INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT MISCONDUCT IN NEW ENGLAND—

VOLUME 3

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 11, DECEMBER 5 AND 6, 2002

Serial No. 107–56

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

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INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT MISCONDUCT IN NEW

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INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT MISCONDUCT IN NEW ENGLAND—

VOLUME 3

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 11, DECEMBER 5 AND 6, 2002

Serial No. 107–56

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

DAVE WELDON, Florida

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

C.L. ‘‘BUTCH’’ OTTER, Idaho

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on:

May 11, 2002 ..................................................................................................... 1

December 5, 2002 ............................................................................................. 251

December 6, 2002 ............................................................................................. 403

Statement of:

Bulger, William, president of the University of Massachusetts ................... 406

Gershengorn, Wendie, judge, Middlesex Superior Court .............................. 101

Huff, Michael, supervisor of the homicide squad, Tulsa Police Department; and David Wheeler, son of murder victim Roger Wheeler, accompanied by Frank Libby, attorney ................................................................. 265

McDonough, James M., Esq. ............................................................................ 84

O’Sullivan, Jeremiah, former New England Organized Crime Strike Force

chief attorney ................................................................................................ 289

Zalkind, Jack, Esq. ........................................................................................... 8

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana:

Exhibit 1 ..................................................................................................... 338

Exhibit 3 ..................................................................................................... 345

Exhibit 4 ..................................................................................................... 347

Exhibit 5 ..................................................................................................... 349

Exhibit 16 ................................................................................................... 342

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 256

Delahunt, Hon. William D., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts:

Exhibit 21 ................................................................................................... 54

Exhibits 15 and 16 .................................................................................... 36

LaTourette, Hon. Steven C., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio:

Exhibit 12 ................................................................................................... 22

Exhibit 18 ................................................................................................... 61

Exhibit 49 ................................................................................................... 87

Exhibits 4, 5 and 8 .................................................................................... 14

Exhibits 11 and 13 .................................................................................... 91

Lynch, Hon. Stephen F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts:

Exhibit 10 ................................................................................................... 363

Exhibits 1 and 2 ........................................................................................ 48

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 5

O’Sullivan, Jeremiah, former New England Organized Crime Strike Force

chief attorney, prepared statement of ......................................................... 294

Tierney, Hon. John F., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Massachusetts:

Exhibit 20 ................................................................................................... 64

Exhibit 22 ................................................................................................... 75

Exhibit 26 ................................................................................................... 66

Exhibit 41 ................................................................................................... 72

Wilson, James C., chief counsel, Committee on Government Reform, exhibit 46 ........................................................................................................... 103

(1)

INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF LAW

ENFORCEMENT MISCONDUCT IN NEW ENGLAND

SATURDAY, MAY 11, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Boston, MA.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., at the J.W.

McCormack U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, 90 Devonshire Street,

Courtroom 6, 15th Floor, Boston, MA, Hon. Steven C. LaTourette

presiding.

Present: Representatives LaTourette, Tierney, Delahunt, Frank,

and Lynch.

Staff present: James C. Wilson, chief counsel; Chad Bungard,

counsel; Joshua E. Gillespie, deputy chief clerk; Nicholis Mutton,

assistant to chief counsel; and Michael J. Yeager, minority deputy

chief counsel.

Mr. LATOURETTE. The hearing will come to order.

We are meeting today out of the location of Washington, DC.

This is a meeting of the Government Reform Committee for the

purposes of having a continuation of hearings into law-enforcement

irregularities in the New England area.

The chairman of the full committee, Dan Burton, is unavoidably

detained today, and has asked me to chair today’s proceedings.

We’re lucky to be joined by two members of our committee, Mr.

Tierney and Mr. Lynch of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,

and also someone who has been with us all the every step of our

proceedings, and who serves capably on the Judiciary Committee.

Good morning.

I want to ask unanimous consent at this time that all Members’ and witnesses’ statements be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Tabular material referred to be included in the record? Without

objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the binders of exhibits be included

in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that Representative Delahunt, who

is not a member of the committee, as I indicated before, be permitted to participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered.

Just a couple of brief observations before I yield to my colleagues.

One is that, as I indicated, this is a continuation of a variety of

hearings that we’ve had here. We were also in Boston a couple of

2

months ago for the purposes of deposing witnesses. All of this relates to the long and unjust imprisonment of Joseph Salvati and

others surrounding the murder of Teddy Deegan.

During the course of our investigation, we have discovered information that has led the Chair and committee to believe that the

Federal Bureau of Investigation, while a wonderful and honorable

institution in our country, engaged in behavior in New England in

the 1960’s and 1970’s of which no one should be proud.

The purpose of these hearings is not to embarrass anyone. The

purpose of these hearings is to get to the truth, and, as this committee is engaged in oversight responsibilities, to determine whether or not there are additional legislative items that are needed to

be addressed in this or future Congresses to make sure that what

happened in New England does not occur again.

A couple sort of procedural notes.

The rules of the committee, since most of you probably don’t attend committee hearings on a regular basis—and why would

you?—the rules of the committee indicate that, as far as the questioning of witnesses is concerned, all witnesses that come before

the committee are sworn.

Second, the time is then divided between the majority and minority party. Even though I happen to be in the minority this morning,

I am a Member of the majority party. We will assign half-hour

rounds to each party.

At the conclusion of that, we have in our possession a prosecution memo prepared in the Patriarca prosecution by people not

here today. It is the committee’s desire to question Mr. Zalkind

about the contents of that prosecution memo.

It has been the subject of sort of an ongoing discussion between

committee counsel and the Department of Justice; and it’s my opinion, as well as I think the opinion of Chairman Burton and others

on the committee, that there is nothing contained in this memorandum that even comes close to talking about national security, or by

which national security would be compromised.

However, the administration has taken the view that this internal Justice Department document is privileged. As a matter of fact,

President Bush, much to my dismay, asked this of the Attorney

General, and the Department of Justice has caused it to be the

subject of executive privilege.

Because of that claim, with which I disagree, we will at the conclusion of the first round of questioning close the hearing for a brief

period of time and conduct a hearing in executive session while we

talk to Mr. Zalkind about the prosecution memo.

That is not something that we think is necessarily a good idea,

but it is the agreement we had with the Department of Justice; and

failing that agreement, we would not have the opportunity to ask

this very important witness about this very important document.

With that, it is my pleasure to yield to Mr. Tierney from Massachusetts. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’m going to be brief, only because I’ve been through a number

of hearings and have had an opportunity to open on many occasions.

3

The purpose of these hearings, at least in part, is to determine

what further oversight is necessary with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, particularly with respect to their use of confidential informants or, as we suspect here, misuse of confidential informants,

and the lack of transparency enabling a proper amount of oversight.

Just a brief word on the behavior of the administration here.

Once again, we find a claimed need for secrecy with respect to

documents that nobody on this committee believes warrant that

type of treatment.

Since September 11th, this is an administration that has sought

increasingly to give more and more power to investigative and

prosecutorial bodies; and yet we find their desire for secrecy more

and more troubling.

If we’re going to expand power, I think we need to have better

oversight and more transparency, at least between the body that

does the oversight and the agencies that are involved.

That’s a matter for another day. But I’m glad to note that both

parties, minority and majority, are concerned about it; and it’s an

ongoing controversy that we’ll continue to address here and back

in Washington.

But for the purposes of these hearings, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from these witnesses so that we can continue in

our efforts to make some determination as to what the best way

is for us to deal with the improprieties which have occurred, which

seem unfortunately to run broadly and to run deep.

So I thank you for coming up here this morning and conducting

these hearings, and look forward to the testimony of the witnesses.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning; and I want to join my colleagues in thanking you

for your good work, and also Chairman Burton. I state the obvious

when I say we do have our differences at times, but I have nothing

but admiration and commendation for the work handled by the

Chair, and also the subcommittee Chair, in this matter.

First and foremost, I would like to just say that we are after the

truth in these hearings. We’re after whatever justice can be provided to the families that have been so hurt by this, for the lives

and the years that have been stolen by misconduct of the FBI.

Today’s hearing focuses on the next step in this ongoing investigation to clarify the circumstances around the wrongful prosecution of Mr. Salvati and Mr. Limone, and others, for the murder of

Teddy Deegan.

I’m new to this committee, and I’m obviously the caboose on this

train; but I must say that Mr. LaTourette and Mr. Delahunt and

Mr. Tierney and Mr. Wilson have put in many, many hours and

many days and weeks in this investigation, and I’m in a role of just

lending support to their efforts, their good work.

I must, however, say that this is the most distressing thing that

I have seen since I have come to the Congress.

Sitting in these hearings, and hearing the testimony of current

Federal officials and FBI personnel, both current and retired, this

4

is most heart-wrenching; and I am just heartsick over the loss to

the families that have been affected here.

And I think it is our remaining duty, if we cannot find full justice

for the families that have been damaged here, that we have to first

of all make sure that this never happens again, and that those at

fault must be brought to justice.

That will be very difficult; but I think if we are truly to fulfill

our responsibilities to protect those rights guaranteed under the

Constitution, then we must do so. I think it is inappropriate, at the

least, for a thinly veiled defense of executive privilege to be asserted in this case.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen F. Lynch follows:]

5

6

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Lynch.

Also, I see that Congressman Frank of Massachusetts has joined

us; and as we did with respect to Mr. Delahunt, I would make the

same unanimous request that Congressman Frank, a Member of

the Massachusetts delegation, be permitted to participate in today’s

hearing. Without objection, so ordered.

In introducing Mr. Delahunt, I want to note, I made a wisecrack

about being in the majority party, but being in the minority today.

In this particular endeavor, the investigation of the allegations

of law-enforcement misconduct in New England, those of you from

the New England area can be more than proud of your congressional delegation in the House of Representatives.

Despite their committee assignments, and despite the fact that

they may be busy with other things, all of them, to a man—we

don’t have any women—all of them, to a man, have dropped what

they were working on to make sure that this received the full consideration of the Congress; and I give them great credit.

And now it’s my privilege to yield to Mr. Delahunt for anything

he might want to say.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I’ll be very brief, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just say, while we’re passing out kudos here, that your

effort and your work and your commitment to this exercise has

been extraordinary, Congressman LaTourette.

You deserve much credit; as does counsel, Chief Counsel Jim

Wilson, who’s sitting to my right; as well as Mike Yeager, who is

chief counsel for the minority side.

These hearings have gone on for some time now. They have been

very exhaustive and intensive, and they have been very informative.

I think it’s appropriate for me to note today that in our presence

we have with us two of the individuals whose names have been

mentioned quite frequently during the course of these hearings;

and they are Mr. Joseph Salvati and Mr. Peter Limone.

I don’t think it’s necessary to go into the history of the Deegan

case. Many of us are aware of it; and there’s a growing understanding by the public, not just here but I think all over the United

States, that certainly justice was not done in their case.

But just to pick up on something that Congressman Lynch said,

it is absolutely essential in a healthy democracy to have a justice

system that has the confidence of the American people, of the public; and that’s what we’re here about, to restore that confidence.

There is a key issue that we’re looking into; whether law-enforcement officials should have known that certain individuals went to

trial and were not provided what clearly was exculpatory information, and that at the same time certain confidential informants

were developed. Their conduct was ignored; even protected.

By that I mean that there will be testimony entered into the

record today that will establish that the very top of the FBI was

aware that in the case of one of these confidential informants there

was a likelihood that he would commit murder in the future; and

yet they believed that the so-called benefit to the FBI and law enforcement outweighed that risk.

I think it’s fair to say that we all find that totally unacceptable.

Not only were innocent people convicted, but the public was put at

7

risk; and in fact innocent people died as a result of the development, or rather the ignoring, of a certain confidential informant.

With that, I yield back to the Chair.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. Frank, any opening remarks you would like to make?

Mr. FRANK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very pleased to be here, although as a general rule staying

out of courtrooms is a principle that many people in my profession

strive to achieve. I appreciate the opportunity to be available.

Being in a courtroom—or the courthouse, I guess—is a little more

familiar for my colleague. There are very few courthouses in this

area not named for one of his predecessors, so he gets to go to them

more often.

I am very grateful to the gentleman from Ohio who is presiding

today, to the chairman of the full committee, and to the gentleman

from Indiana for his willingness to take on a task that many would

shy away from; and that is—and I can’t think of any task more important—trying to make sure that law-enforcement people, whom

we necessarily trust with enormous power over our lives, discharge

those powers responsibly.

Last fall, Congress significantly increased the ability of the FBI

and other law-enforcement agencies at the Federal level to pierce

the veil of privacy that most people would prefer to have. We greatly enhanced law enforcement’s powers.

Some of us were torn at the time. We understood the need to enhance law enforcement’s ability to protect us from a new type of

criminal, even unfortunately suicidal criminals who elected to do

great damage; but we were worried about safeguards.

What is essential is for us to show that when we give law-enforcement agencies that power, we can exercise oversight to minimize abuse of that power; and that’s why these hearings are so important.

What has come forth through Judge Wolf as well as through

these hearings and elsewhere is a pattern of abuse of law-enforcement powers that is so shocking that many of us, had we been confronted with these facts in the absence of the evidence, would not

only have denied them but would have chided those who brought

them forward with being obsessed with imagined conspiracy.

This is one of the worst examples of the failure of people to do

their duty that I’ve ever seen with regard to the FBI.

While we have no reason to think that these abuses are ongoing,

I am still disappointed that I have not seen in the FBI, or in the

people who supervise it in the Justice Department—and this is bipartisan; it was true in the previous administration, and it’s true

in the current one—I haven’t seen the kind of zeal to penalize people who abuse power that the public is entitled to see. Only when

there is a zeal to penalize the abuse of power will people be confident in granting more and more power.

We still have the situation of Wen Ho Lee, where it was acknowledged that an FBI agent gave a judge false information; and on the

basis of that false information, a man was shackled and put in solitary confinement for a year.

The FBI acknowledged—this is in the previous administration—

that the FBI had given false information.

8

I don’t know whether someone was lying, or if someone lied to

the agent. We don’t know where it came from. But the FBI has

done nothing to tell us what has happened, or to penalize anybody

for the fact that a man was put in these very, very restrictive conditions, which a judge said were based on false information. We

have this ongoing outrageous situation.

Unfortunately, many of my colleagues are intimidated against

looking into this; and so I’m especially grateful to the leadership

of the Committee on Government Affairs, and grateful to them for

coming here.

I also want to acknowledge my colleague Congressman Delahunt,

whose considerable experience has been an especially important

asset in our trying to deal with this. He went through some of this.

He’s in the position of being able to say ‘‘I told you so’’ with regard

to some of these specifics; and I am very grateful, as I said, because

I cannot think of a more important job than for us to show that

we are capable of dealing with abuse.

If we cannot deal with abuse of law-enforcement powers, we’re

not going to be able as a society to give law enforcement the power

it ought to have to protect us.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Frank.

The first panelist this morning is Mr. Jack Zalkind, who was the

prosecutor in the Deegan case representing the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office.

Mr. Zalkind, it is the custom of this committee for all witnesses

to be sworn.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, sir.

At this time, Mr. Zalkind, if there are any opening remarks that

you would like to make to us, we would be happy to receive them.

STATEMENT OF JACK ZALKIND, ESQ.

Mr. ZALKIND. I’ll wait until the end, if you don’t mind.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Very good.

That being the case, under the rules of the committee, we will

now engage in half-hour rounds among the parties. As I’ve indicated to my friends on the Democratic side, since there are four

times as many of them as on our side, we’ll be willing to enlarge

that particular time.

Mr. Zalkind, if you could, just for the purposes of the record

we’re creating today, could you give us a little bit of your professional history?

Mr. ZALKIND. I graduated from Boston University Law School in

1961. That year, I was active in Senator Edward M. Kennedy’s first

campaign for the Senate.

I had originally come from Bridgeport and planned to go back to

Bridgeport; but when Senator Kennedy was elected to the Senate,

I was fortunate enough to be nominated as an Assistant District

Attorney for Suffolk County.

I held onto that position until 1971; but I must add that during

those 10 years the position of an Assistant District Attorney was

part-time. It did not become full-time until Mr. Delahunt’s movement to make it full-time.

9

I left the office in 1971, and I have been in private practice as

a defense attorney and a litigator since then.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much.

The reference to the change made by Mr. Delahunt by legislation

from part-time to full-time, is there some significance to that, other

than the hours, in terms of how you would approach or handle a

case, or how cases were delivered to you?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Can you just describe what that was?

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, for example, when this case was being

brought forth in 1967, most of the prosecutors had been there for

10 or 15 years. They couldn’t practice criminal law; but they practiced probate, they did a lot of tort work, and they had their own

practices.

Because I was sort of young, and because I wasn’t married at the

time, I didn’t have much of an outside practice. I had a lot of time;

and I think that I could give time to a case. For most of the other

prosecutors, that wasn’t the case.

One Assistant District Attorney brought the case in front of the

grand jury, and the next thing the prosecutor did was, he had a

case, and he said, go ahead and try it. So he had nothing to do with

the original investigation, and he was as blind as could be.

I think that situation has changed also. Today, most of the prosecutors bring their own cases before the grand jury.

Indeed, through the efforts of former Attorney General Bellotti

and of Mr. Delahunt, prosecutors now start the investigations

themselves, so that they know where the case is coming from.

In this particular case that I was involved with, I had prosecuted—well, I think I’ve answered the question as far as why I

think that part-timers are wrong.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Prior to the Deegan case, had you handled a

capital-murder case?

Mr. ZALKIND. I think this was the first murder case that I had

ever handled.

Mr. LATOURETTE. So I assume you didn’t present the testimony,

if I understood your answer to the previous question, to the grand

jury?

Mr. ZALKIND. I did.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You did?

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, why that was unusual was this: I had originally prosecuted Joe Barboza back in 1964 or 1965 for some misdemeanor. He was found guilty; and after he was let out of jail, I

prosecuted him again under some gun-carrying charges while there

was still an outstanding charge for an attempted murder.

I got a conviction against him on the gun charge, and he was

sent to Walpole. There was still an outstanding felony; and during

that year—I think it was 1967—a Supreme Court decision came

down that said that the habitual-criminal statute was constitutional, so that in Massachusetts, if a defendant was sent to Walpole

for a third time, he would then receive the maximum sentence.

So I asked the District Attorney if we could take a chance—we

had never done that before—and I brought an indictment against

Barboza for habitual criminal.

10

Mr. LATOURETTE. And how much time would Mr. Barboza potentially face to——

Mr. ZALKIND. I think it was 84 years.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And was it about that time, down in Walpole,

that he was visited by Mr. Rico and/or Mr. Condon?

Mr. ZALKIND. What happened was, I had heard scuttlebutt that

Joe Barboza had become an informer.

I wasn’t assigned to the original case. The original case was assigned to Assistant District Attorney John Pena, who became a

Municipal Court judge. He prosecuted that first case, and they lost

that case.

He then became a witness in the case against Raymond

Patriarca down in Rhode Island, and that was prosecuted by Mr.

Harrington.

Again, I wasn’t very much involved with that. I never liked Joe

Barboza; I never trusted him.

Well, they won that case in Rhode Island; and then Mr. Byrne

asked me—I won’t say asked me—told me that Barboza had another case. He mentioned the facts of this Deegan case, and they

thought that I would be the guy that could handle it, for many reasons.

I was hesitant to do it, because I knew Barboza. I never trusted

him. I said that I would take it under the conditions—and I’m not

trying to make myself a big shot; obviously I was only a young guy,

but I just knew I was trying to protect myself—I said I would take

the case, but I did not want to talk to Barboza until such time as

he appeared before the grand jury under oath.

So the next time I saw Barboza, he was in front of the grand jury

and testified under oath. So I took a lot of precautions. That was

unusual in those days. Most of the time the prosecutions were presented by, I think in those days it was a fellow by the name of

Ralph Bernard. So this was a little unusual.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think in some of the records we have it indicates that your first contact was in September 1967. Does that

sound about right, in terms of when he appeared in front of the

grand jury?

Mr. ZALKIND. That sounds right, yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Going back to, then, the prior contacts, before

you actually met him at the grand jury as he gave testimony leading to the indictments in the Deegan murder case, did you receive

documents from the FBI concerning their contacts with him?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. During the course of the Deegan trial, Special

Agent Condon testified that they had met with Mr. Barboza nine

times between the time when he originally indicated he would cooperate and when you eventually met him at the grand jury.

We have today documents that were prepared contemporaneously with those meetings, that describe the sum and the substance of those. Were those items ever shared with you?

Mr. ZALKIND. I’ve seen them now; but in those years I never saw

any FBI reports, nor did I speak to Condon about the substance of

the Deegan case.

11

I did speak to him about what kind of a witness Barboza would

make, because he had seen him testify in the Patriarca case; but

more than that, we had not much contact.

Mr. LATOURETTE. If you weren’t made aware of the substance of

the conversations, were you made aware of the fact that he was receiving things from the FBI in return for his cooperation?

Mr. ZALKIND. The only thing that I was made aware of was that

he was put into the Witness Protection Program, and that his wife

was being protected, and that he was being kept in an area off in

Gloucester.

But as far as receiving money or anything like that, I have no

memory now if I was told anything like that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Your understanding of what the Witness Protection Program would have been was that he would have received

a new identity and a new location; you don’t know anything about

money, and you don’t know anything about potential employment?

Mr. ZALKIND. I may have known then, Mr. Chairman, but I certainly don’t remember them now.

Mr. LATOURETTE. OK.

As an old prosecutor, let me ask you this. When you showed up

at the grand jury, and this was your first new contact in the

Deegan case, how did you know what to ask him?

Mr. ZALKIND. I had a booklet prepared. The prosecution had

given me a booklet of the events that transpired. It was a summation of the various factors. I started right off by reading questions,

etc., and went sort of right through the script.

Mr. LATOURETTE. When you say the prosecution, who prepared

that document?

Mr. ZALKIND. That was prepared by, probably, John Doyle and

Sergeant Frank Walsh.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Aside from handing you a script from which to

read at the grand jury when Mr. Barboza testified, was it your understanding that they had had contact with his FBI handlers in

preparing that?

Mr. ZALKIND. Oh, yes. I saw them in the office; of course.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you ever talk to Doyle or Walsh about

their contacts, how’s the star witness coming, what’s Barboza up to,

anything like that? Was there any office talk about this prior to

your—— Mr. ZALKIND. I think I only became interested—I told you I

didn’t like him.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. ZALKIND. And even when we had this prosecution going on

in our own office, I never watched any of the trial. I just wasn’t

interested in it until I became involved with this, with my own

case. But then I did talk to him; of course.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I wrote down, as you were talking before, two

phrases—‘‘never liked him, never trusted him’’—in reference to

your feelings about Barboza; and I guess that means that probably

some of the seminal questions that bother members of the committee—if you never liked him and you never trusted him, it’s our understanding that this case was based solely upon his testimony.

Mr. ZALKIND. No, that’s not true.

Mr. LATOURETTE. What else was it based on?

12

Mr. ZALKIND. There was a lot of corroboration of his testimony;

for example, the autopsy report. Barboza told us that there were

three guys involved with the shooting; and sure enough, there were

three different types of bullets that were found in the body.

Barboza told us that Roy French cooperated with him in setting

this up in this alleyway; that was corroborated.

He said that while he was sitting in a car, a policeman passed

in front of him and noticed the bent plates. Well, we had that Captain Barslowski, I think his name was, who testified that, yes, indeed, he did see this license plate, he did see it bent; he described

the men that were in the car, and he described them almost exactly

the way Barboza had told us. There was a lot of corroboration.

There was another witness, Anthony Stathopoulos, who became

a government witness; and he testified that he had meetings with

Barboza and French where this thing was set up, etc.

So there was a lot of corroboration.

Mr. LATOURETTE. But again, I think you hit the nail on the head

when you said there was a lot of corroboration of Mr. Barboza’s

statements.

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. In other words, again, to me, Mr. Barboza’s

testimony could lead in two directions. One, it was absolutely true,

he was there; and the reason the story was so accurate is that he

was a participant, which we now know today he was.

So again, the question is, as a prosecutor, based upon the level

of corroboration of his testimony, despite the fact that you didn’t

trust him, didn’t like him, you felt comfortable that he had gone

on the straight and narrow at least relative to this——

Mr. ZALKIND. No, I never said that he had gone on the straight

and narrow; never.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You never did; but the truth of the

testimony——

Mr. ZALKIND. When I put this case in to the grand jury—and it

was really, really voluminous—then I spent, Mr. Chairman, the

next 6 months speaking with him at least four or five times a

week, with a detective with me at all times, going through every

phase of the case.

And I told him over and over again, if I ever find out that you

put someone here that doesn’t belong here, or you left someone out,

that’s perjury in a murder case; and I’ll put you in. I mean, I made

it so clear. I thought that I had done everything that was humanly

possible to keep the story straight.

Mr. LATOURETTE. We know today that the story wasn’t straight,

obviously; and we know it through documents that we’ve obtained

from the FBI.

Mr. ZALKIND. I agree with you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And the question is, first of all, out of six individuals who were charged in the Deegan murder, Jimmy Flemmi

was not one of them?

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

13

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think the committee has provided you with

an exhibit book. Exhibits 4, 5 and 8, for instance, all indicate that

it was pretty common knowledge in the New England underworld

that Jimmy Flemmi very much wanted to kill Teddy Deegan. Was

any of that information—— [Exhibits 4, 5 and 8 follow:]

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

Mr. ZALKIND. Let me interrupt you, Mr. Chairman. Let me say

this.

I was not from Boston. I had not been involved in organized

crime. Jimmy Flemmi, before or after this case, didn’t mean very

much to me at all; and perhaps I was naive in that respect.

I did see the documents that were shown to me; and I must tell

you this, that I was outraged—outraged—at the fact that if they

had ever been shown to me, we wouldn’t be sitting here, because,

I wasn’t the person that made the decisions, but I certainly would

never have allowed myself to prosecute this case having that

knowledge. No way.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Which brings me to another document; and I

might ask counsel to give me a hand with what the exhibit number

is, but it’s the Chelsea Police Department report.

Mr. ZALKIND. I’m familiar with it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Again, we have some conflicting information.

That’s exhibit No. 12, I’ve been told; that is the Chelsea Police Department police report.

Again, the way I’m familiar with things is, when you’re prosecuting a case, they give you a police report, there’s some followup investigation, you go to the grand jury, and you move forward.

I think pretty clearly the Chelsea Police Department report indicates that, first of all, Mr. Barboza was a participant in it, and his

testimony at trial was not truthful.

When was the first time you saw the Chelsea Police Department

report?

[Exhibit 12 follows:]

22

23

24

25

Mr. ZALKIND. I submitted an affidavit on that. It begins this way.

Victor Garo, who was the attorney for Joseph Salvati, whom I

had known before, and on whose behalf I had sent letters for commutation for many of these men, had shown me this report. I

looked at it, and I saw that most of the report looked very, very

familiar to me. It seemed like it was material that I knew.

There was a certain portion of the report in the back that indicated that certain men were seen leaving the Ebb Tide, certain

men were seen not leaving the Ebb Tide; and as soon as I got that

report, I sent a letter—I’m sorry; I called up the District Attorney’s

office. I believe that would have been in February 1993.

I spoke to the First Assistant, Mr. Gittens. That office, by the

way, had just come in. Newman Flanagan had left office, and there

was a new District Attorney. I asked him if I could come up and

see my old file; that there was something in there that I wanted

to look at.

I never received an answer from him. I sent a followup letter; I

never received an answer from him.

I think I provided your committee with copies of all of these letters. My first letter was sent on March 16; I sent another letter October 20, and another letter on October 27.

To this day—despite, I know, the fact that my colleague

McDonough says he remembers seeing them in the file—I must tell

you that I have no memory of seeing that report in the file.

Just one step further.

As I said in the affidavit that I submitted at the time, if I had

had the file, I thought that I might go further. I didn’t consider it

exculpatory evidence in the respect that the evidence at the trial

did not indicate that Mr. Salvati left the Ebb Tide with Joe

Barboza.

According to Barboza’s testimony, he was in the parking lot, and

when they came back, the evidence didn’t indicate that Mr. Salvati

came back with him. He was allegedly disposing of some guns.

I never paid much attention to that report; it didn’t mean that

much to me. But that’s my position.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think the Chelsea Police Department report,

together with information developed contemporaneously with the

murder of Teddy Deegan by the FBI and observations of statements that Mr. Salvati and others eventually convicted were not

involved and it was Barboza and Flemmi, and as a result of some

listening equipment, that Mr. Barboza and Mr. Flemmi went down

and asked permission to kill Teddy Deegan; when combined with

the Chelsea Police Department report, obviously today we have a

picture where—— Mr. ZALKIND. Absolutely, sir, absolutely.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And so you have no quibbling at all that if that

information had been made available to you by the FBI or the

Chelsea Police Department, you would not have been in the situation that you found yourself in now?

Mr. ZALKIND. We wouldn’t be sitting here today, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. From an oversight standpoint, I understand

that one fix that you think is a good one was Mr. Delahunt’s legislation going from part-time to full-time; but what else went wrong

here? We can leap to one conclusion.

26

Mr. ZALKIND. I’ll tell you what went wrong, and I think it’s a

very important factor.

In those days, the discovery process for a defendant was practically nil. In this case here, the defense attorneys never received

the grand-jury minutes; they never received any reports by witnesses; they never received a list of the witnesses that were going

to appear. That was the way the law was written. They received

practically no discovery.

Under today’s evidentiary rules, both in the state court and even

in the Federal court, they would have received the grand-jury minutes; they would have received any statements that were adopted

by witnesses; they would have received the list of witnesses.

I mean, my God, when lawyers went into court those days, they

had no idea who they were going to face. They would ask me at

the beginning of the day, you know, who’s our witnesses? And if

I felt it was OK, I would give them the names of the witnesses.

So they couldn’t do any background checks. It was really, really

hard to try a case.

But, the most important thing: I think that there should be a

rule of law that when a state prosecutes a case, or vice versa, and

a request is made by defense counsel, that all exculpatory evidence

in the possession of the prosecution should be given not only to the

local prosecution, but to any law-enforcement agency that is involved with the case.

If that had been the law in this case here, again, this case

wouldn’t have gone forward; because the evidence that you’ve seen

would have been presented as exculpatory evidence.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Let me ask you, in conjunction with that, we

know today about the promises of money, jobs and other things

that were made to Barboza; relocation, protection.

Was the status of the law such in 1967 as to indicate that if a

motion was made by defense counsel to reveal inducements, payments or other incentives reflecting a person’s reliability as a witness, could they have forced that from the prosecution?

Mr. ZALKIND. You know, I must tell you, Mr. Chairman, I really

think that they may have made such a motion. We had made no

promises to Barboza.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. ZALKIND. I now see that the FBI had made promises to him

that they would intercede on his behalf to get the District Attorney

to do things for him. Obviously that is the rule now.

Mr. LATOURETTE. That’s one of the things that concerns me. I

have no difficulty that the Suffolk County folks didn’t make any

promises to Mr. Barboza; I also have no problems understanding

that the Federal Government made a lot of promises to Mr.

Barboza.

The link in the chain that appears to be missing, and it’s something that I’ve seen a lot in law enforcement, is, I don’t have anything in my file; did you feel an obligation to those who took credit

for this prosecution?

Mr. Condon and Mr. Rico received raises; they received upgrades

in rank; they were commended by J. Edgar Hoover.

27

Did you feel an obligation to go to the people that had developed

Mr. Barboza’s testimony and say, I have been asked whether or not

we’ve given anything to Mr. Barboza; I haven’t, have you?

Mr. ZALKIND. If that had been part of a motion, I certainly would

have done it.

Mr. Chairman, in those days, you have to understand that the

FBI and local prosecution were far apart. This case sort of came

together because years ago Garrett Byrne prosecuted the famous

Brinks robbery after the Federal statute of limitations had run out;

so he had a pretty good relationship with the FBI.

We would never have thought of asking an FBI agent for his reports; it just wasn’t done. Now, today, it’s done as a matter of

course.

Mr. WILSON. It is?

Mr. ZALKIND. Every motion I file now, it will say from all lawenforcement officials, including the DEA, the FBI. I make a whole

list. Whether I get it or not is a different story; but it’s on the

record.

And another thing: What is considered exculpatory under Brady

today was not the law in 1968. It had just come into effect; and,

you know, the law of what’s exculpatory and what isn’t has

changed through the historical works.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I understand that. But I do think that even

under the old standard of Brady, that’s now developed over the last

40 years, information from witnesses that say that people other

than those being charged with the murder committed the murder

probably fell under the category of exculpatory——

Mr. ZALKIND. I agree with you 100 percent. My only problem is

that Chelsea report has always bothered me; I just don’t know

where that fits. But the FBI statements, certainly, yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I’m going to close.

Just before I yield to Mr. Tierney, I want to be clear about this

Jimmy Flemmi business. You say you weren’t from New England;

and so, when did the name Jimmy Flemmi ever mean anything to

you?

Mr. ZALKIND. Ah. In 1970, I was asked to prosecute Jimmy

Flemmi. That was 2 years after this case.

Flemmi had allegedly beat up someone, or tried to extort him;

and the government had a tape. Again, I didn’t put the case in to

the grand jury; someone else did.

They said, here’s the case, and you’ve got a cinch case. Here’s a

tape that the victim made of Jimmy Flemmi shaking him down.

So I put on the case—he was represented by Joe Balliro, as a

matter of fact—I put on the case; and during the case said that this

guy’s a good friend of Joseph Barboza. And I certainly noticed he

was bald, something like the guy sitting in the back seat.

And a strange thing happened in that case. Now that I realize

it, what happened was, after I played my tape showing that he had

tried to extort this guy, in defense they come up with a tape, and

the tape was a tape that Flemmi made saying, you know, I wasn’t

really serious about hurting you the other day, etc.

So in my mind, in those days, I thought, goodness, someone must

have tipped him off that they were making a tape.

28

Well, I can see today that if the FBI was using him as an informer, and the word got back to him that we had tapes, I guess

that’s what happened.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you ever aware or has anyone told you

that the FBI had information that the Deegan murder had been

sanctioned by Raymond Patriarca?

Did you learn that either before——

Mr. ZALKIND. I did not learn that until I watched this committee’s hearing on closed-circuit TV, when Judge Harrington testified

before your committee.

Mr. LATOURETTE. It’s my pleasure now to yield half an hour to

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t intend to use the

half-hour by myself. I’d like to make sure that my colleagues all

get a fair amount of time here, so I’m going to try to be brief and

then pass it along.

Let me just ask you, sir, were you at the time of this prosecution

on the Deegan case privy to a March 15, 1965 memo from FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. You never saw that at all?

Mr. ZALKIND. Never. I’ve seen it recently.

Mr. TIERNEY. And that goes back to your testimony that you

didn’t see it because not all of the different law-enforcement agencies made materials available?

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Were you privy to the 1965 memo from the FBI

Special Office to the Deputy Director?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Same reason?

Mr. ZALKIND. Same reason.

Mr. TIERNEY. You made mention a little bit earlier that you had

later an opportunity to send letters recommending commutation on

behalf of some of these gentlemen. Would you tell me how that circumstance arose?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes. The lawyers called me. I don’t remember who

it was at first; but Victor Garo, who is sitting here now, after I became a defense attorney, we tried a case together, and he said to

me that he was representing Joe Salvati; he was doing well in prison, etc. We had a long talk.

I said to him, you know, honestly, in those days, if these guys

had ever asked me and the plea was second degree, we would have

taken it in 15 seconds; because, you know, to get to first was sort

of a price.

In any event, I said, based upon what I know about the case, no

one ever made any threats to me during the trial. Everyone behaved like a gentleman. They had done their time.

And I said, I agree; I think that if they can get a commutation

to second degree, it wouldn’t bother me one bit. And so I wrote letters on all their behalfs, as far back I think as 1975. I’m not sure

of the date, but I did.

Mr. TIERNEY. In relation to that, have you ever been contacted

by anybody from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the U.S.

29

Attorney’s Office to discuss your role in that commutation proceeding?

Mr. ZALKIND. No. No one ever told me not to. No one ever told

me that it was the wrong thing to do; and if they had, I would have

told them they were wrong.

Mr. TIERNEY. Just to followup on the chairman’s questions to you

about where do we go from here, what comments might you have

to make concerning law enforcement’s use of confidential informants, and how they use that process? How can we be sure as we

go forward that we don’t get the same kinds of abuses and problems that we see in this case?

Mr. ZALKIND. I certainly can’t believe that the FBI or anybody

should sanction informers committing crimes that are not told to

the prosecution.

In other words, if they’re left to their own ways, and you can deal

with drugs and you can deal with B&Es, but you can’t deal with

murders, that’s an outrageous situation.

I understand, they can’t be foolish; they have to integrate, and

they have to put on this facade of crimes. But I think the FBI’s got

to know exactly what’s going on in their lives.

Second, and I think even more importantly, the FBI or law-enforcement agents should not keep informants’ identities away from

the Attorney General’s office or the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

In other words, if there’s an informer, then the prosecution has

got to know about it. It can’t be kept separate. There’s got to be

some balance.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

What I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to allow my colleagues

to question. I’d like to ask Mr. Lynch if he would use 7 minutes,

and then seven for each. Then if there are any left, we’ll go back

and utilize that; give everybody an opportunity here.

Mr. LATOURETTE. As I said, I’m more than happy to enlarge the

time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Zalkind. Actually, I’m pleased that

you also saw the tape of the testimony from Judge Harrington before this committee.

For me, this case boils down to a certain framework of events

and facts that really illustrate the wrong that was done here.

In terms of your own knowledge—and I appreciate your coming

before the committee, and being so helpful—did you have any

knowledge of the fact that the Organized Crime Strike Force had

put a surveillance device—a so-called bug, as Mr. Harrington described at the hearing—in the offices, I think it was on Hanover

Street, in the North End? Did you have any knowledge about those

activities?

Mr. ZALKIND. No. I think that bug was in Providence, wasn’t it?

Mr. LYNCH. I’m sorry?

Mr. ZALKIND. The Harrington bug was in Providence, Rhode Island, at Patriarca’s office.

Mr. LYNCH. OK.

Mr. ZALKIND. But I had no knowledge of that. No, no; none whatsoever.

Mr. LYNCH. All right.

30

Did you have any knowledge at all of the fact that Mr. Flemmi

had asked Mr. Patriarca, apparently in Providence if you’re correct,

for permission to kill Teddy Deegan?

Mr. ZALKIND. Absolutely no knowledge of that.

Mr. LYNCH. And can you just share with the committee any, as

you’ve described it, scuttlebutt, or any knowledge at all around the

time of the Deegan murder, the fact that Mr. Barboza or others

had actually been the ones that provided information that led to

the prosecution of Mr. Limone and Mr. Salvati for that crime?

Mr. ZALKIND. I don’t understand what you mean by scuttlebutt.

Mr. LYNCH. Well, if you don’t have direct knowledge, you did indicate that there were discussions within prosecutorial circles

around what was being said about the individuals involved in this

case.

Mr. ZALKIND. It was years later that things came to me. I spoke

to Joe Balliro, and Joe Balliro told me as recently as a couple of

years ago that if this privilege were lifted, he could tell a story that

he had heard from Jimmy Flemmi when he represented him in

that 1970 case.

And then, even as early as 1970, I heard a lot of scuttlebutt that

Jimmy Flemmi was Barboza’s real close man, and probably—probably—Jimmy had something to do with the Deegan case; but, you

know, who knew? This was 3 years later.

Mr. LYNCH. I understand.

Mr. ZALKIND. At the time, I would think that no one in their

right mind would give any information to me, the prosecutor, because I think I had a reputation of being a tough guy and a very

honest guy; and if anyone ever leaked anything to me that would

throw this case off, I’d really explore it.

But as I said, when I said I didn’t trust Barboza, I did everything

humanly possible to check out his story. I mean, even when it came

to Joe Salvati, I asked him, how was this guy involved? He’s not

a member of so-called organized crime. And his answer to me was

that he was a good friend of Ron Cassesso, and that Ronny wanted

a man.

He just passed it off so lightly, and I couldn’t find anything that

indicated that Joe Salvati wasn’t there.

But I worked on that continuously; and I must tell you that up

until the day the jury came back, I had no information that would

have alerted me that there was something left out.

Mr. LYNCH. In my closing remarks—and maybe we can come

back to this later; I don’t want to take up all the time—but in the

time after the wrongful prosecution of Mr. Salvati for the Deegan

murder, there was a great body of knowledge that came out after

that, where slowly people became aware of certain facts that would

serve to exonerate Mr. Salvati.

Was there any movement among any of the offices that you dealt

with to go back and question the premise under which Mr. Barboza

and others pointed to Mr. Salvati and others in the wrongful prosecution?

Mr. ZALKIND. After the prosecution, it must have been about 2

years later, Joe Barboza—this is what I was anticipating—Joe

Barboza met with F. Lee Bailey someplace in the woods and said

that his whole story was a lie, and he wanted to make amends, etc.

31

Of course we investigated that. We had a hearing; and then as

soon as we came forth for a hearing, Barboza said, nah, I was just

kidding around with Bailey; I just wanted to shake him down for

some money.

But we investigated it again, and we still couldn’t find anything

really wrong with the story.

There was another incident where Stathopoulos and another witness started to recant on his testimony. We investigated—not we;

by 1971 I was out of the office—they investigated that end of the

story. It led to a dead end.

There were motions for a new trial by Cassesso, which were denied. There was a motion for a new trial by Mr. Salvati, which was

denied.

And so there was always this stuff going on. I wasn’t involved

with it by that time; I was out of the office.

And I must say that in 1993, when I did send a letter or when

I received this statement allegedly by the Chelsea police and I did

contact the District Attorney’s office, I really didn’t get much cooperation.

I don’t say it was intentional; it may very well be that they

couldn’t find the file. It was a new office, you know.

But I think that if I had seen the file in those years in 1993, and

if indeed that was there, maybe this process could have been shortened. I don’t know.

Mr. LYNCH. I appreciate your coming before the committee.

Thank you, Mr. Zalkind.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Zalkind, I think you’ve laid out the changes

in terms of the relationship between the prosecutor and the investigator after State District Attorneys’ offices became full-time. I

think that response was ample and adequate.

Going back to the prosecution in the Deegan case, would you describe for the committee the members, if you will, of the team? I

think I heard you say that you saw FBI agents in the office.

Mr. ZALKIND. They weren’t part of my team. They were there for

another reason.

At the time, one of the witnesses, John Fitzgerald, had had his

leg blown off, and they were involved with finding a place to store

him, to keep him safe. They were there involved with Barboza’s

safety.

Obviously there was all kinds of talk with law enforcement in my

office; but really, other than time of the day, how’s it going and so

forth, I was busy. I would not consider—— Mr. DELAHUNT. You had a private practice during this time,

also?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes; but as I told the Members before, I had put

it to one side at that time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right.

Mr. ZALKIND. This was a full-time job.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But in terms of preparing the case for presentation, it was Mr. McDonough that you would work with?

Mr. ZALKIND. Mr. McDonough worked with me in the respect

that—I don’t think I ever had him with me when I questioned witVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:56 Mar 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\84604.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
32

nesses. I think what he did mostly was prepare legal memoranda

for me.

Mr. DELAHUNT. He was the second seat at the prosecution, too?

Mr. ZALKIND. No. As I understand second seat, that’s someone

that helps you try the case. Mr. McDonough I don’t believe ever

questioned any witnesses.

Strategically, I would always bring in Larry Cameron or some

other assistant to sit next to me; because there were rumors that

during the course of the trial some harm was going to come to me.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And better to Cameron than to Zalkind?

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, I wanted the message to go out that if you

off Zalkind, people are going to know about it; and once in a while

Garo would sit down next to me and toss out ideas.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But the truth is, in terms of trial preparation, it

was more or less your exclusive domain; you had Mr. McDonough

doing the research in terms of issues of law. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. ZALKIND. I prepared the case. Once this case went to the

grand jury, the decisions were mine.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Did you ever have an occasion to discuss the

Chelsea police report with Mr. McDonough? Do you have any memory of having a conversation?

Mr. ZALKIND. I have no memory. I’m not saying I didn’t.

Mr. DELAHUNT. No; I understand.

Mr. ZALKIND. I have no memory.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In terms of the investigative team, who was running the investigation?

Mr. ZALKIND. John Doyle.

Mr. DELAHUNT. John Doyle, and he was a Boston police officer?

Mr. ZALKIND. He was a Boston police officer who had not obtained the rank of anything more than a patrolman; but because

of his ability, I guess—— Mr. DELAHUNT. Or his relationship with Mr. Byrne; right.

And were there any other Boston police officers involved?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes. There was Sergeant Frank Walsh; there was

Detective Eddie Walsh. I had 10 policemen involved with this case.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Were they assigned to the District Attorney’s office?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. They were assigned, so in effect they answered

to Garrett Byrne, then District Attorney in Suffolk County; is that

correct?

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And they worked with you.

Did you consider either Paul Rico or Dennis Condon as part of

the investigative effort in terms of the Deegan case?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But in fact, you would see them on occasion in

the courthouse building, in the District Attorney’s office?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But you never had a conversation with them regarding the case?

Mr. ZALKIND. I may have, but I don’t remember ever saying to

them, listen, is there something I should know about this case? I

33

would be embarrassed. These were FBI guys. My contact, if I had

to go outside my office, I would go to John Doyle. But that just

didn’t happen.

I mean, for example, on a hunch, I asked the Malden police to

see if there were any parking tickets that were ever issued to Louis

Greco; and lo and behold, I think there was a parking ticket we

found for Greco when he was supposedly in Florida, something like

that.

But we did nothing with the FBI that I can remember.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Actually, the crime was committed in Chelsea,

and for the benefit of those who are unaware, Chelsea is not part

of Boston; it’s a separate municipality?

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And the Chelsea police would then provide, presumably, their reports and their information to the Boston police

that were assigned to the District Attorney’s office?

Mr. ZALKIND. Through John Doyle.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So you wouldn’t interact necessarily with the

Chelsea police that were involved in the investigation? If you can

remember.

Mr. ZALKIND. Sure; I talked with them if I felt it necessary. You

have to understand how it went.

John Doyle was the chief of investigations, and he had this file;

he had everything. I don’t know what he had in his file. And he

would say, Jack, this is what I have, this is what I have, this is

what I have, this is what I have. I’m not saying he held anything

back, but I never looked into his file.

The file that I had myself was my trial notes; it was a trial preparation sheet. I don’t think I would allow any of the detectives to

look at that file.

But I would say that the main body of the preparation of this

case before I got it was in John Doyle’s hands.

Mr. DELAHUNT. There was a State Police report that was drafted

shortly after the Deegan murder. Do you have any memory of that

particular report? It was authored by a Lieutenant Cass; I believe

that’s the name.

Mr. ZALKIND. I have some vague memory of something like that,

but I have no memory what it was like or anything.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In that report, I should indicate, there was reference to Flemmi as being involved in the Deegan case.

Mr. ZALKIND. I have no memory of that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You have no memory?

Mr. ZALKIND. No memory.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Also, it’s somewhere in the book of exhibits, but

I don’t want to dwell on it; there was also a Boston Police Department report, and it was from the Intelligence Division, which also

implicated Flemmi in the Deegan murder.

Mr. ZALKIND. After the fact?

Mr. DELAHUNT. After the fact; but contemporaneously, shortly

after the fact. And you have no memory of that?

Mr. ZALKIND. I have no memory of that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And it could—I’m not saying it is—but that could

have been within, let’s call it the John Doyle file; but you had no

information?

34

Mr. ZALKIND. I have no memory now that I had that information.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Now that you’ve had an opportunity to review

the exhibit book that obviously has been developed by committee

staff and for the committee, there are numbers of exhibits there

that would implicate Jimmy Flemmi, the so-called ‘‘Bear,’’ as a

principal in the Deegan homicide.

Mr. ZALKIND. Congressman Delahunt, let me say this to you.

The information that Joe Barboza had told an FBI agent that he

would not implicate Jimmy Flemmi in a murder case is the most

exculpatory piece of evidence that anyone could have.

That information should have been in my hands. It should have

been in the hands of the defense attorneys. It is outrageous, it’s

terrible, and that trial shouldn’t have gone forward.

And I can’t make personal apologies; but I would say this, that

based on what I’ve seen, this is awful. And I feel terrible. I’ve lived

with this for a long time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We’ve known each other for a number of years,

and you know that I have great respect for you; and I’m glad you’ve

made that statement. I think we all can agree. I know the members of the committee agree with that.

I want to again, and I’ve done this before, on behalf of the people

of the Commonwealth apologize to these two gentlemen for having

served a sentence that never should have been imposed on them.

You came to this case 6 months after Barboza became a cooperating witness.

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So you never had any knowledge about Joe

Barboza, other than the fact that you had prosecuted him, cooperating with the government until some 6 months after he had

agreed?

Mr. ZALKIND. Oh; that’s correct.

I find out now that they had attempted to bring him into their

fold; but it was only when he was indicted as a habitual criminal

that I guess they were able to put the last nail in the keg.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you have any idea how Mr. Barboza was convinced, or who influenced him to cooperate with the government?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes. I would absolutely think it was Paul Rico and

Dennis Condon.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And now that you’re aware of, clearly, his relationship with Joseph Barboza——

Mr. ZALKIND. You mean with——

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. I mean with Vincent Flemmi, are

you aware of the fact that subsequent to the Deegan murder, despite all of the information regarding the involvement of Flemmi in

the Deegan murder, in fact the Federal Bureau of Investigation

conferred upon Jimmy Flemmi top-echelon status as an informant?

Are you aware of that?

Mr. ZALKIND. I’m aware of that now, yes; and——

Mr. DELAHUNT. Three months after the murder?

Mr. ZALKIND. After the murder.

And also, I’m not convinced; but I gave you the story, when I

prosecuted him in 1970 with that mysterious tape, I think then he

was cooperating with them.

35

And if he was cooperating with them then, then they knew that

he must have been involved with this murder; and even then,

didn’t they have an obligation to tell me that then? Didn’t they

have an obligation to tell me that, when all these motions for a

new trial were coming forward?

I mean, I don’t mean to be redundant—— Mr. DELAHUNT. I’m going to yield to my colleague on the Judiciary Committee; but after he concludes, I’m going to ask you to review exhibit 15 and exhibit 16, which provide some very recent information that I feel is rather disturbing, Mr. Zalkind.

Mr. Frank.

[Exhibits 15 and 16 follow:]

36

37

38

39

40

Mr. FRANK. Did they whack the budget so bad that they only

have one mic?

With respect to a general point, Mr. Zalkind, you’ve had experience as a prosecutor and a defense attorney; and I was particularly

struck when you noted that the state of the law is such today that,

while not impossible, it is less likely that an innocent person would

be falsely convicted, because we have changed the procedures so

that people on trial get a fairer shake, in the sense that material

is available to them. You mentioned the Brady material, discovery

rules, etc.

Obviously, there’s been a lot of controversy over some of the legal

changes; and we have people who say, well, you make it easier for

criminals to get off, you’re interfering with law enforcement in

doing their job.

I think it’s important to underline the point that you have made,

that what we have done in this past 35 years to some extent has

been to strengthen protections for innocent people, and make it less

likely that innocent people will be convicted, because you’ve given

them a fair shot.

Mr. ZALKIND. In one respect you’re right, Congressman Frank.

But on the other hand, Congress puts laws in hand that make

it difficult to defendants to proceed with a fair shake, and then

they come in with sentencing guidelines that are outrageous. The

sentencing guidelines are draconian.

So on one hand we give them a little bit more knowledge, a little

discovery; but now that you have the discovery, so what? We make

it harder for you to do sensible sentencing.

Mr. FRANK. I believe the sentencing guidelines are a grave error.

My sense of what you cite as an improvement came from the

courts; so the courts have made it fairer, but you think that the

political branches have restricted that fairness?

Mr. ZALKIND. Somewhat.

Mr. FRANK. But I do think that it’s important to understand that

some of the reforms that have come in that have been so harshly

criticized in fact have worked to make it less likely that people

would be unfairly treated.

Mr. ZALKIND. That is true.

Mr. FRANK. I was struck by your telling us several times that

you didn’t like Joe Barboza. Which ones of those guys didn’t you

like? I mean, you didn’t like Barboza——

Mr. ZALKIND. I had a deal——

Mr. FRANK. Were some people likable? Who did you want to hang

out with?

Well, let me ask you, more to the point, about the FBI. Clearly,

they withheld information about Barboza. This is obviously somewhat speculative; but we are here, obviously, without strict rules

of evidence. We’re trying to come to conclusions in a policy sense.

Do you think Barboza’s handlers at the FBI knew that Mr.

Salvati was innocent?

Mr. ZALKIND. I can’t answer that question.

Mr. FRANK. Do you think they became aware of it at some point?

Mr. ZALKIND. I think that they knew from the beginning that Joe

Barboza was lying, and that alone is enough to impede all——

41

Mr. FRANK. They knew that he was lying, and he was the

linchpin of the case?

Mr. ZALKIND. He was it. Without Joe Barboza there was no case.

Mr. FRANK. So they came before you and told you dishonestly

they wouldn’t proceed against Joe Barboza?

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. FRANK. And we do know they were talking to Barboza about

what happened in the Deegan case; is that fair to say?

Mr. ZALKIND. From the reports I’ve read, of course.

Mr. FRANK. So we do know that the FBI were talking to Barboza

about the case; and I would then say it’s a reasonable inference

that he was probably telling them the truth.

That leads me to believe that the problem here with the FBI was

not simply that they didn’t tell you more about Barboza, but that

at some point in these conversations we do believe they knew that

Flemmi was involved, correct?

Mr. ZALKIND. When you say ‘‘we’’——

Mr. FRANK. I’m saying, do we now know that the FBI learned

that Flemmi was involved in the Deegan murder?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. FRANK. That’s the point.

If we now know that Barboza told them the truth about Flemmi’s

involvement, it seems to me overwhelmingly likely that he told

them the truth about Salvati’s non-involvement.

This is particularly distressing. Again, we’re not making a legal

judgment here; we are as elected officials trying to come to the

likeliest conclusion on the basis of which to make policy.

It does sound to me like it’s fairly clear that the FBI not only

withheld information from you about their relationship with

Barboza, and the fact that he was lying, but that they are very

likely to have known that Mr. Salvati was innocent, and allowed

you to proceed with that knowledge, and didn’t tell you.

Mr. ZALKIND. I can’t answer that.

Mr. FRANK. I understand.

What was the relevance of the Chelsea police report?

Mr. ZALKIND. I never gave much, frankly—— Mr. FRANK. What did it say?

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, it was a very long document. You have it

there; and—— Mr. FRANK. Just the substance of it.

Mr. ZALKIND. The substance was the last paragraph.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Zalkind, I’ll wait for you to get to the mic, unless

you don’t want to be on the record on this.

Mr. ZALKIND. Fine, fine; but I do have it. There’s a paragraph.

Should I read it into the record?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Go ahead.

Mr. ZALKIND. This is the last page, the third paragraph from the

bottom.

‘‘I received information from Captain Renfrew that an informant

of his had contacted him and told him that French had received a

telephone call at the Ebb Tide at 9 p.m. on 3–12–65, and after a

short conversation he had left the cafe with the following men: Joseph Barboza, Ronald Cassesso, Vincent Flemmi, Francis Imbuglia,

Romeo Martin, Nicky Femia and a man by the name of Freddi who

42

is about 40 years old and said to be a ‘strong-arm.’ They are said

to have returned about 11 p.m., and Martin was alleged to have

said to French, ‘We nailed him.’ ’’ I think that’s the thing—— Mr. FRANK. So the relevance here is the absence of any reference

to Salvati.

First of all, we understand you have no recollection of ever having seen that. Second, you said there was an explanation that

Barboza gave that Salvati’s absence was that he left earlier and

that he came back late, etc.

And this isn’t a question; it’s a comment, and it’s why I think

these hearings are so important, and why remedial action is so important. The likeliest conclusion is that the FBI had pretty good

reason to believe that Mr. Salvati was innocent, and for their own

purposes kept silent, while you were acting on misleading and inaccurate information to prosecute.

I cannot think of anything worse as far as the Federal Government is concerned than to sit quietly by and allow an innocent man

to lose so much of his life for their own purposes, mainly to protect

people who were hardly worth protecting.

That’s all, Mr. Zalkind.

Mr. ZALKIND. Let me just say, Mr. Salvati is correct; and all my

heart says, how about the other guys? If he was going to lie about

this, it’s such a terrible mess. I don’t even know where to begin.

Mr. FRANK. He may very well have—— Mr. ZALKIND. He may have lied about other people. I don’t know.

Mr. FRANK. In fact, given what we know about Barboza and

about this relationship, it’s very likely that he did; and it is very

likely that we have uncovered only some of the injustice, and that

other injustices may have occurred.

That again reinforces our obligation as the Congress to continue

to focus on this, and not to drop it until we have the best assurance

you can get that we’ve got safeguards against this kind of thing

happening again.

Mr. ZALKIND. We’ve got to make some laws that make it mandatory on law-enforcement personnel, whether they be FBI or whether they be state people, whether they’re involved in the case or not,

to come forward with exculpatory evidence.

Even if the FBI had nothing to do with this case, if they looked

in their reports and they saw that John Jones had said that someone else was involved, do they just sit on it?

I think that you’ve got to make some legislation that says it’s got

to be turned over to the prosecution.

Mr. FRANK. I appreciate that.

There’s an analogy here, obviously. The legislature here has just

enacted legislation, and the Governor signed it, to strengthen affirmative obligations of reporting on the part of clergy where there

is an allegation of child abuse.

I think that people who are put in special positions of responsibility concurrently ought to be given special obligations to come

forward as applicable.

I will talk to my colleagues; it sounds like something that the Judiciary Committee ought to take up.

Thank you.

43

Mr. ZALKIND. Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Zalkind, Mr. Delahunt asked you about a

couple of exhibits.

I think, for the benefit of people who are watching this who may

be interested in taking a break—including you Mr. Zalkind—I just

want to talk about these two documents, solicit your opinions about

them and then any opinions my colleagues may have; and then

we’ll take a 10-minute recess so everyone can collect themselves.

In his chatting with you, Mr. Delahunt talked about two exhibits

which you’ll find in your exhibit book, 15 and 16.

Fifteen is a pretty short document. It’s just an Airtel that is basically a communication from the director of the FBI to the special

agent in charge of Boston wanting to know about the progress in

terms of developing this top-echelon-informant individual. We know

that person today to be James Vincent Flemmi.

Exhibit 16 I think is the more intriguing document. It’s a multipage document; if you want to just take a minute to review it.

Five days after the Airtel was sent on June 4, on June 9 a communication was sent back to J. Edgar Hoover that reads in pertinent part, ‘‘Concerning the informant’s emotional stability, the

agent handling the informant believes, from information obtained

from other informants and sources, that BS 919-PC,’’ and we know

that to be Jimmy Flemmi, ‘‘has murdered,’’ and then there are,

sadly, six names redacted, where we don’t even know from this document what six people he murdered; but Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

is the non-redacted name, ‘‘as well as a fellow inmate at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, Massachusetts, and,

from all indications, he is going to continue to commit murder. . . .

Although the informant will be difficult to contact once he is released from the hospital because he feels that,’’ another redacted

individual, ‘‘will try to kill him, the informant’s potential outweighs

the risk involved.’’

The committee now knows that the informant, as I indicated, referred to in this passage was Teddy Deegan.

Mr. ZALKIND. Teddy Deegan was the informant?

Mr. LATOURETTE. Excuse me; Jimmy Flemmi. And this is an exchange of documents that went back and forth from the FBI in

1965. As a matter of fact, June 9, 1965 is when they indicate that

they know that Jimmy Flemmi had participated in the murder of

Teddy Deegan.

The sort of softball question to you is, I guess you would have

an opinion as to whether or not it was wrong to withhold this information from you, and if that would have affected your thinking

during the prosecution.

Mr. ZALKIND. I really have to answer that. It’s so obvious. That’s

probably the most startling revelation that’s been before me since

this case began way back when.

I mean, I just can’t imagine anyone allowing that to happen and

not telling the prosecution.

Mr. LATOURETTE. The last question I want to ask you on it is

this.

You said that you had watched Judge Harrington testify before

the committee in Washington, DC; and he indicated to us then that

44

Jimmy Flemmi at one time was put in front of the grand jury to

give him cover.

Were you a participant in having Jimmy Flemmi testify

before——

Mr. ZALKIND. No knowledge whatsoever.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think I would yield my turn now to my colleagues to ask any questions or express any reactions.

The other thing I want to say about exhibits 15 and 16 is that

why some of us have some sort of strident remarks about what’s

going on with the production of documents is that after about a

year of investigating this case by the committee and requesting

documents, it’s my understanding Mr. Wilson, and counsel can correct me if I’m wrong, that we just came into possession of 15 and

16 last week. Is that correct?

Mr. WILSON. It’s correct to say that the first exhibit, 15, just

came to us a couple weeks ago. The other one, we had.

Mr. FRANK. Can I ask a question? Some of the victims of Mr.

Flemmi, those victims were redacted. My guess is it’s probably too

late——

Mr. WILSON. They wouldn’t care.

Mr. FRANK. Do we know who those were, and can we get them?

There may be other cases where someone may have been convicted

unfairly.

It would seem to me that knowing the other list of victims might

give you a lead on what other occasions to look at as to who might

have been convicted unfairly; so I would think at least they might

show you those.

If this guy’s an informant to the Federal Government, and he

kills somebody, I think it’s a little late for the Federal Government

to show such concern for the person that was killed by not letting

anybody see his name. That doesn’t seem to do much good.

And I would think that would be one of the areas where you

would want to look to see who these others were.

Mr. LATOURETTE. We will let counsel make an observation.

Mr. WILSON. We have recently received documents that indicate

who these other individuals are. The Justice Department has asked

us to keep these names confidential, and we’ve done that thus far.

But the committee is aware, first through me being allowed a

number of months ago to inspect some redacted documents at the

FBI headquarters, and then recently, just two or 3 weeks ago,

through a production to the committee, we now know who these

other individuals are; so that the redactions here, we know who the

names are, but the Department of Justice would prefer that we not

disclose this information.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Can I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. LATOURETTE. You can ask a question.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I just simply cannot understand any rational

basis put forth by the Department of Justice to seek, after some almost 40 years, to continue to maintain secrecy. People have a right

to know. This is absolutely unconscionable on the part of the Department of Justice.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Tierney?

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join in this.

45

We’ve had a number of hearings, one hearing on specifically the

issue of Mr. Zalkind and the Department on whether or not they

would produce documents.

The administration sent in a witness to testify who not only

wasn’t cooperative but actually failed to even testify as to who gave

that witness instructions not to produce certain documents. It got

to that level of absurdity.

Now we sit here with a document that’s heavily redacted for no

apparent reason, 35 years old or more. There certainly are no reasonable grounds for claiming executive privilege, even on any limited basis, on that.

The overwhelming capacity of these documents and the testimony of witnesses to help us with the purpose of making sure of

the appropriate oversight of government agencies would far outweigh any executive privilege under any case law that may exist.

So it’s outrageous and ridiculous of this administration. Both

parties are upset with the path this administration has taken. We

should not have to go through this type of dynamics just to get to

the bottom of this, if in fact we’re going to try to put some proceedings in place.

These two documents that the chairman just went over with you,

the most recent ones, should give us all cause for serious concern

at a time in this country when this administration and Attorney

General Ashcroft have sought more and more prosecutorial authority, and have sought to limit more and more defendants’ opportunities even to get evidence that they might use in their own defense.

If we’re going to seek those kinds of powers for the government,

then we ought to make sure that the administration is giving this

committee and the Congress the information it needs, as well as

appropriate oversight, to make sure that the FBI and other investigators have in fact safeguards, that there is transparency, and

there is adequate oversight to make sure this kind of travesty that

we see perpetrated in this case is not continued.

These two documents reflect on the comments I made earlier in

the opening remarks that this is not a problem limited to a couple

of rogue agents in the FBI on a local basis.

This was an endemic problem; it goes all the way to the top. Why

we continue to have a building in Washington named after J.

Edgar Hoover is beyond my comprehension, particularly when you

look at documents like this.

It’s a disgrace what went on in this case. It’s a disgrace to this

administration, and it continues to this day for no apparent reason.

To withhold information under the guise of executive privilege is

entirely without merit. We’ve seen it in this matter.

We’ve seen it in the Enron situation, where the administration

refuses to produce documents showing which companies had met

with the administration when policy for this country’s energy situation was being created. We know that there’s information there

that would be valuable to the public.

We’ve seen it in an instance where members of this committee

in minority requested census information, and had to sue the

White House in order to get census information for every census release going back to the beginning of census time.

46

This shield or veil of secrecy is not doing this country any good,

is not allowing Congress to do its work, and is consequently not allowing us to do our best job in providing the protections that you’ve

testified to and other witnesses in front of this committee have testified to.

I thank the chairman here, and Chairman Burton as well, for

their willingness to make this a bipartisan effort.

This is not about parties or about politics. It’s about having a justice system that works for every American, and making sure that

they believe and have faith in it; because without that we aren’t

going to be able to have the protections that people in this country

are overseas fighting for.

We need to strike some balance for people to have their liberties

protected in every sort of way, but also protection for this country;

and if this administration wants us to expand on one side of that,

they’ve got to convince the American people that they’re willing to

put in place the protection of people’s civil liberties on the other

side of that.

With that said, I pass this on to Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you; thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Zalkind, just based on these two exhibits that the chairman

has focused on, it’s indeed troubling that 3 months after the

Deegan murder, exhibit 15 basically reflects a decision of the Director of the FBI—this was after he has received information that

Jimmy Flemmi has killed Deegan, or certainly expressed an intent

to kill Deegan, and others—that the Director is asking how is the

progress in terms of developing Mr. Flemmi as a top-echelon informant.

So that’s with that information in hand; and with direct evidence

that he attempts to continue covering up.

I think in exhibit 1 he states—this is Mr. Condon’s memo— ‘‘Flemmi told him that all he wanted to do now was to kill people,

and that it is better than hitting banks,’’ and that he feels he can

become ‘‘the top hit man in the area and intends to be.’’

Then we have another exhibit in a similar vein, exhibit 2, a Boston letter to the Director of the FBI. This is Mr. Condon again telling the Director of the FBI, Mr. Hoover, that ‘‘Flemmi is suspected

of a number of gangland murders and has told the informant of his

plans to become recognized as the number-one ‘hit man’ in this

area as a contract killer.’’

And again, Mr. Rico from the FBI, in a Boston memo, says that

‘‘Vincent Flemmi’’—this is from another informant—‘‘Vincent

Flemmi wanted to be considered the best hit man in the area.’’

Again, the Director has information that Mr. Flemmi wants to

kill Teddy Deegan.

Now, here, after the murder of Mr. Deegan, 3 months after,

here’s the Director of the FBI asking the Boston office, how is the

progress on Mr. Flemmi, in terms of being developed as a top-echelon informant?

47

That is just so disheartening. It is clearly criminal. It’s criminal;

there’s no other way around this.

Just coming fast-forward to the current situation, I would love to

believe your earlier statement that things are getting better; that

this can’t happen anymore.

[Exhibits 1 and 2 follow:]

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49

50

51

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, I didn’t say——

Mr. LYNCH. While certainly there was——

Mr. ZALKIND. They’re getting better.

Mr. LYNCH. That certainly this couldn’t happen again.

All I’m saying is that as members of the committee, and as representatives of the legislative branch, we see what the President is

doing.

On the one hand, we understand the need after September 11th

for gathering greater information in our war against terrorism; but

the plain fact of the matter is, the President is seeking the ability

to deal with unsavory characters and to get around any limitations

in terms of the terrorists and the associates of terrorists with

whom the government cooperates.

So we’re looking to expand the group of people whom we bring

into these types of relationships, because we want to get at the terrorists. So we’re not getting away from dealing with unsavory characters; we’re actually recruiting them to a greater degree.

Second, which is confounding, is this insistence on executive

privilege 40 years after the fact, when truth is needed, where justice is needed.

I don’t see us moving in a better direction; and I don’t think that

there’s greater reason for hope that this is an isolated case and

that these are circumstances that are wholly unique to this time

and place.

And again, I know I’m being redundant. I just want to thank the

chairman for his good work and for his persistence. I think we need

to further investigate these other related cases that may have had

the same taint, the same fallibility, that the Deegan case had.

And I just call upon the witness to add his voice to those who

might lend some common sense and reason to the argument regarding the scope of executive privilege being exercised in this case.

Thank you.

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, I can tell you this; that now, as I sit here

now, I realize exactly what happened in this case.

I’m a pretty tough guy; I went through a war and so forth. I was

a victim in this case. The FBI knew that they had lost Joe Barboza.

He was in jail. I was instrumental in making him a prisoner for

the rest of his life.

So what they did, they knew they had Joe lost; but they figured,

well, let’s flip Joe, and let Joe know that we’re not going to push

him on his friend Jimmy Flemmi. So they let Joe go on and tell

the story, leaving out Jimmy Flemmi; and then Jimmy Flemmi is

allowed to go on and be their informer.

He then commits a crime 2 years later; and I believe that they

interfered by telling him about the prosecution and giving him a

tape, and it’s the same story that you have right now that’s going

on with this agent—I’m not taking any position on that—but it

comes right from the top.

The Bureau has always allowed these rogue agents to go as far

as they wanted with the excuse that, well, you have to do what you

have to do to stop organized crime. Maybe you do; but you don’t

have to put innocent people in harm’s way, and especially not put

them in jail, as they did in this case.

52

When I leave here today, I must tell you, I just need some time.

This has been very shocking to me.

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Zalkind, I just want to make something perfectly

clear. In no way do my questions—and I speak for myself, but I

think it’s true of the other Members as well—in no way do my

questions offer any suggestions of culpability on your part.

Mr. ZALKIND. I know that, sir; I know that.

Mr. LYNCH. To go back to the Harrington testimony at the previous hearing, there were parallel cases here, one a Federal case

and one a state case, against Deegan. There was information obtained in the Federal case through a bug, a surveillance device,

that indicated that Mr. Flemmi had asked for permission to kill

Mr. Deegan.

At that time, when your case was going on, Mr. Harrington was

asked as the head of the Organized Crime Task Force, why did you

not share that information—not referring to you, Mr. Zalkind, but

to your case—why was that information not shared in the Deegan

case?

The explanation given by Mr. Harrington was that he was involved in a Federal case against Mr. Patriarca, and that you were

involved in a state case surrounding the murder of Mr. Deegan.

That information was not shared with you. Was not shared with

you; that was Mr. Harrington’s statement.

And when the Chair asked further why that information was not

shared, the answer was completely unacceptable; it was in the ‘‘I

forgot’’ category.

So I just want to make clear that I am in no way suggesting, in

any remote way, that there’s any culpability on your part, Mr.

Zalkind.

Mr. ZALKIND. I understand that, Congressman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you.

Would you like to say something? How about Mr. Delahunt?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Zalkind, I appreciate your revelations that

have occurred here today.

What if I added into that body of knowledge the fact that Mr.

Barboza was influenced to become a cooperating witness through

the efforts of FBI agents, utilizing Mr. Stevie Flemmi? What would

you say to that, Mr. Zalkind?

Mr. ZALKIND. I would say I can’t believe that, because Stevie

Flemmi was charged as one of the men who blew off John

Fitzgerald’s leg.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, before we return, I would recommend that

you, during the break here, review exhibit 21, because it’s been recently disclosed that the head of the Boston office of the FBI sent

to the Director, Mr. Hoover, a memorandum on June 20, 1967, that

Stevie Flemmi was developed by Rico and Condon.

And I’m quoting now, ‘‘via imaginative direction and professional

ingenuity, utilized said source,’’ referencing Stevie Flemmi, ‘‘in connection with interviews of Joseph Baron, a professional assassin responsible for numerous homicides and acknowledged by all professional law enforcement representatives in the area to be the most

53

dangerous individual known.’’ Now, going back all these decades, is there any wonder, or

should there be any question, as to why Jimmy Flemmi was left

out of his obvious involvement in the Deegan murder?

[Exhibit 21 follows:]

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Mr. ZALKIND. It’s obvious.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It becomes obvious now?

Mr. ZALKIND. It’s obvious; it’s obvious.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, I think we should probably——

Mr. ZALKIND. Heinous, but obvious.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Heinous, but obvious.

I’ll yield, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Ladies and gentlemen, it’s about 13 minutes to

noon. Let’s take a recess and startup again at 12.

[Recess.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. The committee hearing will be back in order.

Mr. Lynch is still with us; he will join us again. Mr. Frank advised

us that he has some other business that he had to attend to, but

we thank him for being here.

Mr. Zalkind, prior to the break—and it’s my intention to go on

to something known as the 5-minute rule; we’re going to move

through some of the other portions—before the break, Mr.

Delahunt talked about Stevie Flemmi, with particular reference to

exhibit No. 21.

Just by the way of record purposes, I think I indicated, and others did, that Agents Rico and Condon were given salary increases

because of their work with Joseph Barboza; and that’s included in

some of the exhibits that you have before you.

What has always mystified the committee in moving through this

was a reference to a confidential informant identified by the code

BS 955 C-TE.

When Mr. Delahunt and I were up in Boston several months ago

interviewing Special Agent Condon, we asked questions like, was

this electronic surveillance? Was it a person? Who was it? And he

indicated to us he had no knowledge of who it was.

And we’ve asked the Justice Department for over a year who this

informant was, and there was no way to understand the Deegan

case and the use of Barboza without understanding what this was

a reference to.

We’ve now been told, Mr. Delahunt indicated to you, that BS 955

C-TE was Stevie ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi.

And it occurs to me that a few questions by any competent investigator who knew what the FBI was up to would have asked

Barboza things such as, Mr. Barboza, you told us you would never

provide information that would allow James Vincent Flemmi to fry;

we know that today, and why shouldn’t we just conclude that you

were lying?

I think it would have been appropriate to ask whether Raymond

Patriarca was part of the conspiracy to kill Deegan, and I think

you indicated you had no knowledge to indicate Raymond Patriarca

was part of the conspiracy back in the 1960’s. Is that correct?

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Someone might have asked where was Jimmy

Flemmi on the night of the Deegan murder, I suppose, if this information had been available.

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, if the information had been available, I certainly think you would—aside from the problem of Flemmi—probably would have indicted Raymond Patriarca.

59

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Barboza indicated to some other inmates

of Walpole, and through other informants we have information,

that Mr. Barboza actually shot Teddy Deegan with a .45-caliber

handgun; and obviously that’s inconsistent with the testimony he

gave to you. It would have been appropriate to ask Mr. Barboza

whether or not, the day before the Deegan murder, he and Jimmy

Flemmi had gone to Raymond Patriarca and asked for his permission to kill Deegan.

From the records we have, no one asked Barboza about the information the FBI had; and it appears from the record that the FBI

agents handling Barboza didn’t want to ask the questions, because

it might then upset the story that he was prepared to tell.

In the last month, we have received some additional documents

from the Justice Department that help us resolve the puzzle of how

Rico and Condon got him to testify.

Again, that’s because BS 955 was the brother of one of the men

who killed Teddy Deegan, specifically the informant whom they developed, Steve ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, who killed a number of people, along with Whitey Bulger. Director Hoover gave Rico and Condon $150 raises each for providing information in the Deegan case, and the case against Raymond Patriarca and Gennaro Angiulo.

I would ask you, did you even know who Steve Flemmi was at

the time of the Deegan trial?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you ever made aware that the person

who was credited with changing Barboza’s mind about testifying

was the brother of the man who went with Barboza to Patriarca

to ask for permission to kill?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Obviously we’re building a record here, so I

hope you don’t think I’m as big an idiot as the question sounds; but

if you had known what we just told you, would you have approached Mr. Barboza’s testimony differently?

Mr. ZALKIND. I wouldn’t have prosecuted this case.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And were you ever aware that Steve Flemmi

was targeted to become a top-echelon informant for the FBI in

1965?

Mr. ZALKIND. No. No, I was not.

Mr. LATOURETTE. When he testified in the Deegan trial, Special

Agent Condon said it was not fair to say that he and Paul Rico

were major figures with regard to the investigation surrounding

the information furnished by Mr. Baron. Do you remember that

testimony?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes, I do.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Was this, in light of what we know today, accurate testimony?

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, they weren’t major participants in my trial;

but of course, they were major, major participants in the whole

Barboza episode, since they flipped him.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Exhibit 18 is Agents Rico’s and Condon’s summary of their interview with Mr. Barboza.

On Page 2, Barboza told Rico and Condon again this statement

that ‘‘he would never provide information that would allow Jim

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Flemmi to ‘fry.’ ’’ I believe you told the staff of our committee when

you were interviewed earlier that you nearly fell out of your chair

when you heard that information. Did you in fact say that to our

staff?

[Exhibit 18 follows:]

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Mr. ZALKIND. Yes, I did.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And why did you say that?

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, again, it’s the whole thing of secreting evidence. They have a witness that they knew was lying to me, and

they never told me he was lying.

I mean, there must be some rule, whether it be regulatory, administrative or actual criminal rules, that when an FBI agent lies

to another law-enforcement agency to protect someone, that’s got to

be a crime. It’s got to be, someplace along the line.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And did the FBI ever indicate to you that they

had evidence of Mr. Patriarca’s involvement in this at all?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And did you ever hear any talk within the lawenforcement community, either at the same time or shortly thereafter, about prosecuting either Mr. Patriarca or Mr. Angiulo for

their complicity in the Deegan murder?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Zalkind, let me just put some other things in the record.

Would you look at exhibit 20, please?

[Exhibit 20 follows:]

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Mr. ZALKIND. Sorry; there’s a lot that’s blank before you get to

it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, as you’re looking—— Mr. ZALKIND. I have it; I have it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me summarize.

It indicates that on May 24, 1967, which is about the time that

Barboza was being developed as a witness, FBI Director Hoover

asked for an investigative report on Barboza.

Were you ever aware that Hoover, or at a minimum the FBI

headquarters in Washington, were interested in Barboza?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes, I was aware that J. Edgar Hoover was interested in this case.

I think that my boss, Garrett Byrne, had had some communications with Hoover, I guess congratulating him for doing such a

good job in prosecuting this case. That’s the extent.

Mr. TIERNEY. Exhibit 26 appears to be the report that was requested by Hoover that we talked about earlier. Among the catalogue of murders, it indicated that Barboza claims he shot Teddy

Deegan with a .45-caliber gun.

Now, this certainly contradicts Barboza’s testimony that not only

did he not shoot Deegan, but that he never saw who did it; correct?

[Exhibit 26 follows:]

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Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would this knowledge have been important to you

if you had been aware of it at the time you had been putting

Barboza in front of the grand jury?

Mr. ZALKIND. What’s the date of this report?

Mr. TIERNEY. It’s July 18, 1967.

Mr. ZALKIND. There wouldn’t have been the prosecution.

Amongst other things, this would have been just another nick in

the rifle, and that would have been the end of it.

Mr. TIERNEY. So obviously, that would have had some impact on

your assessment of Barboza’s credibility?

Mr. ZALKIND. It would have had an impact on my assessment of

the credibility of the FBI.

Mr. TIERNEY. We all have some concern about that.

Were you aware that the defense lawyers in the Deegan matter

made a motion to obtain all police-department reports?

Mr. ZALKIND. I know they made motions for the police department. I don’t know if they ever referred to FBI reports.

But all of those motions were ruled upon by the judge; and as

I said before in my opening, discovery in those days was very restricted.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you oppose the motion?

Mr. ZALKIND. Probably. Probably.

Mr. TIERNEY. And looking back, obviously you would agree it

would have better served the interests of justice if—— Mr. ZALKIND. I wouldn’t have opposed any motion that asked for

exculpatory evidence, but I would have opposed motions that asked

for police-department reports.

Mr. TIERNEY. Why?

Mr. ZALKIND. Because they’re not available as a general rule

anyhow.

Mr. TIERNEY. Should they be?

Mr. ZALKIND. I think it depends upon the case.

I think, if it’s a police report made by a policeman testifying,

they certainly should be available. He’s a witness testifying; it’s

like a grand-jury record in a Federal case.

Should all police reports? I don’t think all of them should be.

Some of them obviously have to be kept within the confines of confidentiality.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you ever consider using a polygraph on

Barboza?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Were you aware that Louie Greco, who was one of

the defendants in the Greco case, was in Florida on the day of the

Deegan murder, and had passed a whole series of polygraphs

indicating——

Mr. ZALKIND. There was some talk by Larry O’Donnell, his defense counsel, that he had taken a polygraph. I don’t even remember if he asked to have it introduced into evidence. He might have

asked a question. It didn’t really concern me very much, because

in those days polygraph tests were not admissible.

Mr. TIERNEY. Exhibit 41 is an affidavit by Anthony Stathopoulos.

Essentially, you know who Anthony Stathopoulos was?

[Exhibit 41 follows:]

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Mr. ZALKIND. I do.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who was he?

Mr. ZALKIND. Anthony Stathopoulos was the witness in the trial

that brought Teddy Deegan to the alley after having a meeting

with Joe Barboza.

Mr. TIERNEY. On the first page of his affidavit—— Mr. ZALKIND. This is 41?

Mr. TIERNEY. 41; right.

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. On the first page of that affidavit, Stathopoulos

says that Officer Doyle had told him that Barboza said that Greco

shot Deegan, and that when he testified he was told the seating arrangement of the witnesses.

Had you ever seen the affidavit before today?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes, I have seen this affidavit. I think I saw this

attached to some motion that maybe Ronny Cassesso made for a

new trial; but I think I’ve seen this before, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. At the end of the first page, it says that ‘‘Baron

told me’’—Stathopoulos—‘‘that he was going to keep Flemmi out of

it because he said that Flemmi was a friend of his and the only

one who treated him decently.’’ When did you become aware of that statement?

Mr. ZALKIND. I don’t know whether I was out of the office. I

think I may have been out of the office at that time. But I was

made aware of this.

Mr. TIERNEY. In fact, the second page discusses reports and conversations that the department says he reportedly had with you.

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you have any recollection of any of the events

or reports that Stathopoulos is talking about in this document?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes, I have.

I have a very firm recollection insofar as the defense counsel in

the case asked that they be allowed to interview the witnesses, including Stathopoulos. I told Stathopoulos, they have an absolute

right to interview him, but he has an absolute right not to be interviewed.

He says, what do you think I should do? I said, I think you’ll get

confused, but it’s up to you.

I never told him not to do it. I didn’t have much faith in any of

these witnesses, as far as what happened later on.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you know whether or not that interview took

place?

Mr. ZALKIND. The interview with the Boston police officer?

Mr. TIERNEY. Right.

Mr. ZALKIND. I was told about it. I wasn’t there, so I don’t know.

Mr. TIERNEY. If you look at exhibit 22, it’s a summary of an

interview with Anthony Stathopoulos as conducted by Officer

Robson. Do you remember who Officer Robson was?

[Exhibit 22 follows:]

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Mr. ZALKIND. Yes. He was assigned to us. I think he was MBTA.

Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. In the interview, Stathopoulos says he saw

Cassesso and Martin, but did not see anyone else; but when

Stathopoulos testified at the Deegan trial about a year later, he

said he saw Louie Greco. Were you aware then of the inconsistency

in those two statements?

Mr. ZALKIND. I don’t know if I ever saw this before.

Mr. TIERNEY. That’s exhibit 26, you’re saying?

Mr. ZALKIND. Exhibit 26?

Mr. TIERNEY. 22.

Mr. ZALKIND. 22; yes. I may have seen this report; I may not. I

don’t know. But when we questioned him, the eventual statements

that came out were that he couldn’t really recognize anyone that

he saw coming out of the alleyway.

And I said, well, they’re going to be all sitting in front of you.

If you see anyone that’s familiar to you, point it out; if you don’t,

don’t. And that was the extent of it. And he did point out Louie

Greco as being a man that looked like the fellow.

Mr. TIERNEY. And the inconsistency between the two statements

was not known to you at that time?

Mr. ZALKIND. It may have been; it may have been. It may have

been.

Mr. TIERNEY. But it meant nothing to you?

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, not nothing. This was an officer writing it

down. It just didn’t mean that much to me. If I saw it; I don’t even

remember seeing it at the time.

Mr. TIERNEY. To go back to his affidavit, which is exhibit 41, it

indicates that Stathopoulos visited Barboza before the Deegan

trial. Did you know that?

Mr. ZALKIND. That the police had visited Stathopoulos?

Mr. TIERNEY. No; that Stathopoulos had visited Barboza.

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes; with the two police officers from the District

Attorney’s office?

Mr. TIERNEY. Right.

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes, I knew about that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you make further inquiry as to what that was

all about?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. And what did you find?

Mr. ZALKIND. They told me that Stathopoulos wanted to be assured that Barboza was not going to bother him. They sort of

brushed it off.

I wasn’t even involved when that took place. They went down

there; and then I said, what was all this about? They said, well,

he wanted to go down and talk to Barboza to be sure that nothing’s

going to happen to him. Something like that.

Again, you know, that’s my memory. It wasn’t important to me

at the time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who were those officers that accompanied him?

Mr. ZALKIND. I think it was John Doyle and an elderly—I’m

sorry; what was the exhibit, please?

Mr. TIERNEY. The affidavit is 41, and the other is 22; the inconsistencies between the two documents.

78

Mr. ZALKIND. I knew about the visit, and I think it took place— before the indictment or after the indictment? I think it was—I forget when the indictment was in the case, but I knew about this.

Mr. TIERNEY. And that raised the prospect of the improprieties

or the difficulties there.

Mr. ZALKIND. You mean as far—— Mr. TIERNEY. As far as going down and talking down to Mr.

Barboza.

Mr. ZALKIND. Oh, no, no. All this information came to me long

after I was out of the District Attorney’s office, but I knew that

they had gone down there.

I asked them why they were going. The police gave me some reason at the time; it sounded OK. I said, go ahead; take him. That

was about it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Zalkind.

I don’t want to beat a dead horse on this electronic-surveillance

information that was available, but the next exhibit is a prosecution memorandum. It’s not in the book of exhibits, but was provided to you separately. It was prepared by Federal prosecutors in

anticipation of the prosecution of Raymond Patriarca.

Mr. ZALKIND. Am I allowed to talk about this?

Mr. LATOURETTE. We’re going to go into executive session and

talk about it then.

Mr. LYNCH. I guess we’ll reserve that point for executive session.

I apologize; I’ll hold my question for executive session. Thank

you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The bottom line, Mr. Zalkind, is that there was

a plethora of evidence that would have implicated Jimmy Flemmi

in the Deegan murder, given what we’ve been talking about this

morning.

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Particularly the reports from FBI agents; but additionally from Chelsea, the report from the State Police that I referred to that you were unaware of, as well as that report from the

Intelligence Division of the Boston Police Department.

But nobody, most specifically, ever asked the tough questions of

Joe Barboza.

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s not true. I asked the tough questions.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But you did not have available to you——

Mr. ZALKIND. Oh, that’s correct; that’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT [continuing]. The information that was available

that would have allowed his credibility to be truly assessed and

evaluated?

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

What I meant was, Congressman, I said to him, now, look, Joe,

I want you to tell me everyone who was there. This is after he told

the story to the grand jury, and I was preparing him.

I said, you’ve got to tell me why this person was there, why that

person. Why did you put Louie Greco in the alleyway?

Mr. DELAHUNT. We don’t even know, Mr. Zalkind, if Mr. Barboza

was aware of the existence of these various reports, do we?

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Mr. ZALKIND. Of course not. I wouldn’t know that, no.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And so the reality is that specifically the FBI,

but also other law-enforcement agencies, had within their possession documents that exculpated Mr. Salvati and Mr. Limone, simply because they were referenced in those documents, and those

documents related to interviews and statements made by Mr.

Barboza to a variety of informants.

Mr. ZALKIND. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But—and I’m talking at the investigative level— we have no information whatsoever from any investigator that they

pursued the information to determine whether the information that

they had was in fact accurate.

Mr. ZALKIND. You mean prior to the indictment?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Prior to the indictment, or during the indictment, or during the trial, or subsequent to the trial. I think later

on we might be hearing from a former member of the parole board.

All of this information was in the custody of the Federal Bureau

of Investigation; and yet it was never brought to your attention, it

was never brought to the attention of the parole board when it was

reviewing the petitions for parole at any point in time. No point in

time.

Going back, like I said earlier, in time, it’s clear that the interest

of the FBI in developing Jim Flemmi as an informant overrode all

other concerns.

Mr. ZALKIND. It certainly appears so, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And then we pause for a moment, and think of

what it meant in terms of public safety.

There are references in here to the inclination of Vincent James

Flemmi to continue to commit murders, and he was given a free

pass. That is the bottom line; he was given an opportunity to commit more murders.

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, may I suggest to you that previously I think

I understood you to say that Steve Flemmi was also cooperating

with the FBI.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, we just learned, I think within the past 2

weeks—and Mr. Wilson, the chief counsel, can elaborate on that— that it was Steve Flemmi who intervened and encouraged and influenced Barboza to cooperate.

Mr. ZALKIND. But here’s the thing that gets me as I sit here now.

Steve Flemmi was one of the men that blew off John Fitzgerald’s

leg 6 months before this trial; and if he was a government informant, then the FBI knew the perpetrators of John Fitzgerald’s attempted assassination.

Really, for my own mind, do we know when he became an informer? Or am I stepping out of line? Because it really, really—— Mr. DELAHUNT. I would defer that to Mr. Wilson.

You referenced earlier in your remarks the relationship between

the FBI and other law-enforcement agencies. Are you aware that

when Barboza entered into the Witness Protection Program he was

relocated to California?

Mr. ZALKIND. No. I purposely did not want to know that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don’t know if you’re aware that subsequently

he was relocated to California, and he committed a murder in California.

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Mr. ZALKIND. I know that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Are you aware of the fact that neither the District Attorney’s office there, the State Police there, nor the local police were ever informed that Mr. Barboza, who is described in

many of these reports as one of the most dangerous psychopaths

in the history of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, was being

relocated there?

Mr. ZALKIND. I have since learned that fact.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think it was Mr. Frank earlier who referenced

what is going on here in terms of clergy and sexual abuse.

Can you for a moment imagine allowing someone with Barboza’s

record, knowing him as well as you do, to go to another part of the

country without informing either state or local law enforcement?

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, I think today, Mr. Delahunt, that couldn’t

happen; because under the terms of probation, the probation department of the area where he goes to becomes knowledgeable of

the person being there, even if his identity is changed. I think; I’m

not sure.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I have to respectfully disagree with you, Mr.

Zalkind. I’m not sure that is in fact the case.

Mr. ZALKIND. Then that’s what you boys should be doing, is making sure that it does happen.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think that it’s important to stress that we have

a situation where evidence, as you say, is concealed resulting in an

injustice; but it is also concealed resulting in an erosion of public

safety elsewhere.

It is as if the premise and the predicate of all of this behavior

is concealment; don’t disclose.

Today we’re asking you, for example, to review a memorandum

that you haven’t seen, to review it, digest it, assimilate it, analyze

it, because the Department of Justice still abides by that principle

of concealment.

And let me say this, just in terms of the spirit of bipartisanship.

This has nothing to do with who sits in the White House. This has

been a culture that has been created over a period of decades by

both Republican and Democratic administrations, and it’s time that

we addressed it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Delahunt.

As I indicated a little earlier, we’re going to now, at the request

of the U.S. Department of Justice, go into a closed session. Before

we do that, I want to do two quick pieces of business.

Without objection, I want to insert into the record a letter dated

May 10, 2002 to the chairman of our committee, Dan Burton of Indiana, from Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Bryant, which describes the U.S. Justice Department’s position on what we’re going

to do.

And prior to going into executive session, I want to yield to chief

counsel on our side, Mr. Wilson, to ask a few questions about the

prosecution memoranda; and then we will ask everyone to clear the

room, shut off your cameras, and we’ll try and alert you when you

can come back in.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Zalkind, I’ll be fairly brief. A few housekeeping

matters.

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Earlier on, you mentioned there was a memo prepared by, I believe, Detective Doyle for your use before the grand jury; is that

correct?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. Do you still have a copy of that memo?

Mr. ZALKIND. No, I don’t.

Mr. WILSON. What happened to that after you——

Mr. ZALKIND. It was in the file with everything else when I left

the office.

Mr. WILSON. Did you leave all of the material that was pertinent

to the Deegan case at the District Attorney’s office?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes, I did.

Mr. WILSON. One other thing. We, through our investigation over

the last year, have learned that there might be some significance

to some testimony by Joseph Barboza before the grand jury, and

we’ve been able to obtain minutes from Barboza’s appearance before the grand jury.

I have a copy here, which it may or may not be necessary to

show you; but over the course of the last year, through our investigation, we’ve heard that there may be some significance to something he said, and we have not been able to find that in the grandjury minutes, but there’s a page missing from our grand-jury minutes.

Did you by any chance keep copies of the grand-jury minutes?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

Mr. WILSON. Were you ever aware at any point that there was

missing material from the grand-jury minutes?

Mr. ZALKIND. No.

The only thing I was thinking about is that during the course of

the grand-jury sessions he had mentioned some place where he had

gone to get hot goods, Arthur’s Farm, and amongst the people that

he met there, he would mention some people.

There was one name he mentioned, it was very embarrassing,

and I may have said to the stenographer something like, strike

that name. It might have been some sports figure or something like

that, that had nothing to do with it. I never, never would allow any

page to be stricken or anything like that.

Mr. WILSON. But if that took place, that would be one name?

Mr. ZALKIND. Oh, yes.

Mr. WILSON. What we have is an absence of an entire page.

Mr. ZALKIND. I know nothing of that.

Mr. WILSON. Just one followup.

We have talked about the Barboza recantation, the Stathopoulos

affidavit, various other information; and you pointed out at the

time that those events occurred they did not have a particular significance to you.

In light of all of the evidence that you’ve now been presented, do

you think that those materials should have had relevance to the

people that did have access to material about what happened in the

Deegan murder?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Stathopoulos, I did not consider him a credible witness. I certainly know that when he said in some statement or affidavit that

82

I wore a disguise to meet him in a hotel, I mean, it was just ludicrous. I didn’t give much attention to it at all.

I saw one affidavit that he said that Joe Barboza said that

Jimmy Flemmi was not going to be involved, and that’s why he

went to see Joe, so that Joe could assure him that Jimmy wasn’t

going to hurt him.

I think probably, if I were still in the office, coupled with the fact

that I prosecuted Flemmi in 1970, maybe something more should

have gone on. I don’t know what good would have happened; I don’t

know.

Mr. WILSON. I’m directing that more to other people who, when

that information came out, one would think that they would, if

they were operating in good faith, have indicated to you that they

have information that perhaps bolsters Barboza’s recantation or

bolsters the Stathopoulos affidavit or other material that subsequently we’ve been able to obtain.

Mr. ZALKIND. I can’t answer that question.

Mr. WILSON. Before we go to executive session, I have here now

a memorandum that you reviewed yesterday; is that correct?

Mr. ZALKIND. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. You were provided a copy of a prosecution—— Mr. ZALKIND. Yes. It was provided. I saw and read it. I have no

copy of it.

Mr. WILSON. We’ll provide that to you in a moment, and ask you

questions specifically about that memo when we go into executive

session.

But just as a general comment from you, we wanted to be able

to question you about this memorandum in an open session, because we thought that would be fair for you. We appreciate your

coming forward and answering these questions.

Do you think as a matter of fundamental fairness to you we

should be asking you questions about the memorandum you reviewed in secrecy?

Mr. ZALKIND. Absolutely not.

But, without skirting the edges, that memorandum never mentions my name in any way, shape or form. However, what it does,

I guess we can’t talk about it; but it certainly buttresses my statement that I never had any information about Flemmi or anybody

else being involved.

Mr. WILSON. Well, to be fair, you can talk about it if you’d like

to characterize what you saw, and I think it’s appropriate for you

to provide——

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, then, I will say it.

Absolutely; this memo that I saw had within it conversations had

between Raymond Patriarca, Joe Barboza, Ralph Cassesso, Jimmy

Flemmi.

And in there, they go down and they want to speak to Raymond;

and Raymond——

Mr. LATOURETTE. If I may, I think we’re getting really close to

the edge, and I don’t want to violate it.

I think the question to you is, do you think it’s fair that we talk

to you, are forced to talk to you, in private, and a general observation about it; but I think the specifics of it probably would violate

the agreement we have with the Department of Justice.

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Mr. ZALKIND. Whatever you say. But it is extremely exculpatory.

It’s probably the most exculpatory bit of evidence that you’ve

shown me.

Mr. WILSON. Now, one reason we did want to question you about

this particular memorandum is because it’s not a memorandum

that was prepared at the time of the Deegan murder.

Many of the materials you’ve seen today were prepared in 1965.

There are transcripts of an illegal bug in Patriarca’s headquarters

in Providence, there are Airtels going from Boston to Director Hoover; but they were all prepared in 1965.

The particular prosecution memo we’re going to talk about in executive session was prepared in 1967, at the time people were preparing to prosecute a number of individuals for the Deegan case.

Mr. ZALKIND. Correct.

Mr. WILSON. Is it, in your mind, significant that a document

that, to use your words, contains exculpatory information was prepared at the time of prosecution of the individuals for the Deegan

murder?

Mr. ZALKIND. Of course it’s significant. It should have been given

to me, along with other things.

Never mind given to me; I should have been told about it. It

would have influenced our decision as to whether to go forward

with this case, and we wouldn’t have gone forward with this case.

Mr. WILSON. The last question is, is it significant, as you sit here

today, that government prosecutors in Boston were sending to senior government officials at Justice in Washington, DC, some of the

information that you’re now aware of that pertains to the Deegan

murder?

Mr. ZALKIND. It’s significant, I suppose, in that maybe they had

a guilty conscience and wanted to unload, or make sure there was

a record of what they knew. I don’t know, other than that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much.

Ladies and gentlemen, at this time, pursuant to our agreement

with the Department of Justice, I would ask everybody to clear the

room, turn off all equipment; and also pursuant to our agreement

with the Department of Justice, this portion of the transcript will

not be subject to public review.

[Whereupon, proceedings were continued in executive session.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. We’re back in public session at this moment in

time.

Mr. Zalkind, I want to express, if I haven’t already, on behalf of

myself and other members of the committee, our appreciation for

your willingness to be here today and your willingness to answer

all the questions we had.

Before we move to our next witnesses today, I just would make

an invitation to you. If there’s any closing observation you would

like to make, we would be more than happy to hear it.

Mr. ZALKIND. Well, I think that in the last couple of weeks we’ve

read about a decision made by our Supreme Judicial Court wherein

they say that most people do not have to volunteer to come forward

to disclose a dangerous situation. That was the Worcester fire.

The Supreme Court said that, however, when you are the instigator of that potentially dangerous situation, then you have a duty

84

to come forward to law enforcement, so that it won’t become more

dangerous. It’s pretty simple words.

I think that, if this committee does anything, it could in some

way perhaps make law that would force either prosecutors or lawenforcement people to disclose knowledge that they have that, if

not given, could adversely affect the lives and freedom of other people.

In this case here, this information was exculpatory. I know they

were trying to hide an informer.

But there should have been an obligation on their part to come

forward, even if there were not a motion made, that would have

stopped this trial, or at least have clarified it; and they didn’t do

so.

Today, under our Federal system, we’ve got some Rule 16s,

where a defendant doesn’t even have to come forward and ask for

exculpatory evidence. There is a Rule 16 that makes it mandatory.

Well, I think we’ve got to go one step further.

I think that the FBI, or whatever law-enforcement agency, when

they have this situation and there’s good cause to believe that by

withholding this information they are going to put into force a step

that could cause men like this to spend all these years in jail,

that’s a horrible thing.

I don’t have to live with this. You used to let this stuff roll off;

but I realize now that there was a terrible injustice here.

I can’t apologize to these men for the whole FBI, but I certainly

apologize for myself. I don’t know what I could have done, but

maybe I could have worked harder at pushing this thing; I don’t

know.

I think, if we can come out of this hearing with some legislation

that will prevent this, then we’ve done the job that all of us in this

country want to have done.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Zalkind, thank you for your testimony,

and you go with our thanks. Thank you very much.

The next witness that the committee will hear from now this

afternoon will be James McDonough.

Mr. McDonough, before taking your seat, the practice of the committee is that all witnesses be sworn. I would ask you to raise your

right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, sir. Please be seated.

Mr. McDonough, we have a brief understanding of what it is you

did in the Suffolk County prosecutor’s office; but could you summarize what it is you did do in 1967 in the Suffolk County prosecutor’s office?

STATEMENT OF JAMES M. McDONOUGH, ESQ.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. At that time, I was not a full Assistant District Attorney.

At that time, there were a number of Assistant Attorneys General in various offices throughout the state who were regulated by

the state legislature.

There were in the Suffolk County DA’s office, and most offices,

people like myself who did legal research, wrote briefs, wrote memorandums of law, and in major cases assisted the District Attorney

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in charge of the case with the production of the witnesses and

logistical matters and so forth.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Were you assigned to such a major case as the

Deegan murder?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Yes. Mr. Zalkind was given the Deegan case.

He asked me to assist him in the trial.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Can you describe for us as best you can recall

what it is that you did in the Deegan case?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. My memory is, I think, a little bit different

from Mr. Zalkind’s in some respects.

I was present throughout that trial, and I was in the second seat.

Not being an Assistant, I could not make any objections to testimony; I could not argue to the court. I didn’t have any vocal dealings, I didn’t have any direct dealings, with opposing counsel,

which I would say were about five or six.

But I was responsible for some of the technical aspects of advising Mr. Zalkind on what testimony should be brought forward.

And I’d like to save some time a little bit here; and I guess the

reason I’m here is the so-called Chelsea police report.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Right.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I’m amazed at some of the comments that

have been made about this situation; because as far as I’m concerned, the matter of the Chelsea police report is here because I

remembered having it, because of the testimony regarding the finding of the bullets in the alley.

But this matter has been before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and was heard by Judge Banks.

The Supreme Court of the state has ruled, first of all, that the

Chelsea police report was not exculpatory; that it could be inferred

that all of the information in it was known to defense counsel from

their cross-examination, and that the prosecutor had no duty to

disclose that at the time and under the circumstances revealed.

And unless we’re going to criticize the Supreme Judicial Court of

the Commonwealth for their ruling on the matter, I don’t see that

there’s much of an issue there.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Let me just ask you a couple questions. You’re

right; it is your 1993 affidavit, the Chelsea police report, and the

other two police reports that have our attention.

But just to finish what it is you did during the Deegan trial, did

you interview witnesses?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No. I was not allowed to, and I never did.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you respond to motions filed by defense

counsel?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No. I could not speak in open court at any

time at that time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I’m talking about in terms of research and

writing. If a defense lawyer filed a motion for some purpose and

a written response was required by the District Attorney, would

you help in the drafting?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I don’t recall specific instances, but I would

have done that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. That would be the type of thing that you would

do?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Yes.

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Mr. LATOURETTE. You said you gave Mr. Zalkind advice about

witnesses.

Do you recall, if not the specifics—if you recall the specifics,

great—but do you recall having active conversation with Mr.

Zalkind relative to, when this guy’s on the stand, we should ask

him this?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Well, when you’re sitting in that second seat,

you have an idea what the prosecutor wants to ask; but sometimes

they forget, so that you can remind them, maybe, to go to that subject.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you, like Mr. Zalkind, meet Mr. Barboza

for the first time at the grand jury?

Were you present at the grand jury?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I was not present at the grand jury. I was not

involved in the case at that time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Did you ever meet Mr. Barboza?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I saw him, but I never really met him. I never

had any personal face-to-face conversation with him. I was in

rooms on two or three occasions that he was in the room during

court recesses. That’s about it.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Exhibit No. 49 in the materials is an affidavit

executed in 1993 indicating that the Chelsea police report was in

the prosecutor’s file during the trial.

[Exhibit 49 follows:]

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88

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Mr. MCDONOUGH. That was my memory.

That was my memory; and the reason I remember it is not because of the statement that Mr. Zalkind referred to, but it was an

evidentiary problem contained therein of number of bullets.

The bullets were picked up by various police officers. As you

know, it’s important to establish a chain of custody, especially in

this case, where there’s a question of how many guns were used.

That had to be resolved, and that’s why I remember the report.

I guess my memory was right. I don’t know; I’m not familiar with

Mr. McKenna’s affidavit, but the report was found in files of the

District Attorney’s office.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I heard what you said about, I’m sorry, I don’t

remember the name of the court, but I guess it’s the Supreme

Court of the State of Massachusetts. I understood that you said

there’s been a discussion about the Chelsea police report, and it’s

been found by the court not to be exculpatory.

What it does contain, whether exculpatory or not, if you look at

it, there are people in the report who were not prosecuted, and

then there are some who are not in the report who were prosecuted.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. That’s an evidentiary problem. These hearsay

statements, this is the trouble with disclosing information. I have

raw files that I had.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Here’s the difficulty I have. You have the report from the Chelsea Police Department, which some people have

said never turned up during the course of the prosecution. You say

it was in the prosecution file. The Supreme Court or whatever it

is says that it’s not exculpatory.

If the prosecuting agencies are in possession of the report in

1967, when this case is going on, don’t you think it’s unusual that

somebody doesn’t go to Barboza and say, what’s the deal? We have

this Chelsea Police Department report prepared right after Teddy

Deegan is murdered. Some people listed in it we’re not prosecuting,

and there are some people we are prosecuting who aren’t listed in

it.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Barboza, in this trial, was cross-examined extensively about Flemmi and the information in this report. That’s

why the Supreme Court of Massachusetts inferred they had this report from a cross-examination, I think by Mr. Chisholm mostly,

and Mr. O’Donnell.

That was the whole theory of the case; and then it was argued

in the same case that Barboza was guilty, and he should have put

him in. That was all put before the jury.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Have you been following the hearings of this

committee at all?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Somewhat, in the paper; but this is the first

time I’ve seen these so-called 23 pages, and I don’t know where

they come from, or what kind of statements they are. Is there anything in the summary that says they did it?

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think Mr. Barboza says he did it, eventually.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I mean, in these FBI reports, is there any

other suggestion that somebody actually said that they did it?

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In other words, these statements are also hearsay statements,

which, even if they were available, probably couldn’t have been

used without bringing in the witnesses.

Mr. WILSON. That’s the point.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. There are serious evidentiary problems with

some of these. I haven’t read them, so I don’t know.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Before I leave you to my colleagues, let me ask

you about the other two exhibits of interest to us, 11 and 13. These

are reports from the Boston Police Department and the Massachusetts State Police Department. Exhibits 11 and 13.

[Exhibits 11 and 13 follow:]

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92

93

94

95

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Mr. MCDONOUGH. I have 13. [Pause].

OK; I have 11 in front of me now.

Mr. LATOURETTE. And 11 is the police report from Boston; is that

right?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Yes.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Boston Police Department; 13 is the Massachusetts State Police Department.

My question is not that complicated. I’m just wondering, as with

the Chelsea Police Department report, do you have a recollection

whether or not these two documents were within the prosecutor’s

file during the prosecution of the Deegan murder case?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I have no memory of seeing exhibit 11 in the

files of the District Attorney at any time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Could you look at exhibit 13 for me? And my

question will be the same.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I think I know the background of this report.

I really don’t have a specific memory of this; but I notice in Paragraph 9 it just paraphrases the language in Evans’ report.

At this time, the Chelsea police did not have the capacity to investigate homicides. In other words, there’s a 3-year period between the date of the homicide and Barboza’s becoming a witness.

At the time of the murder, the Chelsea police used to call in

State Police to investigate homicide cases. Then, when this case

went nowhere, right after the event, then Suffolk County got involved in it, and the Boston Police.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Who was responsible for assembling the prosecutor’s file in this case? Who determines what goes into the prosecutor’s file and what doesn’t?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Well, the prosecutor mostly, and whatever materials come in.

Mr. LATOURETTE. This document was prepared 2 days after the

murder, if that’s a correct statement.

The Chelsea Police Department didn’t do their own homicide investigations, so they called on the State Police. I understand that;

but why, then, isn’t the State Police report located within the prosecutor’s file as you guys get ready to prosecute the Deegan murder

case?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I won’t say that it isn’t; I just don’t recall. I

know that Lieutenant Richard Gass was a State policeman at that

time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Just very briefly. Part of what troubles me is this.

If counsel had received the evidence contained in the Chelsea Police Department report done by Lieutenant Evans and that had led

to an investigation as to the whereabouts of the men named in the

report but not named in the indictment, so beginning with whether

the Supreme Judicial Court thought it was exculpatory, getting

back to what the lead prosecutor in this case would have done if

he had this information, if you were the person doing the research

in this case for Mr. Zalkind, and you recall having this report that

was authored by Lieutenant Evans of the Chelsea Police Department about the Deegan murder, how is it that document did not

get before Mr. Zalkind and brought to his attention so that he

could in fact question in more depth about those individuals?

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Mr. MCDONOUGH. I can’t speak for his memory of what his decisionmaking process was at the time, but the evidence report wasn’t

a part of the District Attorney’s office. I think they found it at the

time of the Salvati motion.

Mr. TIERNEY. Was it your responsibility to make sure that documents like that were in fact in Mr. Zalkind’s file? Was that your

role in the office at that time?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. To some extent, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you remember putting this document in that

file?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No, not this one.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you’re assuming it was there?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I assume it possibly was. I don’t know.

I really don’t know. I have no memory of this one being there.

The Chelsea police report I knew was there.

Mr. TIERNEY. That’s the report I’m talking about.

I’m talking about the report that was written by Lieutenant

Thomas Evans of the Chelsea Police Department. In it he said he

had information from Captain Renfrew that an informant of his

had contacted him and told him that Roy French, Vincent Flemmi,

Francis Imbuglia, Romeo Martin, Nicky Femia and a man called

Freddi left the Ebb Tide restaurant at 9 at the evening of the

Deegan murder and returned around 11. According to the report,

Martin was alleged to have said to French, ‘‘We nailed him.’’ Mr. Flemmi appears in this document; and again, there’s no

mention of Joseph Salvati.

Mr. Zalkind testified that if he had seen the information in that

report, he would have, perhaps prior to the return of the indictments, but certainly during the trial, caused a more concentrated

investigation into the whereabouts of the men mentioned in the report who were not named in the indictment.

So with that report, sir—do you recall that report? You’ve said

in an affidavit that you did; and do you recall it because you

thought it important to the case to put it in Mr. Zalkind’s preparatory file?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. It was in the file somewhere; I know that. It’s

in the custody of the DA’s office now.

But that evidence, if you can call it evidence, would not be conclusive anyway.

Mr. TIERNEY. No, no. I don’t want to keep going back to it. I

want to give you that point for what it’s worth right now.

You’re the person who, I understand, prepared Mr. Zalkind’s trial

file?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. To some extent, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. To a good extent?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Yes, that’s fair.

Mr. TIERNEY. It was your job?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. You recalled this document, and you thought it was

important enough in that trial to put it in Mr. Zalkind’s file for

preparation purposes?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. It was among the documents we had, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Was it among the documents that you culled out

from the others included in the trial preparation file?

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Mr. MCDONOUGH. I don’t know what you mean by a trial preparation file.

Mr. TIERNEY. In the course of preparing the file for Mr. Zalkind

to use at trial, you didn’t take some information and say, that’s not

something I want to use at trial, and take something else and say,

that’s something I want to put in his trial file; you just put everything in one file?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. It didn’t work the way you say.

Mr. TIERNEY. How did it work?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Well, we had reports, but then when the witnesses came, we dealt with it as we went along.

Mr. TIERNEY. How did you deal with this when the witnesses

came up? How did you deal with this one?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. In the first place, I don’t think it’s accurate.

The information in it that the phone call came to French, French

didn’t need any phone calls; French was there. Why would anybody

tell him that we nailed him? I wouldn’t regard that as reliable information anyway.

Mr. TIERNEY. Back at that time, do you recall whether or not you

thought this was a significant document that should be brought to

Mr. Zalkind’s attention?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I don’t remember bringing that specific portion

of it to his attention.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is it significant to you now that Mr. Zalkind thinks

it was significant, in that if he had had it, he would have done a

more thorough inquisition of the gentlemen who were not named

in the indictment but were named in the report?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I don’t know what he could have done with it;

because the defense lawyers cross-examined Barboza extensively

with regard to this very matter, with regard to the very same

names.

This was all brought out in their cross-examination, and as part

of their argument.

Mr. TIERNEY. But you don’t recall specifically bringing it to Mr.

Zalkind’s attention, or indicating you thought it was in any way

significant?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No. My concern, as I said, was informants,

and that’s how I remember the documents.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. No questions at this time.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. McDonough, you referred to cross-examination by the defense counsel, and obviously you’re indicating that

they did have this Chelsea police report at their disposal.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I don’t know that. They had the information,

no question about it; and the Supreme Court has inferred that they

did have the same information.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We don’t know whether they had this particular

report, but you claim at least that they had this information?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Oh, definitely.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But what they didn’t have was access to the informants?

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Mr. MCDONOUGH. But they had access to Lieutenant Evans, and

they could have asked him for his report on the stand.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But let me ask you this. I think we can agree

that the role of the prosecutor ought to be to do justice.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No question.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Correct?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No question.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you see any sort of responsibility on the part

of government, whether it be state or the Federal Government, to

vet a particular report, whether it be an FBI report or a State Police report or a Boston report or a Chelsea report?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. In the abstract, I’d say they do.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, in reality; because clearly I hope and believe that it’s the responsibility of the government to investigate

and to be satisfied that they’re indicting those that are truly responsible.

If there should be information, I won’t even call it exculpatory,

but that tends away from particular topics and a particular subject,

would you agree it ought to be pursued by the government; not by

defense counsel on cross-examination, but by the District Attorney’s office and the investigative agencies?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. The answer, I think, is yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. That’s the point that my colleague is making.

You sat here this morning as we’ve been talking again about the

problems that are endemic, some of us believe, in terms of the Department of Justice as well as the FBI, in terms of disclosure.

There’s a case going on across the street that we’re all familiar

with that most likely would not have occurred but for, you know,

a Federal District Court Justice by the name of Mark Wolf threatening the Department of Justice with contempt, so that the names

of particular informants were revealed.

So just simply to suggest that it’s the burden of defense counsel

on cross-examination to come up with this information—you know,

we do have an adversarial system; I understand we have an adversarial system. But it’s not a game; it’s a search for the truth. And

there are unfortunately too many cases where the government does

not disclose the necessary information to secure the truth. That’s

what I think we’ve discovered during the course of these hearings.

Again, I don’t disagree; the Supreme Judicial Court could rule

that this wasn’t necessarily exculpatory information.

But where I do disagree is at the responsibility of the government to pursue to whatever ends were necessary to make a determination that they were in fact proceeding against the right people.

In any event, you have no memory of a Boston police report.

Have you had a chance, Mr. McDonough, to review the exhibit

books?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Just this morning.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just this morning?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You had no information that you can remember

from the FBI, the reports from the FBI that we’ve been discussing

here this morning?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. There were no reports from the FBI.

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I’ll remind you that in those days, the FBI would never give you

a 302 report, or whatever you call it; you had to get permission for

an agent to testify from the Attorney General of the United States.

They never gave us any information.

With regard to their presence, I think I met Rico once in the

street, or was introduced to him. I never had a conversation with

him. They were not present during the trial of this case.

During the trial of this case, actually, my memory was Barboza

was not in Federal custody. Barboza was kept in a safe house

which was run by the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office, and

he was also kept at the Barnstable County House of Correction.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Are you aware that in the Deegan case, Special

Agent Condon did testify?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Yes, I am.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But Special Agent Rico did not testify?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. That’s right; he did not.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In your conversations with either of those two

gentlemen, or with anyone else, did you have conversation that

would have raised some doubts in your mind as to whether there

was other information that you did not have available which would

have compelled you to produce that information to counsel for the

defense?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No.

My memory is that the only reason Dennis Condon testified was

that there was some suggestion that Barboza and Stathopoulos had

been together with him, and they had compared notes as to the incidents in the alley.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So that was the rationale——

Mr. MCDONOUGH. That’s all he testified to.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Are you practicing law, Mr. McDonough?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I’m on the other side now. I’m semi-retired;

I’m writing appellate briefs for the Committee on Public Counsel.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. McDonough, do you have any recollection of

who participated in determining whether the death penalty would

be sought in the Deegan case?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No.

Mr. WILSON. Do you have any recollection——

Mr. MCDONOUGH. That was not an option, I don’t think, at that

time. The penalty for first-degree murder was the death penalty

unless the jury recommended clemency.

Mr. WILSON. Well, we’ll leave that.

Do you recall whether Jimmy Flemmi was ever put before a

grand jury?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. WILSON. My last question is, do you recall whether anybody

ever went back to Lieutenant Evans and asked him where he got

his information for the report that was the Chelsea police report?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Well, I was not involved in the trial; but it was

Judge Banks who offered to produce the informant for the consideration of defense lawyers, and they declined the opportunity, I believe.

101

But that was in connection with the Salvati motion for a new

trial; and at that time I suspect that Mr. McKenna talked to Lieutenant Evans of the Chelsea police.

Mr. WILSON. Do you know that, or is that speculation?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I think I can say I know that. I wasn’t present

at any of those meetings, but—— Mr. WILSON. So McKenna spoke to Evans?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. I think he spoke with Barslowski and Lieutenant Evans.

Mr. WILSON. And what was McKenna’s job at that time?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. McKenna handled the motion for a new trial

in the Salvati case.

Mr. WILSON. Now, you mentioned that there was an informant,

and Judge Banks offered to make that informant available.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. That came from the so-called Evans report.

Mr. WILSON. How do you know that?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. From reading the Salvati case and reading the

report. Evans said Renfrew had an informant, or tipster as the Supreme Court called it; but I think it’s actually a woman.

Mr. WILSON. How do you know that person was the only informant that Evans would have—— Mr. MCDONOUGH. I don’t know that; but Evans said somebody

told Renfrew, and that’s in the report.

Mr. WILSON. Right. But do you have any knowledge that there

was only one informant that gave information in the Chelsea police

report?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No, I don’t. Just what the report says.

Mr. WILSON. So all you know is what’s in the report and what’s

in the Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion; is that correct?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Correct.

Mr. WILSON. Do you have any other knowledge apart from those

two documents that would shed light on any of the informant information?

Mr. MCDONOUGH. No.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. McDonough, we thank you very much for

coming here today. We thank you for answering all the questions

we put to you, and you go with our thanks.

Mr. MCDONOUGH. Thank you very much.

Mr. LATOURETTE. The last witness to appear before the committee today is Wendie Gershengorn.

Welcome; we appreciate your being here today. It is the practice

of the committee that all witnesses be sworn, and so I would like

you to raise your right hand and stand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. LATOURETTE. I think, by agreement of the Members of the

minority party, we’re going to let Mr. Wilson, lead counsel, begin

with the questioning; and if anybody else has questions, we’ll go

from there.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Good afternoon.

STATEMENT OF WENDIE GERSHENGORN, JUDGE, MIDDLESEX

SUPERIOR COURT

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Good afternoon.

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Mr. WILSON. Judge Gershengorn, how long have you served on

the Massachusetts Parole Board?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. It was approximately 3 or 4 years. I can’t remember the dates.

Mr. WILSON. Do you have a general recollection of how many

commutation petitions you reviewed?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. No.

Mr. WILSON. Is it safe to assume it is a fairly large number?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. It was a large number.

Mr. WILSON. We wanted to focus on one document. It’s exhibit

46; and we’ve supplied this to you in advance of the hearing, so

hopefully you’ve had an opportunity to review exhibit 46. Do you

have that in front of you now?

[Exhibit 46 follows:]

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Ms. GERSHENGORN. I do.

I’m sorry; but I was told by Mr. Mutton that it was customary

for me to be permitted to just make a short statement, and I did

want to just do that.

Mr. LATOURETTE. You know what? That’s my job, and I apologize

for that. It absolutely is your right and opportunity to make a short

statement. We would welcome you to do that.

Ms. GERSHENGORN. I first of all wanted to thank you all for my

being here in the way that I am here, because Mr. Wilson was kind

enough when he first contacted me to offer to speak to me informally.

Since at that time I believe there was an active case pending in

the Superior Court involving these issues, and indeed involving the

very person that I understand you’re going to want to speak to me

about today, I thought it was important, and I thought that it was

even required under the Code of Judicial Conduct, for any comments that I made to be on the record. So I appreciate your accommodating that request.

Those same rules as I read them prohibit me from making any

public comments about pending or impending public cases.

So again, I appreciate your accommodating that aspect by being

willing to summons me so that I can speak to you; and I am delighted to share any information I have with you and answer any

of Mr. Wilson’s questions.

Mr. LATOURETTE. I want to thank you very much for that, Judge;

and I apologize for not doing that to Mr. McDonough in the back

of the room. I didn’t deny that opportunity, but I didn’t give the

opportunity to Mr. McDonough.

The record of this hearing will be open for a period of 7 days; and

if there’s a statement that you would like to provide to us, an opening set of remarks, Mr. McDonough, you’re more than welcome to

do that, and we’ll be more than happy to receive that.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Exhibit 46, which you have before you, is a memorandum dated November 29, 1976, and it is to the Board of Pardons, Special Attention Board Member Gershengorn, from Joseph

M. Williams, Jr., Supervisor, Warrant Investigation Unit; and it’s

involving Joseph Salvati.

Who was Joe Williams, Judge Gershengorn?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Mr. Williams was a parole officer. He was

the head of the investigation unit, warrant department; he was a

supervisor. He actually did all of the investigations.

Mr. WILSON. We’ve spoken with many people, and their general

consensus was that he took his job seriously. Would you agree with

that assessment?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. I would; I would.

Mr. WILSON. Do you know why Mr. Williams prepared this particular report?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. I have no memory of this specific report; so

I can’t say I know why he prepared the report, no.

Mr. WILSON. Do you recall asking him to provide a report?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. The report is dated November 29, 1976, and

Mr. Williams, in the report, says, ‘‘As you advised on 11–17–76.’’

106

I don’t know why I asked him; but I can tell you what my practice

was, if that is helpful to you.

Mr. WILSON. Pardon?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. I can tell you what my practice was; but I

have no recollection, no specific recollection.

Mr. WILSON. Just very briefly, was it your practice in cases

where you had questions to ask for a report to be prepared for you?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Yes.

Mr. WILSON. And do you recall that happening, although not in

this case?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. In general, my procedure was to ask staff to

get all the information they could about a petitioner, and different

persons were responsible for different areas of questions.

Mr. WILSON. This document indicates that it was prepared at

your request.

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Correct.

Mr. WILSON. Is it fair to say that reports such as this were not

prepared for every single commutation request?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Every commutation request came in as a petition with reasons why that person believed they should get a commutation; and obviously, depending on what reasons they gave,

that would direct the kind of investigation or questions that you

have.

If they say that they had worked for many years in a hospital

program with severely incapacitated kids, you’d ask a staff member

to get all of the records from the hospital that involved the kind

of work he was doing; everyone he knew.

Mr. WILSON. What I’m getting at is, Mr. Williams didn’t prepare

a report like this for every single commutation request; is that correct?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. No.

Mr. WILSON. He had to be asked to prepare a report; is that correct?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. He had to be asked to prepare a report, and

the report would depend on the person.

Mr. WILSON. If we could turn to the second page of exhibit 46,

there are four points made in the memorandum, and I’ll read the

fourth in full for the record.

‘‘The ‘word’ from reputable law enforcement officers was that

subject was just thrown in by Barboza on the murder because he

hated subject, that Joseph Barboza was asked by people, was this

true, and that Barboza denied this’’; and the second word, ‘‘word,’’

in this section is in quotation marks.

Do you have any recollection as to whether you did anything further after you received this memo and read this section?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. As I say, I have no memory of this particular

petition or the events specifically surrounding it; but when you

called me I told you that it might help reconstruct what happened

if I could have the whole request for commutation from Mr. Salvati,

or from counsel if he was represented by counsel.

I would have written notes, I would have seen who came on Mr.

Salvati’s behalf, and I would have had some opinion, given a vote

with an opinion, and that would perhaps refresh my recollection.

107

But I have no specific memory of doing anything as a result of

this information.

Mr. WILSON. If it’s acceptable to the chair, we’re waiting to receive some information that we thought we would have received by

this week; and when we obtain that information, if it’s agreeable

to you, we will provide you information, and if there’s something

that furthers our purposes you can perhaps provide a written onthe-record response for inclusion in the record.

Ms. GERSHENGORN. I would be happy to.

Mr. WILSON. Let me just go to where we’re ultimately going to.

This is a very short memorandum, and it seems to be somewhat

significant that the final point is that the ‘‘word’’ from reputable

law-enforcement officers was that this individual was not at the

crime, that he was convicted, and indeed it was a capital crime

that he was convicted of committing.

Obviously the question arises, how did this information strike

you at the time, and what did you do next? And I think you’ve answered the question that you don’t have any recollection; is that

correct?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. That’s correct.

Mr. WILSON. Do you recall whether any other board members at

the time had any questions about Mr. Salvati’s case? Moving away

from this document, were there other questions that were shared

amongst the Parole Board members?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Every member would have voted on this

case.

To the extent that the member was one who was inclined to give

reasons for their decision, those reasons would have been expressed

on the vote sheet, which I assume you have because it’s part of the

corrections commutation file.

So I’m afraid I don’t understand the question.

Mr. WILSON. No; the question is, aside from this particular document, do you recall any discussions amongst the other board members or observations made by them that, for example, they had concerns about this particular commutation application, and specifically there was an argument that the person convicted was innocent, and then there was an official report prepared by the man

who prepared reports for the board that indicated that some reputable law-enforcement officers thought that he was thrown into

this murder because the person that testified against him didn’t

like him, and he was not at the crime, which seems to be a fairly

salient piece of information in the context of a commutation application for somebody who had been through a capital-murder case?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. I think I wasn’t understanding where you

were going with that, and what you were asking me.

To the extent that I’ve devoted my entire professional career to

the criminal-justice system, the justice system, as a public defender

and Federal defender, District Court judge and Superior Court

judge for 20 years, I am constantly concerned that there may be

innocent people incarcerated.

It has been with me all the time, as a public defender and Federal defender, that I was perhaps not doing enough, that somebody

else perhaps could have done a better job.

108

As a Superior Court judge, it’s a significant part of my jurisdiction to look at motions for new trials; and in Massachusetts motions for new trials because of newly discovered evidence are always entertained.

So, yes, whenever a person tells me such a thing—and I think

my colleagues on the board, every one of them, feels this way—that

was an area that you would just really feel in the pit of your stomach.

However, No. 1, it was not unusual for persons appearing before

the Parole Board or the Governor’s Board of Commutations to tell

us that they weren’t responsible.

That aside, the oath that we took was to enforce the law; and the

statute that creates the Parole Board and that creates the Governor’s Board of Commutations in Massachusetts is one that constrains the role of the government.

The statute specifically says that the Board shall not review the

proceedings of the trial here, and shall not consider any questions

regarding the correctness, regularity or legality of such proceedings.

And so the Parole Board was just not a place that was designed

to or that could consider guilt or innocence. We weren’t equipped

for it; but, and equally as important, it wasn’t what we were permitted to do.

Mr. WILSON. That anticipates my next question, which is simply

the what-next aspect.

You asked for a memo to be prepared; a memo was prepared, and

what happened next? And I think it’s fair to say you don’t recall

what happened next.

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Do you mean what happened as far as a

vote?

Mr. WILSON. Well, anything that’s pertinent to this case and

your involvement.

Ms. GERSHENGORN. I have no specific memory of the taking of a

vote on this case.

So I guess the answer is, I have no memory of what happened

next; except that I’m a judge, and I read the advance sheets, I read

the reports, and I know that the Supreme Judicial Court and a

judge of the Superior Court reviewed this case as late as 1995, and

the judge of the Superior Court reviewed it yet again within perhaps the past year.

Mr. WILSON. My last question has a couple parts to it.

Did any Federal law-enforcement personnel speak with you

about Louis Greco?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Again, I have no memory of that. I have no

memory of who Mr. Greco is.

There has been only one occasion, which has nothing to do with

any of these individuals, on which I remember any law-enforcement person appearing before the Parole Board. That was done in

a session on the record, and had nothing to do with any of these

individuals.

Mr. WILSON. I’ll ask the same question putting the three names

again, Peter Limone, Henry Tameleo and Joseph Salvati; and I

think your answer would be no?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. No.

109

Mr. WILSON. Do you have any recollection of any law-enforcement personnel speaking to you about a parole or commutation in

an ex parte fashion?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Never. Never.

Mr. WILSON. Do you have a recollection that you did not have

one?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. I have no recollection in this matter; I guess

that should be the predicate. It was many years ago. There was

nothing really unusual about it. I have no memory.

But I have no memory of any law-enforcement person coming to

speak to me.

You say ex parte. In those days, the petitioner himself would

often come, because lifers in those days got furloughs, and they

would come to the Board. Family members would come, and that

would be in a sense ex parte. They would actually come and talk

to a member.

But law enforcement did not. I don’t remember any time law enforcement did.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Wendie, how are you?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Good.

Mr. DELAHUNT. These applications by the four individuals that

Mr. Wilson listed received a lot of attention. They were high-profile

matters. I don’t know whether you have a memory of the publicity

surrounding the hearings. I see Mr. Salvati here and Mr. Limone.

Do you have a memory of the publicity surrounding those hearings?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. In 1970—there weren’t—— Mr. DELAHUNT. When did you serve on the Board? From when

to when?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. 1975 through 1979.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Through 1979; OK.

Ms. GERSHENGORN. And this petition was around 1976.

I don’t recall. I don’t recall this at all, but I don’t recall a hearing

being given. I mean, I don’t recall a public hearing at that time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Who was the chair during your tenure on the Parole Board?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Judge Chernoff.

Mr. WILSON. Judge Chernoff was the chair of the Parole Board

at the time?

Ms. GERSHENGORN. Yes.

So, was there a hearing? I don’t recall any hearing.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don’t want to belabor this, but the committee

has a number of statements and testimony relative to the issues

and concerns surrounding the petitions. Maybe the staff could provide them to you, to see if it evokes any memory whatsoever.

And why don’t we just simply leave it like that, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Mr. LATOURETTE. Judge, I want to thank you very much for your

participation this afternoon, for your answers.

110

As we indicated, there may be additional information coming

your way. We would appreciate whatever response you have in response to that.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing today; and

with that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[A complete set of exhibits for the hearing record follow:]

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(251)

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S USE OF

INFORMANTS IN NEW ENGLAND

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Boston, MA.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Courtroom

6, 15th Floor, J.W. McCormack U.S. Post Office and Courthouse,

90 Devonshire Street, Boston, MA, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman of

the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Burton, Shays, Tierney, and Lynch.

Also present: Representatives Delahunt and Meehan.

Staff present: James C. Wilson, chief counsel; Chad Bungard,

Hilary Funk, and Matt Rupp, counsels; Blain Rethmeier, communications director; Allyson Blandford, assistant to chief counsel;

and Robert A. Briggs, chief clerk.

Mr. BURTON. I ask that the tabular material referred to be included in the record and without objection so ordered. I ask you

now to consent that a binder of exhibits for this hearing be included in the record and, without objection, so ordered.

I also ask you now to consent that questioning in the matter

under consideration proceed under Clause 2J2 of House Rule 11

and Committee Rule 14 in which the chairman and ranking minority member allocate time to the committee counsel as they deem

appropriate for extended questioning not to exceed 60 minutes divided equally between the majority and minority and, without objection, so ordered.

I also ask unanimous consent that Representatives Delahunt and

Meehan, who are not members of the committee, be permitted to

participate in today’s hearing and, without objection, so ordered.

We may have another Member appear later. If not, that’s fine.

If he does, we will ask that there be no objection to him participating in the hearing as well.

I want to thank my good colleague, one of our subcommittee

chairman, Mr. Shays, for being here, especially with the weather

being like it is in the northeast today. It is nice having my colleague on the committee, Mr. Tierney and Mr. Lynch with us. Mr.

Meehan and Mr. Delahunt, we appreciate you being here as well.

We are here today in Boston because the Government Reform

Committee has been conducting an investigation for the last 2

years into how the FBI used informants here in organized crime

cases.

What we have found has been absolutely shocking. When I was

growing up in Indiana, the FBI was revered. J. Edgar Hoover had

252

been put up on a pedestal. I thought he could walk on water. I remember watching Jimmy Stewart in ‘‘The FBI Story,’’ and watching Herbert Filbrick in ‘‘I Led Three Lives,’’ and how they referred

to Mr. Hoover like he was deified.

There was no organization in the country that was more highly

regarded than the FBI. So it is very disturbing when we dig into

something like this episode in Boston and discover a level of corruption that is absolutely appalling. And it is extremely disappointing to learn that so much of what was going on here was brought

directly to J. Edgar Hoover’s attention in Washington. It seems

that he and his aides just let these terrible injustices slip by.

I want to make it clear that I am a strong supporter of the FBI.

There are many, many good people in the FBI who are dedicated

law enforcement officers. So when I single out one group of FBI officials for criticism, it is not meant to denigrate the entire organization.

But I really believe in congressional oversight. And when we see

the type of abuse that happened here in Boston, we have an obligation to dig into it. We have an obligation to get the facts and lay

them out for all of the American people to see.

Hopefully, the FBI and the Justice Department will be stronger

organizations as a result. Maybe if congressional oversight had

been more vigorous, we wouldn’t be sitting here today. And when

we finish, I hope we will have done our best to make the system

better.

We first got involved in this because we heard about the case of

Joe Salvati. I see him sitting here today, along with his wife Marie.

Joe Salvati went to prison for 30 years for a crime he didn’t commit. He was convicted because the FBI let their star witness, Joe

‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza, commit perjury on the witness stand.

The Justice Department had lots of evidence of who the real killers were. But they let Barboza put Joe Salvati away for life. Other

defendants were given the death penalty, although it wasn’t carried out. That was in 1967. It took 30 years for Joe Salvati to get

out of prison. When he went to prison, he had four little kids.

When he finally got out, they were grown men and women.

He isn’t the only one. Peter Limone, who I also see here today,

spent 34 years in prison. That is pretty shocking. But that is just

the tip of the iceberg. That was the beginning of nearly four decades of corruption involving the Justice Department: Informants

committed murders with impunity. Killers were tipped off so they

could flee before being arrested. Local investigations of murders,

and drug dealing and arms smuggling were limited to Boston. They

sent Joe Barboza into the compromised. When people went to the

Justice Department with evidence about murders, some of them

wound up dead.

One FBI agent, John Connelly, has been convicted and sent to

prison. A second agent, Paul Rico, took the Fifth before our committee. When he first appeared before our committee he didn’t take

the Fifth. He was very recalcitrant.

I asked him if he wanted to take his Fifth Amendment privilege

and he said, ‘‘What can you do to me?’’ After we questioned him

and after he found out how grievous the problem was, he came

back the next time with several lawyers and did take the Fifth.

253

I never thought I would see the day when an FBI agent took the

Fifth. But what makes what happened here so bad is that it wasn’t

just one or two people. The pattern of corruption and ethical shortcuts went on for nearly 40 years.

The damage that was done wasn’t just limited to Boston. They

sent Joe Barboza into the witness protection program in California.

They gave him a new identity and he killed again. An FBI agent

and a Justice Department lawyer flew out to California to testify

on Barboza’s behalf and they helped him get a lighter sentence.

We held a hearing on that episode back in February. One of the

local law enforcement officials from California said it all in his testimony: ‘‘The FBI at the time was considered pretty sacrosanct.

They had damaged our case to the point that we didn’t think the

jury would give us a first degree murder verdict.’’ At the end of the day, people’s respect for the rule of law was

destroyed. And the reach was wide—Bulger and Flemmi’s cozy relationship with law enforcement caused problems in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Florida, Oklahoma, Nevada and

California.

Today, we’re going to hear about a murder in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

A prominent businessman named Roger Wheeler was murdered in

1981. In Boston, the FBI had reason to believe that Whitey Bulger

and Stephen Flemmi were involved. But they didn’t share the evidence. It’s hard to believe that people in Oklahoma were trying to

solve a murder and Federal law enforcement officials were protecting the killers.

Now we know a lot more. Flemmi and Bulger were prized informants. They were protected. Worse still, the hit man in the

Wheeler murder has said former FBI Agent H. Paul Rico was part

of the conspiracy. That is the same Paul Rico who came before our

committee and took the Fifth.

We’re going to hear today from Sergeant Mike Huff of the Tulsa

Police Department. He’s going to tell us about the stone walls he

kept running into when he tried to conduct this investigation.

We’re also going to hear from Mr. Wheeler’s son, David. I think

that’s important. We can never forget, we aren’t talking about abstract ideas. People died because of what FBI informants did. Lives

were destroyed. And we shouldn’t ever lose sight of that.

In addition, we’re going to hear from two former Federal prosecutors, Jeremiah O’Sullivan and Paul Markham. Mr. O’Sullivan led

the prosecution of a horse race-fixing case. James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi were deeply involved. They

were named as co-conspirators, but they were never indicted. We’d

like to know why. Mr. O’Sullivan also played a major role in a lot

of other matters involving Whitey Bulger and William Bulger.

Mr. Markham was the lead prosecutor in the trial of Raymond

Patriarca. He relied heavily on the testimony of Joe ‘‘The Animal’’

Barboza. In the course of that investigation, Mr. Markham and his

staff had access to wiretaps of Patriarca. Those wiretaps revealed

that Patriarca talked to Joe Barboza and Stephen Flemmi about

killing Teddy Deegan—the murder for which Joe Salvati and others

were convicted.

Some of the documents say Patriarca authorized the killing. But

Jimmy Flemmi was given a free pass. Patriarca was given a free

254

pass. We have a number of questions for Mr. Markham, including

whether he became aware of the facts in the Deegan case, and if

he did, what he did with them. I just want to remind you of what

happened when we were last here and the prosecutor in the

Deegan case appeared before us.

He said: ‘‘I must tell you this, that I was outraged—outraged at

the fact that if [the exculpatory evidence] had ever been shown to

me we wouldn’t be sitting here . . . I certainly would never have

allowed myself to prosecute this case having that knowledge. No

way. . . . That information should have been in my hands. It

should have been in the hands of the defense attorneys. It is outrageous, it’s terrible, and that trial shouldn’t have gone forward.’’ The prosecutor concluded by saying that he believes that

Barboza’s FBI handlers ‘‘knew from the beginning that Joe Barboza

was lying. . . . They have a witness that they knew was lying to

me, and they never told me he was lying.’’ It’s just unbelievable.

I’d like to thank all of our witnesses for being here today. I know

some of you aren’t here by choice. And I know that these are difficult questions to answer, and that it’s tough to dredge up these

old cases. But I wouldn’t have stuck with this investigation for so

long if I didn’t feel like this investigation was so important.

We cannot have the FBI winking and nodding while their informants commit murders. We cannot have the Justice Department

being complacent in perjured testimony that sends innocent men to

death row or to prison. The American people have a right to know

what happened. We need to lay this all out in the open so we can

restore the faith of the people in their government. And we need

to make sure that nothing like this ever happens again.

Before we go to our first panel, I want to say a few words about

tomorrow. I have called William Bulger to testify. Mr. Bulger is

well-known in this state. He was the President of the Senate. He

is the President of the University of Massachusetts. He’s a very

prominent person I am sorry he has to answer questions, but if we

didn’t talk to him, there isn’t a person here who could say we did

a thorough job.

This has caused quite a stir in the press. I did not make the decision to call him lightly. We do not intend to make unfair allegations. Our purpose is not to embarrass him. I think there are a

number of fair and legitimate questions that ought to be asked,

and that’s what we plan to do.

We were initially informed by his attorney that Mr. Bulger would

not appear before the committee, so I issued a subpoena. I think

it’s very unfortunate that I had to take that step. I had hoped that

Mr. Bulger, as a prominent member of the community, would appear voluntarily and cooperate with the committee’s investigation.

Yesterday, the Boston Globe published excerpts of Mr. Bulger’s

grand jury testimony. As everyone knows, grand jury testimony is

secret, and it’s against the law to release it. This committee has

never been in possession of that testimony. I want it noted for the

record that we were not the source of that information. I also think

that whoever did leak it acted in a very irresponsible manner.

We’ve had a very difficult time getting documents from the current Justice Department during this investigation. We had to fight

for months just to get an opportunity to read prosecution memos

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we asked for. That fight wasted a lot of time. We found out just

this week that very important documents had not been turned over

to us.

More time will be wasted. It’s very frustrating that at the same

time that important documents are being withheld from a congressional committee, grand jury testimony is being leaked to the press.

That’s not the right way to do business.

I want to again thank everyone for being here today. I want to

thank Mr. Delahunt who is very informed about a lot of these

issues. He’s not a member of the committee, but he’s been an active

part of this investigation from the outset, and he deserves a lot of

credit.

I also want to thank Mr. Shays, who made the suggestion almost

2 years ago that we start looking into this, and he’s made valuable

contributions all along the way. Thanks also to my other colleagues

for taking time during their holiday break to be here and work

with us on this issue.

With that, I’ll go to Mr. Tierney for an opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I think

that I for one want to thank you for having the half a dozen hearings that we’ve had over the past 2 years on this committee. We’ve

made a vigilant effort in pursuit of the facts of this case. We have

attempted to shed light on what appears to be a disgraceful relationship between the FBI and members of organized crime in Boston.

Over the next 2 days I expect we are going to continue that vigilant search for the truth and will be asking questions that long ago

should have been answered. We will seek the truth about those

crimes that should have been adverted.

You are right in saying that for nearly 40 years FBI agents in

Boston recruited members of organized crime to act as bureau informants. The facts bear that out. It also appears that meanwhile

these same agents may have also been recruited by organized

crime.

The result was a corrupt system where FBI agents protected the

informants at the expense of innocent citizens. What is most disturbing is that the FBI and other branches of the government are

alleged to have been complacent in the miscarriage of justice perhaps knowing that the wrong man had been convicted and imprisoned.

We have a particular responsibility to see that the Department

of Justice ensures that the victims of this corrupt relationship between FBI agents and members of Boston’s organized crime see

justice done. I urge the Department of Justice to explore a wide

range of options including the establishment of a victim’s compensation fund to address the claims of those most adversely affected by these crimes.

You indicated, Mr. Chairman, that you support the FBI and the

Justice Department. I think that is obviously true for every Member of Congress. We are not doing our job unless we make sure

that those in our organizations that are properly functioning and

that people can have confidence in them in that they are representing the true values of the country.

We have to keep in mind that one critical component of this inquiry is to determine what has to be done in the future so that

these shameful activities don’t happen again. We had one very specific hearing on this a while back with recommendations of what

we might do about informants and protected witnesses and how the

law might be applied as it stands or be amended so it would be

more effective and not lead to situations as this one has apparently

done.

We need to have another hearing, I suspect, Mr. Chairman, before we wrap up to make sure that we are pointed in the same direction to make sure that any improvements are, in fact, put in

place.

We also have to question how appropriate it is for the FBI headquarters to bear the name of J. Edgar Hoover. I thank you for filing a bill and co-sponsoring that with several others here. If, in

fact, as the evidence seems to indicate, the director at that time

knew of the situation and knew that innocent people being sent to

jail it seems to me we are not doing a justice to anybody to let that

name remain on that building.

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While it’s symbolic more than anything else, it is at least a good

measure of our seriousness of purpose in moving forward and making sure that we try to make it real to the Department of Justice

and the FBI employ agents that uphold the law rather than undermine it.

There is much that we have to scrutinize and condemn about the

past but we do have to look forward to the future and see what we

are going to do to correct the situation and prevent it from happening again.

Before I close, I just want to extend my heartfelt sympathies to

the family of Roger Wheeler whose killer remains unpunished. I

also want to express the concerns again that I did to the Limone

family and the Salvati family. I appreciate that all of you have testified before this committee in trying to help us do our job of oversight. I hope in some small way that this process will bring some

measure of justice to your families and other families that might

have been scarred by this sorted saga.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Tierney. We will now hear from one

of very important subcommittee chairman Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, the truth

is sometimes stranger than fiction. For me it sure was over 25

years ago when our Connecticut State’s Attorney said that former

FBI employees were killing his witnesses. I looked at Austin

McCreggan with some disbelief. He was right. He talked about how

there was a corrupt FBI organization in the greater Boston area,

in the New England area. I didn’t believe him. I didn’t believe my

friend.

I care mostly about this hearing because of Joe Salvati and

Marie and Peter Limone, and obviously the other two gentlemen

who were in prison and who passed away in prison. And for who

knows how many other families that may still have loved ones in

jail because of a corrupt FBI in the northeast.

So this is a very important hearing. We need to make sure that

the FBI cleans up its act. And we need to get better cooperation,

I think, from the FBI. The fact that they still are so reluctant to

cooperate with us and, frankly, the Department of Justice is very

disconcerting.

I know that you will continue to pursue this next year. Whoever

is chairman of this committee will continue to pursue it. I can’t say

I look forward to this hearing today but I know it’s an important

hearing and I thank you for having me.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Shays.

Mr. Lynch is a very valuable member of the committee. Mr.

Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, and also

Chairman Shays and our ranking member in attendance, Mr.

Tierney. I want to thank my colleagues for the bipartisan efforts

that have been in place and the efforts to resolve this troubling

matter.

In the course of these hearings and in the transcripts of the Federal court proceedings before Judge Wolf we have retraced a long

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cally the use of informants to infiltrate and prosecute organized

crime in New England in the last 40 years.

The nature and extent of the wrongdoing by agents and supervisors, which are the subject of these hearings, go to the very core

of our legitimacy as a government. While there have been important procedural questions raised in the press recently, which the

chairman has touched upon, I think it is important to refocus on

the factual basis of these hearings.

It is important to recall that under the color of law there have

been what we would fairly describe in other countries as atrocities

committed here. Let us remember that with the aid and assistance

of law enforcement there have been brutal murders of innocent

committed here. Let us be reminded that under the watchful eye

of the FBI completely defenseless women have been strangled here.

Let us not forget that based upon the findings of fact, that people

who return to the FBI for protection were led to their deaths by

the very people who held the duty to protect them. Let us not for

a moment forget that based upon the evidence before this committee, that the FBI allowed innocent men to be implicated and to be

convicted and imprisoned while they remained silent.

These were innocent men, husbands, fathers who spent over 30

years, and in some cases the remainder of their lives, in prison. It

is also important to remember that while these innocent men went

to trial and were convicted for a murder that they did not commit.

For every moment that these men sat in jail year after year for

30 years separated from their families, watching their children

grow up without fathers, watching their wives raise families without husbands, during all this as all this transpired, the FBI and

law enforcement officials either failed or refused to come forward

with the evidence that would have allowed these men to be free.

In closing, I find it impossible to ignore the human cost that

these events have caused. The families whose lives have been destroyed, the sons and daughters, brothers and sisters who have

been taken, the lives of fathers and husbands who have been stolen—stolen all under the color of law.

Mr. Chairman, I must compliment you on your energy and your

persistence during these hearings. As we have seen during these

hearings, in some of these atrocities the FBI and others were active

participants. In other instances they simply looked the other way.

I am pleased to say that with your help, Mr. Chairman, and the

good work of Mr. Waxman and Mr. Tierney and Mr. LaTourette

and Mr. Delahunt and my colleagues here today along with Chairman Shays that looking the other way has never been an option

for this committee.

Simply put, we seek the truth. It may in the end turn out to be

the painful truth. It may be the ugly truth, but in the end we need

the truth. We owe it to the victims, some of who were not even afforded a decent burial. We owe it to those like Maria Salvati and

Joe Salvati and their kids and their families.

We owe it to their esteemed counsel, Mr. Carrillo who has also

been a true hero on the part of justice in this matter. While we can

never restore has been taken away, if we aren’t vigilant and

thoughtful and loyal to the principles that underlie this country,

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our democracy and our constitution, perhaps in the end we may

prevent something like this from ever happening again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Lynch.

Mr. Meehan, welcome.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting

Congressman Delahunt and me to this hearing. We are both members of the House Judiciary Committee with jurisdiction over the

Justice Department. In fact, back in July 1998 I was the first Member of Congress to call for hearings on this matter. About a year

and a half later Congressman Delahunt, Congressman Frank, and

I sent letters to the chairman of the Judiciary Committee seeking

hearings on this matter.

Chairman Burton, I just want to say for the record the work of

this committee has been outstanding and shedding light on so

much of the horrible corrupt actions of so many people in positions

of public trust are very, very important.

I think these hearings have a special importance to all the people

of Massachusetts, to every Member of Congress, to me as a former

state prosecutor in this state.

What happened between Federal prosecutors, Boston FBI agents,

and Boston gangsters is really outrageous. It has damaged the

FBI’s credibility. It has exposed terrible flaws in the informant

management and undermined cases against these gangsters and

many others.

This special relationship helped dangerous felons flee justice. It

cost people their lives. People were murdered. There were people

in this room whose lives have been shattered forever.

There is nothing wrong with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office cultivating informants for cases, but there is something very

wrong when the relationship goes from agents using informants to

informants using agents. Guidelines were supposed to govern the

use of informants. The existing guidelines were clearly inadequate,

but regardless of the adequacy of the existing guidelines, these

guidelines were completely and totally ignored anyway.

Interactions between FBI agents and gangsters weren’t documented or disclosed. In many, many instances we have found out

they were falsified. Oversight by the Justice Department, the FBI

headquarters, was the exception instead of the norm.

Inevitably maintaining relationships with informants may require law enforcement to make tough decisions about an informant’s criminal actions. I think any former prosecutor or prosecutor

knows that is the hard truth. But, Mr. Chairman, there is a difference between making careful case-by-case decisions about how

long the leash should be and the notion of not only giving informants a blank check but allowing the system of corruption to take

place.

Unfortunately, Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, Whitey Bulger,

and others headed to nothing. In fact, some FBI agents went out

of their way to keep their criminal enterprise and operation. They

identified FBI and police informants for their gangsters. They lied

and they dissembled. They shut down leads in crimes of violence

in other cases.

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Perhaps worst of all they hindered and obstructed Michael Huff

and the Wheeler family from learning the truth about these gangsters and their role in their father’s murder. And, yes, some Federal prosecutors in Boston facilitated this incestuous relationship

between the officers and the gangsters.

The Judge Paul Wolf found despite some of their denials, Federal

prosecutors knew Whitey Bulger, Stephen Flemmi were long-time

FBI informants. These prosecutors made grave errors that allowed

Boston gangsters to commit and continue to commit these heinous

crimes. Worst of all, some of these Federal prosecutors lost sight

of their most solemn duty.

Above all, prosecutors with the enormous power they have must

maintain the public’s trust and have balance. Here in Boston with

the victim’s families here today, the trust was completely and totally shattered. Sadly, some of these prosecutors let their zealousness blind them into the duty that they had to maintain the integrity of their office.

With these hearings, Mr. Chairman, and the light that has been

shed on, I hope that we are never in a position again to have a case

like this unfold, but it is more than just regulations. It’s more than

just making sure they follow the rules. It’s shedding light and making sure that we change the culture of these agencies that have

committed such corruption.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Meehan.

Mr. Delahunt, once again, I want to thank you very much for all

the hard work you’ve put in with this committee even though you

are not a member of it. You are now recognized.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I mean that in a very

sincere and genuine way. The work of the committee in your leadership has been extraordinary. I think I would be remiss not to

also note that it was Judge Wolf back four or 5 years ago that

started this process, if you will. I find it particularly disturbing

that a judge, a Federal district court judge, had to threaten with

contempt an associate attorney general to produce a response.

As you have indicated, the cooperation on the part of the Department of Justice and the FBI has been remiss, has not been willing.

But you have persevered. You persisted and, yes, we have accomplished something. Let me suggest this. I truly hope that whoever

succeeds you, whether it be another committee of the House, possibly even the Judiciary Committee, that we continue to pursue

and continue this effort.

As I was reading the briefing board this morning, there are so

many individuals whose testimony could be valuable to this effort.

I just took a list of them if I can find them. If you would just indulge me.

I suggest that we should be hearing from special agent in charge

Larry Sarhardt, from Anthony Ciulla, from John Connelly, from

maybe Mrs. Steve Flemmi, from Mr. Martarano, from John Morris,

from Assistant Special Agent in charge Robert Fitzpatrick, from

one Frances Greene, from former Governor and former U.S. Attorney Bill Weld. We should also extend an invitation to the current

director of the FBI Robert Meuller who was first Assistant U.S. Attorney here in this jurisdiction.

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I think it’s important, as others have said, to lay it all out on the

table and let the chips fall where they may. But, again, your efforts

to date that were impeded by a lack of cooperation from the Justice

Department and from the FBI have born great fruit and you are

truly to be commended.

I think it’s particularly noteworthy that you, Mr. Chairman, took

on an Attorney General of your party who had recommended to the

President of the United States executive privilege and you succeeded and prevailed. That should never go unnoticed. If there ever

is any suggestion about partisanship, that is simply not been the

case in this particular matter.

I would ask, Mr. Chairman, if through you we could inquire in

the audience here if there is any representative from the FBI, from

the U.S. Attorney’s Office, or from the Department of Justice. If

they could just simply stand and identify themselves as maybe at

some point in time you or a member of the committee may have

a question to ask of them. With that, I’ll yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. I will exceed to your

wishes. Are there any members of the Justice Department, the

FBI, or any of the other agencies that are relevant to this investigation here? If you are, just stand up so we can see who you are.

Anyone else? Could you identify ourself, please?

Mr. WYSHAK. I am Fred Wyshak, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you.

Mr. HERBERT. I am James Herbert, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much.

Once again, Mr. Delahunt, thanks for all your help. We really appreciate that.

We will now hear testimony from our first witness panel, Michael

Huff and David Wheeler. Please approach the witness table. Mr.

Huff, you are here on my left.

We will also ask Frank Libby, who is Mr. Wheeler’s attorney, if

he would join us at the table.

Mr. Huff, Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Libby. Would you raise your right

hands?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Let the record show that the witnesses answered

in the affirmative.

Mr. Huff, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

STATEMENTS OF MICHAEL HUFF, SUPERVISOR OF THE HOMICIDE SQUAD, TULSA POLICE DEPARTMENT; AND DAVID

WHEELER, SON OF MURDER VICTIM ROGER WHEELER; ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LIBBY, ATTORNEY

Mr. HUFF. Thank you, sir, for having us here. I appreciate the

chance to share some of these thoughts.

Mr. BURTON. Would you identify yourself and in what capacity

you are here, please?

Mr. HUFF. I am Sergeant Michael Huff of the Tulsa Police Department. I am supervisor of the Homicide Unit and the leading investigator on the Roger Wheeler homicide for the past 21 years.

On May 27, 1981, a sunny, spring afternoon, Roger Wheeler, Sr.,

family man, oil man, CEO of Telex Corp., and owner of World Jai

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Alai, was murdered in Tulsa, Oklahoma, at the Southern Hills

Country Club, with one shot between the eyes from close range, in

full view of the crowded swimming pool. The murderers were Winter Hill hit men from Boston, killing at will, with no fear, and empowered by corruption from within the FBI.

Mob hits don’t happen in Tulsa, let alone at the Southern Hills

Country Club, where prestigious golf tournaments like the U.S.

Open grab the media attention. With this in mind, the Winter Hill

Gang and associates chose Tulsa, with an assumption that the

Tulsa Police Department wouldn’t solve the case. They were wrong.

The impact of this murder was tremendous and immediate. The

Wheeler family was torn apart; the Telex Corp. went away, taking

thousands of high-paying jobs with it. The Tulsa Police Department

launched a tremendous commitment and investigative effort that

has spanned over 21 years. A task force of over a dozen dwindled

down to me, the first detective at the scene.

I became consumed and obsessed with this case. The stress of it

all destroyed my family also. I can only imagine how life would

have been so very different had the Winter Hill Gang not come to

Tulsa that day in May. Early in the investigation the leads came

in fast and furious.

The investigation led us in the direction of the killers of Sheriff

Buford Pusser, made famous by the Walking Tall movies, to international intrigue of CIA spies, to the investigation of the Lancaster

Street garage conducted by the Massachusetts State Police, including my good friend Trooper Rick Fraelick. The Massachusetts State

Police were the first to offer information on suspects from the Winter Hill Gang, as we came up here in July 1981.

In July 1982, myself, my partner, and detectives from the Connecticut State Police traveled to Boston to meet with the Massachusetts State Police to gain information on activities and whereabouts of John Callahan, the former president of World Jai Alai,

who had been fingered by Brian Halloran as offering him the hit

on Wheeler.

Halloran had been killed several weeks earlier after telling his

story to the FBI. The FBI had cut him loose without telling us

about Halloran’s cooperation. Hours later, he and Michael Donahue

were gunned down on the Boston waterfront.

We then met with Strike Force Prosecutor Jerry O’Sullivan. In

a meeting that lasted over an hour, we came away in shock with

the information exchanged. Flemmi and Bulger were hit men

known to the Feds. Retired FBI Agent Paul Rico, then vice-president of World Jai Alai, was described as a ‘‘rogue agent’’ that caroused with the Winter Hill Gang members during his tenure in

Boston.

FBI Agent John Connelly was mentioned as having some real estate transactions with the Winter Hill Gang. All the while, the official FBI line was that these agents were the ‘‘cream of the crop.’’

Callahan was also discussed with O’Sullivan during this meeting

and was subsequently murdered and found in the trunk of his car

at Miami International Airport just weeks later.

These are just a few tidbits of that meeting. I was shocked and

upset to the point I completed my 1982 reports on this meeting

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clude FBI Agents Paul Rico and John Connelly as associates of the

Winter Hill Gang.

Over the past 20 years, there have been many such instances of

surprise and disappointment during this investigation. I look back

to the July meeting in this very building as an ‘‘end of innocence’’ in my career in law enforcement. I had never been exposed to such

a cesspool of dirt and corruption.

The investigation sputtered for years. In January 1995, I received a phone call from the Massachusetts State Police. They had

put together a case on Flemmi, Bulger, and others. I was so excited—help had arrived. The Massachusetts State Police had always been in the thick of it—hardworking, honest investigators.

In the next few weeks, I traveled to Boston with 60 pounds of

reports and phone records—most pre-dating the careers of many of

the troopers working on this case—I also arrived with the message

to these fine men that I knew they were about to step off into unimaginable corruption within the FBI.

During this trip, I had a conversation with now-retired FBI

Agent Connelly, who talked of his ‘‘deal’’ with the FBI to come back

to Boston to ‘‘take down the LCN’’ and not work ‘‘his Irish.’’ That

comment from the now-convicted, corrupt agent has come to have

a greater meaning to me.

As Flemmi dropped his bombshell that he was a protected informant of the FBI, the Wolf hearings uncovered some dirty truths

about the FBI in Boston. As a result, the investigation of the Justice Task Force led by John Durham and Garret Byrne, and staffed

with some excellent investigators, including Special Agent Tim

O’Rourke, one of the finest investigators I have ever worked with,

John Connelly was indicted for his sickening, cowardly, and corrupt

acts. I admire, respect, and appreciate the work of the Justice Task

Force.

Were there more corrupt FBI agents from the Boston office? I

think so. We continue to accumulate evidence and information in

the investigation of Roger Wheeler’s death concerning the involvement of a retired FBI agent. The Tulsa Police Department and the

Tulsa County District Attorney recently had a very productive and

promising meeting concerning additional charges reference the

Wheeler murder.

I have no agenda in this situation other than solving the murder

of Mr. Wheeler and arresting all of the involved parties. I encourage anyone that may have information concerning Mr. Wheeler’s

murder to contact me.

I have spent nearly one-half of my life working murder cases,

and I am sickened by the thought of law enforcement officials, or

anyone else for that matter, protecting murderers. They are scum

bags that should be locked up along with the killers.

I must say, the stress and emotions of this investigation have

taken their toll on relationships and friendships. But if not for the

work of AUSA Fred Wyshak, DBA Agent Dan Dougherty, Troopers

Tom Foley, Steve Johnson, Tom Duffy, and others, we would not

be here today. They have my sincere respect and thanks.

In closing, I would like to say that the fugitive Whitey Bulger is

a degenerate lowlife. I look forward to the day he is in custody, and

I hope to be part of the arrest team. My final question is why

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doesn’t the FBI turn that fugitive case over to the U.S. Marshal’s

Service, an objective agency with an outstanding reputation that

specializes in the capture of fugitives?

Thank you very much for your time.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Huff. We are going to try to accommodate you before this is over with.

Mr. HUFF. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Wheeler, you are recognized.

Mr. WHEELER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to

appear before this committee today. I was 29 when this started so

this is not as easy for me now.

Roger Wheeler started life as the son of a Boston newspaper

proofreader. He joined the Navy during WW II and later met my

mother, then a student nurse from Kansas, at an ROTC tea dance.

The jukebox had broken down, and my mother asked him to fix it.

She was impressed and a year later, they were married.

My father went to college and got an engineering degree on the

GI Bill. He went looking for work and found it, in the oil fields of

Oklahoma and Venezuela. My father believed in hard work—he

considered hard work a good thing—and he passed that belief, and

others, on to my three brothers, my sister and myself.

More than anything, my father believed in the American Dream.

As a depression-era child living north of Boston, he started and ran

his own neighborhood businesses, ranging from bicycle repair to

selling potholders and firewood. He was a natural entrepreneur.

After the war he built businesses that ultimately grew to employ

thousands.

His first interests were the oil and mineral industries; he was an

expert in the engineering of oil pipelines. But he later recognized

the promise of a brand new industry with a bright future, computers. He became chairman of Telex Corp., one of the first to companies to separately manufacture computer hard drives. From his vision and hard work came companies, such as Telex, that competed

with IBM, Dow Chemical, and other major corporations.

This was a man who didn’t steal, who tried not to harm people.

He employed people, thousands of people who ultimately lost their

jobs when he was murdered. This was a son of Boston the city can

and should be proud of. He was, after all, one of them. He was also

my father.

In the late 1970’s, at home in Tulsa, my father was approached

with a business opportunity, an opportunity presented to him by

the bank formerly known as the Bank of Boston, whose main offices were right down the street from where we sit today. The opportunity was a company known as World Jai Alai, founded back

in the 30’s by some old-line New England families.

My father was a careful businessman, and he looked into this

proposal for some time before deciding to commit to purchasing

WJA. My father had the greatest respect for the Federal Bureau

of Investigation.

My father wasn’t much for television; the time spent with us kids

was mainly reserved for the out of doors: Hiking, water skiing; fishing—one day we caught the same fish, on separate hooks—and

working together, outside. But there was one television program, I

recall that he would religiously watch with us kids: ‘‘The FBI.’’

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My father’s faith in the Federal Bureau of Investigation carried

over into his decision to purchase WJA. On more than one occasion,

my father said that, with all of the rumors of organized crime’s involvement the gaming industry, he had solid comfort, knowing that

his executive staff was made up of former FBI agents, and they

had told him his company was ‘‘clean.’’ My father’s life represented what many consider to be the American ideal: vision, hard work, a good sense of opportunity and

maybe a little bit of luck, leading to great financial success. Sometimes his patriotism overflowed, like the time he installed a large

flagpole in the front yard of our home and had the first flag raising

dedicated by several ministers complete with a marching band.

In May 1981, I was working at World Jai Alai in Miami; my father had hired me, a computer software engineer some years out

of college, to learn all I could about the WJA computerized accounting systems. One Wednesday afternoon I received a call, telling me

only that my father had been shot in the head and had been taken

to a Tulsa hospital.

In a race to see my father before he died I picked up my wife

and 8-month old son, threw clothes from the wash cycle into a suitcase, and headed to the airport. With soapy water dripping behind

us I raced from counter to counter looking for a quick flight to

Oklahoma. Only when it became obvious that we had a 2-hour wait

did I make a call to the hospital to check on my father. The operator said she had no record of his admission and, after a long pause,

told me simply that I should call home.

My family and I got on the plane and flew to Tulsa. Police officers met the plane as it arrived, and came directly down the aisle

looking for us by name, instructing other passengers to sit back

down. My wife, child and I were escorted off, taking the stairs directly to the tarmac; we were whisked into a pair of unmarked vehicles. Weapons were everywhere as my family was pressed between officers for safety.

In fewer than 7 hours our lives had become surreal. The next day

I had to repeatedly negotiate between the funeral home and my

mother. She kept asking to see her husband. They kept asking for

more time and finally, in desperation, asked me, ‘‘Do you realize

where he was shot?’’

When we arrived at the funeral home to view my father, I finally

started to lose control. My mother kissed my father’s body. I almost

passed out fearing that part of dad’s face would fall apart.

Twenty-one years have now passed. In spite of all of the FBI corruption uncovered to date, I am still working with the FBI. I believe that there are many good people in law enforcement, prosecutors such as John Durham and FBI agents such as Tim O’Rourke.

And there is at least one courageous judge, Federal Judge Mark

Wolf, who dug into all of this by holding hearings, day after day,

for months. Without their perseverance, it’s likely that none of this

corruption would have been uncovered.

Sadly, I also realize that there are others who have themselves

been corrupted over time; corrupted in their deals with informants

from one element of organized crime, in their misguided efforts to

bring down another element of organized crime. And there are the

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ple, who stood quietly by, tolerating this in their midst, so as not

to upset careers or give the Bureau a black eye.

Forgotten in all of this are the people the Agency is sworn to

serve, the people it was designed to protect: People like my father.

People like all of the others murdered by this Agency’s informants,

whose families, some of them present today, in this room, grieve to

this day.

Something else has been lost, too, perhaps forever, as a result of

these disclosures of FBI abuse; trust and confidence. The trust of

people who, like my father, believed the FBI served a good and

honorable purpose. People who would like to trust the Bureau, but

now, sadly, do not. Where there was once trust, there is now fear.

And that is a loss we cannot afford.

Twenty-one years have passed since John Martarano, the hit

man for informants working for FBI, Boston, came up to my father

and shot him in cold blood, between the eyes. We know precisely

how this happened, 20 years after the fact, from Mr. Martarano’s

own testimony.

Martarano testified as a government witness in the recent corruption case against former FBI Agent John Connelly. We know

that Bulger shot Brian Halloran, and that Martarano, at the direction of Bulger and Flemmi, later shot John Callahan, the former

president of WJA, to keep them quiet about my father’s murder.

How many others were involved, in these and other FBI informant murders? Who else at the Bureau knew about these secret relationships with these known criminals, but turned away, said nothing, as others were murdered? Did any Supervisors or other agents

care to ask any questions, connect the dots between these murders

and their own informants?

How could the FBI pretend to investigate itself, give itself a

clean bill of health and then a year later bring criminal charges

against John Connelly, Whitey Bulger and Steve Flemmi? Where

was the Justice Department in all of this? Was there no oversight

at all?

I think that this committee’s work, in seeking records from the

FBI and the Department of Justice, and in conducting hearings

such as this, is critical to finding the answers to these questions.

It is the place to start the process of restoring some measure of

faith in the FBI. I am deeply concerned that little has changed.

My family and the families of several others who have been murdered as a result of these abuses have come forward with claims

of wrongful death against the government. We want the truth to

come out and have come into Federal court to seek it. The government defends itself from our claims on grounds almost too absurd

to believe.

It says we are all too late in bringing our suits; the same government that just prosecuted John Connelly for this corruption, says

that we should have come forward sooner, that somehow we were

supposed to know more about the FBI’s misconduct, and sooner

than the FBI itself.

For all of these reasons, I urge the committee to continue its

work on this, in the next session of Congress. No other arm of government can or will take this up, and it is too important to leave

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alone. The integrity of the FBI, and much of our faith in Federal

law enforcement is in the balance.

Let me close by briefly mentioning two special people, two individuals who are responsible for me being here today, and who

helped me survive since that horrible day, more than 20 years ago.

My wife, Laurie, was and is today, always there for me regardless

of how bad things became. She gave me stability when the rest of

my world came apart. I am grateful to her for that and I want to

publicly thank her.

Like Laurie, Sgt. Det. Mike Huff, of the Tulsa Police Department

Homicide Unit, has been there with me. Mike was among the first

law officers responding to the scene of my father’s gruesome murder, in May 1981.

Mike, sitting next to me, is with my family and me to this day.

When I began to complain to him about my situation, Mike took

me around to see and speak with others less fortunate. Mike often

showed me how crime can be solved by dedication to duty, and

hard work—not by trading one life for another.

Inspired by Mike, I spent time developing a new type of software,

designed to assist law enforcement in evaluating apparently

unconnected pieces of evidence developed in crime investigations. A

derivative of this technology is going to be part of the new Transportation Department’s computer search for terrorists.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to appear and testify before this committee. I would be pleased to answer whatever

questions you might have.

Mr. BURTON. Before we start the questioning, I want to say two

things, Mr. Wheeler. First of all, I want to thank you very much

and your family for putting a human face on this tragedy. Too

many times we read in the paper somebody has been killed and the

next day that’s all there is to it.

Today you have put a human face on your dad and your family

and what you’ve gone through. I think that is very, very important

because I think one of the other things we need to do is tug at the

heartstrings of America to let them know how important it is that

this sort of thing never, ever happens again and that we hold law

enforcement officials accountable who participate in this kind of

thing.

The second thing I would like to say to you before we start our

questioning is if you would send to this committee a letter enumerating the problems you’ve had with the civil suit including the statute of limitations that evidently they said has passed so you

couldn’t pursue it.

We will take a look at it and see if we can’t help you in some

way with that civil suit because it is obvious to me, and I think

to the rest of the committee, that there is no way you could have

started the civil suit unless you knew that the FBI was involved

and you couldn’t have known that for a fact until some time later.

If you will get that to us and to Mr. Wilson, we will see if we can’t

be of some assistance to you.

Mr. WHEELER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BURTON. With that, I don’t know how we’re going to run this

clock. I’ll tell you what we will do. We will just try to keep a rough

idea on the time. I’ll let my colleagues ask questions if you guys

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would try to stay within—you know what the parameters are.

When Mr. Wilson asks questions, if any of my colleagues want to

interrupt and ask followup questions, you are welcome to do so.

Let me start. For the record, I’ll ask——

Mr. HUFF [continuing]. Jack and James Herbert and his crew

came on board, absolutely they helped. Prior to that we had roadblocks to say the very least.

Mr. BURTON. To you think that former FBI agent Paul Rico has

been protected by the actions of the Justice Department?

Mr. HUFF. I do want to say that my investigation concerning

Paul Rico is still ongoing and it has been publicly reported before

that we are seeking murder charges against Paul Rico in Tulsa for

the murder of Mr. Wheeler.

Mr. BURTON. Would you care to elaborate on any of that information that you have?

Mr. HUFF. Well, in respect, sir, to that ongoing investigation, any

information with regards to evidence I can’t. But I can tell you

that, yes, we did feel that the Justice Department hindered our investigation. There is one particular time, November 1982, when the

Justice Department convened a meeting in Tulsa, Oklahoma,

where they invited investigators and prosecutors from all the agency locations where these murders had happened out to Tulsa for a

meeting and it was a sham.

It was under the guise of information sharing, although little information was shared. At the very end of the meeting it was, ‘‘OK.

All you guys, what do you know on Paul Rico? Stand up and tell

us now.’’ That was because Paul Rico was due to be a witness

against Judge Al C. Hastings in a Federal corruption trial in southern Florida. They were allegedly looking for discovery material in

relation to Paul Rico.

That meeting with fine troopers from Massachusetts State Police

and Connecticut State Police ended in everybody getting up and

walking out. We felt we had been misled. We felt that it was a very

poor attempt to try to share information. We felt at that time that

we weren’t going to get anywhere with Paul Rico with the help of

any Federal people.

Mr. BURTON. You’ve touched on this a little bit but 20 years ago

you thought it was important to interview Whitey Bulger and Stephen Flemmi about the Wheeler murder. Can you tell us what happened and whether or not you got any assistance in interviewing

those guys?

Mr. HUFF. I do want to say that the FBI agent that we were

working with in Tulsa was attempting to help us to a certain point.

I think he was being lied to also. As time as gone on and I’ve had

access to look at other information and reports and whatever, I do

feel that he was trying to straddle the fence, if you will, trying to

keep the FBI happy and not assist us to a certain extent.

We felt that we needed to talk to Whitey Bulger and Stephen

Flemmi. We had no idea that they were informants. We kept pressuring the FBI in Tulsa to be the liaison. That never happened. It

turned out later on we see in reports where they convened a highlevel meeting in Washington to discuss this. We were just led on

by the FBI. ‘‘Yeah, we will get you there. We will facilitate that.’’

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All the while we’re thinking in the back of our naive minds that

surely the FBI has targeted these guys as some sort of organized

crime targets. They were going to take him down. We didn’t want

to step in the way of that. We just wanted to do our job but it was

totally opposite of that. They had targeted the Wheeler case to not

get soft.

Mr. BURTON. Now, in 1982 you met with Jeremiah O’Sullivan. I

believe he was a prosecutor at the time. You met with him in Boston. I guess a year had passed since the Wheeler murder and they

were looking for leads—you were. You and others met with Mr.

O’Sullivan in Boston. Is that correct?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. Myself, my partner, Dick Bishop, two Connecticut state troopers who were actual investigators. It was Andy

Osuf and Dan Toomey, as well as a very excellent Massachusetts

state trooper by the name of Greg Foley.

Mr. BURTON. As I understand it, O’Sullivan laid out the Halloran

story and told you guys about the alleged involvement of Flemmi,

Bulger, and Martarano. Can you go into that?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. It was what has become known as the

Halloran story, the Halloran debriefing, where Flemmi, Bulger,

Martarano were involved. He down played that. He said Halloran

was a liar, that he was only given a percentage of the truth and

it couldn’t be corroborated. They cut him lose and they never told

us about him while they had him and he was still alive.

Shortly after they cut him lose he wound up dead here in Boston,

he and Michael Donahue. He down played Halloran’s credibility.

He talked in detail about his knowledge about Bulger and Flemmi

doing murders. They were doing murders for the LCN here in Boston. Being able to travel cross-country on murders. Other than

Tulsa and Florida the only other cross-country murder I’ve later

become aware of is the one of, I believe, Peter Paulus in Nevada

which occurred in the 1970’s.

It appeared to us, especially hindsight is always 20/20, but he

really knew quite a bit about these guys. We thought in the back

of our mind surely these guys have got to get ready to take a fall.

Mr. BURTON. Would you have liked to have known about this a

year earlier?

Mr. HUFF. Oh, absolutely. I believe that if Halloran came forward in January 1981, I would have liked to have known that. We

could have worked with that and worked alongside them, or at

least had some input to contribute to their investigation.

Mr. BURTON. I have more questions but I’ll yield to Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I just want to ask, Mr. Huff, when you

were talking to Mr. O’Sullivan about this Halloran thing, did he

tell you specifically why it was that he was discounting his credibility?

Mr. HUFF. He said that Halloran had become a coke freak over

time and that Halloran had a diminished respect in the Boston circle of organized crime people that one time he had been a very well

respected hit man but, for other reasons, he was not as well respected now.

He also said that Halloran chose not to offer information on

Howie Winters which apparently was a man of interest to them

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here. Because of that and because they couldn’t corroborate some

of the things he said they cut him lose.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did your information have Mr. Halloran having

any contact with the World Jai Alai?

Mr. HUFF. Not that I recollect at the moment. That was a question I wasn’t anticipating. I would imagine in my several thousand

pages of reports I address that but I don’t think that——

Mr. TIERNEY. But none that you are aware of, or none that you

can recall, at least?

Mr. HUFF. No, sir. Not right at the moment other than his association with John Callahan who was the former president of World

Jai Alai.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you know that association?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. I did know that association. He was very

closely associated with John Callahan here in Boston.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Wheeler, you didn’t know Mr. Halloran, did

you?

Mr. WHEELER. No, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you have any subsequent meetings with Mr.

O’Sullivan?

Mr. HUFF. That was my one and only meeting. It lasted about

90 minutes. It was, I believe, July 8, 1982.

Mr. TIERNEY. And you said at that time it was pretty clear that

he had a lot of information not just about Martarano but also about

Flemmi and Bulger?

Mr. HUFF. Yes. Quite a bit of information on Flemmi and Bulger

on how they did hits. We felt that reading between the lines that

he knew of specific hits they had been involved in. He also appeared to be very familiar with Paul Rico and aware of John

Connelly also.

Mr. TIERNEY. And Mr. Rico at that time held a position with

World Jai Alai?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Was he security vice president?

Mr. HUFF. He was in the management. I think after Mr. Wheeler’s death he became vice president of World Jai Alai.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, Mr. Huff, did you have a meeting last year

with the Justice Department lawyers in 2001?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. Which ones are you talking about?

Mr. TIERNEY. How many did you have last year?

Mr. HUFF. Well, I’ve had meetings with Fred Wyshak. I’ve had

meetings with John Durham. I am trying to think if there was a

lawyer involved when the Department of Justice did the leak investigation last year. I’ve had several meetings.

Mr. TIERNEY. And the purpose of those meetings?

Mr. HUFF. The exchange of information primarily in regards to

these ongoing cases as well as the Wheeler case specifically.

Mr. TIERNEY. And the cooperation level that you find at this

point in time?

Mr. HUFF. At this point in time it’s wonderful between Wyshak,

John Durham, and those people. They are fine people.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Shays, do you have questions?

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Mr. SHAYS. I would like to allow my Massachusetts colleagues to

ask some questions and then I would like to jump in again.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Huff, I am going to ask some obvious questions

but we are trying to create a record here so bear with me. Why is

it in your mind you think the FBI clearly withheld relevant information from you for so long? The second part of my question is

bring us up to date more recently your dealing with the Justice Department and the FBI and has the relationship and their level of

cooperation changed?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. In looking back obviously the reason why

they were withholding information is that they were protecting

Flemmi and Bulger. I guess individually we see that John Connelly

was probably protecting them not only for career reasons but for

personal reasons.

I feel that they knew that Paul Rico was a target of ours and

that didn’t set well with them for one reason or another. Yes, I

think it’s very obvious why they protected these guys and withheld

information recently. When I say recently, I am going from 1995

on when I first became aware of indictments on Flemmi and Bulger.

The level of cooperation changed and that’s because of state

troopers here in Massachusetts, the DEA agent Dan Dougherty and

Fred Wyshak, James Herbert, Brian Kelly. They have one goal in

mind and I thought this as I heard each of your opening statements—they are seeking the truth. Wherever that leads, they are

heading in that direction. That has changed.

John Durham, outstanding man. He has been very helpful in furthering our specific investigation on the death of Mr. Wheeler. Yes,

it’s a different group of people we’re dealing with today.

Mr. LYNCH. One final question, Mr. Wheeler. I understand that

after your dad’s passing that Mr. Rico was elevated to the position

of Vice President with World Jai Alai. Would in the internal structure of that company, if you know, would Mr. Rico have been able

to rely on the fact that he might have moved up in the organization

or succeeded in the organization with your father’s absence or if

your father was unable to serve?

Mr. WHEELER. Yes, I do. I think that based upon their understanding of how my older brother would be the general partner

that they would be in a position to do that. They would be in a position to do basically what they wanted as far as management control.

Mr. LYNCH. How old was your brother at that time? Do you remember?

Mr. WHEELER. He was 34 but he had no experience running a

business. Basically he would follow my father’s direction. When my

father was killed the business just—Roger, Jr. relied upon Donovan

and Rico.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, sir. No further questions.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Huff, you indicated that you had one meeting

with Mr. O’Sullivan that lasted about 9 minutes.

Mr. HUFF. Ninety minutes.

Mr. MEEHAN. Ninety minutes.

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Mr. HUFF. An hour and a half, yes.

Mr. MEEHAN. During the course of that hour and a half meeting

did you find at that time your conversation and his statements

credible, truthful, and honest at that time?

Mr. HUFF. At that time I thought they were honest. I was wondering what was not being said.

Mr. MEEHAN. Given your experience over the last 20 years, looking back and reflecting on that 90-minute conversation with Mr.

O’Sullivan, would you to the extent it’s possible consider, looking

back, his conversation and his statements to be truthful, credible,

and honest?

Mr. HUFF. Well, in some ways I would think that they—I think

that the decision to cut Brian Halloran lose, there was a story behind that we have since come to know, I think, why that happened.

I found in looking back 20 years later his statements, some of

them may have been truthful but they were outlandish to find out

now that he knew that Flemmi and Bulger were informants working for them and knowing specifically about murders and how they

do murders. He seemed to have some real inside information and

I just couldn’t imagine law enforcement using cold-blooded killers

to let them run lose like vicious animals.

Mr. MEEHAN. Did you at anytime after that 90-minute conversation request any additional meetings or communication or conversations with Mr. O’Sullivan?

Mr. HUFF. Well, not directly with Mr. O’Sullivan. I think in writing. I wrote to our U.S. Attorney in Tulsa requesting that we call

Paul Rico before a grand jury. That never happened.

Subsequently, we did call, I believe, Dick Donovan to a grand

jury in Tulsa which was very unproductive even to the point of— I mean, all this minutia of what happened way back when, but

when you recall the day that Dick Donovan came to a grand jury

and we were positioned in the hallway waiting to talk to him afterwards, the FBI was facilitating the grand jury and the FBI

sneaked him out of the building, into the basement, into an FBI

agent’s personal car, and drove him directly to the airport to keep

him from us. I mean, those kind of things add up and they accumulate.

Mr. MEEHAN. Sure do. Thank you, Mr. Huff.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our condolences to you, Mr. Wheeler. Your testimony was particularly moving and poignant. We all emphasize with what you’ve

endured for years.

Let me direct my questions to Mr. Huff. Subsequently have you

become aware of what FBI agents developed, Bulger and Flemmi,

as informants?

Mr. HUFF. Yes. It all tracks back to Paul Rico.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So you now understand given the information

that has been made public that Whitey and Stevie Flemmi were developed as informants by H. Paul Rico?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. I have.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Upon his retirement, Mr. Rico became an employee of World Jai Alai?

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Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And subsequently have you learned that Mr.

Martarano was an associate of Mr. Bulger and Mr. Flemmi?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. I have.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And obviously you have learned through the testimony of Mr. Martarano that he traveled to Tulsa, Oklahoma, and

committed the murder of Roger Wheeler?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. During your meeting with Mr. O’Sullivan back in

1982, did Mr. O’Sullivan disclose to you that he was aware that

Bulger and Flemmi were informants of the FBI?

Mr. HUFF. He did not disclose that to us.

Mr. DELAHUNT. He did not disclose it?

Mr. HUFF. No, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But you came to that meeting with the intention

of securing assistance in the investigation of the murder of Roger

Wheeler.

Mr. HUFF. Absolutely.

Mr. DELAHUNT. At that point in time did you have information

which led you to believe that Bulger and Flemmi were involved in

that murder?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. That initial information was received from

that Massachusetts State Police approximately a year prior to that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So that information came from the Massachusetts State Police to you and then you came and had that meeting

with Mr. O’Sullivan who, at that point in time, do you remember

what his particular role was in the U.S. Attorney’s Office?

Mr. HUFF. He was the chief Strike Force prosecutor on the organized crime Strike Force.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So he headed the organized crime Strike Force?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And he never disclosed the fact that both Bulger

and Flemmi were informants of the FBI?

Mr. HUFF. No, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You said during that meeting with Mr.

O’Sullivan that references were made to Mr. Connelly, the former

Special Agent of the FBI, the now convicted former Special Agent

of the FBI, had certain real estate transactions with Bulger and

Flemmi or associates. Did that occur during that meeting with Mr.

O’Sullivan?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. That was an exchange between the Massachusetts State Trooper and O’Sullivan.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So was that information that was disclosed by

Mr. O’Sullivan to the Massachusetts State Police, or was it presented by the Massachusetts State Police to Mr. O’Sullivan?

Mr. HUFF. It was presented to Mr. O’Sullivan at which time he

tried to downplay that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. What was his response, if you can remember? I

understand that this is very difficult. This is 20 years ago.

Mr. HUFF. There are certain things in the past 20 years that you

remember pretty vividly and I remember that hour and a half pretty vividly. In that downplay of that it was him trying to change the

subject. He seemed to be very protective of Mr. Connelly. In fact,

he even—I believe that he even told us that this whole situation

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was being handled by, I believe, Agent Gerry Montanari who was

not even in Mr. Connelly’s squad. He was in a labor racketeering

squad and Connelly was in organized crime squad.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Suggesting that they didn’t even talk together?

Mr. HUFF. Suggesting that, but even when he said that, I recalled that months back shortly after Wheeler was murdered when

we were reaching out to other agencies to help us gather information, that it was Connelly of the FBI that they sent to talk to John

Callahan about this.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Not Special Agent Montanari but Special Agent

Connelly?

Mr. HUFF. Absolutely. Hindsight is 20/20 but I look back on that

and thought why would they send Connelly to talk to Callahan

where Callahan, I believe, gave him a prepared statement. You

know, quite candidly you look back—— Mr. DELAHUNT. Callahan gave who a prepared statement?

Mr. HUFF. Callahan gave Connelly a prepared statement denying

his involvement with the Wheeler murder.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I see. If you know, was there any followup in

terms of inquiry or was it just simply the acceptance of a signed

statement?

Mr. HUFF. I think it was the acceptance of a—I believe the statement was faxed to him.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Faxed?

Mr. HUFF. Which really—— Mr. DELAHUNT. It was an in depth investigation, in other words,

Mr. Huff?

Mr. HUFF. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Getting back to those real estate transactions,

when this was presented to Mr. O’Sullivan by an official of the

Massachusetts State Police, did he indicate that he would investigate that allegation?

Mr. HUFF. No, sir. He did not.

Mr. DELAHUNT. He did not? Can you remember with any specificity whatsoever the assertions that were made by the Massachusetts State Police official relative to real estate transactions?

Mr. HUFF. I believe it was a transaction of a piece of real estate,

maybe a home. I know that Whitey Bulger’s name came into it like

maybe he was the seller or something of that nature.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Was O’Sullivan surprised by the allegation?

Mr. HUFF. Not necessarily surprised but maybe alarmed. I know

that the state trooper also said that Connelly had been seen several times with Bulger. Those were the kind of things I was soaking in like a sponge. I couldn’t imagine that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But you were unaware at the time that Bulger

and Flemmi had become informants for Special Agent Connelly?

Mr. HUFF. Totally unaware of that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Did Connelly ever disclose that to you? You

made reference earlier to how they were going to focus on the LCN,

La Cosa Nostra, and they were going to use—I think they weren’t

going to do the Irish. I think maybe that’s the word you used.

Mr. HUFF. Those are his exact words. I recall that conversation.

I had attempted to contact Connelly direct several times when he

was still an FBI agent and never got a reply from him. I tried to

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communicate with him through an FBI agent in Tulsa. That didn’t

really happen much either. When I came up here in 1995 after the

Massachusetts State Police had worked their investigation on

Flemmi and Bulger, I brought a load of reports.

At that time Connelly had gone to work for the power company

or Boston Edison somewhere here. I was trying to get a meeting

with him. All I was able to do was get a phone conversation with

him which lasted several minutes.

In that his very specific words is ‘‘his deal,’’ and that was his

word, with the FBI was to come back to Boston to take down the

LCN—those were his specific words—and not work ‘‘his Irish.’’ I

really recall that specifically. I don’t think that we talked at that

time about them being his informants. He was wanting to talk

about there was going to be a movie made on him or something.

Mr. DELAHUNT. A movie made on Mr. Connelly?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. I acknowledged to him that I had seen on television on Top Cops or something. I am trying to change the subject back to something important and he’s wanting to talk about

himself. I ended up ending the phone call and didn’t get to the

point with him.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Shays, did you have something?

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Wheeler, I don’t think I owe you an apology more

than I just want to say that you should have been on my list and

your family should have been on that list alongside of Joseph

Salvati. Mr. Salvati’s children have him back in the family minus

30 years. You don’t have your dad. Your children don’t have their

grandfather. I am just interested how old your dad was when he

was killed?

Mr. WHEELER. That’s kind of an interesting thing. I am not very

good with ages actually. It seems like he was about 52, 55.

Mr. SHAYS. She he potentially would still be living today.

Mr. WHEELER. Yes. His mother is still alive today.

Mr. SHAYS. I want to ask you about your civil suit. I would be

willing to have your attorney participate but he wasn’t sworn in so

if it’s necessary for him to participate, we would need to swear him

in. I want to understand where the civil suit lies right now and

what your task is to move forward.

You need to be sworn in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. LIBBY. Briefly, Mr. Shays, the Wheeler suit was filed roughly

a year or more ago. We’re not alone. There are eight or 10 other

families similarly situated including another case that is not a

wrongful death case but an extortion case involving the South Boston Liquor Mart scenario where a claim has been made against the

United States and many former FBI agents for their wrongdoings.

We have a collection of cases pending before three different Federal judges in this district. The Justice Department Civil Division,

not the Massachusetts U.S. Attorney but the Justice Department

Civil Division down in D.C., is handling the defense of each of

those cases.

It’s gone into just beginning just now after more than a year to

get into discovery which, of course, is somewhat ticklish because of

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fidential law enforcement information material and the like. We’re

talking about 20 or 30 years worth of material.

The defenses which have been raised today, and I trust that this

is the heart of your question, has been singular and that is it’s not

been a denial so far as we know. There may be one or two answers

where there have been—in the way of a denial of liability but it’s

focused primarily on timeliness, or rather untimeliness of bringing

these claims.

The essence of that is that you sat on your right so if you sue

the United States you have to sue within a certain period of time— 2 years I believe is the statute—or you lose those rights forever.

The claim from the government, the very government that is prosecuting the criminal actions here, they are defending the very same

kind of conduct on claims that these private citizens should have

brought these suits, should have known about this FBI misconduct

earlier than the FBI did essentially.

This FBI gave itself, as I understand it, responsibility back in as

late as 1997 so that they couldn’t find any wrongdoing. The

Connelly indictment didn’t come until the following years. These

civil suits followed on the heels primarily on the remarkable yeoman work of Mr. Wyshak and others who have been involved in the

so-called Salenni hearings held by Judge Mark Wolf over the

course of nearly 2 years.

He finally in September 1999 put together a nearly 700-page report of findings of those hearings which span decades of these secret relationships. Only then did the nature of his misconduct come

to light. From that you saw the families finally understand how it

was the Government was somehow answerable, reliable, responsible for their harms. The suits have been filed. In virtually every

instance, as I understand, the defense is that we’re all too late.

Mr. SHAYS. The bottom line is, though, you filed within 2 years

of learning of that.

Mr. LIBBY. We certainly filed within 2 years of Judge Wolf’s decision where he has pulled all that information together. Before then

it’s been speculation, conjecture, rumors, newspaper reports of OC

figures on the one hand and speculation about internally in the

FBI on the other.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand why you need statutes of limitation but

it seems to me the law is flawed if you are not able to move forward.

Mr. LIBBY. Well, some have been ruled on. One or two, as I understand, have been ruled on and have been denied by one of the

judges handling the case. There are others—I don’t want to comment beyond that—that are still pending.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Would the gentleman yield for a moment?

Mr. SHAYS. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think in response to the gentleman’s question,

myself, Mr. Meehan, and Mr. Frank sent a letter to the Department of Justice expressing our dismay that the Department of Justice would interpose such a defense. I have never heard a theory

as put forth by Justice in the history of American juris prudence

to defend a case that obviously lies with both Mr. Wheeler and others. Hopefully Justice will revisit the fact that defense is simply

unconscionable and insulting.

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Mr. LIBBY. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just a final point. I am familiar with that letter, Mr. Delahunt, and all of the various families

are familiar with it as well. We appreciate the sentiment behind

it. We think it is perfectly appropriate. Understand we are simply

looking to get our day in court.

We’re not looking for a leg up or any of that. In fact, we have

some serious logistics issues to deal with that we are confronting

with respect to various agencies spanning from Oklahoma, Florida,

Connecticut, Massachusetts, as you might imagine over 20 to 30

years, as I mentioned. We just simply want to be heard.

Mr. SHAYS. I would say when you said would Justice revisit, I

read that two ways. Will the Department of Justice revisit and will

Justice be revisited. I know that my chairman and I have talked

about this kind of issue and I would think that both of us would

love to kind of add our names to that letter as well. It just seems

so obvious to, I think, both of us that there has to be a statute of

limitations but at a point which you are aware that you have a

case.

I want to ask you, Mr. Huff, you are on record obviously as saying your investigation was hindered by the FBI and the Department of Justice. Correct?

Mr. HUFF. I believe so.

Mr. SHAYS. And you have subsequently concluded that the FBI

and the Department of Justice hindered your investigation because?

Mr. HUFF. Because goes off in several different directions, I

guess.

Mr. SHAYS. You can go off on more than one.

Mr. HUFF. I guess because they wanted to keep Flemmi and

Bulger on board because John Connelly didn’t want his house of

cards to fall. Because they were protective of H. Paul Rico for whatever reason, whether it be the Judge Alcee Hastings case they had

put effort into, or the fact that they just wanted to protect Rico.

And because they didn’t want embarrassment from the FBI for

the FBI. I think that is probably a pretty narrow focus there, too,

I think, as this thing further unfolds. I mean, I look back on so

many things. For example, one that I got kind of upset about last

night when I recalled where supposedly Connelly wrote an FBI report shortly after Callahan’s death to say that Flemmi told him

that this would be a group of Cubans that Callahan had begun to

deal with in Florida.

The assertion was that Flemmi just gave that to Connelly to report because Flemmi had told Martarano to drop the watch off in

Little Havana, Callahan’s watch which they took from the body,

Little Havana in Miami. When in actually that tracks back to us

because in July 1982 prior to Callahan’s death we had begun to investigate a man of Cuban decent that had a lose connection with

World Jai Alai as a pretty good suspect.

We shared that information with the FBI. It doesn’t take much

to connect the dots there that information gets to Connelly and

Connelly feeds that to Flemmi and off of that they leave the watch

in Little Havana knowing that is going to be a red herring that

we’re going to chase like a dog chasing a bone, which we did unfortunately. It just fed on each other. You know, there are so many

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instances of that kind of information that so much time was wasted. They sent us off chasing ghosts. I got to tell you, this has been

21 years of my life.

This isn’t the only murder case I’ve investigated. I investigate a

lot of murders and we solve 90 percent of them in Tulsa but, boy,

did this distract me and this totally screwed up my life. I am mad

about that. That’s me talking to you. That’s not the Tulsa Police

Department. My ex-wife is mad about it, too. My kids are mad

about it.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Huff, I really appreciate you coming to testify today.

Mr. Wheeler, I was a State Legislator when you dad was killed.

At the time I thought gambling is a messy business, you know. It’s

controlled by organized crime. It’s kind of my stereotype. My first

pass was to think, ‘‘Well, this is a man involved in organized

crime.’’ Austin McGreggan told me your dad was a man of impeccable

character. Just a beautiful man who had come up from a more

modest beginning. Your testimony today obviously just makes that

so personal. I am so grateful you are here today. So grateful you

testified.

Mr. WHEELER. Thank you very much.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Shays. I think Mr. Tierney has one

or two questions. Then we will try to wrap this up. I think the chief

counsel has a couple of questions and then we will try to wrap up

this panel.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. I just wanted to see whether or not

you’ve given us everything you can recall with respect to that 1982

meeting with Mr. O’Sullivan. You said a moment ago in answer to

somebody’s question that the story behind cutting Halloran lose

has since come to be known by you. Have you told us everything

that you believe is related to that story about Halloran being cut

lose or is there something else you want to add?

Mr. HUFF. I believe I’ve told the crux of it. I mean, I think that

Halloran was cut lose. I think that probably there was some input

from John Connelly to O’Sullivan to get rid of this guy. I mean, the

FBI line for many, many years until recently was that Halloran

was a liar. He might have lied about some things but he didn’t lie

about this. It was right in line with.

Now, in talking to people that were involved to a certain extent

in these murders, we know that Halloran was being truthful. In

that meeting there were other things that came out. There was a

lot that came out. He told us that John Martarano, the fugitive

John Martarano, was in the Fort Lauderdale area with some specificity.

Certainly he was in the Ft. Lauderdale area. He was staying in

and around the apartment of John Callahan. You know, when John

Callahan was murdered, we told the Metro Dade Police that, ‘‘Hey,

John Martarano is a figure in this somewhere or another.’’

Little did we know that some 20 years later we would find out

that John Martarano was a traitor man that killed Callahan. We

told them that John Martarano was a fugitive and he was in the

Fort Lauderdale, Southern Florida area and they acted upon it. I

see no indication that the FBI, the feds, acted on it at all.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Was Trooper Dana Toomey with you at that meeting in 1982?

Mr. HUFF. Dan Toomey. Yes, sir. Connecticut State Trooper.

Mr. TIERNEY. I am just looking at a report filed by him on this.

He indicated that Mr. O’Sullivan described Halloran as somebody

that had information that wasn’t corroborated. Do you recall that?

Mr. HUFF. Yes. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. O’Sullivan said that Halloran would not testify

against Howie Winters. That was apparently by way of disparaging?

Mr. HUFF. Yes. Apparently they really wanted to get at Howie

Winters and since he wasn’t going to help him that way, I kind of

thought the pay back was, ‘‘We’re cutting you loose.’’ Mr. TIERNEY. Do you recall Mr. O’Sullivan indicating that he

didn’t think that either Martarano, Bulger, or Flemmi were brilliant and that he called them not brilliant?

Mr. HUFF. He did call them not brilliant. I thought that was kind

of interesting. He would say they traveled across the country to

commit murders. They didn’t put the amount of effort or planning

into it that the Italians did.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. I just have two questions here and then we will let

Mr. Wilson sum up. In that 1982 meeting in Tulsa, Oklahoma, can

you give us the names of the FBI agents and the people that were

in attendance? We would like to have those for the record.

Mr. HUFF. I was fearing you were going to ask that. I did a pretty thorough report except for that. Agent Bob McKechnie from

Tulsa, Oklahoma, was there.

Mr. BURTON. Bob McKegney?

Mr. HUFF. McKechney.

Mr. BURTON. McKechney?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. Agent Gerry Montanari from Boston, Joe

Usher from Miami.

Mr. BURTON. FBI agent?

Mr. HUFF. Yes. And maybe Tom Diehl from Miami.

Mr. BURTON. Those are the four that you recall? Anybody else?

Mr. HUFF. I think there were FBI supervisors from Boston and

I don’t recall their names.

Mr. BURTON. Can you check and give that to us for the record.

John Morris maybe?

Mr. HUFF. I don’t believe it was Morris. It was their Agent

Hannigan. Maybe an Agent Hannigan sticks with me.

Mr. BURTON. Was it a state trooper Hannigan?

Mr. HUFF. No, sir. Then there were two Department of Justice

people from Washington.

Mr. BURTON. Do you know who they were? Do you have a record

some place that you can get those to us and get those names for

us?

Mr. HUFF. I am sorry to say I don’t. I am certain the FBI has

a record somewhere. And I do have a record which, as far as our

case file, it was the FBI agenda to the meeting.

Mr. BURTON. If you could check on that and I’ll tell you why. Because we have subpoenaed documents and, as you know, we had

to move. We requested documents. We threatened a subpoena but

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we requested documents and we were even at one time in the possibility of holding the president in contempt on that executive privilege issue. We did get documents but there are still documents we

just don’t have. If you have any additional information that would

be helpful to us, we would appreciate it.

Mr. HUFF. I’ll research it and I’ll make contact with other participants at the meeting.

Mr. BURTON. We have specifically asked for this information on

the 1982 meeting and they have stonewalled us. I would just like

to say to the Assistant U.S. Attorneys who are here if you could

pass on to your compatriots at the Justice Department that this

isn’t going to go away. We would really appreciate it if they would

give those to us.

It would be very helpful because we are going to continue to plug

on either through the Judiciary Committee or our committee or the

Senate because we’ve got a lot of people that are now interested in

this. It would be a lot easier if they would just give us that information whether than force us to keep fighting for it. It’s not going

to do any good. We’re going to keep pounding on this until we get

it so if you could help us with that, we would appreciate it.

The four investigators that were looking at the Callahan murder

in Miami. Tell us just real quickly about their attitude toward the

lack of cooperation or cooperation that we’re getting?

Mr. HUFF. Detective Shelton Merit was a primary investigator at

first. He put his heart and soul into it and felt that he was being

followed by FBI people. He felt that he was really kind of in jeopardy. Ultimately ended up going through a divorce and getting

transferred out.

Mr. BURTON. The pressure on him was great like yourself.

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Before we turn it over to Mr. Wilson, is there anything you think ought to be added to the record that we haven’t

asked you questions about real quickly? You think we covered it

pretty well?

Why don’t you take the mic then, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. I’ll be very brief. Mr. Huff, I wanted to ask you

some questions about two documents. We got them last night and

I reviewed them very late. Mr. Tierney referred to one and I think

somebody is going to bring this down to you. It’s an investigative

report from the Connecticut State Police. It’s dated July 8, 1982.

It was prepared by Trooper Toomey. This is the document that Mr.

Toomey referred to.

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. This can be included in the record.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

Mr. WILSON. The final full paragraph on the page, I’ll just read

this and I was going to ask you for some comment on a couple of

sentences. ‘‘Mr. O’Sullivan told us he had third-hand information

that Halloran was offered the Wheeler hit and he [Halloran] discussed it with the Winter Hill Gang and Callahan. The hit was

done by Martarano, Bulger, and Flemmi.

Later in our meeting Mr. O’Sullivan told us Halloran told him

this information. Mr. O’Sullivan said that at the time of the murder of Roger Wheeler, Sr., Halloran was not in the gang’s inner cirVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:56 Mar 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00292 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\84604.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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cle. He also said H. Paul Rico was connected to the Winter Hill

Gang. Now, this document will be included in the record of the

hearing. We just got it last night and it won’t be released today because we haven’t had a chance to redact it for personal information.

I wanted to ask you about the first sentence here. It says that, ‘‘Mr. O’Sullivan told us he had third-hand information that

Halloran was offered the Wheeler hit.’’ Now, that doesn’t appear to

be accurate. Is this inaccurate information?

Mr. HUFF. I believe that line may be inaccurate. I mean,

O’Sullivan talked of his direct exchange between Halloran and he.

Mr. WILSON. This is what I am driving at. Did he first try and

put you off this trial by saying that he didn’t have the direct information?

Mr. HUFF. I don’t recall that, Mr. Wilson, no.

Mr. WILSON. But you don’t recall one way or the other?

Mr. HUFF. No, but I do feel like he was trying to put us off the

trial and more to the fact of him talking about how unreliable

Halloran was and how it was all uncorroborated.

Mr. WILSON. OK. But you don’t have any reason to disagree with

Mr. Toomey’s report here that Mr. O’Sullivan did say it was initially third-hand information?

Mr. HUFF. No. I didn’t quite understand that. I am OK with

Toomey’s report.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough. Now, the final sentence says that he,

that would be Mr. O’Sullivan, said that H. Paul Rico was connected

to the Winter Hill Gang. Do you have a recollection of that?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Can you tell us everything you can tell us about

that one observation?

Mr. HUFF. I recall his initial words were that Rico caroused with

the Winter Hill Gang guys. He played cards and pool with them,

drank with them. He said this was in the timeframe when some

of the criminal activities that some of the Winter Hill Gang Members were committing were not under a Federal statute. Everybody

felt that it was OK. The activities that he was talking about were

murder so everybody is looking the other way because there’s no

Federal law against murder so Rico can hang out with these guys.

That was a big point of conversation for us after we left.

Mr. WILSON. And Mr. O’Sullivan had no doubt about this statement that he made?

Mr. HUFF. It seemed very matter of fact, very specific. I mean,

it was so specific and I was so alarmed by it that I put it in my—

I listed them in my report on all the information that I had gathered about people associated with the Winter Hill Gang. I don’t

know if it was right or not but I was naive and shocked. I came

back and did a 20-some-page report and I listed him as an associate of the Winter Hill Gang.

Mr. WILSON. Let me cut you off here because that is the last

thing I am going to ask you about. Another document has just been

put in front of you.

Mr. LIBBY. This can be included in the record as well, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Without objection.

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Mr. WILSON. If you could take a quick look, the document I am

looking at is what appears to be a Tulsa Police Department. It appears to be prepared by yourself. It’s in conjunction with the Roger

Wheeler Homicide. I wanted to ask you two questions. If you go to

the third page of the document, at the bottom there’s a handwritten number 1129.

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. We have the name John Connelly in the middle of

the page.

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Now, you prepared this report on May 27, 1981. Is

that correct?

Mr. HUFF. Well, I prepared this report—I believe on the last

page it’s probably going to tell you—on August 20, 1982. The murder happened May 27, 1981 which is just listed in the heading.

Mr. WILSON. So this was prepared after your meeting with Mr.

O’Sullivan?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. WILSON. It’s obviously a little bit surprising to us that in

1982 you would prepare a summary and the title at the top is Winter Hill Gang and Associates and you would include John Connelly.

Is there anything more you can tell us than what you just did tell

us about what Mr. O’Sullivan said that led you to put John

Connelly on this list?

Mr. HUFF. This was investigative information that we obtained

from sources in Massachusetts. A lot of this is just the investigative reports, not conclusions. I put in here that we received unsubstantiated information about a home purchase from James Bulger

on John Connelly. He’s currently an FBI agent working in organized crime in Boston, Massachusetts.

Mr. WILSON. So you in Oklahoma were able to come up with this

information based on one trip to Boston or maybe a couple of trips?

Mr. HUFF. We made trips to Boston. We felt we had a good contact with the state police. We felt that this conversation with

O’Sullivan put us to the point of—Mr. O’Sullivan seemed to appear

to accept that Bulger and Connelly had been seen together. In the

context of that conversation was that they had been seen together

in more of a social setting than in a work related setting.

Would I put this in a report today with 27 years experience as

a policeman, 22 of it working homicide? I don’t think I would put

this in a report today, but that day after we came back from that

trip, you just can’t imagine how disenchanted I was with what we

learned. Maybe it was frustration that I put it in this report.

Mr. WILSON. Let me just followup with one last question on the

page that is marked at the bottom 1140. There is an entry for Rico,

H. Paul. This was put in this report for the same reason, for the

information you obtained from people during you investigation.

Correct?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. This is as a result of that meeting with Mr.

O’Sullivan.

Mr. BURTON. I believe Mr. Tierney has one.

Mr. TIERNEY. Just one. Maybe I didn’t hear you but in your page

1129, the third page of that report, where you are talking about

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John Connelly, you have a sentence in here that says, ‘‘Subject also

allegedly socializes with James Bulger and Steve Flemmi.’’ Under Mr. Rico’s comments on 1140 you say that Jerry

O’Sullivan told you that Rico socialized at one time with the Winter

Hill Gang. You don’t say that necessarily under Connelly but is

that where you got the information that you put in this report that

Connelly allegedly socialized with James Bulger and Steve

Flemmi? Did you get that from O’Sullivan?

Mr. HUFF. Well, that came in exchanging information between

the state trooper and O’Sullivan. The state trooper seemed to have

some specifics about these contacts of seeing Connelly and these

guys together.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you know who the state trooper was?

Mr. HUFF. I believe it was Trooper Foley.

Mr. TIERNEY. Trooper Foley mentioned to the group of you that

were at that meeting that Connelly had some social contact?

Mr. HUFF. Well, had been seen with them more in a social setting. That’s the way we took it. That’s the way my partner took it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did O’Sullivan have any comment to make about

that?

Mr. HUFF. He down played, avoided, changed the subject.

Mr. TIERNEY. He didn’t respond to it directly?

Mr. HUFF. No, not directly, sir, that I recall.

Mr. TIERNEY. He didn’t ask any questions about it or explored it

any deeper?

Mr. HUFF. Definitely didn’t look into it deeper.

On several occasions and that was the context in which the conversation appeared to me. I don’t remember any specifics about any

specific location or activity, what they were doing, but I felt it was

a social meeting.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I want to thank you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If you could indulge me for two final questions.

Mr. BURTON. OK, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In the report by the Connecticut State Police,

there is a reference there to Halloran seeking to get into the Federal witness protection program. It further goes on that Mr.

O’Sullivan would not get him in because the information given by

Halloran was not corroborated. Did at anytime the subject come up

in your conversations with Mr. O’Sullivan? If it did, did he explain

to you the basis for the request by Mr. Halloran?

Mr. HUFF. He said Halloran had a lot of information on hits. I

think Halloran was—it was my understanding that Halloran was

fearful of going back out on the street. I think O’Sullivan had kind

of expounded upon that people knew Halloran was a snitch.

Mr. DELAHUNT. So Mr. O’Sullivan indicated to you that there

was an awareness that Halloran was, in fact, an informant, a

snitch?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Did he indicate to you that Halloran expressed

fear for his life, if you can remember?

Mr. HUFF. Well, in the context I think Halloran was wanting in

the witness protection program because of fear for his life. He knew

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he was giving up a lot and he knew he couldn’t survive. That was

what I understood that as, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Are you aware that several hours before he was

murdered there was a special agent, I think by the name of

Grummage, that had a conversation with Mr. Halloran?

Mr. HUFF. I believe that was agent Bruntick. I was aware that

there was a phone conversation, I believe, between Bruntick and

he.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Did you ever have a conversation with Bruntick

relative to Halloran?

Mr. HUFF. I don’t recall if Bruntick ever came to Tulsa or not.

I might have run into him out here in Massachusetts. But I think

when I learned in detail of that conversation, or learned about it,

I think Mr. Bruntick was already dead. He was deceased.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Are you familiar with, or did you become familiar

with Assistant Special Agent in charge by the name of Fitzpatrick?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Have you had an opportunity to have conversations with Mr. Fitzpatrick?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Did he indicate to you that he advocated in behalf of Mr. Halloran in terms of participating in the witness protection program?

Mr. HUFF. I tell you, when I got to know Bob Fitzpatrick was

during the Wolf hearings. I felt that Mr. Fitzpatrick was being

truthful to me. Yet, because of those hearings and uncertain if I

was going to be part of those hearings or whatever, I really tried

to avoid in detail a lot of conversation with Mr. Fitzpatrick about

this because I didn’t want it to jeopardize, you know, any potential

testimony that he or I may have.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me pose it a different way. Were you aware

of the fact that Mr. Fitzpatrick felt so strongly about the need to

place Halloran in the witness protection program that he went over

Mr. O’Sullivan’s head and sought the assistance of the then U.S.

Attorney William Well?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir. I became aware of that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You became aware of that?

Mr. HUFF. Yes, sir.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And that obviously bore no fruit.

Mr. HUFF. I think Fitzpatrick was trying to do the right thing

between a rock and a hard place there.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In other words, Assistant Special Agent in

charge Fitzpatrick felt that there was a legitimate concern in terms

of the danger that was present for Mr. Halloran. Is that right?

Mr. HUFF. I believe so.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I guess he was right. Wasn’t he, Mr. Huff?

Mr. HUFF. I believe he was right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I thank the chairman.

Mr. BURTON. I want to thank you both very much. I think on behalf of the whole committee we want to thank you for your testimony. Mr. Wheeler, once again, thank you for coming here and giving us a human side to the problems that your family faced. Mr.

Huff, thank you very much for your diligence over these past 20

some years in pursuing this. Hopefully it will come to fruition. We

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are going to continue to try to assist you in getting this case resolved regarding Mr. Rico so we will work with you.

Mr. HUFF. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. What I would like to do, I don’t hear any stomachs

growling up here but what I would like to do because we have two

more witnesses coming up very quickly and we have extensive

questioning from Mr. O’Sullivan and Mr. Markham, I would like to

take about a 10-minute break and try to get back here right at

12:30 to bring the next panel up.

With that, we stand in recess until 12:30.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. We will start off before we swear in the witness

and say that we want to make absolutely sure that all of our witnesses are aware of their constitutional rights and prerogatives and

that if they have any concern about testimony, that we understand

if they exercise their rights.

With that, Mr. O’Sullivan, would you stand to be sworn, please?

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Have a seat. Mr. O’Sullivan, do you have an opening statement you would like to make?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I do, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I was about to say Your Honor.

Mr. BURTON. The only people I make say Your Honor are my

kids and my family.

STATEMENT OF JEREMIAH O’SULLIVAN, FORMER NEW ENGLAND ORGANIZED CRIME STRIKE FORCE CHIEF ATTORNEY

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. This is the courtroom where the Winter Race

Fix Case took place. It’s all come back in a very different way.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased that

this committee has invited me to testify at this hearing regarding

the FBI’s use of cooperating witnesses and confidential informants

in New England. As I believe the committee knows, although this

topic has been the subject of public interest for some time. I have

not previously had the opportunity to comment publicly on it.

In early 1998, shortly before my scheduled appearance at the

hearings then being held by U.S. District Judge Mark Wolf, I suffered a serious heart attack and two strokes which precluded my

testimony then. Although I have not fully recuperated and have not

returned to the practice of law, I welcome this opportunity to be

of assistance to this committee, but I ask your indulgence if I

should need to pause and reflect in order to articulate my answers

to your questions.

I had the privilege of serving in the U.S. Department of Justice

as a Federal prosecutor for approximately 16 years from 1973

through 1989. During that time, I held positions as a Special Attorney with the New England Organized Crime Strike Force, as an

Assistant U.S. Attorney, as the Chief Attorney of the New England

Organized Crime Strike Force, and briefly as the U.S. Attorney, all

in Boston.

Much of the focus of my activities was on the prosecution of organized crime both in Boston and throughout New England. I was

personally responsible for and involved in the successful prosecuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:56 Mar 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00297 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\84604.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion of Howard Winter and his criminal organization in what has

come to be known as the ‘‘Race Fix Case’’ in 1979.

I was also personally responsible for and involved in the successful prosecution of Gennaro Angiulo and the Boston branch of the

Patriarca Family of La Cosa Nostra in 1986. These cases crippled

organized crime in the Boston area. Organized crime became a primary target of the Justice Department in the early 1960’s under

the guidance of Attorney General Robert Kennedy for good reason:

it is an insidious force of evil in our society.

Unchecked, it is like a cancer, invisible, but spreading and deadly, affecting the lives of many innocent people. By its nature, it is

secretive and operates by instilling fear in its victims and participants alike. One way to prosecute such crime effectively is through

the use of inside information from informants and immunized witnesses. They are, to use an apt cliche, a ‘‘necessary evil.’’ During my tenure as a Federal prosecutor, I believed—and I believed it to be the view of the Department of Justice—that it was

necessary and in the public interest for the government to use informants who, for their own reasons, wanted to provide information

about criminal activity of others to help the government build

cases.

However, I also believed that the goal in such situations was to

build important cases that otherwise could not be brought. The

goal was not to protect or aid the informants, and my view was

that any informant who engaged in other criminal activity was fair

game for prosecution and should be pursued and prosecuted just

like any other criminal, absent a formal determination by the Department of Justice in Washington that a grant of immunity was

in the public interest. This was the basis on which I conducted my

activities as a Federal prosecutor, and I did in fact personally prosecute informants.

Much of the public focus on government’s handling of informants

over the last few years has been on the FBI’s dealings with James

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. I welcome this opportunity to state

unequivocally that I never authorized, suggested or supported any

grant of immunity from prosecution or other protection for Bulger

and Flemmi. To the contrary, I was involved in repeated endeavors

to build criminal cases against them, despite knowledge of their

work as FBI informants.

In the 1970’s, Bulger and Flemmi were affiliated with Howard

Winter’s vicious gang, which was the subject of the indictment in

the ‘‘Race Fix Case.’’ The key witness in that case was a gangsterturned-government-witness who had a long record of criminal conduct.

Because of potential issues with his credibility, the indictment

was focused on key members of the Winter gang against whom the

government had developed independent corroborating evidence.

Bulger and Flemmi were not the central figures, and independent

corroborating evidence did not exist against them. Thus, although

they were named as unindicted co-conspirators, they were not

charged as defendants in the indictment.

Before the indictment was returned, FBI agents approached me,

told me that Bulger and Flemmi were informants, and asked me

not to indict them on that basis. I told the agents that I had alVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:56 Mar 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00298 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\84604.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ready determined not to indict them based on lack of corroborative

evidence.

In response to the agents’ query whether I objected to their telling Bulger and Flemmi that the agents had intervened and saved

them from indictment, I told the agents that I did not care what

they told Bulger and Flemmi about my decision as they were the

agents’ informants, not mine. I assume, based on the public record,

that the agents proceeded to take credit with Bulger and Flemmi

for preventing their indictment.

That, however, is not the case. One need only review the trial

transcript of the Race Fix Case to note the absence of evidence— telephone toll records, visual surveillance, or anything else—corroborating for the jury the cooperating witness’ assertion that Bulger and Flemmi were part of the race-fixing scheme.

More than 20 years after the fact, in light of Bulger and

Flemmi’s recent notoriety, it is easy to forget that Howard Winter

was the focus of the case. The gang was named after him. Had I

believed, based on my prosecutorial experience, that Bulger and

Flemmi could have been named as defendants without undermining the overall likelihood of success of the case, I would have recommended their indictment.

Indeed, approximately a year later, I was approached by the

Massachusetts State Police with a request for assistance in obtaining a wiretap on a garage on Lancaster Street where Bulger and

Flemmi were believed to discuss criminal activity. The State Police

declined to work with the FBI, and, after unsuccessfully approaching other Federal law enforcement agencies, I discussed the matter

with the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office and proceeded to

advise and assist that office in obtaining the wiretap order.

After the wiretap was compromised by a leak to the subjects,

both the Massachusetts State Police and I were upset. The source

of the leak has publicly been identified in other proceedings.

Flemmi testified before Judge Wolf in 1998 that the tip came from

an FBI agent who had consulted me. That is categorically untrue.

Judge Wolf’s opinion, which questions the accuracy of Flemmi’s assertion about me, is correct in doing so.

In the aftermath of the Lancaster Street garage matter, a senior

FBI official contacted me and vociferously upbraided me for assisting the State Police in an investigation regarding an FBI informant. In late December 1980, that official, who was evaluating

whether Bulger should be kept as an FBI informant, contacted me

to inquire about Bulger’s value in a pending investigation.

My response was that the FBI would have to make that evaluation regarding one of its informants. Judge Wolf’s opinion quotes

from a memorandum written by that FBI official, recording my response as purportedly being that the information from Bulger was

‘‘crucial,’’ and that there was no ‘‘improper conduct’’ by the FBI in

continuing the relationship ‘‘regardless of his current activities.’’

Judge Wolf notes that I was not sent a copy of this memorandum, and the Judge raises the question whether the memorandum

is an example of self-serving ‘‘Bureau-speak’’ ‘‘written in meaningful measure for the protection of the FBI.’’

Judge Wolf’s question is right on the mark. My view was that it

was within the FBI’s province to evaluate its informants and that,

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assuming that the FBI followed its proper procedures and guidelines, its use of Bulger would not have been improper. I certainly

did not give the FBI official any hint or suggestion that Bulger— and Flemmi—should not be vigorously pursued and prosecuted for

any crimes they committed.

Indeed, on two subsequent occasions, other FBI agents developed

plans to surreptitiously record potentially incriminating conversations with Bulger and Flemmi. When those agents consulted me,

on each occasion I supported the effort. However, on each occasion,

the effort failed, apparently because certain other FBI agents alerted Bulger and Flemmi.

Since these matters came to public attention in approximately

1998, I have been the subject of testimony, press comment, and

mention in books. Some of this has been wildly inaccurate, reflecting, for example, a level of journalism that has failed even to get

my marital status correct.

Some of this has been simply untrue, as was, for example, recent

testimony of a now-disgraced FBI agent that I did not indict Bulger

and Flemmi in the Race Fix Case in response to FBI agents’ request to spare their informants. I welcome this opportunity to set

the record straight.

I state categorically and unequivocally that, although I was made

aware of the status of Bulger and Flemmi as FBI informants in the

late 1970’s, I never authorized them to commit any crimes and

have no knowledge of any such authorization.

Nor did I ever give them any type of immunity from prosecution.

Nor did I ever take any steps to protect them from investigation

or prosecution. As a prosecutor, my goal was to prosecute criminal

activity vigorously, but always following the highest ethical and

moral standards.

I firmly believe that, to continue to be successful in the war on

organized crime that is so important to our Nation, the government

must rely on the use of informants as one of the weapons in its arsenal. However, the concept is that the informant is a tool to be

used by law enforcement, not that law enforcement is a tool to be

used by the informant.

Based on publicly reported information of which I am aware, the

system appears to have gone awry with respect to the handling by

some FBI agents of some informants in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and

steps to ensure that this does not occur again are warranted.

Thank you.

I want to followup briefly on some of the questioning of Mr. Huff.

Representative Burton’s invitation letter mentioned only the Race

Fix Case so that a July 1982 meeting with Detective Huff and others is not addressed in my opening statement.

I would like to address briefly the July 1982 meeting. How did

this meeting come about first? This meeting came about at the request of the Massachusetts State Police that I meet with Detective

from Oklahoma and from Connecticut State Police and describe to

them the structure of the Winter Hill Gang and it’s operations in

the Boston area.

What occurred at this meeting? This meeting, as indicated by Detective Huff, with my description of the Winter Gang and its structure and their relationship to other people, i.e., Agent Rico.

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Third question. Why was Brian Halloran not put in the witness

protection program, which I think is the substance of a lot of the

questions? I thought I told Detective Huff this but the answer is

very succinct and very brief. At the time that Mr. Halloran was cooperating with the FBI, he was under charges of murder in the

Suffolk County, Massachusetts.

It would have been contrary to Justice Department Policy to

sponsor somebody against whom there was a murder case pending

to sponsor him in the witness protection program. However, I did

approach Suffolk County District Attorney Newman Flannigan and

asked him whether, in fact, he would consider removing the murder charges or in some way dismissing the murder charges if Mr.

Halloran would cooperate with him.

Mr. Flannigan said he would think about it and he turned me

over to Thomas Munday who was in charge of his homicide unit

and Sergeant Hudson, retired and now Detective Lt. Hudson of the

Boston Police Department, who was the chief homicide investigator

for Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office.

Assistant District Attorney Munday and Detective Hudson took

Mr. Halloran to various murder sites that they thought that Mr.

Halloran might have information and that Mr. Halloran indicated

that he had information regarding murders committed by the Winter Gang. I can remember one specifically. A murder site in South

Boston. I think the victim was Louis Little and the bar outside of

which the murder occurred was Triple O’s.

Detective Hudson and Assistant District Attorney Munday told

me that Mr. Halloran’s story about how the murders went down

and Assistant District Attorney Munday told me that Mr.

Halloran’s story about how the murder went down and how other

murders went down was totally inconsistent with the physical evidence that they had developed regarding the murders. So they told

me they would not recommend to Mr. Flannigan that the murder

case against Mr. Halloran be dismissed.

As a matter of fact, they recommended to me that I get away

from Mr. Halloran because they thought Mr. Halloran was lying to

them. That’s when I told Detective Huff that I didn’t believe Mr.

Halloran because Mr. Munday and Detective Sergeant, later Lt.

Hudson, told me that they didn’t believe him and that was the only

basis on which I made the statement to Mr. Huff.

Thank you for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Sullivan follows:]

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Mr. BURTON. Did you ever talk to Mr. Halloran directly?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Did he tell you that he thought his life was in jeopardy?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, he never said that but—— Mr. BURTON. Why did he want to get in the witness protection

program?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. He told the agency he thought his life might be

in jeopardy and the agents told me that but Halloran never said

that to me.

Mr. BURTON. But you were aware that he thought his life was

in danger?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I was.

Mr. BURTON. And you felt that even though his life was in danger, according to him, that he should not be in any way protected

because of this case against him?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I thought he should be protected. I recommended the FBI give him some money and they put him in a

safe house as they did for a period of time down on Cape Cod. He

returned to the Boston area from that safe house. They had given

him a cottage on the cape, as I remember it, and that’s where he

was supposed to stay but he returned to the Boston area on his

own.

Mr. BURTON. On his own?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. On his own.

Mr. BURTON. How long after the request was made of you that

he be put in a witness protection program that he was murdered?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I have no idea. I have a chronology here. He

was murdered in May 1982.

Mr. BURTON. When were you asked to put him in the witness

protection program?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I do not recall, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t recall when the FBI talked to you about

him?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Sometime shortly before his murder, at least.

Mr. BURTON. Do you have a rough idea of the timeframe?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I would say it was probably 2 or 3 months before his murder.

Mr. BURTON. Two or 3 months? But you did tell the FBI that you

thought he ought to be put in a safe house some place but not in

the witness protection program?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ever suspect that Bulger and Flemmi were

committing murders?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. When did you first learn that Bulger and Flemmi

were informants? I think you touched on that a minute ago.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I think I said in my statement when Supervisor

Morris and Agent Connelly approached me when I was considering

whether to indict in the Race Fix Trial. Shortly before the Race Fix

indictment was returned was when I first thought they were informants.

Mr. BURTON. But you said you didn’t have enough evidence to indict at that time.

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Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I didn’t have enough corroborating evidence.

Mr. BURTON. But there was evidence that they might have been

participants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s what Mr. Ciulla said, yes.

Mr. BURTON. When you say you didn’t have enough corroborative

evidence, can you explain how much you needed and what you did

have?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Sure. Let me back up a second, Congressman.

The Race Fix Case was about attacking the Winter criminal organization which was head by Howie Winter. My primary purpose in

bringing the case was to convict Mr. Winter and remove him from

the scene. I didn’t want to do anything which would impair the

chances of conviction to Mr. Winter.

The evidence against all the other defendants was there was at

least telephone call records that came from hotel rooms where Mr.

Ciulla was out of state fixing races, where he would call, i.e., telephone calls to Joe McDonald’s house. And there was testimony in

one case, the secretary for the Demetri brothers who identified

Howie Winter and Martarano as having met with the Demetris.

There was at least some total record of evidence and some witness

testimony regarding public defendants.

Mr. BURTON. Well, the other defendants we’re talking about are

Bulger and Flemmi. There were 21 total defendants. You said you

did not have enough corroborating evidence to indict Bulger and

Flemmi. What evidence did you have on them? Did you have any

evidence at all?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. All I had was Mr. Ciulla’s testimony.

Mr. BURTON. And you didn’t think that was sufficient?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not.

Mr. BURTON. But, at the same time, did you know Bulger and

Flemmi were involved in murders?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. So you knew they were involved in murders but you

didn’t feel like in this particular case, the Race-Fixing Case, you

had enough corroborating evidence to include them in the indictment?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s exactly correct.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask my chief counsel to jump in here real

quickly.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. O’Sullivan, do you know whether any of the 21

defendants were indicated with only the testimony of Anthony

Ciulla?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I think there was one.

Mr. TIERNEY. And do you recall who that was?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t. It was a member of the Winter Gang.

I just don’t remember.

Mr. TIERNEY. Would it have been James Simms?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That sounds right. It could be.

Mr. TIERNEY. Were you able to review this week the prosecution

memo? We had asked the Department of Justice to make a copy

available to you one of the documents the President claimed executive privilege of or the prosecution memo for the Race Fix Case?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did they make it available to you?

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Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask you this question, Mr. O’Sullivan.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. You said he was indicted because of the testimony

of this individual.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. By he you are referring to Mr. Simms?

Mr. BURTON. Yes. Did the same person make the allegations

against Mr. Flemmi and Mr. Bulger?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. Then why did you indict one and not the other two?

I mean, the only evidence you had was the testimony of that individual and you did indict this individual. Why did you not indict

the other two based upon his testimony?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Because, Congressman, as I said in my statement, the case was about the Winter Gang, the gang headed by

Howard Winter, and I wanted to take out as much of the leadership of that gang as I could. I thought if I left anybody in the leadership position standing, i.e., Mr. Simms, that the gang would continue.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just followup. I want to be sure I’ve got this

straight. You knew Bulger and Flemmi were murders. Right?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I knew that all the Winter Gang were murders.

Mr. BURTON. You knew Bulger and Flemmi were murders?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. And the testimony that indicted Mr. Simms came

from the same individual that testified against Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. And yet you chose not to indict them. It’s alluding

me why would you—you had three people that he mentioned, and

probably others. You indicted one that was part of the Winter Hill

Gang, but you did not indict Bulger and Flemmi based upon the

same testimony and yet you knew they were murders. I can’t figure

out why you let them off the hook.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Congressman, a little history. The Winter Gang

was composed of various disparate elements of other gangs. The

core of the Winter Gang were the Winter Hill Gang headed by

Howard Winter and his cohorts. That was the glue that held the

Winter Gang together. My approach to the prosecution was to convict Howard Winter and any other member that I thought would

continue the gang going forward. That included Mr. Simms.

I also thought, backing up a step, Congressman, that given the

fact there were 21 defendants and given the fact that Mr. Simms

had a history of being a fugitive from justice, that he wouldn’t be

around when the trial started so that was the second reason I indicted Mr. Simms because I didn’t think he would be ready for trial

and he wasn’t.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Will the chairman yield for a moment?

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask one more question and then I’ll yield

to District Attorney because it’s his time and then he can yield to

you.

I mean, maybe I am just not getting it but you were afraid that

he might flee and he was an integral part of the Winter Hill Gang.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, I wanted him to flee. I didn’t want 21 defendants standing in the courtroom, Congressman.

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Mr. BURTON. I understand.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Even though this is a big courtroom.

Mr. BURTON. But you were afraid he might flee? If you indicted

Bulger and Flemmi, who you knew were murders, what made you

think that they wouldn’t flee?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. They didn’t have any history that they would be

fugitive because I just didn’t see them as being fugitives.

Mr. BURTON. Wait a minute. I’ve got to get this straight, Mr.

O’Sullivan. You knew they were murderers.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I knew that everybody I was indicting was a

murderer.

Mr. BURTON. You knew they were murderers but you thought

they might not—there was no history of them fleeing if they were

indicted so you weren’t worried about them leaving.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. You had 20 defendants already. Mr. Simms would

make it 21 but you had some objection to going to 23 even if it

meant getting two murderers off the street?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Ciulla, I suspect, was going to say very clearly

that Bulger and Flemmi were both involved with the race-fixing

scheme. Right?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. He would say that they were partners and

shared in the proceeds but they didn’t have any involvement. He

didn’t describe them to have any operational involvement in the

scheme. He never called them. He had no contact with them. Had

no meetings with them. He knew they received some of the proceeds of the race-fixing scheme. That’s all he would testify to.

Mr. TIERNEY. At the time that you were finding out what Mr.

Ciulla would testify about Bulger and Flemmi, did you know that

Bulger and Flemmi were informants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. You didn’t know it at that time?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did either Mr. Morris or Mr. Connelly from the

FBI tell you at that time they were informants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No. The first time I learned they were informants is when I was considering drawing the indictments of the

race-fixing scheme and they approached it. That was the first time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, this is pretty much in the same proximity,

right? You were considering the Ciulla case from the time they approached you?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. You were considering drawing the indictment on

all 21 of the people that you eventually indicted.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, Congressman.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you did know at that time that they were informants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. And is that, in fact, the reason that you then decided not to indict them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No it’s not, Congressman.

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Mr. TIERNEY. What did both John Morris and Agent John

Connelly tell you exactly about Bulger and Flemmi at that time?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I really don’t have any specific recollection of

the conversation, Congressman, but they approached me and they

said that they understood that I was considering indictment of

them, among others, and they wanted to bring to my attention that

they were informants. They were requesting that I not indict them

because they were informants. That’s all I remember.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you have any concern knowing that Mr. Ciulla

had some evidence against Bulger and Flemmi? Were you at all

concerned that either of them might try to cause him physical

harm or kill him?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Of course. I was concerned about all of the defendants that they might get to them. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did Mr. Ciulla tell you that he was afraid that they

might do that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t think he told me that he was afraid they

would kill him. He was afraid that another member of the Winter

Gang, Joe McDonald, would be his primary fear.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did every one of the 21 people that you indicted,

every one of them, you had information on them that each and

every one of them was a murderer at one time or another?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No. A number of the people that were indicted

in the case were indicted in the case in order to make the case

more solid against Winter, i.e., the bookmakers in Las Vegas, those

type of people.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Delahunt, did you want to proceed?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes. I just want for one moment to clarify. I

thank my colleague for yielding. You are referring to the Winter

Hill Gang.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I am referring, Congressman, to the Winter

Gang. It’s different than the Winter Hill Gang.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand that. At the same time would you

agree with me, and you and I have, you know, had professional relationships through the years, that both Mr. Flemmi and Mr. Bulger were considered part of the Howie Winter Gang.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. They were partners in the gang.

Mr. DELAHUNT. They were, as you would suggest—you made reference to Mr. Simms, Jimmy Simms. In your professional judgment

in terms of the hierarchy of the Winter Gang, it was clear that

Bulger and Flemmi would succeed to be the successors to Mr. Winter if he should be convicted. Would you say that’s a fair statement,

Judge?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It’s not a fair statement.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is not?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We have a disagreement on that. Let me explore

a little differently. It was clear that Bulger and Flemmi had a continuing relationship with Howie Winter.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. On a regular basis.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If we had the opportunity to explore Massachusetts State Police files and FBI reports, we would discover that

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they were in constant communication with each other. Is that correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I believe so.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But you don’t want to describe them as the logical successors to Mr. Winter?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, Congressman, because the logical successor

to Mr. Winter would be the people that he most trusted which were

the remnants of the Winter Hill Gang, Joe McDonald, Jimmy

Simms, and Sal Sperlinga who was also named by Mr. Ciulla as

somebody who was involved in the Race Fix scheme who I also did

not indict because there was no corroborating evidence.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I’ll yield back and I’ll save my time. I just wanted to clarify and put in context the relationship between these parties. They were well known to each other.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Absolutely.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. O’Sullivan, prior to this occasion had you ever

been told before or given the identity of the informant?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. Was that a regular occurrence?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, it’s not, Congressman.

Mr. TIERNEY. How frequently would you say you had that type

of information in a previous investigation?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I would suggest it was less than 10.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it was pretty unusual?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Very unusual.

Mr. TIERNEY. So were you surprised when Morris and Connelly

approached you and gave you information about Bulger and

Flemmi in this instance?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Surprised that they were informants? Yes, I

was surprised but not surprised that they would approach me

about an informant because Mr. Connelly had done it before.

Mr. TIERNEY. When you met with Detective Huff, do you recall

a state trooper telling you that there was a real estate transaction

between Connelly and James Bulger?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t know.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you remember being told at that time that

Connelly had numerous social contacts with Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t.

Mr. BURTON. I want to make sure I clarify one thing and then

I’ll go to Mr. Shays. When you met with Mr. Huff did you indicate

that there was some social contact between Connelly and Mr. Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not, Congressman. I don’t remember doing

that and I don’t think I would have.

Mr. BURTON. You didn’t indicate that there was a good relationship there between those two individuals?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. How about Rico? Did you indicate that there was

a cozy relationship between Rico and Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t think I did that either.

Mr. BURTON. I think Mr. Huff’s recollection is a little different

than yours in that meeting. Are you sure about that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’m not sure about it but I don’t think I did.

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Mr. BURTON. Did you know there was a cozy relationship between them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Between whom, Congressman?

Mr. BURTON. Connelly and Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not.

Mr. BURTON. You did not? Did you know their was a cozy relationship between Rico and Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not.

Mr. BURTON. You are sure about that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I am sure about that.

Mr. BURTON. So you wouldn’t have said that in a meeting with

Mr. Huff?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I wouldn’t have said it in a meeting with Mr.

Huff.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chair, I’m happy just to suspend my time and

let my Massachusetts colleagues ask questions and then come

back.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I just want to go back, if I

could, Mr. O’Sullivan. You testified just a short while ago and I

just want to get this straight. I’m trying to write some of this

down. First you testified that all the members of the Winter Hill

Gang were murderers. Is that correct or is that—am I mishearing

you?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I think you are mishearing me. Most of the

members of the Winter Hill Gang were murderers. I would exclude,

for instance, Sal Sperlinga who was a bookmaker. I believe most

of the Winter Hill Gang members were murderers, yes.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Let’s back this up. I’m new at this. How many

members are you saying are in the Winter Hill Gang?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Well, it depends on how you define a gang. I

think the core membership was seven individuals. Then there was

various other people who were associated with the members.

Mr. LYNCH. For the committee, could you name who those individuals are?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. Or were.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Howard Winter, James Simms, Joe McDonald,

John and Jimmy Martarano, Whitey Bulger, and Stevie Flemmi. Is

that seven?

Mr. LYNCH. Seven. That’s right. Bulger and Flemmi are members

of the Winter Hill Gang. Let me get this right. You testified previously that they were involved somehow in the profit sharing end

of this race-fixing scheme. Is that correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct, Congressman.

Mr. LYNCH. And if I follow this correctly, the race-fixing scheme

relied upon threats and intimidation and bribes. Quite often

threats and intimidation to force these jockeys to participate in this

race-fixing scheme. Am I correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. So you’ve got two guys who are known murderers to you. They are getting profit from this race-fixing scheme.

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The race-fixing scheme is using threats and intimidation. Again,

these two fellows are known murderers. Somehow they are not indictable in this matter. Is that what you’re telling this committee?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s what I’m telling the committee, Congressman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Could you yield for a second?

Mr. LYNCH. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. You said a moment ago, Mr. O’Sullivan, you wanted to take off the street all the potential ascendents to the leadership of this gang. That’s why you indicted Mr. Simms.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now we have seven members of that gang. You indicted Winter. Right?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Right.

Mr. TIERNEY. You indicated Simms, you indicted McDonald, and

the two Martaranos. Then the only ones you didn’t indict were the

two remaining people who could ascend into the leadership,

Flemmi and Bulger.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s true, but my analysis was that the core

of the gang was made up of Winter and the survivors of the Winter

Hill Gang. That was Winter, Simms, McDonald. That was my analysis. The Martaranos were indicted because I had very good physical evidence, i.e., a witness who would testify that she saw them

meeting with the Demetri brothers and with Howie Winter. I had

telephone calls to premises they locate.

Mr. TIERNEY. Am I wrong in saying your first thought was that

you wanted to take them off the street anybody who could ascend

to the leadership?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. And then you gave us the names of seven people

that you thought were the top dogs. Right?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you took five off the street and you let two.

Those two you had no more—you had the same amount of evidence

against them as you had against Simms, one person’s testimony.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Yield back.

Mr. LYNCH. Just one more question. Were there any other persons indicted of this 21 defendants that were indicted solely for

participating in the profit sharing, if you will, of this illegal enterprise?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’m not sure I understand your question, Congressman.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. You explained before, Mr. O’Sullivan, that Bulger and Flemmi did, in fact, benefit from the profit sharing aspects

of this illegal enterprise, this race-fixing scheme. Somehow that

distinguished them from the other 21 who were more—at least I’m

surmising that they were involved in the operational aspects of this

race-fixing scheme.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. True.

Mr. LYNCH. In that other group, the 21 indicted, were there any

members of that group whose sole involvement was merely—not

merely but solely taking profits from that enterprise?

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Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, sir. One person wasn’t indicted because he

was similar. We had no evidence against him and he was sharing

only in the profits.

Mr. LYNCH. But he was indicted?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. He was not indicted.

Mr. LYNCH. He was not indicted.

I yield. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Then is it, Mr. O’Sullivan, that you found out that

Connelly and Rico did have a social relationship with Whitey Bulger and James Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Only from rumors I’ve heard around the street

over a period of time primarily emanating from DEA but I can’t

give you a date or specific time but I’ve heard rumors over time.

Mr. TIERNEY. At any other point in time where you were prosecuting cases did you ever exercise your prosecutorial discretion

and not bring charges against Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, Congressman. As a matter of fact, I tried

to develop cases against them.

Mr. BURTON. At that meeting with Mr. Huff that you recall, Mr.

Toomey stayed with police fellows there in Connecticut, I believe.

Correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t remember who was there. I know there

was a number of people there.

Mr. BURTON. I want to make absolutely sure about your testimony because it’s very important. I don’t want you to find later

that you misspoke and it might be a problem for you. You did not

say that Rico caroused with the Winter Hill Gang and he was

friendly with them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did say he was friendly with them. I did not

say that he caroused with them.

Mr. BURTON. Well, he was involved with them. He was intimately involved with them. Mr. Huff indicated that you were very

emphatic that he was very close and was seen many times with the

Winter Hill Gang?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, that’s what I said.

Mr. BURTON. And that would be Bulger and Flemmi as well?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, I assume that was the case.

Mr. BURTON. So what you’re saying now is a little bit different

than what you said earlier in that you didn’t recall saying that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Well, I just didn’t understand. I never said carousing or that kind of stuff. I had no knowledge that he was socially involved with them. I had knowledge that he was in business

with them in the sense that he was then the head of security of

the race track that Mr. Callahan owned.

Mr. BURTON. We can bring Mr. Huff back up. I want to make

sure that I’ve got this clear. Mr. Huff said, and we just asked him

about this a minute ago, that you were very emphatic in saying

that Mr. Rico was seen with them a lot at social gatherings and

those things and you were very emphatic about his closeness to the

Winter Hill Gang and Bulger and Flemmi.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t have any memory of saying that, Congressman, but I would not dispute that I did say it.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meehan.

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Mr. MEEHAN. So Mr. O’Sullivan, you testified in response to Mr.

Tierney’s question that you heard on the streets that Flemmi and

Bulger had this relationship with Connelly and Rico. Is that correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. MEEHAN. What period of time is that? When did you first become aware, through hearing it on the street?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t know, Congressman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Don’t you think as a Federal prosecutor you had

an obligation to followup and find out what that relationship was

all about?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did followup, Congressman. I did try to investigate them both. The investigations were blown up by someone

else. I tried with the state police to aid them in the wiretap at the

Lancaster Street Garage. I tried to do a wiretap on Stevie Flemmi.

I tried to get a cooperating Boston police officer wear a body reporter against Mr. Bulger. In all situations those efforts came to

naught.

Mr. MEEHAN. OK. Let’s go to Lancaster Street Garage investigation. How did you become aware of the state police investigation?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Colonel O’Donovan from the state police approached me and asked me if I would do an investigation of Mr.

Bulger and Flemmi with the state police and I said I would.

Mr. MEEHAN. Do you remember who headed up that operation

for the state police?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, Colonel O’Donovan and Lt. Robert Long.

Mr. MEEHAN. Did you discuss the Lancaster Street bugging operation with Trooper Bob Long of the Massachusetts State Police?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. MEEHAN. And do you recall Trooper Long telling you that he

thought that Bulger and Flemmi were FBI informants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. MEEHAN. What did you say in response?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t remember. I said let’s go ahead and do

the case anyway.

Mr. MEEHAN. Did it make sense to you?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. During the case, yes, it made sense to me.

Mr. MEEHAN. Did it make sense to you that Bulger and Flemmi

were FBI informants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I have to believe it since the rumor was around

on the street. A lot of knowledgeable law enforcement officers were

saying it and I believed it.

Mr. MEEHAN. Did you know by then? In other words, Bob Long

says that, ‘‘Gee, I think that Bulger and Flemmi are FBI informants.’’

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Did it make sense to me?

Mr. MEEHAN. Did you know that they were informants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. At that point in time the FBI approached

me and told me in the Race Fix Case that they were informants.

Mr. MEEHAN. OK. So you knew that they were informants.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. MEEHAN. In that operation isn’t it true the state troopers

had collected substantial evidence on Whitey Bulger’s ongoing

criminal activities with the mafia?

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Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. That’s why I—— Mr. MEEHAN. This potentially could have been the biggest organized crime case ever presumably. Would you agree?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I would not.

Mr. MEEHAN. You wouldn’t? A big case, though?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Certainly a big case.

Mr. MEEHAN. Can you understand why Trooper Bob Long who

certainly had worked with the FBI in other cases like Operation

Lobster was reluctant to work with the Boston FBI?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Absolutely I understood it.

Mr. MEEHAN. Can you understand his concerns about the FBI

after Bulger had eluded prosecution in the horse race-fixing case?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That never came up because—— Mr. MEEHAN. Did he ever bring it up?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. He didn’t bring it up, no.

Mr. MEEHAN. Did you ever tell Bob Long that it would be political suicide for you to recommend that any case be assisted by a

Federal agency other than the FBI?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I think when he approached me with the Lancaster Street Garage case I may have said that, yes. I don’t have

memory of it but that is probably what I did say.

Mr. MEEHAN. Do you think it would have been political suicide

for you to have recommended that another Federal agency assist

the Massachusetts troopers?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I was using political in a small p sense meaning

administratively it would have caused big problems. I took the

state police and I went to the DEA and I went to the Secret Service

and asked them to participate in an investigation in Bulger and

Flemmi with the state police and they both refused.

Mr. MEEHAN. So if you had a sense that it would be political suicide for you to have recommended that other Federal agencies be

involved, does that tell us anything about the FBI culture during

that period? What does it tell us about the FBI culture during that

period?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It tells us that the FBI if you go against them,

they will try to get you. They will wage war on you. They will

cause major administrative problems for me as a prosecutor. That’s

what it tells us.

Mr. MEEHAN. Well, wouldn’t you feel as a prosecutor then, and

a well-respected prosecutor, one that the young prosecutors coming

into the U.S. Attorney’s Office looked up to, and given that awesome responsibility to make sure that Federal law enforcement is

being carried out in an honest manner with integrity.

Wouldn’t you think that you had an obligation then in the interest of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, in the interest of the administration of justice, to followup with that problems of the culture, to followup with the notion of it would be political suicide not to include

the FBI in this investigation?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. And by following up, Congressman, could you

define it a little more clearly? What does followup mean?

Mr. MEEHAN. Following up means finding out specifically in an

aggressive way, the same way that you aggressively handled other

cases successfully I might add, prosecutions of organized crime, to

make sure that there wasn’t any corruption or misdealings with orVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:56 Mar 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00318 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\84604.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ganized crime figures and witnesses within the Justice Department

and potentially within the FBI.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did that, Congressman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Unsuccessfully.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Unsuccessfully.

Mr. MEEHAN. You apparently told Bob Long that maybe the

microphone surveillance could have been compromised by a civilian

installer. Is that true?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It is.

Mr. MEEHAN. And you even knew the name of the installer?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s right. This is a person who had done

some wiretap sweeps for the Patriarca family so I was concerned

about him.

Mr. MEEHAN. And did that cause Bob Long to want to investigate

the installer and go in that direction rather than another direction?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I have no idea.

Mr. MEEHAN. After the Lancaster Street failed, do you think it

did so because it was compromised by the FBI?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. MEEHAN. You told the FBI and the Office of Professional Responsibility investigators that you came to know of a series of leaks

about the investigation that was attributable to John Morris. Is

that true?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’m not quite sure what I meant by that when

I said it, Congressman. I just don’t have a memory of when I said

that what I meant.

Mr. MEEHAN. Were you concerned then at that time about the

quality of the investigation?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’m not quite sure what you mean.

Mr. MEEHAN. How would you characterize leaks?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. How would I characterize leaks?

Mr. MEEHAN. The leaks in this case, which was obviously a critical case that potentially could have been a major case against

Bulger and Flemmi. How would you characterize the leaks? Were

they favorable to anyone else in the investigation?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. They were favorable to Bulger and Flemmi

clearly.

Mr. BURTON. Let me followup. I might have missed what you

said just a moment ago but did you indicate that the FBI said—

you can put it in your own words—that if you caused them problems, that they wouldn’t cooperate with you in an investigation or

something?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Can you tell me in your words how you said that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. During the Lancaster Street Garage aftermath,

the SAC of the FBI, Lawrence Sarhadt, called me and asked me

to come over to his office and berated me up and down, swearing

at me, yelling as loud as he could about how I should never have

associated myself with the state police and gone against FBI informants.

Mr. BURTON. So you felt that they were not going to cooperate

with you unless you worked with them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s what he told me.

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Mr. BURTON. OK. So he told you that. Now, go back to what Mr.

Huff said. Mr. Huff said, ‘‘Rico was connected to the Winter Hill

Gang. Rico caroused with them.’’ This is according to what you told

him. ‘‘Rico caroused with them according to O’Sullivan. He drank

with them. He played pool with them. He was, as a matter of fact,

very specific about this.’’ This is what Mr. Huff said a few minutes

ago before you came up and testified.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I was sitting in the courtroom and I heard him

say it.

Mr. BURTON. The reason I’m bringing it up again is you indicted

five of the seven, as Mr. Tierney asked, but you did not indict the

race scandal, the two individuals we have been talking about.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. Bulger and Flemmi. And it seems to me that there

must have been some reason for that. Now, if Rico was carousing

with the Winter Hill Gang and he was close to Bulger and Flemmi,

and you were ‘‘in someway threatened by the FBI,’’ was that the

reason you didn’t indict them in the race scandal?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It was not, Congressman. The reason, as I articulated earlier, was a lack of corroborative evidence.

Mr. BURTON. I know but the thing that bothers me a little bit

is that you indicted somebody based upon the testimony of an individual. You also said the same things about Bulger and Flemmi

but you didn’t indict them. Now, in my mind there has got to be

a reason why. The same evidence was presented.

I know you said he was higher up in the gang, but the fact is

the FBI said they wanted you to cut out this working with the

state police so you had been admonished, maybe before that even,

to not go around the FBI. Here was Rico carousing with the Winter

Hill Gang and two of the top lieutenants in the Winter Hill Gang,

Bulger and Flemmi, were not indicted in the race scandal, even

though the testimony of an individual indicted somebody else for

the same reasons.

It seems to me if Rico was carousing with them, you had been

admonished by the FBI to keep your hands off of some things because they didn’t want you going around with the state police. Here

are two kingpins of this group, two murderers, that you didn’t indict. There has got to be some reason for it and I still in my mind

can’t figure it out.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Well, I’m sorry, Congressman. My reasons are

as stated, that I wanted the case against Howard Winter to be the

strongest case that I could bring and I thought that having people

in the case against whom the evidence was very weak—the evidence against Winter was weak as it started but I decided based

on that I did not want to have people in the case that the jury—

we would have a domino affect where the jury would consider certain people not guilty and then it would carryover to the key people. That’s why I did it.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meehan, because I took some of your time, go

ahead.

Mr. MEEHAN. Do you know, Mr. O’Sullivan, how the state trooper’s bug was compromised in the Lancaster Street Garage investigation?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t.

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Mr. MEEHAN. You don’t to this day?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t to this day.

Mr. MEEHAN. How did this all happen? I mean, just listening to

you talk about what you heard in the street, what you knew of the

relationships, being pushed around by the FBI because you were

talking to the state police, state police investigations being compromised by the FBI.

Why in the world didn’t somebody stop in what was considered

at that time to be one of the best U.S. Attorney’s Office in the country stop and say, ‘‘What the hell is going on here? What is the FBI

up to?’’ How did this happen?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Well, some of us tried to stop it anyway. I asked

the FBI to remove John Connelly as a Strike Force rep from the

FBI. I knew that would cause a major problem but I asked them

to do it and I did it based at the behest of various agencies including the state police. Some of us tried to do something. We tried to

get him out of the organized crime program.

Mr. MEEHAN. But sometimes when you are trying to clean up an

agency you have to go above that agency because sometimes agencies don’t want to clean up themselves and it is just remarkable to

me after so many years that more couldn’t have been done. I don’t

know. You bring in young attorneys and the first thing you do— I was a prosecutor in Middlesex County. The first thing you do is

you teach them about the ethics of the enormous power they have

as prosecutors. You teach them to be leery of the police departments when they come in on cases. And you teach them to always

be able to balance what the police are saying or what the investigators are saying, to make sure you always have integrity in that system, and to watch that we couldn’t have expected better from the

Justice Department. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just to pursue the thought expressed by my colleague, Mr. Meehan. Let me ask you a policy question first. You

suggest that you took what you felt to be a dramatic step by going

against the FBI and your dealings with, I presume, Special Agent

in charge Sarhadt?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If you could restructure the relationship between

the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Federal Bureau of Investigation,

would you make any changes? Let me editorialize for a moment.

It seems to me that you felt that the FBI in many respects was an

intimidating force without any checks, without any accountability,

and certainly without any transparency.

It was as, if you will, an island unto itself operating out there

with only internal supervision. Of course, as we’ve learned subsequently, what goes on in field offices and what reports to send up

to Washington can be distorted, can be sugarcoated, important information can be omitted. If you could respond to my question, how

would you structure as we contemplate legislation to ensure that

not just the FBI, but all investigative agencies have some accountability outside of the institutions themselves.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Congressman, I really don’t have an answer to

that question because that’s why you’re having these hearings. I

would suggest that it really isn’t a structural issue down at the

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field level. It really is a question of somebody above the field looking over their shoulder.

I would suggest that the Inspector General of the Justice Department, the Inspector General of the FBI, they ought to take some

test cases around the country and go into those offices and talk

with the prosecutors rather than what the FBI does now. They

have an inspection with, you know, somebody comes over and

counts the pens and pencils and then they come over to the U.S.

Attorney’s Office and they ask how are relationships.

The U.S. Attorney’s Office being politicians say, ‘‘Everything is

fine as far as we can tell.’’ If, in fact, the internal investigative unit

of the FBI were to look specifically at dynamics of how the cases

are operated, what the relationship between the FBI and the prosecutors are. That would be, I think, one way to do it.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And that wasn’t done during your tenure?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’ve never seen it done, Congressman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Getting back for a moment to the Race Fix Case.

You suggested that it was your decision not to prosecute prior to

the approach by Morris and Connelly relative to Flemmi and Bulger and the fact that they were informants.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And at different times, I think, during the course

of some of your responses to questions posed by my colleagues, and

I also believe in your opening statement you referenced the findings of Judge Wolf.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Let me read to you a finding that Judge Wolf

made. This is on page 142 you have these findings. Maybe you

could identify counsel for us.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. This is my partner, Hugh Scott. We’ve got a

copy if you want to give me a minute.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Sure. Also, if we could trouble the committee,

could we have some more water for Mr. O’Sullivan?

Mr. BURTON. Would you yield?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. I want to read you something, Mr. O’Sullivan, while

you’re looking for that. Anthony ‘‘Fat Man’’ Ciulla implicated Bulger and Flemmi in that national horse race-fixing scheme. There

were 21 people involved and, of course, the President claimed executive privilege and we did get those documents.

Apparently Ciulla himself was outraged that Bulger and Flemmi

were not indicted. He was afraid they would kill him. Of course,

I’m sure you are familiar with the Black Mass and I want you to

comment on this. It states that Bulger and Flemmi were made to

promise that they would not murder Ciulla and that was what got

him to go along and testify against all the others who had been indicted.

Because Bulger and Flemmi were told about the impending indictments by the FBI, they were able to warn others including

John Martarano who was the contract killer for Bulger and Flemmi

and he was able to get out of town before being picked up. Of

course, 2 years later he was the trigger man in the Wheeler murder.

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Can you comment on that? Ciulla who, you know, you base some

of these indictments on his testimony. Did he indicate any outrage

to you or anybody that you know of that Bulger and Flemmi had

not been indicted?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, Congressman. I wouldn’t have listened to

what a witness said anyway. I have not read Black Mask and I am

not familiar with it. I kept myself away from it on the basis that

I knew I would be testifying sometime and I knew that Black Mask

was incorrect in a number of major factual ways.

Mr. BURTON. Do you think what I just read is incorrect?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. You do?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I do.

Mr. BURTON. So you don’t think that Ciulla was upset that Bulger and Flemmi of the seven leaders was not indicted?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. He may have been upset, Congressman. I don’t

know that for a fact but I’ll assume.

Mr. BURTON. Do you think if they found out he testified against

them, that they would have been a little ticked off?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Do you think maybe since they were known murderers they might murder him?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. They among others in the Winter Gang, yes, including Howard Winter.

Mr. BURTON. Yet you said that there was not enough corroborating evidence to indict those two?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s what I said, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. Did you have any indication or did anybody tell you

there was a deal not to murder Ciulla, that he had testified against

the others but not Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t know anything about that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Absolutely not.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t know anything about Martarano being

told that he was going to be indicted and he took off and, of course,

killed somebody 2 years later?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not know that either, Congressman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. On page 142 I’m going to read out loud and I’ll

make a reference to page 141. Let me read it out loud while you

are thumbing through the transcript.

‘‘In May 1979 the FBI in Boston requested and received from the

Director of the FBI approval to reopen Bulger as an informant. The

Director was told, however, that no prosecutable case developed

against Bulger in the opinion of the Strike Force attorney handling

the matter.’’ That would be you, Mr. O’Sullivan. Correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I assume.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Judge Wolf goes on further. ‘‘This was not true.

While Bulger and Flemmi were not prosecuted in the Race Fix

Cases because Connelly, Morris, and O’Sullivan had decided that

their value as informants outweighed the importance of prosecuting

them.’’ You would disagree with that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I disagree with that, Congressman, because I

think it was based on the testimony of Mr. Morris who testified

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that he and Connelly had approached me and convinced me not to

indict them. I didn’t testify at those hearings for various reasons.

Mr. DELAHUNT. On page 141 another finding by Judge Wolf. This

is a simple sentence. ‘‘O’Sullivan consulted Daily and subsequently

agreed not to charge Bulger and Flemmi in the Race Fix Case.’’ Presumably, Daley is an FBI agent with whom you were working.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, he was the case agent.

Mr. DELAHUNT. He was the case agent. Do you have any memory

whatsoever of consulting with Special Agent Daley regarding Bulger and Flemmi in seeking his approval or his support in terms of

not indicting Bulger and Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You don’t. Would you disagree with the finding

or you just simply don’t have—— Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Would you read the finding again?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I’m sorry?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Would you read the finding again?

Mr. DELAHUNT. It’s just a simple statement. It says, ‘‘O’Sullivan ...’’ Again, this is Judge Wolf. ‘‘. . . consulted Daily and subsequently agreed not to charge Bulger and Flemmi in the Race Fix

Case.’’ I don’t know whether Agent Daley might have testified before Judge Wofe. I don’t have any knowledge to that effect.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Nor do I.

Mr. DELAHUNT. However, just one inference that could be drawn

given the finding by Judge Wofe was that Daley did, in fact, testify.

One could draw another inference that Daley before Judge Wolf

would have acknowledged that there was some consultation between you and Daley relative to not indicting Bulger and Flemmi

based upon the fact that they were FBI informants.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s not the case. There was some consultation with Agent Daley about all the defendants and about the evidence we had against them and how we could get further evidence

that might buttress the case against them. Yes, I consulted with

Agent Daley about the structure of the indictment and who the defendants could be. We were intimately involved in putting the case

together but not about Bulger and Flemmi as informants or their

role as informants.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, on page 141 of the findings, this is a reference to Connelly and Morris. They emphasized that Bulger in a

purported conversation with you either subsequent to your decision

as to whether to prosecute or not or before. We don’t know that.

But in their conversation with you, they emphasized that ‘‘Bulger

and Flemmi were crucial to the ambitious plan they and O’Sullivan

were developing to bug 98 Prince Street, the headquarters of

Gennaro Angiulo, then the leader of the LCN in Boston. Thus, Morris and Connelly asked O’Sullivan not to include Bulger and

Flemmi in the forthcoming race fix indictment.’’ Again, this is the

finding that was made by Judge Mark Wolf.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I assume it’s based on Morris’ testimony. At

least to that extent, we did discuss how important Bulger and

Flemmi might be to the wiretap at 98 Prince Street. Yes, that is

true.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You know, you just used, I think, a very important verb, ‘‘might.’’

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Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’m sorry?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Might. Might be crucial. It seems to have become

accepted among those that are interested in these matters that

somehow Flemmi and Bulger were crucial or were critical in developing the probable cause necessary for 98 Prince Street bug.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. They weren’t.

Mr. DELAHUNT. They weren’t?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. They weren’t.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. I think that is really important for

the public to hear that because I hope that once and for all the

myth of information that was secured by Mr. Connelly and Mr.

Morris from Flemmi and Bulger was just about nothing. Is that a

fair statement?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. You have to understand the iterations of the

wiretap application process at 98 Prince Street.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I am familiar with the process.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It was originally going to be a Rico wiretap. Unfortunately, the First Circuit came down and said that Rico did not

apply to criminal organization so we had to redo the wiretap application just to focus on subsequent crimes like loansharking and

gambling, not Rico. I believe that Bulger and Flemmi might have

been some help in the initial application but they weren’t of any

substantive help ultimately when we did the application.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would dare say my own perusal, if you will, and

I would ask you to try to recollect in developing the affidavit, whatever positive assistance came from these two individuals relative to

the development of the probable cause necessary in the affidavit

came from Flemmi and none of it came from Bulger.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t know that, Congressman, because I don’t

remember the information today so I can’t answer that question.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you have any memory whatsoever in terms

of the contribution, or can you distinguish between the contribution

by Flemmi and Bulger in terms of the 98 Prince Street? Would you

weigh one over the other or is it vague to you at this time?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It’s vague. I couldn’t distinguish, Congressman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Again, I think that for the first time we have

heard that this myth that these informants were developed because

they were crucial is just that, it’s a myth. Any former agent that

would take credit for developing them and cracking La Cosa Nostra

in New England is a gross exaggeration.

I say that directed to the members of the states that are here

present because it has taken on a life of its own. You had numerous other investigative techniques as well as informants that were

assisting you and providing you information that was necessary in

terms of the 98 Prince Street investigation.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s true, Congressman. As a matter of fact,

I met with some of those informants personally to develop the information so I know who has contributed to the 98 Prince Street

wiretap.

Mr. BURTON. We will come back if you need to. Thank you.

Mr. O’Sullivan, I am grateful that you are here today. I appreciate you not using your very serious illnesses as a basis for not

being and I consider you a very willing witness. I understand that

during your time in service to your government that you were conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 09:56 Mar 06, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00325 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\84604.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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sidered one of the best and the brightest. I have to tell you as I

listened to you, I feel that your responses have been candid and

fairly quick and responsive and not a lot of hesitation and wanting

us to understand how you view it.

It still doesn’t add up to me and so I’m struggling to see if there

is something that is in your heart or in your mind that you think

we may know that we don’t know. I was somewhat stunned by your

very veracious response to Representative Meehan when he asked

you about the FBI. I mean, that lit a fire under you and you became very animated in your description about if you confront the

FBI, you pay a big penalty. I would think if the FBI confronted you

they would pay a big penalty.

Yet, it seemed to be the other way around. As we talk about various FBI agents, I’m thinking the FBI folks that I know, they don’t

have that kind of personality. I either don’t know a lot of FBI folks

or I just didn’t know them up in this area. It is your testimony if

you confront the FBI you pay a penalty. That blows me away.

When I hear Winter Gang, I heard seven and I said five down

and two to go. I was kind of waiting for you to say, ‘‘We wanted

to get those five but, you know, these guys were next in line. They

were on my list.’’ I didn’t hear you say that. Tell me this. Did anyone from the FBI tell you that you should not prosecute Whitey

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, not specifically.

Mr. BURTON. Did anyone from any local or state police department tell you not to prosecute Whitey Bulger or Stephen Flemmi?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. Did anyone from the Justice Department suggest

that you not prosecute—— Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. Then having successfully prosecuted the first five,

when were you planning to prosecute them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. In my opening statement, Congressman, I said

that I had developed two cases against them. The Lancaster Street

Garage, in my agreement with the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office list, if that wiretap was fruitful, we would sit down and

allocate which part would go Federal and which part would go to

the state.

Second, in the Boston police corruption investigation I had

planned a wiretap on a bookmaker who is in direct contact with

Stevie Flemmi and I had planned to have a Boston police officer

who was cooperating wear a body recording against Whitey Bulger.

There were two cases that were in the wings waiting to take off.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Tierney just brought to my attention that when

you were asked a question by Mr. Shays whether or not anybody

in the FBI asked you not to prosecute Bulger and Flemmi, you said

not specifically. Is that what your answer was?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t remember my answer. If that’s what it

is, I was referring back to the fact that Morris and Connelly had

come over and seen me and ask me not to do it.

Mr. BURTON. They came over and asked you what?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Not to prosecute.

Mr. BURTON. Not to prosecute Bulger and Flemmi.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, in the Race Fix Case.

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Mr. BURTON. So they specifically asked you not to?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ask them why?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. They told me because they were FBI informants.

Mr. BURTON. They told you they were FBI informants and you

thought that was sufficient even though you knew they were murderers and you knew that they had been accused just like—what’s

the other fellow’s name that was indicted?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, I didn’t think that was sufficient, Congressman. I told you I made up my mind before they came over and

asked me that question. When they did come over and ask me that

question, I told them I already decided not to indict them.

Mr. BURTON. You know, it kind of troubles me that you knew

they were murderers and here is two FBIs saying that we are, in

effect, protecting murderers who were involved in numerous murders because they were informants. Didn’t you find that a little

troubling?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I didn’t reflect on it but——

Mr. BURTON. You didn’t reflect on it?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. BURTON. Well, you know, it goes back to the same thing

we’ve been asking over and over again and I can’t get a grasp on

your reasoning; that is, that you indict one guy based upon testimony and two other guys you don’t indict and they are murderers.

Two FBI agents came over and told you not to indict them because

they were informants. You said, ‘‘I have already decided not to indict them because there is not enough corroborative evidence. Yet,

there is another fellow who is pretty high up in the organization

that you did indict because he might be up here above him. I just

can’t understand that. Why would you get the whole kit and caboodle?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Because it’s better settling for half a loaf than

the whole loaf. The half a loaf, in my opinion, was Howie Winter.

He was the linchpin that held this criminal organization together.

Mr. BURTON. How many times when you were a prosecutor did

you agree not to prosecute known murderers because they were informants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t think it has ever happened.

Mr. BURTON. You never did?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. BURTON. Except in this case because you had already made

up your mind?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. If you hadn’t already made up your mind you would

have indicted them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Mr. SHAYS. I didn’t listen, I guess, to the question. I said did anyone from the FBI ask you not to indict Bulger and Flemmi. I

thought you said no. You said not specifically and now you are saying yes? I do want to be clear.

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Mr. O’SULLIVAN. In my opening statement I said that when I

made up my mind not to indict them, that Morris and Connelly

came over after the fact and asked me not to indict them.

Mr. SHAYS. So when I asked you the question did anyone from

the FBI ask you not to indict them, you said no to me. Really what

you should have said is, yes, but—— Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct, Congressman.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Did anyone from the Justice Department tell you

not to indict them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, Congressman. Absolutely not.

Mr. SHAYS. Did anyone from the state police at anytime ask

you——

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Absolutely not.

Mr. SHAYS. So the only people, according to your testimony, that

asked you not to indict are the FBI?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. Based on the facts. Now, did you respond with some

degree of—somewhat incredulously like, ‘‘What do you mean these

are FBI informants? They are known murderers?‘‘ Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, I did not, Congressman.

Mr. SHAYS. Why not?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I assume that when you have informants at

that level they are involved in crimes.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me ask you, though, should I make an assumption that they were involved in past crimes or do you think that

they had stopped committing crimes? Let me understand something. If you are an informant and giving testimony against someone else, are you still allowed to be killing people?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I assume that is a rhetorical question, Congressman.

Mr. SHAYS. Where would you have drawn the line with the

crimes they were allowed to commit?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Whatever the Justice Department guidelines

are on that.

Mr. SHAYS. What were they?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I have no idea because they are the FBI’s, in

the first instance, to put into effect. They are the ones that control

the informants, not the prosecutor.

Mr. SHAYS. This isn’t a pretty picture right now. I mean, someone of your stature is basically saying that you’ve got a gigantic

problem with the FBI and that if you confront them, you do it at

some risk to your ability to carry on your work, which is like they

can blackmail you practically by their simply refusing to cooperate.

The implication is that under your command of this job, the FBI

was able to influence who would prosecute and who you wouldn’t

based on their willingness to cooperate with you. Is that the kind

of view I should leave this hearing with?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, it’s not, Congressman. I would bring to your

attention that I worked with the state police and I worked with the

FBI to build a case on Bulger and Flemmi in two separate instances.

We have gone over that fact. When the state police came to me

after the Race Fix trial and they asked me to develop a case on

Flemmi and Bulger and they didn’t want to work with the FBI,

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then I went to the District Attorney of Suffolk County, which was

the only agency that I could think of that might be willing to bring

the wiretap. I went to him and I aided them in developing the

wiretap, the state wiretap, but they did get the Lancaster Street

Garage.

Mr. BURTON. Would you yield for a moment? Let me ask you

this. You said that you did try to indict Bulger and Flemmi subsequent to this.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I didn’t. I said I tried to investigate them.

Mr. BURTON. You tried to investigate them. Why didn’t you indict

them? You couldn’t find anything?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. You knew they were murderers, you knew they

were involved in the race-fixing thing, and you couldn’t indict them

and couldn’t find anything?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. After the case was resolved in the race-fixing thing,

you knew they were involved and you had testimony from Ciulla

or whatever.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Ciulla.

Mr. BURTON. You still didn’t have a hook to hang your hat on?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, I could have indicted them after the verdict

came back in another case, but the case went on for 4 plus months

and I didn’t think that a subsequent effort would be any less in

that I didn’t have enough evidence to convict them.

Mr. BURTON. Well, the gentleman that Ciulla accused, was he

convicted?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’m sorry?

Mr. BURTON. The gentleman that Ciulla—— Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Winter was convicted.

Mr. BURTON. Was Simms convicted?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, he was.

Mr. BURTON. He was convicted on Ciulla’s testimony. Was he

not?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, he was.

Mr. BURTON. And you say you can’t go back and indict these

other two who had the same accusation made by Ciulla?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. Why? Why didn’t you go back and get them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Because my judgment was I wouldn’t have been

able to convict them.

Mr. BURTON. Why, you already convicted one? Why did you think

you had less of a case the second time?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Because I believed that these cases, you know,

you put them on and sometimes they don’t work.

Mr. BURTON. But you did convict him.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. So it was the same evidence. Why did you not go

back and get him? You said you wanted to nail him.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. Why didn’t you go back and get him on the same

charge?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Because I didn’t have any corroborative evidence.

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Mr. BURTON. You didn’t have corroborative evidence on the other

guy either, Simms.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, but he was an important person in the

Winter Gang.

Mr. BURTON. I know. I understand.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I could take a risk of charging him.

Mr. BURTON. OK. You took a risk and you convicted him on the

basis of the same evidence that you had on Bulger and Flemmi, but

you didn’t go back and get him. Why?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Why? Because I didn’t think that they were

convictable based on the facts of the case.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. O’Sullivan, I am lost because you convicted one

guy based upon the facts, the same facts, and then you go back to

Bulger and Flemmi and you’ve got the same evidence on them and

you don’t even charge them and you’re saying you didn’t have

enough evidence. It doesn’t wash. Why?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I keep repeating myself, Congressman. I can’t

say it any clearer than I’ve said it. I’ll rest on my statement.

Mr. SHAYS. Would the chairman yield for a moment?

Mr. BURTON. Let me finish, Mr. Shays, before I yield.

I do want to say, and not ask it again, but the question that I

would have said having been successful against Simms, that the

testimony held up, I would have thought that you would have said,

‘‘Boy, I got these two guys because we’ve got a successful conviction

here so it did hold up.’’ It makes me then wonder if deciding not

to act was because the FBI said Bulger and Flemmi were informants.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, that wasn’t the reason.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Let me just ask you to characterize three FBI

agents. I want you to describe to me FBI Agent Connelly.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Can I interrupt you for a second, Congressman?

Mr. BURTON. Sure.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. One thought came to mind. When I prosecuted

the Race Fix Case, I was then an Assistant U.S. Attorney and

Chief of the Public Corruption Unit. I took the case with me from

the Strike Force down to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. But my duties

in the U.S. Attorney’s Office soon became so overwhelming in

terms of the cases I was developing in the public corruption unit

that I didn’t have time to go back and reconsider Bulger and

Flemmi. It wasn’t my job.

Mr. BURTON. I will say this. I do agree that sometimes we have

lots of choices we have to make. We sometimes overwhelm the

criminal justice system and prosecutors. I understand that part of

your argument, but it still is a mouthful. As it relates to FBI

Agents Connelly, Rico, and Condon, I want you to describe to me

what they were like to work with.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I never worked with Rico. I never saw him. I

very rarely worked with Condon. I very rarely worked with

Connelly since Connelly wasn’t a case agent. He was developing informants.

Mr. BURTON. So you wanted to get rid of him?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did.

Mr. BURTON. Even though you didn’t work with him?

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Mr. O’SULLIVAN. He was a Strike Force rep. All the agencies get

to develop somebody who is the liaison between that agency and

the Strike Force. I asked the FBI to remove him as a Strike Force

rep.

Mr. BURTON. And explain to me why.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I didn’t trust him.

Mr. BURTON. Well, you didn’t trust him because?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I didn’t trust him because of his relationship

with his informants.

Mr. BURTON. And his informants were?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Bulger and Flemmi.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. O’Sullivan, I just want to talk to you a little bit more about

something that has me puzzled here. What were Mr. Simms’

priors?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Mr. Simms has a substantial criminal record. I

can’t remember it off the top of my head now, Congressman.

Mr. TIERNEY. But murder wasn’t one of the prior convictions.

Was it?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you had a fellow who was not a murderer, or

not known to be a murderer to you, and you had a situation where

you thought that this case was relatively weak but you only had

Mr. Ciulla’s testimony and nothing corroborative. Yet, you were

willing to put that person in with 20 odd others and potentially,

according to your testimony, make that whole case weaker and

stand the risk of that jury finding him not responsible, not guilty,

and then going right down the line and having an impact on all

the other cases.

Yet, when it came to then having the conviction in knowing you

had found him guilty along with the others, you then made a decision not to go after Bulger and Flemmi even though they were

murderers and you have the same evidence and you have a risk

but you didn’t have the same risk of losing other 20 other cases,

just the risk of losing that case possibly.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. The answer is I didn’t go after them in the Race

Fix Case. I went after them in other cases.

Mr. TIERNEY. You investigated in other cases.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. And hopefully I would have been successful in

those cases.

Mr. TIERNEY. But here is one where you had enough to indict

them and prosecute them on because you had the same thing you

had on Simms. If, as you say, you just thought, ‘‘I’m just moving

on to other things. I have an overload of work,’’ or whatever, why

didn’t you refer it to somebody else and let me do it?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Well, there was somebody in charge who could

have taken over the case.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who was that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. My boss at the time, Gerald McDowell.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you recommend that Mr. McDowell do that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not.

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Mr. TIERNEY. One account of this whole situation has Lawrence

Sarhadt asking you to close out Whitey Bulger as an informer in

1980. Did that every happen?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It didn’t.

Mr. TIERNEY. It did not?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It did not.

Mr. TIERNEY. Not long after the Oklahoma investigators learned

about the possible tie between Flemmi and Bulger, Flemmi was

closed out as an informant. Did you know that at the time?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not.

Mr. TIERNEY. No further questions.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. O’Sullivan. I just want to followup

on the mirror image of Mr. Tierney’s questions. That is, at a certain point in time in the Race Fix Case you had these 21—actually,

there were 23, I guess, candidates for indictment. Actually, there

is a list of some 64 other co-conspirators who remain unindicted.

We’ll talk about them in a minute.

But you got this fellow named Simms who you say had a substantial criminal record. At that point in time you say you were at

least aware of Mr. Bulger’s record and Mr. Flemmi’s record. I just

want to ask you at the time you were considering an indictment,

did you know the fact that James Bulger had several arrests in

Massachusetts for armed robbery? Were you aware of that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I was generally aware he had a substantial

criminal record.

Mr. LYNCH. And he had grand larceny charges against him as

well, a prior record. You were aware of that time?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I knew he had a substantial criminal record, the

specifics of which I don’t remember that I knew.

Mr. LYNCH. Well, do you remember that he had done time in

Leavenworth and also in Alcatraz Prison?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’ve heard that.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. How about Mr. Flemmi, the fact that he had

been tracked previously. He had arrests connected with armed robbery, gambling offenses. This is a race-fixing scheme. Were you

aware of that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. How about his loansharking and propensity to

carry firearms? Were you aware of those?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. In general terms, yes.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. How about murder and also dynamite bombing

a District Attorney’s personal vehicle in Boston? Were you aware

of that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. You know these people are part of this criminal

enterprise, which is they are taking money from a race-fixing

scheme. Still sitting here today you insist that based on all the evidence that has come out here, that these gentlemen were

unindictable?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. As I think about it, there was one other fact

that distinguished Flemmi and Bulger from Simms.

Mr. LYNCH. Let’s hear it.

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Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Simms was an active participant in the race-fix

scheme. Flemmi and Bulger were not. All they did was to share the

proceeds. If I had a trial and I put Ciulla on the stand, all Ciulla

would testify to is he fixed races and he sat down and they

whacked up the money in Winter Hill. That’s all he would testify

to.

He had no specific facts that would tell me anything or would tell

the jury anything about what role Bulger and Flemmi had other

than sharing in the proceeds. Whereas Simms had a specific role.

He was Winter’s alter ego who would give Ciulla directions, etc.

Mr. LYNCH. I ask you just the general sense here the willingness

for a prosecutor to go for an indictment. In your own experience in

your career, what is the success rate on—I understand you don’t

want to indict the innocent, those that have no connection. You

want to spare them their reputations. You want to spare them the

risk of wrongful prosecution. With the weight of evidence here,

what is the success rate? In order for an indictment to be rendered,

does it have to be 100 percent certain before you can bring an indictment?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. There was something in effect at the time called ‘‘The Principles of Prosecution’’ in the Justice Department U.S. Attorney’s manual which said that you should not indict someone unless you had a substantial probability that you could convict them.

That was the standard that I used.

Mr. LYNCH. Let me ask you just finally, in addition to the 21 indictments that were handed down, were all these people convicted?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. LYNCH. How many?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Most of them were convicted but at least one

was found not guilty.

Mr. LYNCH. You’re saying 20 out of 21 were convicted? Is that

right?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Well, there were several levels. Some of them

pled guilty, some——

Mr. LYNCH. That’s OK. We’ll count down. If they pled guilty,

chances are they were probably guilty.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I think one was found not guilty. That’s my

memory.

Mr. LYNCH. And there was another group of 64 unindicted coconspirators. Do you remember that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t. I know there was a lot of people that

I didn’t indict but I don’t remember how many.

Mr. LYNCH. Tell me of the 64 initially unindicted co-conspirators

were any of those eventually indicted?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t know, Congressman.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. I have two questions here real quickly and then I’ll

yield to Mr. Wilson. He has a question. If Bulger and Flemmi were

splitting up the money that came in from this race-fixing, was that

a criminal offense?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. MEEHAN. So then why didn’t you consider indicting them?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. As I said, there was no corroborative evidence.

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Mr. BURTON. Would you yield to Mr. Wilson just for a moment?

Mr. WILSON. Mr. O’Sullivan, why is it that you have such a clear

recollection that Bulger and Flemmi only received proceeds from

the face-fixing scheme?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It came into my head, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. On January 29, 1979, you apparently wrote a

memorandum along with Gerald McDowell to Gerald McGuire who

is the Deputy Chief of Organized Crime for the Racketeering Section. This memo conflicts with what you just testified to.

It says, and I’ll read the pertinent part and then we’ll break it

down and talk about the various pieces. It says, ‘‘Truman Barnosky

met with Howard Winter and six of his associates in late 1973 to

discuss a race-fixing scheme, Winter and his associates, including

Bulger and Flemmi.’’ The memo states that after the initial meeting with Winter Truman Barnosky met with Winter and partners

in the scheme, John Martarano, Joseph McDonald, James Simms,

Whitey Bulger, Stephen Flemmi.

Bulger and Flemmi, ‘‘Would help find outside bookmakers to accept the bets of the group.’’ Then later is says, ‘‘Ciulla and the Winter group then began to fix races at tracks around the country.’’

This is not a quote but it says the scheme lasted for 2 years and

more than 200 races were fixed.

This memorandum, one of the ones the President claimed executive privilege over, states that the group actually met to discuss the

race-fixing scheme which indicates that Bulger and Flemmi were

part of the conspiracy to actually create the scheme. That’s the first

thing it says.

Then it says, ‘‘Winter and his partners would provide the money

necessary to carry out this scheme.’’ They actually funded the

scheme. Then it says that Bulger and Flemmi specifically, ‘‘Would

help find outside bookmakers to accept the bets of the group.’’ They

were a very, very integral part of actually involving themselves in

this bookmaking and race-fixing process. You made it sound like all

they were doing was getting some ill-gotten proceeds. First of all,

is this memo correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It must have been at the time I wrote it. It was

in 1979. I just don’t have a clear memory of the facts today so you

got me, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. We apologize for this. I asked the Department of

Justice on Monday to provide you with a copy of this memorandum.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. They didn’t.

Mr. WILSON. It’s not for us to apologize to you for that, but we

did ask them.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Well, I regret, Mr. Wilson, when I spoke to you

on the telephone Tuesday you did not mention to me. We would

have been glad to look at the memorandum and I’m sorry we

didn’t.

Mr. WILSON. I just assumed they would do something that was

so simple.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll be brief. Mr.

O’Sullivan. Whether you accept it or not, it’s clear that the public’s

trust was shattered by both the Boston FBI office and Federal

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prosecutors. In retrospect do you believe that you could have done

anything at all to prevent some of this from happening?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t, Congressman.

Mr. MEEHAN. You don’t know?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t know.

Mr. MEEHAN. You blame the FBI for what happened but I want

to know if you believe that you could have done more to make sure

that the Boston FBI office was not abusing its power regardless of

organizational skills.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t think I could have, Congressman, because that would have precipitated World War III if I tried to get

inside the FBI to deal with informants. That was the holy of holies,

inner santurium. They wouldn’t have allowed me to do anything

about that, Congressman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Let’s put it in a specific context. Did you know that

Whitey Bulger and Stephen Flemmi were interviewed together on

several occasions?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not.

Mr. MEEHAN. How is it that you are the head of the Organized

Crime Task Force at the heights of one of the Federal Government’s most significant crackdown on organized crime and interviews with the likes of Whitey Bulger and Stephen Flemmi are taking place. Hardly a meaningless event.

It’s hard to believe they were leading organized crime figures

among the Irish mob at the time. Yet, you didn’t know anything

of them being interviewed together. Nobody ever went over the notion of interviewing them together.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct, Congressman.

Mr. MEEHAN. Would anyone in the U.S. Attorney’s—do you find

that to be outrageous, the fact that they would actually bring these

two gangsters into a room and interview them together giving them

the opportunity to corroborate their stories?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I would like to know more of the facts as to

what they were interviewing about.

Mr. MEEHAN. Generally as a matter of policy you bring in two

of the biggest gangsters—— Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Generally as a matter of policy it’s wrong.

Mr. MEEHAN. But does it make sense that the head of the Organized Crime Task Force wouldn’t be aware of this? Does that make

sense? How do we prevent that from ever happening again? It is

incredible to me to think that you have these two gangsters, murderers who clearly have a corrupting influence on other investigations and the Federal Government, the chief law enforcement agency in the country, brings them in to have interviews and they interview them together. Yet the head of the Organized Crime Task

Force doesn’t know about it. It’s hard to believe.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s what happened, Congressman.

Mr. MEEHAN. No further questions, Your Honor.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you, Chairman.

Earlier today Detective Huff in his testimony referenced, or alluded to the fact that you had what to him was surprising information about John Martarano. He referenced that you indicated to

him that Martarano is in the Ft. Lauderdale area. Do you have any

328

memory of you expressing that during the meeting with Detective

Huff?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t, Congressman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You don’t. Do you have any independent memory

of having information regarding the whereabouts of John

Martarano in Florida in the Ft. Lauderdale area?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You don’t. You also earlier referenced something

about Mr. Simms and the likelihood of his fleeing.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Could you explain that again for me?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. I had been—let me back up a step. The

whole Race Fix Case was about dismantling the Winter Gang. Not

the Winter Hill Gang, the Winter Gang. I started by working on

the Winter Hill Gang back when I first became a Federal prosecutor. Actually, when I was a state prosecutor as well.

One of the things we did was we did a gambling case. I did the

gambling case with the state police involving football cards. When

we traced the football cards back to the layoff office where they

went, lo and behold there was Mr. Simms who was then a fugitive

from justice for something. He was arrested and indicted in a football card case and then he became a fugitive again. He has a history of fugitivity.

Mr. DELAHUNT. That factored into your decision to proceed

against Simms and not against Flemmi and Bulger?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It factored into my decision. There was only a

critical mass of people that I could indict in one indictment. Twenty-one was a lot.

Mr. DELAHUNT. But if you take your description as the core

group being three and then, let’s say, the larger group being seven

and then you include Flemmi and Bulger, that’s a fairly nuance

distinction, I would suggest.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It’s a distinction I make, Congressman. I may

have been wrong but that is the distinction I made.

Mr. DELAHUNT. OK. The reality is that we know Mr. Flemmi was

a fugitive for an extended period of time.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, he was.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I mean, he was involved in the Carborn, an attorney by the name of Fitzgerald.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Fitzgerald. Right.

Mr. DELAHUNT. And he disappeared for how many years. Do you

remember?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t.

Mr. DELAHUNT. You also indicated that you had two investigations where the subjects of the investigation were Flemmi and

Bulger.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Could you describe briefly?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. One was the Lancaster Street garage investigation. The second was the Boston police corruption investigation in which we were attempting to do a wiretap on a bookie in

Rocksberry who had some interaction with Mr. Flemmi. At the

same time we developed a Boston police officer who was willing to

wear a body wire against Mr. Bulger.

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Mr. DELAHUNT. Those two proved to be unsuccessful?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you remember another investigation where I

happened to be a potential corroborating witness involving a

Frances Greene?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I remember the name Frances Greene. I don’t

remember the case at all. Yes, I do remember the case.

Mr. DELAHUNT. In an attempt to refresh your memory, there was

an allegation that Bulger and Flemmi threatened this individual’s

life in a restaurant in my former jurisdiction in Norfolk County. I

would suggest substantial corroborating evidence. I referred that

case to the FBI and to the Strike Force. At that point in time you

were the head of the Strike Force and a colleague of ours by the

name of Marty Gutrol was your assistant. The deputy, if you will.

You have no memory of that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t, Congressman. I have a memory of

Frances Greene and using him as a witness in a political corruption case but that’s all.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Involving Frank Tracy?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Do you remember having a conversation with me

several years—that occurred in 1976. You and I had a conversation

in the old Statler Hilton Hotel over on Park Plaza. I asked you

about that particular case and you indicated to me that nothing

happened on the case. You have no memory of that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield.

Mr. BURTON. Maybe I can refresh your memory a little bit on the

Greene case. You mentioned him immediately when you started

talking about it so you evidently remember Mr. Greene pretty well.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I do.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Frances Greene alleged that in 1976 Whitey

Bulger and Stevie Flemmi threatened to kill him if he didn’t repay

$175,000 loan he had borrowed. Greene went to Edward Harrington who was the prior attorney at the time but was about to

become the new U.S. Attorney in Massachusetts who told him the

matter could best be pursued through a state investigation because

the extortion occurred in Norfolk County.

Harrington phoned District Attorney William Delahunt who forwarded the case to the FBI because Federal extortion laws carried

stiffer penalties than they could obtain under Massachusetts law.

Greene and Delahunt were interviewed by agents working with

Connelly and the case was put in FBI files and closed a year later.

Now, what Mr. Delahunt was asking you was do you remember

that case? I mean, it seems pretty substantial. You knew these

guys were murderers. Didn’t you?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. You knew they were murderers and a case was re- ferred to you where there was a $175,000 loan that was not repaid

and these two guys who you knew were murderers threatened to

kill this fellow and you didn’t followup on the case.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Congressman, I have no memory of the case, no

memory of it being referred to me.

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Mr. BURTON. And you don’t remember talking to Mr. Delahunt?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I have no memory of talking to Mr. Delahunt.

Yes, that’s correct.

Mr. BURTON. You just don’t remember?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I do remember Mr. Greene.

Mr. BURTON. But you don’t remember this case?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t.

Mr. BURTON. And you were the head of the Strike Force?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Maybe if I mentioned some names it might job

your memory. There was the recipient of the loan. The provider of

the loan was an individual by the name of Rita Tobias. Does that

name ring a bell?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No, it doesn’t, Congressman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. The FBI agents that interviewed me were Kennedy and Daley, I believe.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Daley was a case agent in the Race Fix trial.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don’t know if it was the same agent but this,

again, doesn’t help you?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It doesn’t.

Mr. DELAHUNT. They came and they interviewed me. I indicated

that I was present in the restaurant at the time of the extortion.

My colleague says to me I had better explain it a little more. I’ll

let that sit right there. But I obviously could identify several of the

individuals.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It doesn’t ring a bell, Congressman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield back to the chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Do you have a question?

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, I do.

Mr. BURTON. Yield to Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. I don’t intend to keep you here much longer, Mr.

O’Sullivan. I just want to say my interest in this whole issue started with Mr. Salvati and Marie Salvati and their incredible story.

You were in the Massachusetts Attorney General’s Office at the

time of the Deegan trial. That part is correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Do you know anything about the Deegan murder

or anything about innocent people being sent to jail?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t.

Mr. SHAYS. When you started reading these stories later on, did

you start to say, my God, these guys were fingered by two corrupt

informants, people that you knew to have no credibility. Did you

start to have a little question of interest in this case at all?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not, Congressman.

Mr. SHAYS. Why?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. It just wasn’t on my turf. I didn’t think that I

could right the wrongs of the whole world, Congressman.

Mr. SHAYS. That’s not really what I’m asking whether you could

right them. I’m interested whether you began to have any questions or doubts about the fact that innocent people might have been

in jail because of Mr. Bulger and Mr. Flemmi.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I didn’t, Congressman. I just didn’t think about

it to be honest.

331

Mr. SHAYS. When did you start to think that they might be innocent?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t know.

Mr. SHAYS. It had to be at some point. When they were finally

let go or a little before or when?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I think probably when they were finally let go.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me ask one last question. Is there anything

that this committee has been working on that you are aware of

that you have information about that you think would be pertinent

but we just simply failed to ask you?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t think so.

Mr. SHAYS. There’s nothing you need to say to this committee

that would be helpful to this committee?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t think I do, Congressman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. O’Sullivan, at one point you told the FBI’s Office of Professional Responsibility that there were always allegations being made against FBI Agent Connelly, but I don’t have any

record of you telling exactly what those allegations were. What

were the allegations that you alluded to?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t remember what I told the Office of Professional Responsibility, Congressman.

Mr. TIERNEY. You don’t have any recollection of that at all?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Don’t have any recollection at all. Don’t even remember being interviewed by the Office of Professional Responsibility. When was the date of that?

Mr. TIERNEY. 1997. You don’t remember back to 1997?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Not at all?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Not at all.

Mr. TIERNEY. You are familiar with the incident referred to as

75 State Street?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I am.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you ever discuss the 75 State Street investigation with William Bulger prior to your announcement in 1989 that

the investigation was closed?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. Which FBI agent was in charge of that investigation, Agent Morris?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. He was the squad supervisor, yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. When you announced that the 75 State Street investigation was closed, you said it was ‘‘not even close.’’ Would you

have said that publicly if you knew at that time John Morris was

taking money and gratuities from James Bulger?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t think that would have affected my decision on 75 State Street. The answer is yes, I would have said that,

even if I knew that fact.

Mr. TIERNEY. When you decided to close the case, did you rely

on the word of the FBI?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes, but I relied primarily on the two investigating Assistant U.S. Attorneys who had done most of the work

and had interviewed most of the witnesses in that case. I relied on

Ralph Gantz and Alex Leak.

332

Mr. TIERNEY. So you did not rely on the FBI people at all or just

to a limited degree?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. To a very limited degree.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you think that investigation could have been

compromised by the information that you got from the FBI sources?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Anything is possible but I don’t think so, Congressman. I think that the investigation was conducted appropriately by the Assistant U.S. Attorneys and I think that they got

to the bottom of the case and there was no case against Mr. Bulger.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you ever interview Mr. Bulger, William Bulger?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. When I took over as U.S. Attorney I arranged

to have Mr. William Bulger interviewed by Alex Leak and Ralph

Gantz.

Mr. TIERNEY. But you didn’t personally do this?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not personally.

Mr. TIERNEY. Before that interview were you aware of whether

John Connelly had talked to Mr. Bulger, Mr. William Bulger, about

the Federal investigation or any evidence that had been developed?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I was not because I had basically set a hermetic

seal around that investigation so nobody would know what we were

doing. The information didn’t go either way. I didn’t know he was

asking about it or anything about it. I read about it in the paper

later on that he did ask about it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did you direct any of your people to ask questions

concerning the relationship between Mr. Connelly and Mr. Bulger,

both Mr. Bulgers?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. No. Let’s back up a step because 75 State Street

was an investigation which a decision had been made that they not

be indicted, that an indictment should not be brought, and it was

reviewed by the then U.S. Attorney who ratified the decision. The

then U.S. Attorney was fired by the Justice Department and I was

made the temporary U.S. Attorney.

I was asked by Attorney General Thornburgh to review 75 State

Street so that was a tertiary review that I was reviewing. And

that’s where I directed these various interviews of William Bulger,

etc., which had not been done at that point. That is a long way of

answering your question, I think, Congressman.

Mr. TIERNEY. You did not know at that point in time that John

Morris had been taking money and gratuities from James Bulger?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I did not.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. TIERNEY. Yes, I yield.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Just one question. It’s my memory that you

made a public announcement relative to the 75 State Street investigation.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Where was that announcement made?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Where was it made? I think it was made in a

press room in this building the U.S. Attorney’s Office had.

Mr. DELAHUNT. How long were you a government lawyer for the

Federal Government?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Sixteen years, I think.

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Mr. DELAHUNT. How many times did you have a press conference

to announce the closure of an investigation without an indictment?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. This was a very rare instance.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Answer the question. How many times?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I think it may have happened before but I just

don’t remember the instance. At least one other time, I think.

Mr. DELAHUNT. One other time?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. One other time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Could you go back and try to refresh your memory and let the staff and the committee know about that other

time?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Sure.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I yield to my friend.

Mr. BURTON. But you didn’t think there was enough evidence? Is

that correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I’m sorry, Congressman. Which case are we

talking about now?

Mr. BURTON. We’re talking about the 75 State Street allegations.

Any other questions?

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Were there other investigations of this matter? Did

any law enforcement agency conduct a similar investigation?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Of 75 State Street are you talking about?

Mr. MEEHAN. Yes.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes. The Massachusetts State Attorney General

reviewed the matter as well.

Mr. MEEHAN. Which Attorney General was that?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Scott Harshbarger.

Mr. MEEHAN. And had the prior Attorney General reviewed the

case? State Attorney General.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t know. I only know that I think it was

Mr. Harshbarger’s office.

Mr. MEEHAN. And did Mr. Harshbarger make a determination on

the case?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. He did.

Mr. MEEHAN. What was that determination?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That there was no indictable case.

Mr. MEEHAN. No further questions.

Mr. BURTON. Let me just go through this real quickly here.

Thomas Finnerty was a partner or a law associate of Bulger.

Brown paid Finnerty $500,000 in July 1985 as a partial payment

for Finnerty’s partnership interest in the 75 State Street development. A month later Finnerty issued himself and Bulger checks for

$225,000 each.

Two additional checks were issued to Bulger and Finnerty for

$15,000 in October 1985. Bulger claims that the money was a loan

in anticipation of a legal fee. There was a superseding indictment

that was issued by a Federal grand jury in Boston that Brown had

made illegal payments to the city of Boston further alleging that

other public officials had received moneys from Brown. Bulger returned $215,000 to Brown’s trust 3 days after the indictment became public and made an additional repayment of

$39,000 2 weeks later. All the funds that Bulger paid, he repaid

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all these loans but they were returned to him within the next 12

months, I presume, as legal fees. You said the case showed power

brokering but did not rise to the level of extortion.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct, Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t think that sounds a little bit unusual?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Sure. That’s why I said it was power brokering,

Congressman.

Mr. BURTON. What is the difference between power brokering

and extortion?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. My view was that Mr. Finnerty was attempting

to play on his connection with Mr. Bulger to shake down the real

estate developer who wanted some influence from Mr. Finnerty.

But the real question is what does Mr. Bulger do with respect to

it? We had no evidence that Mr. Bulger did anything in his official

capacity. That is, he introduced no legislation, did nothing about it.

Mr. BURTON. So he returned all the money to show that there

was nothing?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I have no idea why he returned it.

Mr. BURTON. All the money was repaid to him over the next

year?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I have no idea about that. In order to be a Federal crime it has to be under color of official right and a state official has to do something and we could find nothing. We diligently

went through the state house archives to find legislation whether

Mr. Bulger had introduced legislation to facilitate the city taking

the parking garage that 75 State Street is built on.

Out of all of that we couldn’t find a single thing that he did. All

I was doing, Congressman, was a tertiary review of a decision that

had been made by two line prosecutors and ratified by a then U.S.

Attorney to close the case. I was reviewing the closure. I wasn’t the

line attorney doing the investigation. I was reviewing the investigation.

Mr. BURTON. OK.

Any other questions?

Mr. DELAHUNT. I have some to wrap up and clean up.

Mr. BURTON. Go ahead, Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It’s just some clean-up in terms of an interview

that was conducted by the FBI back in July 1997 of yourself. Presumably it was done pursuant to an OPR investigation. I think,

Mr. Scott, you were present with Mr. O’Sullivan.

Some of these statements, I think, are not ample enough to reflect the facts. On page 1 it says, ‘‘O’Sullivan had no involvement

in the Lancaster Garage Title 3 investigation until after the fact.’’

That’s inaccurate. Correct?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s inaccurate, Congressman.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Not only were you intimately involved in that investigation per your testimony here today, but presumably you

were funding it through LEAA or——

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Was not funding it, Congressman. It was done

by the state police and the District Attorney’s Office. All I did was

help the District Attorney. The Assistant District Attorney who

was assigned to the case had no experience with electronic surveillance.

335

If there is anything that I know, it’s an electronic surveillance.

I helped them write the T3 application, the state T3 application,

and familiarize them with the T3 routine, how we would have to

file reports with the monitoring judge at that time.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If you read this, it would appear to be a Federal

Title 3. Obviously it’s not a Title 3 investigation. It’s a state investigation but it wouldn’t be Title 3.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. That’s correct.

Mr. DELAHUNT. OK.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Title 3 authorizes a state to have their own.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I understand. There are references here to an investigation you were conducting relative to the Boston Police Department. There is a statement in here. I don’t know whether it belongs here and what the rationale is for it but let me read it to you.

‘‘Connelly [referring to the former agent John Connelly] was very

close to Ed Walsh of the Boston Police Department. Walsh became

a Deputy Superintendent of the Boston Police Department and was

a self-proclaimed expert on organized crime.’’ What is the purpose,

if you can remember?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t remember. I don’t remember making

that statement. I don’t remember the interview, Congressman but

it’s there. I must have said it.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Also there is a reference in here to a statement

that you made relative to an Angelo Sonny Macurrio. Let me read

it to you. ‘‘O’Sullivan was never told that Maccurrio was an FBI

informant while he was the governing prosecutor. O’Sullivan was

shown a copy of a letter dated October 31, 1988, that he appeared

to have drafted. The letter was addressed to the U.S. Parole Commission.

It was written in behalf of Angela Macurrio. O’Sullivan did not

recall this letter and it did not refresh his recollection. O’Sullivan

does not recall having any conversations with Diane Kottmyer, who

was a member of the Strike Force, about Macurrio being an informant. At that time there was nothing special about Macurrio and,

therefore, no reason for any of this to stick out in O’Sullivan’s

mind.’’ Is that an accurate reflection of what you can remember?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Or can’t remember.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Or can’t remember.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It goes on here to say, ‘‘There were probably 15

to 25 instances where the identities of FBI informants were revealed to O’Sullivan. O’Sullivan traveled on several occasions to

testify on behalf of informants. He also had meetings at the Department of Justice where the identities of informants were revealed to him.’’ Is that a reflection of what you can remember now

in terms of your interaction with informants?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. I don’t remember saying that but, yes, that’s my

interaction with informants.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Wilson has one question and then we’ll let you

go, Mr. O’Sullivan.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. O’Sullivan, is it fair to say that the decision not

to indict Bulger and Flemmi in the Race Fix Case was an exercise

in prosecutorial discretion?

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Yes.

336

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough. My last comment was, Mr. Scott, your

attorney, has vigorously represented you but he has been a pleasure to deal with. We don’t always get that. I really do appreciate

his willingness to work with us and his cooperation with us. I want

to thank him for that because, as I say, it’s not what we always

get.

Thank you, Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. We appreciate the opportunity to cooperate with this

committee because there have been a lot of misstatements and distortion of the record in regard to Mr. Mr. O’Sullivan’s very distinguished career as a Federal prosecutor. We welcome the opportunity to set the record straight. 20/20 hindsight is a wonderful

thing in terms of guessing the exercises, as Mr. Wilson as said, of

prosecutorial discretion.

I think that the record is absolutely clear that Mr. O’Sullivan

using his best good faith judgment as an experienced prosecutor

made what he believed to be an appropriate decision at the time

and under the circumstances not to indict Mr. Bulger and Mr.

Flemmi in the Race Fix Case. He did that using his best good faith

judgment of what was a way to proceed and the most effective way

to obtain a conviction of Mr. Winter and not do it as a response

to the FBI and he exercised his best judgment.

Mr. BURTON. We appreciate your comments. You weren’t sworn.

We normally don’t have attorneys for witnesses who are testifying.

Let me just say that we will followup on the answers that were

given by Mr. O’Sullivan and we may get back to you with some additional questions at some point in the future.

With that, we’ll let you go and we’ll go to the next panel. We

would like to take maybe a five or 10-minute break and then we’ll

come right back at 3 because it’s getting late in the day and we

want to get through the rest of this.

Mr. O’SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate appearing before the committee.

[Recess.]

Mr. BURTON. Sorry for the lateness of getting back in here but

we had some things come up that we had to address. Like all hearings, you have unexpected things occur.

Paul Markham, thank you for being here. Would you please rise.

Do you have counsel with you?

Mr. MARKHAM. No.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Do you have any opening statements you would like

to make, Mr. Markham?

STATEMENT OF PAUL MARKHAM, FORMER U.S. ATTORNEY

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. MARKHAM. No, sir.

Mr. BURTON. You do not have any opening statement?

Mr. MARKHAM. No, I’m here to answer your questions.

Mr. BURTON. OK. Great. You were the lead prosecutor in a case

involving the use of Joe ‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza against New England Mafia Boss Raymond Patriarca. Barboza testified in three

cases over a 6-month period. One was the Patriarca prosecution

and another was a prosecution of Gennaro Angiulo. The third was

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a prosecution of six individuals for the murder of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan. The Patriarca prosecution was Federal and the other two

were state. I mark them as important because Federal law enforcement developed the Barboza, so on and so forth. I won’t go into all

of that. Let me get to the questions.

You have the exhibits in front of you, sir?

Mr. MARKHAM. What exhibits?

Mr. BURTON. Do we have any exhibits in front of him?

Mr. MARKHAM. I never received any exhibits.

Mr. BURTON. You did not?

Mr. MARKHAM. No.

Mr. BURTON. OK. You’ll get them right now and we’ll take the

time to let you take a look at them. There are questions we will

be asking based upon these exhibits.

Mr. MARKHAM. What are they?

Mr. BURTON. You have exhibit No. 1 before you, sir?

[Exhibit 1 follows:]

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339

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Mr. MARKHAM. I have it, yeah.

Mr. BURTON. OK. It states that the microphone surveillance advised on March the 9, 1965, that James Flemmi and Joseph

Barboza requested permission from Patriarca to kill Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan as they are having a problem with him. Patriarca

ultimately furnished his OK. Were you aware of this in 1968, that

Patriarca had OKed the hit?

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, I was aware. Are you familiar with the

Taglianetti Case, sir?

Mr. BURTON. My chief counsel is and I’ll be glad to yield to him.

Mr. MARKHAM. There was for a period of time a bug, if you will,

in the Patriarca office in Providence, Rhode Island. That had been

in place since 1962 through 1965. The Taglianetti Case was in

Providence, Rhode Island, which was a Federal income tax prosecution.

The government voluntarily at that time, or the FBI, said that

we had these illegal tapes in Patriarca’s office during that period

of time. As a result of our prosecution of Patriarca, we wanted to

be sure that it was clean. That is, the so-called Marfeo case.

As a result of that, we were sent not the tapes themselves but

what is called logs which were excerpted by somebody in the Department of Justice who had listened to these tapes presumably

certain excerpts. We wanted to know the excerpts with respect to

Barboza and the Marfeo case.

With respect to this first thing, it very well may have been in

those logs. I don’t recall at this point but I don’t dispute the fact

that it was. Let me say this. I had no interest in the Teddy Deegan

case. That was a state case. Not only that, but this log was also

produced in the Patriarca case.

One of the defendants, rather one of the counsel in that case,

was the most prominent and best criminal lawyers in the state, Mr.

Balliro, had this information. Mr. Balliro also represented one of

the defendants in the Deegan case. Aside from that, is there a

question with respect to—yes, I was aware of it perhaps, but it had

no relevance to me at the time in connection with the Patriarca

prosecution.

Mr. BURTON. I understand. What bigger targets for prosecution

did the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston have in 1968 than Raymond Patriarca?

Mr. MARKHAM. I would say none.

Mr. BURTON. We asked Dennis Condon why Patriarca wasn’t

prosecuted for the Deegan murder and he suggested that we should

ask you about that. Microphone surveillance had Jimmy Flemmi

and Joe Barboza asking Patriarca for permission to kill Deegan.

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t understand the first part. Why he wasn’t

prosecuted for what?

Mr. BURTON. We asked Dennis Condon why Patriarca wasn’t

prosecuted for the Deegan murder because he OKed the hit. That’s

why I asked you that first question. And he suggested that we

ought to ask you. Microphone surveillance had Jimmy Flemmi and

Joe Barboza asking Patriarca for permission to kill Deegan.

At least two FBI documents say that Patriarca gave his permission. That is in exhibit 1 and 16 that you have before you. Deegan

341

was killed 3 days later and the Justice Department had a lot of reliable evidence that Flemmi and Barboza killed Deegan. Did you

ever discuss with anyone whether Patriarca should have been prosecuted for Deegan’s murder?

[Exhibit 16 follows:]

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Mr. MARKHAM. No, I did not. As was stated earlier today, there

is no Federal statute on murder. If he was murdered, that would

either have been in Rhode Island or Massachusetts.

Mr. BURTON. What about interstate conspiracy?

Mr. MARKHAM. Patriarca was indicted in our case on the socalled Travel Act, Title 18, 1952. Marfeo was never killed, by the

way. After our indictment Barboza was turned over to the District

Attorney’s Office from whom we got him in the first place. Now, if

they wanted to prosecute anybody for murder, they could have. I

had no control over that.

Mr. BURTON. But you didn’t think you should take any action

knowing that Patriarca gave the OK to kill Deegan?

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t think who should take any action?

Mr. BURTON. You didn’t feel like you should take any action

against Patriarca for the Deegan murder?

Mr. MARKHAM. No, I didn’t. What action could I have taken?

Mr. BURTON. You have a tape that——

Mr. MARKHAM. No, I don’t have a tape.

Mr. BURTON. You have the excerpts of the tape.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. BURTON. Did the excerpts of the tape indicate or show that

Patriarca OKed the murder?

Mr. MARKHAM. The excerpts are here presumably. I don’t recall

seeing any excerpts. Now, whether or not——

Mr. BURTON. You said you read exhibit 1.

Mr. MARKHAM. I read the first——

Mr. BURTON. I know, but you had this in your possession when

the prosecution was taking place. You got these logs, you said.

Mr. MARKHAM. I’m sure that they were not—I didn’t. My staff in

the office went over this. I reviewed it, of course. I’m sure I saw

this.

Mr. BURTON. I’m sure the staff would point out something as relevant.

Mr. MARKHAM. Not relevant to my case.

Mr. BURTON. Well, I know, but something as important then as

Patriarca saying to those individuals, Barboza, ‘‘Yeah, go ahead

and you can kill Deegan.’’ You say there is no action that you could

have taken?

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah, the action to turn Barboza over to the District Attorney’s Office. They could pursue that if they wanted to.

I don’t know whether they knew this or not but don’t forget, sir,

these were illegal tapes that were under seal in this court. I don’t

know whether I could have possibly released this information.

Mr. BURTON. Did you ever talk to Jimmy Flemmi about his involvement in the Deegan murder?

Mr. MARKHAM. Wouldn’t know Jimmy Flemmi if I tripped over

him. Never heard of him.

Mr. BURTON. Exhibit No. 3 is a memorandum written by FBI

agent Dennis Condon. It says Flemmi told an informant that all he

wants to do now is kill people and that is better than hitting

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banks. Informant said Flemmi said that he feels he can now be the

top hit man in this area and intends to be. Exhibit 4 has FBI Director Hoover asking the Boston Office how its efforts to develop

Jimmy Flemmi as an informant were coming along.

[Exhibit 3 follows:]

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346

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know that I have ever seen that, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Uh?

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know that I have ever seen that.

Mr. BURTON. You don’t have exhibit 4 before you?

[Exhibit 4 follows:]

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348

Mr. MARKHAM. Exhibit list, exhibit 4. Memorandum from FBI Director. No, I don’t have that. I don’t think I’ve ever seen that.

Mr. BURTON. I think it’s in your packet there.

Mr. MARKHAM. It says right here. I see it, but I never saw that

before.

Mr. BURTON. Have you looked at the exhibit in there, sir, exhibit

No. 4?

Mr. MARKHAM. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. It says the FBI Director asked the Boston office

how its efforts to develop Jimmy Flemmi as an informant were

coming along. A couple of days later Hoover got an answer. In exhibit No. 5 it says that Jimmy Flemmi has murdered seven people

including Deegan.

From all indications he is going to continue to commit murder.

The document concludes by saying that the benefit of developing

Flemmi as informant outweighs the risk. Were you aware at the

time that Flemmi wanted to be the best hit man in the area?

[Exhibit 5 follows:]

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350

351

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Mr. MARKHAM. No, I wasn’t.

Mr. BURTON. And at the same time that the FBI——

Mr. MARKHAM. Sir, I have never seen these documents that you

show us that are attached here until just this minute. I wouldn’t

see them in the normal course of business.

Mr. BURTON. Let me ask you some questions then assuming you

haven’t seen those documents.

Mr. MARKHAM. Go ahead.

Mr. BURTON. Were you aware that Flemmi wanted to be the best

killer, hitman, in this area?

Mr. MARKHAM. I had never heard of Jimmy Flemmi. I didn’t

know him. I had never heard that, no.

Mr. BURTON. And you weren’t aware that he killed seven people?

Mr. MARKHAM. No, I wasn’t.

Mr. BURTON. Did Jimmy Flemmi ever go before a grand jury to

talk about the Deegan murder?

Mr. MARKHAM. No, he didn’t. I don’t know. The State’s grand

jury? I don’t know. He never was here.

Mr. BURTON. Judge Harrington said Flemmi was put before a

grand jury to give him cover. Were you aware of that?

Mr. MARKHAM. No. What grand jury? State grand jury?

Mr. BURTON. We don’t know whether it was a Federal or state

grand jury. You are not aware of it?

Mr. MARKHAM. No, I’m not. I don’t think it was a state grand

jury because I had no contact with Jimmy Flemmi.

Mr. BURTON. So you didn’t know that Jimmy Flemmi was a Federal informant?

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know if he ever was. There’s two Flemmis.

One is Steve and one is Jimmy.

Mr. BURTON. Well, Vince and Jimmy Flemmi.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. BURTON. You didn’t know that he was a Federal informant?

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t know that until I read the decision in

Commonwealth against Limone wherein part of that opinion states

that, ‘‘FBI focus on Flemmi as a potential source began on March

1965. The first reported contact with Flemmi as an informant was

by FBI Agent Rico on April 5. In his letter AUSA Durham states

that FBI files show that Flemmi was contacted five times as an informant by Special Agent Rico and that Flemmi’s file was closed

on September 15, 1965.’’

Mr. BURTON. You reviewed the handwritten logs, you said.

Mr. MARKHAM. I said my staff reviewed them and I reviewed

their pros memo.

Mr. BURTON. Do you recall reviewing the part that said something about Patriarca talking about approving the hit of Deegan?

Mr. MARKHAM. I just said yes. Yes, I did.

Mr. BURTON. You remember that? OK.

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, I don’t remember it specifically. If it was in

there I didn’t pay that much attention to it because it had nothing

to do with the case I was interested in.

Mr. BURTON. It seems to us if you had the microphone surveillance about Patriarca and the Deegan——

353

Mr. MARKHAM. No, I didn’t have the microphone surveillance, sir.

That’s where you’re wrong. The FBI did and they admitted that it

was illegal.

Mr. BURTON. But you had the logs.

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. BURTON. And your staff reviewed the logs.

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. BURTON. And you reviewed your staff report.

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. BURTON. If you had the logs about the surveillance about

Patriarca and the Deegan murder that showed Patriarca was involved, and you had a witness that had decided to testify because

he was facing a very long prison sentence, you would spend a lot

of time discussing the Deegan murder. Is that a mistaken assumption?

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s a mistaken assumption on your part. My

focus in the Patriarca case was with the informant that we had,

Mr. Barron, who was going to testify about the Willy Marfeo situation, not about Deegan. Deegan was done by the state. I had nothing to do with the state prosecution of Deegan.

I would be very much surprised if Mr. Balliro, who was aware

of these logs, did not talk to Flemmi. I would be very much surprised if that is not the case. I would be very much surprised if

there is not also other information somewhere in the files that disclose there were several other people involved in this.

Mr. BURTON. That’s why we’re asking you these questions, sir.

Just a moment.

Mr. TIERNEY. The only question I would have, just to cut to the

crux of it, sir, having had those notes did you at sometime become

aware that there was a prosecution with respect to the Deegan

murder?

Mr. MARKHAM. I was aware only that there was such a prosecution. It had no significance to me with respect to my function as

a U.S. Attorney.

Mr. TIERNEY. Knowing there was a prosecution going on it just

never came into your consciousness that, ‘‘Gee, I have information

and maybe these guys on trial aren’t responsible.’’ Mr. MARKHAM. Well, I would assume that the Suffolk County

District Attorney investigated that case fully.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess what I’m thinking is did you not even get

to the level of concerning yourself that, ‘‘I heard something different than it what it looks like they are prosecuting?’’

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t hear something different.

Mr. TIERNEY. Or you read something perhaps.

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, I’m not so sure that’s so.

Mr. TIERNEY. I’m asking you whether or not your staff gave you

that information and whether or not it rang a bell for you when

you found out they were prosecuting other individuals.

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, of course, as you know, Baron was in on the

Deegan case and testified that he shot him. Flemmi was not indicted. Why I don’t know. I never thought of it.

Mr. TIERNEY. That’s my question. You never thought of it?

Mr. MARKHAM. No. Any number of reasons why he might not

have been indicted.

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Mr. TIERNEY. Well, that’s where I was going. I was wondering if

you thought of it and thought you just didn’t have to take any action or whether it never occurred to you.

Mr. MARKHAM. It never occurred to me.

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Markham, in the earlier testimony with Judge

Harrington, you talked about the fact that this listening device

that had been planted in Patriarca’s office had rendered evidence

to the New England Strike Force. Not just to one single person but

was disseminated among law enforcement that were interested in

prosecuting organized crime as a rule, not just what was perceived

to be happening in a Federal court but what was happening in society and all of New England.

On this tape based on the evidence that we got from the FBI— and they have summaries there. They are not the actual logs—it

was reported that Vincent, or James Flemmi, and Joe ‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza had asked Mr. Patriarca for permission to kill Teddy

Deegan.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. LYNCH. And after getting the approval they carried that out.

Mr. Deegan’s body was found in the trunk of a car in Massachusetts in Chelsea. Any sense that might be some type of interstate

conspiracy to commit murder that would fall under a Federal jurisdiction?

Mr. MARKHAM. They were prosecuted. The Deegan murder was

Roy French. About five people were prosecuted for that case.

Mr. LYNCH. The wrong people.

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know whether they were or not. I wasn’t

there. You know, the SJC affirmed that decision. There were several motions for a new trial. As a result of Judge Wolf’s hearing

there is some question now on the credibility of some of the witnesses. The testimony was principally based on Baron who in exhibit 1 admits that he was down with Patriarca requesting permission. Why Flemmi wasn’t indicted I don’t know. Maybe they didn’t

have anything on Flemmi. I don’t know.

Mr. BURTON. Let me followup on that. Since the murder involved

going across the state line, you did have jurisdiction if you wanted

to indict Patriarca for murder. Didn’t you?

Mr. MARKHAM. We had already indicted Patriarca on the Marfeo

thing when these things—— Mr. BURTON. I understand. I understand, but you could have indicted him.

Mr. MARKHAM. Perhaps. I wasn’t familiar nor was there any investigation with respect to corroboration on that thing. That was

done by——

Mr. BURTON. I know, but you saw——

Mr. MARKHAM. No, no, no. Let me finish my answer. That was

done by the Suffolk County Office, not by the U.S. Attorney’s Office.

Mr. BURTON. I understand. But you looked at the logs.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah, and saw this.

Mr. BURTON. And you saw that the Deegan hit was approved by

Patriarca. The crime went across state line so you did have jurisdiction.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

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Mr. BURTON. Since you had jurisdiction why didn’t you indict

Patriarca on that charge?

Mr. MARKHAM. Because Patriarca had already been indicted on

the Marfeo thing. OK?

Mr. BURTON. I understand.

Mr. MARKHAM. We wanted to do that one first. I had left the office in 1969. I left the office in June 1969.

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Markham, just because Mr. Patriarca was being

already prosecuted for another murder, I don’t just understand

that——

Mr. MARKHAM. Because there were several legal issues involved

in this on the Title 18 1952, the so-called Travel Act. They were

determined by the Court of Appeals as to whether or not the particular facts in the Patriarca case would support a conviction under

1952.

There was plenty of time—I don’t know if there was plenty of

time. I don’t know about the statute of limitations or anything, but

we had gone through with the information we had at the time of

the indictment, prior to the indictment, and we prosecuted him. I

didn’t get this information until after the indictment. I’m sorry. I

misspoke. We didn’t get this information until after the—— Mr. BURTON. The logs clearly showed—— Mr. MARKHAM. I understand that.

Mr. BURTON. Let me finish. The logs clearly showed that Deegan

and Barboza were involved in the Deegan murder.

Mr. MARKHAM. No, it doesn’t. I disagree with you on that. It

clearly shows that two hoodlums were down in Patriarca’s office

and requested permission.

Mr. BURTON. Flemmi and Barboza were involved in the murder

so there was—— Mr. MARKHAM. No, it doesn’t. Two hoodlums were down there

shouting their mouth off probably, bragging and wanting to know

if they could. That’s doesn’t prove it. Do you think that is admissible in a court?

Mr. BURTON. Just let me finish my question.

Mr. MARKHAM. I thought you had.

Mr. BURTON. Just let me finish. I haven’t because you keep interrupting. You had four or five people go to jail.

Mr. MARKHAM. No, I didn’t have four or five people—— Mr. BURTON. No, not you. Listen.

Mr. MARKHAM. You said you did and I didn’t.

Mr. BURTON. Four or five people went to jail.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. BURTON. They were not guilty of——

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know whether they were or not.

Mr. BURTON. They were not guilty of the Deegan murder history

has proven. There was information in these logs that showed that

Patriarca OKed Flemmi and Barboza to make the hit. You had that

information before you. Why—— Mr. MARKHAM. It didn’t—— Mr. BURTON. Listen. You had it and you saw it. You knew these

other people were convicted and went to jail and they stayed for

30 years. Why wasn’t that ever pursued by you or your office? Why

wasn’t that brought forward?

356

Mr. MARKHAM. Because it was irrelevant to my office. It didn’t

say in this log here that Roy French was also going to do it either.

Do you know the facts in the Deegan case, sir?

Mr. BURTON. Well, we certainly have looked at it for the last several years.

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, OK. How many people were indicted?

Mr. BURTON. Six.

Mr. MARKHAM. Was Roy French one of them?

Mr. BURTON. Hey, listen. You’re not questioning me.

Mr. MARKHAM. No, no. But you are imputing my integrity that

I resent.

Mr. BURTON. OK. I’m going to let our legal counsel question you.

Mr. WILSON. If we could just back up for a minute.

Mr. MARKHAM. What?

Mr. WILSON. If we could just back up for a minute, please.

Mr. MARKHAM. Sure.

Mr. WILSON. What we want to start off with, I think one of the

first questions was was Raymond Patriarca a very important target

for the Boston U.S. Attorney’s Office in 1967 and 1968?

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. WILSON. Was he the biggest target for prosecution of the

Boston U.S. Attorney’s Office in 1967 and 1968?

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know.

Mr. WILSON. If there was somebody who was a bigger target, who

would that have been?

Mr. MARKHAM. Dr. Spock perhaps, that whole thing.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough.

Mr. MARKHAM. The Plymouth Mail Robbery.

Mr. WILSON. Well, had you received any direction from Washington, DC, vis-a-vis Raymond Patriarca? For example, was Raymond

Patriarca part of the top hoodlum program?

Mr. MARKHAM. See, we didn’t have at that time—back in 1968,

1967 when this originated, there was no such thing as an Organized Crime Strike Force. There just wasn’t.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough, but will you stipulate that Raymond

Patriarca was one of the most significant targets for prosecution in

New England in 1967 and 1968?

Mr. MARKHAM. I wouldn’t call him a target. He was a well-known

organized crime figure. Target, I don’t know.

Mr. WILSON. As a prosecutor in your efforts to attempt to prosecute individuals who you believed were breaking law, was he a

person known to you at the time?

Mr. MARKHAM. He was a person known to everybody who read

the paper, yeah.

Mr. WILSON. Fair enough. When you had information such as the

information in the prosecution memo that was discussing Raymond

Patriarca and his possible involvement in a conspiracy to murder

Willy Marfeo, were you interested in the information that was relevant to Raymond Patriarca?

Mr. MARKHAM. With respect to the Deegan thing, the answer is

no because my focus was on the Marfeo case.

Mr. WILSON. Let me just sort of try and move to a level of common sense.

Mr. MARKHAM. Please. I’m trying to use common sense.

357

Mr. WILSON. Information pertaining to Raymond Patriarca that

was picked up from microphone surveillance, was that of interest

to you and your office?

Mr. MARKHAM. This particular log on March 9, 1965?

Mr. WILSON. I’m not asking about a particular piece of information. I’m just thinking as you prepared the Marfeo indictment were

you interested in the landscape of information available to you? For

example, if there was a piece of information that indicated to you

Patriarca might have been involved in a Marfeo conspiracy to murder Marfeo, that might have been of interest to you. Correct?

Mr. MARKHAM. It was because I had a witness who was going to

testify to that. I had no witness who was going to testify with respect to the Deegan case.

Mr. WILSON. Fine. If there was a piece of information in the

same set of logs available to you that said that Patriarca was not

involved in the Marfeo conspiracy, would that have been of interest

to you?

Mr. MARKHAM. I wouldn’t have prosecuted him.

Mr. WILSON. OK. So what you’re telling us is that you reviewed

all of the information available to you to determine what you were

able to do as a prosecutor.

Mr. MARKHAM. With a witness. I had no witness on the——

Mr. WILSON. I’m not asking you about the Deegan case.

Mr. MARKHAM. You asked me a broad question and you want the

answer.

Mr. WILSON. I’m asking you very broad questions. I’m asking you

the question were you—was it important to you to review all of the

relevant information pertaining to Raymond Patriarca as you prepared the Marfeo indictment?

Mr. MARKHAM. As it affected Willy Marfeo, yes.

Mr. BURTON. Let me finish my statement and then you can respond.

Mr. MARKHAM. I would be happy to.

Mr. BURTON. You had documentation that showed that Patriarca

OKed the hit on Deegan. Let me finish. You had that information

before you. The two people involved was Flemmi and Barboza. That

information was relevant to the people who went to jail for the

Deegan murder. Why wasn’t that information made public so that

these people who were innocent might have gotten out of jail

quicker?

Mr. MARKHAM. Because that information was under seal in this

court, No. 1. It was illegally obtained information. That’s No. 1. I

don’t think it would have been appropriate of me to release it.

Mr. BURTON. Let me followup on that.

Mr. MARKHAM. Let me finish the answer. Also, this information

that is exhibit 1 was known to Mr. Balliro and Mr. Chisum both

of whom represented defendants in the Deegan case.

Mr. BURTON. How do you know they knew that?

Mr. MARKHAM. Because they had access to it. It was given to

them.

Mr. BURTON. How do you know that?

Mr. MARKHAM. I know that Mr. Balliro is one of the most competent trial lawyers I know and I know that if everything is turned

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over to him that could be of a exculpatory nature or that is relevant, he would have read it.

Mr. BURTON. That is deductive reasoning.

Mr. MARKHAM. It is. It is.

Mr. BURTON. How do you know that? You don’t know it for a

fact.

Mr. MARKHAM. I did not go up to him and say, ‘‘Joe, did you read

the Deegan case?’’ No.

Mr. BURTON. So you don’t know?

Mr. MARKHAM. Only what I told you, that it was available to

them. If they wanted to read it they could and I’m sure they did.

Mr. BURTON. I want to make sure I understand this.

Mr. MARKHAM. Sure.

Mr. BURTON. There were two attorneys who were representing

the defendants in the Deegan case.

Mr. MARKHAM. Two of the defendants.

Mr. BURTON. Two of the defendants in the Deegan case. They, according to you, had exculpatory evidence that would have shown

that they weren’t involved in the murder.

Mr. MARKHAM. No, according to you. They had the log that is exhibit 1 here.

Mr. BURTON. They had the log and it was not used in court?

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know whether it was or not. I didn’t follow

the Deegan case.

Mr. BURTON. You said it was under seal. How did you know

that?

Mr. MARKHAM. Because it was under seal except for defense

counsel in the Patriarca case that had access to it. Presumably Mr.

Balliro and Mr. Chisum availed themselves of the opportunity to

look at this evidence that was produced which was this.

Mr. TIERNEY. Could you yield for a second?

Mr. BURTON. Yeah, I’ll be happy to yield.

Mr. TIERNEY. Just for my benefit, are you assuming that in the

normal course of things the information would have been available

to them?

Mr. MARKHAM. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you know for a fact that it was given or might

it not have been given?

Mr. MARKHAM. We were instructed to deposit it with the court.

Mr. TIERNEY. For the purposes of disclosing it to Mr. Balliro and

Mr. Chisum?

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah, sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. For that specific purpose?

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, you know, that was 30 some years ago.

There were motions for a production of documents and for exculpatory evidence. This was produced in response to those motions.

Mr. TIERNEY. In the Deegan case?

Mr. MARKHAM. No, in the Patriarca case.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. So in your Patriarca case you disclosed these

documents or deposited them in court for those attorneys to see.

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. And then you are assuming that if they saw them

in that case, they would then use them in the other case?

Mr. MARKHAM. I would think so, yeah.

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Mr. BURTON. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. I want to go back to where I was pursuing this. In

the Taglianetti Case Mr. Taglianetti got selected information that

was pertinent to Taglianetti’s interaction with Patriarca. Correct?

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know the facts in the case except that

Taglianetti was the case that the FBI—— Mr. WILSON. Hold on.

Mr. MARKHAM. Let me finish. Voluntarily disclosed that they had

a bug in the Patriarca office for about 4 years.

Mr. WILSON. But in the Taglianetti case Mr. Taglianetti got a

small subset of the information from the overall universe of material reported in 168 Atwell Avenue. Correct?

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. WILSON. OK. If Mr. Taglianetti got a subset of the information available to him for use in his case, how are you able to tell

us today that an individual got everything?

Mr. MARKHAM. I’m not saying that today. I’m saying that exhibit

1 was part of the logs. I told you I don’t recall what the whole logs

were but I do know that this was in it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Can I go through this again because I’m not sure

that you weren’t talking when we said this. My understanding is

that in your case of Marfeo you had these excerpts of the tapes.

Your office had them.

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right. There were excerpts—— Mr. TIERNEY. In the Marfeo case two of the attorneys were

Chisum and Balliro.

Mr. MARKHAM. Right.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who we later found out were also two of the attorney in the Deegan case.

Mr. MARKHAM. Right.

Mr. TIERNEY. In our Marfeo case the judge deposited to court for

purposes of the defense counsel’s review all the exculpatory material you had. You deposited it amongst that exculpatory material

these excerpts.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. And then assumed that they had the opportunity

to see them here and assumed that they did because you know

them to be good counsel.

Mr. MARKHAM. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. If they had in the Marfeo case, then you would assume that they, being the same counsel in the Deegan case, had

also seen them for that purpose.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct. And the further assumption is that because the case was investigated by the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office who had access to Baron, Baron was going to tell

them the whole thing whether in fact Flemmi was there or not

there or whatever it was. The fact that he did or did not is something that is a different jurisdiction.

Mr. BURTON. I would just like to make a comment. You don’t

have to answer because it’s not relevant to your questioning.

Mr. MARKHAM. What are you going to make it for then?

Mr. BURTON. I just want to make this comment. It seems incredulous to me that there were sealed documents that would show the

innocence of people that were languishing in prison and they were

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sealed because it was illegally obtained. Even though it was illegally obtained to let people rot for 30 years in jail when you know

they are innocent is just hard to comprehend.

I mean, obviously these phone taps were illegal. Obviously the

logs were illegal. Obviously it was sealed by the court because it

was illegal. Yet, those documents showed clearly that the people

who were responsible for the Deegan murder weren’t the people in

jail. Why you would let people rot—— Mr. MARKHAM. Wait a minute. Please.

Mr. BURTON. Why anybody would let people stay in jail when

there is exculpatory evidence, even though illegally obtained, is beyond me.

Mr. MARKHAM. Are you accusing me, sir, of knowing—— Mr. BURTON. Not you. Not you.

Mr. MARKHAM. What are you asking me for?

Mr. BURTON. I didn’t ask you that. I was making that comment.

This stuff was sealed and it showed that the wrong people were in

the slammer.

Mr. MARKHAM. Why don’t you ask Mr. Balliro that?

Mr. TIERNEY. Just in fairness I want to give you an opportunity

to say something on this. You never saw the transcripts in total or

never heard the tapes?

Mr. MARKHAM. No. They weren’t available to anybody.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it wasn’t a case of you personally not making

these available. I know the chairman didn’t mean to imply that but

I want to give you the opportunity to speak to that point. All that

you saw were the excerpted—— Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. TIERNEY. You were working with District Attorney Garret

Byrne at the time in matters back and forth?

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. There is a memo written by who was then your assistant, I think, Ed Harrington, who subsequently became a judge.

He thought there was excellent cooperation between U.S. Attorney

Paul Markham, District Attorney Garret Byrne and the FBI. Then

he said that District Attorney Byrne ‘‘at our request,’’ assuming

yours and his or yours and the FBI and his, ‘‘held off calling Baron

before a local grand jury until we have concluded our investigation.’’ Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is that accurate?

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. TIERNEY. Now, as part of that excellent cooperation, did the

FBI provide the District Attorney’s office with all of your file or

some of your file?

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know. I don’t know what the FBI did.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. You wouldn’t have directed them one way or

the other?

Mr. MARKHAM. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. He’s talking about cooperation between you and

the FBI and the District Attorney.

Mr. MARKHAM. I think the cooperation was this. I had a telephone call one day from Garrett Byrne who told me this bellow

Barboza was going to do the rest of his life in jail. He had some

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information with respect to Patriarca and would I be interested. I

said of course. From that day we assumed responsibility for

Barboza.

We were the forerunners of this Federal protection act. What I

did, I got in touch with the U.S. Marshals. I called a friend of mine

in Gloucester who has a brother who is a priest who has a house

down there that wasn’t being used. I said, ‘‘Can we use your house

for a couple of days to put this guy in with the protection of the

Federal Marshall?’’ ‘‘Yes.’’

We then took him out to Twin Lakes, Thatcher’s Island—I’m

sure you are familiar with that—for a period of time. That was totally impractical. We then got another place that we rented in

Gloucester on Dolliver’s Neck where we kept him through the trial.

That was the cooperation that we had with Garret Byrne.

Mr. TIERNEY. What did you do for them, anything?

Mr. MARKHAM. He went back to testify in the Deegan case.

Mr. TIERNEY. But that is the extent of it?

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know what else he did for them.

Mr. TIERNEY. I’m just trying to figure out what Mr. Harrington

meant. I don’t know if you know or not but I’m trying to find out.

Mr. MARKHAM. With the cooperation there was I’m sure he was

made available even though he was in our custody at the time.

Mr. TIERNEY. That’s as much as you know about that?

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. I would just like to followup on this. You know, at

least your initial remarks sounded very similar to what Judge Harrington had said, which was when we asked him why he had not

come forward, even though he had general knowledge of the transcripts and the logs certainly implicating Mr. Barboza and Mr.

Flemmi in the murder of Teddy Deegan.

Mr. MARKHAM. Barboza testified that he did it in court.

Mr. LYNCH. Sir, may I remind you that you are sitting about five

rows in front of a group of people that sat in jail for 30 years for

killing Teddy Deegan. May I please remind you of that fact? May

I please?

Mr. MARKHAM. Of course you may.

Mr. LYNCH. Please. Don’t dismiss it.

Mr. MARKHAM. I’m not dismissing it. I feel very sorry for——

Mr. LYNCH. You keep implying that they got the right people, sir.

We found that to be wrong.

Mr. MARKHAM. You did. I don’t know—well, OK, fine. Go ahead.

Mr. LYNCH. That response right there is indicative of the problems that we’ve had.

Mr. MARKHAM. I can’t help you with respect to that. All I can tell

you is that this case was not investigated by my office. This case

was investigated by the Suffolk County District Attorney. We

turned over Mr. Barboza who is quoted in exhibit 1. Why they

didn’t go further with that I don’t know.

Mr. LYNCH. Sir, all I’m saying, and let me finish, is that you are

not the first witness to come before this committee to say that the

reason that five innocent—a group of innocent men went to prison

for 30 and 34 years. Some of them died in prison. The reason that

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happened is because the State and the Federal Government were

not talking to each other. That’s not the first time I’ve heard this.

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t say that.

Mr. LYNCH. However, I just want to point out something here,

exhibit 10. This is from Ramsey Clark, the Attorney General at the

time, to J. Edgar Hoover. It talks about, ‘‘I have been advised by

the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section and Mr. Paul Markham, the U.S. Attorney in Boston, that without the outstanding

work performed by Special Agents Dennis Condon and Paul Rico,

these convictions would not have been obtained.’’ They are talking about Patriarca. ‘‘In addition to Special Agent

Condon, who was an excellent witness, the Government called representatives of the Rhode Island State Police Department, the

Providence City Police, the Boston Police Department, the Revere

Police Department, the Treasury Department.’’ The final sentence

here, ‘‘This prosecution is certainly one of the most significant examples of Federal and state cooperation.’’ That is not an inability of jurisdictions to talk to one another. I

don’t think it supports the argument that the reason that the Federal Government never got involved or the FBI never got involved

or the U.S. Attorney’s Office never came forward with evidence

that would have been exculpatory and would have probably garnered the release of some innocent men from prison.

[Exhibit 10 follows:]

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364

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s your assessment, sir, and you may have it.

Mr. LYNCH. I have heard nothing from you that leads me to believe otherwise, sir.

Mr. MARKHAM. Pardon me?

Mr. LYNCH. I have heard nothing from you that leads me to believe otherwise.

Mr. MARKHAM. I’m just reading everything that you rest your assumption on. I’ll read it so the press can have it here, too. A report

by Charles Rapuchy regarding arraignment and the Patriarca

microphone surveillance reads, ‘‘The microphone surveillance advised on March 9, 1965 that James Flemmi and Joseph Barboza requested permission from Patriarca to kill Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

as they are having a problem with him. Patriarca ultimately furnished his OK.’’ Now, that is information that is worthless unless you have a witness. I did not have a witness on that. I had a witness, Joe

Barboza, who was going to testify in the Marfeo case. I don’t know

whether he would have ever testified in the Deegan case because

that was being prosecuted in Suffolk County. I can’t be more clear

than that.

Mr. BURTON. And as interesting as this would be to any prosecuting attorney, you are saying that you didn’t discuss this in your

office with your subordinates or the other attorneys there that had

looked at those logs?

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t say that.

Mr. BURTON. You did talk to them about it?

Mr. MARKHAM. We discussed on the prosecution memo this particular thing. The reason—— Mr. BURTON. So you did discuss that? You did discuss that?

Mr. MARKHAM. What do you mean discuss it? It was part of the

prosecution memo and I was aware that there was taped recordings. The purpose of that was to show—— Mr. BURTON. I know. I understand all that. So you were aware

and your staff was aware that information was in there even

though you didn’t have any witness to back that up. Right?

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. BURTON. You knew it was in there?

Mr. MARKHAM. And so did counsel for the defendant’s in the

Deegan case.

Mr. BURTON. And you’re saying that was not used in court to

defend——

Mr. MARKHAM. Why don’t you ask Mr. Balliro that? I don’t know

what he did with it.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Mr. Markham, this is a matter of great interest to

us. We have gone to the Department of Justice and we have asked

them for the material that was turned over to Mr. Balliro and Mr.

Chisum. Maybe there are legitimate reasons for this but they were

unable to furnish us with the material that was furnished to

Balliro and Chisum. We do know in the Taglianetti case he didn’t

get everything. He got a subset of information.

We do know that in subsequent occasions pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act requests, the Patriarca logs have been released to the public and not everything went out so we don’t know

365

what was released. We do know one thing. You have been telling

us that Mr. Balliro and Mr. Chisum got access to this information.

We know that the Deegan case was a death penalty case and we

know that the other attorneys for the other individuals who were

subject to a death penalty did not get access to these logs.

Mr. MARKHAM. Presumably co-counsel would have advised me of

that.

Mr. WILSON. Is presumably good enough in a death penalty case

not to give each individual lawyer access to exculpatory information?

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t give them. The court gave them access to

it.

Mr. WILSON. I’m asking you that question. Is it good enough to

give the potential exculpatory information to two lawyers out of six

lawyers in a death penalty case?

Mr. MARKHAM. Would you tell me what is exculpatory about this

with respect to Roy French?

Mr. WILSON. I’m asking you the question.

Mr. MARKHAM. I can’t understand you. You are saying this is exculpatory. I disagree with you. I don’t think it is exculpatory.

Mr. WILSON. That’s an interpretational issue. Mr. Barboza’s

credibility was the central issue at the Angiulo trial. It was the

central issue in the Marfeo trial. It was the central issue in the

Deegan murder trial. Mr. Barboza’s credibility was all there was in

these prosecutions.

Mr. MARKHAM. Not so. Not so. Not in the Marfeo case.

Mr. BURTON. Unfortunately we have to recess for about 5 minutes. We’ had something come up that is very important so we’ll

stand in recess until the fall of the gavel.

We are reconvened.

Mr. MARKHAM. Mr. Chairman, I may have misspoken and I want

to clear the record. The order of the U.S. District Court to turn

over the log was prior to the indictment in the Federal court in the

Deegan case. In case that was unclear, I wanted to clarify.

Mr. BURTON. The logs were turned over prior to the indictment.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yes.

Mr. TIERNEY. So the ‘‘exculpatory evidence,’’ and you can argue

about that, that was in the logs was turned over before the indictment?

Mr. MARKHAM. Not very long before the indictment but somewhat before the indictment but still to Mr. Balliro and Mr. Chisum.

Mr. TIERNEY. So that tells us at the time that you filed these documents in the court for the Marfeo thing, Mr. Chisum and Mr.

Balliro didn’t even know there was a Deegan case.

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know whether they did or not.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, there was no indictment in the Deegan case.

Mr. MARKHAM. There was no indictment.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it well may be that they didn’t know there was

a case, didn’t know they were going to be retained as counsel,

didn’t know they were going to be representing the defendants, and

may well not have made any connection on that.

Mr. MARKHAM. Except this. Barboza was turned over to Garrett

Byrne’s office after the indictment in the Patriarca case. How far

along there investigation went at that time I don’t know.

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Mr. TIERNEY. That was going to be a subsequent question to ask

you. So I think then being the sequence, at that time you certainly

could not have assumed that because you put those documents into

court that Chisum and Balliro necessarily were going to use them

in a subsequent case. You didn’t even know there was a subsequent

case at that time.

Mr. MARKHAM. No. At that time, no. I certainly assumed that

any case down the road that would be helpful.

Mr. TIERNEY. When you found out there was a Deegan case, you

read it in the paper, or how did you find out there was a Deegan

case?

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know.

Mr. TIERNEY. Do you remember having a conscious thought at

that time, ‘‘God, there was exculpatory information but I don’t have

to worry because Chisum and Balliro already have that.’’

Mr. MARKHAM. No.

Mr. TIERNEY. This was constructed after the fact?

Mr. MARKHAM. Yes. That reference to the log, you know, perhaps

I forgot about it because it was not in my case.

Mr. TIERNEY. Originally whether you had intended to or not, you

had my thought process going that you consciously thought, ‘‘It’s all

set. I know there might be a problem but because those two attorneys have the case, it’s not a problem.’’

Mr. MARKHAM. I’m not sure that’s so. I think in retrospect, the

basketball thing, no harm, no foul.

Mr. TIERNEY. That’s more the way you are looking at it now.

When you look back at this, you’re saying you think——

Mr. MARKHAM. At the time I don’t think I gave it all that consideration because the Deegan case was not an essay at that time.

They weren’t indicted until after—well, Deegan was murdered in

October 1965 and the indictments were in October 1967, 2 years

later. Patriarca was indicted in our court here in June 1967 and

we turned him over to the state authorities right after the indictment.

Mr. TIERNEY. He was indicted before the conviction?

Mr. MARKHAM. Oh, yeah. That case was continued any number

of times. It wasn’t tried until March 1968.

Mr. TIERNEY. So Garret Byrne had this witness first and he offered him over to you.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. So he didn’t proceed at all. You kept him for a period of time until you got your indictment in. Is there any other

reason why you didn’t give him back to Garrett Byrne and proceed

with his grand jury hearing in the interim?

Mr. MARKHAM. No, because that was the deal. We were going to

keep him under wraps so to speak and protect him. There was serious thought of attempts on his life, especially in the Patriarca case.

Mr. TIERNEY. Was there some thought that he couldn’t be protected and be a witness at a grand jury hearing in Suffolk County?

Mr. MARKHAM. He was.

Mr. TIERNEY. I know, but not at the last one. I guess I’m asking

why——

Mr. MARKHAM. Because prior to our indictment——

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Mr. TIERNEY. I’ll start again. Garrett Byrne gave you a phone

call and said, ‘‘I’ve got this guy, Barboza. He’s got stuff on

Patriarca. Would you like it?’’

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. He then proffered him over to you and you started

protecting him, your group.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Then he started testifying at your grand jury.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Was there any reason that he also couldn’t have

been testifying in that period of time at the Suffolk Country grand

jury, or what was the delay? Why didn’t he?

Mr. MARKHAM. Because the deal was that we were going to use

him for our purposes to get the Patriarca indictment and then you

can have him. That’s what it was.

Mr. TIERNEY. Is there some reason it couldn’t be done simultaneously? It went over a significant period of time.

Mr. MARKHAM. No, not really.

Mr. TIERNEY. The grand jury?

Mr. MARKHAM. He was developed in March of—it was 6 months.

Patriarca was indicted in June 1967, 4 or 5 months after we got

him. Then he was turned over. I didn’t question him about the

Eddie Deegan murder. I was concerned about the Marfeo case.

Mr. TIERNEY. He was not even indicted during that period of

time that you had him for the Deegan?

Mr. MARKHAM. No. He was indicted in the Deegan case in October 1967. That was prior to our trial.

Mr. TIERNEY. Prior to your trial.

Mr. MARKHAM. The Patriarca trial was March 4, 1968.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who protected Deegan when he testified at the

grand jury down in Suffolk County?

Mr. MARKHAM. Who protected Deegan?

Mr. TIERNEY. I’m sorry, not Deegan. Barboza.

Mr. MARKHAM. The U.S. Marshals.

Mr. TIERNEY. So they continued to protect him even at that point

in time?

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. At any point in that time you were cooperating

with Mr. Byrne’s office and he had the two grand juries or whatever, was there any discussion——

Mr. MARKHAM. We didn’t have two grand juries.

Mr. TIERNEY. You had a grand jury and they had a grand jury.

That would be two grand juries. Right? The Suffolk County one

and yours.

Mr. MARKHAM. I only had the one grand jury in the Patriarca

case.

Mr. TIERNEY. I don’t dispute that at all. I hope you don’t. So now

each of the jurisdictions had a grand jury hearing.

Mr. MARKHAM. Right.

Mr. TIERNEY. And you were proceeding on it. At any point in

time during that period was there any discussion that you were

aware of concerning the fact that Mr. Flemmi or Mr. Bulger were

protected witnesses for the FBI?

368

Mr. MARKHAM. I have never heard of it while I was a U.S. Attorney.

Mr. TIERNEY. And you had no idea of the relationship between

Mr. Flemmi and Mr. Barboza?

Mr. MARKHAM. Never heard of it. There’s two Flemmis now. You

know that?

Mr. TIERNEY. Right. Either Flemmi.

Mr. MARKHAM. Jimmy Flemmi is the one of notoriety now. I had

never heard of him, nor had I ever heard of Bulger.

Mr. TIERNEY. But you heard of Vincent—not Vincent, Stephen?

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, just as a result of this and he was mentioned in that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Was it ever mentioned to you by the District Attorney’s Office or by the FBI or anybody that they didn’t want

Barboza to actually be tried in Suffolk County?

Mr. MARKHAM. What?

Mr. TIERNEY. They didn’t want him to have to proceed to trial

and be sentenced in Suffolk County.

Mr. MARKHAM. Barboza not be tried in Suffolk County?

Mr. TIERNEY. Right.

Mr. MARKHAM. Of course, that was the deal. Garrett Byrne was

not going to prosecute him and turn him over to us. We agreed to

take him on the condition that he gives us the Marfeo case. What

prompted Garrett Byrne to do that I don’t know.

Mr. TIERNEY. You said he subsequently had a grand jury hearing

and indicted him himself. Right? Or am I missing something?

Mr. MARKHAM. The Deegan case, but that’s not the same matter

that he was held on in the first instance. I don’t know what that

was about.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it wasn’t anything you picked up on Deegan

given to you and then take back on Deegan. It was totally a separate matter.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. For which you have no information.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. Was there ever any discussion by the FBI with

you, any of the agents about not giving him back to Garrett Byrne

at that point in time and just keeping him in the program?

Mr. MARKHAM. No. There was no program at that time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, keep him protected, I should say. Did you

have any conversations with FBI Agent Rico about your prosecution about the Marfeo case?

Mr. MARKHAM. Sure.

Mr. TIERNEY. And Connelly?

Mr. MARKHAM. Condon.

Mr. TIERNEY. Condon, not Connelly.

Mr. BURTON. I think we are about to wrap this up. I want to

make sure I understand the Marfeo case, which you were working

on, the logs were filed or sent to the court before that case came

to trial.

Mr. MARKHAM. No. Oh, before it came to trial. Yes.

Mr. BURTON. Before it came to trial. And before the indictment

of the innocent people that went to prison.

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Mr. MARKHAM. Well, before the indictment in Suffolk County,

yes.

Mr. BURTON. In Suffolk County. But the indictment came before

your trial took place.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. BURTON. So your awareness of the issues was pretty—your

antenna was up on your case before you were about to go to trial

at the same time that this indictment came down regarding the

Deegan murder.

Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t understand your question.

Mr. BURTON. Well, let me rephrase it. You were about to go to

trial on the Patriarca case. Before you went to trial on that case,

an indictment came down on the Deegan murder.

Mr. MARKHAM. Right.

Mr. BURTON. It is curious to me that having had those logs before you that indicated that Barboza and Flemmi were the hit men

in the Deegan case, that you wouldn’t have felt some responsibility

to inform the prosecution about that evidence in the Deegan murder.

Mr. MARKHAM. It may be curious to you, sir, but it’s not curious

to me for the reasons I stated because four of the defendants in the

Deegan case knew that.

Mr. BURTON. I think that begs the question. You knew that innocent people were going to go to jail.

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t know they were innocent.

Mr. BURTON. You knew the sentence was there. You saw this information about the Patriarca OK on the hit.

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. BURTON. I don’t want to prolong this because I thought we

were winding it up.

Mr. MARKHAM. Let me respond to that question. In the Deegan

case there was ample evidence, a lot of evidence that this was authorized by Camillio and Patriarca.

Mr. BURTON. That’s right but not the two principles that really

were involved in it, Flemmi and Barboza.

Mr. MARKHAM. Sure. Barboza testified.

Mr. BURTON. What about Flemmi?

Mr. MARKHAM. He wasn’t indicted.

Mr. BURTON. He wasn’t indicted so you knew that those two got

the OK but you didn’t know about these other individuals so—— Mr. MARKHAM. I don’t know whether Flemmi went through with

it. I can’t look into that. That happened in 1965.

Mr. BURTON. It seems to me that since you were working on a

case involving Patriarca at that time, you would have at least

picked up the telephone and said to the prosecuting attorney in

that other case, ‘‘Hey, here is some evidence that you ought to take

a hard look at because it may show that some of those guys might

not have been involved in that murder. I just don’t know but you

ought to look at it.’’ Mr. MARKHAM. What guys?

Mr. BURTON. The guys that went to jail that were innocent.

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t know what the evidence was against

them. I didn’t even know who was going to be indicted. I didn’t

know what the evidence was that they had.

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Mr. TIERNEY. I just want to clarify this. You keep going back to

the fact that Chisum and Balliro were lawyers in both cases. That

really wasn’t relevant at that time.

Mr. MARKHAM. I’m sorry, sir?

Mr. TIERNEY. It was not relevant at that time because you didn’t

know they were going to be engaged in the other trial.

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. OK. We keep getting back to that point. I don’t

want it to be left with anybody or on the record that you consciously thought everybody knew about what was in that record because you have the same two attorneys in both cases. Both cases

didn’t exist at the time you deposited those items into court for discovery in the Marfeo case.

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, the Deegan case, that indictment was in

October 1967 well before the trial of the Patriarca case which was

not tried until March 1968.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you are telling me now that it was a conscious

decision, that you understood both lawyers at that time to be involved in both cases?

Mr. MARKHAM. I assumed as much. As I said, this was not really

paramount in my mind.

Mr. TIERNEY. I just want to make sure we understand what is

assumption and what is factual. It’s not factual but assumption on

your part.

Mr. MARKHAM. As I said before, it may be somewhat now in retrospect but it——

Mr. TIERNEY. It sounds an awful lot like retrospect.

Mr. MARKHAM. It was not a big concern of mine at the time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Sounds an awful lot like retrospect. Maybe looking

back you saw, ‘‘Gee, both attorneys are there. I hope they got the

information.’’

Mr. MARKHAM. Yeah.

Mr. TIERNEY. All right. At some point after you finished your indictment and your trial, you were aware through publicity of one

way or another that the Deegan matter was proceeding to trial.

Mr. MARKHAM. Correct.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I assume that in the course of reading those

public pronouncements on that, that you understood who the defendants were?

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t have a great deal of interest in that case.

I followed it somewhat.

Mr. TIERNEY. You followed it somewhat. You are a prosecutor

and the guy is related. You know, it’s the same situation.

Mr. MARKHAM. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. So you saw the names of the defendants and the

name that you didn’t see in there was Flemmi. Right?

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, I assume so. I read the paper and he was

not there. That’s right.

Mr. TIERNEY. And I guess, sir, that’s what we’re all assuming,

too, and we are all wondering knowing that and knowing your commitment to justice, presuming it at least, you didn’t say to somebody why isn’t Flemmi named on this when you’ve got this document so the other guy tells you if there is a reason or not.

371

Mr. MARKHAM. I didn’t think of it at that time, but I’ll tell you

why. There is any number of reasons a prosecutor would leave

somebody out of the indictment. (A) he didn’t do it; (B) he was

going to be a witness; (C) they didn’t have a good case against him.

Now, all we know is that at some time Flemmi and Barboza, who

was a bargain by the way, were down there and requested permission to do it and was given it. Whether they did it or not, I don’t

know. Because if you followed that case at all, Roy French was— as a matter of fact, that’s the name of the case, Commonwealth

versus French.

Mr. TIERNEY. I have no more questions. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. Well, Mr. Markham, it’s been interesting.

Mr. MARKHAM. I apologize to you if I got a little, you know, from

time to time but, you know, I probably can understand the concern

of the committee. I do resent any inference that I purposely did

something that resulted in innocent people going to jail. I did not

purposely or negligently.

Mr. BURTON. All I can tell you is there was evidence that could

have led to a different outcome and 30 years of several people’s

lives were lost. I think that is a real tragedy.

Mr. MARKHAM. I couldn’t agree with you more but that has nothing to do with me. Thank you.

Mr. BURTON. That’s your opinion.

Mr. MARKHAM. Well, it is my opinion and I challenge you to tell

me what I should have done that I did not do.

Mr. BURTON. I’ll leave it to the people who are paying attention

to what is going on. Thank you very much.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]

[A set of exhibits and additional information submitted for the

hearing record follows:]

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(403)

THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S USE OF

INFORMANTS IN NEW ENGLAND

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Boston, MA.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in Courtroom

6, 15th Floor, J.W. McCormack U.S. Post Office and Courthouse,

90 Devonshire Street, Boston, MA, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman of

the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Burton, Tierney, and Lynch.

Also present: Representative Meehan.

Staff present: James C. Wilson, chief counsel; Chad Bungard,

Hilary Funk, and Matt Rupp, counsels; Blain Rethmeier, communications director; Allyson Blandford, assistant to chief counsel;

and Robert A. Briggs, chief clerk.

Mr. BURTON. Good morning. The Committee on Government Reform will come to order. I think yesterday we put in the record all

the sessions that we needed.

Edmund Burke said: ‘‘The only thing necessary for the triumph

of evil is for good men to do nothing.’’ He wasn’t talking about why

we’re here, but he might just as well have been.

Everyone in this room knows that the Government Reform Committee has been trying to get to the bottom of what happened here

back in the 1960’s and subsequent to that. We’ve tried to be thorough. We’ve tried to be fair. Perhaps if others had done this, we

wouldn’t need to be here.

Perhaps people like Joe Salvati wouldn’t have spent their lives

in prison. People like Roger Wheeler wouldn’t be dead. But we are

here, and we are going to do our very best.

For the most part, cooperation has been the rule. We’ve talked

to hundreds of people. Most have tried to be helpful. We haven’t

needed to issue many subpoenas and I’m encouraged that most

people genuinely want to know what happened. And most of them

want to help. That’s a good sign.

I’m glad Mr. Bulger is here. I’m glad he’s going to testify. But

I do wish it had been easier. The committee wasted months when

executive privilege was claimed over documents. Yesterday, you

could see how important those documents were.

I wish Mr. Bulger had been a little more willing to discharge his

civic duty and cooperate. We don’t need to be running into court

like yesterday. It’s a big distraction, and it takes valuable time

away from what we need to be doing. But I am glad we are going

to move forward.

404

I’ll close by reminding you why we’re here.

Rogue members of the FBI, up to the highest levels, protected informants at the expense of innocent people.

Informants committed murders with impunity.

Killers were tipped off so they could flee before being arrested.

Local investigations of murders, and drug dealing, and arms

smuggling were compromised.

When people went to the Justice Department with evidence

about murders, some of them wound up dead.

It is sad. It’s tragic. It’s unbelievable. But it did happen. I think

an awful lot of good people stood by and did nothing. Hopefully,

we’ll never see anything like it again.

But we can’t stand by now and do nothing. That’s why congressional oversight like this is so important. I thank my colleagues for

being here. I really appreciate it. I look forward to Mr. Bulger’s testimony.

With that, Mr. Tierney, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. TIERNEY. Just very brief, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. I welcome our witness here today. Again, Mr. Chairman, I want to

thank you for these hearings which have really been a vigilant pursuit of the facts in this case. Without reiterating yesterday’s opening statement, I’ll just say once again how important it is to shed

light on the relationship between the FBI and members of organized crime so that we can determine just what went on in this situation and get to the proper culture of our FBI.

People need to trust this investigative body and they need to

have faith in its integrity and the integrity of its agents. The same

is true of the Department of Justice. That has been the goal of this

hearing, to make sure that we determine what must be done in

this process with respect to informants and protected witnesses

and relationships of that office.

Yesterday there was some disturbing testimony as to how at

least one U.S. Assistant Attorney or U.S. Attorney felt somewhat

intimidated by the culture of the FBI and their attitude toward

how they did their work. Today’s hearing presumably will give us

more information about how the FBI operated in this area and we

need to know that. We need to move forward. I thank you for the

opportunity and I thank the witness for being here today to give

us what information he may have.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Meehan.

Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for your diligence

and your dedication in terms of conducting these hearings. Also including members of the Judiciary Committee who have oversighted

the Justice Department. Frankly, when we look at the regulations

and procedures that were violated in this case, ultimately what

this case is about is trying to make sure that this never happens

again.

We heard yesterday how the Boston FBI agents actively handled

Michael Huff’s investigation into the murder if Roger Wheeler. We

heard about the terrible impact this had on the Wheeler family. We

heard extremely disturbing testimony about the practices of the

Boston FBI agents and Federal prosecutors. These hearings have

raised serious questions about law enforcement practices in the

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United States. Who watches the guidelines? What happens to those

who are supposed to protect the public trust?

There has been incredible distractions swirling around in the

media and I want to clear a couple of thing up. First, these hearings are about getting to the truth. We are trying to get to the

truth for the Wheeler family. Trying to get to the truth so that we

make sure that these violations of the public trust never happen

again.

We have seen abuses in law enforcement. Frankly, in this particular instance we saw grand jury testimony that apparently had

been leaked. I don’t know who leaked the information but there is

a possible violation there as well. All of these violations of the rules

and procedures that law enforcement are required to follow should

be followed diligently.

I believe that every Member of Congress should make a commitment to making sure the rules of procedure are followed and to do

everything we can to make sure the type of corruption that was

seen in this horrible case involving the Boston FBI office never

happens again. The ultimate goal of all in Congress should be to

make sure that this type of abuse in law enforcement never happens again.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Mr. Meehan. I appreciate the Judiciary

Committee and I am confident that you folks will be pursuing this

investigation next year as well.

Congressman Lynch is on his way. He’ll be here shortly. We’ll

recognize him when he gets here if he wants to make a statement.

Before we swear in the witness, I just like to say to the witness’s

counsel, according to the rules of the committee, your client can

confer with you at anytime and there is no problem with that. But

we admonish you not to participate in answering the questions. If

he has reason to confer with you, he can do that. You can do that

here in the room or outside, whatever you want to do but we are

here to hear from Mr. Bulger.

Mr. KILEY. Certainly, Mr. Chairman. I understand the rules. I

will certainly will not participate in answering the questions you

pose to the witness. I think, as you know from the letter I sent yesterday, that I have asked you to postpone Mr. Bulger’s hearing. I

want to formally request it again today.

The principal bastian that we have protecting us against the

abuses of Government is the Bill of Rights. In order to protect my

client I want to exercise rights under the Bill of Rights. It is my

intention to appeal yesterday’s order and I want to formally ask

you to postpone pending that appeal. I have no illusion that you

are going to grant it but I want to ask it.

Mr. BURTON. I understand, Mr. Kiley. Have a seat. Let me just

say that we have conferred with legal counsel and we checked all

of the reasons why we can’t do that. As you know, we are at the

end of this session. It has been going on for a long time.

Because of that and other reasons, we can’t grant an extension.

That coupled with the fact that, you know, we asked that Mr. Bulger testify and we had to end up sending a subpoena so the subpoena is only valid for a period of time. We feel like we must continue today.

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With that, Mr. Bulger, would you stand to be sworn, please.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. BURTON. Would you like to make an opening statement, Mr.

Bulger?

Mr. BULGER. I believe my attorney, if it is acceptable, would like

to make a statement.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Bulger, we will allow you to make any statements you want. You can confer with your attorney but we want

to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BULGER, PRESIDENT OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. BULGER. Mr. Chairman, some of our communications during

the past week may have resulted in a misunderstanding and that

is regrettable. There certainly was no intention on my part to show

disrespect to the committee or to the institution of the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, under the rules of the House that the committee

has provided to me, if a witness believes that the evidence or testimony he is going to give the committee may tend to defame or degrade the witness, he may request that the committee proceed in

closed session. That is Rule 11K5 of the House. I am asking the

committee to do that at this time.

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Bulger, we will take a vote on that at your request. We may have to wait just a minute until Mr. Lynch gets

here. Oh, Mr. Lynch is here.

Glad you made it.

We talked about this yesterday and we feel like the issue is such

that the questions should be asked in open session, but we will ask

for a vote.

All those in favor of closing the hearing to the media and the

public, say aye. All opposed, say no. It’s unanimous we will proceed

in open session. We talked to the parliamentarian about the rule

to make sure we were following the rules of the parliamentarian.

It was concurred so we will proceed with the questions.

Mr. Bulger, have you talked to your brother, James, since 1995?

If so, where was he and where is he now?

Mr. BULGER. On advice of counsel, I am unable to answer any

questions today. This position is based, among other things, on privacy and due process rights, and the right against being compelled

to provide evidence that may tend to incriminate myself, all of

which are found in the Bill of Rights including the rights and privileges under the first, fifth, and sixth amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

As the Supreme Court recognized in the case of Ohio versus

Ranier, one of the Fifth Amendment’s basic functions is to protect

innocent men who might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.

I find myself in such circumstances and, hence, stand on my constitutional rights as advised by counsel.

Mr. BURTON. I presume then that any of the questions posed to

you by the committee will be met with the same Fifth Amendment

response?

Mr. BULGER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BURTON. Well, unless members of the committee have some

comments or questions. Jim, is there anything you think we should

407

proceed further with? Any comments or questions from the Members?

Well, you have that right, Mr. Bulger. We’ll honor that right and

the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.]

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