Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30624

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

EDWARD COLEMAN, also known as Lil Edward,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:03-CR-274-8

Before GARWOOD, DENNIS and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Edward Coleman, federal prisoner # 28581-034, pleaded guilty, pursuant

to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent

to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, a quantity of cocaine

hydrochloride, 100 grams or more of heroin, and quantities of marijuana (count

one). He also pleaded guilty to commission of violent crimes in aid of

racketeering (count two). Coleman was sentenced to concurrent terms of 121

months in prison on each count.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 7, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 08-30624

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Coleman, represented here and below by the Federal Public Defender,

appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a reduction of sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), in light of the recent amendments to the crack

cocaine sentencing guidelines. In denying the motion, the district court noted

that Coleman’s original sentence was within the amended guidelines range and

that no further reconsideration applied. 

Coleman contends that the district court arbitrarily denied his § 3582(c)(2)

motion without regard to case-specific facts, such as his postconviction

rehabilitative conduct, or consideration of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Coleman contends a sentencing range overlap, by itself, cannot be used to justify

the denial of a reduction. As an initial matter, we reject the Government’s

assertion that Coleman waived the right to bring the instant appeal under the

terms of his plea agreement. See United States v. Cooley, 590 F.3d 293, 297 (5th

Cir. 2009).

The denial of a § 3582 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United

States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2009). Section 3582(c)(2) permits the

discretionary modification of a defendant’s sentence in certain cases where the

sentencing range has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission.

United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 517

(2009). In such cases, the district court may reduce the sentence after

considering the applicable factors under § 3553(a) and the applicable guideline

policy statements. § 3582(c)(2). However, the sentencing court is not required

to provide reasons for its denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion or to expressly explain

its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Evans, 587 F.3d at 673-74. If the

record shows that the district court gave due consideration to the motion as a

whole and implicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors, there is no abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Whitebird, 55 F.3d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir. 1995).

Although the district court did not discuss the § 3553(a) factors expressly,

the record reflects that it considered them. See Evans, 587 F.3d at 673. The

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No. 08-30624

In the report to the court from the committee consisting of a representative of the 1

District Attorney’s Office and a representative of the Federal Public Defender’s Office, the

court was advised of the original guideline range (121-151 months), the amended guideline

range (97-121 months), that “Defendant is eligible for [section] 3582 sentence reduction” and

of the fact that Coleman had no prison disciplinary record (and Coleman’s motion to reduce

likewise mentioned that and his completion of a drug abuse program in prison). 

We also note that at the original sentencing the district court stated that “You

[Coleman] had a history here of run-ins with the law. You were lucky your criminal history

was only II as opposed to III. I have some question about that. It looks like to me Probation

might have given you a little bit of a break with this criminal history II rather than III.” The

court also said at the original sentencing that the sentencing objectives of punishment and

rehabilitation could be met by a 121 month sentence. 

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district court’s decision denying the motion indicates that it understood that

Coleman’s original sentence was within the amended guidelines range and

shows that the district court considered the amended guidelines range but

determined that no reduction in sentence was warranted. Under these

circumstances, the court gave due consideration to the motion to reduce sentence

and implicitly considered the § 3553(a) factors. Moreover, the record reflects

that the district court was made aware of Coleman’s good conduct in prison, and

there is no reason to believe that the district court believed erroneously that it

could not reduce Coleman’s sentence. Accordingly, Coleman has not shown that 1

the district court’s denial of his motion was an abuse of discretion. See Evans,

587 F.3d at 673-74; Whitebird, 55 F.3d at 1010; United States v. Harrell, 341

Fed. Appx. 965, 2009 WL 2566998 (5th Cir. 2009). 

AFFIRMED.

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