Volume / 

Volume II 

Volume 111 

Volume IV 

Volume V 

Volume VI 

Volume VII 

Volume V//l 

Volume IX 

Volume X 

Volume XI 

THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: 

THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH 

A Crisis of Confidence and Competence 

1. The Question of Federalism: Key Problems 

2. Indicators of Federal Growth 

3. The Scope of the Federal Role Report 

The Condition of Contemporary Federalism: Conflicting Theories and 

Collapsing Constraints 

1. Alternative Perspectives on Federalism 

2. Breakdown of Constitutional Constraints; Interpretive Variations from the 

First Constitutional Revolution to the “Fourth” 

3. Government UnLocked: Political Constraints on Federal Growth Since the 

1930s 

4. Financing Federal Growth: Changing Aspects of Fiscal Constraints 

5. Governmental Growth: Conflicting Interpretations in the Social Sciences 

Public Assistance: The Growth of a Federal Function 

Reducing Unemployment: intergovernmental Dimensions of a National 

Problem 1 

intergovernmentalizing the Classroom: Federal involvement in Elementary and Secondary Education 

The Evolution of a Problematic Partnership: The Feds and Higher Ed 

Protecting the Environment: Politics, Pollution, and Federal Policy 

Federal involvement in Libraries 

The Federal Role in Local Fire Protection 

An Agenda for American Federalism: Restoring Confidence and Competence 

1. American Federalism 1960-1980: Contrasts and Continuities 

2. The Dynamics of Growth in Federal Functions: An Analysis of Case Study 

Findings 

3. The Federal Role: Criteria, Assessment, and Analysis 

4. Issues and Recommendations 

Hearings on the Federal Role 
THE 

FEDERAL 

ROLE IN THE 

FEDERAL SYSTEM: 

THE DYNAMICS OF 

GROWTH 

The Evolution of a Problematic Partnership: 

The Feds and Higher Ed 
Blank Page 
Acknowledgments 

T. his volume was prepared by the Government 

Structure and Functions section of the Commission staff. Timothy J. Conlan was responsible for 

its research and preparation. Anne H. Hastings 

provided valuable assistance in preparing the final version of the report. Other memb,ers of the 

Commission staff--especially David R. Beam and 

Cynthia Colella-reviewed the manuscript and 

provided helpful suggestions. Delores Dawson’ 

and Kathleen Behringer good-naturedly p&pared 

the manuscript. 

The Commission gratefully acknowledges the 

helpful comments provided by several scholars 

who reviewed a preliminary version of this report, 

including Chester Finn, Jr., Senior Legislative 

Assistant to Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan; Edith K. 

Mosher of the University of Virginia; Stephen K. 

Bailey of Harvard University; and Irene Spiro of 

the staff of the Sloan Commission on Higher Education. Full responsibility for the content and 

accuracy of this study naturally rests with the 

Commission and’its staff. 

Wayne F. Anderson 

Executive Director 

David B. Walker 

Assistant Director 
Blank Page 
Foreword 

T he Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations was established by Public Law 380, 

which was passed in the first session of the 86th 

Congress and approved by the President on September 24,1959. Section 2 of the act sets forth the 

following declaration of purpose and specific responsibilities for the Commission: 

Sec. 2. Because the complexity of modern life intensifies the need in a federal 

form of government for the fullest coop’- 

eration and coordination of activities between the levels of government, and because population growth and scientific 

developments portend an increasingly 

complex society in future years, it is essential that an appropriate agency be established to give continuing attention to 

intergovernmental problems. 

It is intended that the Commission, in 

performance of its duties, will: 

(1) bring together representatives of 

the federal, state, and local governments 

for the consideration of common problems. 

* * * * * 

(5) encourage discussion and study at 

an early stage of emerging public problems that are likely to require intergovernmental cooperation. 

(6) recommend, within the framework 

of the Constitution, the most desirable 

allocation of governmental functions, re- 
sponsibilities, and revenues among the 

several levels of government. 

Pursuant to its statutory responsibilities, the 

Commission has from time to time been requested 

by the Congress or the President to examine particular problems impeding the effectiveness of the 

federal system. Section 145 of the 1976 renewal 

legislation for General Revenue Sharing, P.L. 94- 

488, mandated that the Commission: 

study and evaluate the American federal fiscal system in terms of the allocation and coordination of public resources 

among federal, state, and local governments, including, but not limited to, a 

study and evaluation of: (1) the allocation and coordination of taxing and 

spending authorities between levels of 

government, including a comparison of 

other federal government systems. (5) 

forces likely to affect the nature of the 

American federal system in the shortterm and long-term future and possible 

adjustments to such system, if any, which 

may be desirable, in light of future developments. 

The Commission’s study, The Federal Role in 

the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth, of 

which the present volume is one component, is 

part of the Commission’s response to this mandate. Staff were directed to [a) examine the present role of the federal government in the American federal system; (b) review theoretical 

perspectives on American federalism, the assignment of functions, and governmental growth: and 

(c) identify historical and political patterns in the 

development and expansion of national governmental domestic activities. This case study on the 

federal role in higher education is one of seven 

prepared by Commission staff pursuant to this assignment. 

Abraham D. Beame 

Chairman 

vi 
CONTENTS 

Chapter 1. The Scope of Federal Involvement in Higher Education 1 

Postwar Trends ................................................. 4 

The Composition of the Federal Role ............................. 8 

Chapter 2. The Evolution of a Federal Role: 1787-1958 ............... 11 

A National University ........................................... 11 

Federal Land Grants for Higher Education. ........................ 12 

The Morrill Land Grant College Act ............................ .: 12 

TheGIBill ..................................................... 13 

Federal Research Grants to Universities ........................... 14 

Chapter 3. Beginnings of a New Federal Role in Higher Education: 

The National Defense Education Act,, ..................... 17 

Chapter 4. A Direct Federal Role Established: The Higher 

Education Acts of 1963 and 1965 .......................... 21 

A New Rationale for Federal Involvement: The Higher Education 

Actof ..................................................... 22 

Chapter 5. Equal Opporhmity Preeminent: The 1972 Higher 

Education Amendments .................................. 25 

The Policy Environment ......................................... 26 

The Policy Process .............................................. 28 

Chapter 6. A Growing Regulatory Presence. .......................... 33 

Evolution of Federal Regulation .................................. 33 

Regulation: Major Issue of the 70s ................................ 35 

The Politics of Regulation ................................... 40 

Across-the-Board Regulations ................................ 40 

Direct Regulation ........................................... 40 

TitleIX ..................................................... 42 

vii 
FERPA ..................................................... 43 

The Current Status of Regulation ................................. 44 

Chapter 7. Recent Legislative Actions ................................ 47 

Tuition Tax Credits ............................................. 47 

Department of Education ......................................... 48 

Chapter 8. The Political Dynamics of Federal Involvement: 

A Summary Analysis ..................................... 51 

Policy Analysis: Actors and Process .............................. 51 

Policy Entrepreneurship ..................................... 51 

Political Parties ............................................. 53 

Interest Groups ............................................. 54 

PublicOpinion ............................................. 55 

Forces and Rationales of Greater Federal Involvement .............. 55 

Constraints on the Federal Role .................................. 56 

Constitutional Constraints ................................... 56 

Political Constraints ......................................... 57 

Budgetary Constraints ........................................ 58 

Federal Involvement in Higher Education: Speculation on the 

Future .......................................................... 59 

Figures, Graphs, and Tables 

Figure 1. Federal Program for Higher Education and Related 

Activities: 1787-1980 ,,, 2 

Graph 1. Estimated Expendittires of Institutions of Higher Education, - 

by Source of Funds, Alternate Years: 1960-76 6 

Graph 2. Estimated Expenditures of Different Forms of Federal Aid 

by Institutions of Higher Education, Alternate Years: 

1960-70 . . . . . . . . . . ..__........__..................__...... 7 

Graph 3. Trends in Costs of Implementing Federally Mandated Social 

Programs:1965-75 ,........,,,.......,._.................. 37 

Table 1. Total Outlays for Higher Education, by Source of Funds, 

Selected Years: 1939-m _. i.. 4 

Table 2. Federal Funds as a Percentage of the Total Current Income 

of Universities and Colleges, by Control of Institution: 

1939-70 . . . . . ..__.......................................... 4 

Table 3. Estimated Expenditures of Institutions of Higher Education, 

by Source of Funds, $elected Years: 1960-77 5 

Table 4. The Development of Washington Representation in 

Higher Education.. 27 
Blank Page 
The Scope of Federal Involvement in 

Chapter 7 

Higher Education 

T he federal government has been involved in 

higher education since the founding of the Republic. Land grants for higher education were 

provided to the states throughout the 19th century. Other forms of limited federal assistance 

were gradually added (see Figure 1). Until the 

1940% however, the federal role remained a modest one. State and private institutions bore almost 

total responsibility for nearly all facets of higher 

education. 

This situation has changed enormously since 

World War II. In fiscal 1977 the federal budget for 

higher education was approximately $11.75 billion and growing.’ Including all major forms of 

aid, this constitutes about one-fifth of all funds 

spent by public institutions of higher learning 

and about one-third of total private school funds.’ 

Not only has the scope of federal involvement 

grown very large; it is also very broad. Federal aid 

comes in a variety of forms: aid to students, support for research, and programs of institutional 

assistance. Much of the aid comes through a host 

of programs with primarily educational aims, but 

even more comes from programs whose major 

purpose is other than education. All of it has enormous impact on the higher education community, 

both through the distribution of funds and through 

administrative conditions placed on grants. In addition, the federal government increasingly affects higher education through nonfiscal instruments, particularly through a variety of regulatory 

1 
- 

1767 

1667 

1667 

1914 

1935 

1936 

1937 

Figure 1 

FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES: 

1787-1980 

Commencement of endowment of public institutions of higher education with 

public lands-Northwest Ordinance: 

“Schools and the means of education 

shall forever be encouraged.” 

Ohio Enabling Act-established the 

provision of land grants and land scrip 

to new states under the statehood acts. 

Establishment of the first federal institution of higher education-US. Military 

Academy at West Point. 

The First Morri// Act-initiated federal 

policy of aid to states for agricultural 

and industrial education through land 

grants for colleges. 

Federal Department of Education established by Congress; later the Office 

of Education. 

Hatch Act-encouraged scientific investigation in agriculture. 

The Second Merrill Act-introduction of 

federal grants of money for college instruction in specified areas of learning. 

Smith-Lever Act-matching of funds for 

agricultural and home economics instruction through Agricultural Extension 

Service. 

National Youth Administration--employment for college students. 

Bankhead-Jones Act-increased sypport for land grant colleges. 

National Cancer Institute Act-provided fellowship grants. 

1964 

1964 

1965 

1965 

1966 

1967 

1966 

1971 

Economic Opportunity Actof 7964 (P.L. 

88-452)-war on poverty through retraining and remedial education and 

other opportunities; college work-study 

program. 

Amendments to National Defense Education Act-extended and expanded 

to include areas of English, reading, 

history, and geography. 

National Foundation for the Arts and 

Humanities (P.L. 89-209)-foundation 

to support humanities and the arts 

through grants. 

Higher Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89- 

329)-aid to colleges, students, and 

teachers. 

International Education Act (P.L. 89- 

698)-to provide a strengthening of 

American educational resources for international studies and research. 

Education Professions Development 

Act (P.L. 90-35)-to coordinate, 

broaden and strengthen programs for 

the training and the improvement of educational personnel. 

Higher Education Amendments of 1968 

(P.L. 90-575)-extended and improved 

four major education acts and authorized six new programs. 

Comprehensive Health Manpower 

Training Act of 7971 (P.L. 92-257)- 

amended Title VII of the Public Health 

Service Act. Increased and expanded 
w 

1950 

1950 

1952 

1954 

1958 

1963 

1963 

1964 

The Serviceman’s Readjustment ActGI Bill, educational aid for veterans. 

The National Science Foundation Actpromoted progress in science through 

scholarships and fellowships in fields of 

science. 

The Housing Act-low interast ratas for 

loans to institutions of higher learning 

for building of housing facilities. 

National Science Foundation-fellowship program. 

Cooperative Research Act-authorized 

the Office of Education to conduct cooperative research with colleges, universities, and state educational agencies. 

The National Defense Education Act 

(P.L. 85884)--provided for graduate 

fellowships in science, mathematics, 

foreign languages, counseling and 

guidance, educational technology. 

Health Professions Educational Assistance Act (P.L. 88-129)-construction 

of facilities and student loans. 

Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 

(P.L. 88-204brants to all colleges, 

public and private, for improvement of 

facilities. 

The Civil Rights AC1 of 7964 (P.L. 88- 

452)-desegregation of the schools enforced and assisted. 

provistons tor nealtn manpower tramrng 

and training facilities. 

1972 Education Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 

92-318)-established a National Institute of Education. Federal matching 

grants for state student incentive grants; 

the National Commission on Financing 

Postsecondary Education; State Advisory Councils on Community Colleges; 

a Bureau of Occupational and Adult Education and state grants for the design, 

establishment, and conduct of postsecondaty occupational education; and the 

bureau-level Office of Indian Education. 

Amended current Office of Education 

programs to increase their effectiveness and better meet special needs. 

Prohibited sex bias in admissions. 

1975 Harry S. Truman Memorial Scholarship 

Act (P.L. 93-842)-scholarships promoting public service education. 

1978 Education Amendments of 7976 (P.L. 

94-482)-reauthorized and amended 

major higher education legislation. 

1979 Department of Education Organization 

Act (P.L. 98-88wstablished the Department of Education. 

1980 Education Amendments of 1980 (P.L. 

98-347)-reauthorized and amended 

major higher education legislation. 

SOURCE: Sidney Tiedt. “Historical Development of Federal Aid Programs,” in Roe L. Johns, Kern Alexander, and Dewey St&r, 

eds., Stahrs and Impact of Educational Finance Programs, National Educational Finance Pmjeci, Volume IV, Gainsville, FL, 

National Education Finance Project, 1971, pp. 23-240; and US Depwtment of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Center 

for Education Statistics, Digest of Education tiat&Uss 1979, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979, pp. 157- 

162. 
Table 1 

TOTAL OUTLAYS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, 

BY SOURCE OF FUNDS, SELECTED YEARS: 1939-70 

(in millions of dollars) 

Total 

Outlays 

Academic Public and 

Year Private 

Total 

Public 

Outlavs Federal’ State Local 

Percent 

Public 

Outlavs 

1939-40 $ 922.5 $ 214.5 $ 38.9 $ 151.2 $ 24.4 23% 

1949-50 2,782.0 2,075.2 1,521.42 492.1 81.7 75 

1959-w 5,567.0 2,856.6 1,298.0 1,406.8 151.8 51 

1969-70 19,901.7 12,096.l 5,129.l 6,197.0 770.0 61 

1 Does not include federal aid to graduate students. 

2 Includes $993 million in GI Bill expenditures. 

SOURCE: Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. Higher Education: Who Pays? Who Berm%? Who Should Pay?, New 

York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1973, pp. 131-163. These figures were obtained by adding the institutional receipts for each level in 

each year, that proportion of direct student aid also derived fmm each level (as listed on page 162), plus that proponion of 

inStitUtiOnal student aid that derived from state and federal sources (assigned in the proportion of 16% state. 90% federal as 

suggested on pp. 131-132). 

conditions ranging from health and safety to affirmative action. 

POSTWAR TRENDS 

Since World War II, college enrollments have 

increased steadily and dramatically, quadrupling 

between 1946 and 197k3 Total spending on 

higher education has risen proportionately. Table 

1 indicates that total public-private outlays in 

higher education increased from $920 million in 

1939-40 to $19.9 billion in 1969-70. Total spending from public sources-federal, state, and local-has outstripped even this rapid rate of growth. 

The public sector has become increasingly important in supporting higher education, with its 

share growing from 23% in 1939-40 to 61% in 

1969-70. Table 1 shows clearly that this publicsector growth has come primarily from the state 

and federal governments. But whereas states have 

focused their efforts primarily on public state institutions, federal funds have ccme to play an increasingly important role in private institutions 

(particularly very large ones), as may be seen in 

Table 2.4 

the federal role. Coming from such a wide variety 

of federal programs, many funds are difficult to 

trace. In an effort to obtain data which more accurately reflect the total impact of the federal role, 

published data have been supplemented with 

some excluded categories of federal higher education assistance. These estimates remain flawed 

in certain respects, but overall, they present a 

Table 2 

FEDERAL FUNDS AS A PERCENTAGE 

OF THE TOTAL CURRENT INCOME OF 

UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES, BY 

CONTROL OF INSTITUTION: 

1939-70 

1939- 1949- 1959- 1969- 

40 60 60 70 

Vivate 

nstitutions 0.7 8.6 19.4 20.7 

‘ublic 

nstitutions 10.3 9.6 16.6 15.8 

iOURCE: Chester Finn, “Federal Patronage of Universities il 

he United States,” Minerva 14, Winter 1976-77. pp. 500~501 

Although they accurately indicate general 

trends, the data just discussed are not entirely 

consistent and tend to seriously underestimate 

4 
Table 3 

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, BY 

SOURCE OF FUNDS, SELECTED YEARS: 1960-77 

Source of Funds by Amount, in Billions of Current Dollars 

Level and Control 1980 1982 1984 1988 1988 1970 1972 1974 1978 1977 

Public and Private 

Total’ $6.7 $6.5 511.3 $15.2 $19.9 $24.7 $29.2 $34.3 544.6 $49.2 

Federal Total2 1.7 2.3 3.0 4.1 5.2 6.1 7.6 9.2 10.6 11.73 

Student Aid2 0.6 0.6 0.8 1.3 1.7 2.6 4.0 5.5 6.7 7.33 

Research* 0.9 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.4 

4.41 InstltutlonaP 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 

State’ 1.6 2.0 2.6 3.5 4.6 6.4 7.8 9.7 13.4 14.9 

Local’ 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.0 

All Dthes 3.2 3.9 5.4 7.2 9.3 11.3 12.7 14.0 19.0 20.6’ 

Percentage Distribution 

1980 1982 1984 1988 1988 1970 1972 1974 1978 1977 

Public and Private 

Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 

Federal Total2 25.3 27.1 26.6 27.0 26.2 24.7 26.0 26.8 23.7 23.8 

Student Aid2 8.9 7.1 7.1 8.5 8.5 10.5 13.7 16.0 15.0 14.8 

Research 13.4 16.5 14.2 14.5 12.1 10.1 9.6 9.3 7.6 9.0 Institutional 3.0 3.5 5.3 4.0 5.6 4.1 2.7 1.5 1.1 

State 23.9 23.5 23.0 23.0 24.1 25.9 26.7 28.3 29.9 30.3 

Local 3.0 2.4 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.6 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.1 

All Other 47.8 45.9 47.8 47.4 46.7 45.8 43.5 40.8 42.3 41.8 

1 U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. National Center for Education Statistics, The Condition of Education: 1977, 

p. 161. 

‘Compiled from U.S. Department of Health, Educatica, and Welfare, National Center for Education 8tatistics. Projections Of 

Education Statistics to 1984-85. pp. 166-166. 

’ Compiled from Executive Of&x of the President. Cffica of Management and Budget, “Special Analysis J.” Special Analyses: 

Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal yew 1979. 

SOURCE: U.S. Depaiiment of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics. The Condftfon of Education: 1977, Washington. DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 161; U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 

Welfare. National Center for Education Statistics, Pmjecffons of Education Smtistics to 1984-85, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Dffice, 1976. pp. 165-166; Executive Dffice of the President, Office of Management and Budget. “Special 

Analysis J: Education,” Special Analyses: Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal year 1979, Washington, DC, U.S. 

Government Printing Oftice, 1976. The figures from The Condition of Education: 1977 are used exactly as they appear, with the 

exception that new estimates of federal expenditures have been substituted. The eMmateS derived fmm Pmj~ctions were arrived 

at as follows: to the category “Hiiher Education” in Table B9, p. 165, we have added tha following additional categories from 

p. 166: “Veteran’s Education, ” “Loans, Total (Higher Education), ” “Applied Research and Development,” and “U.S. Academies.” 

The major problems in doing this are (1) part of the category “Veteran’s Education” probably goes into technical schools rather 

than higher education; and, (2) adding total applied research may overstate this category. These problems are balanced by our 

inability to add other categories of Table 6-9. such as “Training of Federal Personnel.” Our figures. therefore, continue to 

underestimate total federal spending on hgher education. For example, a comprehensive analysis of higher education financing 

in 1971-Z found total federal spending to bs $8.1 billion, compared v&h our total of $7.6 billion (National Commission on the 

Financing of Postsecondary Education, Financing Postsecondary Education in tie Untied St&s, Washington, DC, U.S. Govemment Printing office. 1973, p. 67). Similarly, in his excellent comprehensive analysis of federal spending on higher education, 

Chester Finn estimated the 1976 federal total to be $12.6 billion, compared to the total here of $11.7 billion. Chester Finn, op. 

cit., p. 600. 
50% 

45 

40 

35 

30 

25 

Graph 1 

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES OF’ INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 

BY SOURCE OF FUNDS, ALTERNATE YEARS: 1960-76 

(percentage distribution) 

KEY: 

Federal Total - 

State -- 

Local - 

All other . . . . . . . . 

.*..... ‘....~.... .,...* ‘*“....-.-*. “.......*.......“‘~**~~* 

a... *..a 

-... a... 

. ..*... * . . . ..-a 

L, 

1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 
Graph 2 

ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF FEDERAL AID 

BY INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION. ALTERNATE YEARS: 

1960-70 . 

(percentage distribution) 

20 

15 

5 

0 

SOURCE: Table 4. 

1960 1962 1964 1966 1966 1970 1972 1974 1976 

KEY: Student Aid mmmmmmmmm 

Research - - - 

Institutional - 

7 
more comprehensive portrait of the federal higher 

education effort. 

With these limitations in mind, Table 3 shows 

federal, state, and local expenditures on higher 

education from 1960 to 1977. It is clear from these 

figures that expenditures on higher education 

have continued to grow rapidly during the past 

15 years. Moreover, while both federal and state 

expenditures have grown, recent state spending 

has outpaced that of the federal government (see 

Graph 1). The federal role, while extremely important in the postwar era, remains supplementary to the states. As Ira Sharkansky observes: “Of 

all the services that ale supported by state funds, 

the state governments have most clearly taken 

command of higher education.“5 

THE COMPOSITION OF THE 

FEDERAL ROLE 

Federal aid to higher education differs significantly in form from state aid. Whereas state aid 

tends to be general institutional support to state 

institutions, federal assistance is mainly directed 

at particular national purposes, such as aid to low 

income students and support of scientific research. Indeed, a Library of Congress study in 

1975 counted 439 separate authorizations that 

touch on postsecondary educaticm6 Although 

most of these are small and not all receive appropriations, the degree of program specificity is remarkable. 

These various components of federal aid to 

higher education have changed enormously over 

the years. To begin with, federal aid to students, 

as opposed to research and institutional grants, 

has become a progressively larger proportion of 

total federal assistance. Student aid, which constituted about 35% of federal aid in 1960, 

amounted to 63% in 1976’. (See Graph 2.) Other 

changes in the composition of federal aid have 

included: 

l Equal Education. Within federal student assistance, a totally new emphasis on promoting equal educational opportunity has arisen 

since the mid 1960s. Whereas in 1968 the federal government expended $216 million for 

such purposes (4%),8 by 1979 it spent an estimated $2.7 billion toward this end (21%)- 

nmre than a ten-fold increase in as many 

yeaw9 In addition to increased expenditures, 

equal opportunity has become the focus of 

major federal regulatory efforts. 

l Veteran’s Readjustment. For several years, 

the largest federal student assistance program 

was the Veteran’s Readjustment Act. After 

being phased out in the early 196Os, the GI 

Bill was reenacted in 1966 for veterans of the 

Vietnam War. It grew very rapidly for several 

years, reaching a peak of $4.3 billion in 1976. 

Since then, it has declined just as rapidly, 

with estimated expenditures of $2 billion in 

FY 1979.‘O 

l Military and Health Research. Federal grants 

for research have changed as dramatically 

over the years as has aid to students. In the 

1940s and 196os, this category of spending 

was dominated by military research, but this 

is no longer true. During the mid 196Os, 

space-related research became very important 

but subsequently declined. Research on 

health, meanwhile, has risen steadily through 

the years, now constituting around SO% of all 

federally supported research in colle~?s and 

universities.” 

Federal involvement in higher education, then, 

continues to be an evolving phenomenon. Untouched by these budgetary figures are other elements of a changing federal role, particularly the 

growing use of regulations and grant conditions, 

largely for new purposes. These have become increasingly important in recent years, enlarging 

both the scope and salience of federal involvement. All of these elements of federal involvement-its scope, form, distribution, and goalsreflect a number of evolving causal factors that 

have helped to determine the way in which the 

current federal role has developed. It requires a 

look at political history to help identify what 

these factors have been, the roles that they have 

played, and what they imply for the future. 

FOOTNOTES ysis 1: Education.” Special Analyses: Budget of the United 

States Government: Fiscal Year 197% Washington, DC, U.S. 

Government Printing Office, 1978. With the exception that 

’ Actual outlays in 1977 derived from: Executive Office of the tax expenditures have not been included, these figures were 

President, Office of Management and Budget, “Special Anal- compiled in accordance with the method used by Chester 

8 
Finn, “Federal Patronage of Universities in the United 

States,” Minerva 14, Winter 1976-77. PP. 500-501. 

pThomes Wolenin and Lawrence Gladieux, “The Political 

Culture of a Policy Arena: Higher Education.” in Matthew 

Holden, Jr., end Dennis L. Dreseng, eds.. What Government 

Does, Beverly Hills, CA, sage, 1975, p. 184. 

3 U.S. Department of Health, Education, end Welfare. National 

Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Edocotion Statistics, 1974, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, p. 75. 

’ The figures used here must be interpreted cautiously since 

certain funds are frequently underestimated. This is perticulerly true of federal research funds end direct aid to students. Because some of these funds are not primarily intended for educational purposes, different sources variously 

omit considerable portions of this federal assistance in spite 

of its substantial educational impact. For example, the figures used in Table 1 do not include federal sssistence to 

graduate students, which in 1973 amounted to $680 million. 

Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Higher Edocotion: Who Pays? Who Benefits? Who Should Pay?, New York, 

NY, McGraw-Hill, 1973, p. 95. The date reported in Table 

2 reflect total federal sid even less accurately since they are 

derived fmm institutional receipts. A great deal of federal 

assistance to students is reported as income derived fmm 

students rather than fmm government. When federal student 

assistance is figured in, es with aid to veterans in 1949-50, 

the federal share rises substantially. 

5 Ire Sherkansky, The Maligned States. New York, NY. McGraw-Hill, 1972, p. 82. Although the federal financial mle 

is secondary in terms of aggregate spending, the higher education community is diverse. Certain classes of institution~majar research universities, various private schools, 

end many predominantly black institutions--are pUthlerly dependent on federal assistance vie-r&s the states. 

@ Robert Andringa, “The View from the Hill,” in Fedemlism 

ot the Crossmods, Washington, DC, institute for Educational 

Leadership, 1977. p. 73. 

’ Calculated fmm Table 3. 

B U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National 

Canter for Education Statistics, Projections of Education Statistics to 198445. Washington, DC. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 169, from Tsble B-10: “Office of Education Expenditures, by Legislative Program: Fiscal Years 

1960 to 1976.” Estimate includes the pmgrems of “Equal 

Opportunity Grants” and “Work-Study Pmgrem and Cooperative Education.” 

a “Special Analysis J,” op. cit., p. 217. Table J-Z, including 

“Basic Opportunity Grants,” end “Work-Study end Suppl~ 

mentery Grants, Student Incentive Grants.” 

I0 Finn, op. cit., and Ibid. See also “Federal Student Aid end 

How It Grew.” Chmnicle of Hinher Education. October 11. 

1978, p. 5. 

I 1 

” “Special Analysis P: Research end Development,” inSpecial 

Analyses: Budget of the United States Government: Fiscal 

Year 197% op. cit. p. 313. 

n 
Blank Page 
Chapter 2 

The Evolution of a Federal Role: 

17874958 

A NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 

T he earliest consideration given to federal involvement in higher education concerned establishment of a national university. Proposals to 

found such an institution gained prominence at 

several junctures in American history, beginning 

in the 1780s. One proposal, which sought creation 

of a national university to cap state and local educational systems, was rejected at the Constitutional Convention. As it was ratified, the Constitution contained no mention of education at all. 

Although some felt it required a Constitutional 

amendment, the first six Presidents all endorsed 

the concept of a national university. George 

Washington even left a bequest in his will toward 

its establishment. Congress, however, opposed 

the idea. It viewed the matter as strictly a state 

responsibility for which the federal government 

lacked Constitutional authority for direct involvement. As George Rainsford writes: “In spite of the 

prestige and persuasiveness of its supporters, a 

national university failed to materialize. (Sltcict 

construction views of the Constitutional power of 

the federal government prevented the creation of 

a national system of education.“’ With the ascendance of the highly localistic Jacksonian Democrats, the fate of this proposal was sealed. Eventually, Columbia College (predecessor to George 

Washington University) was founded in the District of Columbia, but it was intended as a facility 

11 
for the residents of the federal district rather than 

for the nation as a whole. 

There was a resurgence of interest in creating 

a national university in the late 1800s. Presidents 

Grant and Hayes lent their support to the idea. By 

this time, however, several eastern colleges were 

developing their own graduate schools, and they 

opposed the concept as redundant and competitive.2 

FEDERAL LAND GRANTS FOR 

HIGHER EDUCATION 

Federal land grants for higher education were 

more successful. They began early on with the 

allotment of two townships for this purpose to 

Ohio, upon its admission as a state in 1802. This 

established a precedent, and similar grants were 

negotiated with other states as they entered the 

Union. In all, 45 states eventually benefited from 

such grants of federal land or land scrip.3 

These grants served to stimulate the early development of higher education in the states, but 

Constitutional scruples and practical politics 

greatly diluted their impact. To begin with, concern with the public land instrument largely overshadowed the educational aims of these grants. 

Congress wished to dispose of the lands quickly 

and easily, the states were eager to receive land 

proceeds under any pretext, and it was hoped that 

promoting education would encourage settlement.’ Moreover, there was “almost complete absence of federal control over the use of these 

grants.“5 They were often grossly mismanaged by 

the states, resulting in low proceeds for their educational recipients. 

THE MORRILL LAND GRANT 

COLLEGE ACT 

A more significant form of federal aid to higher 

education was enacted in the Merrill Act of 1862, 

which established the system of land grant colleges. Under this law, federal lands and land scrip 

were distributed among the states-in rough proportion to their population-to “establish colleges for the benefit of agriculture and mechanic 

arts.” 

The act was a crucial step in the evolution of a 

federal role in higher education. The grant-in-aid 

technique was utilized to lessen political and 

Constitutional objections to federal involvement. 

A national purpose was specified, and the grants 

served as incentives to stimulate state activity on 

its behalf. In the process, the basic pattern of incremental federal involvement into higher education-in the form of categorical programs for 

specific national interests-was established. 

Justin Merrill, a Vermont Republican and the 

chief sponsor of the act, initially proposed a more 

direct federal role in promoting agricultural education. In 1856 he introduced legislation to establish one or more “national agricultural 

schools,” similar to the national military academies.” Meeting strong opposition from southern 

Democrats in Congress, this proposal went nowhere. 

The following year, Merrill introduced a different bill, similar to the one passed in 1862, which 

provided land grants to the states on behalf of 

agricultural and mechanical education. Again, 

primary opposition arose from southern Democrats who found the concept threatening and unconstitutional. They regarded the federal grants 

as an interference with state responsibilities and 

unauthorized by the Constituticm7 One southern 

Senator attacked the bill as “one of the most monstrous, iniquitous, and dangerous measures which 

have ever been submitted to Congress.““. 

The bill narrowly passed both Houses of Congress, with support divided along party and sectional lines. However, President Buchanan issued 

a “resounding” veto, calling the bill “unconstitutional and inexpedient.” Although he added 

objections based on public lands policy, Rainsford concludes that, “principally the President 

considered the act unconstitutional for all the.reasons that southern states’ righters had reiterated 

since the time of Jacks~n.“~ 

When the bill was reintroduced in 1861, circumstances had drastically changed. The southern states had seceded from the Union, and the 

activist Republican Party had come to power under a new President. Morrill’s new legislation excluded the secessionist states, and a requirement 

was added that recipient schools teach military 

tactics. 

This time around, the center of controversy was 

public lands policy. Many westerners opposed 

the distribution of land scrip to the eastern states 

and feared the effects of the law on land prices. 

But the bill passed both Houses by wide margins, 

12 
appealing to those who Xw.s not necessarily 

sympathetic with the antislavery base of the Republican party but wh[o] were not attracted by the 

anticentralism of the Democrats.“‘o Moreover, 

while the act represented “the work of middleclass reformers” and “had little to do with 

pressure from farmers and workingmen’s associations,” its appeal to the great agricultural population was unmistakable.” 

Although farmers and their spokesmen did not 

initiate the Merrill Act, they rapidly became major 

supporters of it. Soon after its passage, both agricultural organizations and the land grant colleges began to lobby for additional federal aid, 

particularly in support of agricultural research: 

As early as 1871 the main theme at conventions of land grant institutions was 

the need in the United States for experiment stations associated with the 

land grant colleges. By 1872 agricultural societies had turned to the federal government for assistance in establishing and running . experiment 

stations.” 

A number of states became involved in agricultural research after 1875, but financing remained 

a problem. Continued pressure for federal assistance resulted in numerous legislative proposals 

in the 1880s and the eventual passage in 1887 of 

the Hatch Act, which provided annual subsidies 

of $15,000 per year to agricultural experiment stations associated with land grant colleges in the 

states. Additional grants to these colleges were 

adopted in the second Merrill Act three years 

later. 

Until almost 1960, the contours of federal assistance to higher education followed the fundamental patterns that were established in these 

original acts. To minimize constitutional objections, federal participation took the form of grantsin-aid. Political constraints on broad federal involvement produced a series of narrow, categorical programs directed at specific problems. Generally, these have been areas in which opposition 

has been muted due to the pressing nature of a 

problem or its high visibility and unquestionable 

national character. Once a program has been enacted, this original support tends to be reinforced 

by the efforts of beneficiaries.” 

Although kducational institutions and issues 

were involved, the primary purpose of most of the 

early “higher education programs” was not education at all but, rather, some additional national 

interest. Education has generally been involved 

in an instrumental sense. For example, concern 

with the sale and distribution of the public domain largely overshadowed the educational interest in the early land grants.” Similarly, the promotion and dissemination of agricultural research 

through the agricultural experiment stations and 

the extension service were the focus of the later 

programs. During tbe 193Os, federal funds were 

temporarily expended on college work-study arrangements under the National Youth Administration as part of the federal government’s broad 

response to the economic emergency. In each 

case, moreover, the federal role was strictly supplementary to that of tbe states and the private 

sector. Nevertheless, the programs did have an 

important stimulative effect: 

Despite the comparatively small sums realized from the federal land grants and 

the instances of early mismanagement, 

the importance of these grants to the development of state universities in the 

Middle West and Far West should not be 

underestimated. In state after state, institutions of higher learning were founded 

in order to take advantage of the federal 

grants. Often these “universities” were 

scarcely more than high schools, but they 

were the foundations on which the states 

were later to build strong state universities. It seems likely that without the stimulation of tbe federal grants many states 

would have had no public institution of 

higher education-and some no higher 

educational institutions at all-until 

many years later.‘5 

THE GI BILL 

This initial pattern of federal aid to higher education carried over into the post-World War II 

era. Although the sheer size of the postwar federal presence exerted a more significant impact 

on the structure, focus and conduct of education, 

the federal interest in higher education was still 

largely incidental. It massively affected educational institutions in the pursuit of essentially 

noneducational goals. 

The Service Man’s Readjustment Act of 1944 

(GI Billj was a prime example of this. By 1960, it 

13 
had assisted 3.5 million former servicemen in 

pursuing postsecondary education.1B Yet, the primary purpose of the act was not the promotion of 

education per se. This was still considered to be 

a state responsibility, as was indicated in the failure of Congress to pursue the Zook Commission 

proposals (1946) for federal operating and capital 

expenditure grants to state universities. Rather, 

the aims of the act were the promotion of national 

economic policy and national defense. The education program helped to smooth the postwar 

economy’s readjustment to the millions of ex-soldiem returning from the war and to repay a national debt of gratitude for their wartime service. 

In matters of this kind, however, legislative objectives and their method of implementation can 

be closely interrelated and result in important unanticipated consequences. Certainly the educational impact of this legislation was enormous. 

Partly in response to the flood of new students 

stimulated by the GI Bill, additional federal programs were enacted. To help relieve overcrowded 

campus housing, the Housing Act of 1950 authorized long-term loans for dormitories and 

housing construction. hi 1955 the interest on 

these loans was federally subsidized, and their 

coverage was expanded to include construction 

such as dining and health care facilities and student unions. Opposition remained, however, to 

more direct forms of federal aid to higher education. Expansion of college construction loans to 

include instructional facilities failed enactment 

three times in the 1950s. 

FEDERAL RESEARCH GRANTS TO 

UNIVERSITIES 

Another major federal involvement in higher 

education stemming from World War II evolved 

out of the massive federal research effort. Before 

the war, the federal government financed about 

15% of the nation’s research and development (R 

& D) effort, mostly in agriculture but also in a few 

small health programs.‘” The wartime crash effort 

in military research raised the federal share of the 

country’s research activities to about SO%, or $3 

billion. In order to utilize the nation’s existing R 

& D resources, much of this money was channeled 

to the universities. 

As in other instances of federal wartime involvement in new activities, the changes wrought 

by the war persisted. Afterwards, the federal government continued to finance 60°fo of the nation’s 

R & II, 45% above its prewar level. By 1960, the 

federal government was spending $750 million 

on research in institutions of higher education 

and providing two-thirds of all higher education’s 

research money, prompting Alice Rivlin to write 

at the time that: “Research and development are 

by far the most important federally supported activities involving colleges and universities.“‘* 

Reflecting cold war priorities, federal research 

moneys in the late 1940s and 1950s were heavily 

concentrated in defense-related fields and technologies [as was federal spending in general). In 

an attempt to avoid complete military dominance 

in basic research, the National Science Foundation was created in 1950.‘9 Over the next 2% decades, the composition of the federal research effort continued to evolve. The military share 

declined in relative terms as spending on health 

research increased with the establishment of the 

National Institutes of Health, and research on 

space flourished in the 1960s.zo 

While scholars agree that the impact of federally funded research on colleges and universities 

has been significant, interpretations vary as to the 

precise nature of this federal impact. There are 

two major issues: (1) the extent of institutional 

dependence on the federal government, and (2) 

the extent to which federal research priorities 

have distorted the academic priorities of recipient 

scholars and their institutions and, consequently, 

have shaped the direction of institutional growth. 

Theoretically, federal research grants do not entail institutional dependence on the federal government. However, significant portions of many 

grants are devoted to overhead costs and help 

support a broad range of university services. 

Moreover, as a large percentage of faculty and 

graduate students became dependent on the federal government for support-particularly in 

medicine and the natural sciences-postsecondary institutions themselves came to be increasingly reliant upon federal support. Lauriston King 

explains that: 

Although research and development 

support has been geared toward hard results and not educational subsidies it has 

in many instances come to look like aid 

to institutions themselves. Such support 

can come in the form of fattened faculty 

paychecks, the purchase of costly equip14 
merit, or the construction of new buildings to house special research projects. 

Some major research universities have 

drawn an increasingly large share of 

their budget from federal funds.2’ 

Similarly, Don K. Pr&e asserts that: 

The scientific revolution has made the 

universities themselves financially dependent on government, and involved 

them deeply in the political pro~ess.~~ 

The result was spelled out by former Yale President Kingman Brewster: 

I would estimate that the liberal arts 

and sciences institutions like Stanford, 

Harvard, Chicago, and Yale are at least 

one-third financed by the national government. This is of course heavily concentrated in medicine and the physical 

sciences. In the case of places like M.I.T. 

and Cal Tech the degree of government 

dependence is much higher.23 

The effects of this dependence have been a matter of some controversy and are subject to varying 

interpretations. On the whole, it appears that the 

consequences for individual researchers have differed from those for their institutions. Don K. 

Price notes that initial fears that reliance on federal grants would significantly distort the work of 

individual scientists generally have not been realized.24 However, Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (DNY) asserts that the broader effects upon institutions and the scientific disciplines have been 

enormous. He argues that the development of 

higher education in the postwar era has been 

shaped largely by the distribution of incentives 

offered by the federal government: 

The enormous expansion of chemistry, 

physics, biology, engineering, and their 

derivative fields came from the federal 

government: but it is absolutely essential 

to remember that this expansion reflected the fact that the federal government wanted it to happen. The universities were put to work on behalf of goals 

and activities deemed by government officials to be in the national interest a 

clear case of federal domination of the 

directions in which higher education 

moved.25 

Presumably, one consequence of this development has been that, as the direction of scientific 

inquiry has been altered, the balance of power and 

resources within institutions of higher learning 

has been altered with it. Moreover, the high degree of institutional dependence has had the consequence of limiting the options available to colleges and universities when they find themselves 

confronted with federal regulations and grant 

conditions they oppose. As the president of Ohio 

State University remarked in 1976: 

This year, one-eighth of our total kdget 

($43 million) will come from federal 

sources. The fact is, we have no 

choice whether to be involved in major 

federal programs. There is no way that 

the president of Ohio State can say that 

we will not participate in federal student 

aid, research, or health assistamxZ6 

FOOTNOTES 

’ George N. Rainsford, Congress and Higher Education in the 

Nineteenth Century, Knoxville, TN, University of Tennessee 

Press, 1972. p. 27. See also pp. W-19. See also Alice Rivlin, 

The Role of the Federal Government in Financing Higher 

Education, Washington, DC, Bmalrings Institution. 1961, p. 

116. 

z Rivlin, op. cit.. pp. 116-117. 

3 Rainsford. op. cit., pp. 36-45. 

‘Ibid.. pp. ix, 97. See also Rivlin. op. cit., p. 10 

5 Rivlin. op. cit.. p, 13. 

‘Rainsford, op. cit., p, 84. This section is based largely on 

Rainsford’s account. 

’ Rainsford states that: “The constitutional issue posed the 

greatest threat to southerners who, by 1859, were put off by 

any idea contrary to the doctrine of states’ rights or by any 

attempted federal influence on local institutions.” Ibid., p. 

88. 

8 Quoted in ibid. 

8 The hiahlv localistic lscksonian Democrats opposed the less 

intmsi~e &ncept of federal land grants as &II as more dired federal activities like a national university. Democratic 

Party platforms fmm 1844-56 read in part: “RESOLVED, 

That the federal government is one of limited powers, derived solely from the Constitution, and that grants of power 

shown therein ought to be strictly construed and that it 

is inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional powers. [TJhe pmceeds of the Public Lands 

ought to be sacredly applied to the national objects specified 

in the Constitution. and that we are opposed to any law 

for the Distribution of such pmceeds among the States, as 

repugnant to the Constitution.” As quoted in Rainsford, 

op. cit., p. 82. 

loIbid., p. 94. 

15 
l1 Ibid. 

‘*Ibid., p. 116. 

I3 As Dan K. Price observes: “State and local gwemments and 

private corporations used to join in their jealousy of purely 

federal activities and to consider extension of them as socialistic. The federal grants to states in the field of agriculture, however, were no longer socialistic in the eyes of the 

Governors and the farm bloc; they were a defense of the 

American way of life. even though they entailed government 

controls.” The Scientific Estate, New York, NY, Oxford 

University Press, 1968, p. 74. 

“Although this is less true of the Monill Act than of some 

others. Rainsford writes that “The educational significance 

of the Merrill legislation arose primarily because of the subsequent importance of the institutions founded. Yet the 

educational aspects of the measure received scant attention 

in the Congressional debates in 1862. The passage of the act 

reflected concern for political strategy mare than advancement of education.” Rainsford, op. cit., p. 95. 

IS Rivlin, op. cit., p. 13. 

‘Blbid., p. 61. 

“Ibid., p. 34. 

‘8Ibid., p. 24. In FY 1979, the federal government anticipated 

R 8 D outlays of $3.3 billion in the nation’s colleges and 

universities. This constituted about two-thirds of higher education’s research funds. “Special Analysis P,” op. cit., pp. 

310. 313. 

181bid., p. 37. 

‘D”Special Analysis P,” op. cit., p. 329. See also chart of total 

federal research expenditures 1953-78: U.S. Office of Management and Budget. Special Analyses: Budget of the 

United States Government: Fiscal Year 1978, Washington, 

DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 294. 

2’ Lauriston King, The Washington Lobbyists for Higher Education, Lexington, MA, D.C. Heath, 1975, p. 11. 

22 Price. op. cit., p. 17. 

za Kingman Brewster, Address to Fellows of the American Bar 

Association, February 22. 1975, reprinted in Congressional 

Record, March 10,1975, p. S5827. Colleges and universities 

differ markedly in their degree of dependence on federal 

funds. The Carnegie Commissiw on Higher Education estimated that in 1968 the top public research universities 

derived about 27% of their total resources fmm federal 

SOUICBS. For similar private research universities, the estimated figure was 52%. In contrast, public and private liberal 

arts colleges received less than 10% of their funds from federal sources (although as institutional receipts these figures 

may underestimate federal student assistance&see Camsgie Commission on Higher Education. Institutional Aid: 

Fedeml Support to Colleges and Universities, New York, 

NY, McGraw-Hill. 1972, p. 40. 

PI “Mast scientists once feared that if they had to depend on 

subsidies from federal agencies, they would be committed 

to work toward those agencies’ purposes, and thus lose their 

freedom. On the contrary, it is now clear that the university 

scientist of reasonably high status in his field realizes that 

he has more freedom by virtue of his ability to seek funds 

from a wide variety of federal and other sources than if be 

were entirely dependent an the decisions of his university 

administration.” Price, op. cit., p. 181. 

‘sDaniel Moynihan, Coping, New York, NY, Vintage, 1975, p. 

302. Original emphasis. 

x8 HaroldEnarson,“RestaringthePa~ership,”remarks printed 

in Congressional Record. rune 24, 1976, pp. E3594-95. 

i 

16 
Chapter 3 

Beginnings of a New Federal Role 

in Higher Education: 

The National Defense Education Act 

A ssessments of the modern era of direct federal 

involvement in higher education variously identify the Natioml Defense Education Act of 1958 

(NDEA) and the Higher Education Act of 1965 as 

the crucial milestones in the development of a 

new federal role. Although the latter stands 

preeminent, NDEA was of great importance in 

promoting the transition to a new foundation for 

federal assistance. 

As indicated above, prior programs with &jjor 

educational impact tended to focus on other national needs, particularly national defense. Education was largely viewed instrumentally. Moreover, the aim of federal action in most cases was 

to stimulate state and local interest in new areas. 

For the most part, NDEA followed this pattern in 

form, but it also advanced new varieties of federal 

assistance OD behalf of a newly emerging federal 

interest in education itself. Under what were then 

considered conditions of national emergency, 

such narrowly conceived student aid precedents 

as depression era work-study grants and GI Bill 

student assistance were broadened into a more 

direct federal concern with education: 

The 1958 National Defense Education 

Act [NJJEA) was important “not so much 

because of the specific provisions but 

because of the psychological breakthroughs it embodied. It asserted, more 

forcefully than at any time in nearly a 

century, a national interest in the quality 

17 
of education that the states, communities, and private institutions provide.” 

Although the ostensible federal interest 

in passing the eclectic measum was national defense, there was also some suggestion that the federal government was 

moving in the direction of guaranteed 

opportunity for higher education.’ 

Proposals for general aid to education, particularly at the elementary and secondary levels, had 

been the focus of extraordinary controversy in the 

decade prior to enactment of the NDEA. With the 

exception of those few matters with a fairly direct 

relationship to national defense, broad support for 

increased federal involvement in education was 

thwarted by internal divisions within the proaid 

coalition and firm resistance by opponents to a 

greater federal role. This standoff was altered 

dramatically, if only temporarily, in the national 

uproar following the Soviet orbit of Sputnik in 

October 1957. 

The legislation that became the NDEA was developed almost simultaneously by both the Eisenhower Administration and the Democratic Congress? Under pressures for action from both 

Congress and public opinion, the Administration 

drafted a bill in January 1958. At the same time, 

a bill was fashioned in the Democratic Congress 

by Sen. Lister Hill (D-AL) and Rep. Carl Elliot [DAL). As Chairman of the Senate Committee on 

Labor and Public Welfare, Hill had been a major 

supporter of federal aid to education for years and 

was a veteran of the divisive controversies involved with it. He instructed his committee staff 

to develop !egislation that would “steer between 

the Scylla of race and the Charybdis of religion.” 

As Sundquist reports: “In accepting the title ‘national defense education act,’ Hill observed that 

his colleagues would not dare vote against both 

national defense and education when joined in 

the same bil1.“3 

Both the Administration and Congressional 

bills combined federal assistance to higher education with aid to elementary and secondary education. In both, assistance to higher education 

focused on providing aid to students in the form 

of scholarships, the Congressional bill including 

education loans and work-study as well. In reaction to Sputnik and following a series of commission reports and recommendations emphasizing 

the shortcomings of American scientific education, both bills indicated “preference” for students in the “defense-related” areas of science, 

math, and modern foreign languages. Neither, 

however, restricted aid to such students. 

With the racial and religious issues defused and 

cooperation established between HEW and the 

congress, the two proposals were melded together in Congressional committee with little opposition. The major difficulty in passage arose in 

floor debate, where opposition to the scholarship 

provisions as a “free ride” resulted in their reduction in the Senate and elimination in the 

House. These provisions emerged from conference as student loans only, and the NDEA easily 

passed both Houses. It was signed by President 

Eisenhower on September 2, 1958, with the following higher education provisions: (1) a student 

loan title authorizing $295 million for direct government loans over a four-year period, with a 

“preference” given to students planning a teaching career or intending to pursue the study of science, math, engineering, or a modern foreign language; (2) an authorization for graduate 

fellowships, with preference for those planning a 

college teaching career; (3) funds to colleges to 

enhance the teaching of modern foreign languages; (4) grants to conduct research on innovative teaching aids; and (5) moneys to the NSF 

to promote the dissemination of scientific information. 

True to the President’s general reluctance to allow substantial federal involvement in supporting 

education, the Eisenhower Administration originally conceived of theNDEA as a limited and temporary measure. Certainly these characteristics 

eased its passage. Once passed, however, the program quickly established its permanence. Moreover, its scientific focus, which was neither consistently developed nor stringently legislated to 

begin with, was weakened further in subsequent 

changes.* Indeed, as suggested in Sen. Hill’s comment above, many saw the Sputnik “crisis” and 

the bill’s rationale of national security more as a 

pragmatic vehicle for federal aid than a careful 

adherence to Constitutional scruples. The bill’s 

justification of a federal interest in education was 

the clearest to be uttered in years: 

The Congress hereby finds and declares that the security of the Nation requires the fullest development of the 

mental resources and technical skills of 

18 
its young men and women. The national interest requires that the federal government give assistance to education for programs which am important 

to our national defense.5 

Alice Rivlin observed at the time that: 

The National Defense Education Act 

may represent the beginning of a new era 

of explicit recognition of higher education as a legitimate area of federal concern. To be sure, the word “defense” is 

in the title and there is considerable verbiage about “national security” and the 

“present emergency.” Nevertheless, the 

act comes closer to being an out-and-out 

education measure than any previous 

FOOTNOTES 

’ King, op. cit., pp. 5-S. 

’ See James Sundquist, Politics and Policy. Washington. DC, 

Bmokings Institution, 1968, pp. 174. 423. This section is 

based largely on Sundquist’s account and on that in 

Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Notion, Volume 

I: 1545-1~64, Washington, DC. Congressional Quarterly 

Service. 1565. 

3 Sundquist, op. cit., p. 176. In detailing the origins of legislation. it is. perhaps, almost never entirely accurate to characterize programs as spontaneous products of a few key individuals. In this instance. there were precedents for the 

legislation that were slowly grinding their way through the 

policy process. Both the President and Congress had previously indicated same support far scientific education, prob 

ably a small categorical program much less significant than 

NDE.4. This and other questions were examined in 1956 and 

legislation. The provision for the student 

loan program seems to indicate Congressional acceptance of the idea that it is in 

the national interest for the federal government to help undergraduates finance 

their education on a continuing basis. 

The action was not taken in order to keep 

students out of the labor force or to compensate them for military service, but because facilitating their education is desirable 

This appraisal was reaffiied in retrospect by 

Gladieux and Wolanin: “NDEA represented a 

quantum leap in the acceptable size and scope of 

the federal role in supplementing the states in the 

field of higher education.“’ 

1957 by the President’s Committee on Education Beyond 

High School, but the Committee’s bmad proposals appeared 

unlikely to atiact Eisenhower’s appmval. Together, these 

formed raw material that could be tapped and packaged 

when the circumstances allowed, but their status was very 

uncertain othenvtse. 

’ Gladiew and Wolanin have written that: “NDE4 was styled 

a temporary, emergency Program. and a program specifically 

aimed at producing scientific manpower. However, it became in fact a Permanent and broader program well before 

its initial four-yea authorization expired.” Congress and the 

Colleges. Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1976. P. 9. 

6 P.L. 85-864, sec. 401. The section notes, however, that: “The 

Congress mdfirm the principle and declares that the states 

and local communities have and must retain wntrel over 

and Primary responsibility for public education.” 

B Rivlin. op. cit., p. 119. 

‘Gladieux and Wolanin, op. cit., P. 9. 

19 
Blank Page 
Chapter 4 

A Direct Federal Role Established: 

The Higher Education Acts of 

1963 and 1965 

I f the NDEA represented a transition to a new 

federal role in higher education, the last 20 years 

have witnessed the maturation of that role based 

upon: [I) a pervasive and broadening fiscal and 

regulatory presence, and (2) a new rationale for 

federal intervention-promoting broader educational access and equal opportunity. Major legislative innovations, based one upon another, passed 

in rapid succession in 1963, 1965, and 1972. Fiscal and political barriers to a more expansive federal role were eroded and overcome. V\thile it 

could be still written in 1975 that the federal role 

in higher education clearly remains “supplementary” ia tie ‘@Y~izc~ u/ tie s&&8 “’ a Lzzw 

university president noted in the same year that: 

We have just passed through a period 

in which the federal government took the 

major responsibility for the changes occurring in higher education; from Sputnik until the present [I9751 has been a 

“federal” period.2 

For the most part, the higher education titles of 

the NDEA provided aid to students, not institutions. Since the report of the Josephs Committee 

in 1957, however, support for institutional aid 

had been building as colleges came under increasing pressure from growing enrollments.3 In Fesponse to this situation, Sen. Joseph Clark (D-PA) 

attempted in 1958 to fashion a higher education 

construction aid bill along the lines of the HillBurton program of hospital construction grants.4 

21 
When this proved unworkable, he sought to expand provisions of the Housing Act of 1950, 

which already granted loans for the construction 

of college housing, to include loans for instructional facilities. This proposal died in the House 

in 1956 and was part of the housing legislation 

that was twice vetoed by President Eisenhower in 

1959. 

Similar legislation was included in President 

Kennedy’s omnibus education bill in 1961, but it, 

too, failed in the House when it became enmeshed 

in the religious controversy surrounding other 

portions of the Administration bi11.5 Offered sep 

arately in 1962, the bill nearly achieved passage, 

but the conference version again became caught 

up in the issues of race and religion as the 1962 

election neared, and the bill was rejected once 

more.= 

Despite this legacy of deadlock and failure, a 

renewed effort was made in 1963. The religious 

issue was more subdued that year. Antagonists on 

both sides of that issue, who nonetheless supported the federal aid concept in general, began 

to recognize the fatal consequences of failing to 

accommodate one another. Moreover, the religious controversy was considerably less applicable to higher education, for two reasons. First, the 

primary advocate for limiting aid only to public 

schools was the National Education Association, 

which represents elementary and secondary school 

teachers. Secon,d, a series of precedents had been 

established f&including private schools in programs of federal assistance to higher education, 

including the GI Bill, research funds, dormitory 

construction loans, and the NDEA. Thus, if the 

religious issue could be kept from spilling over 

fmm the elementary and secondary education 

arena, sufficient support for passage appeared to 

exist. 

This called for a conscious strategy to maximize 

support and avoid controversy. Thus, in contrast 

to 1961, the Kennedy Administration offered a 

higher education package independent of elementary and secondary education. The Congress went 

further and separated the construction aid pmposal from the other postsecondary education 

programs. As Sundquist observes, the categorical 

approach was strictly adhered to: 

the tacticians had learned. The National Defense Education Act had shown 

that special purpose aid, carefully designed, could be enacted at a time when 

general purpose aid could not be. A special purpose approach would make it 

possibleforthe tacticians to probe, jockey, 

negotiate, and compromise on a wide 

range of separable and lesser programs, 

and the antagonists could move quietly 

away from the irreconcilable positions.7 

Accordingly, the bill, as it passed, provided a 

five-year, $1.2 billion commitment of loans and 

grants to public and private colleges and universities for the construction of classmoms. The 

highly controversial scholarships were eliminated. With the active support of the education 

subcommittee chairmen and the new President, 

this proposal became one of the first major bills 

signed by President Johnson, leading him to refer 

to the 66th Congress as “the Education Congress 

of 1963.“8 

The Higher Education Facilities Act was, thus, 

“the first broad education bill enacted in the postwar period that did not have national defense 

overtones.“g Gladieux and Wolanin note that in 

debate over the bill, “the national defense rationale of federal higher education policy receded 

the goal of equal educational opportunity began to emerge.“‘~ A similar process affected the 

NDEA, which was reauthorized in 1961 and 

amended in 1963 and 1964. Its loan and graduate 

scholarship funds were increased, while its “defense-related” instructional focus was expanded 

to include areas in history, the humanities, and 

social science, “thus illustrating the strategy of 

moving toward large-scale aid through gradual 

expansion of special-purpose legislation.“” 

A New Rationale for Federal 

Involvement: Thzfy 

86 

hger Education Act 

Undergraduate scholarships, work-study assistance and federal aid to libraries were all separate 

categorical programs recommended by President 

Kennedy in his 1963 omnibus education package. 

The Congress broke that down into separate components and passed the construction aid bill that 

year. Work-study assistance to students from low 

income families was contained in the Equal Opportunity Act passed in 1964. All were repackaged in the Johnson Administration proposals 

that became the Higher Education Act of 1965.12 

22 
This act established a new federal charter in 

higher education-promoting equal opportunity 

through aid to students. It combined this with a 

substantial array of separate categorical programs 

for a variety of other specific purposes. All told, 

the act consisted of eight titles authorizing a total 

of $840 million. 

The centerpiece was a program of “Educational 

Opportunity Grants,” available to students of “exceptional financial need” in amounts up to $800. 

This was the first program of scholarships to undergraduates ever enacted by the Congress. It was 

supplemented by the transfer of the work-study 

program from the Office of Economic Opportunity 

to the Office of Education and by a new program 

of subsidized loans to students from low and middle income families. The administration had recommended replacing the direct loan program of 

the NDEA with interest-subsidized loans, but 

Congress included both in the Higher Education 

Act. 

Other titles in the act included categorical programs for grants to college libraries, matching 

grants to states for establishing community service programs in colleges and universities; aid to 

“developing institutions” (primarily black colleges in the south); Talent Search (to encourage 

talented students to attend college); the Teacher 

Corps; and an expansion of the 1963 construction 

grant program. Additional postsecondary categorical programs enacted in 1965 included the reauthorization and expansion of some provisions of 

the NDEA, expansion of the college housing program, and establishment of programs to further 

the humanities and to aid the deaf. It is no wonder 

that President Johnson remarked that Congress in 

1965, “did more for the wonderful cause of education in America than all the previous 176 regular sessions of Congress did, put togetber.“13 Ten 

years later, knowledgeable observers agreed that: 

The basic legislative charter of higher 

education policy is the Higher Education 

Act of 1965. The 1965 act is clearly 

distinguished by the breadth of the programs it initiated and by the size of the 

federal commitment it represents.‘4 

Despite the size and scope of these legislative 

initiatives and the legacy of controversy from 

which they emerged, passage of the bill proved 

surprisingly easy.15 A number of developments 

were responsible for this. The Democratic 

Congressional and Presidential landslides in the 

1964 election and the political strength and skill 

of President Johnson served to greatly enhance 

the position of aid supporters. Passage of the Civil 

Rights Act and the Elementary and Secondary 

Education Act had largely settled the difficult issues of race and religion in basic education. These 

had often spilled over into higher education in 

the past, greatly complicating Congressional consideration. Moreover, these other acts largely 

overshadowed the Higher Education Act, making 

it relatively less controversial. Finally, the rationale of equal educational opportunity proved to be 

a powerful vehicle for propelling increased federal activity. It appeared to define a new @nd legitimate federal role in higher education, one 

which, furthermore, had attained widespread 

support in other functional areas at the time. As 

Gladieux and Wolanin concluded: “The logjam in 

higher education policy with respect to scholarships was broken by latching on to the antipoverty theme of the times.“‘” 

FOOTNOTES 

“Ibid., p. 203. 

@Ibid., p. 205. 

’ Wolanin and Gladieu, “Political Culture,” op. cit., p. 184. ‘Ibid., p. 206. 

p Clark Kerr, Address to the Postsecondary Education Con- ‘Ibid., p. 210. 

vening Authority of the Institute for Educational Leadership 

(reprint], July 17, ,975, p. 6. 

BCongressional Quarterly, op. cit.. p. 1201. 

8President’sCommitteeonEducationBeyondtheHighSchoal. 

lo Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, op. cit., 

This was established in 1956 because the 1955 White House 

p. 11. 

Conference on Education involved only elementary and sec- 

” Sundquist, op. cit., p. 210. 

12 P. L. 89-329. 

ondary education. Although Josephs, a life insurance executive, and most of the committee were initially predisposed 

against substantial federal aid, they eventually recommended a major general aid program. Eisenhower opposed 

this. Sundquist, op. cit., pp. 195-196. 

‘Ibid., p. 197. 

I3 Quoted in Sundquist, op. cit., p. 216. 

I’ Wolanin and Gladieux, “Political Culture,” op. cit., p. 180. 

I5 Only 22 votes were cast against the bill in the House, only 

three in the Senate, Sundquist, op. cit., p. 216. 

I8 Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, op. cit., 

p. 12. 

23 
Blank Page 
Chapter 5 

Equal Opportunit Preeminent: The 1972 

Higher Ey &cation Amendments 

W. lth the passage of the comprehensive Higher 

Education Amendments of 1972,' the federal role 

in higher education was broadened and elaborated. Despite the unpretentious title of the act, it 

has been described as “the most sweeping aid to 

education bill ever enacted,“* and it established 

a basic charter for federal policy in higher education that continues today. Notably, it was largely 

a Congressional innovation, developed in reaction to proposals put forward by the, Nixon 

Administration and the higher educationinterest 

grOUpS. 

The centerpiece of the act is a program of Basic 

Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs) which 

reaffirms and extends the Congressional commitment to equal educational opportunity and reemphasizes the federal focus on aid to students 

rather than aid to institutions. This program transformed the precedent of equal opportunity scholarships in the 1965 act into an “entitlement” program? premised on the right of all qualified 

students to an advanced education. By greatly increasing federal spending for equal opportunity 

student assistance, it overshadowed the scholarship program of the 1965 act, which it redefined 

as “Supplemental Educational Opportunity 

Grants.“4 Finally, the new act placed new emphasis on educational innovation, signified by the 

transition from “higher education” to “postsecondary education.” As Norman Birnbaum writes: 

The 1972 amendments enable us to 

proceed toward the creation of a 

25 
learning society. . The idea of entitlement . formally enlarges the potential 

student body of institutions of learningby breaking with the convention of 

higher education only for adolescents 

or younger adults. In principle, every citizen is now entitled to higher educational opportunity.. The amendments 

formalize a new category, postsecondary 

education, and specifically include technical and vocational education and the 

proprietary sector.s 

Specifically, the BEOG program entitles any 

student in good standing to a basic grant of $1,600 

(previously $1,400), minus the amount that a student and family can reasonably be expected to 

contribute. This basic grant can then be supplemented, if necessary, with additional grants, loans, 

and work-study funds from programs established 

in the 1965 act and reauthorized in 1972. The 

1972 amendments also created a new program of 

“cost of education” allowances to colleges and 

universities based on the number of federally 

aided students at each institution and their degree 

of dependence on federal subsidies. This program 

was considered by Congress as a complement to 

the BEOGs, in recognition of the fact that charges 

to students generally cover only a portion of the 

cost of instruction.B In addition to these two major 

innovations, the 1972 amendments also (1) reauthorized basic categorical programs of the 1965 

act, such as community services, library improvement, developing institutions, and improvement 

of graduate education; (2) established new programs to improve occupational education and 

counseling, aid community colleges, assist faltering institutions, and promote continuing education; and (3) reorganized the federal educational 

establishment through creation of an educational 

division within HEW, composed of the Office ,of 

Education and a new research-oriented National 

Institute of Education (NIE). 

THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT 

The political environment in which the 1972 

act evolved was a complicated one, a fact which 

greatly influenced the policy development process. The higher education policy subsystem had 

become firmly established in the 1960s but was 

undergoing considerable change in the early 

1970s. A new Administration wiih strong new 

policy preferences occupied the executive branch. 

A new chairman had assumed leadership of the 

Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee; Sen. 

Claiborne Pell (D-RI) took pride in being an “idea 

man” and was suspicious of the higher education 

lobby, concerned about their lack of innovative 

policy proposals.’ On the House Select Subcommittee on Higher Education, the small group of 

policy experts and entrepreneurs was in a state of 

flux as members changed positions and alliances 

within the subcommittee. The higher education 

interest groups were developing their organizational capacity and becoming more active. Finally, along with these new actors, a number of 

new approaches toward higher education policy 

were gaining circulation, thus creating an mmsual degree of flexibility in the policy-initiation 

process. 

The higher education interest groups orchestrated the initial dialogue for a new approach to 

federal policy in their field. The constituent 

groups had agreed among themselves to push for 

* program of no-strings capitation grants to colleges and universities that would provide money 

to each, proportionate to its enrollment. They 

strongly sought a change in emphasis from student aid to aid for educational institutions. 

The power and institutional presencq of these 

groups were growing in the late 1960s and early 

1970s. In response to the federal program initiatives of the 1960% they were increasing their activity and developing their organizational resources (see Table 4). As Lauriston King observed 

in his study of the higher education lobby: 

The changes that occurred in the 

Washington higher education community through the 1960s were rarely the 

product of initiatives taken by the association representatives, but were instead 

responses to new federal policies and to 

constituent pressures. At the heart of the 

changes were structural and organizational modifications and transactions. 

These included the proliferation of representatives from different parts of higher 

education; the creation of informal and 

quasi-formal structures for promoting 

common interests: the rise of a cadre of 

political specialists; and the shift in significant policymaking responsibility from 

association membership to more politi26 
Major Associations: 

National Association of State Universities 

and Land-Grant Colleges 

Association of American Colleges 

Association of American Universities 

American Association of State Colleges 

and Universities 

American Association of Community and 

Junior Colleges 

American Council on Education 

Special Purpose Associations: 

Association of American Medical 

Colleges 

Council of Graduate Schools 

Council of Protestant Colleges and 

Universities 

Council for the Advancment of Small 

Colleges 

American Association of Colleges of 

Teacher Education 

Small Associations and State Systems: 

College and University Divlslon, National 

Catholic Education Association 

State Colleges of South Dakota 

University of California 

State Colleges of California 

Association of Jesuit Colleges and 

Universities’ 

Division of Educatlonal Services of the 

Lutheran Council 

Associated Colleges of the Mldwest 

East Central College Consortia 

College Service Bureau 

10071 130 1947 1947 

1915 779 IQ47 1968 

1900 50b 1962 1969 

1961 

1920 

1918 

314 1962 

875 1939 

I,39gc 1918 

1967 

1965 

1962 

1876 1116 1965 1970 

1960 324 1962 1962 

1958 230e 1960 None 

1956 140 1956 None+ 

1917 

Table 4 

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON REPRESENTATION IN 

HIGHER EDUCATION 

Association or Office 

(number of 

Founded institutions) 

Federal 

MemberShiD Washlncton Grants 

Off i& Program 

Opened Began 

a Founded as the Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges. 

b Includes two Canadian institutions. 

c Institutional members. 1974. 

a Includes 16 Canadian institutions. 

= Disbanded, 1970. 

‘ Until 1970, Jesuit Education Association. 

SOURCE: Lauriston King, The Washington Lobbyists for Higher Educatti, Lexington. MA. D.C. Heath, 1975, p. 112. 

863 1959 1969 

228 IQ29 

6 1965 

9 1960 

19 1968 

1965 

1960 

1968 

20 

44 

12 

7 

114 

1962 1962 

1967 1967 

1966 1966 

1968 1968 

1969 1969 

27 
tally knowledgeable and sensitive rapresentatives based in WashingtonP 

This enhanced organizational presence took 

two forms. 

On the one hand, there was an efflorescence of 

special Washington representatives for individual 

schools and small groups of schools, as well as 

new member-servicing staffs within the established educational associations. Both of these developments were designed to help subscribers 

utilize federal grants and programs.9 

On the other hand, the major higher education 

organizations greatly enhanced their participation in the policy process. Even before their energetic attempts to affect the 1972 act, such behavior surfaced during their participation in the 

struggle over the 1970 education budget.‘O 

Although this growing federal orientation 

among higher education institutions and associations largely originated in response to the new 

federal programs of the Great Society, it gained 

additional impetus as the financial problems of 

higher education became increasingly serious 

during the late 1960s. Studies spoke in terms of 

The New Depression in Higher Education.‘L This 

is particularly true of the private liberal arts colleges which could not depend upon the states for 

assistance. Many turned to the federal government instead. 

Perhaps the most universal response 

[to the financial problems of colleges], 

however, was to look to the federal treasury for help. Lingering doubts about 

accepting federal money for fear of government control--once a strong deterrent 

among many smaller, church-related institutions-had all but disappeared. “On 

the question of federal aid, everybody 

seems to be running to the same side of 

the boat,” as one college president put it. 

“The only place the money can come 

from is the federal government-that’s 

inevitable,” said the President of Harvard.‘* 

The case of these small colleges is illustrative 

of eroding attitudinal constraints on greater federal involvement in education with the evolution 

of time. Confronted with the combined forces of 

(1) adaptation to the federal goverment incrementally broadening role in higher education policy, 

and (2) severe financial difficulties that often 

threatened institutional survival itself, many private colleges abandoned their opposition to a 

greater federal role and actively sought assistance. 

The transformation in the AAC’s [Association of American Colleges] tone and 

posture toward political action is an impressive indication of the more general 

trend toward abandoning the aloof, almost condescending attitude toward politics that had pervaded much of higher 

education in earlier years. The change in 

the AAC is particularly significant for its 

member colleges were a major force in 

reiterating warnings about the perils of 

federal intervention as a consequence of 

federal aid. Pressing financial problems 

worked rapidly to erode this long and 

cherished ideological heritage.13 

THE POLICY PROCESS 

The massive prograuY4 of institutional aid that 

was sought by the education lobby was rejected 

by the Congress and Administration alike, however. Most governmental decisionmakers, even 

among the educational specialists on the Congressional committees, generally favored a continued 

reliance on the student aid approach for reasons 

of both educational policy and intergovernmental 

integrity. Many ware influenced by educational 

and economic analysts who suggested that more 

emphasis should be placed on the educational 

marketplace, fortified by federal student assistance. This approach would rely on student preferences to determine which institutions received 

governmental aid. 

Direct aid to institutions, on the other hand, 

was thought to simply underwrite and reinforce 

existing institutional practices. Although helping 

to maintain postsecondary institutions generally, 

it demonstrated little regard for the primary national objectives identified in the past, and it violated the surviving consensus on the intergovernmental allocation of functions. By and large, 

national policymakers remained supportive of a 

secondary federal role in higher education-including federal stimulus of certain national objectives, but with major responsibility for institutional support residing in the states: 

28 
a frequently voiced argument against 

enrollment-based institutional aid was 

that it seemed to imply that the federal 

government would assume a major share 

of the basic support of higher education, 

a responsibility traditionally left to the 

states.‘5 

In 1971, the Nixon Administration submitted to 

Congress a proposal requiring that aid to students 

be more strictly targeted on the basis of need, 

though it limited total aid even to these students 

to $1,400 per year. In addition, more emphasis 

was placed on loans than on grants, and higher 

education categoric& were to be consolidated 

into a National Foundation for Higher Education. 

This proposal was roundly criticized in Congress from all sides-for its limited budget, its 

heavy reliance on loans, and its inattention to the 

needs of hardpressed schools and middle-class 

students. Rep. John Brademas (D-IN), for example, 

characterized the bill as one written by the then 

Budget Burea~,‘~ which was known for its penurious behavior. In general, there was simply a 

great deal of distrust and suspicion of the Administration. This was exacerbated by the circumstances under which the proposal was developed-largely in the White House itself, with 

considerable secrecy and relatively little outside 

input. There was also much feeling among 

Congressional specialists that abstract policy concepts had been too hastily and clumsily applied.17 

As a result, the bill received little support from 

either side of the aisle in Congress. 

The Administration’s legislative failure and its 

aloof stance left to Congress the task of structuring 

a consensus. In the Senate, this task was largely 

assumed by Labor and Public Welfare Committee 

Chairman Claiborne Pell and his staff. Sen. Pell 

advanced a proposal reflecting his strong conviction that higher education should be available to 

all as a matter of right. This concept took shape 

legislatively in the form of a new program of Basic 

Educational Opportunity Grants, which combined elements of the Administration approach 

wjti other ideas in a much largerprogram. These 

grants were to be available in amounts up to 

$1,200, depending on family income, and could 

be supplemented with existing loan programs. 

Sen. Pell and others had become disenchanted 

with the higher education lobby, viewing its constitutional aid proposal as unimaginative and selfserving.‘* However, a cost of education allowance 

was attached to the basic grants in order to cover 

costs of instruction, beyond basic tuition fees, incurred by schools. So composed, the proposal 

passed the Senate easily. Committee members had 

reached a “gentlemanly agreement” on the bill, 

combining their ties to specific categorical programs folded into it with more generalized support of the basic concept.‘g 

While the Senate completed action on its bill, 

leading members of the House Special Subcommittee on Education remained divided in their 

approach. The Subcommittee Chair, Rep. Edith 

Green (D-OR), strongly supported a program of 

institutional grants. Having become convinced of 

the serious financial problems facing higher education, she allied herself with the education 

lobby. 

Two ranking Republican members, Reps. Albert 

Quie (R-MN) and John Dellenback (R-OR), were 

also originally attracted to this position, due to its 

no-strings aid approach and its promised relief for 

threatened private colleges. However, along with 

the Administration, they eventually came to support provisions similar to those in the Senate bill, 

with targeting on need plus cost of education allowances to aid private colleges. An important 

consideration in this decision was a developing 

fear that institutional aid would become a politically uncontrollable spending program: i 

Quie felt that enrollment-based institutional aid could easily become an expensive and inflexible commitment by 

the federal government. The analogy that 

he and his staff frequently applied was 

the impact aid program, which made 

grants to local school districts based on 

their enrollments of elementary and secondary school students from families employed by the federal government. A generation of Republican and Democratic 

administrations had struggled unsuccessfully to repeal or amend impact aid 

and distribute the large number of dollars it represented in some more rational 

way. Capita&m gmnts, Quk femd 

would be as immovable and irrational as 

impact aid.‘O 

The basic differences in approach which had 

emerged in the House Special Subcommittee on 

Education were never fully resolved during the 

29 
course of House deliberation and passage of a 

postsecondary education bill. A rather unusual 

alliance on behalf of the student aid-cost of instruction approach gradually developed between 

Reps. Quie and Brademas. However, the final 

House bill largely reflected Rep. Green’s preference for general institutional aid. 

Most Committee members were not firmly committed to this approach. As in the Senate, however, inclusion of members’ priority projects in 

the final legislation gave them “personal stakes” 

in the bill sufficient to allow passage. For example, Brademas’ concept of the National Institute 

of Education to perform evaluation and research 

was added to the bill. Similarly, Rep. Roman Pucinski (D-IL] obtained inclusion of occupational 

education and ethnic studies programs.” 

This outcome was altered during the HouseSenate conference. The combination of a divided 

House delegation and a united Senate delegation 

resulted in resolution of the student aid-institutional aid question along the lines of the Senate 

approach. As is commonly the case in Congressional deliberations, personal factors entered importantly into the decisionmaking process as 

well. Chairman Carl Perkins (D-KY) of the House 

Education and Labor Committee, firmly joined the 

Quie-Brademas alliance after Mrs. Green charged 

from the House floor that House conferees were 

selling out to the Senate. Personal antagonisms 

may thus have helped undermine support for institutional aid. 

As reported from conference and finally passed, 

the 1972 Education Amendments reflected the 

basic thrust of the Senate position, combining 

need-oriented student aid with cost of instruction 

allowances. Through a diiicult and fragile exercise of Congressional restraint, a more cowentional federal aid approach was retained. Gladieux and Wolanin summarize the outcome as 

follows: 

The 1972 act reaffirms the traditional 

boundary between federal and state roles 

in the support of higher education. The 

basic responsibility resides with the states 

while the federal government provides 

funds to fill specified national needs. 

Thus Congress pulled up short of a plan 

that amounted to federal revenue sharing 

with institutions of higher educationacross-the-board general operating support distributed on the basis of enrollments. It was unwilling to underwrite 

the entire system without reference to 

any national objective other than praserving and strengthening educational 

institutions. Instead, Congress decided 

on a program that would help institutions only in such a way as to advance 

the purpose identified above as the hallmark of the act, equal opportunity for 

higher education. The responsibility fw 

general support of institutions, it was decided, should continue to rest with the 

statwzg 

FOOTNOTES 

‘P.L. 92-318. 

* Congressional Quarterly. Congress and the Nation, Volume 

III, 1969-72, Washington, DC. Congressional Quarterly, 

1973, p. sm. 

J Although founded on the concept of entitlement to higher 

education, the program is not a “true” entitlement because 

its overall funding is subject to the normal process of 

Congressional appropriations. Thus, if qualified demand exceeds moneys appropriated, grants may be adjusted downward. The rapid growth of the program, however, suggests 

a reluctance to deny expectations so created. 

’ 1977 outlays for BEOGs totaled $1.387 billion. compared 

with supplementary and work-study grants combined of 

$620 million. Outlays for BEOGs in 1979 are estimated to be 

$1.936 billion (not including proposed additions in lieu of 

tuition tax credits] vs. $762 million for the 1965 programs. 

s Norman Bimbaum. “Higher Education and the Federal Govemment,” Educational Record 57, Fall 1976. p. 227. 

B This program, while authorized, has ncd been funded. 

’ Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress ond the Colleges, op. cit., 

““. 89.111. 

B King, op. cit., p. 110. 

*As King describes it: “In a word, the basic service the higher 

education representatives provide for members is aid in 

grantsmanship, the increasingly organized and systematic 

effort to reap the harvest of federal policies directed toward 

higher education.” Ibid., p. 46. 

‘O One report described this unusual 1970 effort as follows: 

“The council’s strategy is to ‘talk to key people on committees’ about legislation in which them is ACE interest. If there 

is something of interest to the council happening in a cornmittee. Wilson said, he often will ‘get on the telephone’ to 

college presidents in the states of key committee members 

and get them to call their respective Senators or Representatives. Callege presidents ‘don’t need as much pmmpting’ to contact the federal government as they did a few 

years ago. Wilson said. ‘Since the federal government has 

now become their prime source of funds, they’ve much more 

savvy than they used to have.’ ” Lucille Eddinger. “Washington Pressures/American Council on Education,” National 

Journal, April 25. 1970. pp. 887-888. 

30 
‘1 Earl Cbeit, The New Depression in Higher Education, New 

York. NY, McGraw-Hill, 1971. 

‘2 Gladieux and Wolanin. Congress and Colleges, op. cit., p. 

22. 

I3 King, op. cit.. p. 89. 

“Glad&x and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, op. 

p. 37. This section is based largely on their account. 

cit., 

31 
Blank Page 
Chapter 6 

A Growing Regulatory Presence 

S. mm the passage of the 1972 act, the focus of. 

policy debate in higher education has largely 

shifted from finance to regulation. Reautborization of higher education legislation in 1976 and 

in 1980 consisted mainly of extensions and refinements of the basic structure of higher education aid established in the Education Amendments of 1972. While major new initiatives, like 

tuition tax credits, and radical changes in the existing loan system have been proposed, nose has 

passed the Congress to date.’ 

On the other hand, concern over a variety of 

federal regulations and grant conditions has increasingly become the subject of speeches, articles, editorials, and reports. The programs and 

problems involved are many and varied. They 

range from environmental and safety laws affecting broad sectors of the economy to grant conditions aimed specifically at higher education. 

Complaints range from increasing red tape and 

the administrative costs of regulatory compliance 

to the distortion of academic priorities and erosion of academic freedom. Before examining these 

issues in detail, however, it is useful first to gain 

some historical perspective on federal regulations 

and higher education. 

EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL 

REGULATION 

As previously mentioned, the earliest land 

grants for higher education entailed practically no 

33 
federal regulations 01 prescriptions whatsoever. 

To a considerable extent, they were maladministered and misspent. The Merrill Act originated 

what became an evolutionary trend in federal conditions on grants-in-aid. Its provisions limited 

spending only to specific purposes and required 

submission of annual reports on expenditures. 

Although poorly implemented and enforced, these 

principles established important precedents which 

survived challenge on the House floor in 1864. 

Rainsford explains that: 

During the debate on the 1864 amendment, Congressman William Holman of 

Indiana proposed an additional amendment whereby the states would individually determine whether they would apply the funds to education in agriculture 

and mechanical arts or to some other 

such purposes as their respective legislatures might designate. The thrust of 

his amendment was to establish local 

control of the endowment fund for any 

purpose. Morrill responded with the 

comment: “As I understand it, the object 

of the original donation was to enable the 

industrial classes of the country to obtain 

a cheap, solid, and substantial education. 

I trust the House will not begin this early 

to fritter away the whole purpose of that 

act.” Congressman Thaddeus Stevens of 

Pennsylvania supported Merrill in emphasizing the national character of his 

act. As he said, “When the original bill 

was framed it was intended to be national and to establish a national system 

of education, bestowing national property for that purpose.“z 

Another exception to the general absence of 

federal conditions cm the use of early grants was 

a civil rights provision attached to the second 

Merrill Act of 1890. According to this provision, 

state college systems that discriminated against 

black students were ineligible for federal landgrant college funds unless separate and “equitable” facilities were provided. Rainsford underscores the importance of this early regulation, 

writing: 

In many ways the most striking feature 

of the Merrill-McComos Act was the 

guarantee that Negroes would benefit 

from its provisions. Section 1 of the 

1890 act provided that no money would 

be paid to a state or territory “where a 

distinction of race or color is made in the 

admission of students.” Separate facilities, however, between which the funds 

were “equitably divided” would satisfy 

this provision. On the basis of pop 

u&ion, the Negro has not received a proportionate share of these federal grants. 

The funds appropriated under the 

1690 act have, however, provided a significant portion of the money spent on 

Negro e@cation in the south through the 

1930s.3 

The great bulk of early difficulties concerning 

governmental controls and higher education, 

however, involved neither the federal government 

nor grants-in-aid. The states have much more 

power in this area and have been more active, 

intruding on occasion even into matters of staffing and curriculum. Such acts by the federal government have necessarily been few. Abuses during the McCarthy era and the attempt to use 

federal aid cutoffs to halt student protests against 

the Vietnam War perhaps qualify as similarly intrusive federal interventions. 

The pattern of federal regulation has been far 

more mundane than these overtly politicd threats 

to the independence of higher education. In fact, 

existing major programs continue to exclude open 

federal interference in curriculum and staffing.4 

As with federal spending programs, regulatory involvement began cautiously. 

The immediate postwar programs of federal involvement in higher education-research and the 

GI Bill-have generally not been a major source 

of conflict over regulatory intrusion. Until recently, at least, colleges and universities have 

been relatively satisfied in their relationship with 

the Veterans Administraticnx5 In research, early 

steps were taken to protect the autonomy of educational institutions and disciplines from direct 

federal interference through the use of semiautonomous scientific panels for distributing research 

grants. While panels have been criticized for narrowness and the research priorities flowing from 

federal grants, more direct interference has not 

been a serious problem. This may change as research restrictions multiply (recent regulations 

range from the experimental use of human sub34 
jects to recombinant DNA research); but, up to 

this point, the main problem with research funds 

has been the resultant degree of dependence on 

the federal government. This makes recipient institutions vulnerable to the later application of 

across-the-board regulations, like affirmative action, which apply to a wide range of federal funds. 

In the 196Os, the issue of federal intrusion became less ideological but more real. At that time, 

the major federal regulatory involvement was on 

behalf of civil rights, as the federal government 

challenged the segregated state college systems in 

the south. Because many states had so abused 

their independence, strong federal actions were 

accorded legitimacy. 

While less salient then, other regulatory issues 

were also beginning to develop. As the number 

and complexity of programs proliferated, administrative costs and burdens on educational institutions grew also. Moreover, the shift in student 

aid to emphasize equal opportunity placed increasing limits on institutional flexibility in this 

area. Summing up these problems, one report at 

the time complained that federal programs entailed “distortion of academic development, disruption of institutional integrity, and the imposition of burdensome, sometimes inconsistent, 

administrative regulations.“8 Nonetheless, these 

concerns were overshadowed by higher education’s thirst for additional federal funds. Even the 

private colleges, the group most wary of federal 

controls, halted their organized opposition to federal assistance and joined the quest for more 

lllO*W.’ 

a greater Congressional willingness to intervene 

in educational policy. Gladieux and Wolanin emphasize this aspect of the 1972 Education Amendments, stating: 

[T)his act also indicate[d) the direction of change . [including) a broadening of the scope of permissible federal 

action that is not seen to compromise the 

role of the states or to constitute “undue” 

federal interference or control. . .tT)he 

act places a special stress on accountability of institutions of higher education 

for their stewardship of federal higher 

education programs. In addition, the 

theme of innovation and reform in higher 

education is quite notable. Underlying 

the 1972 act seems to be the perception 

that much of what is being provided by 

higher education is ineffective, uninteresting, and hideboundP 

Reflecting this emphasis on innovation are: 

. the increased reliance placed on student 

aid-allowing students to “vote with their 

feet;” 

. promotion of “postsecondary education” to 

“encourage and in some ways mandate a 

broadening of the educational mainstream to 

include types of students and institutions 

that have generally been excluded or ‘given 

second-class status in the past;“‘O and 

l the authorization of the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education. 

REGULATION: MAJOR ISSUE 

OF THE 70s 

In contrast, by the 197Os, federal regulation of 

higher education had become as, or more important than the question of more federal funding. 

Gladieux and Wolanin observe that: 

A second factor contributing to regulatory problems in the 1970s was the accumulation of new 

regulations that apply to broad sectors of social 

action, several of which are commonly referred to 

as the “new social regulation.” In contrast to the 

bulk of business-oriented regulations in the past, 

these apply equally to institutions of higher leaming. Included in this category are: 

Institutions of higher education are no 

longer looking to Washington for salvation as they may have been five years 

ago. Many of them are more concerned 

today about protection from potential 

harm at the hands of government.8 (authors’ emphasis) 

l Equal Pay--Equal Pay Act of 1963. 

. Equal Employment Opportunity-Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 

l Affirmative Action--Executive Order 11246, 

issued in 1965, as amended by Executive Order 11375 to include discrimination on basis 

of sex, 1967. 

Several developments contributed to this situa- l Age Discrimination-Employment Act of 

tion. First, in the 1960s and early 1970s there was 1967, as amended. 

35 
l Wage and Hour Standards-Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, as amended (FLSA). 

l Unemployment Compensation-Social Security Act, Employment Security Amendments, 1970. 

l Social Security Tax Increases-Social Security Act, Employment Security Amendments, 

1970. 

l Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)- 

Health Maintenance Organization Act of 

1973. 

l Occupational Safety and Health-Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. 

l Environmental Protection-Environmental 

Protection Agency regulations to implement 

several laws. 

l Access to the Handicapped-Section 504 of 

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” 

According to Change magazine, the costs to institutions of such federally mandated requirements, “have increased ten-to-twentyfold in the 

last decade, rising much faster than total revenue~“~* (see Graph 3). 

Finally, in addition to such across-the-board 

regulations, a series of new regulations and grant 

conditions have been passed which specifically 

affect higher education. These include the Family 

Educational Rights and Privacy Act (Buckley 

Amendment), dealing with access and distribution of student records, and Title IX of the 1972 

Education Amendments, prohibiting sex discrimination. While intended to correct genuine abuses 

or to promote social change, such provisions have 

also created some difficult administrative problems, which have been exacerbated by institutional dependence on the grants used to enforce 

these conditions. 

The result has been a massive outcry against 

federal regulations affecting higher education, As 

the President of Ohio State observed: “A fundamental change is taking place in the relationship 

between Washington and the nation’s colleges 

and universities. the reality is undeniable: the 

federal presence is everywhere in the university.“‘3 

Four problems in particular have received attention. 

1. Federal regulations challenge academic freedom and the merit system. Affirmative action provisions have been particularly criticized in this 

regard. For example, Richard Lester asserts in 

“The Equal Pay Boondoggle” that: 

The extension of the Equal Pay Act to 

executives and professionals has created 

perplexing and disturbing problems, especially for university faculty. Some 

of the Wage and Hour staff (of the U.S. 

Department of Labor] are trying to force 

universities to alter their merit systems 

to conform closely to the industrial and 

civil service models. Such a system 

would eliminate any reward for individual differences in quality of teaching, quality of research, or quality of 

other contributions to achievement of the 

institution’s mission.‘4 

Another affirmative action provision that has 

been singled out for its intrusive effects on higher 

education is Executive Order 11246 [amended by 

E.O. 11375 to prohibit sex discrimination). This 

requires that all federal contractees agree not to 

discriminate in employment and that they take 

“affirmative action” to assure this.15 A balanced 

and comprehensive study on the effects of federal 

regulations at George Washington University concluded that: 

Of all the laws and regulations affecting the university, Executive Order 11246 

has had the greatest and broadest effect, 

in part because of the complexity and 

scope of the order itself. The order ;equires collection of data on all employees, utilization analysis, projection of 

goals and timetables for hiring members 

of minority groups and women, and the 

development of systems to monitor hiring procedures and practices. No other 

regulation requires the development of 

such an extensive management system 

and such extensive modification of policies and procedures. (fit is clear that 

hiring procedures and practices have 

changed. Employment openings are published in appropriate ways, and some departments are making special efforts to 

include qualified women and members 

of minority groups in their applicant 

pool.‘6 

In hyperbolic terms, the President of Rockford 

College complained that: 

Government has imposed a policy 

which says that academic competence 

36 
Graph 3 

TRENDS IN COSTS OF IMPLEMENTING 

FEDERALLY MANDATED SOCIAL PROGRAMS: 1965-75 

Combined Costs at Six institutions Social Security 

9 Equal Employment Opportunity 

Occupational Safety and Health 

Minimum Wage 

l Environmental Protection 

Unemployment Compensation 

1 

Pensions 

0 6~~7 E.T- mg 6870 ~~71 71.~ ~2.73 73.7, 74.~5 Wage and Salary Controls 

Source: American Council on Education. 

Health Maintenance Organizations 

37 
shall no longer be the supreme determining factor in faculty appointments. Academic freedom is now a thing of the past, 

and federal subsidy has been the bludgeon employed to demolish it.” 

2. Federal programs and regulations are costly 

to administer. The study by the ACE indicates that 

the costs of compliance with federally mandated 

programs range from 1% to 496 of the total operating budgets of higher education institutions.‘* 

Change magazine estimated in 1975 that “This 

year’s total cost to higher education institutions 

of federally mandated programs alone is $2 

billion-or the equivalent of the total of all voluntary givings to institutions of higher education.“‘g 

The programs identified by various sources as 

most expensive have been social security, affirmative action programs, OSHA, environmental requirements, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 

(access to the handicapped). While compliance 

costs from these programs vary widely, ranging 

from architectural modifications to data collection and reporting, the ACE report concludes that 

“The residual effects of implementing federal social, manpower, science and tax policies have a 

greater financial impact on higher education than 

do coherent federal education policies.“20 

3. Federal programs distort academic priorities. 

This has long been a concern with regard to federally funded research. It now denotes a broader 

concern that, given the scarcity of educational reSCJUTC~S, compliance with new regulations diverts 

precious educational funds from academic to administrative uses. Ohio State President Harold 

Enarson charged that: 

The burden of intense regulation also 

forces the university to bear a second 

kind of cost-debilitation, These exercises in compliance reverberate 

throughout the organization, consuming 

our time and energy and diverting us 

from other tasks.2’ 

Likewise, Harold Soloman reports in the George 

Washington Study that “if the costs of compliance 

continue to increase, academic quality will certainly have to suffer sometime in the future.“22 

4. Subjecting an entire institution to grant conditions attached to a single program is improper. 

Former Yale President Kingman Brewster has 

spoken out against this practice at length. In an 

address to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, he said: 

I do object to the notion that the receipt 

of a federal dollar for some purposes subjects a private institution to federal regulation and surveillance in all its activities. Thus if we are to receive support 

for physics, let’s say, we must conform 

to federal policies in the admission of 

women to the art school, in women’s athletics facilities, and in the recruitment of 

wrxnen and minorities, not just in the 

federally supported field, but throughout 

the university. It is not sufficient to 

say that since the government is paying 

the bills, therefore it has a right to specify 

the product. This would be understandable if all that is being offered were spacial support for the program of special 

federal interest. To say, however, that 

support for all general educational activities of national importance will be withheld unless a school enlarges the program the government is particularly 

. interested in, is to use the threat of cutting off aid for one purpose in order to 

accomplish another. This is coinstitutionally objectionable, even in the name 

of a good cause such as “affirmative action.“z3 

Given the traditionally decentralized structure of 

higher education, this is viewed as particularly 

objectionable, especially since the federal role differs greatly among the component units.24 

This practice has become even more attenuated 

with the growing reliance on student assistance. 

For example, Title IX antisex discrimination regulations issued in 1975 included as “recipient institutions” schools whose only federal aid consisted of students getting federal assistance. The 

president of one such college objected that this 

was “as if the government were to nationalize a 

supermarket because someone had bought groceries there with a Social Security check.“z5 

While these critiques of the federal role have 

received considerable attention, there is less than 

total agreement within the higher education community of the true extent of the regulatory problem. To begin with, the goals of these regulations 
are generally recognized as worthy, and many 

have been directed at genuine problems in the 

field. The existence of a segregated educational 

system in the south, for instance, clearly warranted extensive federal intervention in that case. 

Similarly, while redress can be expensive, it is 

not clear that colleges and universities should be 

granted favored treatment if they violate pollution 

and safety regulations. 

The use of affirmative action regulations has 

also been defended. One author maintains that 

even the data of regulatory critics establishes the 

existence of “a pattern of discrimination” in the 

hiring of women in higher education. She notes 

that, “comparing 1968-69 to 1972-73 data 

. show a decline in the percentage of female 

faculty in four-year and two-year colleges,” although, “the increase in female PhDs would warrant increased hiring at least at the beginning 

level.“*6 She concludes that “The five-year history 

of affirmative action in American universities can 

only be characterized as a wholesale retreat.“” 

There is considerable recognition that the failings of higher education have at least contributed 

to increased federal regulation. For example, Stephen K. Bailey has argued: 

The surest way to guarantee a continuation and extension of the kinds of government regulation we do not like is 

to pretend that we are free from sin and 

that in any case government has no right 

to invade our bastions of sacred immunity even when we are unjust. Furthermore, if we are foolhardy enough to assume that higher education has mom 

troops than the government in any direct 

confrontation, that we need not be sensitive to emerging norms of social justice, 

or need not attempt to put our own 

houses in order, then we will get what 

we deserve. The government will ultimately run us over, to the sound of applause from public bystanders.** 

And the former head of the ACE argues that 

higher education needs: 

a basic commitment [to self regulation]. We cannot limit or reduce the 

scope of governmental intervention unless we have developed regulatory processes within our institutions and among 

institutions to which we are willing to 

ascribe authority to monitor institutional 

policy and practicexzs 

In addition to these reflections on the justification for regulation, there has also been some 

reevaluation of their total effect. Some observers 

suggest that there has been a tendency to exaggerate the claims of regulatory difficulties through 

hyperbole and rhetorical flourish. For example, 

while original estimates of the cost of making college facilities accessible to disabled students 

ranged from $3 billion to $8 billion, higher education administrators now admit that these figures may have been greatly exaggerated, in part 

because of misunderstandings of federal requirements.” Charles Saunders, director of the ACE’s 

Office of Governmental Relations, speaking of the 

literature on federal regulation in general, warned 

that it: 

represents anecdotal, undocumented 

complaints about the evils of government 

interference and lacks disciplined examination of the federal role on the individual campus. Initially the rhetoric 

may have helped call attention to the 

problem, but now . [t]he need is for 

accurate diagnosis.s’ 

Finally, careful studies of the regulatory issue 

have illustrated the positive impact of re&lations 

as well. The study of regulatory effects at George 

Washington University observed that: 

(questionnaires completed by academic 

department chairmen showed that some 

believed open advertisement had resulted in better qualified applicants than 

the department had previously attracted. 

At least three other areas have benefited: (1) Salaries of men and women faculty members were equalized in 1973. 

Annual reviews are conducted to ensure 

that discrimination in salaries does not 

recur. (2) In response to Title IX, the 

university has provided for a strong intercollegiate athletic program for women. 

(3) A beginning has been made in making physical facilities accessible to the 

handicapped. Although not demonstrable, perhaps most important of all is the 

assessment that, despite good intentions, 

many changes required by federal law 

39 
would not have occurred without the 

law.32 

The Politics of Regulation 

This high degree of controversy over the federal 

regulatory role necessarily raises questions about 

the enactment of these regulatory policies. Were 

they developed deliberately or haphazardly, 

openly or obscurely, bureacratically, congressionally or through group demands? Although the 

legislative history of many regulations is sketchy, 

some studies, particularly on the regulation of sex 

discrimination on higher education, are available.” Thus, elements of the politics of regulation 

can be pieced together. 

Across-the-Board Regulations 

The ACE argues forcefully that across-the-board 

regulations cause increasingly serious administrative and fiscal problems for institutions of 

higher learning.34 Yet, under the best of circumstances, it would prove difficult to anticipate and 

resolve such problems. By their very nature, such 

regulations affect broad areas of activity indiscriminately. This broad scope precludes detailed 

consideration of a regulation’s impact on specific 

areas like higher education, even though it may 

be sufficiently distinct to warrant it. The effect 

upon higher education is only incidental to the 

general regulatory aims involved. Accordingly, 

the political debate on such regulations is likely 

to occur on a similarly general plane. It can be 

expected that legislative consideration will focus 

on the universal effects of such regulation. 

These inherent problems are exacerbated, however, by the frequent absence of careful consideration given even the general effects of acrossthe-board regulations. When they are proposed, 

Congress often seems to react to such regulations 

as moral issues of opportunities for position-taking, rather than as specific legislative enactments 

with important operational ramifications. This 

manner of policymaking certainly characterized 

several environmental enactments.35 It seems also 

to have occurred with rehabilitation regulations. 

A recent ACIR report found that “The provision 

prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped in federally assisted programs was 

subjected to no public hearings and few floor debates of any substance prior to its incorporation 

into the Rehabilitation Services Act of 1973.“36 

Reviewing several other such programs, the report concludes that there is a “failure of Congress 

to consider the full consequence of general national policy conditions.“3T 

A similar shortcoming appears evident in the 

adoption by Congress of other grant conditions. 

In the case of sex discrimination, Jo Freeman 

writes that: 

[Representative Bella Abzug (D-NY)] 

makes it a policy to carry in her floor file 

a standard antisex-discrimination 

amendment which she introduces into 

every bill she can. Abzug has encouraged 

others to do so in their committees, and 

the condition of similar provisions to the 

Revenue Sharing, Health Manpower, and 

Nurses Training Acts was largely due to 

this semiautomatic respon~e.~~ 

Likewise, a study of the Age Discrimination Act 

of 1975 concluded: 

By and large, members of both Houses 

proceeded with the consideration of ADA 

in haste, causing the bill’s poor craftsmanship. As Sen. Thomas Eagleton 

(D-MO) and others interpret the legislative history, “not only was there no record showing discrimination origintllly, 

. . . problems of age discrimination . 

should not have been addressed in such 

a broad ~wipe.“~~ 

Clearly, such “semiautomatic” procedures are not 

conducive to the careful examination on a regulation’s consequences for the specific program involved, even if the provision should prove to be 

warranted. 

Direct Regulation 

Inaddition to across-the-board regulations, severa1 grant conditions have been developed in recent years which apply specifically to higher education. One example of this was the application 

to higher education of Executive Order 11246, 

which prohibits racial and sexual discrimination 

in employment among recipients of federal grants 

and contracts. More recent cases include Title IX 

of the Education Amendments of 1972, concerning the elimination of sexually discrimatory practices in educational admissions. facilities and 

40 
practices; and the Family Educational Rights and 

Privacy Act (FERPA), dealing with procedures of 

educational records keeping. 

The roots of E.O. 11246 extend back to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gender 

was added fortuitously to the antijob discrimination provisions in Title VII of this act. During debate on the House floor, southern opponents of 

the legislation sponsored an amendment to prohibit sex discrimination which was described by 

civil rights proponents “as a ploy,” part of an attempt to “load up the bill with objectionable features that might split the coalition supporting 

it.“40 The amendment was opposed by civil rights 

groups, the Labor Department’s Women’s Bureau, 

the American Association of University Women, 

and by many Congressional liberals including 

Rep. Edith Green. However, enough liberals favoring the amendment joined with conservatives 

to win its adoption, and it survived through final 

passage due to a “combination of historical accident and coattail riding.“*l 

Despite its enactment, there was no immediate 

response to Title VII’s sex discrimination provision. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), charged with enforcing the section, did not take it seriously. The commission 

focused its limited resources on combatting racial 

discrimination, while its executive director labeled the sex provision a “fluke,” “conceived out 

of wedlock.“” However, Prof. Freeman identifies 

Title VII as a major factor leading to the creation 

in 1966 of the National Organization for Women 

[NOW), which organized to seek enforcement of 

the act: 

While sex in Title VII was not at the time 

treated seriously, its existence prompted 

many latent feminists to create a pressure 

group to demand its adequate enforcement. This pressure group, NOW, helped 

stimulate a growing movement which in 

turn prompted more legislation, in a rapidly accelerating ~ycle.~~ 

NOW’s first action was to urge President Johnson to add sex discrimination to E.O. 11246,” the 

executive branch complement to Title VII. E.O. 

11246 requires that all federal contra&es agree 

not to discriminate in employment practices and 

that they take affirmative action to address prior 

discrimination. After additional support for the 

idea was generated by Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther Peterson and others, the Citizens’ Advisory Council on the Status of Women (CACSW) 

was directed to draft a new order which included 

sex discrimination.‘5 That order, E.O. 11375, encountered no opposition and was signed by the 

President on October 13, 1967.46 Freeman concludes that “this relatively easy success was 

largely due to the precedent of Title VII. All 

E.O. 11375 did was bring the policies of the executive branch of government into conformity 

with those of Congress.“47 

The first actual use of the executive order involved higher education and occurred in 1969. 

Bernice Sandier, a part-time teacher at the University of Maryland and a ranking member of the 

Women’s Equity Action League (WEAL), initiated 

a discrimination complaint against the university. 

While seeking legal recourse, she had found that 

neither the Equal Pay Act of 1962 nor Title VII 

applied to her case. Through “an accident of circumstances,” Sandier found that E.O. 11246 did 

apply because it covered all federal grant recipients.” Moreover, it allowed her to file a class action complaint based on an alleged institutional 

pattern of discrimination. General employment 

statistics, rather than detailed documentation of 

her own case, could be used to support such a 

case. If successful, the Labor Department could 

request a governmental investigation of the university’s whole employment practice. Free&n reports that “An OFCC [Office of Federal Contract 

Compliance1 official suggested an appropriate 

strategy and helped draft the initial complaint.“‘9 

The complainant’s strategy reflected delayed 

enforcement of E.O. 11375. The Department of 

Labor (DOL) had not yet issued necessary sex discrimination guidelines to federal contractors. HEW 

had not investigated employment practices in 

higher education. After filing the complaint, 

Sandier and WEAL began an effort to gain enforcement. They met with campus groups, promoting constituent letters to Congress. They sent 

information on sex discrimination in higher education to members of the Congressional education committees. Sandier wrote a speech on the 

subject for Michigan’s Rep. Martha Griffiths (who 

was also on the WEAL board) that was printed in 

the Congressional Record. 

Congressional interest prompted DOL to issue 

guidelines pursuant to E.O. 11375. HEW’s Contract Compliance Office began to investigate sex 

discrimination in higher education and found 

41 
major discrepancies in the wages paid to, and promotions given men and women. This led to the 

creation in 1972 of a special higher education division in the office to investigate further complaints and to take action against them. 

Title IX 

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 

probibits sex discrimination in the admissions, 

facilities, and practices of educational institutions 

which receive federal funds. Despite its importance, it did not represent a majority consensus of 

Congress on the problem. Rather, it was the product of somewhat curious mix of circumstances. 

Title IX evolved in an environment of increasing concern over the problem of sex discrimination in higher education.50 WEAL’s class action 

suit complained of widespread violations of E.O. 

11246 and alleged the existence of a pattern of 

sex discrimination in employment. A June 1970, 

report of the President’s Task Force on Women’s 

Rights and Responsibilities supported this conclusion and provided considerable evidence to 

this effect. It recommended that a number of steps 

be taken to address the situation, such as ending 

the exemptions of professional workers under the 

Equal Pay Act and of teachers from Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act. (Both of these were accomplished in 1972.) 

In response to these charges, Rep. Green introduced a bill to end sex discrimination in 011 federally assisted programs. Hearings on the bill 

were held in 1971. Witnesses were major women’s 

groups, who testified on the problems in higher 

educatiom51 Higher education groups did not appear. 

While no further action was taken on that bill, 

the hearings had convinced Rep. Green that a sex 

discrimination problem existed in higher education. The next year she modified her proposal to 

apply only to recipients of educational grants and 

included it in her 1972 institutional aid legislation. Several other educational bills introduced 

that year included similar provisions. An attempt 

to add one to the Senate’s 1972 education bill 

failed on the floor, but was later adopted in modified form. 

In the House, there was considerable debate 

over the provision, although it focused largely on 

undergraduate admissions. When the subcommittee exempted all undergraduate admissions from 

the provision, Rep. Green requested lobbying assistance from women’s groups. They “heavily 

utilized sympathetic female Congressional staff 

members to place personal pressure” on members 

of the full Education and Labor Committee, and 

the exemption was reduced to cover only private 

and military college admissions.5z Republican 

members dissented from this recommendation in 

the committee report, contending that it “represented further federal restrictions and controls 

over institutions of higher education.“” When the 

full House considered the bill, it voted down the 

committee recommendation and again exempted 

all undergraduate admissions. 

Despite this setback, the antisex discrimination 

provision fared well in the House-Senate conference committee. Essentially, the conferees combined the strongest elements of both the House 

and Senate bills into the toughest provision of all. 

This outcome reflected the diverse interests on 

the conference committee: 

Most of the higher education community 

spent their time wing to influence the 

outcome on other sections of the bill that 

they considered to be more important 

than the issue of sex discrimination. 

Without any organized opposition, and 

with Green pressing hard for adoptiofi, 

the Conference Committee quickly 

adopted Title IX without giving much 

consideration to its eventual impact5 

Commenting on the conference bill, which passed 

both Houses with a strong Title IX, Fishel and 

Pottker note that: 

When Congress passed Title IX in 

1972, it was voting for a general principle of equality; the specific implications 

of the law were understood by few members of Congress. While considering Sen. 

Birch Bayh’s (D-IN) and Green’s proposals, Congress was primarily concerned 

with the question of exempting fmm coverage particular types of schools and certain policies. Congress made no attempt 

to provide a clear and complete definition of what constituted sex discrimination in education. As a result, the real 

public debate on the issues involved in 

eliminating sex discrimination followed, 

42 
rather than preceded, the passage of the 

law.55 

Once the law had passed, it took three years for 

the final regulations to be developed. Several factors were responsible for this, including ambiguous legislative intent: strong cross-pressures, both 

within the bureaucracy and from opposing groups 

on the outside; and an unusual number of clearance procedures which faced the regulations. 

hue to superficial treatment and the symbolic 

nature of the law, legislative intent on Title IX 

was not ~lear.~~ Moreover, HEW’s Office of Civil 

Rights (OCR), which had responsibility for drafting and enforcing the regulations, had very little 

experience in this area, so that its early draft regulations were largely “cut and paste” adaptations 

of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.” These first 

draft regulations produced very heavy public 

comment, which was sharply divided between 

women’s, teachers’, and civil rights groups demanding stronger action, and education and administrative groups pushing weaker regulations. 

Fishel and Pottker explain the result: “Because of 

the absence of any kind of consensus, DHEW policymakers felt free to decide issues as they thought 

best from legal and policy perspectives.“58 

Some members of Congress became concerned 

about the direction the regulations were taking 

and began a series of challenges to them. An 

amendment to exempt revenue-producing sports 

passed the Senate in 1974 but was deleted in conference after an “all-out lobbying effort” by 

women’s groups. In the House, an amendment to 

block effective enforcement of the regulations, 

sponsored by Rep. Marjorie Holt (R-MD] and supported by Rep. Edith Green, was approved by the 

full House. Fishel and Pottker note that: 

Green, who had been the House sponsor of Title IX, was upset by the interpretation DHEW had given to the law in its 

proposed regulation and . was working to negate the impact of the law she 

had previously worked so hard to get 

passed.59 

Like several succeeding attempts, however, this 

action failed to gain the necessary approval by 

both Houses simultaneously. This failure has 

been attributed to the intense activity of various 

women’s organizations, assisted by female staff of 

key Senators and Representatives.@ 

In July of 1975, the final Title IX regulations 

took effect. They were far-reaching and prompted 

the vociferous controversy that has been detailed 

above. Yet, considering their long and difficult 

development, the regulations cannot be said to 

have evolved without ample opportunity for oversight. Before taking effect, they were subject to 

approval by the Secretary of HEW, and, in fact, 

Secretary Weinberger made numerous substantive modifications. Moreover, both the President 

and Congress could have intervened to reject or 

alter the regulations, since the law required unusual Presidential and Congressional clearance 

procedures prior to implementation. But all of 

these steps resulted in only limited revisions; the 

basic thrust of the regulations was left unchanged. 

As Fishel and Pottker conclude: 

The alliance of members of Congress, 

Congressional staff members, and 

women’s organizations working intensively on legislation relating to sexism in 

education has created a formidable obstacle to their opponents.6’ 

FERPA 

The origins of the Family Educational Rights 

and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA; also known as 

the Buckley Amendment) lay in a se&&f reports 

in the early 1970s that documented problems concerning the disclosure and use of student records, 

primarily in elementary and secondary schools.B2 

The Buckley Amendment sought to address these 

problems by requiring that educational institutions (1) provide student and parental access to 

educational records, allowing them to ascertain 

their content and accuracy, and (2) limit the disclosure on such records to others. The amendment applies to any educational institution receiving federal funds. 

The Buckley Amendment was introduced on 

the Senate floor during debate over the General 

Education Provisions Act of 1974.631t was adopted 

there and was subsequently retained by the HouseSenate conference. It had been subject neither to 

hearings nor to any major input fmm educators 

during its drafting, and “at the time, few educators were aware of it.“64 Although it was intended 

primarily to address problems in elementary and 

secondary education, higher education was added 

‘<as an afterthought.“65 The Report of the Privacy 

43 
Protection Study Commission determined that 

higher education was included in the act: 

on the too simple assumption that the 

problems in both (higher education and 

basic education) are similar and that the 

same principles would apply equally 

well in both places.66 

This assumption proved erroneous. The legislation suffered from major defects and had to be 

revised almost immediately.67 Although professional educators had more input in the redrafting, 

“their role could only be responsive, not creative, 

and was, in the main, defensive.“68 The amendments to FERPA were passed once again by both 

Houses of Congress and were signed by the President in December 1974.69 

Despite these revisions, higher education groups 

remain dissatisfied with FERPA, and they are 

seeking exemption from it. They object both to 

the costs it imposes on financially hard-pressed 

institutions and to its intervention into institutional administrative procedures. Testifying before Congress, a representative of higher education asserted that: 

The Buckley Amendment probably 

would not have become law insofar as 

higher education is concerned had there 

been opportunity for Congressional hearings and full consideration by the Congress. . Even with [the December 19741 

changes, the Buckley Amendment . 

represents an unwise exercise of federal 

pClW~~.‘~ 

THE CURRENT STATUS OF 

REGULATION 

Federal regulation of higher education may be 

entering a period of reevaluation. In the continuing controversy, opponents of these practices 

have dominated the discussion in educational circles thus far. The volume and forcefulness of their 

critiques have had some effect. There appears to 

be a new sensitivity to regulatory problems on the 

part of recent administrations. Charles Saunders, 

for example, has described a number of recent attempts to reform the administration of educational regulations.” Similarly, in a recent article, 

Stephen Bailey outlined several examples of Presidential and agency sensitivity to the appeals of 

higher education groups that the regulatory burden be eased.72 

Congress has also displayed a growing sensitivity to regulatory issues. Several provisions of the 

Education Amendments of 1976-such as the administrative cost allowances, the mandates for the 

coordination of federal agency data gathering, 

and the mandated progress reports on paperwork 

reduction-illustrate that Congress has made some 

attempts to respond to the complaints of higher 

education groups and officials.” Additionally 

some of the more persuasive statements of the 

c~ncems of higher education leaders have been 

brought to the attention of the members of Congress. For example, Kingman Brewster’s critique 

of federal regulation of higher education was inserted in the Congressional Record by Sen. Claiborne Pell, who stated: 

President Brewster’s remarks are most 

cogent. He pointed out that there is 

a growing amount of control by the government, not through direct intervention 

but through oblique approaches such as 

utilizing the colleges and universities for 

affirmative action programs. Although his speech attacks some of the 

programs and bills which I have supported, I think his remarks should y 

read by every Senator.14 

Similarly, Harold Enarson’s comments were entered into the&cord by Rep. Albert Quie, ranking 

Republican on the House Education and Labor 

Committee.7s And former Rep. Edith Green, author of the Title IX sex discrimination provision 

in the 1972 Education Amendments, has remarked: 

If I or others in the House had argued 

that this legislation was designed to do 

some of the things which HEW now says 

it was designed to do, I believe the legislation would have been defeated. I myself would not have voted for it, even 

though I feel very strongly about ending 

discrimination on the basis of sexTB 

The crucial issue will be whether this reevaluation alters the political processes that generated 

these regulations in the first place. The answer to 

this is not yet clear. However, thoughtful observers are now beginning to address some of the most 

44 \ 
fundamental questions concerning the federal 

role, such as: 

l. Is it workable and productive to continue asking higher education to address a growing number of social objectives, however worthy each may 

be in its own right?” 

2. Aside from the question of proper federal 

goals, what means are appropriate in their pursuit?7s 

3. Most generally, what is the proper extent of 

the federal role in the various spheres of higher 

education policy?‘9 

FOOTNOTES 

1 See the discussion of the tax credit debate in Chaoter 1 of 

this volume, en Ititled “Recent Legislative Actions.” 

z Reinef brd, op. cit., p. t00. 

*Ibid., pp. 110-111. 

’ See, 6 x example, Title Xl1 of the Higher Education Act of 

1965 , 1P.L. 89.3291, aa emended in 1972, end Congressional 

Quarterly, Congress and the Notion, Volume III, op. cit., p. 

EO? LIn*. 

s Henry Soloman, “The Growing Influence of Federal Regulations,” Educational Record 58, Summer 1977, p. 282. 

6Quotad in Gladieux end Wolenin, Congress ond the Colleges, p. 37. 

’ These schools were not alone, As e Carnegie Commission 

report observed: “In 1952, the Cammission on Financing 

Higher Education made e strong plea in its report for e ‘halt 

to the introduction of new programs of direct federal aid to 

colleges and universities’ end further stated, ‘We also believe it undesirable for the government to expand the scope 

of its scholarship aid to individual students.’ Realities 

have led all the major higher education associations end 

several commissions, including this one, to call upon the 

federal government for increased levels of support for higher 

education end for pmgrems that provide direct institutional 

grants to be used by institutions for general educational expenses.” Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, fnstitutionol Aid, pp. 9, 11. 

BLawence Gladieox end Thomas Woleoin, “Federal Politics.” in David Brenemen end Chester Finn, eds., Public Policy ond Private Higher Education, Washington, DC, Bmokings Institution, 1978, p. 229. 

g Gladieux end Wolenin, Congress and the Colleges. op. cit., 

p. 205-206. 

“Ibid., p. 2213. 

‘I Except for the lest Item. this list is taken fmm Carol Van 

Alstvne and Sharon Coldmu. The Costs of lmolementinn 

Fed&olly Mandated Social Piogmms ot &leg& and flnr 

versitiesSpecia1 Report, Washington, DC, American Council on Education, 1976, pp. 5-6. 

‘I “Will Government Patronage Kill the Univenities?” op. cit.. 

p. 12. 

‘JBnmon. op. cit., p. E3594. 

“Change, September 1975, pp. 38.42-a. 

I5 3 CFR 1964-65 Camp.. pp. 339-348. 

lb Solomen, op. cit., pp. 272, 277. 

“John A. Howard quoted by Ralph Kinney Bennett, “Colleges 

Under the Federal Gun,” reprinted inCongressional Record, 

June 24, 1976, p. E3596. 

Is Van Alstyne end Cnldren, op. cit., p, 14. 

‘sChonge, op. cit., p. IO. 

“0Van Alstyne end Coldren, op. cit., p. 28. 

2’Enarson, op. cit., p. E3594. 

I2 Solomen, op. cit., p. 289. 

u Excerpts fmm remarks printed in the Congressional Record, 

March 10,1975, p. S582S. See also “The Federal Conditional 

Spending Power: A Search for Limits,” Northwestern University Law Review, May-June 1975, pp. 293-330. 

I’ For example, Finn observes that: “At Harvard, the ‘medical 

mea schools of medicine, public health end dentistry-mceived 61% of its income fmm federal sources in 1973-X. 

end in doing so accounted for more then half of the entire 

university’s federal revenues; by contrast, the law school 

obtained just 5% of its receipts fmm the federal government, 

the business school 2%, the school of design 10%. end the 

divinity school none et all.” Op. cit., pp. 522-523. 

u Quoted in Bennett, op. cit., p. E3596. This practice has been 

challenged in e court suit brought by Gmve City College in 

Grove City, PA. To date, however. this challenge has been 

unsuccessful. See Gene Mae&f, “College Challenges Federal Intervention,” The New York Times, April 10.1979. p. 

Cl: end Gene Meemff. “College Wins Tentative Victory.” 

The New York Times, March IS, 1980. p. A15 

m Marilyn Gittell, “The Illusion of Affirmative Action,“Chan.ge 

7, October 1975, p. 41. See also Janet Battaile, “Study Finds 

Few Gains by Women on Staffs on Colleges Since U.S. Outlawed Disuimtoation in Education,” The New York Times, 

April g, 1978, p. AX. 

I’ Gittell, op. cit., p. 39. 

z8 Stephen K. Bailey, “The Peculiar Mixture: Public Norms end 

Private Spsce,” in Government Aegulotion of Higher Education, edited by C. Hobbs, Cambridge, MA, Ballfoger Press, 

1978, p. 110, 

1e Roger Heyns, “Our Best Defense Against Gov&ment Regulation,” Educational Record 58, Fell 1977. p. 353. 

J0 See Janet Hook, “Renovations for Handicapped Students 

Cost Less then Expected, Colleges Find,” The Chronicle of 

Higher Education, September 29, 1980. p. 15. 

*’ Charles B. Saunders, ,r.. “Eesing the Burden of Federal Regulstion: The Next Move is Ours,” Edocotional Record 57, 

Fell 1976, p. 217. 

Ia Solomen. op. cit., pp. 277-278. 

Js This has received the most attention, Iargely because: “Of 

all the many areas in which women’s rights legislation has 

been submitted, it has achieved its greatest success in the 

area of education.” Jo Freemen, The Politics of Women’s 

Libemtion. New York, NY, David McKay Co., 1975. p. 222. 

sI Van Alstyne end Coldmn. op. cit. 

m See Volume VU of this series, Protecting the Envimnment: 

Politics. Pollution, and Fedeml Policy. 

za Advisory Commission on fntergovemmental Relations, Cotegoricol Grants: Their Role and Design (A-52), Washington, 

DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 237. 

“Ibid. 

BB Freemen, op. cit., p. 204. 

“Steven L. Abmms, “The Significance of Congressionsl 

Change for American Public Policy,” senior thesis, Govemmerit Department. Harvard University. Cambridge. MA, 

1980. p. 67. 

‘@Gary Orfield, Congressional Power: Congress and Social 

Change, New York, NY, Hercount, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975, 

p. 299. 

45 
” Freeman, op. cit., p. 178. 

.a Ibid.. p. 54. The followinn section is based lamelv on her 

account. 

“Ibid., p. 229. 

- . 

u 3 CFR, 1964-65 Compilation. pp. 339-348. 

‘“CACSW was established by E.O. 11126 on November I, 

1963. 

“3 CFR. xw-1970 Compilation. pp. 684-686. 

“Freeman, op. cit., p. 194. Actually, E.O. 11375 went beyond 

contemporary legislative enactments &s they applied to educational faculty. Title VII’s Job discrimination provisions 

specifically excluded teaching personnel. The Equal Pay 

Act of 1962 did not apply to administrative, executive. or 

pmfessionsl worken. E.O. 11375 included both categories 

if employed by a federal contract recipient. 

I0 The discussion of Title IX rests primarily on the account by 

Andrew Fishel and Janice Pottker in National Politics and 

Sex Discrimination in Education, Lexington, MA, Lexington 

Books, 1977, pp. 95-155. 

5’ U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings before the House 

Special Subcommittee on Education, Committee an Education and Labor on Discrimination Against Women, 91st 

Chg., 2nd Sess., 1970. 

I* Fishel and Pot&r, op. cit., p. 101. 

SJ lhid~ 

“Ibid., p. 103. 

=Ibid., p. 132. 

SE “Because of the absence of an extensive history, exactly 

what Congress had intended when it passed the law was 

unclear in maw areas. In addition. them was onlv a limited 

amount of case law on sex discri&ation in education, .” 

Ibid.. D. 107. 

“‘Ibid.; b. 106. 

=Ibid., p. 115. 

“‘Ibid.. p. 114. 

“Ibid., pp. 113-118. 

&‘Ibid., p. 13% 

Oz These Include: Russell Sage Foundation, Guidelines for the 

Collection, Maintenance, and Dissemination of Pupil Records, Report of a Conference on the Ethical and Legal Aspects of School Record Keeping. June Y&14,1972; and particularly National Committee for Citizens in Education. 

Children, Parents, and School Records, Columbia, MD, National Committee for Citizens in Education, 1974. 

m P.L. 93-380. 

s( “Personal Privacy in an Information Society: The Report of 

the hivacv Protection Stud” Commission.” in U.S. House 

of Represe&tives, Hearing &fore the Sub&mittee on EJementary, Secondary and Vocational Education, Committee 

on Education and Labor on H.R. 15, Port 9: Family Educotional Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 95th Gong., 1st Sess.. 

1977. p. 131. 

*Ernest Gellhom and Barry B. Bayer, “The Academy As A 

Regulated Industry? in Hobbs, op. cit., p. 39 

M “Personal Privacy in an Infonxation Society,“op. cit., p. 131. 

eI In particular, the original act prohibited schools fmm disclosing infomation to parents of students 18 years and older, 

without first obtaining student consent. This was amended 

to penntt disclosure to parents of financially dependent students. 

‘Ibid. 

“P.L. 93-568. 

lo Statement of David Steiner, in “Personal Privacy in an Information Society,” op. cit. 

” Saunders, op. cit., pp. 218-2~. 

‘I Bailey. op. cit., pp. 107-109. 

nfbid., p. 108. 

“Congressional Record, March IO, 1975, p. S.5827. 

“Congressional Record, June 24,1976, p, E3593. 

‘eQuoted in Bennett, op. cit., p. E3596. 

“Heyns writes: “Regulations develop because the people 

through their elected representatives have implemented a 

large number of our national goals into laws, which in turn 

obliges government to ensure that the laws are understood 

and complied with. Most of us would not argue for the 

repeal of any of these national goals. It is the number 

and scope of our national gosls stated in terms of law that 

are overwhelming us.“Op. cit., pp. 350-351. 

‘8 Brewster deals with this question, stating “The essence of 

Constitutional restraint is that the worthiness of the end 

should not justify objectionable means. We must be 

vigilant about the use of the spending power as a lever to 

extend regulation beyond the accountability reasonably related to the purposes for which the support is given.” OP. 

cit., p. S5828. 

m One observer, attempting to redefine part of this mle, writes: 

“. there is also the prospect of a new relationship. On 

the campus, yesterday’s partner now appears increasingly 

as today’s oppressor, indispensable but stingy, a$ ever 

more intrusive [butl the federal government and the 

American research university continue to need each other. 

[A] high level of national interest in the university’s 

services remains, and still includes a substantial national 

security component. As for the research university, its dependence on national government for support of much of its 

large-scale msearch is natural and unavoidable. The issue 

for the university, therefore. is not dependence on govemmerit. but the degree and conditions of an inevitable dependence.” Stephen Muller, “A New American University?” Doedalus 107, Winter 1978. p. 33. 

46 
Chapter 7 

Recent Legislative Actions 

A lthough the federal regulatory presence in 

higher education has increasingly been the focus 

of policy debate, two additional issues in recent 

years have received attention in the higher education community which deserve mention: (1) the 

near passage of tuition tax credits, and (2) the creation of the new Department of Education. Neither of the two issues was of exclusive ccmcem to 

the higher education community since each also 

had important, though different, implications for 

elementary and secondary education. Hence, both 

are also discussed in Volume V of this report, Intergovernmentolizing the Classroom: Federal Involvement in Elementary and Secondary Educotion.’ For a more thorough treatment of the issues, 

the reader is referred to that volume. The following discussion will highlight the significance of 

tuition tax credits and a separate department of 

education for higher education, and the perspectives of the higher education community regarding each. 

TUITION TAX CREDITS 

In 1978, Congress came very close to approving 

a program of federal tuition tax credits in response to widespread political support for some 

type of aid for middle income families with children in college. Such an approach to the “middle 

income squeeze” had long been a favorite in the 

Senate where similar proposals had been passed 

several times in the past. However, until 1978 

47 
the House Ways and Means Committee bad consistently blocked all tax credit proposals. The 

1978 proposal, had it been enacted, would have 

allowed a credit against the federal income tax of 

35% of paid tuition up to a maximum of 5100 in 

calendar year 1978, increasing to 5250 in 1981, 

for every full-time student enrolled in a postsecondary institution. The estimated 10s~~ in federal 

tax revenues would have been 5330 million in 

fiscal year 1979, increasing to 5845 million in fiscal 1982. Thus would have represented a major 

financial commitment on the part of the federal 

government, with potential for rapid expansion. 

Initiative for the tax-credit approach for college 

tuition relief came almost exclusively from 

Congressional backers, especially those in the 

Senate. They cited the plights of both middleclass families and private institutions as the basis 

for their endorsement. An advantage of the tax 

credit proposal, according to its supporters, was 

the ease with which it could be administered. As 

Sen. Bob Packwood (R-OR), a chief sponsor of the 

legislation, wrote: 

Stripped of the veneer, the sole issue is 

a question of philosophy: Should we 

leave the choice to the individual, given 

the simple incentive of the income tax, 

or should we leave the decision to the 

bureaucrats with the maze of regulations 

and forms that come with direct government grants.2 

The strongest opposition to the tax-credit bill 

came from the Carter administration and from lobbyists for public elementary and secondary 

schools. Acting on the advice of HEW, the Department of Treasury, and Office of Management 

and Budget officials, President Carter opposed the 

enactment of tax credits at any level of education. 

Opposition was due primarily to its expense in 

terms of forgone tax revenues but also to its fiscal 

regressivity. When the elementary and secondary 

education credits were added to the House bill, 

opposition to the proposal dramatically increased, especially from the public school lobby. 

Highly charged arguments that elementary and 

secondary tax credits would undermine the public schools, subsidize middle class and whiteflight, and violate the Constitutional separation of 

church and state dominated the debate and led to 

the final death of the bill. 

On the other hand, tax credit proposals have 

48 

generated neither ardent opposition nor unified 

political support from either public or private 

higher education lobbyists. Some individual 

higher education leaders have argued that tax 

credits have the advantage of maintaining the diversity that private colleges offer without hurting 

worthy public higher education objectives.3 However, the college and university groups did not 

spend much time working on the college credits. 

Thus, when Carter finally proposed an alternate 

approach to financial relief for middle income 

families with a focus on student aid programs and 

financial need, most of the higher education 

groups rallied around his plan because it cost less 

and kept federal policy on familiar ground. 

The stumbling block to final enactment of the 

tax bill was Senate opposition to the House-sponsored extension of benefits to parents of elementary and secondary students. When the two bills 

were sent to a conference committee for final reconciliation, Senate conferees agreed to cut the 

bill’s maximum individual tax break in half in 

return for the removal of the elementary and secondary provision. In a surprise move, however, 

the full House voted to recommit the conference 

report with instructions to restore the elementary 

and secondary credit, and thus effectively killed 

the bill. With any form of tax credit facing a Carter 

veto, an administration-backed expansion of college student grants and loans to include diddle 

class families was passed in the waning moments 

of the 95th Congress.’ 

That legislation, the Middle Income Student 

Assistance Act,5 removed the family income 

limitation that governed eligibility for subsidized 

student loans and expanded eligibility for Basic 

Educational Opportunity Grants to include students from families with incomes between 515,000 

and 525,000. As anticipated, the response to the 

loosened eligibility requirements was “prompt 

and substantial,“6 and by 1980 the burgeoning 

costs of the student loan program in particular 

had become a major source of controversy swrounding the reauthorization of higher education 

programs. 

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 

When President Carter pledged to the NEA during his 1976 campaign that he would actively pursue the creation of a separate department of education, the response of the higher education 
community was decidely lukewarra7 The higher 

education organizations failed to adopt a unified 

position either in support of, or in opposition to 

the proposed department. Some organizations, 

such as the American Association of University 

Professors (AAUP) and the American Association 

of Community and Junior Colleges (AACJC), actively supported a separate department. Others, 

such as the Association of American Universities 

(AAU) and the California State University and 

Colleges system, joined with individual presidents and chancellors of major universities [including Howard, Columbia, Stanford, and the 

University of Illinois) in opposing its establishment. The American Council on Education (ACE], 

the umbrella organization established to help coordinate higher education’s relationship with federal government, took no official position on the 

ismzs 

The two reasons most frequently cited for supporting the proposal were the increased visibility 

and administrative efficiency that a separate department would afford federal higher education 

programs.g For instance, according to one lobbyist, “Hopefully now that education will be removed from HEW, it will reduce the amount of 

time it takes to make money available to higher 

education institutions and the time it takes to get 

regulations approved. “lo But opponents found 

neither claim convincing. Critics of the proposed 

separation argued that organizational changes do 

not necessarily lead to better program administration or increased prestige, especially since the 

most difficult problems facing education are programmatic rather than organizational. On the 

other hand, they argued, a more predictable outcome of a separate department would be an increase in federal regulation. As Jack Peltason, 

president of ACE, verbalized the dilemma facing 

the higher education community: 

How you react to a department of education depends on whether you are a captive of your fears or your hopes. The fears 

are of greater regulation, and the hopes 

are that the department will be a platform 

for greater visibility.” 

While the fear of increased regulation dominated the concerns of the opponents of a separate 

department, they had other worries as well. For 

instance, many felt that higher education would 

be a low priority in the new department because 

of the leadership role played by NEA in its establishment and because of the large percentage of 

the budget consumed by elementary and secondary programs. Although Congress did not approve 

a proposal to create two undersecretaries-one for 

elementary and secondary and one for higher education-it did agree to allocate one of six assistant secretary positions to postsecondary education. 

Moreover, because of the peculiar mix of programs that affect higher education, many critics 

saw little hope or justification for their consolidation in a single department. For instance, one 

of the largest federal programs in support of 

higher education, the GI Bill of Rights, “was enacted primarily as an unemployment and incomesecurity program,“‘z and lobbyists for the veterans were adamant in their opposition to its transfer from the Veterans Administration. Similarly, 

research funds that eventually find their way into 

institutions of higher education and on which 

many of those institutions are dependent are scattered throughout practically every federal department, and there never was much likelihood of 

their consolidation. In addition, because much of 

the higher education budget is allocated to student aid programs that me mcm similar in their 

administration to welfare programs than to the 

major elementary and secondary programs, the 

argument was made that removing ihem from 

HEW would hurt more than it would help: 

. . more than 90% of the funds committed to higher education are in reality 

channeled to and for individuals, making 

them in reality welfare programs; and as 

welfare programs they justifiably fit into 

the bigger picture of Health, Education, 

and Welfare--not as a separate entity.13 

In the end, those who had argued against the 

feasibility or desirability of consolidating the programs affecting higher education were proven 

correct, for the department as it was finally constructed included only a few higher education 

programs from outside the Education Division of 

HEW. 

Many higher education organizations eventually did throw their support behind the new department when it began to appear inevitable that 

Congress would pass the legistation, but their endorsement was frequently unenthusiastic and 

tempered with a “wait and see” attitude. Nor have 

49 
their misgivings been assuaged since the department began operating in May 1980. Although 

most of the higher education community approved of the selection of Albert A. Bowker, retired chancellor of the University of California at 

Berkeley, as Assistant Secretary for Postsecondary 

Education, it was harsh in its criticism of the department’s weak lobbying efforts on behalf of the 

1980 reauthorization of higher education programs.14 Lobbyists complained that department 

personnel were unable to provide needed information to evaluate proposals, that they were slow 

in preparing their own legislative proposals, and 

that on the whole their influence in drafting the 

final bill was minimal. Additionally, seven higher 

education organizations-including ACE, AAU, 

the National Association of Independent Colleges 

and Universities, and the Association of Catholic 

Colleges and Universities-sent a strongly worded 

letter to the Secretary of Education expressing two 

concerns regarding the development of the 

agency’s structure and functions: first, that the 

department’s organizational structure “retains the 

top-heavy layer of staff officials whose infinite 

capacity to second-guess and delay the decisions 

of program officials was one of the most grievous 

faults of the organizational pattern that existed 

under the Department of Health, Education, and 

Welfare;” and second, that it is a violation of the 

legislation to list as a function of the Office of 

Postsecondary Education the “fostering of higher 

standards in postsecondary programs” as published in department briefing materials.‘5 

Thus, the Department of Education is clearly 

engaged in an uphill struggle to gain the confidence of the higher education community. As one 

commentator put it: 

To keep the department fmm being 

tested prematurely and deflected into 

purely defensive postures, Education’s 

new leadership will have to reach out 

early and reconstruct the former coalition of interests that was sundered in the 

legislative acrimony accompanying the 

department’s birth. The department faces 

a most uncertain future unless it can win 

support from the host of organized interests that either opposed or 

were monumentally indifferent to its creation.16 

FOOTNOTES 

’ Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Intergovemmentalizing the Classroom: Fedeml Involvement 

in Elementary and Secondary Education, A-81, Washington, 

DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980. 

2 Bob Packwood, “Tuition Tax Credits: A Philosophical Question.” letter to The Washington Post. April 27, 1978. 

s See David G. Brown and Thomas E. Wenzlau. “A View fmm 

the campus, ‘I in Public Policy and Private Higher Education. edited by David W. Bmneman and Chester E. Finn, Jr., 

Washington, DC, Tbs Bmokiis Institution, 1980, pp. 3!37- 

398: Lawrence E. Gladieux and Thomas R. Wolanin, “Federal Politics,” p. 223: William McNamam, “The Tax Credit 

Debate.” Change 10, March 1978. pp. 44-45; Rochelle L. 

Stanfield, “Political Maneuvering Over Tuition Tax Credits,” Notional Jaumol, July 22, 1978, pp. 1157-1159: and 

Rochelle L. Stanfield. “The Taxpayers’ Revolt, Part II-Education Aid for Everybody?“, National Journal. April 1, 

1978, pp. m-514. 

* See “Tuition Tax Credit Fails Under Veto Threat.” Caneressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978, Washington, II?., Con&~- 

sional Quarterly, 1978, pp. 248-256. 

J P.L. 95-566. See “College Student Assistance,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1978, pp. 568-571. 

6 David W. Breneman and Susan C. Nelson, “Education and 

Training,” in Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 

1980s, edited by Joseph A. Pechman, Washington, DC, The 

Bmokings Institution, 1980, pp. 242-245. 

’ See Edward C. McQuire. “Let’s Not Take Educatio 

HEW,“Chronicle ofHi&rEducotian, March 5, 19 f 

Out of 

9, p. 72: 

Beverly T. Watkins, “Some Educators Are Jubilant, Others 

Wary as Carter Gets Education Department Bill,” Chronicle 

of Higher Education, October 9, 197% pp. 11-12; and Rochelle L. Stanfield, “Them’s a Lesson to Be Learned Over a 

Department of Educstion,“Natianal Journal. July 23, 1977, 

PP. 1149-1153. 

BWatkins, op. cit., p. I*. 

eSamuel Halperin, “The Federal Future in Higher Education.” Change 10. Februarv 1978. DD. 24-26. 

‘“Wat&, opYcit.,‘p. I*. 

‘I Quoted in ibid. 

‘zMcQuire,op.cit..p. 72. 

‘*Ibid. 

I* See Janet Hook, “Carter Picks Berkeley’s Bowker for Top 

Higher-Education Post,” Chronicle of Higher Education, 

March 10.1980, pp. K-14, and “Compromise Student-Loan 

Plan Voted by House-Senate Conferees,“Chmnicle @Higher 

Education, August 25, 1980, pp. 17-18. 

I3 Letter to Han. Shirley M. Hufstedler, Secretary of Education, 

April 2, 1980. 

‘$ Samuel Halperin, “The Department of Education: Last hut 

Not Least,” Change 11. November-December 1979, p. 37. 

50 
Chapter 8 

The Political Dynamics of Federal 

Involvement: A -Summary Analysis 

POLICY ANALYSIS: 

ACTORSANDPROCESS 

T. his case study suggests that policy innovation 

in higher education has largely been the product 

of policy entrepreneurs in the executive branch 

and in Congress. Parties, public opinion, and interest groups, which are often thought to be central to the initiation of policies in this country, 

have generally been supportive of federal initiatives. But, to varying degrees, they have essentially been secondary actors in the policy process. 

Policy entrepreneurship refers to a situation in 

which elite political actors are able to formulate 

and advance new policies largely on their own 

initiative. It assumes that broad popular, partisan, 

or group support can make higher education an 

attractive but not compelling arena for policy innovation. Entrepreneurs are left sufficient flexibility to choose among arenas of activity, to define 

the character of their involvement and the substake of their initiatives, and to mobilize support 

for their decisions. 

The entrepreneurial pattern emerges strongly 

from enactments in the SOS and 60s. The NDEA 

owed its origins to then-HEW Secretary Folsom 

and Assistant Secretary Richardson, on the one 

hand, and to Sen. John Sparkman and Rep. Carl 

Elliot on the other, who devised legislation able 

51 
to capitalize on the crest of public concern about 

American science. The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 and the Higher Education Act of 

1965 were very much the products of active Presidential involvement, with important roles also 

played by top political officials in HEW and key 

members of Congress. Writing about these acts, 

Gladieux and Wolanin conclude that: 

Administration leadership was a chief 

characteristic of the policymaking process. Major higher education proposals, 

beginning with NDEA, emanated from 

the executive branch. Congress was not 

a rubber stamp.. However, through 

1968, the dominant pattern of policymaking was executive branch initiative 

followed by Congressional response.’ 

The Nixon Administration furthered this process of high-level White House participation in 

higher education policymaking. The judgment of 

many informed observers at the time was that, 

“many decisions are being made in the Executive 

Office Building.“’ But as these Administration 

proposals were largely stillborn, the policy initiation role shifted to education specialists in Congress. There, policy entrepreneurs produced and 

guided to passage substantial legislative innovations, as Gladieux and Wolanin attest. 

The formulation and enactment of the 

Education Amendments of 1972 demonstrate Congressional initiative in domestic policymaking. While on the basis 

of this case one is hardly led to proclaim 

Congressional dominance or even resurgence, it suggests that in some circumstances, as when the executive 

branch abdicates or is passive, Congress 

can be a reservoir of innovative thinking 

and constructive action on the domestic 

front.3 

The Congressional entrepreneurs were essentially key subcommittee members in the House 

and Senate. As Congressional specialists in educational policy, these members are part of what 

might be called the higher education policy subsystem. With professionals in higher education 

and the Department of Education (previously the 

Office of Education), they share a commitment to 

education and a dedication to providing additional resources.4 In basic matters of policy, however, they can act independently of higher education groups and agency specialists, selectively 

choosing among their varied and often conflicting 

suggestions. The 1972 amendments highlighted 

the differences between certain Congressional entrepreneurs who were interested in pursuing innovative policy approaches, on the one hand, and 

on the other hand interest groups and their allies. 

Similarly, during the passage of the legislation 

reauthorizing higher education programs in 1980, 

agency specialists were frequently at odds with 

Congressional subcommittee members and the 

lobbyists. While the lobbyists were quite effective 

in working with the subcommittee and in influencing the substance of the legislation, Department of Education officials (and, in the early 

stages of developing the legislative package, HEW 

officials) were severely criticized “for failing to 

provide information (Congress] needed to evaluate proposals and for failing to present clear positions qn key issues.“s Thus, there is very little 

evidence that an impenetrable “iron triangle” has 

evolved in the higher education subsystem. In 

fact, in the past 20 years the various participants 

frequently have appeared to be working at crosspurposes with one another. 

The pattern of legislative entrepreneurship in 

higher education policy is evident in other spheres 

as well. The tuition tax credit is one of the most 

significant innovations recently proposed in education. It is almost entirely a Congressional initiative, but, unlike other recent legislation, its 

major proponents are not specialists from the education committees. Rather, it appeals to a broad 

coalition of legislators, while many specialists 

both in and out of Congress tend to oppose it. 

The politics of regulation has been equally entrepreneurial. E.O. 11246, Title IX, and the Buckley Amendment were all advanced through the 

actions of a few individuals. Fishel and Pottker, 

for instance, conclude that “a relatively few 

women in Washington have been able to achieve 

significant results to protect and advance the 

rights of women in education. .“6 In the case of 

Congressional actions, a small number of concerned members have been able to achieve significant and independent policy objectives 

through persistent efforts. Working closely with 

Congressional staffs and with representatives of 

several women’s groups, they have formed a network which Prof. Freeman calls “woodwork feminists:” 

52 
There were a large number of “woodwork feminists” in the federal govemmerit. This incipient network was 

already emerging around education legislation. Of all the many policy areas in 

which women’s rights legislation has 

been submitted, it has achieved its greatest success in the area of education. This 

is partially because there were a lot 

of feminists in the House Education and 

Labor Committee. Thus, it was easy 

to set up a symbiotic relationship between feminists interested in education 

and committee members interested in 

women’s rights.? 

A number of important bureaucratic actors have 

been part of the “woodwork” phenomenon as 

well. Former Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther 

Peterson’s role in the creation of E.O. 11246 

stands out as one e~ample.~ As Fishel and Pottker 

have written: 

great numbers of qualified women 

over the years have sought employment 

with the federal government, thus creating the nucleus of support for government action on women’s issues that could 

be tapped at a later time. [Wlhen the 

women’s rights movement began, these 

highly placed women were in the 

right positions to help accelerate the 

goals of the liberation movement as it 

picked up speed. As a result, these 

women would often serve as catalysts for 

change on public policies affecting 

WOIIXILS 

By and large, however, the bureaucratic role has 

not been “imperialistic.” The executive branch 

bureaucracy was not very influential in the development of women’s legislation and actually 

opposed much of it. ‘O Pseudobureaucratic actors, 

such as federal task forces and growing legislative 

staffs, played much more vital roles at this stage, 

The former helped provide research on which the 

groups and legislative entrepreneurs could base 

proposals, and the latter were important in developing and passing regulatory legislation. 

Once legislation was passed, the major bureaucratic actors remained hesitant to enter the field 

of sex discrimination in higher education. The 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(EEOC), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC], and the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) 

all had their regulatory roles thrust upon them. 

The experience with Title IX regulations, which 

were explicitly modeled after Title VI of the Civil 

Rights Act, suggests that bureaucratic policy input was guided more by standard operating procedures than by imperialistic objectives.” This 

may, of course, change as these agencies develop 

an institutionalized involvement in sex discrimination (Title IX sex discrimination complaints totaled 40% of all complaints filed with OCR in 

1975,‘* the HEW Office of Contract Compliance 

established a higher education division in 1972); 

but such institutional interests were essentially 

the product of the entrepreneurial activities of 

others. 

Political Parties 

The political parties have played two rather different roles in the creation of higher education 

policy. As mass-based conduits of public opinion, 

parties have played a fairly limited role. They 

have helped to establish broad mandates and opportunities for “action,” but they have had only 

modest impact on the substantive content of policy. As parties have been represented by certain 

elite actors, they have been a more crucial determinant of policy formation. Such actors have frequently sharpened and refined party differences. 

However, their activities have more often served 

to reinforce an entrepreneurial pattern of policy 

development than a party-oriented one. 

Since the New Deal, the Democratic Party has 

more actively favored federal aid to education 

than have the Republicans. As a rule, the degree 

of federal intervention into new domestic functions has been highly correlated with party preference.‘” Party platforms on aid to education support this distinction.14 However, party preferences 

can explain only a part of the educational policy 

process. 

To begin with, there is no absolute correlation 

between party and educational policy initiatives. 

The NDEA may be attributed more or less equally 

to the Eisenhower Administration and key members of the Democratic Congress. The 1972 

amendments eventually required support from 

the Administration as well as key Democrats in 

order to pass in their final form, and naturally 

they required signature by a Republican President. Interestingly enough, the original Nixon 
proposals were criticized by Democrats as well as 

Republicans in Congress for their “overemphasis” 

on targeting to the needy and their failure to provide enough relief for the middle class. In fact, 

both the major acts of 1965 and 1972, as well as 

the revisions and extensions in 1976 and 1980, 

attracted broad bipartisan support in the Congress. 

The activist wing of the Democratic Party has 

lent vital force to the development of new programs in higher education, however. There was 

considerable difference between the relentless 

pressure for legislation from Presidents Kennedy 

and Johnson and the reluctant approach by the 

Eisenhower Administration. Even President 

Carter-although he did not support major new 

initiatives in higher education-did press for an 

extension of federal benefits to middle income 

families in 1978 and for the separation of education programs from health and welfare programs 

in 1979. President Reagan, on the other hand, has 

promised to pursue the dismantlement of the Department of Education. Democratic Congressional 

activists have been equally crucial in the formation of higher education policy. Among others, 

the major roles of Sparkman, Brademas, and Pell 

in spending programs, and Green, Bayh, and Griffiths in regulatory policy clearly stand out. 

This represents, in part, popular partisan mandates for “action” in education. But, as substantive policy content has usually not been electorally specified, a broad gap has been left for policy 

entrepreneurs. These actors have had sufficient 

flexibility to choose education as an area for action and then to mobilize support for it. Broad 

popular and partisan support made education an 

attractive but not necessary initiative. 

Interest Groups 

Like political parties, higher education interest 

groups have been secondary actors in the initiation of higher education policy, although there is 

sc~me evidence that their influence has been increasing in recent years. As already discussed, the 

higher education community has traditionally 

been somewhat aloof from politics. Far from being 

responsible for most major federal programs, the 

associations developed largely in response to 

them. Prior to 1970, at least, the higher education 

associations were often notorious for their lack of 

influence, their failure to present a cc~mmon position, and their inability to provide Congress 

with the information it needed. One of the primary problems confronting the higher education 

community has been its considerable fragmentation, since the interests of various institutionspublic and private, large and small-often conflict. As late as 1980, former Commissioner of Education Ernest L. Bayer lamented the difficulty 

the higher education groups had behaving as a 

community: 

Certain fundamentals are shared of 

course, but on most issues institutional 

self-interests act as barriers to anything 

even approaching a common voice.‘5 

During the 1972 reauthorization of higher education programs, the various associations and 

many college and university leaders attempted for 

the first time to influence the debate from the beginning and to present a unified position in support of a program of no-strings capitation grants. 

Their strategy failed, however, because they totally misjudged the depth of Congressional and 

executive branch commitment to the student aid 

focus in higher education policy. Perceived by 

many members of Congress as self-serving and 

politically naive, the lobby exerted minimal influence on the final legislation. By 1980, the higher 

education community had grown significantly in 

political sophistication. Although still riddled 

with factions, it had by then accepted the student 

aid approach and received high marks from 

Congressional staff members for presenting more 

precise positions and for being willing to compromise when necessary. 

Moreover, the lobby may have more significant 

influence in opposing federal actions that it finds 

disagreeable, and it appears to be emphasizing 

such activity increasingly.16 The campaign against 

regulation, for instance, has had some success in 

raising Congressional and administrative awareness of the problem, and the high level of interest 

group activity in this area may be an indication 

of the future. To date, it has helped to distinguish 

regulatory politics from the traditional pattern of 

modest group activity. 

The impact of higher education associations on 

regulatory policy, however, has been complicated 

by the presence of relatively aggressive lobbyists 

representing the clientele groups that benefit from 

strict enforcement of regulatory measures. For instance, women’s groups have played a strong and 

54 
increasingly significant role in the politics of prohibiting sex discrimination in education. Women 

were influential in the formulation and passage 

of several regulatory measures, and the women’s 

lobby has played an active role in the implementation of this legislation. Initially, much was accomplished by “a relatively few women in Washington.“‘r By focusing their attention on the 

federal government, they were able to use their 

limited resources to the best advantage in attaining national impact. 

Like the higher education groups, the women’s 

groups developed largely in response to Congressional passage of major pieces of legislation. This 

was very clear in the case of the Civil Rights Act 

and NOW, of E.O. 11246 and the higher education 

campaign, and even, to some extent, in the case 

of Title IX, as Fishel and Pottker point out: 

“A byproduct of the Congressional battles over 

Title IX has been the emergence of a strong 

women’s lobby on sex discrimination issues.“‘* 

Freeman rightly concludes that the relationship 

between women’s organizations and federal programs and policies has been a symbiotic one.” 

Public Opinion 

Public opinion has generally favored increased 

federal spending for domestic social programs 

since the New Deal. Federal aid to education has 

been no exception. Although no figures are available for most years on aid to higher education 

itself, there has consistently been public support 

for the more controversial question of federal aid 

to elementary and secondary education.20 When 

public attitudes on the specific question of federal 

aid to college students was measured in 1966, 

after passage of the 1965 act, strong public support for the legislation was registered. A Louis 

Harris poll found that 69% of the sample approved of the 1965 college scholarships?l 

This support is reaffirmed by more recent polls 

on federal student assistance. In 1973 and 1974 

Watts and Free asked whether federal spending 

for a number of federal domestic programs should 

be increased, maintained, decreased, or ended. 

For programs aiding needy students, 54% of 

respondents favored increased spending in 1973, 

55% in 1974.22 

These figures demonstrate substantial public 

support for the concept of federal aid to higher 

education. They do not, however, address the actual role of public opinion in the initiation of various higher education programs. In fact, with the 

notable exception of NDEA, public opinion has 

not been closely identified with the development 

or passage of particular programs and program 

trends in federal aid to higher education. Public 

opinion does not tell us why particular legislation 

was established or when and how it was enacted. 

Surges of public opinion are not generally associated with the adoption of various programs. If 

anything, long-term public support without carresponding action suggests weak or superficial 

influence from public opinion. Nor can the evolution of federal higher education legislation, 

from defense-related research to equal opportunity student assistance, be identified causally 

with changes in public opinion. Other factors 

were far more proximate causes of these developments. 

Once again, the politics of regulation in higher 

education can be differentiated from this broader 

pattern. Although it was not the most significant 

determinant of regulatory policy, public opinion 

certainly contributed to the symbolic character of 

regulatory politics. It was this politics of symbolism, within the context of “striking Congressional superficiality,“23 which helped to make 

the entrepreneurial pattern of regulatory policymaking possible. P 

FORCES AND RATIONALES OF 

GREATER FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT 

In both the spending and policymaking arenas, 

it appears that public opinion is most usefully interpreted as establishing the parameters of higher 

education policymaking. It is not unlikely that 

Congressional resistance to higher education 

scholarships reflected to some extent an interpretation of popular values and preferences. Whether 

these attitudes and values had so changed between 1963 and 1965 as to allow passage is doubtful, however. Thus, within the vague--and flexible-parameters of acceptable action established 

by public opinion, various political actors have 

had sufficient latitude to embark on a broad range 

of policy alternatives, from inaction to action in 

varying directions. 

Important among the forces that have shaped 

the federal role in higher education have been 

55 
broad social and technological changes producing our increasingly complex and interdependent 

society. These forces have certainly increased demand for higher education and are viewed by 

some as sufficient in themselves to justify an expanded federal role. As former HEW Secretary 

John Gardner has said: 

No one knows how to best design the role 

of the federal government in education. 

But one thing is certain: with education 

playing a vastly more crucial role in our 

national life, there is no likelihood that 

the federal government can escape greater 

involvement in its4 

In addition, many believe that such social 

changes create externalities in higher education 

which require a greater federal share in its financing. In the 19th Century, for example, externalities contributed to the enactment of the Hatch 

Act, which established federal aid to agricultural 

research, because they created incentives for states 

to inadequately fund agricultural research. It was 

to no state’s advantage to fully support research 

that would be used equally by those in other 

states. This, in turn, produced pressures for a 

larger federal role. Some advocates of greater federal involvement in higher education today resort 

to similar arguments, 25 but, on the whole, externalities have not been a primary justification for 

this. Other rationales, such as national defense 

and equal opportunity, have been much more important. 

Another factor supporting a larger federal role 

has been the rising cost of higher education and 

the fiscal problems of many colleges and universities. This has been important in reversing the 

position of many in higher education, from opposing increased federal funding to demanding 

it. Moreover, it has ignited support for the tuition 

tax credit to help underwrite individual costs of 

college education. 

To some extent, the financial problems of higher 

education reflect changes in demography and the 

labor market. Having expanded rapidly in an era 

of extraordinary growth, higher education is facing difficulties in adjusting to the slackening demand. However, in contrast to the usual pattern 

of federal intervention following the failure of 

states to act, current demands for federal involvement may result as much or more from successful 

state activity. The tremendous growth of low-cost 

public college education in the states has placed 

increasing pressure on private schools in the period of retrenchment.z6 This situation has driven 

to the federal government that segment of the 

higher education community most fearful of federal intervention in the past. 

Another crucial factor shaping the federal role, 

which to some extent reflects the above changes, 

has been the transformation of the national agenda. 

The evolution of federal program rationales has 

reflected changing conceptions of national needs 

and legitimate national concerns, along with COTresponding changes in political forces and demands. Thus, at various times, the dominant rationale for federal intervention has been to promote 

the disposition of public lands, to stimulate agricultural and technical education, to stimulate 

agricultural research, to ameliorate economic 

hardship during the Depression, to promote national defense and postwar economic readjustment, and to promote equal educational opportunity. 

These transformations in the national political 

agenda have affected not only what the federal 

government has become involved in but the manner of its involvement as well. In each case, specific educational programs have been tailored to 

address a particular national problem of the day. 

In this way, the pattern of federal involverpent in 

higher education has been both increme&l and 

discrete, with categorical programs for new purposes gradually added to a residual of the old. 

CONSTRAINTS ON 

THE FEDERAL ROLE 

As definitions of national needs have changed 

over time, so have a variety of constraints cm federal involvement in higher education. These constraints-constitutional, political, andfiscal-have 

acted to structure and define the federal role 

rather than to prevent it altogether. Interacting 

with transformations in the national agenda, these 

evolving constraints have served to reinforce the 

incremental pattern of federal involvement. 

Constitutional Constraints 

The Constitutional structure of federalism has 

constrained the national role of higher education 

from the beginning, although this factor has be56 
come less important as broad interpretations of 

federal powers have gained prevalence. Such 

Constitutional constraints have taken two forms. 

One is outright restriction of federal activity, as 

in the First Amendment separation of church and 

state. A subtler and more important Constitutional constraint has derived from the concept of 

a limited government. Because the federal government is one of enumerated powers, and since 

education is not included among its responsibilities, the scope of its Constitutional role in education depends upon interpretation of its implied 

powers. In fact, education is not mentioned at all 

in the Constitution, thus implying that major responsibility for it rests with the states or with citizens individually by virtue of the Tenth Amendment. The consequence has been that, as far back 

as the proposed National University, some opponents have considered federal involvement in 

higher education to exceed the narrow boundaries 

of national power. Most other attempts at federal 

involvement into education have been similarly 

opposed. 

Perhaps the most important Constitutional influence on federal higher education policy has 

been in the choice of policy instruments. Rather 

than direct provision of services, the grant-in-aid 

technique was developed to permit a modicum of 

federal involvement on behalf of legitimate national purposes. Thus, along with changing conceptions of national needs, Constitutional constraints have helped to shape the pattern of 

federal intervention through use of specific grants 

for agriculture, defense, and equal opportunityrelated purposes. From the Morrill Act to the present, this has proven the path of least Constitutional resistance. 

Since enactment of the NDEA, however, Constitutional issues have not been very important in 

the policy debate. The constraints on forms of intervention appear to be more of a legacy of the 

past than live issues of the day. This situation 

reflects a somewhat paradoxical development in 

the nature of grants-in-aid as well as broader acceptance of a larger federal role. Although originally adopted and legitimized as a less intrusive 

instrument of federal intervention, grants i&e 

served to relax the Constitutional limits on federal 

intrusion, due to modern interpretations of spending power. These interpretations provide few restrictions on federal regulatory objectives as long 

as the regulations are pursued, indirectly, through 

the attachment of grant conditions. With massive 

dependence on federal funding, however, conditions attached to grants become as binding as any 

form of direct regulation. Thus, a century of using 

grants-in-aid to build a Constitutionally acceptable federal role in higher education yields the 

question: Is broad interpretation of the spending 

power making the Constitution irrelevant or obsolete?” At the very least, the Constitution has 

lost considerable effectiveness in limiting the intrusiveness of the federal role. 

Political Constraints 

Beyond these Constitutional issues, the nature 

and extent of the federal role in higher education 

has naturally been subject to the balance of political forces. The federal system complicates such 

political issues by adding to the basic question of 

whether government should be involved in a 

function that of which level (or levels) of government should be involved. Like the first, the assignment of functions question is unavoidably 

political because~ of its implications as to how a 

function will be addressed and who will bear the 

cost and benefits. Moreover, it involves basic ideological issues for a number of different groups OF 

parties. 

Opposition to federal involvement in higher education has never been as strong as th& for elementary and secondaj education. Higher education is not compulsory, and it may involve 

stronger national interests--like defense--and 

greater externalities. In addition, the popular appeal that aid to education enjoys, plus political 

demands arising from educational interests and 

spillovers, create incentives for political entrepreneurs to fashion higher education programs. As 

a result, the federal role has been larger in higher 

education than in basic education, particularly as 

a percentage of total functional expenditures. 

Nevertheless, opposition to new federal initiatives in higher education has certainly not been 

trivial. The long tradition of state and private responsiblity in higher education and the ideological and programmatic implications of federal aid 

have often created powerful constraints cm expansion of the federal role. At various times major 

opposition has arisen from Jacksonian Democrats, 

from rural Republicans, and from business organizations. Each successfully blocked important federal involvement for years. What is more, the 

57 
structure of our political institutions, especially 

Congress, has enhanced the position of aid opponents. The numerous organizational hurdles 

make it possible for a committed minority to successfully check enlargement of the federal role. 

Such difficulties led one author to entitle his book 

on federal aid to education, Obstacle Course on 

CopitoJ HiJJ.zs 

The major effect of this pattern of opposition 

has been to reinforce the categorical aid approach 

in federal higher education assistance. As was 

shown, federal aid evolved in a series of specific 

programs directed at those needs enjoying relatively little controversy. In the beginning, this 

meant that federal involvement developed indirectly or sideways-involving higher education, 

but for reasons largely apart from it. As these programs gained acceptance, more recent legislation 

could address education directly, though continuing the categorical approach of identifying individual programs with least opposition or 

strongest backing. James Sundquist described this 

strategy in the Higher Education Facilities Act: 

[T]he tacticians had learned Ihy 

19631. The National Defense Education 

Act had shown that special purpose aid, 

carefully designed, could be enacted at 

a time when general purpose aid could 

not be. A special purpose approach would 

make it possible for the tacticians to 

probe, jockey, negotiate, and compromise on a wide range of separable and 

lesser programs, and the antagonists 

could move quietly away from the irreconcilable positions .zg 

The Christmas tree elements of the omnibus 

Higher Education Act of 1965 and the 1972,1976, 

and 1989 amendments affiim that this approach 

is alive and well. 

The position of federal aid opponents appears 

much weaker today than was generally true in the 

past. An important federal role in assistance to 

higher education is established and generally accepted today. 

The accumulation of categorical programs has 

affected this political balance on federal aid in 

two ways: First, it has tended to erode the position 

assumed by the most resolute and ideological aid 

opponents. Despite problems, which are mostly 

recent, federal aid has not simply and automatically brought the destruction of higher education 

or destroyed its independence. Secondly, federal 

aid programs have created clienteles and beneficiaries committed to their preservation and expansion. This process began soon after the MorrilJ 

Act, as farmers and land grant colleges began lobbying for federal research assistance. It continued 

dramatically during the 1960s with the institutionalization of higher education’s organizational 

presence in Washington. 

It is possible, however, that these processes are 

not unalterable. Opposition to expmsion of the 

federal role is not dead, and it could be resumed. 

Higher education’s Washington representatives 

can work to limit federal regulatory conditions as 

well as for increased funding, and the regulatory 

tendencies of recent years are already promoting 

renewed opposition to federal intervention in 

general. 

Budgetary Constraints 

A final limitation on the federal role in higher 

education has been budgetary constraints. Since 

most federal involvement has taken a monetary 

form (and most regulations are in the form of 

grant conditions), the federal role in higher education is dependent upon successful competition 

with alternative uses for available resources. The 

small size of the federal government before World 

War II necessarily meant that the f&d& role 

would be a limited one. 

The Keynesian revolution and higher education’s association with defense-related priorities 

of the postwar era altered this situation considerably, as we have seen. However, budgetary considerations remained a factor in limiting more direct forms of federal assistance. They played a 

major role in President Eisenhower’s opposition 

to construction aid legislation, which he twice 

vetoed in 1959. They were evident again in former 

Rep. Quie’s opposition to institutional aid in 

1972.30 They have been an important factor, as 

well, in the recent leveling off [and, with inflation, relative decline] of federal assistance to basic 

research in colleges and universities. Indeed, 

within the growth of total federal aid to higher 

education, the relative decline of some components, such as institutional aid and research, 

reflect considerably the budgetary tradeoffs required by priority-setting. In the 1980 reauthorization of student aid programs--which 

coincided with a Congressional and Presidential 

58 
effort to balance the budget-members of the Senate Budget Committee succeeded in convincing 

the full Senate that a bill hammered out in a 

House-Senate conference committee, which had 

strong support in the House and in the Senate 

subcommittee that authorizes higher education 

programs, was too expensive. The Senate voted 

the bill back to conference committee, where several significant cost-saving measures were finally 

agreed upon, although the legislation still represents an expansion in student aid benefits. 

The impact of budgetary concerns is also evident in the recent expansion of regulatory programs. Whereas earlier programs delivered new 

federal aid to stimulate activities of federal interest, the current tendency is to add conditions and 

mandates to existing grants, forcing recipients to 

address the monetary consequences themselves. 

FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN 

HIGHER EDUCATION: 

SPECULATION ON THE FUTURE 

The future direction of the federal role in higher 

education appears uncertain at this time. Many of 

the forces that helped to form the current federal 

role continue to be active. Balanced against these, 

however, are a number of countervailing forces 

that may be gaining importance. The result could 

be a period of flux in the evolution of the federal 

mb?. 

The pressures for additional federal involvement remain numerous. The complexity and interdependence of society and technology continue to increase. In the past these developments 

tended to stimulate growth in higher education. 

For example, growing demand for tasks such as 

basic research imply a greater federal role in this 

area. The fiscal 1979 budget substantially increased this function.31 In addition, continued rising costs in higher education generate demands 

for additional relief for middle income families, 

as evidenced by proposals for tuition tax credits 

and the passage in 1978 of the Middle Income 

Student Assistance Act. Finally, the higher education policy subsystem can be expected to continue to gain strength. Because it became institutionalized only in the last 10 to 15 years, the 

subsystem’s internal division, apparent in 197Os, 

may be merely a temporary reflection of its recent 

origins.32 

On the other hand, a number of developments 

imply a smaller federal role in higher education. 

Most important are demographic changes which 

will cause declining enrollments over the next 15 

years or so: 

Between 1980 and 1994, for example, 

there will be a 25% decline in the traditional college-age group. Barring other 

student clienteles, this decline could 

mean a drop in full-time equivalent enrollments of 1.8 million students during 

the period in question, resulting in a reduction in total faculty size of 100,000.33 

Changes in the labor force may reinforce declining demand, as many fields requiring higher education may become saturated. In a different vein, 

there has also been erosion of the major rationales 

of federal assistance. In research, for instance, 

connection with defense no longer yields certain 

dollars. Space research has fallen sharply since 

the 1960s. In student aid, reverse discrimination 

controversies and cases, as well as middle income 

demands for financial relief, may indicate a weakening of broad citizen support for equal opportunity programs. Budgetary constraints have 

grown increasingly salient. All of these developments imply lower popular support for higher education programs, thus diminishing political incentives to develop new programs. Finally, facing 

increased regulation, federal grant recipients have 

grown more circumspect regarding federal aid. 

Their disillusionment may undermines a previous 

tendency to seek additional aid. 

At the very least, these factors would suggest 

an unclear future facing federal aid to higher education. 

FOOTNOTES 

’ Gladieux and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, p. 13. 

The entrepreneurial character of these Presidential innovations in educational policy is also suggested by Samuel Beer. 

He asserts that the decision by Presidents Kennedy and 

Johnson to stress educational pmgrams in their legislative 

agendas gave “. a significant new imprint to public policy 

and present-day liberalism. Going over the main Kennedy programs I counted fully a third that made education in mme form a central element. And, it hardly need 

be said, the priority given education has only increased under President Johnson.” In Samuel Beer, “Liberalism and the 

National Idea," Public Interest 5, Fall 1966, pp. 162-163. 
z King, op. cit., p. 57. Gladieux end Wolanin agree that: “[Development of higher education policy in the Nixon Administration] was a largely self-contained exercise that took 

place almost entirely out of Congressional and public view, 

an extreme example of what has been called the ‘secret legislative process of the executive branch.’ ” Congress and the 

Colleges, op. cit., p. 59. 

3lbid., p. xi. 

’ “It is clear that by the mid-1960s, federal policymaking for 

higher education had achieved the status of a policy arena. 

It had a basic legislative charter and specialized legislative, 

executive, and lobbying institutions all focused on the federal programs for general support to higher education.” 

Ibid., p. 183. 

S,anet Hook, “Compromise Student-Loan Plan Voted by 

House-Senate Conferences,” op. cit., p. 17. 

6Fishe1 and Pottker, op. cit., p. 154. 

‘Freeman, op. cit., pp. 222-223, 22th 

6 As head of the Women’s Bureau, Peterson had been equally 

important in the formation of the President’s Commission 

on the Status of Women in 1961. The Commission later gavel 

rise to the Citizens Advisory Commission on the Status of 

Women and to the 50 state commissions. See Ibid., p, 52. 

s Fishel and Pottker, op. cit., p. 2. 

‘I This is equally true in the politics of spending, None of the 

case studies identified the Office of Education as an impartant source of policy initiatives. Despite expansion and the 

addition of major new program responsibilities in the last 

20 years, it was long seen as hidebound and unimaginative. 

As Wolanin wrote in 1977: “Overload is the critical problem 

at the Office of Education. Created in 1867, it was far almost 

100 years a quiet federal backwater. But beginning as a 

steady stream in the 1950s and growing to a torrent in the 

1960s, the Office of Education was deluged with new programs and responsibilities. An old line bureau, low in prestige, understaffed, with archaic management practices and 

a service orientation, was suddenly asked to undertake major responsibilities for operations on the cutting edge of a 

new domestic agenda.” Thomas Wolanin, “Congress, I&rmatian, and Policymaking for Postsecondary Education,” 

Federalism at the Crossroads, Washington, DC, Institute for 

Educational Leadership. George Washington University, 

1977, p. 92. 

” Interestingly enough. an identical pattern developed in the 

formulation of regulations to enforce Section 594. Mark Engebretsan writes: “Given the opportunity to write an a clean 

slate in the area of discrimination against the handicapped, 

ORC elected to rely on its experience in enforcing statutes 

barring discrimination on the basis of race and sex, eventually drafting regulations paralleling earlier enactments.” 

See Mark Engebretson, “Administrative Action to End Discrimination Based on Handicap: HEW’s Section 504 Regulation,” Howard Journal on Legislation 16, Winter 1979, p. 

89. 

r2 Fishel and Pottker. op. cit., p. 145. 

I3 As Nie and Verba observe: “Studies have shown that Democrats do differ from ‘Republicans on many issues, and such 

differences date back to early surveys before World War II. 

The differences have been clear, especially an the kinds of 

welfare and economic issues associated with the New Deal,” 

pp. 194-195. Data presented on page 188 show that the correlation between “size of government” issues and party vote 

is stranger and more consistent than the correlation between 

most other issues. Norman Nie and Sidney Verba. The 

Changing American Voter, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1976. 

I4 Democratic platforms expressed full support for federal aid 

to education from 1944 on. Republican platforms ezmlicitlv 

opposed it as recently as 1952; but supported aid f& cl& 

room construction in 1956 and 1960. See Arthur Scblesinger, Jr., ed., History of American Presidential Elections 

1769-1968, Vol. IV, New York, NY, McGraw-Hill, 1971, pp. 

2955, 3040. 3044, 3152, 3278, 3290, 3373.3393, 3495. 

Is ‘Interview: Ernest L. Bayer,” Educational Record 61, Winter 

1980, p. 5. 

‘* Gladieux and Wolanin, “Federal Politics.” pp. 208-211. 

I7 Fishel and Pottker, op. cit., p. 154. 

InIbid.. p. 133. 

‘~Free”la”, op. cit., p. 239. 

zo See, for instance, Philip Meranto, The Politics of Fedeml 

Aid to Education in 1965, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1967, pp. 42-47, who compiled survey data on 

attitudes towards federal aid to education for various years 

between 1943-65. In all of these years, the percentage favoring federal aid fell below 65% only three times. Although 

additional data gathered by Frank Munger indicate that this 

popular support for the general concept of aid was soft 

(since it obscures important divisions among aid supporters 

on who should receive such aid and for what purposes), the 

enormously favorable public reaction to the passage ofESEA 

in 1965 suggests that, despite divided preferences, the public was willing to accept a broad range of aid alternatives. 

(In 1966, 90% of the public approved passage of aid to education. See Sundquist, op. cit., p. 496.1 

I’ Sundquist, op. cit., p. 496. 

1z William Watts and Lloyd Free, eds., State of the Nation, 

New York, NY, Universe Books, 1973 and 1974. pp. 295, 

324. In 1973, only 11% of respondents wanted federal 

spending for college scholarships reduced or ended, in 1974 

only 5% did. The exact question reads: “Now I am going to 

read off the names of some programs the federal government 

in Washington is helping to finance. As I mention each pmgram please tell me whether you feel the amo”nt of tax 

money now being spent for each should be increased, kept 

at the present level, reduced, or ended altogether: Federal 

programs to make a college education possible for young 

people who could not otherwise afford it?” 

23Fishel and Pattker, op. cit., p. 137. 

2’ Quoted in Rainsford, op. cit., p. vi. 

26 An ACE statement 1969 maintained that: “A century ago 

responsibility for higher education might well have been 

regarded as a state or local concern As we approach the end 

of the 29th Century higher education has become a national 

asset and a national responsibility. Our college-trained population has become so mobile that no individual state or 

region can be assured that its investment in advanced education will provide commensurate returns.” (From Gladieux 

and Wolanin, Congress and the Colleges, pp. 44-45.) In Financing Pastsecondary Education in the United States, the 

National Commission on Financing of Postsecondary Education similarly observes: “It is frequently argued that states 

may be unwilling to provide sufficient financing because 

they are concerned only with the interests of, and benefits 

to their awn future residents and cannot be asked to respond 

to national work-farce needs that are not evident locally.” 

National Commission, op. cit., p. 105. 

26 For example, the National Commission on the Financing of 

Postsecondary Education asserts: “To the extent that states 

try to meet their citizens’ needs by providing low-price public collegiate institutions. they cause financial distress for 

private institutions, which they are often discouraged from 

aiding for political and constitutional reasons.” Ibid. 

z7 See Kingman Brewster, op. cit. 

28 Rober Bendiner, Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill, New York. 

NY, McGraw-Hill, 1964. 

zy Sundquist, op. cit., p. 206. 

3o See also the opposition of former Rep. James O’Hara @MI) 

to proposals far reducing the publiclprivate college tuition 

60 
gap, based on budgetary criteria. Gladieux and Wolrmin, 

“Federal Politics,” op. cit., p. 205. 

s’ Thomas O’Toole, “Carter Vows to Beef Up Nation’s Research 

Effort,” The Washington Post, January 20, 1978, p. A& 

31 According to one report, “Hill staffers who work on education bills mark 1972 as the turning paint in the growth 

and sophistication of federal relations officers.” Certainly 

the process of institutional representation is continuing to 

unfold. At least 100 educational institutions were reported 

to have opened their own Washington offices or hired Washington representatives by ~180. Commuting traffic has also 

grow,,. See Donald Baker and Bar, Barnes, “ColleSe Lobbyists Flocking Here in Quest of Funds,” The Washington 

Post, January 28, 1980, p. Al. 

33 Allan Cartter and Lewis Solomon, “Implications for Faculty,“The Financial State ofHigher Education, 1976. a special report by Change 8. September 1976, p. 37. 

61 
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