alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Perry Crosby, Appellant.

[635 NYS2d 485]

—Appeal by the defendant from (1) a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Cohen, J.), rendered November 13, 1992, convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree under Indictment No. N13012/91, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence, and (2) two amended judgments of the same court, also rendered November 13, 1992, revoking sentences of probation previously imposed by the same court, upon findings that he had violated conditions thereof, upon his admissions, and imposing sentences of imprisonment upon his previous convictions of assault in the second degree under Indictment Nos. 3856/89 and 3945/89.

Ordered that the judgment and amended judgments are affirmed.

The defendant’s contentions that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his knowledge of the weight of the cocaine he possessed and that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the People must prove he knew the weight of the cocaine are unpreserved for appellate review *(see, People v Gray,*86 NY2d 10; *People v Lawrence,*85 NY2d 1002; *People v Monroe,*216 AD2d 494). We decline to reach this issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction. Further, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we find that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence *(see,*CPL 470.15 [5]).

The defendant’s objections to the prosecutor’s summation are, for the most part, unpreserved for appellate review. As to the preserved objections, the comments were proper responses to the defense counsel’s summation or were not so prejudicial as to warrant reversal *(see, People v Lamour,*203 AD2d 388).

Finally, the defendant’s sentences are not excessive *(see, People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80). Bracken, J. P., Miller, Altman and Florio, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

PEAYATTA J. GIRVEN, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D18-3478 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed October 11, 2019. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Samantha L. Ward and Christopher C. Nash, Judges. Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Ama N. Appiah, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Johnny T. Salgado, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, SILBERMAN, and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADDED BY

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Coast Financial Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30,
2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Report), I, Justin D. Locke, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 1350, as added by § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the period covered
by the report.
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       |  |     |  |                                         
|---------------------- |  | --- |  | ----------------------------------------
|Date: November 1, 2007 |  | By: |  | /s/ Justin D. Locke                     
|                       |  |     |  | Justin D. Locke, Chief Financial
Officer
**EXHIBIT
      23.1**








**CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM**




We
      consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (Form
      S-8 Nos. 333-130505, 333-129754, 333-114866, 333-97769, 333-66746 and 333-37914)
      pertaining to the stock option plans of Genius Products, Inc. and subsidiaries
      of our reports dated May 1, 2007, with respect to the consolidated financial
      statements of Genius Products, LLC and subsidiaries, and the consolidated
      financial statements and schedule of Genius Products, Inc. and subsidiaries
      included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31,
      2006.





/s/
      ERNST
& YOUNG LLP





Los
      Angeles, California


May
      1,
      2007
```

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 58 (Tuesday, March 27, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Page 14263]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-5584]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Department of the Navy

Meeting of the Board of Visitors of Marine Corps University

AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD.

ACTION: Notice of open meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Board of Visitors of the Marine Corps University (BOV MCU) 
will meet to review, develop, and provide recommendations on all 
aspects of the academic and administrative policies of the University; 
examine all aspects of professional military education operations; and 
provide such oversight and advice, as is necessary, to facilitate high 
educational standards and cost effective operations. The BOV MCU will 
be focusing primarily on Professional Military Education in the Marine 
Corps. All sessions of the meeting will be open to the public.

DATES: The meeting will be held on Monday, April 16, 2007, from 8 a.m. 
to 4 p.m. and on Tuesday, April 17, 2007, from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held in the Hooper Room at Marine Corps 
University, 2076 South Street, Quantico, VA 22134.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mary Lanzillotta, Executive Secretary, 
Marine Corps University Board of Visitors, 2076 South Street, Quantico, 
VA 22134, telephone number 703-784-4037.

M. A. Harvison,
Lieutenant Commander, Judge Advocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, 
Federal Register Liaison Officer.
 [FR Doc. E7-5584 Filed 3-26-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3810-FF-P
```
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-12-00784- CR

Marc us Anthon y P erkins, App ellant

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 6 O F TRAVIS CO UNTY NO. C-1 -CR- 12- 2164 72, H ONO RAB LE B RANDY M UELLER, JUDGE P RESIDING

O R D E R A N D M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N P ER CURIAM

Appellant file d h i s n otice of appea l on November 30, 2012, the clerk’s record was filed J anuar

y 2, 2013, and the repor

ter’s rec ord was filed M ar ch 25, 2013. On Aug ust 9, afte r appellant’ s attorney failed to respond to a late-br ief notice sent in May , we abate d the appea l to the tr i al court for a hear ing pursuant to rule 38.8. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(b)( 3). On October 3, we

rec eived a supplemental rec ord containing the trial court’s finding s in which the court stated that counsel said he had been unable to speak to appellant but that there was “no indi ca t i o n t h at Mr. Perkins wis h ed t o ab at e the appea l, howeve r.” We reinstated the case , and on Fe bruar y 13, counsel informed us that he had still had no contac t from appellant but that he would file a brief on appellant’ s behalf

; Ma rch 17 was set as the brief deadline. O n Marc h 24, we sent counsel another late-br ief notice, asking for a response by April 3. On April 14, counsel called to inform us that hewould be filing a motion for extension of time by April 18. To date, the brief has not been tender ed,

and a motion for e x tension of time has not bee n filed.

Be cause we do not have a trial-cour t finding that appellant no longe r wishes to p ro s ec ute his appea l, we may not proce ed to consider the appea l without briefing

. S ee i d

. R. 38.8(b)( 4) (appe llate court “may consider the appea l without briefs” if trial court deter mines that appellant “no longe r desires to pr osecute the appe al”) . We thus must abate the appe al once ag ain. S ee id. R. 38.8(b)( 2) (if brief is not timely filed, appellate court “must order the trial co u rt t o immediately

conduct a hear ing to de termine whether the appe llant desires to prose cute his appe al, wh et h er t h e appellant is indige nt, or, if not indige nt, whether reta ined counsel has abandone d the appea l, and to make appropr iate fin d i n g s and rec ommendations”). The trial court shall hold a hear ing pursuant to rule 38.8 on or befor e J une 2, 2014, and shall deter mine whether appellant wishes to abandon his appea l and, if not (or if it is unclea r), the date by which co u n s el wi l l file appellant’ s brief. Should counsel fail to file a bri ef b y that date, we will instit ute contempt proce eding s ag ainst him. See id. R. 38.8(b)( 4) (base d on trial court’s finding s and rec ommendations, appellate court “may act appropr iately to ensure that the appellant’ s rig hts a re protec ted, including initiating contempt proc eeding s ag ainst appellant’s c ounsel”).

I t is ordere d May

2, 2014.

Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Goodwin, and F ield Abated a nd Remanded Filed: May

2, 2014 Do Not Publish 2
#### James C. Fargo, *as President, etc., Respondent, v.*William Milburn and others, *Appellants.*

— Judgment affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.7


April 25, 1997

Mr. Lyn Maddox



Dear Lyn:

On behalf of PG&E Corporation, I am pleased to modify our previous offer for
you to join our organization as President and Chief Executive Officer of PG&E
Energy Trading and as Senior Vice President of PG&E Corporation reporting to me.

It is my understanding that these details are consistent with those described to
you by G. Brent Stanley and will form the basis for your acceptance of this
offer.

Your initial target annual total compensation plus a one-time signing bonus of
$50,000 is calculated to be approximately $935,000.  Listed below are
compensation and benefit details:

1.   An annual base salary of $300,000 ($25,000 monthly) subject to possible
increases through our merit review plan.

2.   One time bonus of $50,000 payable within 30 days of your hire, subject to
normal payroll withholdings.

3.   A target annual bonus of $135,000, which equals 45% of your base salary, in
an annual incentive plan under which your actual bonus dollars can reach from 0
to $270,000 based on your performance relative to established goals.  For 1997,
this bonus will be not less than $135,000.

4.   Annual award of 5,000 performance units under our Performance Units Plan
(PUP).  The value of these units is tied to the price of PG&E Corporation common
stock.  The estimated value of this award is $100,000 based on a value of $20
per share.

5.   A stock option grant of 120,000 shares of PG&E Corporation common stock.
The estimated value of this award is $333,600 based on a present value $2.78 per
share.

6.   An annual perquisite allowance of $15,500.

7.   Participation in our health and welfare benefit plans.

8.   Four weeks of paid vacation per year.

As we have discussed, a number of these compensation elements, as well as
election as an officer of PG&E Corporation, are subject to Board of Directors
approval.
<PAGE>

We are enthused that you are planning to join our team and working with us for
the success of PG&E Corporation.

I would appreciate receiving your written acceptance of this offer as soon as
possible.

Please call me at the office or at home (510) 933-9369 at any time.

Sincerely,

ROBERT D. GLYNN, JR.


Accepted:

L E MADDOX
--------------------

4/26/97
--------------------
Date
Exhibit 4.48

 

Annex 3

 

To the Cash Pooling Agreement

 

Act of accession

 

Polca, 5 Place du Champ de Mars, 1050 Brussels, Belgium,

 

For the attention of the CEO,

 

Re: Accession to the Polca Cash Pooling Agreement (the “Agreement”) of Cdiscount Group (the “participating Company”)

 

1.              All terms used herein shall have the same meaning as defined in the Agreement.

 

2.              Cdiscount Group confirms having received and read all the provisions of the Agreement as well as any other information, document considered useful and necessary for the Agreement and its implementation.

 

3.              Cdiscount Group states to be controlled directly or indirectly by Casino Guichard Perrachon in the sense referred to in the definition of the term “Casino Group” found in Article 1 of the Agreement.

 

4.              Cdiscount Group confirms having provided Polca with its latest legal financial statements, including financial information on its equity and its financial debts, in accordance with Article 6.2 of the Agreement, on the basis of which the Maximum Amount of Advances is set to 50 million (Fifty million) euros.

 

5.              Cdiscount Group hereby agrees to be a Participating Company within the meaning of the Agreement, endorses each of the declarations provided for in Article 9 of the Agreement, agrees to be bound without reservation by the terms and conditions of the Agreement, to benefit from all the rights it creates and engages to perform all the obligations imposed upon it.

 

6.              For the purpose of participating in the cash pooling transactions provided for in the Agreement, Cdiscount Group states that the account No. FR76 3000 3018 4000 0201 4787 673 opened with the Bank should be considered as its Secondary Account for the purposes of the Agreement.

 

7.              We confirm having the authority and capacity to sign the Act of accession to the Agreement.

 

8.              Please note that all correspondence relating to the Agreement will be sent by post, fax, email or telephone to:

 

·                  Adrien Boute

·                  1 Esplanade de France - 42008 Saint-Etienne

·                  Email: aboute@groupe-casino.fr

·                  Telephone: 04 77 45 36 97

 











 

For the purposes of Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement, only the person below or the substitute will exclusively have the capacity and the authority to represent us:

 

·                  Emmanuel Grenier

·                  1 Esplanade de France - 42008 Saint-Etienne

 

9.              As we have negotiated and agreed, we have noted that, for us, the date of entry into force of the agreement is fixed as October 17, 2014.

 

For the sake of good order, please return to us one of the two originals of this Annex, with your handwritten signature preceded by the words “read and approved”.

 

 

	
 
    	
Kind   regards,
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Executed   on October 17, 2014
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
Cdiscount   Group
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
by   Emmanuel Grenier
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
/s/   Emmanuel Grenier
p.1 

OAR Box 1828 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

18) ll-K- (B)-6 

Docket Number: 

A-83-27 

Printed 11/12/2008 11:12:48 AM Sheet 18 of 325 
P.2 

n P. 

"(0 

H-K-(B)-6 

DATA ASSUMPTIONS IN THE IFCAM MODEL. 

Letter from K.F. Held, EEA to J. Pratapas, EPA:EAB. 

July 26, 1979. 

THIS INFORMATION CAN BE FOUND IN DOCKET A-79-02, ITEM 

II-K-(B)-6
#### Embree Bullard v. John W. Green and Others.

Au appeal will lie from an order in Chancery, setting aside a sale in a foreclosure suit after confirmation of the commissioner’s report of the sale.

*Heard April*23*d.*

*Decided May 1st.*

Appeal in Chancery from Washtenaw Circuit. After confirmation of the commissioner’s report of sale in a'foreclosure suit, the Circuit Court in Chancery, on application of one of the defendants, made an order, setting aside the-sale made, and ordering a resale. The purchaser appealed from this order.

*A. Fetch,*

now moved to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the order appealed from was not a *final'*order, within the meaning of the statute. He cited and commented on *Benedict v. Thompson,*2 *Doug. Mich.*299; *and Romeyn v. Hale,*1 *Mich.*93. He also suggested whether the order was not in its nature discretionary, and therefore not in any event the subject of review.

*O. SawJdns,*contra.

Manning J.:

This is an appeal from an order setting aside a sale of mortgaged premises on a decree of foreclosure, after the confirmation of the commissioner’s report of sale; and a motion is made to dismiss the appeal, on the ground that the order setting aside the sale is not a final order. By the sale, report and confirmation —there being no appeal taken from the order of confirmation — the purchaser’s right under the sale became vested, without any further action on the part of the court. The order appealed from deprives him of this right. It contemplates, it is true, further proceedings on the decree, affecting the rights of the parties to the decree; but it does not contemplate *223any further proceedings whatever touching the right of the purchaser. As to him the order is final. It puts an end to his rights. As purchaser, he has no interest in, and is not a party to such further proceedings, whether he bo a party to the foreclosure suit or not.

In *Baker v.*Pierson, 5 *Mich.*456, we held that an appeal would lie from an order denying a writ of assistance to a purchaser at a mortgage sale, to put him in possession of the mortgaged premises.

The motion must be denied, with costs.

Martin Ch. J. and Campbell J., concurred.

Ciiristiancy J., was absent.
<PAGE>

                                                            EXHIBIT 10.10.8

February 27, 2001

Mr. Gregory M. Rueger, Sr. Vice President
Generation & Chief Nuclear Officer
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street, 32/nd/ Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105

Dear Greg:

You are an essential member of our senior executive team and I view your
contribution as vital to getting the Corporation through its current challenges,
achieving the Corporation's objectives, and providing strong returns to
shareholders.

The Board of Directors recently approved a Senior Executive Retention program
which includes you.  Under this program, you will receive a grant of phantom
PG&E Corporation restricted stock units granted under the PG&E Corporation Long-
Term Incentive Plan.  The amount of your grant is $1,250,000 and it translates
into 95,715 units calculated at the closing price of PG&E Corporation common
stock on February 21, 2001, of $13.06 per share.  An extremely small number of
individuals are included in this arrangement.  For this reason, it is absolutely
necessary for you to restrict any conversation on this subject to me, Brent
Stanley, or Gordon Smith.

Your grant of phantom PG&E Corporation restricted stock units is effective
February 21, 2001, and will vest on December 31, 2004, subject to either one of
the following conditions:

  -  50 percent will automatically vest on December 31, 2004. The remaining 50
     percent will vest on December 31, 2004 only if the Corporation's
     performance, as measured by relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR) on a
     cumulative basis over four years, is at or above the 55th percentile of its
     comparator group; or

  -  if, at the end of the third year of the grant, December 31, 2003, the
     Corporation's performance as measured by relative TSR on a cumulative
     basis, is at or above the 75th percentile of its comparator group, the
     entire grant will vest.

You may elect to defer your actual award payments under the PG&E Corporation
Supplemental Retirement Savings Plan prior to the award cliff-vesting.  Such
deferrals will be made in PG&E Corporation phantom stock units on the first
business day of January of the year following vesting.  Awards not deferred will
be paid in cash in January of the year following vesting.

Greg, I look forward to your continued strong contributions to PG&E
Corporation's success.

Sincerely,

ROBERT D. GLYNN, JR.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE ANTONIO RIOS AVALOS,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney

General,

Respondent. No. 2 1

- 1 170

Agency No. A206

- 265

- 948

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 9, 2023 * *

San Francisco, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit

Judges.

Jose Antonio Rios Avalos, a citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the

Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision affirming an immigration judge’s denial of

his motion to reopen his removal proceedings to seek cancellation of removal

.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 15 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

Exercising jurisdict ion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and reviewing the denial of a motion

to reopen for abuse of discretion, Perez

- Portillo v. Garland , 56 F.4th 788, 792 (9th

Cir. 2022), we deny Rios’s petition.

The Board did not abuse its discretion by denying Rios’s motion

. Because

R io s fail ed to depart the United States on or before April 9, 2016, in accordance

with his sixty

- day grant of voluntary departure

, he became statutorily ineligible for

cancellation of removal for ten years, or until April 9, 2026

. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1 229c(d)(1) ( i f a noncitizen “permitted to depart voluntarily .

. . fails to depart

the United States within the time period specified ,” they “ shall be ineligible, for a

period of 10 years, to receive” cancellation of removal ) ; Dada v. Mukasey

, 554

U.S. 1, 10 (2008) ( “ The voluntary departure period in no event may exceed 60 .

. .

days .

. . .” ) ; Granados

- Oseguera v. Mukasey , 546 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2008)

( “[A] fter the period for voluntary departure ha [s] elapsed [,]

. . . the [Board is] not

simply correct to deny the motion; it [is] compelled to do so by the operation of 8

U.S.C. § 1229c(d)(1)

. . . . ”)

.

W e need not address Rios’s remaining contentions. Simeonov v. Ashcroft

,

371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) ( “ As a general rule courts

. . . are not required to

make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they

reach .” (quoting INS v. Bagamasbad , 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) ) )

.

***3

PETITION DENIED. 1

1 Rios ’s motion to supplement the record (Doc. 8) is denied.