States had

made its allocations of forces, and Korea played second fiddle to Vietnam.

Bonesteel intended to keep it that way, even if it cost lives.

That, after all, loomed as the practical human price of an economy-of- force operation. Doctrine writers refer to the acceptance of "risk" in

economy-of-force undertakings, implying the perils of casualties and pos- sibly even defeat in the secondary arena. Bonesteel's men might have to

suffer losses due to the lack of reinforcement simply to free up resources

for the big war in Southeast Asia. At the operational level, economy of

force risked reverses in the secondary theater. At the soldier level, it meant

that young men risked death for no immediate, tangible gain. The cerebral

Bonesteel needed to invent a way to defuse this potential morale problem,

both for his own restive draftees and the aggressive ROKs.
13

The two missions in Korea did not necessarily work against each other

as long as North Korea restrained itself. But that depended on Kim I1-

sung's intentions; his capabilities to make trouble were not in doubt.

Enemy

In evaluating the DPRK armed forces, one must be careful to

distinguish between conventional and unconventional components. Prior to

the final months of 1966, most U.S.-ROK collection and analysis focused

upon the line units of the North Korean military. Kim Il-sung's new LIC

forces had yet to show themselves in a major way.

The DPRK conventional order of battle certainly demanded concern. The

north disposed a strong army, a surprisingly good air force, a small navy,

and an improving militia at the village level. The north's sluggish socialist

economy had not performed well since about 1960, but Kim Il-sung

supplemented native industry by taking care to gain military aid from at

least one and usually both Communist giants. Thanks to the ouster of

Khrushchev in late 1964, the USSR had chosen to renew arms shipments

in May 1965. Kim Il-sung gladly incorporated the new Soviet hardware into

his military. 2 6

Of the four branches of the DPRK armed forces, the Korean People's

Army (KPA) posed the most noteworthy conventional threat (see table 1).

It deployed eight infantry divisions along the DMZ, backed by eight more

infantry divisions, three motorized infantry divisions, a tank division, a

collection of separate infantry and tank brigades and regiments, and about

ten skeleton-strength reserve divisions. Altogether, and assuming mobilization, the KPA could place about thirty-four division equivalents in the field.

Reports of the time credited the tough KPA conscripts as being "wellequipped and highly dedicated." KPA officers, many veterans of the

1950-53 fighting, knew their jobs. Kim Il-sung trusted his army so much

that, unlike the Soviet or Chinese forces, his KPA had no true political

officers. Commanders led without fear of ideological oversight. This allowed

them a degree of initiative not often seen in Communist armies. Schooled

on a mixture of Soviet, Chinese, and home-grown doctrine, the KPA

practiced regularly for an attack to the south. American analysts warned

that KPA "organization and emphasis on mechanized strength [gave] it a

capability of rapidly moving into a strong offensive role."27

The Korean People's Air Force (KPAF) also worried U.S. and ROK

planners. The KPAF's inventory of jet aircraft included some 60 11-28 light

bombers and about 450 MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighter-bombers, all suited for

ground attack. The Soviet-trained pilots seemed bellicose and competent: two

interceptors damaged a USAF RB-47 reconnaissance jet in mid-1965. Briefed

on this air armada, General Bonesteel pronounced it "formidable." He feared

that a massive KPAF preemptive strike could destroy the smaller ROK air

arm on the ground before U.S. air reinforcements arrived to even the

balance. 28
14

TABLE 1

Balance of Conventional Military Power in Korea, November 1966

DPRK UNC (U.S. portion)

ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL 386,000 675,000 (55,000)

Army

Soldiers 345,000 600,000 (50,000)'

Special Operations Forces 3,000 1,000

Border Guards 26,000 39,000

Militia 1,200,000 none 2

Regular divisions 24 22 (2)

Reserve divisions 103 10

Tanks 800 656 (216)

Other armored vehicles 900 1,381 (781)

Artillery 5,200 2,160 (224)

Air Force

Airmen 30,000 28,000 (5,000)

Combat airplanes 590 265 (60)

Helicopters 20 65 (58)

Navy

Sailors 9,000 17,450 (450)

Marines 2,000 30,050 (50)

Destroyers/frigates 0 7

Submarines 4 0

Minor combatants 79 30

Landing craft 20 23

Auxiliaries 34 12

'About 46,000 ROK troops (2 Army divisions, 1 Marine brigade) were deployed to Vietnam at

this time. They have been included in this table, although they were not immediately available.

2The ROK Homeland Defense Reserve Force, totaling over 2 million people, was not formally

organized until 13 April 1968.

3

At this time, little public information had been released concerning DPRK reserve divisions.

Some U.S. sources later estimated that the DPRK disposed from 10 to 17 low-strength mobilization

divisions (roughly equivalent of ROK reserve units).

Sources: Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1968-69 (London: Adlard and Son, 1968), 13, 38-39; Joseph S.

Bermudez, Jr., North Korean Special Forces (Surrey, England: Jane's Publishing Co., 1988), 101, 161; Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam

Order of Battle (Washington, DC: U.S. News Books, 1981), 272-73; General Charles H. Bonesteel III, United States Army (ret.),

"U.S.-South Korean Partnership Holds a Truculent North at Bay," Army 19 (October 1969): 61; and James P. Finley, The US

Military Experience in Korea, 1971-1982: In the Vanguard of ROK-US Relations (San Francisco, CA: Command Historian's Office,

Secretary Joint Staff, HQ., USFK/EUSA, 1983), 19-21.

Analysis assessed the little Korean People's Navy (KPN) as "primarily

a coastal defense force." Its four Soviet-made W-class submarines, four

Soviet-supplied Komar-class missile boats, and cluster of motor torpedo

boats might hamper U.S.-ROK sea lines of communication in the Sea of

Japan. 29 Most allied planners readily discounted this small naval force.
15

The Workers' and Peasants' Red Guard Militia, organized in response

to Kim Il-sung's December 1962 call for arming the populace, provided a

pervasive government presence throughout North Korea. This vast force of

discharged conscripts, local auxiliaries, informers, party activists, and

observers supported the regular army components by guaranteeing rear-area

security and trained replacements. 30 The ubiquitous militia made U.S.-ROK

infiltrations of the north extremely hazardous, thereby hampering human

intelligence gathering. In concert with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the

militia also ensured loyalty in the Communist state.

Powerful as the North Korean forces appeared, when placed in the full

context of the conventional balance on the peninsula, the Communists did

not possess a militarily significant advantage in combat power. If Kim I1-

sung chose to reunify his country by force, he confronted two important

problems. First, even with increased Soviet and Chinese material aid, the

DPRK could not sustain a long war against its more populous and

prosperous neighbor. If the two Koreas fought, the DPRK had to try for a

quick knockout. A war of attrition favored the richer south. Second, the

DPRK could not count on intervention from China or the USSR to offset

the almost assured American role in any major renewal of the fighting.

The north had to assume that the United States would reinforce its forwarddeployed units, first with air power, then sea power, and finally with land

power. Again, this argued for a lightning strike, winning before the U.S.

reinforcements arrived.

Given the standing conventional balance in 1966, however, Kim Il-sung's

generals could not reasonably expect to succeed in a risky blitzkrieg. The

sides were too evenly matched.31 Something had to be done to undermine

ROK strengths in favor of the DPRK. Kim's new "military line" promised

a solution to the problem. In the words of a later American report, "the

ultimate aim of these operations is to create as much trouble as possible in

South Korea, including difficulties in our relationships with the South

Koreans. When these 'preparation of the battle area' efforts have achieved

sufficient success, then the regular forces may be used as required in order

to complete the communization of the Korean peninsula."3 2 Put simply, a

well-orchestrated northern LIC effort might spark the insurgency necessary

to divert U.S.-ROK forces and give the edge to Kim Il-sung's conventional

military units.

The North Korean premier chaired the National Intelligence Committee

that directed and approved all intelligence and proinsurgency activities. Its

subordinate Cabinet Intelligence Committee coordinated, collated, and

analyzed information gathered by the field agencies. The actual DPRK field

units amounted to fewer than 3,000 men (and selected women agents). Their

low numbers could be deceptive, however, since each skilled operatoragitator had the potential to choose, train, and supervise up to a hundred

informants and guerrilla recruits. In this aspect, they resembled U.S. Special

Forces (Green Berets).

The KWP Liaison Department controlled tactical employment of intelligence and unconventional efforts (see figure 3). Its own Military Section
16

Conventional forces emplaced just north of the DMZ (west to east)

Elements, II Corps

Elements, 6th Infantry Division

Elements, 8th Infantry Division

Elements, VII Corps

Elements, 15th Infantry Division

Elements, 45th Infantry Division

Conventional/unconventional forces in the DMZ (west to east)

Two companies, 6th Infantry Division DMZ Police

Two companies, 8th Infantry Division DMZ Police

Two companies, 15th Infantry Division DMZ Police

Two companies, 45th Infantry Division DMZ Police

Unconventional infiltration forces

Liaison Department, Korean Workers' party

Military Section

Guerrilla Guidance Section

General Political Bureau of the KPA

Propaganda and Instigation Bureau

Enemy Affairs Guidance Bureau

Security Bureau

Reconnaissance Bureau, KPA 1

124th Army Unit (at least 9 operational detachments)

283d Army Unit

17th Foot Reconnaissance Brigade

'The Reconnaissance Bureau had assumed the lead role in unconventional warfare by late

1966, although it remained formally under the supervision of the Liaison Bureau.

Sources: Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 8, 26-34, 63, 157; and Bonesteel interview, 329-30.

Figure 3. Korean People's Army and associated forces along the U.S.-held segment of the DMZ, 1

January 1968

conducted surveillance and staged incidents designed to subvert the South

Korean military and police. The Guerrilla Guidance Section assisted and

fomented insurgency in the ROK.

In addition to these organic sections, the KWP Liaison Department

supervised infiltrators from the KPA General Political Bureau. This outfit

ran the Propaganda and Instigation Bureau and the Enemy Affairs

Guidance Bureau. The former bureau attempted to cause individual defections and unit dissatisfaction in the ROK military. The latter focused on

psychological warfare to undermine the morale of both the ROKs and the

Americans.

The KWP Liaison Department also coordinated those Ministry of

Internal Affairs investigations that required hot pursuit or preemptive raids

south of the DMZ. Although rare, these Security Bureau missions made it

very hard for U.S. and ROK agents to find their way north or return.
17

The final subordinate bureau under the KWP Liaison Department was

the Reconnaissance Bureau of the Ministry of Defense. This element

provided the main striking arm for Kim 11-sung's unconventional warfare

effort. It operated four Foot Reconnaissance Stations, one in support of each

KPA corps on the DMZ. Each station controlled a small foot reconnaissance

brigade responsible for collection of military intelligence along the DMZ.

These brigades often escorted and covered infiltrators from other DPRK

agencies. 33

The Reconnaissance Bureau also controlled the 23d Amphibious Brigade,

which employed specially made infiltration boats to work the ROK coastlines. Camouflaged to look and sound like run-down fishing boats, these

carefully engineered craft contained hidden diesel engines capable of bursts

of incredible speeds (0-40 knots in three minutes). Moreover, their cleverly

rounded wooden hulls defied radar acquisition. It took bold sailors to bring

these craft inshore. Although the KPN might not have made much of a

fight against the U.S. Seventh Fleet, its array of small-boat skills enabled

it to deliver sea raiders under the most adverse conditions.

At this time, the North Koreans did not employ airborne insertions.

The reasons for ignoring this potentially useful method included a lingering

respect for the wartime UN air supremacy, concern over the excellent U.S.-

ROK early-warning net, a shortage of trained pilots and specialized

transport aircraft, and the lack of any indigenous experience in parachute

and airlanding operations. The KPAF had concentrated on air defense and

ground attack, not special operations. As long as the DMZ and coasts

remained relatively accessible, the DPRK neglected aerial infiltration

means.3 4

A recoilless rifle position along the DMZ
18

In addition to its own units, the Reconnaissance Bureau had authority

to draw on conventional KPA, KPAF, and KPN units for support of its

missions. In the DMZ, for example, frontline KPA divisions assisted infiltrations and covered withdrawals, often with supporting fires. North Korean

divisions made especially good use of their DMZ Police Companies (troops routinely stationed in the northern half of the zone in accordance with the

1953 Armistice Agreement). DMZ Police supplied the latest situation updates and provided guides as necessary. 35

North Korean infiltrators depended upon stealth to breach the DMZ or

the ROK seacoasts. Superbly trained, repeatedly rehearsed, and thoroughly

indoctrinated, these special fighters displayed remarkable knowledge of

demolitions, land navigation, and small-unit tactics. Most doubled as

political agitators, ever ready to reeducate interested locals and spread Kim

Il-sung's gospel to what were thought to be willing southern ears.

These men drilled at evasion. Their mission lay in the ROK rear, where

they usually moved in small teams of two to twelve men. Because each

member normally carried little beyond his Soviet PPSh submachine gun

and some demolitions, the KPA teams lacked the firepower to slug it out

with conventional units. They preferred flight to battle.

When in contact, however, they fought with cunning and aggressiveness.

The infiltrators proved adept at arranging violent, immediate ambushes,

breaking contact, or waiting patiently for pursuers to pass by-whichever

technique best suited their tactical situation. If trapped, these North

Koreans rarely surrendered, preferring suicide by hand grenade. 36 Man for

man, the DPRK special forces soldiers of 1966-69 might have been the

toughest opponents ever to face American soldiers.

Additional special operations units still on the drawing boards would

soon arrive to augment Kim Il-sung's able clandestine warriors. Even without them, however, the northern Communists had created a potent

instrument for guerrilla combat. American and ROK ignorance of these

deadly new enemies only made their impact that much more effective.

Terrain

The topography of the Republic of Korea has been described as a

petrified "sea in a heavy gale" (see map 1). Hills and ridges proliferate,

with the exception of some rolling lowlands near Seoul, the capital and

largest city. The long, rugged chain of the Taebaek Mountains defines most

of eastern Korea; its affiliated Chiri Massif greatly restricts movement in

the southern portion of the ROK. Much of the forest that once covered

Korea has disappeared, leaving underbrush and saplings behind to inhibit

mobility. Two rivers, the Imjin along the DMZ and the Han near Seoul, lie

athwart movement corridors from north to south.

Weather also affected mobility in Korea in the 1960s. The peninsula's

temperate climate resembled that of New York state. Glutinous mud hampered vehicle operations during the early spring thaw and the heavy rains
19

Wonsa nl

* PYONGYANG

Sariwone

inchon I

I\,IL <^

ROK

Second

Army

C

Co

z

--

>

Wn

CHIRI

MASSIF

Map 1. Korea, 1966-69

ininmh~s

i JAPAN~fg
20

of late summer; frequent storms also made air sorties questionable in these

months. In these wet periods, even tracked vehicles could be road bound.

The dry periods of late spring (May-June) and midwinter (JanuaryFebruary) offered the best conditions for massed motorized movement. As

long as the snows did not get too deep, the cold weather actually could be

preferable due to good trafficability on frozen lower slopes and the drainage

of rice paddies on the valley floors.

Dismounted elements could move year-round. North Korean agents

favored the dry ground, longer nights, and fogs of early autumn-before

the snows came. Unlike in the spring, the summer vegetation was still

present to shield their movements. September, October, and the first two

weeks of November became prime infiltration times.

Without vehicles for heat and shelter, troops on foot-even special

forces-usually avoided movement in the bitterly cold Korean winters. This

resulted in an unconventional warfare "campaign season" from March to

November, although there were exceptions.

Unless able to use the seas that surround the Korean peninsula, a conventional invader enjoys little choice but to grind south from hill mass to

hill mass, slowed by late summer mud and deep winter snow. Admittedly,

Seoul lies within a few dozen kilometers of North Korea, but it could take

months to get that far against any sort of determined soldiery-as both

sides found out during the static war of 1951-53. Korea favors the prepared

defender. The United States and the ROK had been preparing since 1953. 37

Though fine for conventional defense, this same ROK terrain and

weather aided covert infiltrators. Even with a lot of good infantry, it was

not physically possible to block every twisting gully and overgrown hillside,

especially on dark nights during blinding thunderstorms or screaming

blizzards. In a midintensity war, a few "leakers" (infiltrators) mattered little.

In counterguerrilla work, however, stopping skilled agents would prove a

monumental challenge.

Conventional or not, most North Korean land forces heading south had

to cross the Demilitarized Zone. This man-made boundary reflected the

battle lines on 27 July 1953 rather than any natural barrier. The DMZ

extended across the entire 242 kilometers (151 miles) of the peninsula. By

agreement, the zone extended two kilometers north and south of the Military

Demarcation Line (MDL), the precise armistice trace.

Each side had authority in their half of the DMZ, and each stood guard

with care, alert for signs of another conventional war. The U.S. 2d Infantry

Division defended 29.8 kilometers (18.5 miles of the DMZ) directly in front

of Seoul. The ROKs handled the rest. The Panmunjom Military Armistice

Commission site, located in the neutral Joint Security Area, lay opposite

the western part of the American sector, smack in the center of the DMZ

proper (see map 2).

Terrain along the DMZ amounted to a microcosm of the ROK. In the

American sector, for example, the maze of hills averaged 500 feet in height.
21

U.S. and South Korean soldiers guarding a sector of the DMZ under harsh circumstances, 26

August 1967

Two major corridors, the Munsan (western) and Chorwon, converged on

Seoul. The Imjin River flowed roughly parallel to the DMZ, just behind the

forward U.S. positions. Underbrush, tall grass, and thickets choked the

lower slopes of the endless succession of ridgelines. 38

Aside from the rough natural surroundings, both sides had undertaken

improvements in the neutral buffer area. These refinements facilitated early

warning of any major attack. A string of observation posts, authorized by

the truce, dotted each portion of the DMZ itself. Patrols were also permitted

on either side of the MDL. The north prepared minefields and fighting positions just north of the DMZ; to a lesser degree, the U.S.-ROK troops also

readied defensive lines just south of their side of the zone.

The armistice allowed no crew-served weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, or fortifications in the zone. Each side could send only 1,000 men into

the DMZ at any one time. Once there, these temporarily designated "DMZ

police" could patrol as necessary "for the conduct of civil administration

and relief' on their side of the MDL. Both sides agreed to refrain from

firing weapons across the MDL, overflights of the DMZ, and infiltrations

of any type. Joint Observer Teams (UN and Chinese-DPRK) and Neutral
Czech-Polish Camp

/ P s a ... e ....... tX g n ,e,: !ii^ ~,- i

CP Young

3d Bde, U.S. 2d ID

CP !Greaves

2d Bde,; I : U.S:. 7th ID !

Blue Lancer Valley

I 1st Bde, U.S. 2d ID

., Spoonbill Bridge

Freedom Bridge

CP Custer,

2d Bde, U.S. 2d ID

CP Kaiser,

1st Bde,

7th USID

CP St. Barbara, DL

HQ, U.S. I Corps (Group)

CP Casey,

HQ, U.S. 7th ID;

3d Bde, 7th ID

CP Hovey, 1i

2d Bde, U.S. 7th ID*

Artillery

CP Red Cloud, I l

HQ, U.S. I Corps (Group)

-NI

*Displaced forward as 4th Bde, U.S

TO SEOUL

rch 1968. 1

Map 2. The DMZ, U.S. sector, 1966-69

22

CP.Howze. EHQ, U.S. 2d ID

s- c Ir 1PPII I - -- r
23

Nations Teams (Swedish, Swiss, Czechs, and Poles) based at Panmunjom

supposedly enforced these provisions.

As a practical matter, the North Koreans flouted most of the rules.

They fortified their DMZ outposts; introduced machine guns, mortars, and

recoilless rifles; and created a special force of permanent DMZ Police well

in excess of the numbers allowed. Moreover, they shot at any UN soldier

on or near the MDL, including those placing markers in accordance with

the armistice. 3 9 In contrast, United Nations troops generally followed the

regulations.

The DMZ constituted the most militarily significant obstacle to land

forces moving from north to south. But neither side could cross the DMZ

in force without triggering well-prepared defensive schemes. Thanks to their

illicit work, the northerners made any movement from south to north

incredibly risky. What is more, the KPA could count on secure, wellprotected bases of operations for their thrusts south against the more lawabiding UN forces. In time, the allies would emulate their adversaries and

become more interested in true counterinfiltration rather than just mere

early warning of large-scale attack. But that was not the case in 1966.

Aside from their ground approach, northern forces also could use the

seas in attempts to outflank the DMZ. Because the small KPN might carry

only a few battalions at most, the threat of a DPRK D day did not exist.

Incremental sea infiltration, though, turned out to be another matter. South

Korea had to protect almost 6,800 kilometers of irregular, island-strewn

seacoast. The narrow coastal plains (five kilometers wide to the east, up to

twenty to the west) included most of the important cities, roads, and

military facilities-all well within striking distance for seaborne raiders.

Conversely, much of the shoreline fronted on remote, sparsely populated

wilderness.4 0 For agitators determined to reach large segments of the

population, establish hidden caches, or create spectacular terrorist

incidents, the ROK coastline offered many opportunities.

Along with the topography, the human facets of the South Korean

environment deserve a few remarks. Civilian loyalties might determine the

fate of the country, particularly if properly manipulated by DPRK guerrilla

organizers. Ethnicity, rural sentiments, and the existence of a form of ROK

nationalism all bore consideration by both sides.

The Korean population has been described as "one of the most

homogeneous in the world."41 This meant that distinctions between North

and South Koreans were largely artificial and that northerners could appeal

to a common heritage. On the other hand, most southerners distrusted their

North Korean cousins. Traditional regional prejudices-long predating the

war-stereotyped northerners as rude and belligerent. The bulk of South

Koreans in 1966 vividly remembered the grim events of 1950. Northern

aggression only buttressed the old folk beliefs. It hardly helped that Kim

Il-sung had called in the hated Chinese and Russians on his behalf.

Besides exploiting ethnic links, North Korea hoped to develop support

from rural southerners. Kim Il-sung and his men rightly noted that the
24

Workmen establishing lights at the chain-link fence aong the DMZ

growth of capitalist industries in the south created social instability-as

evidenced by the urban confusion of 1960-61. But Park's coup and

subsequent elevation to civil power-in defiance of the Seoul intellectuals

and students-convinced the DPRK leadership that agitation among the

disgruntled city classes guaranteed little. The majority of South Koreans

still lived in farming villages in 1966. As long as the countryside believed

in the government and sent its sons into the ROK Army and police, urban

insurgents stood little chance of victory.

Could the farmers be subverted? Isolated from the new wealth of the

cities, less educated, locally focused, and steeped in superstitious, traditional

ways, the Korean farmers looked like a ripe target. They nicely matched

the recommended audience for the Maoist ideas in vogue in Kim Il-sung's

new military line-or so it seemed.

One crucial difference deserved notice. Since President Rhee's land

reform of 1949-50, private farm ownership had become the norm rather

than exception; less than 10 percent of the ROK's rural people still worked

as tenant laborers by 1966.42 While not exactly New England yeoman

farmers, these Koreans were not penniless peasants. They retained all of

the conservatism typical to the countryside, yet in a very real sense, they

now owned a piece of the ROK.

0)B

Q)

"s

'I

mp

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m

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25

Along with southern prejudices and rural attitudes, a degree of

discernible ROK nationalism had also arisen. The treaty with Japan,

membership in the Asian Pacific Council, rising economic power, and

especially the dispatch of ROK forces to aid the mighty United States-all

made South Koreans conscious of their country's increasing influence.

North Koreans decried these developments as evidence that the ROK

authorities had sold out unification for capitalist treasures. Sometimes it

appeared that the ROK had given up Rhee's old goal of bringing the two

Koreas together. Yet as President Park put it, ROK economic growth not

only brought recognition worldwide, it also provided "a current for national

unification," a nebulous phrase that suggested the DPRK could be conquered

by southern economic dominance alone.43 This image of peaceful triumph

contrasted sharply with the usual public view of the warlike, crafty

northerners.

In sum, the social and economic conditions militated against conventional midintensity conflict. Moreover, the DPRK would need to launch a

quick war over ground and under weather that aided the defense, a defense

very likely fully alerted by its DMZ trip-wire units. Without a navy, North

Korea could only barge south in force and hope for the best. That is, unless

it went the low-intensity route.

South Korea offered a guerrilla agitator plenty of access, whether across

the overgrown DMZ or along the lengthy, barren coasts. The population in

the cities had already shown cracks in its cohesion during Rhee's collapse,

and the rural majority might be ripe for propaganda and organization.

Environmental factors favored the lone guerrilla, the small special-warfare

boat, and the trained terrorist team. The fact that U.S. and ROK troops

were not ready for such a campaign only made the terrain benefits that

much more useful to northern infiltrators.

Troops Available

American and South Korean forces on hand in late 1966 formed a

strong conventional force. Backed up by the U.S. Fifth Air Force in Japan

and Okinawa and the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific, these

troops deterred overt attacks by North Korea. U.S. capabilities against

covert threats existed, but they had yet to be organized into a coherent

framework. The UNC land forces positioned one U.S. and nine ROK divisions along the DMZ, backed by another U.S. division and nine more ROK

divisions, plus a few separate brigades. Upon mobilization, the ROK Army

would be filled out with four ready reserve divisions and six less wellequipped rear-area security divisions. 44

Provisions for UNC operational control and the ongoing U.S. advisory

and assistance program ensured solid cooperation between the allied armies.

American headquarters often directed ROK Army units. The I Corps

(Group), for example, commanded a mixed force of ROK and U.S. divisions.

Now and then, small U.S. forces, typically helicopter or signal units, served

under ROK supervision.
26

Although the most powerful formations on the peninsula, both U.S.

Army divisions in Korea suffered from quantitative and qualitative

deficiencies (see table 2). Vietnam had priority: Korea would have to fend

for itself. U.S. units in Europe drew down too, but they did not fight anyone

during this time. U.S. Eighth Army soldiers did, and they started with what

they had.

Both American divisions lacked the usual complement of infantry battalions; the U.S. 7th Infantry Division had only one tank battalion instead

of the usual two. A pair of mechanized infantry battalions beefed up each

division's firepower, partially atoning for the absent battalions. With their

reduced establishments, both divisions hobbled along chronically understrength.4 5

Though they had most of their weapons, each division sorely missed

the normal complement of helicopters. General Bonesteel recalled: "When I

got there on 1 September 1966, there were only four or five Hueys. That

was the total number of Hueys in South Korea." 4 6 Hunting infiltrators in

the rough Korean terrain necessitated a lot of trained light infantry or a

lot of helicopters to move the infantry on hand; Bonesteel's divisions had

neither.

TABLE 2

Strength of U.S. Divisions in Korea, 1 January 1968

U.S. 2d Infantry Division U.S. 7th Infantry Division

TOE* MTOE** TOE MTOE

Aggregates

Personnel 16,810 15,057 16,810 11,300

Helicopters' 88 20 88 20

Tanks 135 135 135 81

Battalions 2

Infantry 8 5 8 5

Infantry (Mechanized) 0 2 0 2

Tank 2 2 2 1

Cavalry 1 1 1 1

TOTAL 11 10 11 9

*TOE: Table of organization and equipment, a model unit.

**MTOE: Modified table of organization and equipment, theater alterations to ideal unit organizations.

'In Korea, divisions substituted elderly, underpowered OH-23 Raven helicopters for modern OH6A Cayuse and UH-1D Iroquois (Huey) types.

2

lnfantry battalions in Vietnam habitually formed a fourth rifle company; those in Korea retained

the traditional three companies.

Sources: United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Combat Readiness of United States and South Korean Forces in South Korea, 90th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC, 7 June 1968), 4-5; United States Department of the Army, Table of

Organization and Equipment no. 7 G, Infantry Division (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 31 March 1966),

2, 10, 17, 64, 66, 72; Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, Leavenworth Papers no. 1 (Fort

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 21; and Stanton,

Vietnam Order of Battle, 47-54, 340-41.
27

Trimmed numbers did not help, but the uneven quality of U.S. units

hurt even more. Firepower might mask these flaws in a big war, but they

showed up only too well in small-unit clashes with the skilled North Korean

special operators. Old weapons, thirteen-month tours, some poor soldiers,

and weak leadership also hampered unit performance. The last problem

exacerbated the first three.

Weapons were not first-rate. U.S. troops in Korea did not have the new

M-16 automatic rifles, M-48A3 diesel-engine tanks, or UH-1 turbine-powered

helicopters. They got by with heavy M-14 semiautomatic rifles and tired

M-48A2C gasoline-engine tanks.

They tried to get by with their old, small helicopters, but that did not

work. Aside from a handful of UH-1B and UH-1D Hueys, the Americans

relied on underpowered, bubble-topped OH-23 Ravens-each able to carry

only a pilot and one passenger.47 Bonesteel pooled the few available Hueys

at I Corps (Group), the headquarters that controlled both divisions.

Like their fellow Americans in Vietnam, most U.S. soldiers in Korea

served a short tour. With few exceptions, they came and went as individuals, not units. Soldiers remained in country thirteen months (a month

longer than Army troops in Vietnam). Bonesteel could and did extend key

and essential men up to two more months. A few officers stayed even

longer, typically to fill crucial command and staff slots.

The individual rotation policy affected American abilities to function in

the demanding Korean environment. On the positive side, every unit had

veterans. On the negative side, many American companies seemed like collections of strangers rather than well-honed teams. Each arrival and

departure tended to reshuffle everyone to keep key roles covered. Rifle

squads rarely maintained the same roster for two weeks in a row. Thus,

American units in Korea remained in a state of constant flux, even when

not taking casualties.

Troop quality could have been better. Korea received more than its

share of the sad "Project 100,000" soldiers-disadvantaged young men

inducted into the U.S. Army as sort of an "armed Job Corps." Uneducated,

unruly, and unhappy, these people gravitated toward the military equivalent of unskilled labor-the infantry.4 8 They demanded extra training time

and created numerous disciplinary headaches. Some performed well. Many

did not.

Along with a "Project 100,000" soldier, most rifle squads also had a

KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to U.S. Army) soldier. This system

remained as a holdover from a 1950 program designed to flesh out understrength U.S. units, provide a quick infusion of "local knowledge," and train

South Koreans in U.S. techniques. 4 9 While potentially very useful in counterinsurgency work, KATUSAs presented their U.S. chain of command with a

soldier typically weak in his command of English and understanding of

modern mechanical technology. Again, the consequent inefficiencies resulted

in the loss of valuable tactical training time.
28

Weak leadership made everything worse. Short tours and the priority

on Vietnam meant that veteran officers and sergeants simply were not

there. Those that were assigned often represented a conglomerate of inexperience and sloth that might be charitably called "the second string." One

brigade commander lamented that "junior leaders lacked the basic skills to

take full charge of their men and lead them effectively and aggressively." 50

Why?

Vietnam exerted a powerful influence on professional Army leaders. The

centrifugal effects of mounting casualties and brief tours pulled officers and

NCOs into Vietnam like water sucked toward a drain. It was not all by

force. Many leaders volunteered for Southeast Asia. Good men wanted to

be there, not in the perceived Korean backwater. Nobody expected to be

part of an "economy of force" mission save the lazy, who were not wanted

anyway. As one general commented, "I've known of officers who have

chosen retirement rather than come here because they thought it was a

dead end." 51

At the officer level, Bonesteel and his commanders made do with what

they had. Often, this meant that senior leaders stretched themselves very

thin by closely supervising poor officers or very junior officers. Raw second

lieutenants led platoons for a few months, then succeeded to company command. With lieutenant colonels in short supply, majors often commanded

battalions for up to a year. Even the U.S. Eighth Army staff seemed full

Soldiers from the U.S. 2d Infantry Division prepare to move out along the DMZ. One soldier (fourth

from left) is a KATUSA.

I

-i

.)

in

zo
29

of young lieutenants routinely coming and going rather than the schooltrained majors and lieutenant colonels normally authorized. 52

Sergeants, the backbone of the U.S. Army, were at a real premium. But

daily work had to be done, and somebody had to try to take charge. To

build up some noncommissioned leadership, the U.S. units resorted to

divisional schools. After a few weeks of tactical instruction, the students

received their stripes.5 3 Such schools produced graduates, but only time

could make them real sergeants. This put even more burden on the understrength, overworked American officer corps.

Though weaker in firepower than the two U.S. divisions, the ROK Army

fielded full-strength units. For the ROKs, Vietnam was clearly a secondary

task. Defending South Korea stayed the top priority-and very nearly the

only priority in times of crisis.

The ROKs did have problems. By and large, they carried weapons two

generations behind the new models used in Southeast Asia. For example,

they still used semiautomatic Garand M1 rifles-good but dated against a

KPA foe armed with automatic AK-47s.54 The ROKs possessed only a few

helicopters.

While the ROKs might have preferred better weapons, few could criticize

the quantity and quality of the Korean rank and file. Draftees ordinarily

served all thirty-three months of active duty in the same company, allowing

almost three times the stability of the U.S. system. American observers

rated the ROK line soldiers as "well trained" and praised the "high esprit"

in their outfits. 55

ROK Army officers normally remained in duty positions longer than

their American counterparts, although this varied depending upon the

individual. ROK Army commanders down to corps level, and occasionally

below, benefited from a well-established system of American assistancethe famous Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), created in 1949.

Beginning in 1964, in a major change of previous policy dating back to the

Korean War, the American advisers began to turn over routine training

and planning to the ROKs. Bonesteel summarized: "the advisers were no

longer telling them when to blow their noses." Not surprisingly, cautious

ROK officers did not exactly jump at their new-found freedom-at least at

first. They got better, but they were definitely still in transition when their

northern foes struck in 1966.

Regardless of KMAG's work, ROK Army leadership certainly had its

own way of doing business. While competent and well versed in U.S. Army

doctrine, South Korean officers tended to treat American field manuals as

prescriptive orders rather than descriptive conceptual approaches. When

stumped, they waited for guidance. This did not always come, as Korean

officers tended to suppress embarrassing news rather than risk offending

their American superiors and advisers. If things went according to plan,

the ROK Army excelled. If not, "they didn't know how to operate," as

Bonesteel bluntly concluded. 56
30

In the air, Bonesteel could count on the American 314th Air Division

of a few dozen warplanes and a small but solid ROK Air Force. The U.S.

fighter-bombers ensured a nuclear capacity if that became necessary. In

addition, the U.S. Fifth Air Force in Japan promised ready reinforcement,

but Bonesteel always considered a surprise air attack from the north to be

his greatest nightmare.57 Like the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force diverted

most of its effort to Vietnam. Thus, the U.S. 314th Air Division and the

Fifth Air Force in South Korea often were undermanned.

At sea, Bonesteel had almost no U.S. help beyond a few port units and

some Navy and Marine advisers. The sea areas around Korea belonged to

an independent command, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, which mainly operated off Vietnam. The ROK Navy, opined U.S. admirals, "could handle the north

Korean Navy, which they strongly outgun." The ROKs also had an

amphibious capability worth reckoning.5 8 But the ROK fleet showed little

capability against sea infiltrators-the most likely way in which the KPN

would present itself.

The ROK also did not have any special counterguerrilla units or village militia in 1966, despite extensive experience battling partisans in 1950-53.

Ad hoc contingents of the ROK Army and Korean National Police had

sufficed to meet these disturbances. Unlike the DPRK, the ROK lacked an

equivalent of the North Korean Ministry of Internal Affairs. The ROK

Army, its Counterintelligence Corps, the National Police (KNP), and the

Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) all pursued infiltrators. 59 But

no central directive apparatus existed.

Given advantageous terrain and rough equivalence in numbers, the U.S.-

ROK forces stood a good chance against a conventional North Korean

attack. With all their nagging troubles, both the U.S. and ROK armies had

made quantum improvements since the Korean War. But the enemy would

not come that way again, at least not right away, and the U.S.-ROK forces

lacked any concerted, systematic means of combating unconventional

operations.

Time

American forces in Korea enjoyed an unaccustomed boon, rare in the

post-1945 U.S. military experience: regardless of considerable grumbling in

the military and among the citizenry, America had chosen to make a longterm military commitment to Korea. The U.S.-ROK 1954 Mutual Defense

Treaty "remained in force indefinitely."60 Of course, a major war in Korea

might cause some reevaluation of that open-ended commitment. But America

had accepted some DMZ casualties since 1953. As long as casualties stayed

at that level, General Bonesteel had all the time he needed.

The South Koreans would not throw in the towel-regardless of the

scale or duration of fighting. They definitely were in for as long and as

much as it took to overcome any incursions. Any alternative amounted to

national extinction.
31

Typically, one thinks of America constrained by time in war, par- ticularly in a protracted insurgent struggle. Yet in this case, it was Kim I1-

sung of North Korea who wanted quick results from his guerrillas. By simply holding on, without cracking and without escalating the conflict, the United States and the Republic of Korea would be victorious. In the

Second Korean Conflict, time favored the allies.

I II - I a L II L··C I P-

Concrete Actions 2.l _ . .I . . .._

There is a very definite pattern, and these are not hit and miss tactics.

-an infantry captain,

U.S. Eighth Army, Korea, 1967

Kim Il-sung's new military line began to take shape as early as the

autumn of 1964. Greater numbers of agents attempted to enter the Republic

of Korea. Most of these infiltrators came from the propagandists of the

Korean Workers' Party Liaison Department and the KPA General Political

Bureau. They intended to size up their ROK opponents much like previous

intelligence operatives had done. But they also hoped to start laying the

groundwork for insurrection.

By October 1966, these stepped-up irregular operations had run afoul of

ROK Army patrols and uncooperative southern villagers. ROK regulars suffered almost three dozen fatalities in a series of clashes; some two dozen

civilians also died in cross fires and terrorist attacks. The number of DMZ

incidents climbed noticeably in the ROK sectors. Hostile probes also

increased along South Korea's coastlines. ROK sailors flushed a KPN

midget submarine in the Imjin River estuary, chased North Korean spy

boats among the east coast shallows, and exchanged gunfire with pugnacious KPN patrol craft.1

Throughout these two tense years, the American sector remained

ominously quiet. It almost appeared that, whatever their motives, the

Korean Communists had chosen to avoid U.S. units. That comforting situation was about to change.

A Call to Arms

The scale and intensity of unconventional warfare had grown since the

December 1962 proclamation of a new military line, yet these efforts had

not really had much impact on the ROK. The DPRK operations lacked focus

and hence showed few measurable results.

Kim Il-sung decided to change that. In a lengthy speech to the Second

Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Conference on 5 October, the northern

premier outlined his refurbished campaign plan. 2 He stated his goal,

33
34

explained a sequence of events to bring about that goal, and described the

means to be employed (see figure 4). Kim left no doubt as to his priority:

"Comrades," he said, "the greatest national task confronting the KWP and

the Korean people at the present stage is to accomplish the country's unification and the victory of the revolution on a nationwide scale."

Strategic objective: Unification of Korea under the DPRK.

Operational objectives (in sequence):

* Create military-industrial base for revolution in DPRK.

* Neutralize United States in Korea; break U.S.-ROK alliance.

* Subvert/liberate ROK.

Means: Combination of methods (conventional/unconventional).

Sources: Compiled from Kim II-song, "The International Situation and Problems of the World Communist Movement," in his Revolution

and Socialist Construction in Korea (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 113-15; and Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces,

30.

Figure 4. DPRK campaign plan (new military line), announced 5-12 October 1966

1i

CS

Even as early as 1963, Communist inflitrators directed their violence on U.S. and ROK troops, as

witnessed by this ambushed jeep
35

How would this be done? Kim Il-sung laid out a three-phase course of

action. First, he exhorted his party faithful to "push ahead vigorously with

the revolution" in the north, thereby building "a powerful base for revolution." While Kim judged this work to be well advanced, he insisted upon

"acceleration" of the ongoing military and industrial modernization. Second,

the Communist chief believed that in order to destroy the "puppet government" in Seoul, he had to neutralize its puppet master. Why? Because

according to Kim, "the US occupation and its colonial rule over South Korea

is the root cause of all misfortunes and sufferings the South Korean people

are undergoing and the main obstacle to unification of our country." Such

ranting against Yankee "imperialism" was hardly novel. Kim's prescription,

however, struck a new chord that went beyond simple rhetoric. "It is also

wrong merely to shout against US imperialism without taking concrete

actions to stop its aggression," he said. Unable to defeat America outright,

Kim hoped to strain and break its ties to the Republic of Korea.

The time to split the two looked ripe. The United States had many

interests aside from Korea, most obviously the war in Vietnam. The United

States should wish to avoid another land war in Asia. Kim wanted to

increase the price of the United States staying in Korea beyond what it

would be willing to pay. He could use bloody, direct attacks or, through

provocations, induce the ROKs to demand a much heavier U.S. commitment.

Either way, the Americans might lose heart. Kim argued thusly: "In the

present situation the US imperialist should be dealt blows and their forces

dispersed to the maximum in all parts of the world and on every front-in

Asia and Europe, Africa and Latin America, and in all countries, big and

small. They should be bound hand and foot everywhere they set foot so

that they may not act arbitrarily."

Once America began to doubt itself or relinquish its role in Korea, then

the DPRK could shift to phase three: the incitement of a broad-based insurgency designed to topple the Park government. This would be marked by

"a rapid expansion of the revolutionary forces and an acceleration of the

democratic revolution for national liberation in every way." Kim implied

that the preparations for phase three would coincide with the phase two

struggle against United States forces in Korea. Whether the final takeover

would come by ground invasion or popular revolution remained unresolved

and depended upon the success of the insurgents.

Either way, the DPRK must be ready. Having announced his aim and

discussed his concept of operations, the northern leader threw the full

weight of his state's resources behind the undertaking. He directed the use

of "a combination of methods involving all kinds of struggle in correspondence to the objective and subjective situations: political struggle and

economic struggle, violent struggle and nonviolent struggle, and legal and

illegal struggle." By stressing "methods" rather than types of forces, Kim

sent an important message to his own armed services. Conventional or unconventional, all North Korean components would contribute.
36

The DPRK premier did not specify a timetable for his campaign, but

he did stress that "unification of the fatherland is the supreme national

task of our people and an urgent question which brooks no further delay."3

The public record contains nothing more definite. Kim Il-sung, however,

implied a possible completion date in another statement at the same party

conference. He pointedly extended the fulfillment of the Seven Year Plan

from October 1967 until October 1970.4 The course of later developments

seems to confirm this possible schedule. In any event, Kim left no doubt

that he expected swift progress.

Kim backed up his words with deeds. He fired the leaders of the KWP

Liaison Department, its subordinate Guerrilla Guidance Section, and the

associated KPA Propaganda and Instigation Bureau. These unfortunates

went off to penal camps. They had been judged too disorganized, too slow,

and altogether too soft.

In their stead, Kim turned to military hard-liners who promised quick,

dramatic results. To underscore this change of policy, he promoted a group

of generals drawn mainly from his old Kapsan band, veterans of the guerrilla fight against Japan from 1936-45. Six of eleven new Politburo

members came from this military faction.

The North Korean dictator also emphasized a new primacy for the KPA

Reconnaissance Bureau in running unconventional missions. Party propagandists and activists took backseats to army terrorists and commandos.

The KPA commenced a crash program to create elite special warfare contingents, which eventually became famous as the all-officer 124th and 283d

Army Units. But these superb outfits would not be ready until 1968. 5 Until

then, the Reconnaissance Bureau had to use what it had and could borrow,

to include party cadres, security formations, and regular military units.

Spurred by their supreme leader's vision and pressed by their newly

promoted generals, North Korean special operators went to work. This time,

as Kim Il-sung warned, the unwitting Americans were "target No. 1."6

First Blood

President Lyndon B. Johnson could not have chosen a worse time to

visit Seoul. General Bonesteel had been in command only about two months.

He spent most of that time trying to separate fact from fiction along the

DMZ. In the meantime, deadly incidents and rumors of future incidents

proliferated. The ROK First Army, for instance, reported numerous

skirmishes on its eastern part of the DMZ. The UNC took no action beyond

ordering defensive precautions. But the ROKs had put up with enough. Late

in October, frustrated South Koreans conducted a cross-border retaliatory

raid without seeking Bonesteel's approval. As a result, American KMAG

advisers argued with their ROK counterparts. The U.S. officers wanted to

prevent another armistice violation; Korean officers countered that the

Americans paid too little attention to ROK casualties. Tempers flared. Mean-
37

while, probably tipped off by their own intelligence, the North Koreans

struck again and again in the ROK Army areas, fanning dissension between

the allies.

Alarmed by the steady increase in violent incidents, the UNC raised

the alert status of all forces in the weeks prior to Johnson's arrival.

Bonesteel ordered especially stringent measures in the combined U.S.-ROK

I Corps (Group)-the "shield of Seoul"-which defended the western segment

of the DMZ. The U.S. 2d Infantry Division braced for trouble along the

DMZ. 7 More patrols went out, and each night, tanks rolled forward to play

their brilliant xenon searchlights across suspected infiltration lanes.

Unfazed by the rising wave of North Korean belligerence, President

Johnson came to Korea on 31 October, trailed by a bustling entourage of

more than 500 people. He met with President Park, U.S. Ambassador

Winthrop G. Brown, General Bonesteel, and American troops at Camp

Stanley-all in a frenzied forty-four hours.8 United Nations Command forces

remained ready, but the DPRK made no move against Johnson.

Instead, the North Koreans took action against Johnson's men. In the

predawn darkness on 2 November, while the American president slept near

Seoul under heavy guard, a KPA squad tracked an eight-man patrol from

Company A, 1-23 Infantry. The northerners, probably from the 17th Foot

Reconnaissance Brigade, paralleled the oblivious American soldiers. Once

the U.S. element reached a point about a kilometer south of the DMZ

President Lyndon B. Johnson

I,
38

proper, the North Koreans estimated that the Americans had relaxed their

vigilance. The Communist soldiers swung in ahead of the plodding

American file, assumed hasty ambush positions, and engaged the Americans

with hand grenades and submachine guns.

The U.S. squad disintegrated under a hail of bullets and grenade

fragments. Despite later wishful stories of heroics, six Americans and a

KATUSA went down almost instantly. A seventh American survived by

playing dead. The KPA troops pumped a few more bursts into some of the

corpses, plunged in a bayonet here and there, and disappeared into the

South Koreans welcoming President Lyndon Johnson to Korea
39

night. One northerner might have been wounded in the one-sided fight. The

sole American survivor ran for his life as soon as the attackers pulled out.

Almost simultaneously, another KPA squad surprised a patrol in ROK

First Army. Two South Koreans died before the northerners withdrew. 9 That

ended the shooting, but it was enough for one night. The twin strikes had

been well timed, well executed, and very effective.

If the North Koreans expected to make a political statement by these

terrorist attacks, they must have been gratified by the next day's news

headlines in the United States. The nearby presidential press corps, no

doubt bored by the routine diplomatic meetings and photo opportunities,

pounced on the bloody story of the lost U.S. patrol (almost wholly ignoring

the coincident ROK Army losses, not to mention previous southern battle

deaths). For one day, Korea displaced Vietnam from the front pages of

American newspapers.10 Then Johnson left for home and interest waned.

Bonesteel's interest did not subside, nor did that of his men and his

ROK allies. The general observed that these "vicious, provocative raids"

looked "considerably different from actions in previous years." Now, KPA

"hunter-killer" squads sought Americans. 11 But why? And what should be

done about it?

Bonesteel's Assessment

The general took it upon himself to address the problem. Had he been

less sure of his abilities, he might have turned to Ambassador Brown and

the rest of the "country team" in Korea. In compliance with the Mutual

Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the ambassador coordinated the diverse

U.S. organizations in Korea. He directed his own foreign service personnel

and supervised the local offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Agency

for International Development, and U.S. Information Service. Anywhere else,

Brown would have also controlled the activities of the U.S. military advisers

in country, although this was not the case in Korea thanks to the persistence of the wartime military command structure.

With its round table of competing bureaucracies chaired by a diplomat,

the country team model amounted to leadership by committee. It promised

little, however, in the face of the new northern aggression. In this instance

(because he could), Bonesteel chose to avoid the entire country team mess.

Unlike Westmoreland in Vietnam, Bonesteel did not have to report to

the ambassador with regard to operational matters. Under his hat as

commander in chief of UNC, he dealt directly with the secretary of defense

and, by extension, the president. His military status also helped him exert

influence on retired General Park Chung Hee and his administration of

former ROK Army men; after all, Bonesteel wielded operational control of

Park's South Korean military. While President Johnson required that

Bonesteel and his ambassador maintain "close relations," the general

interpreted this requirement liberally. While he coordinated closely with
40

Ambassador Brown, an old acquaintance, Bonesteel made his own

decisions.12

Thanks to his acute analytical powers, Bonesteel went beyond the

simple recognition that something unprecedented had occurred. By taking

the time to ask the right questions rather than rushing to act or blithely

resorting to usual responses, Bonesteel acknowledged the complexities of

his situation. He determined to find out why things had changed before

ordering countermeasures. Characteristically, he initiated measures himself

and ensured that his subordinates worked quickly once he issued his

guidance.

Bonesteel asked his intelligence officers for their judgments. "So," he

recalled, "I got the G-2 people together, all of them, and learned not too

damned much about what had been going on up north." The intelligence

staff regurgitated hard data on KPA organizations, weapons, training, locations, and recent DMZ activities. They also listed countless political,

economic, and social indicators. But none of the staff officers could find

any coherent pattern in the mass of detail.

Bonesteel could and did. He immersed himself in the issue in the days

following the 2 November attacks. Determined to understand the larger

purposes of the enemy's scheme, he ignored the mountain of sightings and

radio interceptions and went to the only source that really mattered: "I

personally read all the speeches that Kim Il-sung made the previous two

years," he said, "those that were overt and some that were semi-classified

that we had obtained in some way or another. This was pretty interesting

because he had developed a regular Mein Kampf."

Bonesteel's exhaustive research allowed him to trace the genesis and

content of Kim's October 1966 campaign plan. "He laid out his strategy for

the coming years," explained Bonesteel; "Reading it in the communist

dialectic lexicon, it was pretty plain what they were going to do or at least

try to do."1 3 Thus, within days of the DPRK double strike, Bonesteel

accurately discerned Kim Il-sung's intentions, to include the probable

sequence of major operational phases. 14 But how could the Communists be

stopped without starting a midintensity war?

Bonesteel had his own ideas, but he also had time. The days after

2 November were devoid of action as winter blew in throughout Korea.

With the parameters of the threat now clear, Bonesteel wanted to make use

of this lull to bring in other minds and other perspectives and to develop

solutions.

As early as 6 November, the general formed his brightest staff men

into a Special Working Group. Although the group enjoyed a broad charter

to scrutinize the entire Korean situation, Bonesteel did not just turn them

loose. The general gave specific guidance and suggestions and checked

frequently on the group's progress. To a great extent, the group's findings

and recommendations simply implemented Bonesteel's own original thinking.

There would be other studies, commanders' calls, visits, and fact-finding
41

conferences to study the Korean situation, most notably the definitive

Counterinfiltration-Guerrilla Concept Requirements Plan of late 1967. Even

so, the Special Working Group's report gave the first clear explanation of

Bonesteel's vision of how to fight and win this unexpected Second Korean

Conflict.

Bonesteel placed only one ironclad constraint on his Special Working

Group: he insisted on Korean participation in planning its country's defense.

The general made it clear to his key subordinates that he "wanted to put

the responsibility on the ROKs." 15 Given the rudimentary Korean representation in the American-dominated higher headquarters, this was a bold

move. From a counterinsurgency perspective, it proved essential.

The Doctrinal Void

American and Korean officers searching for countermeasures to the new

KPA threat relied on the same body of printed and schooled doctrine.

Unfortunately, that material described conventional solutions inappropriate

to unconventional problems. U.S. Army doctrine did not really allow for

the nature of the war under way in Korea and thus could only offer a few

half-baked practical hints.

Army doctrine at that time proposed a spectrum of conflict roughly

similar to that currently envisioned-but one described and analyzed hazily

at the lower end of the continuum. A command of Bonesteel's size would

refer to FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations Larger Units (corps to

theater), for doctrinal guidance. The 1966 edition identified the extremes of

the spectrum as cold war and general war ("unrestricted application of

military force," i.e., nuclear combat), with limited war in the gray area

between.

Korea in 1966 certainly fell short of general war. Was it a cold war or

a limited war? The manual's authors defined cold war this way: "a state of

international tension wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures, short of overt

armed conflict involving regular military forces, are employed to achieve

national objectives." That sounded like Korea, except there, regular forces

had joined the fray on both sides, and there had been overt armed conflict,

with more impending.

The Army described limited war as an "overt engagement" for limited

ends with limited means. These examples were provided: "local aggression,"

"conventional war," and "limited nuclear war." 16 Did Korea constitute "local

aggression," whatever that meant? There had certainly been overt

engagement.

This theoretical ambiguity characterized most of the U.S. Army doctrine

of that period. Contemporary doctrine visualizes a more fully developed

view of low-intensity conflict under the broad categories of peacekeeping,
42

A U.S. Army freight train falls victim to saboteurs north of Seoul, Korea, 13 September 1967
43

Low-Intensity Conflict (Cold War): U.S.-ROK Versus DPRK

Peacekeeping:

* U.S. membership in Military Armistice Commission, Panmunjom.

* U.S.-ROK DMZ duties under the Korean Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953.

Combating Terrorism:

* U.S.-ROK DMZ and coast anti-infiltration operations.

* ROK police/military counterterrorist operations.

* U.S.-ROK military antiterrorism operations.

Counterinsurgency:

· U.S.-ROK intelligence operations.

· U.S.-ROK combined joint-service exercises.

· U.S.-ROK civil-military infrastructure development.

· U.S.-ROK humanitarian and civic assistance (U.S. Eighth Army Cold War Program).

· U.S.-ROK logistics operations.

· ROK populace and resources control operations.

· U.S.-ROK DMZ coast anti-infiltration operations.

Contingencies:

* U.S. shows of force (USS Pueblo, EC-121 M incidents).

Midintensity Conflict (Limited War): U.S.-ROK versus DPRK

(with PRC*/USSR Support)

U.S.-ROK conventional defense of the Republic of Korea.

High-Intensity Conflict (General War): U.S.-ROK versus

DPRK and/or PRC and/or USSR

U.S.-ROK nuclear defense of the Republic of Korea.

U.S.-nuclear strikes on DPRK and/or PRC and/or USSR.

*People's Republic of China

Figure 5. The spectrum of conflict in Korea, 1966-69

combating terrorism, counterinsurgency, and contingencies. 17 Each of these

types of operations occurred during the Second Korean Conflict (see figure 5).

Today, U.S. Army field manuals (still too few, but some) explain how

to approach such operations. But doctrinal writers of the 1960s, because

they never really came to grips with the distinctive natures of limited versus

cold wars, mainly avoided the whole mess. A reader poring over FM 100-15

would find no further references to cold or limited wars beyond the definitions noted above. If he dug around, a diligent man might unearth a single,

bland paragraph on counterinsurgency or a short paragraph on unconventional warfare that explained the utility of pro-American partisans in enemy

rear areas. 18 The rest of the manual discussed what today would be called

midintensity conflict. Basically, FM 100-15, like its many relatives, told

soldiers how to refight World War II.
44

If one delved into the lower echelon division manual, FM 61-100 (1965

edition), one would find some practical, generic advice about small wars.

The divisional doctrine devoted almost two whole pages to "Cold War

Situations." It was a mixed bag, but at least it was something.

The doctrine writers had given the issue some thought. They warned of

the need to consider political implications and restrictions on tactical

methods and missions and warned a cold war commander to expect nonmilitary, "unpredictable factors" to influence his traditional battlefield ways.

In order to meet these demanding situations, the manual mentioned useful

training subjects for a cold war force: civil-military relations, local

language and customs, rules of engagement, patrolling, and counterinfiltration. Rotation of committed units was suggested to allow continued training

of troops on these difficult subjects. The eventual UNC approach took heed

of this information.

The rest of the material consisted of well-meaning drivel. One paragraph

called infantry battalions "well suited for the control of mobs and for the

suppression of riots and civil disorders." Another noted that armored

cavalry and tanks could be "effective in quelling riots." Aviation might

serve for reconnaissance, supply, liaison, and loudspeaker work; air assaults

received little consideration. A concluding paragraph recommended the use

of riot control chemicals as necessary. To read this, one might get the

impression that cold war operations equaled urban riot suppression.

The divisional doctrine had two other subjects of interest, under

separate headings. A half-page commentary on "counterinsurgency" called

the division "particularly well suited" to such missions-although no

particular proof supported this claim. In the "unconventional warfare"

section, the authors offered a contrast to illustrate their points about

guerrilla fighting. Whereas Special Forces (Green Berets) work in the enemy

rear, "the conventional forces are most generally concerned with guerrilla

warfare" in friendly areas. 19 There was no discussion of how to conduct

such operations, leading to the logical conclusion that they were to be

handled in traditional ways by conventional units "well suited" to such

actions.

With little to gain from the most common doctrinal sources, what of

the more specialized manuals? The U.S. Army's "31-series" purported to

address small wars, but by the 1960s, these works generally offered

guidance written by and for Special Forces. While theoretically interesting,

they all presumed the availability of Special Forces elements in theater.

Bonesteel had no Green Berets in Korea. He did, however, have a lowintensity conflict.

Only one "31-series" manual directly addressed conventional forces in

unconventional wars: FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations. This work

encouraged the U.S. commander to employ his superior mobility and firepower to find, fix, fight, and finish guerrillas. Local forces were only useful

as trackers, interpreters, and in some static security jobs. Killing guerrillas
45

equaled victory. Standard U.S. Army tactics and powerful U.S. Army units

would suffice for that. Since American forces were to carry the brunt of the

fight to kill guerrillas, it made sense that they should be used as mobile

reserves, not tied down in defense of fixed locations, such as at borders.

The authors of FM 31-16 recommended that frontier security operations

"be conducted by indigenous forces to economize on the available (U.S.)

military combat power which can be better utilized against the guerrilla

force." To handle a trace like the DMZ against an unconventional threat,

FM 31-16 would turn the whole thing over to the South Koreans in order

to free up stronger U.S. units to pounce on guerrillas in the interior.20 That

concept, described in four pages, was about the only printed U.S. Army

doctrine that specifically applied to Bonesteel's predicament in Korea. And

it was wrong.

Obviously, perfect hindsight enables one to find much fault with U.S.

Army LIC doctrine of the 1960s. But at the time, most of it had yet to be

called into question-nor would it be until much later, well after the end of

the Vietnam War. 21 Nothing written or taught as U.S. Army doctrine

discussed peacekeeping, actions against terrorists, or contingency operations

under any heading, even though U.S. forces, including those in Korea, did

such missions throughout the 1960s. Doctrinal authors of that era also

appeared blissfully unaware of the political dangers of a "go it alone"

Americanized approach to small wars.

So not much applicable doctrine existed, and what did might well be

considered counterproductive. Given that Bonesteel's U.S. and ROK forces

had been steeped in this inadequate doctrine, two alternatives existed. First,

the United Nations Command could fight a conventional war against the

North Korean infiltrators, modifying standard U.S. Army tactics as

necessary to adjust to local conditions. This reflected the choice eventually

adopted in Vietnam, where, under this approach, General Westmoreland best

expressed the preferred means for defeating insurgents and intruders:

"Firepower."2 2 Of course, in Korea, that probably meant a major war-and

hence failure to achieve one of Bonesteel's principal strategic objectives.

With war raging in Vietnam, Bonesteel knew that he had to stop the DPRK

in the low-intensity arena-not escalate to the midintensity realm. One

Asian war was enough. "I was trying to maintain the peace," he said, "so

we wouldn't have to fight another one in Korea."23

A second path beckoned. It would involve junking the approved

doctrinal framework and inventing unique tactics suited to Korea. Although

appealing to Bonesteel's unorthodox streak, this course of action entailed a

huge risk. Could the Americans and ROKs, trained for conventional combat,

play their required parts in such an effort? True, the general could retrain

his own U.S. Army units, subject to the debilitations of inadequate strength

and short tours. The real challenges involved dealing with the U.S. Air

Force, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marines, and especially the ROKs, who

enshrined U.S. doctrine as near holy writ. Bonesteel did not control their
46

internal structures, training, or doctrine-save by whatever suasion he could

milk from his powers of operational control.

Faced with a doctrinal void and the desire to keep things at a low

intensity, Bonesteel trusted his instincts. He cut the umbilical cord. The

United Nations Command began to invent its own doctrine to meet its

needs. "So," recounted Bonesteel, "we developed these tactics and efforts to

get ahead, especially in the DMZ, and I was looking for any kind of idea."24

Bonesteel's Special Working Group issued a preliminary report in

January 1967. By February, the UNC had started to implement the key

recommendations. Based on this study and his personal investigations,

Bonesteel recognized that his troops had to conduct three types of

operations to beat back the North Korean surge. The first involved "developing a guard against infiltration across the DMZ." The second comprised

a similar naval effort along the seacoasts. The third type of operation

conceived of counterguerrilla operations in the interior-"an entirely different

concept" from the first two tasks.2 5 All three types of operations had to be

accomplished without jeopardizing the conventional defense of the ROK.

Anti-Infiltration: The DMZ

Of the three tasks, the land anti-infiltration role most resembled a conventional mission. A manual prepared from the U.S. Eighth Army

experience of the late 1960s said: "Border security/anti-infiltration operations

follow all the normal doctrinal principles found in the traditional concepts

of defense." 26 If a force knew how to conduct an area defense, it could

guard the DMZ against both conventional and unconventional threats.

In light of the real dangers of a northern invasion, it only made sense

to employ the bulk of the conventionally trained U.S.-ROK forces doing the

sorts of things that they would do in a midintensity war. They would not

necessarily maintain those skills chasing guerrillas through the hinterlands

of South Korea. Bonesteel explained that "the front-line US and ROK

divisions are responsible for both the DMZ security mission and the defense

mission." 2 7

That sounded like the same old approach along the DMZ, and in a

sense, it was. There was nothing inherently wrong in what the UNC forces

were doing; how they were doing it created the trouble. Traditional doctrine

alone guaranteed more casualties at the hands of KPA elite forces.

Bonesteel could not sit back and let his subordinates resolve these

issues. American officers already had their hands full simply running their

understrength, underofficered units. The Koreans, for their part, equated

most kinds of improvisation to disobedience. With Kim Il-sung's special

forces promising a rapid expansion of the campaign in the spring, Bonesteel

needed a comprehensive approach, not just a spotty amalgam of random

experimentation. After soliciting other views, Bonesteel decided how to fight

on the DMZ. As part of his plan, he directed and, more often, encouraged
47

and disseminated others' good ideas. His most important initiatives affected

tactics along the DMZ, but he made sure to enhance these new procedures

by looser rules of engagement and an integrated DMZ rotation and training

plan.

Bonesteel addressed anti-infiltration tactics that detected, delayed, and

neutralized intruders. 28 Though fairly capable at neutralization, both the

Americans and the South Koreans needed work at detecting and delaying

infiltrators. Prior to 1967, most detection occurred by chance, and delay

was bought by bloody meeting engagements. Throughout 1967, the UNC

evolved a four-layer defense against infiltration. Not only did the defense

have to work, but it had to comply with the armistice agreement and do so

without draining troops needed for ground defense against conventional

invasion. The UNC tested its concepts in the U.S. 2d Infantry Division

and the ROK 21st Infantry Division. In a bureaucratic maneuver worthy of

the experienced Washington insider that he was, Bonesteel cajoled the U.S.

Army Combat Developments Command into giving him some $30 million

to create a "DMZ/Barrier testbed" based on his two experimental divisions.29

In these two divisions, and eventually across the peninsula, four antiinfiltration tiers fell into place. Patrols in the DMZ; guard posts in the

DMZ; a new barrier defense system; and new, mobile quick-reaction forces

cooperated to find infiltrators, fix them, and destroy them (see figure 6).30

Patrols had been going out into the DMZ since the armistice, but for

the Americans, these had degenerated into rather pro forma affairs in the

long, dull decade after 1953. The 2 November ambush changed that: "The

days are gone," mused a U.S. sergeant, "when you could ride out to the

DMZ with just a driver, wearing a soft cap."31 By mid-1967, U.S. patrolling

became a very serious business. An American colonel explained that these

patrols endeavored "by their presence to deny the area to the north

Koreans and to search for signs of enemy activity, hiding places, and infiltration routes."

Squads and platoons patrolled, sometimes as units, sometimes as ad

hoc formations. Armistice rules prevented use of machine guns and

recoilless rifles. Routes wove in front of, behind, and between the string of

guard posts planted in the allied half of the DMZ. Typically, each company

had one patrol out at all times, with more after dark and during periods of

tension. Patrols tended to go out for twenty-four hours, reconnoitering by

day and establishing ambushes at night. Compositions, routes, and timings

changed in attempts to confuse the KPA.

Patrolling received command emphasis, but U.S. units never achieved

the proficiency of their ROK allies, let alone that of the stealthy North

Korean recon troops. A brigade commander conceded that U.S. units "took

the most casualties while on patrol."3 2 Some of these losses could be

attributed to skilled enemies, but many U.S. deaths and wounds arose from

inexperienced, inept, or inattentive leadership. Concerned senior commanders

tried to reach down and provide the leadership absent from U.S. units. One
48

ENEMY PORTION OF DMZ

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE _ . . . .. ., = __

PATROLS

^< / X PATROLS

Ac^-A A iA A4-ZA

Observation/guard posts (as allowed by 27 Jul 53 armistice)

SOUTH EDGE OF DEMILITARIZED ZONE ("SOUTH TAPE")

A

----- X--- X-- -X- X -X- X

SOUTH BARRIER FENCE-REINFORCED CHAIN-LINK FENCE

Electronic sensor belt (if used) Raked sand/dirt "footprint" strip

DEFOLIATED FIELDS OF FIRE

|° O oO | Minefield

LrLrSL-Lu

Platoon defensive position

* * 0

I

Minefield 0 0 0 0

n nsiv ition

Platoon defensive position

1 oo

Figure 6. UNC anti-infiltration dispositions (idealized example)

brigade commander required an officer from each company to be on patrol

in the DMZ at all times and supplemented this order with "frequent officers'

calls, continuous supervision, on-the-spot corrections, and some wholesale

butt-chewings." 33 Unnecessary casualties occurred anyway, right down to

the end. Bonesteel acknowledged this sloppy U.S. patrolling by caustically

granting that "the best counterinfiltration devices were the eyes, ears, and

brains of the GI, if you could keep him awake." 34
49

The ROKs took casualties, too, despite their better discipline. Proportionate to their strength, though-and even with their many other rolesthe ROK Army maintained a lower casualty rate than the American

troops.3 5 The U.S. forces' proximity to Seoul and the main infiltration routes

accounted for part of this. On the whole, though, the ROK Army's more

cohesive and rigorously trained units patrolled more effectively than their

American allies. Did all of these patrols catch many North Koreans? Statistically speaking, they did not. But their constant presence, like policemen

on neighborhood beats, complicated and delayed KPA intrusion plans.

In a similar way, the small squad and platoon guard posts in the

Demilitarized Zone served as static surveillance sites and bases of fire for

beleaguered patrols. Americans stretched the armistice provisions by sandbagging and entrenching these positions. Despite armistice prohibitions

against such weapons in the zone, troops often kept machine guns and

recoilless rifles hidden but ready for use if needed. 36

U.S. units rotated through these posts for stretches of seven to ten days.

Except during relatively rare, direct KPA attacks, the troops followed a

fairly standard routine. During the day, soldiers on guard post duty rested,

trained on small-unit tactics, and rebuilt or extended their field fortifications. At night, they came to full alert. Thanks to Bonesteel's $30 million

windfall, the posts often had night-vision devices to watch the DMZ. Hand

flares and searchlights also contributed to visibility.

As with patrols, the ROKs played the outpost game better than the

Americans. Some U.S. soldiers, said one officer, treated the guard posts as

rest areas. Some did not wash or maintain equipment unless closely

supervised. Inspections revealed "dirty, bent, and generally unserviceable"

ammunition. Part of this resulted from primitive conditions in the newer

bunker complexes, especially during the brutal winter. Mostly, though, it

was another symptom of weak junior leadership.37

To support the guard posts, Bonesteel, employing his engineering skills,

introduced a new barrier defense system incorporating common backyard

chain-link fence. The barrier defense system ran along the south trace of

the DMZ. Nagging armistice regulations did not apply here, so the UNC

could turn its full panoply of assets to the problems of detecting, delaying,

and neutralizing infiltrators.

The system centered around a chain-link fence, ten feet tall, topped by

triple strands of concertina wire and reinforced by interwoven saplings and

steel engineer pickets. A narrow, raked-sand path paralleled the fence on

the allied side to highlight footprints. Just past the sand strip lay a 120-

meter-wide kill zone cleared with plows, chain saws, axes, and chemical

defoliants. In that area, mines and tanglefoot wire fronted a line of

conventional defensive positions. From there, defenders used a final

protective line of interlocking machine guns and on-call mortar and artillery

concentrations to dominate the kill zone. Observation towers stood at
50

intervals along the trace to permit clear view of the open areas. Local

patrols checked the fence line and covered dead ground between positions.

It took a combined U.S.-Korean engineer force about two months to

finish the test fence in the American sector. Along with the fence, engineers laid mines, built roads to allow quick movements laterally and forward,

and cleared dozens of helicopter landing zones. Similar efforts went on in

front of the ROK 21st Infantry Division.38

Due to his agreement with Combat Developments Command, Bonesteel

required his test units to try out a veritable toy store of futuristic Starlight Scope night-vision devices, helicopter-mounted "people sniffers," electrical

fence proposals, and unattended ground sensors. It was, after all, the

heyday of the "McNamara Line" in Vietnam and the supposed advent of

the electronic battlefield. The night illuminating devices proved very useful,

and one model of electrical fence functioned well, although it cost too much

for widespread use.

The sensors posed special problems. Various types detected seismic

vibrations, ground pressure changes, body odors, magnetic disturbances,

infrared sources, and acoustic disruptions. Unfortunately, rain, wind,

passing trucks, and wandering animals tripped the sensors so often that

their indications proved meaningless. Moreover, soldiers detested emplacing, guarding, and maintaining the temperamental things. Scientists brought model after model for evaluation, but none really worked.

The fence and its ancillary devices came in for harsh criticisms.

Whispers in the Pentagon spoke of "Bonesteel's Folly." Correspondent Wesley Pruden, Jr., remarked that "many Texas ranches have fences

against frisky steers that are almost as effective." The notion of merely fencing off the ROK seemed simplistic, and the continual misadventures

with the sensors only made the attempt seem more futile. Sneering mounted

as the fence began to show triangular cuts six to ten inches above the

ground. UNC intelligence officers estimated that it took about thirty to forty seconds for the North Koreans to cut through. 3 9

Troops patrolling the rugged terrain along the DMZ

*IQ)

Q,

1o

I
51

These critiques missed the mark. Bonesteel had no special love for new

technology-only for new ideas. By accepting the Combat Developments

Command funding and designation as a test bed, Bonesteel had to tolerate

the bad with the good. At the same time, the parade of scientists pumped

badly needed money and equipment into the UNC's bargain-basement war

effort.

In preference to a space-age cordon, the general promoted pragmatic

answers. He particularly enjoyed an idea developed in the ROK 21st

Infantry Division. The enterprising Korean commander planted a hybrid

strain of very light-colored buckwheat all along the fence. "You could spot

something in that white area at about three times the distance you could

where you didn't have the white background," observed Bonesteel. It worked

quite well with the night scopes too. Plus, the ROKs harvested and ate the

wheat in the autumn. Bonesteel made it a point to show the buckwheat to

visiting scientists. "I was not looking for a technological solution,"

summarized the general. 40

Bonesteel never expected the fence to block enemy infiltration. "It was

never intended to be a barrier but was designed to hamper easy movement

and provided clear observation on either side of it. ... It was hard to get

through one way or the other without leaving traces," said Bonesteel. These

traces served to alert the other new markers on the board-the mobile quickreaction forces (QRFs). 4 1

All echelons, both U.S. and ROK, kept QRFs. They varied in size but

often consisted of a reinforced squad in each forward company, a platoon

at battalion level, a company at brigade, and a battalion/squadrons per

division. Usually built around mechanized infantry, tanks, armored cavalry,

or even the few available helicopters, these units waited-locked and

loaded-to neutralize KPA intruders. The U.S. 2d Infantry Division

supplemented its QRF with a five-platoon Counter Agent Company drawn

from the division's KATUSAs.42 The QRFs went to many false alarms, but

they also tracked down and eliminated quite a few infiltrators.

No one part of the DMZ defenses could stem infiltration, but the sum

of the four layers produced a synergistic effect that surely made KPA

efforts much more daunting. The KPA had found it challenging but quite

possible to slip through the old network of DMZ patrols and posts.

Reinforced patrols and guard posts made that passage less sure, and the

barrier fence and associated quick-reaction forces threatened dangers going

in or out. All of this had been done at little monetary cost and virtually no

change in the UNC's readiness for midintensity war.

Good as the system might be, the crucial barrier fence that tied it

together still spanned only two divisional fronts in 1967-pending more

funding. Bonesteel could not guarantee added resources sufficient to finish

the fence. He could and did take actions to make all of his DMZ forces

more effective, with or without the new barrier.
52

In response to the strong recommendations of his Special Working Group, General Bonesteel loosened the rules of engagement in early 1967.

"The north Koreans were using our half of the DMZ as a kind of

sanctuary," noted the general. "They'd go in and camp there for three or

four nights and scout out our guard posts and the little ROK posts at the

southern end of the DMZ, then they would raid them. So, we changed the

rules a bit."

The UN commander in chief gave the commanding generals of I Corps (Group) and ROK First Army the authority to employ artillery and mortar

fires against known enemy elements in or south of the DMZ. He also

permitted these subordinates to use artillery and mortars against KPA units

shooting from hostile territory. In mid-April, ROK units made use of these

modifications when they fired howitzer rounds across the DMZ in response

to a large KPA probe. This was the first UN use of artillery since the

armistice.4 3

Bonesteel justified his changes in terms of his "overriding responsibility

for taking care of the troops." When he sent a copy of his message back to

Washington, he remembered: "I didn't ask for approval, but I gave them

the opportunity to disapprove." 44 The Joint Chiefs and Secretary Robert S.

McNamara let the new rules stand as issued.

American soldiers have always enjoyed the right of self-defense,

especially on the troubled DMZ. Bonesteel's explicit new rules of engagement made it clear that U.S. troops need not wait to get shot at. Any infiltrator trying to cross the DMZ became fair game. The news made an

immediate impression on the fighting front. Asked by a reporter if his men

could fire on hostiles, a brigade staff officer retorted: "Yes, sir, we can and

we do." Another officer explained that "we do not fire across the MDL

unless fired upon. However, when North Korean troops cross the MDL, we

attempt to capture or kill them."45

If taken in isolation, these new rules might have led to the same

massive use of firepower that often pummeled snipers and infiltrators in

Vietnam. This did not happen in Korea. The ROKs used significant artillery

and mortar fires along the DMZ only three times during the Second Korean

Conflict; they used big guns sparingly in their later counterguerrilla sweeps

farther to the south. The U.S. units never employed their mighty supporting fires. 46 A number of South Korean civilians lived within artillery range of

the DMZ and in the vicinity of counterinsurgent operations. Certainly,

many would have suffered had things been done differently.

Why did the allies forfeit their most responsive, devastating form of

combat power? Partially, this reflected the nature of combat in this conflict.

Possibly for fear of retaliation from the massed, capable UN artillery, North

Korean gunners on the DMZ seldom fired their own tubes unless covering

the withdrawal of an agent team in contact. Sea intruders could not move

rapidly inland if forced to lug bulky cannons or even mortars ashore, and

KPN watercraft did not loiter to deliver fire support at clandestine drop
53

sites. Armistice provisions also figured in, with neither side anxious to

commit massive violations and provoke a midintensity war.

General Bonesteel's repeated emphasis upon stopping the northerners

with manpower, not firepower, probably resulted in the UN resorting to

less cannon gunnery along the DMZ and in the ROK interior. Detecting

and slowing KPA agents could cause these lightly armed teams to be pinpointed and exposed to the direct fires of allied small units, which were

more than able to finish off the hostiles. Even the threat of running into

such responses confounded KPA planners. By making infiltration harder

and by not killing North Koreans, the UN regulated its response to

aggression. When it got too hard to stay covert, Bonesteel thought that

Kim Il-sung would have to turn off his shadow war or risk accelerating it

into conventional combat.

Artillery fires might contribute a little to the neutralization stage of

anti-infiltration tactics, but in general, barraging a squad or platoon

amounted to overkill, with potentially crippling side effects. The UN

commander in chiefs reticence to use artillery flew in the face of the

American custom of "send a bullet, not a man" and might have even cost

a few allied lives and wounds. But Bonesteel single-mindedly pursued his

overall objective. He knew that blowing up a friendly country and its

friendly populace merited little in a guerrilla struggle, even if a few more

infiltrators, or a few less friendlies, died. Keeping the allegiance of the

South Koreans mattered more than kill ratios. "I wasn't much for body

count," remarked Bonesteel.4 7 The UN's big guns remained silent.

Watchful members of Company C, 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, survey the DMZ for infiltrators
54

In addition to tactical innovations and liberalized rules of engagement,

Bonesteel also ensured that his DMZ divisions instituted a sensible DMZ

training and rotation plan (see figure 7). Here again, the general followed

the recommendations of his Special Working Group. The unique aspects of

the DMZ required special, intensive training, especially in light of the

Americans' usual problems with personnel turbulence and inexperienced

leaders. Conversely, units stuck on the DMZ too long might lose their ability

to maneuver on a midintensity battlefield. Saddled with both the lowintensity and midintensity missions, the U.S. and ROK armies compromised

and went with an orderly rotation. Mandatory, exhaustive pre-DMZ

training, to include orientation patrols in the zone for small-unit leaders,

reduced the vulnerability of newly arrived battalions on the zone. Each

battalion also was exposed to only its "fair share" of DMZ danger-an

important morale consideration.

As they trained for the DMZ, units mounted local patrols in the vicinity

of their camps. These were not just dull practice runs; a threat to the rear,

though not as bad as on the zone, really existed. North Korean terrorist

bombings, minings, and snipping-exemplified by the May 1967 demolition

of an American barracks-helped make all patrols important. Units in depth,

like the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, grew especially adept at conducting

these security measures.

In the process, both U.S. and ROK forces sharpened their battle focus

throughout their forward unit areas, keeping all battalions actively involved,

not just the forward units and QRFs. Consequently, terrorist strikes dropped

off in 1968, even though other types of incidents peaked in that violent

Training

Week 0 Battalion notified of upcoming DMZ duty.

Weeks 1-7 Squad/platoon training; weapons qualification; "Quick Kill" courses; patrolling techniques.

Weeks 8-13 Company/battalion exercises; Expert Infantryman's Badge Test; Battalion

Operational Readiness Test (including 17- to 25-mile foot march).

Weeks 14-16 Barrier operations; DMZ reaction/orientation course; night firing; sniper

marksmanship; division command inspection.

Rotation Rules

1. Each battalion served about four months.

2. One new battalion relieved the most "senior" DMZ battalion each full-moon phase (about

once a month).

3. The brigade headquarters (3d Brigade, U.S. 2d Infantry Division and "4th Brigade" [actually

2d Brigade, U.S. 7th Infantry Division] did not rotate.

4. The U.S. 2d Infantry Division Quick-Reaction Force was often located in the area of operations of the DMZ brigades and usually operated under the operational control of a forward

brigade.

Sources: United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, 3d Brigade, "Annual Historical Supplement 1968"; United States Army, 2d Infantry

Division, 2d Brigade, "Annual Historical Supplement 1969"; and Colonel William R. Guthrie, United States Army, "Korea: The Other

DMZ," Infantry 60 (March-April 1970):18.

Figure 7. U.S. manuever battalion DMZ training and rotation plan (initiated October 1967)
55

year. The allies fully exploited training patrols to promote rear-area security

and thus quelled the terrorist challenge while increasing proficiency for the

primary DMZ task.

In the U.S. sector, these changes went into effect during the autumn.

One more battalion, drawn from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, joined the

3d Brigade, U.S. 2d Infantry Division, along the zone. This beefed up U.S.

forces to four frontline battalions and one QRF. 4 8 ROK units took similar

measures. Even allowing for this modest increase of strength in and along

the DMZ, the vast majority of U.S. Eighth Army's subordinate I Corps

(Group) and ROK First Army remained off the zone, ready to deal with a

conventional ground invasion.

Anti-infiltration: The Sea Approaches

Unlike the effort to contain infiltration along the DMZ, the fight against

sea intruders portended nothing but headaches. The Republic of Korea's

coruscated coasts stretched almost twenty-eight times the length of the

DMZ-an incredible frontier to try to protect. Without any U.S. Navy or

Coast Guard ships at his disposal, and with his U.S. Air Force squadrons

busy watching for a North Korean air strike, General Bonesteel had to rely

almost wholly on the ROKs to do the mission.

This sort of sea operation was not merely a variation on a conventional

mission. It bore little resemblance to normal U.S. Navy tasks. In America,

such duties devolve upon the Coast Guard and local police forces. U.S.

sailors had their hands full trying to generate a coastal interdiction

capability off Vietnamese shores. Few human or material resources could

be spared for Korea. 4 9 Bonesteel's tiny U.S. Navy component could offer

little in the way of relevant advice or equipment.

Bonesteel was no sailor, but he recognized the broad outlines of the

problem. With the help of U.S. and ROK seamen, airmen, and soldiers, he

went to work. Halting infiltration by water required a sea barrier, a landbased detection system to identify infiltrators, some means of local defense

to fix the enemy, and on-call QRFs to finish the job. 50 Some parts of these

systems existed, although not always in useful form.

The sea barrier sought to sort enemy craft from among the hundreds

of South Korean fishing vessels that plied the ROK coasts. An ideal system

would feature long-duration radar-equipped patrol planes (like the U.S.

Navy's P-3 Orion) ranging out to 100 kilometers. Ground-based coastal

radar, scanning out to twenty kilometers, backed up these aircraft. The

planes and radars would handle initial detection and pass suspicious

surface contacts on to patrol boats working twenty to sixty kilometers out.

Heliborne boarding parties and fighter-bombers on strip alert waited, ready

to join the fray if the patrol boats needed help. Such an integrated structure

depended upon a lot of communications and reliable radars.5 1

In 1967, South Korea's sea barrier consisted mainly of the small ROK

Navy. This force totaled a paltry seventy-two vessels-only about half in
56

any way suited for coastal duties. The ROK Air Force also stood ready to

dispatch a few flights of jet fighter-bombers when called. Neither service

had long-duration patrol planes, advanced radars, or adequate communications. Only a few coastal radar sites existed, mostly near ROK or U.S.

Navy facilities. 52

The sea barrier provided a nuisance to infiltrators, but distinguishing

friend from foe confounded the ROKs even in those cases where they

thought they had targets. Pitched engagements with intruders rarely

occurred. The only solid success of 1967 came in April, when navy (ROKN)

patrol boats and air force (ROKAF) fighters cooperated to sink a North

Korean espionage vessel.53 In the main, though, the ROK sea barrier was

an ambitious enterprise that could not directly suppress infiltration.

Land-based detection relied mainly on about 200,000 unarmed coast

watchers who reported to the National Police. These local people,

occasionally supplemented by ROK Army reservists, patrolled the beachfronts. They rarely detected any landings in progress but often found traces

of landings that activated reaction forces and led to kills and captures. In

June, coast watchers near Samchok found one of the KPN's specially

designed agent boats stranded on the shore. Clues from this boat led to a

massive search, unearthed a talkative prisoner, and unmasked other

operatives. 54

The unarmed coast watchers could detect, but they could hardly hope

to engage, armed special forces teams. In 1967, no armed local units were

on hand to delay intruders until regulars arrived. Provincial police lacked

the firepower, mobility, training, and numbers to do the job. 55 Many trails

grew cold while diligent watchmen waited for help to arrive.

A village militia, like that in the DPRK, could have provided this

missing piece to the anti-infiltration puzzle. But with demonstrations and

rioting in Seoul during the May-June 1967 elections and clear indications

of a northern guerrilla effort under way, President Park showed an understandable reluctance to issue arms to the general populace. Instead, the

ROKs relied on military quick-reaction forces. By late 1967, these included

ROK Army regulars, reservists, and men of the hundred-odd new Combat

Police companies organized from the National Police ranks. 56

With few helicopters and few communications links (either radio or

telephone) to the coast watchers or each other, these strong forces hardly

ever arrived in time to catch KPA infiltration teams before they dispersed.

The ROKs fragmented command between the disparate agencies involved,

which discouraged speedy reactions. Kills and captures resulted-but only

after prodigious expenditures of time and resources and often only with the

loan of the few available American Huey helicopters. 5 7

Sea infiltration could not be stopped, but the interlopers could be

tracked and eliminated-if the ROK properly coordinated its activities. The

humble coast watchers exemplified the sort of solution that might make up
57

for missing radars and absent patrol planes. But in 1967, the Korean

government was not yet ready to go that route.

Counterinsurgency: The Interior

The Samchok agent boat gave the first hard evidence that the

northerners had begun earnest preparations for the third and decisive phase

of Kim Il-sung's unconventional campaign. "They [Kim's agents] were

targeted against a specific region or province of the south. They were

developing, in effect, an infrastructure, the gauleiters, the pseudo-government

officials," concluded Bonesteel. 58

The South Koreans immediately recognized the hazard. Alarmed, they

turned to the Americans. Bonesteel remembered: "They pretty much wanted

CINCUNC to be responsible for anti-agent activities all over the country."

The general flatly rejected this. "I reminded them," he said, "they were a

sovereign country, and I, as the UN commander, was only responsible for

the DMZ and the sea approaches. However, internal security was their

responsibility." With that statement, Bonesteel reaffirmed the U.S. policy in

effect since 1950. 59

As tempting as full authority might have appeared, General Bonesteel

knew it was an illusion. Most likely, once they saw the true magnitude of

the measures necessary, the ROKs would not cede to an American the

degree of domestic political power essential to meet an incipient insurgency.

Bonesteel could end up with responsibility without authority, and the ROK

government, thinking that the UNC was doing the job, might well become

dangerously vulnerable to North Korea's unconventional campaign.

But what if the ROKs awarded Bonesteel unprecedented prerogatives?

That might well provide an even better opening for the DPRK. Kim I1-

sung, who regularly charged Bonesteel with such dictatorial powers anyway,

would point to the situation as proof that Park's administration really was

composed of nothing but puppets. Thus, Kim could declare himself the only

true Korean nationalist, an assertion hard for Park to refute with an

American general running much of his country. That might have been

enough to sway sympathies in the ROK villages.

So Bonesteel stuck to material assistance and advice. He loaned his

allies his precious helicopters and U.S. communications equipment. He even

parceled out a few valuable A-Teams, coaxed during the summer from the

1st Special Forces on Okinawa; the Green Berets worked in the Taebaek

and southern Chiri Mountain regions. 60 But the American general

adamantly refused to run this internal war for the South Koreans.

ROK counterinsurgency operations, while not lacking in enthusiasm or

scale, granted the initiative to the Communists. Throwing unit after unit of

regulars and police at possible contacts made sense as long as the contacts

remained few in number and uncoordinated with DPRK conventional

threats. Both of those variables looked certain to change for the worse as
58

Kim Il-sung's forces shifted into the guerrilla uprising phase of their

campaign plan. Confused command structures, lack of dedicated counterinsurgency units, and a purely reactive mind-set all conspired to render the

vigorous ROK operations inefficient and, too often, ineffective. During his

frequent meetings with President Park, Ministry of Defense officials,

intelligence directors, and ROK armed forces chiefs, Bonesteel urged them

to unify command of the counterguerrilla effort. The ROKs politely listened

but continued in their own way. "They made some mistakes," admitted

Bonesteel.

As it was, ROK Army commanders and National Police officials alternately took charge of ad hoc task forces, depending upon the initial estimate

of the threat and who happened to be nearby. Army counterintelligence

and the Korean CIA ran independent missions, only occasionally consulting

with the army or police. While not the best way to do business against

guerrillas, this diffused arrangement nicely balanced the key power brokers

in Park's administration, allowing each a piece of the action. 61

For the same reason, the ROKs chose not to establish any special

counterinsurgency units. Which agency would get the new forces, and how

would they affect that agency's influence in state affairs? These were

important considerations. Besides, the current delicate balance seemed to

be getting the job done. To date, the army-police lash-up had worked, just

as it had from 1950-53.62

Finally, the ROK government responded to North Korean insurgent

threats as they arose. No concerted effort mobilized the South Korean people

against the guerrilla organizers. Park and his lieutenants failed to link their

military and police operations with an alternative mass movement to

counter Kim Il-sung's Juche ideology (a Korean nationalist interpretation

of Marx, Lenin, and Mao).

Park and his men expected their people to report irregularities. Still,

Park chose not to trust his citizens to defend themselves. Unarmed and

mostly uninformed, the people posed no threat to Park-but neither did they

threaten outside agitators. Having created a coup and seen plenty of public

unrest, Park played it safe. In doing so, however, he missed an early

opportunity to harness the energies of what turned out to be a very loyal

population. 63 He would correct this oversight under dire pressure early in

1968.

Yet the lessons learned in counterinsurgent warfare during 1967 did

not go unrecorded or unanalyzed-far from it. Bonesteel and Park coordinated to produce two important documents near the end of 1967. Together,

the UNC Counterinfiltration-Guerrilla Concept Requirements Plan and the

ROK Presidential Instruction #18 charted the future course of combined

operations against DPRK unconventional pressures.

The UNC plan codified all of the successful improvisations of the year.

It addressed the DMZ, the coasts, and the interior. The core of the plan

lay in its forecasts of necessary items: helicopters, radios, xenon search-
59

lights, night-vision devices, and the vital chain-link fencing. If someone

asked, Bonesteel had his shopping list ready. In 1967, nobody was asking.

The ROK presidential instruction tied into the UNC plan. It showed

that all of Bonesteel's arguments and suggestions had not fallen on deaf

ears. When implemented in full, his instruction would remedy the command

controversies and lack of dedicated counterinsurgency formations. Park

directed the establishment of a national coordinating council to reduce

command friction. Under this concept, even the previously unfettered

intelligence people came to heel. The president spelled out clear chains of

command for all classes of incidents ranging from individual agent

sightings to province-level unrest. The ROK president also ordered the

creation of eight (later ten) new ROK Army counterinfiltration battalions,

as well as further expansion of the new Combat Police. He stopped short

of authorizing a popular militia, however.

In the words of Bonesteel's aide, Lieutenant Colonel Walter B. Clark,

"Presidential Instruction #18 was a total systems approach to the infiltration problem." This all required several months to fall completely into place,

but important decisions had been made.

So the Americans needed money, and the South Koreans needed time.

Despite painful casualties suffered in the learning process, the Republic of

Korea remained intact and strong. Bonesteel thought they were on the right

course. He would find out soon enough, as the Second Korean Conflict

moved to its climax in the cold snows of a grim January.

i ·

A Continuous Nightmare

Communist north Korea has made 1968 the bloodiest year in Korea since

1953.

-Gilbert H. Woodward

Major General, U.S. Army,

representative at Panmunjom, 1968

Allied losses in 1967 increased dramatically in comparison to previous

years. In accord with Kim Il-sung's new intent, Americans suffered some

especially sharp reverses both on patrols and in their rear areas, with sixteen killed and more than fifty wounded. ROK casualties also climbed to

over 100 killed and more than 200 wounded. About seventy-five South

Koreans died or fell injured in fighting around their villages.1

Still, while a matter of great concern to both the Americans and the

ROKs, these losses had not caused either country's government to question

the validity of their alliance. In fact, General Bonesteel and President Park

seemed to be working more closely together than ever. Their military forces

showed signs of developing useful anti-infiltration and counterguerrilla

capabilities. At the same time, the ROK populace remained, at best, apathetic toward the North Korean interlopers and far more often were exceedingly hostile.

What was going wrong? Due to lack of numbers, Kim Il-sung's covert

forces simply could not mount an unconventional offensive on the scale

necessary to shake the United Nations Command. Nor had the KPA proved

adept at striking at sensitive targets certain to generate U.S.-ROK discord.

Most of the attacks simply struck average American and ROK soldiers.

Although more energetic and bloody, the escapades to date still lacked

organization and focus, the same problems that plagued the 1962-66 political agitation campaign. The KPA generals had delivered a great many

disjointed operations but had made precious little progress.

Indeed, the KPA-led campaign was creating an even worse situation

than the previous political effort. North Korean special operators had neither

driven off the Yankees nor subverted the ROK farmers. Rather, the KPA

men had done just enough to galvanize the Americans and South Koreans

61
62

into taking the kinds of strong measures that would, if completed, spell the

end of any chance for decisive DPRK unconventional operations. Moreover,

Kim's goal of a South Korean uprising seemed to be slipping further away

with each new meter of barrier fence built and each coast-watcher cell

organized.

But Kim Il-sung was not yet ready to give up on his three-phase campaign. After all, many of the North Korean's more potent stratagems still

waited on the drawing board, approved but unfunded, recognized but not

yet implemented. If the North Koreans acted promptly and chose their targets carefully, they could still damage the U.S.-ROK alliance and create

the preconditions for victory in the south.

The DPRK could turn to new forces to carry out this renewed effort

against the south. Chief among these were the plainly titled 124th and

283d Army Units, which were in fact unique outfits raised and schooled

specifically to carry out Kim Il-sung's unconventional campaign. Each unit

numbered about a thousand men, all officers, all handpicked. They coalesced

around a chain of command chosen from the most experienced veterans of

the foot reconnaissance brigades.

The two units each fielded nine subunits, with every subunit targeted

on one of the nine major ROK provinces. Members of the units trained

intensively to gain familiarity with their assigned areas. The officers readied

-themselves for direct-action roles and for recruitment and organization of

South Korean guerrillas. Alongside their provincially focused elements, both

formations retained separate teams for special missions of strategic significance to the DPRK leadership. 2

One such mission arose on 5 January 1968, well past the date when

the DMZ settled into its usual winter torpor. A 31-man detachment from

the 124th Army Unit went into isolation in Sariwon, where they began to

rehearse a building seizure and assassination sequence. For eight days, the

team studied sanitized maps of a hypothetical objective and ran through

numerous practice exercises concerning various key events. They had been

on many such exercises since reporting to the 124th back in March of 1967.

This one, however, was no war game. That became obvious on 13 January,

when the team staged forward into the 6th Infantry Division's rear area,

only a few kilometers north of the DMZ. KPA Reconnaissance Bureau chief,

Lieutenant General Kim Chong-tae, met the men. "Your mission," he said,

"is to go to Seoul and cut off the head of Park Chung Hee." 3

The Blue House Raid

The officers on the detachment knew that their mission might well

decide the outcome of the Second Korean Conflict. North Korean Lieutenant

Kim Shin Jo, a participant captured during the mission, explained that

killing the ROK president "would create political problems within the South

Korean government and would agitate the South Korean people to fight

with arms against their government and the American imperialists." 4 With
63

one stroke, the spearhead group of the 124th Army Unit might push the

Republic of Korea into chaos and open the way for reunification from the

north.

Late on the evening of 17 January, the team changed into ROK Army uniforms, donned dark coveralls, and penetrated the U.S. 2d Infantry Division sector. They cut several holes through the famous chain-link fence and

slipped the entire group through, all within thirty meters of a manned U.S.

position. They moved carefully for two days and nights through the American division's sector. The North Koreans even camped the second night on

a forested hillside within a few kilometers of Camp Howze, the U.S. divisional headquarters.

The infiltration went smoothly until the afternoon of 19 January, when

the team unexpectedly encountered four South Korean woodcutters. Seizing

on an opportunity to impart a bit of indoctrination to these representatives

of the ROK's "oppressed masses," the special operators harangued the terrified woodcutters about the coming insurrection and the glories of North

Korean communism. At the same time, they apparently gave some inference

as to the nature of their impending raid.

After a few hours, the KPA officers released the woodsmen unharmed

with a stern warning not to go to the police. The special forces leaders

calculated that their assassination mission was within hours of completion and that the civilians would probably not go to the police immediately, nor

would the authorities believe such a wild tale.

This proved to be a fatal mistake on their part. The South Koreans

went to the police that very night. The local police chief believed them and

notified his chain of command, which reacted promptly in accord with

Presidential Instruction #18. By morning, the ROK's new counterguerrilla

structure commenced operations. 5 Unfortunately, the ROK leadership did not

know the exact mission of the 124th Army Unit, so the police and the

military tried to guard all important sites and at the same time search the

approaches to Seoul. Even with massive resources employed, however, the

ROKs could not cover everything.

The stealthy raiders entered the city in two- and three-man cells on 20

January. They quickly became aware of the frenzied atmosphere in the

capital. Eavesdropping on busy police and ROK Army radio nets, the KPA

team's leaders plotted the identities and movements of their foes. Obviously, the original plan had to be abandoned. The 124th Army Unit would have

to improvise. The North Koreans were well trained, and their commander

saw a possible way to make use of the heightened alert. Maybe they could

still complete their mission.

Upon rendezvous that night, the men removed their coveralls. This revealed their ROK Army uniforms, complete with the correct unit insignia of the local ROK 26th Infantry Division. The team then formed up and

prepared to march the last mile to the Blue House, the ROK presidential residence, posing as ROK Army soldiers returning from a counterguerrilla patrol.
64

A tracker dog from the U.S. 2d Infantry Division trains for its anti-intruder role on the DMZ

The platoon marched smartly toward the Blue House, passing several

National Police and ROK Army units en route. A scant 800 meters from

the Blue House, a police contingent finally halted the platoon and began to

ask questions that exceeded anything the raiders had rehearsed. The nervous North Koreans fumbled their replies. One suspicious policeman drew

his pistol; a commando shot him. A melee then ensued in which two 124th

men died.6 The rest of the North Koreans scattered and began racing for

the DMZ.

ROK soldiers, police, and American troops cooperated in the massive

manhunt that followed over the next few days. Several sharp encounters

flared as the desperate North Koreans clawed their way toward home. Three

more operatives were pursued and killed in the Seoul area. Subsequently,
65

aroused I Corps (Group) units-to include both U.S. divisions-participated

in successful sweeps that killed twenty-three and captured one of the North

Koreans. Only two of the thirty-one northerners could not be accounted

for-and they were presumed dead.

The liquidation of the Blue House assault team, however, came at a

horrendous price. Three Americans died and three fell wounded in attempts

to block the escaping infiltrators. ROK casualties totaled sixty-eight killed

and sixty-six wounded-mainly army and police but also about two dozen

hapless civilians.7 This cost hardly served as a ringing endorsement for all

the security improvements developed and instituted throughout 1967.

Much had gone very wrong. The 124th cut right through the heart of

the most developed segment of the DMZ barrier system. The embarrassing

inattentiveness of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division said little for American

military performance and strained U.S.-ROK relations. Indeed, the key event

in the whole process revolved around a chance meeting with unarmed

timbermen-random players not really part of the United Nations

Command's anti-infiltration scheme. Fortunately for President Park, the

loyal civilians notified the police, and the local authorities acted with

alacrity. Had the KPA killed the woodcutters, the infiltrators might well

have killed Park too. Even in the teeth of an alerted Seoul, the enemy

nevertheless closed to within 800 meters of Park's residence, stopped more

by luck and individual initiative than by a grand design.

Much had also gone right. The citizenry responded, the police foiled

the raid, and a hasty but thorough amalgam of quick-reaction forces relentlessly pursued the North Koreans. The 124th Army Unit had gotten in, but

they could not get back out-a tribute to the DMZ enhancements. In terms

of anti-infiltration methodology, the delay and neutralization efforts had

gone pretty well. Detection, however, still relied too much on the thin crust

of regular forces along the DMZ. Most of the casualties occurred during

attempts to track down the intruders. The allies were still finding too many

of their prey only while being ambushed.

Nobody had much of a chance to reflect on lessons learned. U.S. and

ROK soldiers were still tracking down the remnants of the Blue House

raiding detachment when, as Bonesteel recalled, "the damned Pueblo occurred two days later and that really put the fat in the fire."8

The "Damned Pueblo"

Neither General Bonesteel nor the South Koreans knew anything about

the USS Pueblo (AGER-2), an American electronic surveillance ship operating off the east coast of the DPRK in January 1968. The United Nations

Command forces, like most of the world, first heard of the small vessel

when it surrendered to KPN patrol boats and KPAF MiGs on 23 January

1968. One American died during the boarding; eighty-two entered North

Korean captivity. The ship was then anchored in Wonsan harbor.
66

Officially, the USS Pueblo did not concern Bonesteel until it was captured and thereby entered his area of operations. He had warned the intelligence agencies and the Seventh Fleet about previous activities near

Wonsan, but nobody had paid much attention to him. 9 Now, Bonesteel was

compelled to worry about it. After the capture, any UNC response to the

Blue House raid had to take into account eighty-two unlucky American

sailors.

The best chance to help the defenseless Pueblo passed during the afternoon of 23 January, as Seventh Fleet, Fifth Air Force, and U.S. Forces,

Korea, attempted to sort out what was happening. The small ship, responding to various intelligence agencies and operating on the fringes of the

Seventh Fleet-U.S. Forces, Korea, areas, really did not "belong" to anyone.

Neither the U.S. Air Force nor the U.S. Navy had set aside any air cover

for the ship, and their understrength local units could not scramble enough

of the right type of planes in time to drive off the Pueblo's tormentors.

In theory, Bonesteel's 314th Air Division and the ROKs had the power

to intervene. But they were fully involved in the post-Blue House sweeps,

vigilant to thwart any follow-up North Korean attacks, and had no prior

knowledge of the Pueblo mission. Indeed, Bonesteel found out about the

capture "just as it was happening."

The USS Pueblo
67

Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp,

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific

Command

I

,0

When he turned to his U.S. Air Force commander, he found that the

only seven aircraft ready and capable of reaching Wonsan carried fittings

strictly suited for nuclear bombs. If the ground crews changed them over

or readied other planes, they would be too late to prevent the ship from

reaching Wonsan. On its part, the ROK Air Force could range all the way

to Wonsan only with the most lightly armed fighters-and then only by

violating DPRK airspace, a risky proposition in light of recent events.10

Nightfall sealed the fate of the Pueblo and her unhappy crew. American

leaders fumed, raged, and wondered what to do. Some civilians in the White

House and State and Defense Departments talked about blockading Wonsan,

telling the ROKs to grab a Soviet spy ship, or even initiating "warning"

air raids that would fly right up to the Wonsan area with all radars operating before angling off. But what about the ship's crewmen? That was

always the rub.

Involved military men advocated the sternest possible response, fearful

of the bad precedent being set and wary of the effects on the already edgy

ROKs. Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, the Commander in Chief, U.S.

Pacific Command, proposed sailing the destroyer USS Higbee (DD-806)

straight into Wonsan harbor, covered by the aircraft of the carrier USS

Enterprise (CVAN-65).11 The Higbee would demand release of the Pueblo

and its crew, promising air strikes on Wonsan if unheeded.

Bonesteel's idea was even harsher. Already fully enmeshed in the aftermath of the Blue House raid, the general reacted with uncharacteristic

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Military operations during the Tet Offensive in Vietnam

emotion at this latest North Korean affront: "It was a most inexcusable

and infuriating thing," he said. His patience exhausted, Bonesteel argued

for a blunt nuclear ultimatum against Kim Il-sung: release the Pueblo or

else. 12

It was the strongest measure ever suggested by Bonesteel and quite

possibly the strongest course of action ever recommended by any U.S.

theater commander during the nuclear age. If nothing else, it offers an

indication of how much pressure rode on Bonesteel's shoulders in January
69

of 1968. The insertion of eighty-two American hostages into an already

highly charged and dangerous DPRK-UNC confrontation had, at least for

a few hours, brought the normally intellectual Bonesteel to the brink of

irrationality.

Nothing came of Bonesteel's suggestions nor that of the others for that

matter. On 30-31 January 1968, the Vietnamese Communists launched their

massive Tet Offensive, and the Korean crisis had to take a backseat to a

full-scale war.

The Moment of Crisis

The last week or so of January 1968 offered enough problems for a

dozen American presidents-let alone an already haggard Lyndon Johnson.

On 20 January, U.S. Marines repulsed a heavy attack on the hills surrounding their vulnerable Khe Sanh combat base; a steady artillery barrage began

the next day. On 21 January, reports of the Blue House raid reached

Washington. On 22 January, a B-52 bomber crashed off Greenland, spilling

four nuclear weapons into the icy waters. On 23 January, the Pueblo was

lost. On 29 January, Johnson had to announce a large tax increase to

finance the Vietnam War. On 30-31 January, the great Tet Offensive swept

across South Vietnam, simultaneously rocking the major cities and even

briefly threatening the U.S. Embassy compound. Johnson wrote later: "I

sometimes felt that I was living in a continuous nightmare." 13

For Johnson, it would get worse, especially in Vietnam. By this time,

the president considered almost every issue in relation to the war in Southeast Asia. He focused on the Pueblo and Tet Offensive-not the Blue House

raid. Johnson assumed the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo to be closely

coordinated with the Tet attack and evidence of a Communist master plot:

"They were trying to divert U.S. military resources from Vietnam," explained

Johnson. He guessed that Kim Il-sung was "trying to pressure the South

Koreans into recalling their two divisions from that area (Vietnam)." If his

memoirs are any indicator, Johnson really believed that strange, improbable

contention. 14

At this point, the American president still hoped for a favorable outcome

in Vietnam and seemed determined not to widen the hostilities in Korearegardless of the Pueblo. Rather than threaten reprisal, Johnson decided to

deal with the devil to get his men back. He ordered Bonesteel to approach

the DPRK through the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, the

only channel of contact between America and North Korea. The ROKs, who

were represented by the United Nations Command in the commission meetings at Panmunjom, were not consulted.15

President Park and his advisers also narrowed their focus. For them,

Tet was a sideshow. The raid on the Blue House and the taking of the

USS Pueblo demonstrated the magnitude of the North Korean threat-a

menace that called for the strongest possible riposte from both allies. Newspaper editorials and government officials remarked that perhaps the ROK
70

must bring its troops home from Vietnam to meet the new Communist peril.

This chorus of opinion grew more strident once rumors of direct U.S.-DPRK

negotiations reached Seoul. Angry ROK Defense Minister Kim Song-un

charged Bonesteel with conscious duplicity in the affair. On 6 February,

the ROKs lodged an official protest against their U.S. ally, accusing the

Americans of a "policy of appeasement." An enraged President Park refused

to negotiate seriously with General Bonesteel or Ambassador William J.

Porter. The ROK leader demanded immediate dispatch of a new emissary

empowered to speak for President Johnson. 1 6

Many opinion leaders in the south urged Park to "go north"-with or

without the Americans. ROK generals bragged openly of their inclinations

to interpret rules of engagement to permit "hot pursuit all the way to the

Yalu River." Concerned by this bellicose talk, Ambassador Porter cabled a

warning that "Park might take some unpredictable action, such as an attack

on north Korea." An embassy official later told reporter Emerson Chapin

that the South Koreans hovered "very close" to war.17 Kim Il-sung's raiders

had failed, but the attempt alone, combined with other circumstances, was

creating the kind of U.S.-ROK split long desired by the DPRK.

In the middle of all of this controversy sat Bonesteel, the very man

who had just recommended nuclear threats to regain control of the USS

Pueblo. Where would he stand in relation to his country's president-who

.wanted to do whatever he could to avoid midintensity war in Korea-and

his ally's president-who appeared to be itching to start that same war?

The emotional Bonesteel had already lashed out, but now with the

moment of crisis at hand, the relentlessly logical Bonesteel took over. He

made a quick but thorough study of Tet, the Blue House raid, and the

Pueblo seizure, searching for connections. He found none. Only the assassination attempt appeared to have been preplanned in Pyongyang. Tet was

coincidental but helpful, the Pueblo a gift that the DPRK had gladly

snatched and exploited.

It looked like the North Koreans had been aware of Tet but launched

the Blue House raid in conformity with their own schedule. If Tet served to

distract America and fix South Korean forces in distant Vietnam, all the

better. The Blue House attack was clearly designed to force issues on the

peninsula, not tie in with some Vietnamese operation. Lyndon Johnson's

conviction that Kim Il-sung acted to spur an ROK withdrawal from Southeast Asia makes little sense. More ROK infantry on the Korean peninsula

surely was the last thing Kim wanted.

As for the Pueblo, it certainly benefited the North Koreans to hold U.S.

prisoners. Even so, the attack on the U.S. ship looked opportunistic, perhaps

even initiated by an overly aggressive local commander. The attack followed

a long series of similar DPRK acts against various American and South

Korean vessels and aircraft. This pattern, stretching back to 1953, predated

the Second Korean Conflict. 18 It was unlikely that Kim Il-sung planned the

seizure, but once he had the ship, he certainly knew how to use it and its

crew to create contention between the Americans and their ROK allies.
71

Based upon this analysis of the situation, Bonesteel fell back on his

unchanged, two-fold mission: to defend the ROK, while avoiding a second

major Asian war. Bonesteel resolved that the American determination to

avoid a major war had to be reflected in a restated and strengthened commitment to deterring the bigger war, while winning the low-intensity conflict in progress on the Korean peninsula. The South Korean ardor for

vengeance had to be transformed into actions that precluded a rerun of the

Blue House raid.19 If General Bonesteel handled it correctly, this crisis could

become an opportunity.

The Conventional Response: A Show of Force

In reacting to the Korean crisis, President Johnson and his key subordinates borrowed from Theodore Roosevelt. America spoke softly to the South

Koreans, while carrying a much bigger stick than usual in the waters and

air near the DPRK. This stick provided leverage over both Koreas. Concerned about a North Korean drive to take advantage of the U.S.-ROK

indecision and discord, President Johnson ordered a massive contingency deployment of American sea and air power in the Korean theater (see figure 8). Ground reinforcements were not sent. "We assumed that the South

Korean Army could look after itself," wrote the president. "We moved as

much military power into South Korea as we could without diverting units

from Southeast Asia," Johnson recalled. This increase of forces continued

even as Tet broke out in Vietnam. 20

With the Southeast Asian war already stretching the U.S. active components to their limits, the president called up 14,787 U.S. Air Force and

U.S. Navy reservists to replace those forces deployed to Korea. Korea, not

Tet, forced Johnson to announce a formal, partial mobilization, the first

since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. While most of the reservists remained

in the United States, about 3,000 airmen eventually made it to Korea. 21

The air power arrived under the operation code-named Combat Fox.

Spurred by Lieutenant General Seth J. McKee of Fifth Air Force, several

air units arrived in Korea before 1 February 1968. Along with forces from

Okinawa, these included the three, potent F-4D Phantom II squadrons of

Colonel Charles E. ("Chuck") Yeager's 4th Tactical Fighter Wing. Yeager's "suitcase air force" flew in from North Carolina within seventy-two hours

of notification, a truly remarkable performance. Altogether, almost 200

combat aircraft deployed. 22

At sea, the Seventh Fleet marshaled some thirty-five major surface

combatants. Six aircraft carriers led the procession of naval might that

comprised Operation Formation Star. Navy air furnished another 400 or so

frontline combat jets. 23

The buildup looked impressive, but appearances could be deceiving. Bonesteel had asked for this show of strength, but he did not really command it. Narrowly defined command relationships strictly limited these

contingency forces to a deterrent role. Thanks to his personal influence,
72

Operation Formation Star

Task Group 77.5

USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) with air wing

USS Truxtun (DLGN-35)

USS Halsey (DLG-23)

USS O'Bannon (DD-450)

USS Collett (DD-730)

USS Higbee (DD-806)

USS Ozbourn (DD-846)

Reinforcing Elements, Seventh Fleet

USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14)

USS Coral Sea (CVA-43)

USS Ranger (CVA-61)

USS Yorktown (CVS-10)

USS Kearsarge (CVS-33)

USS Canberra (CA-70)

USS Chicago (CG-11)

USS Providence (CLG-6)

(Thirteen other destroyer types)

Operation Combat Fox

Fifth Air Force Advance Echelon to Osan AB (from Fuchu AS, Japan)

4th Tactical Fighter Wing to Kunsan AB (72 F-4Ds from Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina)

18th Tactical Fighter Wing (-) to Osan AB, Kwangju ROKAFB (36 F-105Ds from Kadena AB,

Okinawa)

12th Tactical Fighter Squadron (-) to Osan AB (12 F-105Ds from Kadena AB, Okinawa)

334th Tactical Fighter Squadron to Kwangju ROKAFB (24 105-Ds from Kadena AB, Okinawa)

64th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Kimpo AB (24 F-102As from Naha AB, Okinawa)

82d Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Suwon ROKAFB (24 F-102As from Naha AB, Okinawa)

318th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron to Osan AB (24 F-106As from McChord AFB, Washington)

Abbreviations

AB air base CVAN nuclear-powered CVA

AFB Air Force Base CVS antisubmarine aircraft carrier

AS air station DD destroyer

CA heavy cruiser DLG guided missile DD leader

CG guided missile cruiser DLGN nuclear-powered DLG

CLG guided missile light cruiser ROKAFB Republic of Korea AFB

CVA attack aircraft carrier

Figure 8. The United States' military response to the seizure of the USS Pueblo, January through

March 1968

Bonesteel received some help from the Fifth Air Force in prosecuting the

Second Korean Conflict; the Seventh Fleet did not cooperate at all.

The Fifth Air Force's Advance Echelon took charge of the U.S. Air

Force's (USAF) contribution. Senior USAF officers made it clear that these

air units "[were] neither assigned nor attached to the command of General

Bonesteel as Commander, US Forces Korea." In the event of an overt

invasion, the Fifth Air Force would come under UN authority. But until

then, it responded to distant U.S. Pacific Air Forces and through them to

U.S. Pacific Command.
73

Fortunately, Generals McKee and Bonesteel worked out practical arrangements to make use of the new air units in the ongoing low-intensity conflict.

Combat Fox aircraft aided the ROKs in sea-approach coverage and provided

strip-alert quick-reaction flights. Both American infantry divisions received

and exercised new forward air controller teams and procedures, although

no actual air strikes occurred. Squadrons and wings rotated to Korea at

regular intervals, allowing some training for them from the commitment.

Once the imminent danger subsided, the USAF component gradually pared

back to its precrisis strength. In all, Combat Fox lasted sixteen months.2 4

The U.S. Navy went its own way, with the Seventh Fleet anxious to

reduce the task groups and speed ships to Vietnamese waters. None of the

warships responded to General Bonesteel in any capacity, although he would

gain some air sorties in the event of a major war. For Seventh Fleet, the

Korean circuit mainly constituted a waste of time. According to one participating admiral, these activities "usually involved some rather innocuous

air operations for a couple of days, using one of our aircraft carriers."2 5 By

summer, the Seventh Fleet had moved on.

Although not fully orchestrated for maximum support of General

Bonesteel's UNC, the contingency buildup worked. This tremendous show

Charles E. ("Chuck") Yeager in a Bell X-1 supersonic aircraft. Yeager led three squadrons of F-4Ds

into Korea in response to the Pueblo seizure

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74

of force brought in ten times the amount of aircraft normally operated by

the 314th Air Division. The 600 or so USAF and U.S. Navy (USN) jets

completely negated the only real conventional edge the DPRK possessedtheir air arm. Any northern blitzkrieg would have to proceed under

American-dominated skies. North Korea did not try anything. Even unconventional operations dwindled in the face of the U.S. air and sea armadas.

Thus, the contingency deployments did their job and guaranteed some

breathing space for the Americans and South Koreans to settle their disputes. Apprised of the ROK intransigence and war fever, President Johnson

wisely deferred to General Bonesteel and Ambassador Porter and sent an

envoy immediately. Cyrus R. Vance arrived in Seoul on 10 February.

Vance possessed topflight credentials. A former secretary of the Army

and deputy secretary of defense, Vance had spoken for Johnson and the

United States in several delicate situations: Panama in January 1965; the

Dominican Republic (that same year); in Detroit during the riots of June

1967; and on strife-torn Cyprus that autumn. 26 He would speak softly enough

to the Koreans, but his words would be blunt.

As usual, Vance traveled light. Only John E. Walsh, ambassador to

Kuwait, and translator Daniel A. O'Donoghue accompanied the troubleshooter. Bonesteel and Porter met the trio at the airport, and they took off

immediately for the secure confines of U.S. Eighth Army headquarters.

Walsh experienced a frigid flight in a bubble-topped, little OH-23 while

perched unceremoniously on Bonesteel's lap. With the Blue House raiders

just run to ground, even the commanding general could not afford to borrow

one of the few enclosed UH-1 Hueys. The cold flight said a lot about the

resource situation in United Nations Command. Bonesteel might have done

it intentionally, to make a point.

Vance wanted to meet immediately with President Park, but ROK Blue

House staffers rebuffed his request with uncharacteristic rudeness. The

officials told Vance that Park was meeting with his military planners and

not to be disturbed. Unable to arrange a meeting, and looking ahead to a

banquet that evening sponsored by the ROK Army, Vance and his men

huddled with Bonesteel and Porter. The fivesome went over some hundred

discrete issues, ensuring a unified front. Vance would do all the talking for

the next few days.

At the ROK Army dinner that night, the Americans stuck to light

conversation and banal, obvious toasts. Their excited counterparts talked

with conviction about the mighty things to come as the allies avenged the

Blue House and Pueblo incidents. The southerners seemed to think that

Vance's arrival presaged the great march north. One boozy ROK general

cornered Ambassador Walsh and confided in him: "We're blood brothers....

When you are hurt, we are hurt."2 7 If Vance and his partners had any

doubts about ROK belligerence, the banquet demonstrated just how wild

things had gotten in Seoul.

When Vance met Park the next day, the South Korean president proved

quite obstinate. But Vance did not compromise. Johnson's spokesman laid
75

out his position frankly. First, there would be no wider war in Koreaperiod; the U.S. already had its hands full in Vietnam. Any ROK military action against the north would be cleared with General Bonesteel, and he

was not empowered to allow South Korean cross-border reprisals without

President Johnson's approval. Vance made it clear that he could foresee no

circumstances-short of a full-scale North Korean invasion-that could

garner such approval.

Second, with a military attack ruled out, the United States would nego- tiate as necessary in order to gain freedom for the Pueblo sailors. Vance

reminded Park that America had a tradition of talking with groups and

states it did not recognize, including such thorns as the Barbary pirates, the Filipino insurgents, and Pancho Villa. This matter was between the

United States and North Korea.

Finally, Vance offered some sweetener with the bitter gruel. He promised Park $100 million in immediate military aid, to include F-4 series Phantom

fighter jets for the ROK Air Force; additional assistance would follow. To

get this equipment, Park had to vow not to go north.

For four days, Park equivocated. But he really had no choice. Without

the United States, South Korea could never hope to defeat the DPRK at

any acceptable cost. The ROK leader finally consented to reign in his

generals. Vance left, his mission accomplished. Presidents Johnson and Park

met in Honolulu in April to seal the deal. 28 So the great crisis abated. A

midintensity war had been averted. The low-intensity war, however, remained

to be won.

The Conventional Response: Resources

General Bonesteel made good use of the Blue House and Pueblo incidents to garner the additional visibility and funding he needed to throttle

the North Korean unconventional threat. While careful not to divert resources

from Vietnam, Bonesteel knew enough about bureaucratic politics to make

sure that he received a priority on what was left over. He made his case

both within the military establishment and among the larger community of

American political leaders.

The general did his best to convince his military commanders and the

military as an institution that Americans in Korea were in a real war.

While U.S. Pacific Command agreed, the service departments and the

Defense Department held the final authority. If they admitted that any part

of Korea was a combat zone, that would formally give Bonesteel's theater

a priority second only to Vietnam. 29 This formal recognition would help

both American and South Korean morale and signal continued U.S. commitment to prevail in the Second Korean Conflict.

Due to the narrow prerogatives granted by operational control, Bonesteel

could not do much to influence internal U.S. Air Force or U.S. Navy policies

toward Korea. For the Navy and Air Force, Korea did not constitute combat.

Both services, especially the U.S. Navy, wanted to reduce their post-Pueblo
76

shows of force as soon as possible. Neither the Air Force nor the Navy

moved to grant any sort of combat incentives to their deployed contingency

forces, although airmen later benefited from Bonesteel's efforts.

Bonesteel wisely concentrated his efforts within his own U.S. Army.

After all, by 1968, he could point to numerous patrolling and ambush

casualties-all from the ranks of the U.S. Army. Obviously, whatever sailors

and airmen might think, Korea was not just another overseas tour for

soldiers.

Until 1968, Korea fell into an odd category with regard to combat pay

and awards. In Korea, as in the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965-

66, provisions already existed to give combat pay-but only to American

dead (one month, paid posthumously, of course) and wounded (three months'

pay or paid while hospitalized, whichever was shorter). If qualified by duty

position and recommended by their division commanders, these casualties

might also receive Combat Infantryman Badges or Combat Medical Badges. 30

Those not actually hit by hostile fire soldiered on, their sacrifices and

dangers officially unrecognized. By the U.S. Army's reckoning, soldiers on

patrol in the DMZ received the same official consideration as those in garrison at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Bonesteel changed that. Since mid-1967, the general had been pressuring

the Department of the Army (as Commander, U.S. Eighth Army) and Department of Defense (as Commander, USFK and CINCUNC) for designation

of the area north of the Imjin River and south of the DMZ's center (the

Military Demarcation Line) as a "hostile fire zone." Soldiers and airmen

serving or flying in this zone would receive hostile fire pay and other combat

incentives. Only about 4,000 men would be involved, almost all from the

U.S. 2d Infantry Division.

Before 1968, nobody at the Department of Defense really wanted to agree

to such a move for fear of spurring the pugnacious ROKs to think that the

United States was moving toward midintensity war. After the Blue House

raid, the Pueblo incident, and the Vance visit, the South Koreans had been

cowed. Designation of a hostile fire zone might serve to demonstrate that

the United States recognized the Second Korean Conflict and stood by its

ally. Keeping the zone discrete, however, would underscore the sharp limits

to U.S. involvement. 3 1

On 1 April 1968, largely at the insistence of outgoing Secretary

McNamara, the Department of Defense announced that U.S. forces serving

in or flying over the DMZ-Imjin sector would be given hostile fire pay.

Army troops who spent six months in this area received an overseas service

bar and the privilege to wear their combat organizational patch on their

right sleeve for the remainder of their time in service. Within a few months,

the commanding general of U.S. Eighth Army received permission to award

the Combat Infantryman Badge and Combat Medical Badge to all qualified

men serving north of the Imjin River. 32

Bonesteel did not confine his promotional efforts to the military. He

went out of his way to make the case for a stronger defense in Korea to
77

interested civilian lawmakers, government executives, and influential private citizens. Bonesteel welcomed hundreds of visitors, even during the height of

the 1968 crisis period. He explained the nature of what he termed the

"porous war" on the peninsula and made it clear what he thought he needed

to finish the job. 33

As a result, both executive decision makers and Congress had access to

informed opinions about what was necessary in Korea. Along with the $100

million in assistance to the ROKs promised by Cyrus Vance, Congress appropriated $230 million more to improve both U.S. and ROK facilities

and combat readiness throughout the United Nations Command's Korean

domain. 34 In light of legislative discontent with the Johnson administration

in general, and the Vietnam War in particular, this reflected directly on

Bonesteel's ability to make his argument heard.

Bonesteel's lobbying within the defense community and the American

policy-making stratum opened the door to more resources-not a great

amount, but enough. More important, these measures forced Bonesteel's

superiors to acknowledge the Second Korean Conflict as a real war. "They

are in every sense involved in combat," noted a Joint Chiefs of Staff

memorandum. 3 5 To the extent allowed in his economy-of-force theater,

Bonesteel now had the wherewithal to meet the DPRK challenge.

The Unconventional Response: The DMZ

Bonesteel knew exactly what to do with his increased budget, thanks

in large part to the detailed forecast prepared for the late 1967 Counterinfiltration-Guerrilla Concept Requirements Plan. Unfortunately, he did not

control all of the funds. Since President Park had a major say in the

spending priorities for the initial $100 million and the follow-on military assistance monies, Bonesteel could not direct the exact purchase patterns. On their part, Park and his generals succumbed to the attraction of pur- chasing eighteen new F-4D Phantom II aircraft-consuming well over onethird of the first $100 million. 36 Obtaining chain-link fencing, platoon radios,

and night-vision devices amounted to small potatoes next to the gleaming promise of new fighter jets.

Bonesteel did what he could to influence the use of the remaining money, and he closely monitored those funds earmarked strictly for U.S. use. The

general recognized that the window of opportunity opened by the troubles

of early 1968 would not stay open forever, so he focused on those things

most useful to his missions of DMZ counterinfiltration, sea approach counterinfiltration, and counterinsurgency.

Unwilling to count on appropriations from the ROKs and Washington, Bonesteel's logisticians took advantage of the general increase in stock per- mitted after the Pueblo capture. Rather than ordering vast quantities of

ammunition and weapons, UNC supply planners requested a great many mundane counterinfiltration and counterguerrilla items for delivery by the

massive USAF airlift that brought in the Combat Fox units. Thousands of
78

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tons of critical barrier materials and communications gear-worth some

$32 million-arrived via the largest strategic airlift in history up to that

time.37 The UNC used these materials to complete the chain-link fence and

its associated barrier defense system. By 30 July, the line spanned the entire

south boundary of the DMZ, ready to detect infiltrators and delay their

progress sufficiently for quick-reaction forces to finish them off.

The completion of the fence tied together the U.S.-ROK efforts along

the DMZ. With physical linkup completed, Bonesteel took steps to extend

the juncture into the combined command structure, a course foreshadowed

by the consciously mixed Special Working Group of November 1966. Prior

to late 1968, South Koreans served only as liaison officers on UNC and

USFK staffs. In October, the U.S.-ROK Operational Planning Staff began

work, specifically to deal with the anti-infiltration fight. The staff totaled

only twenty-four men, seventeen of them Korean. Though more a cell than
79

a true staff, this important conclave represented the first permanent and

official ROK voice in the combined command. 38

Along with supplies and a new combined planning organization,

Bonesteel's UNC received one small but invaluable reinforcement unit: the

U.S. 6th Combat Aviation Platoon, originally en route to Vietnam. This

outfit's six UH-1D Hueys doubled the number of useful air-assault platforms

in Korea. In conjunction with the six overworked Hueys on hand and the

obsolescent OH-23 Ravens, the 6th Platoon finally gave the allies sufficient

lift to maintain a ready heliborne quick-reaction force on strip alert, while

at the same time employing some Hueys on neutralization operations. The

platoon normally worked directly for I Corps (Group), although Bonesteel

often saw fit to loan the platoon to the ROK Army for counterinsurgency

missions in the interior.39 The new combined staff made such transfers

easier.

Aside from these welcome developments, the rest of the anti-infiltration

improvements occurred only in the American sector. This made sense, because the Americans guarded the key avenues that headed toward Seoul,

and these same Americans had failed so utterly to detect the Blue House

raiders. For the sake of both tactical necessity and alliance politics, the

U.S. sector had to be tightened up.

Manpower remained a problem, both in quantity and quality. The

short-handed U.S. 2d Infantry Division could not send out enough patrols

nor man enough positions to seal off its thirty-kilometer-long DMZ sector.

The backup U.S. 7th Infantry Division, smaller than the 2d Division to

start with, found itself stretched thin as it guarded various nuclear weapons

sites, defended the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, and provided an on-call QRF

for I Corps (Group).

The quantitative deficiencies proved easier to solve. Worried Department

of the Army officials pumped a few thousand additional enlisted men into

the Eighth Army replacement pipeline. They also authorized one-month tour

extensions for certain key leaders and skilled troops in Korea, a policy rejected outright by the Air Force and Navy Departments.4 0 Along with U.S.

Eighth Army's prudent restrictions on leaves and passes and some tough

internal cross-leveling of personnel, this erased the manpower deficit that

plagued DMZ units before 1968.

Quality, of course, also had to be addressed. The U.S. Army tried to

bolster the leadership situation in Korea, a tough proposition with Vietnam

going full tilt. Bonesteel received a few more company-grade officers and

sergeants with Vietnam experience, although not nearly enough to take

charge of the rapidly swelling ranks of the infantry divisions. Shortages

meant that inexperienced and incompetent leaders had to be used. It had

always been a problem during Bonesteel's tour, but now the inept chiefs

had more Indians to misuse. Without good leaders, more men provided little

added combat punch.

With many lower-level leadership slots unfilled, the American forces

resorted to their usual solutions: schools and supervision. Vigorous unit
80

schooling in counterinfiltration tactics made trained leaders, if not sergeants,

out of the more promising privates. The well-known "Imjin Scouts" patrol

leaders' program dates from this period.

Greater supervision by higher headquarters ensured that the novice

leaders did their jobs. Mindful of the strain on his field-grade commanders,

Bonesteel moved a brigade headquarters from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division

forward to the DMZ to take charge of two of the five battalions in the U.S.

sector (see figure 9).41 This reduced the span of control for the brigade

commanders, permitting maximum influence by these experienced infantry

colonels.

At the higher level, Bonesteel gained a subordinate general well suited

to the unique demands of the Second Korean Conflict. The Department of

the Army provided Lieutenant General William P. Yarborough to head I

Corps (Group). A former commander of the Special Warfare School at Fort

Bragg, North Carolina, Yarborough had pioneered many of the counterinsurgency concepts used by U.S. Special Forces.4 2 He would be a useful

source of ideas and leadership.

Finally, the U.S. Army provided three more potential combat multipliers.

First, U.S. Eighth Army accepted a handful of bloodhound dog-tracker teams

to aid in detecting penetrators south of the barrier fence. Second, soldiers

received a few hundred precious M-16 automatic rifles, which for the first

time gave those on patrol firepower equal to North Korean PPSh submachine

guns and AK-47 assault rifles. Third, U.S. Pacific Command made two

Special Forces teams temporarily available for use as anti-infiltration

trainers.4 3 Small things in themselves, each paid dividends when properly

used. These DMZ improvements, especially the completion of the chain-link

fence, the arrival of the additional Huey helicopters, and the adjustments

in the American sector cemented the progress made the prior year. While

the KPA attempted more infiltrations than in 1967, the allies were ready

for them.

Thanks to better detection, contacts increased markedly, but successful

North Korean penetrations dropped off. North Koreans began to fall victim

to ambushes and suffer from chance encounters with alerted UNC troops. The KPA paid in blood for running the DMZ gauntlet, sustaining almost

twice as many losses as in 1967.

The new UNC tactics worked. In a typical example on 19 September,

outposts of the 3d Brigade, U.S. 2d Infantry Division, detected five northern

intruders at the fence. The Americans, aided by their Korean Counter Agent

Company, coordinated a dawn attack by an air-assault reaction force,

armored cavalry, and mechanized infantry to isolate and eliminate the

hostile team. A succession of similar efforts enabled U.S. 2d Infantry Division to claim that it had repulsed or killed twenty-five of twenty-seven agents

between June and November, the height of the infiltration season. 44 ROK

units enjoyed similar little victories. Win or lose, each skirmish made it

just that much harder for the next KPA special unit to confront the steadily

improving DMZ defenses.
81

On the DMZ

ROK 99th Regimental Combat Team1

1-99 Infantry

2-99 Infantry

3-99 Infantry

4th Brigade, U.S. 2d Infantry Division2

1-38 Infantry

3-23 Infantry

3d Brigade, U.S. 2d Infantry Division

2-38 Infantry

2-9 Infantry (Mechanized)

3-32 Infantry 3

South of the Imjin River

2d Brigade, U.S. 2d Infantry Division

1-9 Infantry

2-23 Infantry (Mechanized)

1-72 Armor

1st Brigade, U.S. 2d Infantry Division

1-23 Infantry

2-72 Armor

Division Reaction Force

4-7 Cavalry

Counter Agent Company

Chorwon Valley

3d Brigade, U.S. 7th Infantry Division

1-31 Infantry

2-31 Infantry

1-32 Infantry

2-32 Infantry

1st Brigade, U.S. 7th Infantry Division

1-17 Infantry (Mechanized)

2-17 Infantry (Mechanized)

1-73 Armor

2-10 Cavalry

22d Royal Thai Company

1

Under the operational control of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division.

2

Actually, the 2d Brigade, U.S. 7th Infantry Division, under operational control of the U.S. 2d

Infantry Division.

3From the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, under operational control of 3d Brigade, U.S. 2d Infantry

Division.

Source: 2d ID, "Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U),"

UNCLASSIFIED, Inclosure 1.

Figure 9. American maneuver battalion deployment as of 30 April 1969 (typical after 21 March

1968)

It had taken time, but the conventional U.S. and ROK infantrymen

had regained a definite measure of control over South Korea's ground

frontier. "Their record speaks for itself," said Major General Leland G.

Cagwin of the U.S. 2d Infantry Division; "The other side is coming through

the barrier with less frequency." 4 5 The DPRK was fast losing its ability to

come by land.
82

Helicopters from the 6th Combat Aviation Platoon, U.S. I Corps, sweep through a valley in search

of North Korean saboteurs

The Unconventional Response: The Sea Approaches

Unlike the DMZ, South Korean seacoasts remained very vulnerable to

enemy infiltration. Though some equipment upgrades occurred and the ROK

Navy worked with both ROK and U.S. air units in neutralizing North

Korean contacts, the lengthy coastlines still defied effective defense.

United States equipment transfers allowed for marginal improvements

in the ROK Navy. Aided by advisers from U.S. Naval Forces, Korea, South

Korean sailors accepted two new patrol escorts and an old destroyer into

service. They also standardized their communications to allow for better

links to the ROK Air Force, ROK Army, National Police, and intelligence

agencies.4 6

The most spectacular sea triumph came on 21 August, when two ROK

Navy destroyers joined in a Korean CIA-directed interception off Cheju

Island. A KPN-KPA special warfare team had been lured to the area, enticed

by the prospect of rescuing a top operative imprisoned on the island. ROK

Air Force fighters and even USAF F-4 Phantoms flew cover during a running gunfight that ended with the North Korean craft sunk and its passengers killed or captured.47

The Cheju victory suggested the real problem with the game but overmatched ROK fleet. Lacking long-range patrol planes and coastal radars,
83

the ROK Navy worked best after enemy intentions became obvious. The

South Korean sailors could cut off sea reinforcements or catch known hostiles offshore-but only after being notified by landward ROK elements.

Without a solid counterguerrilla net to snare them ashore, a great many

spy boats could slip past the harried ROK Navy. This fact did not go unnoticed by the DPRK Reconnaissance Bureau, blocked on the DMZ and

desperate for success.

The Unconventional Response: The Interior

The Blue House raid caused President Park to make one important

addition to his otherwise comprehensive counterinsurgency directive: Presidential Instruction #18. In mid-February, he finally approved creation of

the Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF), a popular militia. Formally

announced in April, it proved to be the single most crucial step in the

Second Korean Conflict.

Within 6 months, 2 million enthusiastic southern citizens, including

15,000 women, joined up. These formed more than 60,000 local-defense platoons and companies, formed around a backbone of former ROK soldiers.48

While not well armed for some time, they became an invaluable information

web and eventually a source of supplemental troops for regular ROK Army

formations. It was the story of 1967's dutiful coast watchers in magnified

form.

Emboldened and encouraged by the obvious attraction of the HDRF,

Park took steps to extend the idea toward its logical conclusion by securing

the whole of rural South Korea into the government fold. At the end of

August, a scant month after the barrier fence had been finished, the first

two of twenty planned "Reconstruction Villages" opened just south of the

DMZ. Populated by armed ex-soldiers and their families on the model of

Israeli border kibbutzim, these settlements created a band of fiercely loyal

people squarely in the path of any likely northern infiltrators. Lone KPA

intruders and small agent teams would not long survive in such a proROK medium.

At the same time, the ROK Army reworked its old civic-action program.

Formerly, ROK soldiers did civil engineering work, building roads and

bridges during certain periods each year. The new approach put troops to

work right in the villages to "promote ties between the military and civilian

populace and intensify anti-communist spirit and support anti-espionage

operations." The ROK units dug wells and built classrooms, clinics, and

cultural centers. These community edifices could and did serve as gathering

places for anti-Communist indoctrination classes.

The most important ROK civic-action effort entailed the dispatch of

"Medical/Enlightenment Teams" into the forbidding, backward Taebaek and

Chiri Mountains, scenes of much North Korean infiltration during the

summer of 1967. These carefully schooled ROK regulars and reservists, in

close coordination with the Korean CIA and National Police, conducted
84

medical screenings, inoculations, and minor surgery. They also "enlightened"

the local people by spreading the "gospel" according to Park Chung Hee,

hoping also to inoculate the villagers against North Korean Communist

propaganda. The teams met warm receptions. 49

At this point, these efforts were still tentative and experimental. When

they proved popular, Park went further. By the early 1970s, the rural information programs metamorphosed into the government-mandated Saemaul

(New Community Movement) throughout the villages of the south. This rural

mass movement squarely confronted Kim Il-sung's nationalistic Juche brand

of communism. Saemaul offered a southern mixture of village cooperation,

southern democratic tolerance (as versus northern "arrogance"), a sense of

mission, and a pioneer spirit to raise rural production and living standards. 50

Park intended to challenge Kim Il-sung on all fronts, including ideology.

The Reconstruction Villages, new ROK Army Civic Action Program, and

Medical-Enlightenment Teams of 1968 merely became the first steps in the

education of the countryside in proper ROK patriotism.

The special counterinsurgency units authorized in Presidential Instruction #18 also took shape throughout 1968. Much attention went to the reserve component ROK Second Army and its designated rear-area security

divisions. Each division added a second counterinfiltration battalion. The

Korean National Police continued to expand its paramilitary Combat Police,

raising more local units that tied in with the militia below them and the

supporting reserve divisions that backed them up. All formations received

new American radios courtesy of the Combat Fox airlift.

The ROKs used the lull after the Blue House raid and U.S. air-sea

buildup to organize and exercise these new units, to include training with I

Corps (Group)'s new U.S. 6th Combat Aviation Platoon. ROK Army regulars

and U.S. advisers designed and supervised the training, integrating selected,

regular ROK forces as necessary. 51 By midsummer, after many field prob- lems and a few small-scale call-ups, they seemed ready.

Even the Americans joined in the general enthusiasm for counterinsurgency. Notoriously ethnocentric and determined to speak English, the

U.S. troops were ill-suited for village counterinsurgency work, as Bonesteel

recognized. Still, an attempt had to be made to show that the American

troops also cared about the Korean people and their problems. Some sort of

cultural awareness and language familiarization might permit better working

relationships with local people in the U.S. sector-not to mention better

U.S.-ROK relations overall. In a struggle for hearts and minds, every little

bit could help.

Previous U.S. efforts in this direction had been honored in the breach;

an abortive 1966 2-week voluntary school fizzled after educating less than

200 U.S. 2d Infantry Division soldiers. To work, the new program would

have to be mandatory and go beyond mere "welcome to Korea" classes.

When an experimental version received positive feedback from participating

units, Bonesteel and his subordinate commanders gave the idea command

emphasis and implemented it.52
85

The consequent "Eighth US Army Education and Individual Action

Program," or "Cold War Program" for short, was in place by late spring of

1968. It reached its full fruition under the watchful eye of counterguerrilla

expert General Yarborough. Described as "a revolutionary program which

consists of educational materials that actually change attitudes to a significant degree," the scheme endeavored to help U.S. troops "work and associate

more constructively with Koreans." The KATUSA soldiers assigned to

American companies played pivotal roles in the program, acting as conduits

that connected the American soldiers with Korean villagers.

Along with sustaining classes and field trips, American troops took an

active role in supporting Korean social welfare establishments. The U.S. 2d

Infantry Division, for example, supported thirteen orphanages; taught

English at fifteen nearby schools; conducted cultural exchanges with certain

universities; and helped with an average of thirty local construction, medical,

and educational projects. Division operational reports listed implementation

of the EUSA Cold War Program as one of four missions, coequal to defense

against conventional attack, counterinfiltration, and implementation of the

1953 Armistice Agreement. 53

Did the Cold War Program make any difference? It is hard to say, but

this much can be sure; it offered clear proof that U.S. troops were serious

about their role as defenders of the ROK, not just occupiers. Given the

torrent of North Korean propaganda that forever built on images of U.S.

troops as whoring, drunken colonizers who ran over old people and abused

children, the person-to-person contacts created by the Cold War Program

certainly provided some strong evidence to the contrary. 54 In combination

with the UNC's other steps, it certainly dealt more damage to DPRK

credibility-an important matter in a struggle for popular loyalty.

The cumulative effects of the 1968 initiatives spelled disaster for North

Korean underground networks throughout the south. Stunned by the Blue

House raid, South Koreans rallied to the Park government, which moved

quickly to set up new militia units, reconstruction villages, real civic-action

projects, and medical-enlightenment teams to accommodate the popular

ground swell.

Aided by thousands of willing informants, the Korean CIA cracked

major spy rings in February, July, and August-bagging 132 key agents in

the process. These DPRK networks had reached into the military, the police,

the intelligence services, Seoul government circles, academe, religious groups,

and the countryside. Some of those fingered worked as contract employees

of U.S. Eighth Army, one of the cells having been in place since 1961. 55

But by August, they were gone.

The year that had started with such promise for Kim Il-sung and his

generals had gone disastrously wrong. Shrewd U.S. diplomacy, ROK political

pragmatism, and an intelligent use of new resources had made the DMZ

untenable for the DPRK and enfeebled a big chunk of the North Korean

intelligence apparatus. The only North Korean hope lay in a strike against
86

the allies' weakest flank-the seacoast. It would be the northerners' last

chance at victory.

The Ulchin-Samchok Landings

Around midnight on 30 October, 120 men of the 124th Army Unit landed

at 8 separate locations on the east coast of South Korea, between the towns

of Samchok and Ulchin. The northerners had selected their landing beaches

with great care along the boundary between two separate rear-area security

divisions. After disembarking undetected from a variety of KPN clandestine

watercraft, the men headed inland into the Taebaek Mountains for a planned

thirty-day mission. Perhaps due to intelligence breakdowns, they did not

know that this same area had hosted the Medical-Enlightenment Teams

just months before, or maybe they knew it and did not care.

These elite 124th soldiers were functioning in their guerrilla organizing

role. They intended to create long-lasting guerrilla bases in the south, complete with new informant nets to help make up for those wrecked during

the summer. Any local officials foolish enough to intervene would be killed.

As they reached their first objective villages around daybreak on 31 October,

each of the eight teams rounded up the sleepy locals for introductory educational sessions. They had been told to expect jubilant welcomes as liberators.

After some rote speeches and distribution of pictures of Kim Il-sung, the

soldiers asked for volunteers to join the KWP. The South Koreans just stared

back, dumbfounded.

In one hamlet near Ulchin, nervous 124th Army Unit members beat a

man to death as an example to the others. That same detachment killed

seven others, including a family of five, trying to terrorize the farmers into

cooperation. Instead, even as the KPA special forces men filibustered and

bullied, a teenage boy slipped a note to a woman, who in turn spirited the

paper to her husband. He escaped unseen, running four miles to find a

provincial police chief, who immediately radioed his superiors. 56 But they

already knew about the 124th, thanks to many other reports.

ROK forces swarmed into the area. Some of the first arrived aboard

the rotary-wing aircraft of the ubiquitous U.S. 6th Combat Aviation Platoon,

summoned through the good offices of the new U.S.-ROK Operational Planning Staff. The American choppers joined six new ROK-operated Hueys,

gifts of the American military assistance program. The 36th Rear Area

Security Division, parts of two other divisions, an ROK Marine Corps battalion, numerous Combat Police companies, an ROK Special Forces Group,

and thousands of Home Defense Reserves took part in the exhaustive manhunt that followed. Eventually, some 70,000 troops assisted in the operation.

Within two weeks, the elite, new ROK counterinfiltration battalions ran

down most of the intruders. By 26 December, Park suspended the special

counterguerrilla alert on the east coast. ROK forces announced that they

had killed 110 and captured 7, as compared to 63 South Koreans dead, 23
87

of whom were civilians. The other southerners killed included regulars, reservist police, and militiamen. 57

The ROKs conquered the North Koreans not only because of superior

organization and some timely U.S. support but also because of strong local

support in South Korea. Consequently, unlike the Blue House raid, the

Ulchin-Samchok situation was never really in doubt. Thanks to thorough

preparations, ROK forces "had the full support of the populace," General

Bonesteel observed. "So," he continued, "it was a losing game to begin

with for the North because of a miscomprehension of the situation in the

south."5 8

Ulchin-Samchok provided the acid test for the United Nations Command.

Pretty much on their own, the ROKs had prevailed against the best the

north could offer. Two years earlier, the results might have been disastrous.

But now, the ROKs knew what to do, and the Americans knew how to

help them without doing it for them. Nobody realized it yet in the United

Nations Command, but the Second Korean Conflict had been won.

I -·I I · - I I I

Isolated Provocations

You know he's out there all the time just waiting for you to make a slip.

It's a matter of pride to us to see that he doesn't get through.

- an infantry private first class,

U.S. 2d Infantry Division, late

1968

At about the same time ROK police, soldiers, and militia trapped and

finished off the last of the Ulchin-Samchok landing forces, the North

Koreans finally released the Pueblo crewmen. The United States representative at Panmunjom, Major General Gilbert H. Woodward, signed a

DPRK-mandated confession of American perfidy in order to secure the final

release. Once all eighty-two prisoners returned to UNC control on 23

December 1968, Woodward publicly repudiated the embarrassing statement

of U.S. guilt.1

Yet to all appearances, the damage had been done. For almost a year,

the mightiest power in the world consented to sheath its sword and beg for

its sailors' freedom from Kim Il-sung's Democratic People's Republic of

Korea. Kim had not missed a single chance to extract maximum propaganda

value from the entire sorry affair. He mistreated the American captives,

compelled them to record admissions and apologies for their imperialist

"crimes," and then twisted the knife one more time with the Panmunjom

confession-all the while blaring the tale of U.S. impotence to the listening

world and especially into South Korea. One Pueblo sailor's taped lament

played incessantly from banks of loudspeakers aimed across the DMZ at

his countrymen.

The Pueblo seemed to symbolize faltering American resolve, an image

reinforced by President Johnson's decision to curtail the U.S. war effort in

Vietnam-not to mention domestic political assassinations, race riots, and

campus upheavals. One Washington insider summarized the thinking among

gloomy Johnson administration staffers: "The theory goes that the communists are determined to keep the U.S. humiliated as long as we stay in

the Far East, and Korea is as good a place as any to keep up the humiliation."2 The dishonorable nature of the Pueblo crew's return looked like

the crowning blow to America's tottering prestige as a confident superpower.

89
90

Appearances can be deceiving, however. Even with the gush of propaganda triumphs afforded by the Pueblo episode, Kim Il-sung could hardly

have been pleased with his overall strategic situation. His Communist benefactors, the USSR and China, were not only exchanging insults but bullets

as well along their long common border. Kim could expect no big increases

in aid from either power. 3

This Communist bloc discord could not have flared up at a less opportune moment for the DPRK. This was a tough time for Kim Il-sung to be

left on his own. After more than two years of intensive unconventional

operations, the UNC allies had thwarted the best North Korean efforts.

Economic and demographic trends, apparently unaffected by the northern

offensive, continued to run as strongly as ever in favor of the ROK. Most

distressing of all, the U.S.-ROK alliance had grown stronger, not weaker,

despite some serious policy disputes early in the year. Kim held some American sailors and the headlines, but the United Nations Command held the

initiative throughout the Republic of Korea.

Perhaps the DPRK gave back the Pueblo crewmen because they no

longer served a purpose, other than as a possible casus belli for an increasingly more powerful U.S.-ROK military establishment. As long as the American prisoners remained in North Korea, they formed an unwelcome distraction from urgent political and military decisions facing the Pyongyang

leadership. Its unconventional approach a shambles, North Korea needed

new strategic thinking and a new set of officials to carry it out. While the

public record offers only minimal insight into Kim Il-sung's logic, political

developments in the north suggest that the desire to focus on cleaning house

prompted the rather abrupt return of the Pueblo crew.

A Purge in Pyongyang

Following the Ulchin-Samchok fiasco, Kim Il-sung wasted little time in

junking his entire unconventional warfare campaign. A few days after the

Pueblo crewmen departed, Kim's ax fell, taking out a wide swath of senior

military officers closely associated with the prosecution of the Second Korean

Conflict. Among others, these included defense minister, General Kim Chongbong and his two brothers (both generals); KPA political bureau chairman,

General Ho Pong-haek; chief of the general staff, General Choe Kwang;

Reconnaissance Bureau chief, Lieutenant General Kim Chong-tae; KPN

commander, Admiral Yu Chang-gon; KWP guerrilla activities secretary,

Major General Cho Tong-chol; and the commanders of three frontline KPA

corps. Kim Il-sung summarily executed Kim Chong-bong, Ho Pong-haek, and

one corps commander-then promptly tossed the remainder into prison.4

The North Korean premier justified his harsh actions before his principal

political and military lieutenants at the secret Fourth KWP-KPA Conference

that convened in Pyongyang in January 1969. In a fulsome tirade, Kim Ilsung stated that the defrocked generals had "deliberately sabotaged" his

campaign plan, wrecking it beyond reclamation. These traitors, he charged,
91

"entirely overturned the military line of the party." 5 Kim elaborated on his

accusations. First, the KPA leadership failed to translate the ideology of

the Korean Workers' Party into a program palatable to South Korean farmers. Kim attributed this to the regular officers' lack of emphasis on developing committed Korean Workers' Party cadres in its special operations units.

This charge rings hollow, however, when one considers the extensive

political education furnished to all northern special warfare units-particularly the elite, all-officer 124th and 283d Army Units. But by KWP logic,

the political line could not be wrong, so the KPA's political indoctrination

must have been faulty. Nobody dared to express the possibility that the

KWP message did not appeal to the southerners.

Second, Kim stated that his generals neglected to make coordinated use

of all of the assets made available by the much-touted "fortification of the

entire country." For example, Kim noted that the generals never made use

of all available ground, sea, and air assets, nor did they carefully coordinate

those that they did employ. Most operations proceeded piecemeal.

The northern leader especially decried the commanders' unwillingness

to rely on the extensive DPRK militia, which might have offered some help

in integrating political agitation and military skills. He intimated that a

dangerously misguided KPA distrust of peasant and worker political sentiments lay behind this calculated refusal to involve the Red Guards.

This charge held a bit more water, but only barely. While the generals

often launched uncoordinated, high-risk missions, these mainly reflected

Kim's own insistence on immediate, splashy results rather than the patient

construction of a reliable southern infrastructure. The nature of missions

was also affected by the limited number of high-quality special operators

on hand at any one time. Any resort to throwing a great many conventional

units into the fray promised little help in the unconventional effort and

risked the big war that Kim did not yet want.

Even the premier's complaints about the failure of his generals to involve

the militia seemed suspect. The generals understandably showed reluctance

to use half-trained villagers in the volatile environs south of the DMZ, but

they did not ignore these forces. The home defense outfits expanded in

strength and received better arms throughout this period. This guard force

served a vital function by securing the DPRK interior from ROK espionage

and potential reprisals and thus freed regular North Korean troops for action.

KPA commanders employed the militia not only in routine uses but to

validate unconventional warfare techniques. For example, the Reconnaissance

Bureau tested its Blue House raiders against an entire battalion of specially

selected Workers' and Peasants' Red Guards. The citizen-soldiers played the

parts of ROK police and local civilians so energetically that thirty militiamen

had to be hospitalized due to injuries sustained in these intense exercises. 6

This imaginative use of the DPRK militia did not impress the northern

dictator, although Kim never made it clear just what he thought the parttime troops could add to his campaign in the south.
92

Finally, the premier observed that the purged generals never created a

viable method for generating an insurgency in the South Korean mountains,

even though the objective circumstances for building a guerrilla movement

seemed to exist. Here, Kim argued that the failed leaders could not adapt

KPA tactics and weapons to mountainous terrain, such as the Taebaek

range.7 This greatly concerned all North Korean officers. If even the cream

of the DPRK's armed forces could not operate in the highlands, it implied

a doctrinal failing of massive proportions for an army dedicated to war on

a mountainous peninsula.

The tactical troubles in the up-country, of course, came from far more

than any alleged inability to deal with the physical environment. Secure in

their ideological cocoons, Kim and his cronies chose to ignore effective ROK

counteractions and popular support and, instead, blamed the uniformed chain

of command. The KWP line did not allow for any other possibilities.

Having fingered the culprits and their crimes, Kim Il-sung offered his

new vision for the continuing struggle against the ROK and its U.S. allies.

Kim used the same old catchphrase, "combining regular and irregular warfare," but went on to explain that this now meant something far different

from what it had meant in October 1966. In January 1969, Kim argued

that a combination of methods required strict subordination of all military

activities to party goals. Just as the North Korean armed forces could only

operate in support of KWP objectives, so special operations proceeded only

in support of conventional operations-not vice versa, as had been the case

since 1966.

With the military forcibly ejected from the subversion business, the premier transferred responsibility for creation of southern support back to the

KWP Liaison Committee, which aimed to develop the moribund United

Revolutionary Party as an actor in legal ROK politics.8 Kim no longer gave

much credence to the dream of fomenting a serious anti-ROK insurrection.

This new thinking resulted in crucial changes for the North Korean military establishment. Disgusted by his generals' mistakes, which he attributed

to disloyalty, Kim Il-sung moved to ensure definite party control over every

military activity. Kim instituted full dual command throughout his armed

forces. Prior to this time, the KPA, KPAF, and KPN had enjoyed freedom

from the onerous commissar system that deadened initiative in the Soviet

and Chinese armed forces. After January 1969, however, every companysize element in the DPRK military received a political officer. These party

watchdogs attended orders, rendered secret reports on their commander

counterparts, passed on all officer promotions, conducted surprise inspections

in accord with KWP guidance, and even held authority to shoot disobedient

officers and men. No order was legitimate unless countersigned by a political

officer. 9

This major shift in policy hit the military quite hard. For twenty years,

Kim Il-sung's officers enjoyed the favor of their former guerrilla comrade.

When the party guardians arrived in unit garrisons, not all old-line commanders toed the line willingly. It took months to build a working commissar
93

system, and further purges throughout the ranks were required to make it

stick. As late as November 1970, Kim found it necessary to expel another

slate of key generals as "anti-party factionalists" who "refused the military

line" of the KWP. 10 He gained loyalty-but at the usual cost in innovative

leadership.

Along with a thorough imposition of party discipline, North Korea carried out a complete overhaul of its special operations component to bring it

into alignment with the more conventional approach now espoused. The

infamous 124th Army Unit, the 17th Foot Reconnaissance Brigade (that so

often worked the American sector of the DMZ), and the shadowy 283d Army

Unit all disbanded. Each had lost too many key men in the ongoing conflict;

the 124th had been particularly battered by the Ulchin-Samchok fighting.

More telling, these forces had lost Kim Il-sung's confidence. Like the generals

that spawned them, they had to go.

The dissolution of these elite forces signaled the reorientation of DPRK

special warfare capabilities toward a role clearly subordinate to the conventional military. The remaining few thousand veteran special operators

provided the backbone for new divisional light infantry battalions, corps

light infantry and reconnaissance brigades, and a new national reservoir

of chosen warriors called the 8th Special Purpose Corps. This distinctive

corps included the amphibious arm and the germ of a paratrooper force,

both soon to increase markedly. By 1970, these special units had expanded

to 15,000 men, a solid start on the way to a current strength that by some

estimates exceeds 100,000 troops.11

The new 8th Special Purpose Corps and its associates certainly gave

North Korea a diverse and useful array of unique tactical units, to include

more seaborne elements and a sorely needed air assault capability. Still,

quality necessarily diminished as numbers went up. Good as they were, the

refurbished and swollen ranks of airborne, naval infantry, mountain, and

reconnaissance formations lacked the handpicked personnel, intensive training, and guerrilla-organizing expertise that characterized the rigorously

schooled 124th Army Unit and its contemporaries. While they might complicate U.S.-ROK conventional defensive schemes, the DPRK's rebuilt special

forces no longer could conduct an independent unconventional warfare

campaign.

That squared nicely with the new approach from Pyongyang. Thanks

to Kim's reinterpretation of his previous "combined warfare" idea, the DPRK

returned to a hybrid of the policies of 1953-62 and those of 1962-66-

conveniently couched in the now-familiar rhetoric of the Second Korean

Conflict. As it had from 1953 to 1962, the north now put primary focus on

reunification by overt conventional warfare, to be aided by selected commando missions that drew on the experience built up during the miscarried

guerrilla campaign. Kim believed that his unimaginative generals had squandered a unique chance to undermine the ROK through special operations.

With South Korean and American leaders now fully alerted to such efforts,

the opportunity to create an insurgency had passed, perhaps for the foreseeable future. 12
94

Yet the north did not completely abandon subversion. In line with the

thinking of 1962-66, Kim also saw benefits in pursuing political erosion of

the ROK, but only as an adjunct to invasion, not as a substitute. As in

earlier times, the KWP would handle this undertaking.

The January purges, formal abandonment of the 1966 military campaign

plan, and thorough reorganization of the armed forces, in general, and the

special warfare units, in particular, created a window of vulnerability for

the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The revitalized United Nations

Command forces definitely constituted a more formidable threat than they

had in years. If for some reason the South Koreans or Americans chose to

act, Kim Il-sung could well find himself in the same ugly quandary that

his Soviet mentor, Joseph V. Stalin, faced in 1941: his army would be in

confusion, his officer corps in disarray, and his allies distant and unwilling.

Thus, though the war was admittedly lost and the guilty already punished, Kim found it necessary to keep up a front of mystery and belligerence

lest his cautious enemies discover too much and become bold. Leaning ever

more heavily on his conventional units as his special operators underwent

their painful mutations, Kim played his weak hand well enough to ward

off any response from the uncertain UN Command. In the process, the

North Koreans salvaged a few spiteful victories that marked the last year

of the Second Korean Conflict.

The Allies at High Tide

Premier Kim Il-sung had good reason to fear his opponents. The accumulated effects of over two years of American and South Korean political

and military innovations reached their zenith by early 1969. The fact that

this waxing power now served the active U.S. president, Richard M. Nixon,

rather than the paralyzed, exhausted Lyndon Johnson could not have made

the Pyongyang leadership sanguine about prospects for the coming campaign

season.

Heartened by the resounding success in the Ulchin-Samchok operations,

the United Nations Command put the finishing touches on the major programs of 1968. Anti-infiltration measures on the Demilitarized Zone and

seacoasts dovetailed with the extensive counterinsurgency apparatus erected

throughout the South Korean interior.

On the land frontier, both allies continued to improve on the tactics

instituted during 1968. To aid detection, the Americans installed floodlights

along a four-and-one-half-kilometer segment of their sector. Several UN

divisions continued to test experimental electronic sensors of all types. American and South Korean military engineers and infantrymen worked throughout the winter to strengthen fortifications and clear fields of fire around

the guard posts and the south barrier fence, all important to delay intrusive

northerners. Most of the major construction had to wait until spring, but

the allies did not allow weather to prevent routine position improvements.
95

President Richard M. Nixon, a new,

tough U.S. president entered the scene

against the North Koreans

Both the U.S. and ROK forces received delivery of a total of a dozen

new UH-1 turbine helicopters. The Americans used these aircraft to enlarge

their overtaxed 6th Aviation Platoon into the 239th Aviation Company

(Assault Helicopter)-the first such Huey-equipped organization in Korea.

The forward divisions located and readied numerous landing zones to allow

better use of these new rotary-wing assets. 13 The additional helicopters and

landing zones gave more mobility to the quick-reaction forces so vital for

neutralization of infiltrators.

These ongoing upgrades, coupled with intensive training for U.S. and

ROK DMZ units, made the zone extremely hazardous for the few North

Korean intelligence agents and agitators who tried to take advantange of

the winter ice, snow, and cutting, cold winds. Allied patrols and guard posts

turned back several incursions without loss during January and February.

One American after-action summary correctly attributed these achievements

to the "vigilance" of enlisted men and "their quick reaction." The U.S. units

still were filled with men brought in during the post-Pueblo buildup; though

junior in rank, they were now veterans well-versed in the Korean environment. ROK divisions, always disciplined, also benefited from the extensive

experience gained by all ranks during the bitter clashes of the previous

year. 1

4 This new-found qualitative edge boded ill for the declining ranks of

highly skilled KPA special forces, not to mention their unblooded conventional backups.

- ~~ '- · I
96

The UH-1 helicopter, used in Korea to provide quick-reaction forces greater mobility

With the DMZ so difficult, the northerners might have turned to the

typically open seacoasts. These, however, no longer looked so inviting. In

the wake of Ulchin-Samchok, new ROK Southern and Eastern Coast Security

Commands had been established to oversee integration of everything from

rare search aircraft to numerous citizen coast watchers. In this way, antiinfiltration measures along the barren shores benefited from the immediate

command interest they sorely needed.

The emphasis on the beaches paid off almost immediately. Tipped off

by sound intelligence work from the Korean CIA-carefully coordinated with

police reports and air squadron sweeps-an ROK Navy patrol boat netted

a North Korean spy boat on 25 February, the first of several intercepted

and sunk during the year.15 The exceptional cooperation of the year before

became standard as 1969 went on. The South Koreans appeared to be serious

about closing down coastal infiltration once and for all.

In the interior, the counterinsurgency programs continued to build upon

the successes of 1968. The ROK Army drew upon their own potent special

forces and activated two ranger brigades, each with five battalions. One

went into the Taebaek Mountains, the other to the Chiri Mountains, the

two usual havens for northern guerrilla troublemakers. These hard-bitten

paratroopers, mostly veterans of previous fighting, retained the ability to

relocate on short notice to anywhere within the republic. 16

Intelligence efforts by the Korean CIA and ROK Army Counterintelligence Corps unearthed more DPRK sympathizers, informants, and deepcover operatives. In one far-ranging escapade, ROK CIA men in Saigon

nabbed a double agent en route to Cambodia.17 In addition, local police,

militiamen, and interested civilians brought in a steady stream of useful

news and often participated in the final apprehension of enemy agents.
97

Finally, President Park's long-overdue conversion to the virtues of social

mobilization proceeded full tilt into 1969. He increased funding for his formal

Civic Action Program by 26 percent, with emphasis on the same sorts of

medical services, educational work, and rural civil engineering that characterized the 1968 plan. As before, Park ordered his military commanders to

concentrate upon "local community development and antiespionage operation

areas." s18 Seoul's already strong control of the countryside would become

ironclad in the absence of a viable North Korean guerrilla effort.

Curiously, with all the sweat devoted to the defense of the ROK against

both midintensity and low-intensity challenges, neither General Bonesteel

nor his intelligence staffers took any special notice of the significance of

the wholesale changes in Pyongyang. But the general did know about the

shuffle and even discussed it with visiting journalist Emerson Chapin early

in 1969. Bonesteel correctly identified the affair as an inner-party struggle

resulting from the reversals of 1968.19

From that point, though, the UN commander in chief's vaunted intuition

faltered. Bonesteel did not think the personnel changes meant anything.

He believed that the new defense minister, Ch'oe Hyon, had the reputation

of being a guerrilla warfare specialist, which probably signaled business as

usual. In a later public statement, the general went so far as to say: "The

situation in 1969 reflects a north Korea ready and able to cause trouble,

more so than at any time since 1953." Bonesteel thought that the noteworthy

drop-off in North Korean infiltration merely reflected the success of continuing UNC initiatives, especially that of the new ROK Homeland Defense

Reserve Force. 20 Perhaps better weather might bring about a resurgence of

North Korean pressure, but the enemy seemed stymied by effective allied

responses.

How did the astute Bonesteel miss the signs of real trouble in the northern military system? First, the Korean People's Army operational security

proved to be airtight. If public sources and later actions offer a reliable

guide, it took months before the UNC discerned the stand-down of the 124th

Army Unit and its ilk-let alone the imposition of political officers throughout the North Korean command channels. The exact circumstances of the

UNC discovery of these developments remain classified, but they probably

could not be confirmed until well into 1970, after the Second Korean Conflict

ended. 21 Without definite word, Bonesteel surmised that the drop-off in hostile

infiltration corresponded only to UNC actions and not to any internal

dynamics in North Korea.

Second, Bonesteel's favorite source, Kim Il-sung himself, remained rather

tight-lipped and circumspect throughout 1969. As he confided to some scientific and educational workers in March, he found little time for detailed

pronouncements because "the situation in the country was tense." His next

major address on the South Korean issue came in November 1970, when he

finally delineated his reversion to a conventional military program and

renewed emphasis on the United Revolutionary Party as his front group in

the south. The premier's few public statements in 1969 featured enough of
98

the standard phraseology-"a burning desire to drive the U.S. imperialists

from our soil and unify the country at the earliest possible date"-to convince

Bonesteel that nothing had changed. 22

But the great purge in January clearly indicated that something had

changed-regardless of vague public statements. The 1966 change of plan

had been characterized by a similar, though less extensive, purge. That

time, the supreme leader himself spelled out his state's new direction. He

had acted identically in 1950, 1958, and 1961-62. A new mass program,

promulgated right from the top, followed every previous housecleaning. 23

This time, however, the cleansing lasted much longer. Though Kim already

knew what he intended to do, he could not truly start his mass effort until

the military had been restructured to his liking.

Given Kim's style of personal leadership, his lack of comment furnished

sure proof that the DPRK wallowed in dire straits, caught in the interlude

between concrete strategies. Bonesteel and his subordinates, burned too often

by North Korean craftiness, chose not to read anything into this "dog that

did not bark."

Aside from a dearth of hard intelligence and some faulty analysis, one

should not discount the predispositions of the United Nations Command by

early 1969. Almost all of the key commanders and staff officers recognized

that the tide had turned in the Second Korean Conflict; even the cautious

Bonesteel characterized the situation as "greatly improved." Justifiably

pleased with the giant strides taken since the dark days of November 1966,

the Americans and Koreans naturally attributed the dwindling infiltration

rate strictly to growing allied tactical prowess. Few, if any, considered the

possibility that allied success had caused a breakdown between Kim Il-sung

and his armed forces and a consequent scaling back of unconventional

operations at Pyongyang's direction. 24

Solid intelligence on the real picture up north might have altered some

of Bonesteel's perceptions. Even if he knew that North Korea was in trouble,

the general's determination to avoid a wider war ruled out the kind of preemptive attack so feared by Kim Il-sung. More to the point, had he known

what had gone wrong in the DPRK, Bonesteel might not have displayed so

much optimism in his own troops' improved, but by no means unassailable,

defensive abilities.

Without that knowledge, the Americans and South Koreans could only

proceed from what they sensed-that the situation had changed greatly for

the better. Bonesteel became so certain that things were winding down that

he chose not to submit an expensive (more than $200 million) updated

counterinfiltration and counterguerrilla requirements request to the Joint

Chiefs, even though his staff had labored mightily to produce this revised

document. He even authorized U.S. and ROK patrols to remark the DMZ's

Military Demarcation Line for the first time since early 1967. Rather than

deal with the northern threat, many of the U.S.-ROK senior staff officers

instead prepared for the upcoming Exercise Focus Retina, a test of America's

ability to reinforce its troops on the peninsula. 25
99

Unaware of the North Korean plight and convinced that they were imposing their will on the conflict, the UN Command grew confident, even

cocky. Inadvertently, they encouraged the nervous northerners to take harsh

retribution.

The North Strikes Back

Joint-Combined Exercise Focus Retina could not help but be noticed in

Pyongyang. This mid-March war game featured the spectacular jump of a

three-battalion brigade from the U.S. 82d Airborne Division. Tiers of light

green parachutes blossomed in the late winter skies forty miles southeast

of Seoul near the Han River. The Americans had flown thirty-one hours

straight from Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, intending "to demonstrate rapid reaction capability." Hundreds of jets from four U.S. Fifth Air

Force tactical fighter wings provided notional ground support for the paratroopers (see figure 10). ROK special forces joined the airborne drop and

the maneuvers that followed. The maneuver play included the repulse of a

mythical aggressor that bore more than a passing resemblance to the DPRK.

More than 7,000 troops (4,500 of which were U.S.-ROK forces based in Korea)

participated in this impressive display of allied power.

From Kim Il-sung's vantage point, and according to his propaganda

mills, Focus Retina looked like a dress rehearsal for the opening stages of

a U.S.-ROK march to the north. Had the UNC figured out what was going

on in the hobbled KPA? In any event, Focus Retina demanded a strong

reply from the north. Kim's precise rationale for his response remains hidden

in the bowels of the Pyongyang archives, but his reactions are definitely a

matter of record. From March to May, the DPRK defended itself with a

shield of blows reminiscent of the height of the 1967-68 skirmishing.

Korean People's Army regulars took the lead. They noticed that the

U.S. troops had settled already into some complacent routines, and they

used these patterns against the Americans. A few days before the U.S. airborne troops jumped, North Koreans ambushed a daylight barrier-fence repair

U.S. Army from Fort Bragg, North Carolina (1,806 men parachuted in)

HQ, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division

1-325 Infantry (Airborne)

3-325 Infantry (Airborne)

1-319 Artillery (105-mm towed, Airborne)

U.S. Air Force (approximately 300 aircraft)

18th Tactical Fighter Wing from Kadena AB, Okinawa

347th Tactical Fighter Wing from Moody AFB, Georgia

354th Tactical Fighter Wing from Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina

475th Tactical Fighter Wing from Yokota AB, Japan

Military Airlift Command airlifters from various bases

Figure 10. U.S. combat forces deployed for Exercise Focus Retina, March 1969
100

Part of the 7,000 troops participating in Exercise Focus Retina, a U.S.-ROK continental airborne

assault exercise

patrol from the U.S. 38th Infantry-Company C of the 2d Battalion. The

Americans escaped unscathed.

Two days later, on the eve of Exercise Focus Retina, the enemy tried a

different method. In the full light of morning, a KPA guard post opened

fire at long range against a demarcation-line marker-replacement patrol in

the U.S. sector. One American died; two Americans and a KATUSA fell

wounded. During a rescue attempt, these unfortunates died too, along with

a pilot and four crewmen when the medical evacuation helicopter from the

337th Medical Company (Air Ambulance) crashed shortly after takeoff, a

tragedy not caused by the enemy action.

The North Korean regulars probed U.S. defenses constantly over the

next two weeks, but the wary Americans were on their guard by this time,

and no further casualties resulted. 26 Sporadic clashes also flared along the

ROK divisional fronts, to include a forty-minute firefight on 7 April. In

this case, the northerners merely opened fire. Killing troops, not cutting

through the zone, seemed to be their goal.

On the beaches, eight Communist seaborne raiders landed at Chumunjin

in the Eastern Coast Security Command. Like their regular comrades on

the DMZ, these operatives also showed little interest in subversion or spying.
101

Rather, the team seized and killed a hapless policeman, an act of terrorism

repaid when ROK combat policemen and militia trapped and destroyed the

KPA detachment. 27

Obviously, when taken in concert with the virulent broadcasts and printed

complaints blaring forth from the Communist media, these selective strikes

served to demonstrate Kim Il-sung's concerns about Exercise Focus Retina.

They did not signify renewed attempts to infiltrate South Korea and stir

up the populace-a distinction not lost on Bonesteel. With Focus Retina

over, there appeared to be no need to continue the cycle of violence on the

borders. Thus, Bonesteel denied requests for reprisal raids by his frontline

commanders and limited the UN counteractions to strenuous and largely

effective defensive measures. 28

Aware of the different intent of these recent attacks, Bonesteel tried

diplomacy to curb the KPA. Perhaps the DPRK might choose to talk rather

than fight. On 10 April, the UNC delegation at Panmunjom proposed a

special meeting of the Military Armistice Commission aimed at reducing

tensions along the DMZ. The impassive KPA general and his men heard

the UN proposal and answered with four and one-half hours of stony

silence.29 So, there would be no succor from that quarter.

With the threat still looming and the North Koreans unwilling to acknowledge anything at the truce table, the Americans and South Koreans

took precautions. Units assumed higher readiness postures along and behind

the DMZ and in the exposed coastal command regions. Additionally, to

emphasize that the war on the DMZ had not ended, the UNC suspended

the recently restarted demarcation line marking efforts. 30 These activities

would not resume until years after the Second Korean Conflict ended.

The North Koreans did respond to UN diplomacy-but not in the conference room and not along the DMZ. This time, Kim Il-sung's air commanders committed a calculated act of terror aimed to reopen the seams in

the U.S.-ROK alliance. On 15 April, just after the northern premier's fiftyseventh birthday, two Korean People's Air Force MiG interceptors shot down

a U.S. Navy EC-121M Constellation ninety-five miles off the east coast of

the DPRK. The Communist fighter pilots issued no warning to the unarmed,

four-engine turboprop, which lumbered along gathering electronic signals

under a long-standing project code-named Beggar Shadow. Thirty-one Americans died in the one-sided encounter. 31

The specter of the Pueblo seemed to be resurrected. This time, the evidence clearly showed a premeditated act by the north. There was little likelihood that some local commander had gotten bold given Kim's massive

crackdown against his officer corps. Dare the United States and/or its

Republic of Korean allies hit back?

President Nixon thought so. "We were being tested, and therefore force

must be met with force," assumed the new U.S. leader. His national security

adviser Henry Kissinger agreed. The president convened most of his National

Security Council and weighed his options. Two USN carrier battle groups
102

headed out into the Sea of Japan-just in case.32 Kissinger, noticeably excited

to be facing his "first major crisis," prepared a slate of possible responses.

These included a protest at Panmunjom, armed escort of future reconnaissance flights, seizure of North Korean vessels on the high seas, mining of

Wonsan harbor, shore bombardment by air or ship gunnery, and retaliatory

air strikes against the KPAF fighter airstrips. The president and his national

security adviser agreed that only two options really seemed possible: a

reprisal air strike or an aerial escort linked to a diplomatic complaint at

the truce table. Both men favored the air attack. 33

But Nixon and Kissinger found themselves alone in their enthusiasm

to bomb North Korea. Secretary of State William Rogers feared a public

backlash from another military action in addition to the immensely unpopular Vietnam War. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird warned that Congress

would conduct its own retaliation, scuttling Nixon's other projects early in

his administration. Laird also made the usual strategic argument: Korea

was an economy-of-force theater, and anything used there diverted from

the main effort in Vietnam. For his part, CIA chief, Richard Helms, also

agreed that an air strike risked escalation and promised nothing but momentary gratification in the Oval Office.34 All urged the president to limit his

response to armed escorts and a note at Panmunjom.

The key men on the scene in Korea also warned against an air strike.

Ambassador Porter recommended a mild response, for fear of encouraging

radical elements in Pyongyang (or Seoul, for that matter). General Bonesteel

also "didn't consider it wise" to react strongly, reported the JCS chairman,

General Earle G. Wheeler. The general and ambassador cited intelligence

sources, confirmed by CIA Director Helms, that indicated that the EC-121M

downing was just another "isolated provocation," perhaps hoping to draw

a UNC overreaction to suit some arcane internal needs in Pyongyang. So

far, the ROKs had not stirred. Would they remain quiet if UN Navy fighterbombers struck North Korea? 35

An EC-121 M reconnaissance plane of the type shot down on 15 April by two MiGs
103

Henry Kissinger, national security

adviser to President Nixon in 1969

Dismayed by the lack of support for their aggressive ideas, Nixon and

Kissinger relented. On 18 April, the president announced that armed escorts

would accompany future U.S. reconnaissance flights in the vicinity of North

Korea. He also told the UN representative to the Military Armistice Commission to deliver what Nixon called "a very weak protest" to the DPRK

general at Panmunjom.

In his mind, Nixon reserved the bombing option, but as the days passed,

it became less and less likely. "I still agreed," wrote Nixon later, "that we

had to act boldly. I just wasn't convinced that this was the time to do it."

Like Johnson after the capture of the Pueblo, the president worried about

launching aircraft and then finding himself at war in Korea. "As long as

we were involved in Vietnam," concluded Nixon, "we simply did not have

the resources or public support for another war in another place." 36

The same factors that militated against a massive response to the taking

of the Pueblo still restrained U.S. decision makers. Taking the long view

came easier this time. The infiltration situation had improved greatly, the

ROKs faced no special crisis, and the poor naval fliers were dead-not hostages. Thus, the Americans reacted to the loss of the EC-121M in three

-L-L·I -41 --
104

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird

maintained that Korea was an

economy-of-force theater

co

Qua

-

.0

2

I

I

ll;

Secretary of State William Rogers,

who feared a public reaction to

intensified military action in Korea

II -·I II -- I I = -·F··PCISIB

a--- CC-- - --- L- ILII

II r -c_ e --r ·-- - -----
105

A meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom

ways: the note at Panmunjom, armed escorts, and a naval show of force

off the North Korean coast.

The "nonconfrontational" statement was accepted without comment by

the KPA representative. The American delegation also withdrew until August

to reinforce its protest.3 7 The DPRK gave no indication of how it interpreted

this missive, but it certainly must have calmed any invasion hysteria. Attacks on Americans tailed off drastically over the next few weeks.

The armed escorts proved easier to order than implement. Panicky Pentagon officials suspended all U.S. reconnaissance flights worldwide on 15

April, pending a decision on armed escorts. It took until 8 May to scrape

up enough escort fighters to restart the missions. Given the heavy air

commitment to Vietnam-to include the recent commencement of secret

bombings in Cambodia-this should have surprised few. Nixon, however,

raged against the "postponements, excuses, and delays." He might have

been even more annoyed had he learned that Beggar Shadow flights had

always received fighter escorts through the end of 1968 when requirements

in Southeast Asia and the presumed easing situation in Korea encouraged

a shift of these assets. 38 Once escorted flights resumed, no further reconnaissance aircraft were attacked. The KPAF declined to test the U.S.

aviators.

CO

so

,0I

ci "T

(t) I

I2
106

In the Sea of Japan, the Seventh Fleet's Task Force 71 collected its

warships and demonstrated its capabilities during maneuvers held on 19-

26 April (see figure 11). Much like the Formation Star deployments of 1968,

Rear Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle's ships conducted air and surface trainingall the while reminding the North Koreans of the potential power lurking

off their coasts. 39 Of all of the American reactions to the shooting down of

the EC-121M, this probably carried the most weight. Four aircraft carriers

with more than 350 warplanes could not be lightly dismissed in Pyongyang.

Nixon and Kissinger, however, were not happy with what the latter

termed a "weak, indecisive, and disorganized" American effort in the case

of the downed aircraft.4 0 Yet together, these steps did the job. They mounted

a credible threat, gave Kim Il-sung assurance that he was in no immediate

danger, and, most important of all, maintained alliance solidarity. The North

Task Force 71 operations

USS Enterprise (CVAN-65) with air wing

USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14) with air wing

USS Ranger (CVA-61) with air wing

USS Hornet (CVS-12) with air wing

USS Chicago (CG-11)

USS Oklahoma City (CLG-5)

USS St. Paul (CL-73)

USS Mahan (DLG-11)

USS Dale (DLG-19)

USS Sterrett (DLG-31)

USS Lynde McCormick (DDG-8)

USS Parsons (DDG-33)

USS Radford (DD-446)

USS John W. Weeks (DD-701)

USS Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729)

USS Gurke (DD-783)

USS Richard B. Anderson (DD-786)

USS Shelton (DD-790)

USS Ernest G. Small (DD-838)

USS Perry (DD-844)

USS Tucker (DD-875)

USS Meredith (DD-890)

USS Davidson (DE-1045).

Abbreviations

CG guided missile cruiser

CL light cruiser

CLG guided missile light cruiser

CVA attack aircraft carrier

CVAN nuclear-powered CVA

CVS antisubmarine carrier

DD destroyer

DLG guided missile DD leader

DDG guided missile destroyer

Sources: Lieutenant D. L. Strole, United States Navy, and Lieutenant W. E. Dutcher, United States Naval Reserve, "Naval and

Maritime Events, July 1968-December 1969," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 96 (May 1970):14; and Henry Kissinger,

White House Years (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Co., 1979), 320.

Figure 11. The United States' response to the downing of the EC-121M, April 1969
107

Koreans throttled back. Incidents along the DMZ persisted into May, then

died away in the U.S. sector, although the ROK DMZ divisions and the

coasts continued to experience occasional incursions.4 1

The Torch Passes

By avoiding contact with U.S. forces throughout most of the summer,

the Korean People's Army achieved by inaction what it had never gained

by fighting. With the Second Korean Conflict almost over, the "American

imperialists" began to make long-term plans to pull out of the ROK (a

process still in progress two decades later). The United States could contemplate this possibility because their South Korean allies had finally come of

age-a development that more than balanced any comfort Kim Il-sung might

have derived from waning U.S. interest.

In late July 1969, during a stopover at Guam following his visit with

the crew of the Apollo 11 lunar landing mission, President Nixon told reporters that the United States would supply military hardware and advice,

rather than U.S. ground troops, to support its allies. These allies could also

count on American sea and air power. Though aimed at Vietnam, this

"Nixon Doctrine" also extended to Korea. An alarmed Park Chung Hee

flew to San Francisco in August to receive assurances that the U.S.-ROK

alliance had not been altered. He accepted Nixon's word that basic U.S.

policy remained intact.4 2

Yet despite these words, Park might have done better to look at what

had begun to happen to his American defenders during the summer. With

combat in the U.S. sector rare, the battle-experienced men brought in during

1968 were being replaced by novices. As one veteran U.S. colonel lamented,

"a special kind of leadership is required to keep men 'up' during the lulls

in enemy action."43 Most of the time, the KPA did not cooperate by relieving

the boredom. As in the rest of the U.S. Army about this time, troop quality,

never too impressive in Korea to begin with, started on a long decline.

Sloppy American soldiers suffered five deaths from accidental weapons discharges-equal to the number of U.S. ground troops lost all year to enemy

action. Other careless troops sowed hundreds of little three-and-a-half-ounce

M-14 "toe-popper" mines without regard for regulation marking procedures.

More injuries resulted.4 4

Even the two remaining battlefield face-offs with the KPA sullied the

U.S. soldiers' reputation for competence. On 17 August 1969, a 59th Aviation

Company OH-23 pilot somehow became disoriented and flew his helicopter

into North Korea, where he and his two cohorts quickly found themselves

forced down and placed in custody.45 Rumors of drug abuse swirled around

the incident.

On 18 October, following months of absolute calm in the American sector, four U.S. soldiers from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division drove their jeep

into the DMZ, trusting in a white flag to provide security. The North
108

Koreans pounced on the vehicle. Each American took a bullet through the

head at close range, and their jeep was found riddled with holes torn by bullets and grenade fragments.4 6 The lopsided skirmish suggested too many stark images from the ambush of 2 November 1966. It was as if the American infantrymen had learned nothing, but in reality, they were beginning

to unlearn lessons that had been imparted earlier at great cost.

These developments of 1969 were just the first cracks. A year later, the

same problems with drugs, race relations, and indiscipline that infected the

forces in Vietnam had spread to Korea in a pronounced way. Things deteriorated so badly that a 1970 operational report prominently featured this

ominous note: "The Assistant Chief of Staff G-2 has initiated a master list

of all [U.S.] individuals who present a possible threat to distinguished visitors." 47

Quantitative American contributions also started to erode. The air reservists brought to Korea during Operation Combat Fox left in June-unreplaced. Air Force aircraft strengths slowly drew down to pre-1968 levels.

By November, the U.S. Department of Defense formalized the diversion of

resources from the Korean theater. Due to a $38 million budget cut, U.S.

Eighth Army laid off almost a tenth of its Korean labor force; deferred

some military construction; and restricted usage of vehicles, spare parts,

water, heating fuels, and electricity. 4 8 It marked the first outright resource

reduction since November 1966. Once the cuts started, it was only a matter

of time before the first big slash occurred: the withdrawal of the U.S. 7th

Infantry Division in 1971.

While the Americans started down the slippery slope to a reduced force,

the ROK military, its supporting agencies, and its faithful populace proceeded from victory to victory against the diminishing numbers of North Korean

infiltrators. Between June and December 1969, ROK soldiers repelled numerous DMZ intrusions, trading mortar and even artillery fire with North

Korean line units. On the coasts, joint air-sea-intelligence-police operations located and sank four 75-ton spy boats and captured another, the most

impressive haul to date along the vulnerable beaches. In the interior, police and popular militia worked together to round up hundreds of agents, many reported by concerned citizens. Speeding into action in new helicopters, modernized warships, and screaming F-4D Phantom jets, the South Koreans

had fulfilled Bonesteel's fondest hopes.4 9 At long last, they could defend

themselves against anything the north could throw at them.

Bonesteel himself departed on 1 October 1969, turning over command

to Korean War hero General John H. Michaelis. It fell to Michaelis to nego- tiate the release of the unlucky helicopter crew. Their return on 3 December

1969 signified the end of the Second Korean Conflict, although intermittent

small-scale DPRK-ROK scrapping persisted unabated well into 1971.

Michaelis pronounced the conflict's end in an article published in October

1970. "Continued activity by agents can be expected, but they should meet

with no more success than in the past," he argued. "While north Korea
109

might provoke incidents along the Demilitarized Zone, the probability of

all-out hostilities in the foreseeable future is limited."5 0 It remains so to

this day.

I· · I ·I

What Went Right - lg ii i I I i - , -· Il · LI· Il -· I ii

In small wars, caution must be exercised, and instead of striving to

generate the maximum power with forces available, the goal is to gain

decisive results with the least application of force and the consequent

minimum loss of life.

-U.S. Marine Corps

Small Wars Manual,

1940

Lately, it has become fashionable to refer to the Korean War of

1950-53 as "the forgotten war." Popular historian Clay Blair chose that

apt phrase as the title of his monumental recent study of the war. If the

Korean War, a three-year slugfest that cost America almost 34,000 battlefield

dead, has been lost in the shuffle between the triumph of World War II

and the trauma of Vietnam, is it any wonder that the confusing, sporadic,

and far less bloody Second Korean Conflict has drifted into utter obscurity,

blotted out by the awful spectacle of the contemporary war in Southeast

Asia?

This studied indifference to an important small war is unfortunate given

America's continued involvement on the Korean peninsula and today's constant soul-searching over the perils of low-intensity conflict. Military professionals and interested civilians would do well to consider the results

achieved, the reasons for victory, the broader implications, and the unfinished business of the Second Korean Conflict.

Decisive Results

By comparison to other wars, the human cost of the 1966-69 fighting

in Korea appears rather small (see table 3). Including those killed,

wounded, and captured in firefights and the Pueblo and EC-121M incidents,

the allies lost 1,120 soldiers and police plus 171 South Korean civilians. Of

this total, 374 troops and 80 civilians died.1 To put these numbers in perspective, consider that U.S. casualties in Vietnam averaged more than 1,190

killed per month during 1968.2

111
112

TABLE 3

The Second Korean Conflict: A Statistical Summary, 1966-69

1966 1967 1968 1969

DMZ Incidents

Firefight 22 143 236 39

KPA harassing fire 3 5 19 4

KPA mining 0 16 8 0

U.S.-ROK fire on 12 280 223 24

suspected KPA

Casualties

KPA KIA 13 126 233 25

KPA WIA accurate totals not available

KPA PW 1 4 4 3

KPA defector 17 10 5 1

DPRK agents seized 205 787 1,245 225

ROK/U.S. KIA 29/6 115/16 145/171 10/362

ROK/U.S. WIA 28/1 243/51 240/54 39/5

ROK/U.S. PW 0/0 0/0 0/82 0/33

1This column includes 1 U.S. KIA and 82 U.S. PWs (January-December 1968) from the USS

Pueblo. The PWs were released by the DPRK.

2This total includes 31 U.S. KIA when their EC-121M was shot down by KPAF jets on 15 April

1969. It does not include 8 U.S. deaths resulting from the crash of a medical evacuation helicopter

-on 15 March 1969.

3These 3 U.S. Army helicopter crewmen were held from August until December 1969, then

released.

Sources: Finley, The US Military Experience in Korea, 220; and Lieutenant Colonel Everett H. Webster, United States Air Force, "Is

the Morning Calm About to Be Broken in Korea?" 8-9, Research report no. 4471, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air

Force Base, AL, March 1971.

But there are other ways to consider these Korean numbers aside from

the obvious fact that the soldiers were all just as dead, hurt, or captured

as those lost on Omaha Beach. In retrospect, both the United States and

the Republic of Korea can find some special significance in these sad tallies

from three years of undeclared war on the peninsula. From the American

point of view, the 319 casualties suffered during the 37 months of the Second

Korean Conflict make this fighting the fourth most costly and second longest U.S. military undertaking since the end of World War II. Only the

Korean and Vietnam Wars and the ill-fated Beirut expedition of the early

1980s took greater tolls, and only Vietnam lasted longer. 3 Although more

widely reported and studied, the interventions in the Dominican Republic

(1965-66), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and the Persian Gulf (1990-91)

all proved less sanguine and much shorter.

For the South Koreans, this war cost 84 percent of all soldiers and 58

percent of all civilians lost to DPRK military actions since 1953.4 To date,

the Second Korean Conflict remains by far the single most violent period

in the ongoing, smoldering postarmistice struggle between South Korea and

the north. Only the original Korean War and the ROK contribution in

Vietnam cost more southern lives.
113

What did the allies accomplish to justify these sacrifices? The military

score sheet appears unimpressive at first glance. Given General Bonesteel's

campaign plan, the U.S.-ROK forces did not achieve an especially favorable

body count, killing only 397 KPA soldiers, capturing 12, and convincing 33

to defect. But again, numbers alone do not tell the full story. Almost every

North Korean that fell was a highly trained special operator not easily

replaced. Growing attrition among these few high-quality forces made North

Korea's proinsurgent program markedly more difficult to implement as time

went on. 5 Additionally, aggressive ROK internal security measures, especially

the creation of the Homeland Defense Reserve Force in early 1968, netted a

whopping 2,462 North Korean agents, informants, and collaborators. 6 Even

allowing for President Park's tendency to toss domestic opponents into the

bag of true DPRK auxiliaries, it still seems to be a huge haul. These

damaging blows to the North Korean intelligence apparatus in the ROK

evidently helped to convince Kim Il-sung that further unconventional efforts

could not succeed.

Far more important than any body counts, the combined U.S.-ROK

forces accomplished their mission. The Republic of Korea remained secure

in 1969-and even stronger than in 1966. The allies' array of countermeasures derailed any realistic possibility for a Pyongyang-sponsored insurgency. Kim Il-sung had his chance, took it, and failed. After 1969, the south

could turn its attention to the north's conventional threat, fairly certain

that the DPRK had squandered its opportunity for an insurrection.

The frustration resultant from Kim Il-sung's attempts to stir up a potent

guerrilla movement have had important and lasting effects on all three of

the warring powers. Each involved state-made major policy adjustments in

the wake of the Second Korean Conflict.

For the ROKs, the victory of 1969 has proved both bright and dark.

Success bequeathed the sort of yin-yang paradox so familiar to classical

Korean philosophers. In this case, an uneasy tension arose between newfound economic muscle and internal repression. The issue persists to this

day in the sometimes troubled southern republic.

The bright side of this relationship is the continued expansion of the

ROK productive sectors, especially all varieties of industry. The United

Nations Command shield provided sufficient security to permit a strong,

populous ROK to grow almost unaffected by the northern provocations (see

table 4). The positive trends that accelerated so dramatically in the late

1960s still go on. Thanks to the frustration of his 1966-69 schemes, Kim

Il-sung today must confront his worst nightmare: a South Korea teeming

with twice the population and four (nearly five) times the gross national

product of its northern neighbor.7 The military implications of this imbalance

surely must cause the Pyongyang leadership to think twice before contemplating renewed war. This imbalance has created deterrence in the truest

sense of the term.

Yet the drive to secure the ROK and protect its economic growth had a

darker side. In essence, South Korea traded citizen rights for collective pro-
114

TABLE 4

Republic of Korea Population and Gross National Product,

1962-72

Population Increase GNP Increase

(in millions) (in percent) (in billions) (in percent)

1962 26.2 2.7 $2.3 3.1

1963 26.9 2.7 $2.5 8.8

1964 27.7 2.9 $2.7 8.6

1965 28.3 2.2 $2.9 6.1

1966 28.9 2.1 $3.2 12.4

1967 29.5 2.1 $3.4 7.8

1968 30.1 2.0 $3.8 12.6

1969 30.7 2.0 $4.4 15.0

1970 31.3 1.9 $4.7 7.9

1971 31.8 1.7 $5.1 9.2

1972 32.4 1.9 $5.6 7.0

Sources: Kim Mahn Je, Korea's Economy: Past and Present (Seoul, South Korea: Korea Development Institute, 1975), 342-43; and

Frederica M. Bunge, ed., South Korea, a Country Study, Area handbook series (Washington, DC: United States Department of the

Army, 1981), 56, 113.

tection. Although this guaranteed continued industrial progress, the ways

in which President Park mobilized his people against the northern unconventional challenge left permanent scars on South Korean politics and society. Park apparently grew to enjoy the emergency powers he accumulated

during the Second Korean Conflict, and he discovered that the same intelligence, police, military, militia, and social mobilization systems devised to

defeat northern Communists also worked splendidly against domestic

opponents-all conveniently cast by Park as "pro-northern agitators." In

many ways, after 1969, the Seoul government replaced North Korea as the

greatest danger to the average ROK citizen.

Even as the threat from the north receded, Park and his successors did

not relinquish their powers. There were always enough sparks along the

DMZ to justify further crackdowns. Labor groups, college students, and

opposition politicians felt the unleashed power of the intrusive apparatus

created to thwart Kim Il-sung's unconventional warriors. This resort to the

rule of armed force, rather than law, produced a succession of tragic battles

for authority in Seoul involving the military, the police, and the intelligence

services. Stolen, illicit elections and a hastily rewritten authoritarian constitution led in a few turbulent years to President Park's death in 1979 at the

hands of his own disgruntled Korean CIA chief. Coups, an army junta,

and continued rule by a general-president have marked the period since

Park's demise. Although there have been some promising moves toward
115

real democracy, the military-dominated central government remains firmly

in control. 8 Like the strength of the Samsung and Hyundai corporations,

the overbearing might of the soldiery in Seoul is also a legacy of the Second

Korean Conflict.

If the war delivered a mixed blessing to the ROK populace, the verdict

north of the DMZ appears to have been much more clearly negative. The

guerrilla option appeared to be permanently foreclosed, barring some unforeseeable collapse by the wary generals in the south. Worse, Kim Il-sung's

vindictive purges had wiped out many key northern officers and burdened

the previously innovative Korean People's Army with the strictures of a

clumsy commissar system. Other than some experience in certain clandestine tactics, the DPRK gained nothing by its ambitious, unconventional

campaign.

Faced with a much more capable ROK, today's sullen northern regime

can only hold out and hope for a miracle to bring them any possibility of

victory. Curiously, the overzealous ROK generals might inadvertently deliver

that miracle by pursuing iron-fisted repression, thereby generating the

deep-seated domestic discontent that Kim Il-sung's men had been unable to

foment in 1966-69. But that is only a possibility-and not one that the

north can control. If current tendencies hold up, the very survival of the

DPRK will come into question within a few decades. 9

The Americans, who suffered the least in the conflict, might have reaped

the greatest benefit. Uncomfortable with long-term overseas troop commitments, the United States found itself able to begin a gradual disengagement

from the Korean peninsula. This confident and virtually inevitable long

good-bye began because of the excellent ROK showing in the Second Korean

Conflict. The ROKs' prowess convinced the Nixon administration that it

could withdraw an infantry division in 1971. That pullout was merely the

first and largest. Throughout the 1970s, America made several incremental

withdrawals, while simultaneously transferring more and more authority and

responsibility to the Koreans through such vehicles as the U.S.-ROK

Combined Forces Command (CFC) headquarters. The CFC was established

in 1978 as the logical successor to Bonesteel's U.S.-ROK Operational Planning Staff of ten years earlier. Ample American high-technology arms, both

granted and purchased, have been delivered to make sure that the southern

forces maintain a qualitative edge on the North Koreans.10

Today, American ground units in Korea center around the U.S. 2d Infantry Division. The United States still maintains its formal command of

all forces through the UNC and the new CFC. Given the ROK armed forces'

deep involvement in domestic politics throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a

relatively objective U.S. commander certainly helped keep defenses up while

some of the Korean generals jousted for power in Seoul.

That American command, however, will probably change before the new

century. Overall ROK command and final U.S. withdrawal are in the offing.

General Bonesteel predicted as much as far back as 1970: "I can see a day

where the U.S. forces in Korea will consist of a single armored cavalry
116

regiment-a trip wire to hold up our end of the alliance. The ROKs will do

the rest. That's exactly what we want, you know."11

In a sense, then, Kim Il-sung did achieve one of his goals, though

hardly in the way he had hoped: the United States' forces will leave but

turn over the fate of the peninsula to a powerful, militant South Korea. By

then, the enfeebled North Korean leadership might decide that it prefers

Yankee imperialism-if only as a brake to surging ROK ambitions.

Reasons for the Victory

No one reason explains the U.S.-ROK victory in the Second Korean

Conflict. Still, one could fairly argue that it largely derived from three

causes: the flawed execution of the DPRK campaign plan, the UNC's ability

to discern the northern threat and choose sound countermeasures, and the

eventually comprehensive ROK reaction to the danger of an insurgency.

Like all wars, the 1966-69 Korean combat was lost as much as it was

won. Kim Il-sung's unconventional campaign plan represented a superb

concept poorly executed. In theory, the authoritarian, militarized ROK

government, heavily dependent on a foreign power, should have been vulnerable to efforts to stir revolt. It was, but the northern soldiers botched

their chance-probably for good.

The North Korean failure revolved around an inability to mass their

special operations combat power against the objectives specified in

Kim Il-sung's original blueprint. Lacking the proper numbers of trained

cadres and without an established southern intelligence and logistics infrastructure, it would have taken the North Koreans years just to prepare the

ground for generation of a viable insurrection in the ROK. But Premier

Kim, fearful of the burgeoning southern power and cognizant of the diversion provided by Vietnam, refused to wait. He demanded immediate action,

thus greatly hampering his armed forces' ability to accomplish the task.

Overly optimistic generals accepted this need for speed but ignored the

consequent requirement (so well enunciated by Napoleon) to concentrate their

resources before racing to battle. 12 Instead, they abetted Kim's grandiose

guerrilla designs and sent their few half-prepared special warfare troops

into action piecemeal within weeks of receiving their marching orders. The

major forces built for the campaign (the 124th and 283d Army Units) were

not even raised until four months after the incursions began and were not

committed until fourteen months after the opening shots.

This haphazard commitment of forces resulted in fighting that lacked

much discernible pattern and, therefore, much purpose. Rather than focusing

initially on the Americans and widening potential clefts in the U.S.-ROK

alliance, KPA special forces began to work directly upon the ROK population, thereby diluting their very limited strength between two formidable

targets. All of this provided time for the UNC to figure out what was happening and devise countermeasures.
117

Individually outstanding achievements, such as the grimly efficient

initial ambushes of November 1966, the precision demolition of a U.S. barracks in May 1967, and the near-miss at the Blue House in January 1968,

exemplified both the great potential and the wasted effort of the DPRK

campaign. Certainly, the north had the assets to brew up serious troubles

for the UNC. But with the important exception of the Blue House raid,

these skilled troops were frittered away against average U.S. riflemen, ordinary ROK soldiers, local police, and unlucky southern villagers-hardly the

sort of high-value targets likely to unhinge South Korean society. With only

a handful of special forces available, KPA leaders erred by not being more

selective in their objectives.

Aside from taking little care in choosing tactical objectives, the infiltration teams rarely cooperated to deliver the sort of wide-ranging strikes

and follow-up raids that might have paralyzed the UNC, particularly if

such methods had been used from the outset. Rather, the whole northern

campaign displayed an inexplicable lack of coordination. Forces did not

move immediately to create or exploit opportunities like the Blue House

raid, the Pueblo seizure, and the Tet Offensive in Vietnam; the DMZ and

coasts remained quiet, and the squabbling allies enjoyed a breathing space

to resolve their differences.

The only big, well-orchestrated North Korean operation, the UlchinSamchok landings, came several months after the allies had perfected a

solid counterinsurgency structure. Even this massive infiltration attempt did

not feature simultaneous pressures along the DMZ, thus permitting the

Americans to shift valuable helicopters to support the ROK reaction forces.

One has the impression that the KPA commanders assumed that they

might achieve something simply through "operating," by merely dispatching

random teams into the south to prey on the Americans, ROK troops, and

hapless citizens. All they gained for their troubles were steady attrition and

increasingly more effective allied responses.

What if the North Korean leaders, most of them experienced in guerrilla

warfare, had employed their forces differently? Although the brutal November 1966 ambushes offered immediate proof to Kim Il-sung that the military

supported the new party line, they also tipped North Korea's hand. This

led directly to UNC reactions that doomed the unconventional offensive.

But it did not have to be that way. The northern forces could have saved

their trained men for the decisive moment. It would have been possible to

increase intelligence gathering without confronting and alarming U.S. and

ROK troops or the disjointed ROK internal security agencies (which in 1966

posed little threat to clandestine infiltrators). By waiting a year or so as

their agents shifted over from purely political agitation to setting the stage

for dramatic decapitation raids, the north might have plotted a coordinated

countrywide series of strikes against key ROK and UNC officials. An

Ulchin-Samchok-size landing in the wake of such mayhem, against an unreformed UNC security system, might have produced far more drastic effects.

Instead, the KPA generals settled for a series of small, immediate triumphs

and lost the war.
118

As for the winners, victory came from properly identifying the problem

and then taking appropriate action. General Bonesteel deserves special credit

here. Almost single-handedly, as was his style, the cerebral general divined

Kim Il-sung's new insurgency plan within days of its implementation.

Bonesteel boldly challenged the standard beliefs of the U.S.-ROK intelligence

staffs, who had hitherto watched almost exclusively for a repeat of the

1950 invasion. By accurately understanding the threat at the outset,

Bonesteel spared his men a great deal of bloody, unproductive fumbling

around. From the start, the UNC forces knew what they were up against.

Within a few months after heightened hostilities began, Bonesteel's

Special Working Group of handpicked U.S. and ROK officers created the

UNC campaign plan that defeated Kim Il-sung's proinsurgent activities.

Guided by Bonesteel and ever aware that the United States could not fight

a major war in Korea, the Special Working Group ignored America's "go it

alone" ethnocentric tradition and reposed trust in the ROKs right from the

start. The ROKs' ability to secure their own populace would constitute success. The UNC, mostly ROKs, handled the anti-infiltration fighting on the

DMZ and coasts, leaving the counterinsurgent war inside South Korea

almost exclusively to the ROK government.

Ignoring almost all printed doctrine and contemporary field practice,

Bonesteel refused to commit his American battalions as mobile counter-

.guerrilla strike forces. Instead, he chained them to the unglamorous but

important DMZ security mission and greatly curtailed their use of firepower.

This encouraged the relatively well-equipped U.S. troops to conduct some

important experimentation to formulate the right mix of barriers and smallunit tactics needed to interfere with DMZ intruders. These techniques then

became standard for the ROK soldiers as well. The DMZ service accorded

closely with conventional U.S. tactics, severely limited any escalation of

the American role, and threw the bulk of the war effort on the ROKs. Each

of these expedients reinforced Bonesteel's favored concept of operations.

As Bonesteel envisioned it, the counterinsurgent war proper fell to the

Republic of Korea. Whatever his eventual shortcomings as a corrupt autocrat, President Park Chung Hee distinguished himself in his conduct of the

Second Korean Conflict. Early on, Park accepted Bonesteel's evaluation of

the threat and consequently agreed to most of Bonesteel's suggestions. The

ROK leader believed that, if carried out, these measures could accentuate

the nationalism and guarantee the sovereignty of South Korea that Park

so much wanted.

Park's actions are especially noteworthy because of the personal risks

he accepted. Presidential Instruction #18, which created the effective framework for ROK counterguerrilla operations, tempted fate by requiring the

suspicious fiefdoms of the ROK military, police, and intelligence services to

surrender their independence to a definite chain of command. As these

agencies could make or break Park (and finally did break him), this reorganization represented a substantial political gamble on his part. Had the

Blue House raid and Ulchin-Samchok landings not occurred to validate the
119

new policy, Park could well have felt a backlash from his offended, powerful

subordinates.

In the same way, the February 1968 decision that formed the Homeland

Defense Reserve Force represented an uncharacteristic trust in the average

South Korean, the same people (in Park's mind, at least) who rioted in the

cities and chafed under Park's political programs. For a man elevated to

authority as a result of the chaos created by popular unrest, the choice to

arm his people, especially in the face of determined Communist agitation,

seemed like a very big leap of faith. The new militia might take their

weapons and turn on Park. But like the powerful bureaucracies, the ROK

citizenry rallied to their president in the teeth of the guerrilla challenge. In

Bonesteel's opinion, "I think this [the militia] is what finally turned off the

north."13

It would be wrong to suggest that the UNC did not make mistakesincluding some serious ones. For all his brilliance, Bonesteel appears to

have missed the significance of the KPA purge of early 1969, and his kneejerk recommendation for a nuclear reaction to the Pueblo's capture hardly

did him credit as a sensible strategist. As for Park, he was slow to institute

all of the recommended changes in his counterguerrilla apparatus and never

bothered to deliver the political freedoms that could have cemented ROK

society more firmly to its leadership. Finally, both the Americans and the

South Koreans, despite their potentially substantial naval capabilities, virtually ceded the ROK coastline to the intruders. Although the Ulchin-Samchok

forces failed, the fact that they could land in such numbers so late in the

conflict says a lot about UNC shortcomings on the sea frontiers.

All of these mistakes hurt the allied effort, but North Korea's grave

errors and the UNC's many sound methods counted for more in the final

analysis. It is interesting to observe that in this most political type of war,

the politically astute General Bonesteel proved able to impose his will on

those most political of soldiers-General Park of the south and Marshal

Kim of the north. More than any other individual, Bonesteel dominated the

Second Korean Conflict. Its outcome bears his indelible stamp.

The Broader Implications

Obviously, all participants learned, or could have learned, from their

experiences in the 1966-69 Korean combat. For the Koreans, this knowledge

may be of direct utility in future confrontations on their divided peninsula.

As citizens of a global superpower, however, Americans do not have the

luxury of focusing their attention in one place. Did the experiences of

1966-69 produce any insights that might be applied outside the Korean

context?

It would be easy to dismiss the Korean case as unique and thus unworthy of serious consideration. Certainly, Korea features three elements

distinct from the usual formula for American interventions in the Third

World. First, the ROK in 1966 constituted a somewhat developed polity,
120

with a growing economy and some social cohesion. Second, the United States

had made a long-term commitment to ROK security, formalized by a tested

wartime alliance, a treaty, and forward deployment of U.S. troops. Third,

thanks to the continuation of wartime arrangements, the U.S. military

command structure permitted the U.S. commander in chief in Korea to work

around the U.S. embassy and exert operational control over the host

country's armed forces. Many might suggest that these circumstances are

so peculiar to Korea as to render suspect any general observations about

U.S. actions undertaken in that country and their broader application.

On closer appraisal, the situation in Korea in 1966-69 was not so unusual. First, the ROK had the potential to be a stable sovereign state, but

it also suffered from all of the expected pains of rapid industrialization,

including significant political unrest and social dislocation. Add to this a

semimilitarized government of questionable legitimacy and an aggressive

northern neighbor, and it is easy to see that the ROK was vulnerable to

infiltration and insurgency-especially if the government overreacted with

heavy, indiscriminate force. Although obviously stronger than the Republic

of Vietnam, the ROK was by no means a stable state fourteen years after

the Korean War. One must be careful not to project too much of modern

South Korea onto its 1960s predecessor.

As for the long-term U.S. commitment, this again is not unheard of.

Like any world power, America has posted its forces overseas in many

places, not all of them safe. One can posit a few fairly parallel cases, like

Panama, the Philippines, Honduras, and El Salvador, where the United

States has backed up its words with men on the ground.

It is also important to note that commitments made can be brokenregardless of the amount of blood and treasure invested. Lebanon, Iran,

pre-1979 Nicaragua, and of course South Vietnam serve as pointed reminders

that even long-term arrangements do not last forever. Had Korea gone sour,

the United States might well have pulled out precipitately.

Korea in the 1960s was unique in one sense. The command relationships

obviously seemed optimum from an American military perspective. Thanks

to enduring Korean War practices, the theater commander in chief could

circumvent the cumbersome ambassadorial "country team," a definite advantage in this case, although not completely unprecedented for U.S. field

commanders.14 The really unusual aspect of the Korean command framework

involved the U.S. commander in chiefs operational command of the South

Korean military. Most countries, and even a good portion of today's ROK

population, see such a U.S.-dominant arrangement as a violation of their

sovereignty. There are some similar cases of agreed-upon U.S. command of

multinational forces, such as the Sinai peacekeeping contingent or the

Grenada intervention forces. But these sorts of structures are becoming less

likely. More typical is a sort of combined committee, as in the AmericanBritish World War II setup. Americans found themselves in such committee

war efforts in Vietnam, in Beirut (1982-84), and in the Persian Gulf

(1987-88 and 1990-91).15
121

Even allowing for General Bonesteel's unusual degree of authority in

Korea, it should be noted that U.S. operational control had definite limits.

These were generally understood to relate to troop movements involved with

prevention or conduct of a conventional war, which was not the major

problem in 1966-69. Bonesteel and his U.S. ambassador counterparts could

not and did not command Park Chung Hee, and the ROK president's decisions to reorganize his counterguerrilla forces and establish a militia

proved to be absolutely crucial. Though Bonesteel could direct matters to

some extent, he found it more expedient to persuade the South Koreans. In

this regard, the command relationship in Korea resembles many likely Third

World arenas.

In general, Korea is only unique in as much as all countries and all

wars are unique. Having said that, the real question emerges: what are the

broader implications of the Second Korean Conflict? Six come to mind.

First, victory in low-intensity conflict does not always look the same as

victory in a larger war. Based on the outcome of the balance of individual

engagements, the North Koreans could claim to have won the Second Korean

Conflict. The UNC looked uncomfortably passive in the face of numerous

small reverses-not to mention the alarming Blue House raid, the embarrassing Pueblo episode, and the unexpected EC-121M downing. Yet because

the war revolved around securing the ROK-not matching the north tit for

tat-these DPRK tactical successes meant little. In low-intensity conflict, a

commander must keep his eye on the objective and suppress his conventional

instincts about winning and losing.

General Bonesteel's decision to track enemy infiltration activity rather

than enemy bodies exemplifies the different mind-set required.1 6 The UNC

tactics for forestalling infiltration rested more on allied defensive layers and

ROK social mobilization than steel applied to targets. Making infiltration

too hard to accomplish proved more effective, in the long term, than trying

to locate and kill every intruder with armed force. In a war to protect

unarmed people, the less violence, the better.

Second, low-intensity conflict should be a combined and joint effort.

While this seems obvious today, it is an assertion more often spoken than

accomplished. General Bonesteel took full advantage of the combined UNC

force structure throughout his campaign and looked for opportunities to place

more responsibility on the ROKs. He also employed those U.S. and ROK

joint assets he had available to assist his war effort and showed the South

Koreans how to integrate their nonmilitary agencies into the struggle.

Interestingly, cooperation in the combined realm exceeded that in the

joint domain. Even at the height of the 1968 crisis, Bonesteel never exercised

command over the U.S. Seventh Fleet or the U.S. Fifth Air Force. The U.S.

Air Force, especially in the 1968 show of force, provided good support to

the UNC despite the separated command structure. This reflected the joint

interoperability built through the hard work of Bonesteel's private air arm,

the 314th Air Division.
122

Unfortunately, the U.S. Navy missed a chance to furnish similar support.

Busy with blue-water operations worldwide and brown-water fighting in

Southeast Asia, the U.S. Navy provided little beyond advice (and not so

much of that) to meet Bonesteel's formidable coastal defense problems. The

U.S. Coast Guard, which might have been especially helpful, did not participate at all.

The United States will normally be in an economy-of-force role in LIC.

That is one of the key traits that makes such a war "low intensity" from

the American viewpoint. Economy of force means that the U.S. commander

must work with what he has in theater. Bonesteel, aided by his U.S. and

ROK subordinates, demonstrated an uncanny ability to make the best of

available resources. A shrewd commander like Bonesteel will make a virtue

of necessity. The restraints on American commitments can be employed to

justify shifting the responsibility for wars onto the host countries. The alternative, Americanizing the war, is at best a short-term solution that can

develop unhealthy dependencies in the host state and play right into the

hands of nationalist opposition factions, to include insurgent groups.

In his insistence on a severely restricted U.S. role, Bonesteel deviated

sharply from a prevalent American attitude of his time-epitomized by

General Westmoreland's thoroughly "Made in USA" campaign in Vietnam.

Today, American doctrine and practice come down firmly in support of the

Bonesteel approach. The officers responsible for military assistance in El

Salvador agree that "imposing some sort of ceiling [on U.S. participation]

is a good idea" [emphasis in original] because it "preclude[s] any possibility

of Americanizing the war."17 In the overall scheme of U.S. security policy,

a successful American effort in low-intensity conflict should remain at that

intensity.

Not suprisingly, small wars do not neatly adhere to the doctrinal LIC

categories of operations. Contemporary doctrine separates LIC into

insurgency/counterinsurgency, the combating of terrorism, peacekeeping, and

peacetime contingencies. Examination of the Second Korean Conflict suggests that the clear delineations described in today's doctrine do not really

hold up in the field. The current FM 100-20 notes that "LIC operations

may involve two or more of these categories" and that knowing how to

handle each type of operation might allow a commander to "establish priorities in actual situations." 8 This is the only acknowledgment that things

could get confusing out in the bush.

The doctrine writers go on to explain their categories, recommending

certain discrete forces and tactics to meet each sort of LIC situation. For

instance, the authors discourage any employment of U.S. conventional

combat forces in a counterinsurgency, while noting that American conventional fighting units play a major role in a contingency mission, such as

the evacuation of U.S. citizens from a hostile country. 1 9 That is fine advice

as long as the situations remain clearly in one category or the other.

But what if a U.S. commander finds himself stuck with both situations?

Then, current doctrine stands mute on what to do. Nowhere does FM
123

100-20 discuss the messy realities that confronted Bonesteel in Korea and

faced other Americans in Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and

Panama, to name a few examples. If only LIC operations adapted themselves to such a neat taxonomy!

Instead, the categories intertwine and become blurred. In Korea by

March 1968, the UNC was faced by a simultaneous counterinsurgency threat

in the ROK interior, cross-border terrorism, and a contingency show of air

and naval force-all under the peacekeeping restraints imposed by the 1953

armistice. Just to further muddy the waters, one might mention the enduring

menace of a North Korean conventional invasion. A modern professional

would find it frustrating indeed to try to apply current U.S. doctrine to this

all too typical LIC mosaic.

Since the doctrine of Bonesteel's era made no attempt to address this

confusing array of dangers, the general met the challenges as he thought

best. Then again, so did General Westmoreland in Vietnam. Rather than

rely on the local American commander to act and then hope for the best,

however, one would think that today's doctrine should accept and address

the likelihood that handy theoretical categories rarely occur in nature.

U.S. conventional combat units do have a role in counterinsurgency-if

used wisely. There is little doubt that, despite shortcomings and mistakes,

the American forces of UNC contributed significantly to the allied victory

won principally by the South Koreans. But stung by the bitter memories of

the frustrating Vietnam experiences suffered by U.S. troops, today's doctrine

all but rules out any use of American line units in battling insurgents. 20

The Second Korean Conflict compels some reevaluation of that idea.

There is a sensible middle ground between an Americanized counterguerrilla

war and a completely indigenous effort supported by a few U.S. advisers

and supply clerks. Bonesteel's UNC found two very effective uses for

American combat troops from 1966 to 1969.

First and foremost, Americans in battle served an important political

function by demonstrating U.S. solidarity with their ROK allies. This showed

that the Americans were carrying their part of the war and thereby permitted Bonesteel to argue with President Park as a cocombatant rather than

an uninvolved, and therefore suspect, foreign adviser. Bonesteel gained some

moral authority, and he used it.

Second, Americans helped block DMZ infiltration along the major approaches to Seoul-an important and perilous role that made good use of

conventional U.S. tactics. In carrying out this task, Bonesteel's men developed their own anti-infiltration doctrine, melding manpower, barriers, and

techniques to find, slow, and finish off intruders. The American experiments

became standard across the DMZ and remain so. Echoes of this innovative

effort persist in today's LIC doctrine. 21

Bonesteel's conventional troops contributed to his mission because he

let them do just enough to help, without allowing them to plunge headlong

into the South Korean counterinsurgent fight. It is probable that tying the
124

U.S. soldiers into static defensive positions and denying them any use of

massed firepower exacted an additional price in American blood. But these

measures also prevented escalation and made the ROKs carry the balltwo key ingredients in the UNC victory.

Lastly, command in LIC goes well beyond killing the enemy and

effecting destruction of his resources. Senior commanders in LIC should be

proconsuls, not Pattons (although that general showed some proconsular

skills himself in French Morocco). Commanders need to be aware of American foreign policy, their place in overall U.S. strategy, host-country domestic

politics, and adversary politics and goals. They also should understand

where their forces fit into this complex situation. Without fail, they should

recognize that they are in a LIC environment, not World War II.

Once alert to their surroundings, commanders should be as clear as

possible about defining and pursuing American and allied political objectives.

Good LIC generals "must adopt courses of action that legally support those

objectives even if the courses of action appear to be unorthodox or outside

what traditional doctrine had contemplated."2 2

General Bonesteel provides an intriguing model for a LIC commander.

Intellectually gifted in his own right, conditioned by previous assignments

to consider political factors, and unfettered by any excessive allegiance to

U.S. Army tactical doctrine, he successfully recognized and met the challenges of the Second Korean Conflict. More a politician and bureaucratic

infighter than a field commander, Bonesteel nevertheless concocted and

pursued an operational vision well suited to the situation in Korea.

Bonesteel was not much of a troop leader, nor did he feel close to his

men. Those tendencies, normally unwelcome in generals, probably worked

to Bonesteel's advantage in his small war. He did not worry overly about

employing his men in ways that they found disagreeable and confining;

when they complained, he ignored them and stuck to his campaign vision.

A more soldier-oriented general, a "warrior," might have reacted differently.

Such a general might have employed his American troops more aggressively,

ordered greater use of firepower to protect his men, demanded the right of

cross-DMZ reprisals, or keyed on killing North Koreans. While such a tack

might be better for U.S. soldiers' morale than Bonesteel's restrained methods,

a more traditional American approach promised a weaker ROK or a wider

war-neither acceptable results.

Every war, big or small, requires fighting leaders of high caliber. Lowintensity conflict puts a premium on a hybrid political-military authority at

the decision-making pinnacle. The narrowly focused combat commander still

has his important place, but the Second Korean Conflict suggests that he

does not belong at the very top.

Unfinished Business

The dwindling infiltration rate of late 1969 marked the end of North

Korea's stand-alone unconventional campaign to subvert the south. It did
125

not, however, signal the conclusion of all hostilities on the embattled

peninsula. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz writes that "even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final." 23 Considering

that the conclusion of the Second Korean Conflict simply restored the two

Koreas to the uneasy peace created by the 1953 armistice, Clausewitz'

caution certainly applies.

Occasional skirmishing, sometimes lethal, still occurs along the DMZ,

the South Korean coasts, and inside the ROK. America has sustained

casualties in this ongoing struggle, although never on the scale of 1966-69

(see figure 12). The South Koreans, as in earlier times, bear the brunt of

this desultory probing. Although foiled in their bid to create a southern

guerrilla base, Kim Il-sung and his generals continue to harass the ROK

with a view toward creating some sort of opening for conventional exploita- tion. Kim's advancing age, coupled with the increasingly pro-ROK correlation

of demographic and economic power on the peninsula, argues that some

sort of northern desperation offensive is not out of the question.

Extensive North Korean tunneling under the DMZ, unsuccessful assassination attempts against President Park (1974) and President Chun Doo

Hwan (1983), and a steady trickle of infiltrating agents offer proof of an

enduring DPRK threat.2 4 Even allowing for likely ROK exaggerations, these

events, plus rumors of DPRK nuclear technology and confirmed chemical

and ballistic missile stocks, require the U.S.-ROK forces to stay ready.2 5

This dangerous situation has not been altered by the advent of Mikhail

Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union. There has been no corresponding

glasnost in Pyongyang.

American troops will probably continue to pull out in bits and pieces, but for now, the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command stands ready to

repel aggression. Allied soldiers, to include a few U.S. infantrymen, still

patrol the Demilitarized Zone, man the barrier fences, and wait to provide

quick-reaction forces, dutifully working within the system devised by the

UNC over twenty years ago. South Korean ships, planes, and coast watchers

observe the sea approaches, enforcing schemes evolved by General

Bonesteel's headquarters. Behind the borders, ROK soldiers, police, and

20 November 1974 A combined U.S.-ROK investigation team tripped a KPA booby trap while

examining a KPA tunnel complex, 1 U.S. KIA, 6 U.S. WIA.

18 August 1976 KPA guards in the Joint Security Area attacked a U.S.-ROK tree-cutting

party, 2 U.S. KIA, 4 U.S. WIA.

14 July 1977 DPRK forces shot down a U.S. CH-47 helicopter that strayed north of the

DMZ, 3 U.S. KIA, 1 U.S. briefly held prisoner.

6 December 1979 A U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol (1-9 Infantry) became lost and tripped a

mine on the KPA side of the DMZ, 1 U.S. KIA, 4 U.S. WIA, and unknown

KPA losses.

28 August 1982 A U.S. 2d Infantry Division soldier (1-31 Infantry) defected to the DPRK

Source: Finley, The US Military Experience in Korea, 178-241.

Figure 12. DMZ incidents involving casualties to U.S. forces (since 3 December 1969)
126

militia guard the interior, carrying out programs begun under President Park

in 1967-68.

To date, this massive security effort has been sufficient. Neither the

Americans nor the South Koreans have lapsed into the sort of complacency

that prevailed in the early 1960s. Instead, it appears that the allies have

kept in mind the prescient words of General Maxwell Taylor as he

announced the armistice of 27 July 1953: "There is no occasion for celebration or boisterous conduct. We are faced with the same enemy, only a short

distance away, and must be ready for any moves he makes." 26 Bolstered

by the lessons learned in the Second Korean Conflict, the vigil continues.

I I - -- - -II, - , c -L -L
Appendix 1 9 i' , I 9 ..t .,,

The Second Korean ConflictA Chronology of Key Events

1966

1 Sep General Charles H. Bonesteel III, USA, assumed duties as

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea; and Commanding General,

U.S. Eighth Army.

5 Oct Kim Il-sung addressed the Second Korean Workers' Party Conference. He vowed immediate, vigorous efforts to subvert

the ROK and fight the United States. He also installed

a cadre of hard-liners to prosecute his new insurgency

policies.

31 Oct U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson arrived in Seoul for a state

visit.

2 Nov U.S. patrol ambushed with six killed. This signaled the start of

the Second Korean Conflict.

6 Nov Commander, U.S. Eighth Army, formed his Special Working

Group to address the changed threat from the DPRK.

1967

9 Feb Special Working Group recommendations implemented. This

comprised the rudiments of the UNC campaign plan to

meet the new northern challenge.

12 Apr ROK troops employed artillery to repulse a company of KPA

soldiers. This was the first U.S.-ROK use of artillery since the armistice. It reflected new, more discretionary Eighth Army rules of engagement.

22 May A bomb planted by North Korean terrorists destroyed a U.S.

barracks well south of the DMZ.

1 Jun Ambassador William J. Porter replaced Ambassador Winthrop

G. Brown as U.S. representative in Seoul.

127
128

28 Jul New barrier test fence construction began in U.S. sector of DMZ.

28 Sep U.S. troops completed the anti-infiltration fence in their sector.

One battalion of U.S. 7th Infantry Division joined the

U.S. 2d Infantry Division to start a new rotation system

that placed four maneuver battalions on the DMZ and a

fifth in reserve as a quick-reaction force.

3 Oct Commanding General, U.S. Eighth Army, released his proposed

Counterinfiltration-Guerrilla Concepts Requirements Plan,

his resource forecast for the Second Korean Conflict.

15 Dec ROK Presidential Instruction #18 issued. It delineated new ROK

counterinsurgency goals and actions.

1968

17 Jan A platoon from the KPA's elite 124th Army Unit infiltrated

through the U.S. sector of the DMZ. They intended to

assassinate ROK President Park Chung Hee.

20 Jan Raid on the Blue House detected and repulsed. ROK losses

totaled sixty-eight killed and sixty-six wounded.

23 Jan USS Pueblo (AGER-2) was seized by KPN patrol boats-one

killed, eighty-two captured U.S. men. United States

implemented an air and sea buildup in and around the

ROK. President Johnson activated 14,787 reservists to

support the show of force.

31 Jan Tet Offensive started in Vietnam.

11 Feb U.S. envoy Cyrus Vance arrived to discuss U.S.-ROK approaches

to the deepening Korean crisis.

15 Feb ROK President Park Chung Hee ordered creation of a popular

militia, the Homeland Defense Reserve Force. This was

formally announced in mid-April. Additional measures

strengthened the ROK intelligence agencies, police, and

military for counterguerrilla work.

21 Mar A brigade headquarters of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division deployed north to assist in command of U.S. forces along

the DMZ.

1 Apr Combat pay authorized for U.S. troops north of the Imjin River.

17 Apr President Park and President Johnson met in Honolulu to coordinate allied strategy.

1 Jun U.S. Congress approved an emergency $100 million Military

Assistance Program grant for the ROK.

30 Jul ROK First Army completed its portion of the DMZ antiinfiltration fence. Linked into the U.S. fence that had

been built in 1967, the new barrier ran along the entire

length of the DMZ.
129

21 Aug DPRK agents' boat intercepted and sunk in combined effort

between ROKN, ROKAF, USAF, and ROK CIA.

30 Aug First two of twenty planned ROK "Reconstruction Villages"

opened just south of the DMZ. Discharged ROK Army

veterans and their families lived in these villages.

24 Sep ROK Army units battled a small battalion of KPA troops south

of the DMZ.

15 Oct The ROK-U.S. Operational Planning Staff formed to coordinate

ROK defense. Until now, ROK officers had no official voice in

United Nations Command planning.

30 Oct Ulchin-Samchok landing began. KPA 124th Army Unit troops

attempted to foment a guerrilla movement. KPA force

eliminated. ROK losses totaled sixty-three dead and

fifty-five wounded.

23 Dec USS Pueblo crew released from captivity.

1969

1 Jan In a major shake-up, Kim Il-sung removed and denounced key

leaders in his anti-ROK operations.

7 Mar ROK Army formed two antiguerrilla brigades from their special

forces elements.

17 Mar Exercise Focus Retina demonstrated U.S. ability to reinforce the

U.S. Eighth Army; a U.S. airborne brigade flew in from

the continental United States.

15 Apr KPAF fighters shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121M aircraft over

the Sea of Japan. Thirty-one Americans died. A U.S.

naval show of force followed.

5 Jun The last American reservists departed Korea. They had been

called up in response to the USS Pueblo incident.

26 Jul U.S. President Richard M. Nixon announced what became

known as the "Guam Doctrine" or "Nixon Doctrine." In

short, he promised American advice and equipment for

allies but warned them not to expect commitments of

ground troops. U.S. overseas troop contingents, including

those in Korea, would be reduced in size.

25 Aug President Park met with President Nixon in San Francisco to

discuss implementation of the Guam Doctrine in the

Korean theater.

29 Aug The first six American-made F-4D Phantom II fighter jets were

turned over to the ROKAF.

1 Oct General John H. Michaelis succeeded General Bonesteel as

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Com-
130

mander, U.S. Forces, Korea; and Commanding General,

U.S. Eighth Army.

18 Oct A U.S. jeep was ambushed with four killed. These were the last

U.S. casualties in the Second Korean Conflict.

3 Dec The DPRK returned three captured American helicopter

crewmen.

I- II, I -r · i, , · · I - - I
Appendix 2

U.S. Forces, Korea, Order of Battle,

1 January 1968

Combined and Joint Headquarters

U.S. Eighth Army-U.S. Forces, Korea-UN Command-Yongsan

Military Armistice Commission (MAC) Delegation-Panmunjom

Korean Military Assistance Group (KMAG)-Yongsan

U.S. Army (about 50,000 soldiers)

U.S. Army Support Group, Joint Security Area-Panmunjom

U.S. Army Advisory Group, Korea-Yongsan

2d Engineer Group (construction)-Yongsan

4th Missile Command (supporting ROK First Army)-Chunchon

Eighth Army Depot Command-Eighth Army Rear-Taegu

Eighth Army Special Troops-Yongsan

Eighth Army Support Command-Yongsan

38th Artillery Brigade (Air Defense)-Osan AB

I Corps (Group)

2d Infantry Division(+)-Camp Howze

7th Infantry Division(-)-Camp Casey

I Corps (Group) Artillery-Camp St. Barbara

U.S. Air Force (about 5,000 airmen)

U.S. Air Forces Korea-Osan AB

6145th Air Force Advisory Group-Osan AB

314th Air Division-Osan, Kimpo, Kunsan ABs

3d Tactical Fighter Wing-Kunsan AB

611th Military Airlift Command Support Squadron-Kimpo AB

6314th Support Wing-Osan AB

U.S. Navy-U.S. Marine Corps (about 500 sailors and Marines)

U.S. Naval Forces Korea-Chinhae, Pohang

U.S. Naval Advisory Group-Chinhae

Sources: General Charles H. Bonesteel III, USA, "On Korea's DMZ: Vigil Seals the 'Porous' War,"

Army (November 1968):58-6C; "Pacific Air Forces," Air Force and Space Digest (September 1968):

83-84.

131

Appendix 3, Annex 1

Tactical Disposition of Korean People's Army

Maneuver Forces, 1 January 1968

Along the DMZ (West to East)

2d Army Group

2d Corps

6th Infantry Division

8th Infantry Division

9th Infantry Division (in depth,

'7th Corps

15th Infantry Division

45th Infantry Division

5th Infantry Division (in depth,

corps reserve)

corps reserve)

2d Army Group reserves

3d Motorized Infantry Division

101st Medium Tank Regiment

1st Army Group

5th Corps

4th Infantry Division (in depth, corps reserve)

12th Infantry Division

46th Infantry Division

25th Infantry Brigade

4th Corps

2d Infantry Division (in depth, corps reserve)

13th Infantry Division

47th Infantry Division

111th Independent Infantry Regiment

1st Army Group reserve

103d Medium Tank Regiment

Northern Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Corps

7th Infantry Division

133

In the

1st
134

10th Infantry Division

104th Medium Tank Regiment

3d Corps

1st Motorized Infantry Division

37th Infantry Division

102d Medium Tank Regiment

6th Corps

26th Infantry Brigade

27th Motorized Infantry Division

28th Infantry Division

National Reserves

20th Infantry Brigade

22d Infantry Brigade

24th Infantry Brigade

105th Tank Division

106th Heavy Tank Regiment

Ten cadre-strength reserve divisions

(Cadre unit designations unknown. These reserve component formations were probably located in the interior of the DPRK, although

some may have supplemented coastal-defense border guards.)

Sources: Joseph G. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces (London: Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd.,

1988), 5-6, 154-55, 160-62, 169-73; Suck-ho Lee, "Party-Military Relations in North Korea: A

Comparative Analysis" (Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 1983), 154, 219; Emerson

Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," Foreign Affairs (April 1969):565; Sung An Tai, North

Korea in Transition (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 16-18; Frederica Bunge, ed., North

Korea: A Country Study (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 229-31.
Appendix 3, Annex 2

Tactical Disposition of

U.S. Eighth Army Maneuver Forces,

1 January 1968

Frontline Units on and Near the DMZ (West to East)

Defending Seoul: I Corps (Group)

ROK 5th Marine Brigade

ROK 98th Regimental Combat Team'

U.S. 2d Infantry Division(+)

ROK VI Corps

ROK 25th Infantry Division

ROK 28th Infantry Division

ROK 20th Infantry Division

Forces in depth: ROK I Corps (Group)

U.S. 7th Infantry Division(-) 2

Central and Eastern Republic of Korea: ROK First Army 3

ROK 6th Infantry Division

ROK 3d Infantry Division

ROK 15th Infantry Division

ROK 7th Infantry Division

ROK 21st Infantry Division

ROK 12th Infantry Division

Forces in depth: ROK First Army

ROK 1st Armored Brigade

ROK 2d Armored Brigade

ROK 2d Infantry Division

ROK 5th Infantry Division

ROK 8th Infantry Division

ROK 11th Infantry Division

ROK 26th Infantry Division

ROK 27th Infantry Division

ROK 29th Infantry Division

ROK 32d Ready Reserve Infantry Division(-)4

135
136

Units in the Southern Republic of Korea: ROK Second Army

ROK Marine Division(-)

ROK Reserve Components

ROK 30th Ready Reserve Infantry Division

ROK 33d Ready Reserve Infantry Division

ROK 38th Ready Reserve Infantry Division

ROK 51st Ready Reserve Infantry Division

ROK 31st Rear Area Security Division

ROK 35th Rear Area Security Division

ROK 36th Rear Area Security Division

ROK 37th Rear Area Security Division

ROK 39th Rear Area Security Division

ROK 50th Rear Area Security Division

Deployed to the Republic of Vietnam:

ROK Forces Vietnam Field Command

ROK Capital Division

ROK 9th Infantry Division

ROK 2d Marine Brigade

1

From the ROK 32d Ready Reserve Infantry Division, under operational control of the

U.S. 2d Infantry Division.

2Includes the 22d Royal Thai Company. 3ROK units organized into corps for combat. There are no reliable unclassified listings

that depict the exact composition of these corps, other than ROK VI Corps in the U.S. sector.

4The ROK 32d Ready Reserve Infantry Division went on active duty to help fill the gap

created by the departure of forces to Vietnam. It was replaced in ROK Second Army by the

newly organized ROK 51st Ready Reserve Infantry.

Sources: Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington, DC: U.S. News Books, 1981),

272-73; General Charles H. Bonesteel III, USA, "General Bonesteel's Year End Press Conference,

11 January 1967," transcript from personal papers of Colonel Walter B. Clark, USA (ret.), Charleston,

SC.

m
Appendix 4

Significant U.S.-KPA Firefights,

November 1966-December 1969

2 Nov 66 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol (1-23 Infantry) ambushed

south of DMZ. Six U.S. KIA, one KATUSA KIA, one

U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

12 Feb 67 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol (3-23 Infantry) ambushed

south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.

5 Apr 67 U.S. 2d Infantry Division guard post engaged KPA infiltrators

south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; five KPA KIA.

29 Apr 67 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol ambushed KPA infiltrators

south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA, one KPA

WIA, one KPA captured.

22 May 67 U.S. 2d Infantry Division barracks (1-23 Infantry) demolished

by daylight explosion south of DMZ. Two U.S. KIA,

seventeen U.S. WIA; no KPA losses.

16 Jul 67 U.S. 2d Infantry Division guard post attacked south of DMZ.

Three U.S. KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

10 Aug 67 U.S. 7th Infantry Division construction team (13th Engineers)

ambushed well south of DMZ in daylight. Three U.S.

KIA, sixteen U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

22 Aug 67 U.S. 2d Infantry Division jeep destroyed by mine and ambush

south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA, one U.S. WIA; unknown

KPA losses.

28 Aug 67 U.S. Eighth Army construction team (76th Engineers) ambushed in daylight near the Joint Security Area but

still south of the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA, two KATUSA

KIA, fourteen U.S. WIA, nine KATUSA WIA, three

civilians WIA; unknown KPA losses.

29 Aug 67 U.S. 2d Infantry Division jeep destroyed by mine south of

DMZ. Three U.S. KIA, five U.S. WIA; no KPA losses.

137
138

7 Oct 67 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol boat ambushed on Imjin

River south of DMZ. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA

losses.

22 Jan 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division guard post engaged by KPA infiltrators. Three U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

24 Jan 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division defensive position (1-23 Infantry)

attacked south of DMZ by KPA 124th Army Unit

exfiltrators. Two U.S. KIA; three KPA WIA.

26 Jan 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division defensive position (2-72 Armor)

attacked south of DMZ by KPA 124th Army Unit

exfiltrators. One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.

29 Jan 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrols and outposts engaged and

repulsed four teams of KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses;

unknown KPA losses.

6 Feb 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division guard post attacked. No U.S. losses;

one KPA WIA.

27 Mar 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division reaction forces and ROK 25th

Infantry Division ambushed KPA infiltrators. No U.S.

losses; three KPA KIA.

14 Apr 68 U.S. Army Support Group truck ambushed south of the Joint

Security Area in daylight. Two U.S. KIA, two KATUSA

KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

21 Apr 68 U.S. 7th Infantry Division patrol (2-31 Infantry) engaged

KPA infiltrator company in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA,

three U.S. WIA; five KPA KIA, fifteen KPA WIA.

27 Apr 68 U.S. 7th Infantry Division patrol (2-31 Infantry) ambushed

in the DMZ. One KATUSA KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

3 Jul 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One

U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

20 Jul 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One

U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses. U.S. 7th Infantry

Division patrol (1-32 Infantry) ambushed in the DMZ.

One U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.

21 Jul 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol (2-38 Infantry) ambushed

in the DMZ. One U.S. WIA, one KATUSA WIA.

30 Jul 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol (3-23 Infantry) ambushed

in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, three U.S. WIA; unknown

KPA losses.

5 Aug 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol (1-38 Infantry) ambushed

south of the DMZ in daylight. One U.S. KIA, four U.S.

WIA; one KPA KIA.
139

18 Aug 68 U.S. 7th Infantry Division patrol (1-32 Infantry) ambushed

south of the DMZ. Two U.S. KIA; two KPA WIA.

19 Sep 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrols (2-38 Infantry) and quickreaction forces (4-7 Cavalry, 2-9 Infantry [Mechanized],

2d Division Counter Agent Company) isolated and destroyed KPA infiltrator squad. Two KATUSA KIA,

six KATUSA WIA; four KPA KIA, one KPA WIA.

27 Sep 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division jeep ambushed in the DMZ. Two

U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.

3 Oct 68 U.S. 7th Infantry Division guard post (1-31 Infantry) engaged

KPA exfiltrator south of DMZ. No U.S. losses; one

KPA KIA.

5 Oct 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One

U.S. KIA, two U.S. WIA; unknown KPA losses.

10 Oct 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division boat patrol engaged KPA infiltrator

crossing the Imjin River. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA.

11 Oct 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division ambushed KPA infiltrators in the

DMZ. No U.S. losses; two KPA KIA.

23 Oct 68 U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol engaged KPA infiltrators

in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, five U.S. WIA; one KPA

KIA.

23 Jan 69 U.S. 2d Infantry Division guard posts repulsed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.

4 Feb 69 U.S. 2d Infantry Division guard posts repulsed KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.

13 Mar 69 U.S. 2d Infantry Division fence repair patrol (2-38 Infantry)

engaged by KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown

KPA losses.

15 Mar 69

16 Mar 69

20 Mar 69

29 Mar 69

15 May 69

U.S. 2d Infantry Division marker maintenance patrol ambushed in the DMZ. One U.S. KIA, two U.S. WIA, one

KATUSA WIA. Medical evacuation helicopter crashed

after takeoff, killing five fliers and the three wounded.

U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol engaged KPA infiltrators

in the DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.

U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol engaged KPA patrol in the

DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.

U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol engaged KPA patrol in the

DMZ. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.

U.S. 2d Infantry Division patrol engaged KPA infiltrator.

One U.S. WIA, one KATUSA WIA; unknown KPA

losses.
20 May 69 U.S. 2d Infantry Division guard post engaged KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; one KPA KIA.

21 Jul 69 U.S. 2d Infantry Division guard posts engaged and repulsed

KPA infiltrators. No U.S. losses; unknown KPA losses.

17 Aug 69 U.S. Eighth Army helicopter (59th Aviation Company) strayed

north of the DMZ and was shot down. Three U.S.

captured.

18 Oct 69 U.S. 7th Infantry Division jeep ambushed in the DMZ. Four

U.S. KIA; unknown KPA losses.

Sources: James P. Finley, The US Military Experience in Korea, 1871-1982 (Yongsan, Korea:

Command Historian, USFK/EUSA, 1983), 116-35; Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, "Annual Historical Supplement 1966," "Annual Historical Supplement 1967," "Annual Historical

Supplement 1968," "Annual Historical Supplement 1969," and Headquarters, 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, "Annual Historical Supplement 1968," Military History Institute Archives, Carlisle Barracks,

PA.

140

I
Notes

Introduction

The epigraph comes from General of the Army Omar N. Bradley's testimony to

Congress in the wake of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's relief from command

in Korea. Bradley believed that the primary U.S. concern was not the Chinese enemy in

Korea but the Soviet threat to exhausted, war-weary Western Europe. See Omar Nelson

Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 558.

1. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 37.

2. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War, 1946-1975: The History (Novato, CA: Presidio Press,

1988), 730.

3. United States Department of the Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity

Conflict (Final Draft) (Washington, DC, 7 March 1989), 1-1 to 1-12.

Chapter 1

The epigraph is from Sun-tzu, The Art of War, translated and with an introduction

by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 63.

1. United States, Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The United States and

the Korean Problem: Documents, 1943-1953, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC, 1953),

Document 74, Preamble to the Korean Armistice Agreement. This publication is cited hereafter as Senate, The United States and the Korean Problem.

2. Frederica M. Bunge, ed., South Korea: A Country Study, Area handbook series (Washington, DC: United States Department of the Army, 1981), 43, 202.

3. Ibid., 27; Joungwon A. Kim, "North Korea's New Offensive," Foreign Affairs 48 (October

1969):174-75; and Suck-ho Lee, "Party-Military Relations in North Korea: A Comparative

Analysis," Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 1983, 153, 166-67. Lee, a

1968 graduate of the Korean Military Academy, participated in the Second Korean

Conflict.

4. Bunge, South Korea, 29-34, 39; and Se-jin Kim, The Politics of Military Revolution in

Korea (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), 89-91. Park, born in the

countryside, had been commissioned through an officer candidate school in 1946. He had

risen mainly through staff and intelligence work, although he did have the opportunity

to attend the U.S. Army Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

5. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 153-56, 189-93.

6. Ibid., 153, 175, 182, 189-93; Tai Sung An, North Korea in Transition: From Dictatorship

to Dynasty (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 16-18; and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr.,

North Korean Special Forces (Surrey, England: Jane's Publishing Co., 1988), 28-29.

7. "Party-Military Relations," 153.

141
142

8. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New

York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 358; and James P. Finley, The US Military

Experience in Korea, 1971-1982: In the Vanguard of ROK-US Relations (San Francisco,

CA: Command Historian's Office, Secretary Joint Staff, HQ, USFK/EUSA, 1983), 114-15.

9. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 114-15.

10. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 153-54.

11. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 31, 127-27.

12. Jeffrey Simon, "NATO and Warsaw Pact Institutional Developments," in his NATO

Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,

1988), 41-42; and William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York: Doubleday

and Co., 1976), 499, 505; and Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: The Vietnam War in

Context (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College, April 1981), 91.

13. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 31, 127.

14. United States, Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide

(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1988), 45.

15. Ibid., 49.

16. West Point Alumni Foundation, Register of Graduates and Former Cadets, 1969 (West

Point, NY, 1969), 183, 314, 418; General Charles H. Bonesteel III, "U.S.-South Korean

Partnership Holds a Truculent North at Bay," Army 19 (October 1969):60; and David

Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1971), 890.

17. Colonel Walter B. Clark, United States Army (ret.), telephone conversation with author

from Charleston, South Carolina, 25 March 1990. Colonel Clark was the senior aide-decamp and executive officer to General Charles H. Bonesteel III from September 1966 until

August 1967.

18. Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair (New

York: Coward McCann, 1970), 119.

19. Clark interview; and General Charles H. Bonesteel III, United States Army (ret.), interview

with Lieutenant Colonel Robert St. Louis, p. 328, Senior Officers Oral History Program

Project 73-2, 1973, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

The institute is cited hereafter as USAMHI.

20. Bonesteel interview, 334-35.

21. Ibid., 335-36.

22. Clark interview.

23. Bonesteel interview, 328; and Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 220.

24. Bonesteel interview, 334.

25. United States, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: United

States Government Printing Office, 19 February 1962), 47.

26. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 169-79; and United States, Department of State, "Background Notes: North Korea" (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office,

September 1968), 3.

27. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 210-16; L. James Binder, "On the Line in Korea: The

Porous War," Army 19 (January 1969):57; and United States, Congress, Senate, Committee

on Armed Services, Combat Readiness of United States and South Korean Forces in South

Korea, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, DC, 7 June 1968), 2-3. See appendix 3, annex 1,

of this study for more details on the North Korean order of battle and probable deployment. This Senate publication is cited hereafter as Senate, Combat Readiness.

28. Binder, "The Porous War," 57; Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance,

1968-69 (London: Adlard and Son, 1968), 13; and Lieutenant Colonel Everett H. Webster,

United States Air Force, "Is the Morning Calm About to Be Broken in Korea?" Research
143

report no. 4471, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, March

1971, 13-14, 18.

29. Senate, Combat Readiness, 3; and Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance,

1968-69, 13.

30. Senate, Combat Readiness, 3.

31. Webster, "Morning Calm," 14.

32. Senate, Combat Readiness, 3.

33. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 26-31, 86.

34. Bonesteel interview, 329-31; and Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 31, 86-87,

103.

35. Binder, "The Porous War," 57; and Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 8.

36. Colonel William P. Guthrie, United States Army, "Korea: The Other DMZ," Infantry 60

(March-April 1970):17.

37. Bunge, South Korea, 52-54.

38. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 169-70.

39. Senate, The United States and the Korean Problem, Document 74, Articles 1-11, 23, 27,

Korean Armistice Agreement.

40. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 87; and Bunge, South Korea, 58.

41. Bunge, South Korea, 49.

42. Ibid, 54, 61, 77, 86.

43. Emerson Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," Foreign Affairs 47 (April 1969):561.

44. See appendix 3, annex 2, of this study for more details on the U.S.-ROK order of battle

and likely deployment.

45. Major Vandon E. Jenerette, United States Army, "The Forgotten DMZ," Military Review

68 (May 1988):40.

46. Bonesteel interview, 332; and Captain Rush R. Wicker, United States Army, "CH-37 MojaveWorkhorse of Korea," United States Army Aviation Digest 14 (July 1968):32-34.

47. Shelby L. Stanton, Vietnam Order of Battle (Washington, DC: U.S. News Books, 1981),

287; and United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, "Operational Report-Lessons

Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 30 April 1969 (U)," 10,

Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, United States Army Command and General

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, hereafter cited as 2ID, "Operational Report...

30 April 1969." The library is cited hereafter as CARL.

48. Clark Dougan, et al., eds., A Nation Divided, The Vietnam Experience, vol. 20 (Boston,

MA: Boston Publishing Co., 1984), 78, 80.

49. Senate, Combat Readiness, 4; Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 60; and Colonel

Charles L. Bachtel, United States Army (ret.), "The KATUSA Program," Signal 23

(December 1968): 42-44.

50. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 20.

51. Binder, "The Porous War," 57.

52. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 22; and Clark interview.

53. Wesley Pruden, Jr., "Asia's Other War," Army 17 (November 1967):31.

54. Binder, "The Porous War," 57.

55. Senate, Combat Readiness, 9; and Bunge, South Korea, 231-32.

56. Paul S. Crane, M.D., "Korean Attitudes and Thought Patterns-Prepared for UNC/USFK,"

in the personal papers of Colonel Walter B. Clark, United States Army (ret.), Charleston,
144

SC; Bonesteel interview, 329, 338; and Clark interview. See also General Westmoreland's

similar observations in A Soldier Reports, 313-14.

57. Webster, "Morning Calm," 18.

58. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 20; and Senate, Combat Readiness, 9.

59. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 23-24; Bunge, South Korea, 240-42; and Larry

Cable, A Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine

and the Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986), 33-43.

60. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 105.

Chapter 2

The epigraph comes from Wesley Pruden, Jr., "Asia's Other War," 28.

1. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 114-15, 220; and Bonesteel interview, 329.

2. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 151-54.

3. Kim Il-song, "The International Situation and Problems of the World Communist Movement," in his Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea: Selected Writings (New

York: International Publishers, 1971), 114-15; and Bermudez, North Korean Special

Forces, 30.

4. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 153-54; and U.S. Department of State, "Background

Notes: North Korea," 3.

5. An, North Korea, 16-18; Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 31; and Bonesteel interview, 328.

6. Kim Il-song, "The International Situation," 113.

7. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 116.

8. Ibid., 116; and Clark interview. President Johnson visited Vietnam, the Philippines,

Thailand, and Malaysia before landing in Korea.

9. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 35-36; Pruden, "Asia's Other War," 28; United States

Army, 2d Infantry Division, 3d Brigade, "Annual Historical Supplement 1966," USAMHI;

Clark interview; "DOD Order Curbs 'Premature' Medal of Honor Information," Army

Times, 16 November 1966:5. Those who believe in the whims of fortune might observe

that the ambushed patrol's chain of command included descendants of two of the

American military's more unlucky generals. Major General George Pickett (U.S. 2d

Infantry Division) was a cousin of the unfortunate Confederate who led the doomed

charge at Gettysburg. Colonel Alan W. Jones, Jr. (3d Brigade) had been captured in the

Battle of the Bulge when German forces surrounded the bulk of his father's ill-starred

106th Infantry Division. In Pickett's case, the general compounded his misfortune by

insisting that his lost patrol had fought superbly. He even publicly recommended the

award of a Medal of Honor to one of his dead soldiers. Secretary of Defense Robert S.

McNamara censured Pickett for this improper outburst.

10. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 35-36; and Johnson, The Vantage Point, 363. Though

Johnson referred to his trip to Korea, he made no mention of the patrol casualties in his

memoirs.

11. Bonesteel interview, 328.

12. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, 90; and Stuart L. Perkins, "The US Force Structure

and C3," in Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency: U.S.-Soviet Policy in the Third

World, edited by Richard H. Schultz, Jr., et al. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989),

242-43.

13. Bonesteel interview, 328.

14. General Charles H. Bonesteel III, United States Army (ret.), "On Korea's DMZ: Vigil
145

Seals the 'Porous' War," Army 18 (October 1968):60; Senate, Combat Readiness, 3; and

Bonesteel interview, 329-30.

15. Bonesteel interview, 329.

16. United States, Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations: Larger

Units, With Change 1 (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office,

16 March 1966), 3. The contemporary core doctrinal manual from which FM 100-5 derived

was the 1962 version of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations. It featured a

slightly better theoretical discussion of the various types of warfare, although admitting

that "the dividing line between cold war and limited war is neither distinct nor absolute."

FM 100-5 (1962), 5. Like FM 100-15, FM 100-5 then proceeds to list "local aggression,"

"conventional war," and "limited nuclear war" as examples of limited war, tying the

whole sloppy bundle together by saying that "a limited war is any conflict which does

not involve the unrestricted employment of all available resources." Ibid., 5. Finally, just

to muddy things up, FM 100-5 differs from FM 100-15 by indicating that cold war

situations "can and often do" involve overt combat. Ibid., 155.

Most of the ideas, good and bad, in the other manuals discussed in this study can be

traced back to phrases, sentences, and paragraphs in FM 100-5. See Krepinevich, The

Army and Vietnam, 39, for critical analysis of this manual.

17. FM 100-20, 1-10 to 1-12. Curiously, one part of FM 100-5 (1962) that did not find its

way into other manuals was a brief discussion of situations "short of war," listed as

including "show of force, truce enforcement, international police action," and "legal

occupation." FM 100-5 (1962), 156. Unfortunately, there was no specific definition or

discussion of these operations. Instead, the authors supplied very general (and somewhat

useful) guidance for all situations of this type. This general guidance did percolate down

to the segment on "Cold War" missions in the divisional manual.

18.. FM 100-15, 35-37.

19. United States, Department of the Army, FM 61-100, The Division (Washington, DC: United

States Government Printing Office, June 1965), 146-49. This lifts whole chunks from FM

100-5 (1962), 160-61.

20. United States, Department of the Army, FM 31-16, Counterguerrilla Operations (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 19 February 1963), 71-74; and

Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 39-41, 127.

21. United States, Department of the Army, FM 61-100, The Division (Washington, DC:

United States Government Printing Office, November 1968), 12-15 to 12-18. Indicative

of the lack of doctrinal development during the Vietnam era, this manual repeats almost

verbatim the entire "Cold War" segment referenced in note 19 above. The only notable

change, aside from some adjustments for grammatical clarity, is the substitution of the

term "stability operations" for "counterinsurgency."

22. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 197, features the terse Westmoreland quote concerning fire power as the answer to counterinsurgency. See also Robert A. Doughty, The

Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, Leavenworth Papers no. 1 (Fort

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, United States Army Command and General

Staff College, August 1979), 39.

23. Bonesteel interview, 335.

24. Ibid. The innovations developed in Korea during the late 1960s were summarized in United

States, Department of the Army, FM 31-55, Border Security/Anti-Infiltration Operations

(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, March 1972).

25. Bonesteel interview, 328-30, 332-33.

26. FM 31-55, 3-2.

27. Bonesteel, "On Korea's DMZ," 60-61.

28. FM 31-55, 3-1.
146

29. Bonesteel interview, 331-32, 335.

30. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 17. Colonel Guthrie commanded a DMZ brigade during

the height of the conflict in 1968-69. His frank account of his experiences ranks among

the best sources of information during this period.

31. Staff Sergeant Richard Duke, United States Army, "Action Zone-Korea," Army Digest 23

(March 1968):20.

32. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 19. See appendix 4 of this study for a recapitulation

of significant firefights involving U.S. forces.

33. Ibid., 19-20.

34. Bonesteel interview, 337.

35. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 220.

36. Staff Sergeant Richard Duke, United States Army, "Dead End for Infiltrators," Army

Digest 23 (March 1968):21.

37. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 18; and "Heatless Hootches Burn Investigators," Army

Times, 31 January 1968:7.

38. Duke, "Dead End for Infiltrators," 21; and Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 21. There

had been other, earlier fences made of barbed wire. See, for example, Colonel Robert J.

Davenport, United States Army, "Barrier Along the Korean DMZ," Combat Notes column,

Infantry 57 (May-June 1967):40-42.

39. Bonesteel interview, 333; Pruden, "Asia's Other War," 30; and Guthrie, "Korea: The Other

DMZ," 22. Chain-link fence, although commonly available, costs much more per meter

than barbed wire.

40. Bonesteel interview, 336-37.

41. Ibid., 332-33.

42. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 22; 2ID, "Operational Report... 30 April 1969," 1;

and Robert F. Norton, "Armor Helps Defend the ROK," Armor 77 (September-October

1968): 19-20.

43. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 16; and Bonesteel interview, 331.

44. Bonesteel interview, 331.

45. Pruden, "Asia's Other War," 29; and Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 18.

46. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 116-35.

47. Bonesteel, "On Korea's DMZ," 61; and Bonesteel interview, 334, 337.

48. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 116; and Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 18.

49. Antony Preston, "The Naval War in Vietnam," in The Vietnam War: An Almanac, edited

by John S. Bowman (New York: World Almanac Publications, 1985), 427-28.

50. FM 31-55, 7-6.

51. Ibid.

52. Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1968-1969, 38-39, 68-69.

53. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 117.

54. Bonesteel interview, 333; and Bonesteel, "U.S.-South Korean Partnership," 62.

55. Bunge, South Korea, 245-46.

56. Ibid., 245, 247.

57. Bonesteel, "On Korea's DMZ," 60. Note the photograph of troops from the ROK 26th

Infantry Regiment aboard U.S. helicopters from I Corps (Group).

58. Bonesteel, "U.S.-South Korean Partnership," 62; Bonesteel interview, 332; and Summers,

On Strategy, 47.
147

59. Bonesteel interview, 332; and Summers, On Strategy, 47.

60. William Loomis, "Is a Renewal of the Korean Conflict Imminent?" DATA 13

(June 1968):12-13. The Taebaek and Chiri Mountain areas had both experienced much

guerrilla activity during the Korean War. Forces employed in these regions included

portions of the U.S. 1st Marine Division. See Cable, A Conflict of Myths, 39-41.

61. Bunge, South Korea, 187-89; and Bonesteel interview, 332.

62. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 23-26.

63. Bonesteel, "U.S.-South Korean Partnership," 63; and Kim, "North Korea's New Offensive,"

178-79.

Chapter 3

The epigraph comes from Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," 566.

1. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 220.

2. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 31; Bonesteel interview, 330; and Specialist Fifth

Class John J. Stefans, United States Army, "Confessions of a Red Agent," Army Digest

23 (May 1968):17.

3. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 32.

4. Stefans, "Confessions of a Red Agent," 19.

5. Ibid., 18-19; Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 22; Bonesteel interview, 339-40;

Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 32; United States Army, 2d Infantry Division,

1st Brigade, "Annual Historical Supplement 1968," USAMHI; and United States Army,

2d Infantry Division, 2d Brigade, "Annual Historical Supplement 1968," USAMHI.

6. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 32-33.

7. Ibid., 32; Stefans, "Confessions of a Red Agent," 17; and Bonesteel interview, 340.

8. Bonesteel interview, 340.

9. Ibid., 340-41.

10. Ibid., 341; and Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 211-31.

11. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 239, 261.

12. Bonesteel interview, 341; and Clark interview.

13. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 533.

14. Ibid., 533, 535.

15. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 275-76.

16. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 535; and Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 276.

17. Armbrister, A Matter of Acc6untability, 221, 276; Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea,"

561, 565; and David S. McLellan, Cyrus Vance (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld,

Publishers, 1985), 16.

18. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 108-9, 113-14, 116-18.

19. Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," 565.

20. Johnson, The Vantage Point, 536.

21. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 118, 131; and Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 262.

22. Captain Robert P. Everett, United States Air Force, "Korea: Crisis and Response," Airman

12 (December 1968):5-7; Captain Robert P. Everett, United States Air Force, "Korea:

Suwon-Case in Point," Airman 12 (December 1968):8; and Captain Robert P. Everett, United

States Air Force, "Korea: A Test for Prime Beef," Airman 12 (December 1968):10-12.

23. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 229-31, 266.
148

24. Senate, Combat Readiness, 6-7.

25. Vice Admiral Jerry Miller, United States Navy (ret.), "Do You Have Enough Authority?"

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 116 (February 1990):69.

26. McLellan, Cyrus Vance, 7-15.

27. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 276-77.

28. McLellan, Cyrus Vance, 16; Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, 277; and Gregory

Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

1968), 142.

29. Bonesteel interview, 334-35; and Bonesteel, "On Korea's DMZ," 61.

30. "DMZ Action May Change Pay Rule," Army Times, 7 February 1968:1, 20; and United

States, Department of the Army, AR 672-5-1, Decorations, Awards, and Honors (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 18 September 1989), 28.

31. "Fight Pay for Korea Due Soon," Army Times, 13 March 1968:1, 20; and "Korea DMZ

Combat Pay Approved," Army Times, 10 April 1968:1, 22.

32. AR 672-5-1, 28; and United States, Department of the Army, AR 670-1, Wear and

Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia (Washington, DC: United States Government

Printing Office, 20 March 1987), 85, 88-89. To this day, the Commanding General, U.S.

Eighth Army, retains authority to award the Combat Infantryman and Combat Medical

Badges. This is the only command so authorized.

33. There were 295 official visitors during the first half of the year, during the most serious

period of crisis; these included thirteen Congressional delegations, one cabinet member,

twenty-seven civilian groups, and seventy-five high-level Department of Defense, service

department, and military visitors.

34. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 132.

35. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 36, quoting from the Department of Defense's "Report

of the 1971 Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation."

36. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 132.

37. Everett, "Korea: Crisis and Response," 5.

38. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 122, 125.

39. Loomis, "Renewal," 13.

40. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 40; and "Army Extends Korea Tours for Skilled," Army

Times, 14 February 1968:3.

41. Jenerette, "The Forgotten DMZ," 40.

42. Loomis, "Renewal," 13.

43. Binder, "The Porous War," 57.

44. Ibid., 53.

45. Ibid., 57.

46. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 117, 121.

47. Ibid., 122.

48. Bonesteel, "U.S.-South Korean Partnership," 60; and Bonesteel interview, 333-34.

49. Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group (Provisional), "ROK Armed Forces Civic Action

Program for 1969 (U)," 15 May 1969, 1, 9-11. This includes a summary of 1968 activities.

For the older type of programs, see Kim Han Yong, Republic of Korea Army: 1966 (Seoul:

Office of Public Information, 1966), 12.

50. Bunge, South Korea, 86-89, 230; and Park Chung Hee, Korea Reborn (Englewood Cliffs,

NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), 68.

51. Bonesteel, "U.S.-South Korean Partnership," 63; and Bonesteel, "On Korea's DMZ," 60.
149

52. General Charles H. Bonesteel III, "Year End Press Conference-11 January 1967," in the

personal papers of Colonel Clark; and "Korea Test Plan Educates Soldiers," Army Times,

20 March 1968:5.

53. 2ID, "Operational Report... 30 April 1969," 1-2.

54. Binder, "The Porous War," 55.

55. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 120-22; and Webster, "Morning Calm," 9, which

indicates that the ROKs captured 1,245 agents during 1968.

56. Binder, "The Porous War," 56; and Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 33.

57. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 33-34; and Finley, US Military Experience in

Korea, 128.

58. Bonesteel interview, 334.

Chapter 4

The epigraph comes from Binder, "The Porous War," 57.

1. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 128.

2. Binder, "The Porous War," 55; and Loomis, "Renewal," 12-13.

3. Stephen B. Patrick, "The East Is Red," Strategy and Tactics 42 (January-February 1974);

17; and Stephen B. Patrick, "The China War," Strategy and Tactics 47 (September-October

1979):9.

4. An, North Korea, 16-18.

5.. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 155, 215; and Ilpyong J. Kim, Communist Politics in

North Korea (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 76.

6. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 68.

7. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 155.

8. Webster, "Morning Calm," 9-10; and Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 35.

9. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 211-16, 252-57.

10. Ibid., 155; An, North Korea, 18; Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea, 76; and Dan

Oh Kong, Leadership Chance in North Korean Politics (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1988), 7. Kim Il-sung's quest for personal loyalty among key subordinates included

the elevation of younger brother Kim Yong-chu and son Kim Jong-il. The latter assumed

control of the KWP Propaganda and Agitation Bureau in 1971 and is now Kim Il-sung's

designated successor.

11. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 2, 12-13, 35-38, 72-73.

12. Kim, Communist Politics in North Korea, 76.

13. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 150; 2ID, "Operational Report... 1969," 2-6;

and United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, "Operational Report, Lessons Learned,

Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, for Period Ending 30 April 1970 (U)," 22 September

1970, 3, hereafter cited as 2ID, "Operational Report... 30 April 1970."

14. United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, 2d Brigade, "Annual Historical Supplement,

1969," and United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, 3d Brigade, "Annual Historical

Supplement, 1969," both in USAMHI.

15. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 129.

16. Ibid.; Bonesteel, "U.S.-South Korean Partnership," 61-63.

17. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 129.

18. Joint Military Assistance Group Korea (Provisional), "ROK Armed Forces Civic Action

Program for 1969 (U)," 2-3, 11.

19. Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," 565-66.
150

20. Bonesteel, "U.S.-South Korean Partnership," 61; and Bonesteel interview, 334.

21. Richard E. Bradshaw, "Major Determinants of North Korea Foreign Policy," in The

Politics of North Korea, edited by Jae Kyu Park and Jung Gun Kim (Seoul, Korea:

Kyungnam University, 1979), 190. For the first public admission of a possible change in

the north, see Takashi Ota, "North Korea Held to Shift Tactics," New York Times,

21 September 1969:8. Ota's article offered the first public discussion of North Korean

purges and a possible shift to political agitation rather than unconventional warfare. The

article, based on South Korean and UNC sources, also featured the caveat that "any time the Americans present a target of opportunity, the North Koreans will seize it."

Overall, it was an amazingly accurate piece of journalism. See also Bermudez, North

Korean Special Forces, 76. Bermudez notes these other names for the 8th Special Purpose Corps: 8th Special Duties Army Group, Light Infantry Army Group, Reconnaissance Army Group, 3729th Unit, and Strategic Forces Command. This gives some clue as to the care accorded to operational security in North Korea.

22. Kim Il-song, "On Some Theoretical Problems of the Socialist Economy," in his Revolution

and Socialist Construction in Korea, 165.

23. Lee, "Party-Military Relations," 151-59.

24. Bonesteel, "U.S.-South Korean Partnership," 63.

25. 2ID, "Operational Report... 30 April 1969," 2.

26. 2ID, 3Bde, "AHS 1969."

27. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 129-30.

28. 2ID, "Operational Report... 30 April 1969," 2-3.

-29. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 130.

30. 2ID, "Operational Report... 30 April 1969," 2-3.

31. Bermudez, North Korean Special Forces, 34.

32. Richard M. Nixon, RN, the Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Warner Books, 1978), 472-73.

33. Ibid., 473-74; and Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and

Co., 1979), 317.

34. Kissinger, White House Years, 318-20.

35. Nixon, RN, 474; and United States, Congress, House, Armed Services Committee, Inquiry Into the USS Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, DC, 28 April 1969), 924, hereafter cited as House, Inquiry.

36. Nixon, RN, 473-75.

37. Kissinger, White House Years, 319.

38. Nixon, RN, 476-77; and House, Inquiry, 923.

39. Kissinger, White House Years, 320; and Lieutenant D. L. Strole, United States Navy, and

Lieutenant W. E. Dutcher, United States Naval Reserve, "Naval and Maritime Events, July 1968-December 1969," US Naval Institute Proceedings 96 (May 1970):14.

40. Kissinger, White House Years, 321.

41. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 130-31; and 2ID, 3Bde, "AHS 1969."

42. Nixon, RN, 488; and Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 132.

43. Guthrie, "Korea: The Other DMZ," 17.

44. 2ID, "Operational Report... 30 April 1969," 10.

45. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 132.

46. 2ID, 3Bde, "AHS 1969."
151

47. United States Army, 2d Infantry Division, "Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1970 (U)," 1.

48. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 134.

49. Ibid., 130-35.

50. General John H. Michaelis, United States Army, "Two Decade Vigil Forges a Stronger

South Korea," Army 20 (October 1970):60-62.

Chapter 5

The epigraph is from United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington,

DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), paragraph 1-16.

1. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 220.

2. Bowman, The Vietnam War: An Almanac, 218.

3. The casualties and duration of post-1945 American wars and military expeditions are

available in R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History:

From 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 1199-1400. Interestingly, the Second Korean Conflict (2 November 1966 to 3 December 1969) exceeded the

Korean War in duration by one day (reckoned by U.S. Department of Defense historians

to run from 27 June 1950 to 27 July 1953).

4. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 220.

5. Frederica M. Bunge, ed., North Korea, a Country Study, Area handbook series (Washington, DC: United States Department of the Army, 1981), 202, 223, 227.

6. Webster, "Morning Calm," 8-9.

7. James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare (New

York: William Morrow, 1988), 581.

8. Bunge, South Korea, 34-38, 240; and Webster, "Morning Calm," 4-5.

9. Bunge, North Korea, 242-45.

10. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 207.

11. Clark interview.

12. Napoleon Bonaparte, "Maxims," in The Roots of Strategy: The 5 Greatest Military

Classics of All Times, compiled by Thomas Raphael Phillips (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole

Books, 1985).

13. Bonesteel interview, 334.

14. Perkins, "U.S. Force Structure," 242-44. U.S. forces operated independently of the country

team for extended periods in Honduras (Joint Task Force Bravo, 1984 to the present),

Lebanon (U.S. Multinational Force, 1982-84), and the Persian Gulf (Joint Task ForceMiddle East, 1987-88), among other examples. Although not required, close liaison with

the embassy was kept in all of these cases, just as in Korea during 1966-69.

15. For discussions of the challenges of combined operations, see United States, Department

of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing

Office, May 1986), 164-65; and FM 100-20, 1-16 to 1-17. For an example of the committee approach in Beirut (1982-84), see Daniel P. Bolger, Americans at War, 1975-

1986: An Era of Violent Peace (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 198-99.

16. Bonesteel interview, 334.

17. Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Bacevich, United States Army, et al., "American Military Police

in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador," 41, typescript, March 1988, USAMHI.

18. FM 100-20, 1-11.

19. Ibid., 2-30, 5-2
152

20. Ibid., 2-30.

21. FM 31-55 summarizes the results of the UNC border defense operations of 1966-69. The

barest summary of FM 31-55 (now out of print) can be found in the current FM 100-20,

E-18 to E-20.

22. FM 100-20, 1-9.

23. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 80.

24. Finley, US Military Experience in Korea, 175, 185, 207, 220.

25. Bunge, North Korea, 128, 232, 244.

26. "Korea Today: The Vigil Continues," Army Digest 24 (October 1969):43-44.

- L I- · I ·
Glossary

CIA

CFC

CINCUNC

DMZ

DPRK

EUSA

HDRF

JCS

KATUSA

KCIA

KIA

KMAG

KNP

KPA

KPAF

KPN

KWP

LIC

MACV

MDL

MIA

MSR

PACOM

QRF

ROK

ROKA

Central Intelligence Agency

U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command

Commander in Chief, United Nations Command

Demilitarized Zone

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

U.S. Eighth Army

Homeland Defense Reserve Force

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army

Korean Central Intelligence Agency

killed in action

Korean Military Advisory Group

Korean National Police (south)

Korean People's Army (north)

Korean People's Air Force (north)

Korean People's Navy (north)

Korean Workers' Party (north)

low-intensity conflict

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Military Demarcation Line

missing in action

main supply route

Pacific Command

quick-reaction force

Republic of Korea

Republic of Korea Army

153
154

ROKAF Republic of Korea Air Force

ROKN Republic of Korea Navy

SOP standing operating procedure

UNC United Nations Command

USAF United States Air Force

USFK United States Forces, Korea

USN United States Navy

WIA wounded in action

I - I -
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I I -
162

LEAVENWORTH PAPERS

1. The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, Major Robert A.

Doughty

2. Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939, by Dr. Edward J. Drea

3. "Not War But Like War": The American Intervention in Lebanon, by Dr.

Roger J. Spiller

4. The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During

the First World War, by Captain Timothy T. Lupfer

5. Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies, by Dr. Allen F. Chew

6. Soviet Night Operations in World War II, by Major Claude R. Sasso

7. August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz

8. August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945,

by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz

9. Defending the Driniumor: Covering Force Operations in New Guinea, 1944,

by Dr. Edward J. Drea

10. Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 1917-1918,

by Major Charles E. Heller, USAR

11. Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II, by Dr. Michael J.

King

12. Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World

War II, by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel

13. Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950, by Dr. William Glenn Robertson

14. Dragon Operations:. Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965, by Major

Thomas P. Odom

15. Power Pack: U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966, by

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates

16. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976

Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, by Major Paul H. Herbert

17. The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the

Arctic, October 1944, by Major James F. Gebhardt

18. Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945, by Dr. Thomas M. Huber

19. Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969,

by Major Daniel P. Bolger

I I · ·LI I I I _II I L- - IL I
163

RESEARCH SURVEYS

1. Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War, by Lieutenant

Colonel Charles R. Shrader

2. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization, by Captain Jonathan M. House

3. Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary H.

Wade

4. The Soviet Airborne Experience, by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz

5. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front During World

War II, by Major Timothy A. Wray

6. A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, by Major Scott R. McMichael

7. Key to the Sinai: The Battles for Abu Ageila in the 1956 and 1967 ArabIsraeli Wars, by Dr. George W. Gawrych

*. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1991 554-001/42043

I
- Major Daniel P. Bolger -

Major Daniel P. Bolger is an infantry officer,

commissioned in 1978 from The Citadel. He served

as a platoon leader, company executive officer,

battalion S4, and rifle company commander in the

2d Battalion (Mechanized), 34th Infantry, at Fort

Stewart, Georgia. Following graduate school at the

University of Chicago, where he earned his doctorate in history, he taught Russian and Soviet

history at the United States Military Academy,

West Point, New York. Major Bolger graduated

from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College in 1990 and currently serves as a battalion

operations officer (S3) in the 1st Battalion

(Mechanized), 5th Infantry, in the Republic of

Korea. He has written three other books: Dragons

at War.' 2-34th Infantry in the Mojave (1986),

Americans at War 1975-1986: An Era of Violent

Peace (1988), and Feast of Bones (1990), a military novel.

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Missions

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as an academic department at

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following

missions:

1. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other USACGSC

departments in integrating military history into their instruction.

2. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent for the development

and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the

TRADOC service school system.

3. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the Army and publish

the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components.

I

 r - , - , - -- I , - , -
SYNOPSIS OF LEAEWORTH PAPER 19

From November 1966 until December 1969,

American and South Korean forces battled North

Korean special operations teams across the length

and breadth of the peninsula. The Second Korean

Conflict featured small-scale skirmishes along the

uneasy Demilitarized Zone, spectacular terrorist

strikes, the seizure of the USS Pueblo, and several

determined North Korean efforts to foment a viable

insurgency. The United States and the Republic

of Korea prevailed in this low-intensity conflict.

Why did the United States and its Korean allies

win? This Leavenworth Paper offers a case study

in how an operational-level commander, General

Charles H. Bonesteel III, met the challenge of

low-intensity conflict in his theater. Bonesteel and

his United States and Korean subordinates crafted

a series of shrewd, pragmatic measures that eventually defanged North Korea's aggressive unconventional warfare campaign. This accomplishment

is even more remarkable in light of the many

circumstances that severely cramped Bonesteel's

options. Mediocre, conventionally oriented allied

forces, a volatile Korean political scene, half-baked

American doctrine, and the overarching specter of

a second Asian land war all affected the formulation and execution of the American-Korean response to North Korea's bold provocations.

Low-intensity conflict remains a serious concern for a U.S. Army oriented on more dangerous,

less likely midintensity wars. While the Korean

situation of 1966-69 was certainly unique, this

analysis of the allied performance in a forgotten

conflict offers some important conclusions that may

prove valuable to those confronted with the continuing challenges of waging-and winningAmerica's small wars.