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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

3rd Circuit Court-Conway Family Division

No. 2017-0238

IN THE MATTER OF STEVEN HOYT AND LESLEY HOYT

Submitted: March 8, 2018

Opinion Issued: October 3, 2018

Steven Hoyt, self-represented party, by brief.

Lesley Hoyt, self-represented party, by brief.

LYNN, C.J. The petitioner, Steven Hoyt, appeals an order of the Circuit 

Court (Pendleton, J.) reinstating his alimony obligation to the respondent, 

Lesley Hoyt, and granting an upward adjustment to his child support 

payments. We affirm.

The following facts are found in the record. The respondent and the 

petitioner divorced in 2010 after an 18-year marriage. In 2013, the respondent 

filed a post-divorce petition seeking, among other things, an award of alimony. 

By order dated October 1, 2014, the Circuit Court (Albee, J.) awarded the 

respondent “temporary alimony for a period not to exceed 18 months . . . in the 

amount of $150 monthly.” According to the trial court, the award was 

necessary to provide the respondent, who was suffering from tendonitis at the 

time, with “some temporary assistance” until she was able to restore her health 

and work a greater number of hours.

The parties have three children. The oldest two are currently over the 

age of 18. The oldest child recently withdrew from college and moved back in 
2

with the respondent due to a medical condition. The middle child attends 

college but lives with the respondent while school is not in session. The 

parties’ youngest child is in high school, and primarily resides with the 

respondent.

On May 12, 2016, the petitioner filed a request in the trial court seeking 

a reduction to his child support obligation because the middle child had 

recently turned 18. However, in June 2016, prior to receiving approval from 

the trial court, the petitioner reduced the amount of his monthly child support 

payment. Thereafter, the respondent requested alimony. Prior to the final 

hearing, the respondent filed a one-page proposed order seeking to increase

child support for the youngest child to $1,100 per month and requesting 

alimony in the amount of $600 per month. The petitioner requested that the 

current child support payment be reduced to $982 per month. Accompanying

the petitioner’s proposed order was a detailed request for factual findings along 

with legal citation in support of his position.

On January 25, 2017, the court held a final hearing to resolve these 

issues. The respondent testified at that hearing that the parties’ oldest child 

had to drop out of school due to a medical condition that caused her joints to 

become easily dislocated and made it difficult for her to get out of bed without 

assistance. The oldest child also suffered from a neuropathy that caused 

severe pain and joint stiffness. The respondent explained that she regularly 

drives her to Dartmouth-Hitchcock Hospital for treatment. The respondent

also explained that she is paying for the parties’ middle child to go to college 

and otherwise provides him with financial support. As for the parties’ youngest 

child, the respondent testified that increased costs of extracurricular activities 

justify an upward deviation in child support. Specifically, the youngest child

had recently been invited to go to Disney World with her dance team. 

According to the respondent, “the cost of the trip alone is $1600,” and the 

additional cost of costumes and other provisions will increase the total bill to 

$3,000. The respondent stated that the petitioner refused to contribute any 

money toward the cost of the trip. The youngest child is also in the school 

band, and the respondent testified that she is responsible for purchasing

instruments and uniforms. As a final point, the respondent explained that she 

had become delinquent with “all” of her credit cards after the petitioner 

reduced his child support payment, and these bills are “now in collections.”

The petitioner argued that the respondent’s request for alimony was 

untimely under New Hampshire law. Specifically, the petitioner took the 

position that the original alimony award was only “temporary,” and thus could 

not be reinstated because the current request was made more than five years 

from the original divorce decree. The petitioner also argued that his child 

support obligation should not be increased to fund the youngest child’s 

extracurricular activities because his “support pays for that already” and 

“$3,000 is a lot of money” for a trip that was merely “optional.”
3

On March 13, 2017, the trial court issued an order renewing alimony 

and granting an upward adjustment to the petitioner’s child support obligation. 

The trial court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the original alimony 

award was “temporary,” concluding that it was a “permanent award for a set 

period of time.” Moreover, the trial court reasoned that the respondent’s 

current living situation — taking care of three children, one of whom was 

suffering from “debilitating medical issues” — coupled with her lack of 

sufficient income, warranted an alimony award of $200 per month for 12 

months. As for child support, the trial court found that the respondent’s 

financial difficulties, coupled with the “extraordinary costs related to [the 

youngest child’s] after school activities,” warranted a minor upward adjustment 

to $1053 per month in order to meet the youngest child’s needs. The 

petitioner’s motion to reconsider was denied, and this appeal followed.

“On appeal, we will affirm the findings and rulings of the trial court 

unless they are unsupported by the evidence or legally erroneous.” In the 

Matter of Nyhan and Nyhan, 147 N.H. 768, 770 (2002); In the Matter of 

Plaisted & Plaisted, 149 N.H. 522, 523 (2003). We afford broad discretion to 

the trial court in determining and ordering child support and alimony. See In 

the Matter of Johnson & Johnson, 158 N.H. 555, 558 (2009); In the Matter of 

Nassar & Nassar, 156 N.H. 769, 772 (2008). “Accordingly, absent an 

unsustainable exercise of discretion, we will not overturn its factual findings.” 

Nassar, 156 N.H. at 772. “However, we review its interpretation of the law de

novo.” Id.

The petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority 

to award additional alimony. Specifically, he argues that the original award 

was “temporary” and therefore, under RSA 458:19, could only be adjusted 

within five years of the original divorce decree. Relying on Judge Albee’s use of 

the phrase “temporary alimony” in the 2014 order, the petitioner argues that 

Judge Albee clearly intended the award to be “subject to the 5 year limit from 

the date of the decree.”

Alimony is a statutory creature governed by RSA 458:19 (2004) (amended 

2018). See 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 501, at 85-87 (2016). RSA 458:19 authorizes 

the trial court to consider a request for post-divorce alimony in two separate 

circumstances. One situation arises when a party seeks alimony for the first 

time after divorce. See RSA 458:19, I. In that scenario, the statute authorizes 

the trial court to “make orders for the payment of alimony to the party in need 

of alimony, either temporary or permanent, for a definite or indefinite period of 

time, if the motion for alimony payments is made within 5 years of the decree 

of nullity or divorce . . . .” Id. The other situation occurs when “an order for 

permanent alimony for a definite period of time” has been previously granted 

by the trial court. RSA 458:19, VII. Under the statute, “such [an] order may be 

renewed, upon the petition of either party, provided that such petition is made 

within 5 years of the termination date of the permanent alimony order.” Id.
4

At the time of the trial court’s order, the statute did not define the terms

“temporary” or “permanent.” The trial court reasoned that “temporary alimony” 

means an award granted “as part of the temporary orders . . . prior to a final 

order being issued.” In the trial court’s view, this was “the only interpretation 

that gives meaning to the words temporary and permanent in light of RSA 

458:19, [VII], and its reference to permanent alimony for a defined period.” The 

trial court explained that “while [the alimony granted in 2014] may have been 

for a temporary period,” it “was awarded post final decree . . . for the defined 

period of 18 months, meaning it was permanent for a set period of time under” 

the statute.

The petitioner argues that our decisions in In the Matter of Fowler and 

Fowler, 145 N.H. 516 (2000), and Nassar provide the requisite interpretations 

for temporary and permanent alimony. We disagree. In both Fowler and 

Nassar, we simply recognized that while the primary purpose of alimony is 

rehabilitative, there are certain factual scenarios that override the rehabilitative 

principle. See Nassar, 156 N.H. at 777; Fowler, 145 N.H. at 520. We did not 

specifically define what constituted “temporary” or “permanent” alimony for 

purposes of the statute.

“Strictly speaking, temporary alimony is the allowance which a spouse 

may be compelled to pay the other spouse pendente lite, in order to enable the 

other spouse to maintain or defend the divorce action.” 27B C.J.S., supra

§ 504, at 90. Authority from other states explains that “[t]he purpose of 

temporary alimony is to furnish a needy spouse with funds sufficient to prevent 

the spouse from becoming a public charge while his or her rights are being 

adjudicated.” Burtoff v. Burtoff, 418 A.2d 1085, 1092 (D.C. 1980); see Belfiglio 

v. Belfiglio, 469 N.Y.S.2d 978, 979 (App. Div. 1984) (“Temporary maintenance 

is designed to insure that the needy spouse is provided with sufficient funds to 

meet his or her reasonable needs pending trial.”). By contrast, “[p]ermanent 

alimony is an award made in conjunction with the determination of the merits 

of the action.” 27B C.J.S., supra § 505, at 92; see Wilson v. Superior Court, 

189 P.2d 266, 269 (Cal. 1948) (classifying permanent alimony as “an award 

made in conjunction with the determination of the merits of the action”). 

Permanent alimony need not, as the petitioner suggests, continue in 

perpetuity. See DeGrazia v. DeGrazia, 741 A.2d 1057, 1059-60 (D.C. 1999). 

Instead, the trial court retains the discretion to set a durational limit to the 

award based on the facts of the particular case, so long as its decision is 

reasonable. See Gress v. Gress, 743 N.W.2d 67, 80-82 (Neb. 2007); see also

27B C.J.S., supra § 601, at 231-32 (“[G]enerally, the duration of an order is for 

the determination of the court in the exercise of its discretion based on the 

circumstances of the particular case and consideration of statutory factors, so 

long as it is reasonable.”). We therefore agree with the trial court’s 

interpretation that “temporary” in the context of alimony connotes the 

procedural posture of the award and not the length. In other words, 
5

“temporary,” as used in RSA 458:19, I, means an award that is made before the 

trial court’s final determination concerning a party’s alimony obligation.

Our conclusion is in line with recent amendments to RSA 458:19, which 

added a definitional section to the statute. See Laws 2018, 310:1. Of note, the 

amended statute defines “temporary alimony” as the “periodic support 

payments to or on behalf of a spouse while a case is pending and ending on the 

effective date of the divorce, legal separation, or annulment.” Id. Moreover, the 

amendment replaces “permanent alimony” with the phrase “term alimony,” 

which it defines as the “periodic payments made to a spouse or former spouse

after the effective date of the final decree.” Id. These new definitions draw the

same distinction recognized by case law, and are consistent with our 

interpretation in this case.

Next, the petitioner argues that the trial court incorrectly “modified the 

original award without proof of a substantial change in circumstances.” In the 

petitioner’s view, it was improper for the trial court to consider that the 

respondent was taking care of adult children when making its decision 

concerning alimony. The petitioner’s argument relies upon an inapplicable

standard of proof. It is true that a party seeking “[t]o obtain an order modifying

a support obligation . . . must show that a substantial change in circumstances 

has arisen since the initial award, making the current support amount either 

improper or unfair.” Laflamme v. Laflamme, 144 N.H. 524, 527 (1999). 

However, this standard does not apply to a request to renew an expired award, 

which is what the respondent sought here. See In the Matter of Lyon & Lyon, 

166 N.H. 315, 316 (2014). Rather, in the latter scenario, we have articulated 

that “the burden is upon the party in whose favor the order is to run to 

establish that justice requires a renewal or extension, and if so, what justice 

requires as to amount, in the light of all the circumstances then existing.” Id. 

at 321 (quotation, brackets, and ellipsis omitted).

Moreover, “the trial court must consider all of the circumstances of the 

parties” in reaching its decision. Henry v. Henry, 129 N.H. 159, 161 (1987) 

(quotation omitted); see Taylor v. Taylor, 108 N.H. 193, 195 (1967). 

Consideration is not limited to the statutory factors — as suggested by the 

petitioner. Cf. Henry, 129 N.H. at 162 (explaining that, while not controlling on 

the overall outcome of the case, the terms of a private stipulation between the 

parties was a relevant circumstance to be considered by the trial court). The 

respondent testified that caring for the oldest child has been both financially 

draining and time consuming. The impact of this responsibility is compounded 

by the respondent’s other financial obligations and limited financial means. It 

was appropriate for the trial court to consider these facts when making its 

decision. See Hoffman v. Hoffman, 143 N.H. 514, 519-20 (1999). In sum, 

nothing appears in the record which would indicate that the trial court 

misapplied the burden of proof or failed to consider all the relevant 

circumstances, and we cannot say it unsustainably exercised its discretion in 
6

ordering the renewal of alimony payments. Healey v. Healey, 117 N.H. 618, 

622 (1977).1

As to the child support adjustment, the petitioner asserts that the trial 

court misapplied the statutory factors to this case. Specifically, he argues that 

the trial court could not consider the youngest child’s extracurricular activities 

because extracurricular activities are already included in the child support 

guidelines.

“New Hampshire’s child support guidelines are codified in RSA chapter 

458-C.” Plaisted, 149 N.H. at 524. “The legislature adopted them in order to 

establish a uniform system to determine the amount of child support to be 

awarded, to resolve inequities in child support orders and to comply with 

federal law.” Id. The statutory framework vests the trial court “with the 

ultimate responsibility for determining and safeguarding the best interests of 

children.” In the Matter of Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. 333, 337 (2010); see RSA 

458-C:1 (2004). As such, “the guidelines shall apply in all child support cases, 

including orders modifying an existing support order.” Giles v. Giles, 136 N.H. 

540, 543 (1992); see RSA 458-C:4, I (2004). “There is a ‘rebuttable 

presumption’ that application of the guidelines in a particular case will 

establish the correct amount of child support.” Id. (quoting RSA 458-C:4, II). 

“This presumption may be rebutted only through a ‘written finding or a specific 

finding by the presiding officer on the record that the application of the 

guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case.’” Giles, 136 

N.H. at 543-44 (quoting RSA 458-C:4, II). In that situation, RSA 458-C:5 

authorizes the trial court to “adjust its application of the guidelines if it is 

shown by a preponderance of the evidence that special circumstances exist.” 

Id. at 544 (quotation omitted).

The petitioner argues that our decision in In the Matter of Coderre & 

Coderre, 148 N.H. 401 (2002), superseded in part by statute as recognized in In 

the Matter of Regan & Regan, 164 N.H. 1 (2012), controls the outcome of this 

case. In Coderre, the father was ordered to pay “seventy-eight percent of [the 

children’s] extracurricular activity expenses” in addition to his support 

obligations under the guidelines. Coderre, 148 N.H. at 402-03. We reversed, 

holding “that such expenses are included in the parties’ total support 

obligation,” and could therefore not constitute a separate support obligation. 

Id. at 406. The petitioner construes our holding in Coderre to mean that an 

increase in the cost of extracurricular activities can never form the basis for an 

upward deviation. However, we have explained that “[o]ur holding in Coderre

. . . was not based upon the facts underlying the party’s request for 

 

1 To the extent the petitioner challenges the respondent’s credibility “and the accuracy of her 

expense and income figures,” these “are questions to be resolved by the trial court.” Healey, 117 

N.H. at 622. On the record before us, we cannot say that the trial court’s determinations were 

erroneous. See Nassar, 156 N.H. at 772.
7

extracurricular expenses.” In the Matter of Donovan & Donovan, 152 N.H. 55, 

60 (2005). “Rather, we examined the structure and purpose of RSA chapter 

458-C to determine what expenses are part of general support under the 

guidelines.” Id. Thus, “[a]lthough extracurricular activities are included in 

basic guidelines support, ongoing extraordinary education expenses may 

constitute special circumstances that justify deviation from the guidelines.” Id. 

(emphasis added); see, e.g., In the Matter of Arabian & Squillante, 151 N.H. 

109, 112 (2004) (explaining that the trial court on remand may consider 

whether extracurricular activities created a special circumstance “that would 

justify deviating from the guidelines”).

Furthermore, based on the record before us we cannot say that the trial 

court unsustainably exercised its discretion by granting an upward deviation. 

Laura & Scott, 161 N.H. at 335. Here, the trial court found that “the 

extraordinary costs relating to [the youngest child’s] after school activities” 

warranted a minor upward deviation to the support award. Given these facts, 

the trial court found that it was in the interest of justice to have the parties 

equally share this obligation to provide the “best possible outcome for” the 

youngest child. See In the Matter of Carr & Edmunds, 156 N.H. 498, 501 

(2007) (noting that one goal of the child support guidelines is “to ensure that 

both the custodial and non-custodial parents share in the support 

responsibility for their children, according to the relative percentage of each 

parent’s income” (emphasis added)).2 Moreover, this result furthers the other 

statutory purpose of child support, which is to “minimize the economic 

consequences of divorce to children.” In the Matter of Jerome & Jerome, 150 

N.H. 626, 630 (2004) (quotation and brackets omitted); see 27C C.J.S. Divorce

§ 1149, at 326 (2016) (noting that child support statutes seek to provide the 

child “with a standard of living enjoyed by the family prior to the divorce and by 

the noncustodial parent after the divorce, so as to provide the level of support 

that the child presumably would have enjoyed but for the divorce”).

3

While the petitioner argues that the respondent’s financial affidavit is 

both incomplete and inaccurate, and thus the trial court’s reliance on it was

erroneous, he failed to include the affidavit in the record on appeal. See Bean 

v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004) (“It is the burden of the 

appealing party . . . to provide this court with a record sufficient to decide [the]

issues on appeal . . . .”). Our review is therefore limited to the record before us, 

 

2 The petitioner’s contention that the trial court improperly “made the arguments . . . in its 

summary order on [the respondent’s] behalf” is misplaced. The trial court was obligated to “make 

a written finding as to why a special circumstance pursuant to RSA 458-C:5 justifies an 

adjustment from the child support guidelines to avoid an unjust or inappropriate result” prior to 

deviating from the guidelines. In the Matter of Forcier & Mueller, 152 N.H. 463, 465 (2005).

3 While the petitioner argues that the trial court wrongfully considered college costs in computing 

child support, the record does not support this claim. Instead, it shows that, at most, the trial 

court considered as relevant the fact that while not in college, the two older children lived with the 

respondent.
8

from which we conclude that the trial court sustainably exercised its 

discretion. Nassar, 156 N.H. at 772.

Affirmed.

HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ., concurred.