IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 7, 2023 Session

IN RE RYLEE L. ET AL.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Warren County 

No. JV2794 Brandon J. Cox, Judge

No. M2023-00487-COA-R3-PT

In the course of two separate dependency and neglect proceedings, a mother and father 

were found to have committed severe child abuse on their two children. In this termination 

proceeding, the trial court found that the grounds for termination of (1) severe child abuse, 

and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or 

financial responsibility of the children had been proven and that it was in the children’s 

best interest to terminate their parents’ parental rights. The parents appealed. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which W. NEAL MCBRAYER

and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.

Walter Alan Rose, Tullahoma, Tennessee, for the appellants, Cassie L. and Austin L.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Jordan Keith Crews, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s 

Services.

OPINION

Cassie L. (“Mother”) and Austin L. (“Father”) (collectively “the appellants”) are 

married and are the biological parents of Rylee L. (born in 2019) and Stormy L. (born in 

2021). On August 2, 2020, Father was involved in a single-car accident. Blood taken from 

Father at the scene of the accident tested positive for methamphetamine, fentanyl, 

amphetamine, and ketamine. As a result, police arrested Father and charged him with 

driving under the influence, and the Department of Children’s Services (“the Department” 

or “DCS”) received a report that Rylee was a drug-exposed child.

12/14/2023
- 2 -

On August 7, 2020, DCS filed a petition alleging that Rylee was dependent and 

neglected and requesting that she be placed in the sole custody of Mother. That same day, 

the juvenile court entered an order placing Rylee in Mother’s sole custody subject to a 

protective supervision plan that required Mother to maintain regular contact with DCS, 

comply with random drug screens, complete anger management and individual therapy, 

submit to a parenting assessment and follow all resulting recommendations, and obtain and 

maintain safe and stable housing. When Mother failed to comply with the August 7 order, 

the court entered an order on October 12, 2020, placing Rylee in DCS custody. Two days 

later, Mother and Rylee submitted to hair follicle drug screens, and both returned positive 

for methamphetamine, hydrocodone, and oxycodone. On July 2, 2021, the trial court 

entered an order adjudicating Rylee dependent and neglected and finding that she was the 

victim of severe child abuse perpetrated by Mother and Father. Neither parent appealed 

this order.

Mother became pregnant with Stormy while the dependency and neglect 

proceedings for Rylee were pending. During the third month of the pregnancy, Mother 

and Father submitted to hair follicle drug screens. Mother’s screen returned positive for 

methamphetamine, and Father’s returned positive for methamphetamine, hydrocodone, 

and oxycodone. A little over a month before Stormy was born, both parents again 

submitted to hair follicle drug screens. This time both parents were positive for 

methamphetamine, hydrocodone, and oxycodone. Thus, when Stormy was born, DCS 

received a report alleging that she had been exposed to drugs.

The Department filed a petition alleging that Stormy was dependent and neglected 

and requesting that she be placed in DCS custody. The court entered an order on December 

31, 2021, placing Stormy in DCS custody. On May 23, 2022, the trial court entered an 

order adjudicating Stormy dependent and neglected and finding that she was a victim of 

severe child abuse perpetrated by Mother and Father. Neither parent appealed this order.

During the custodial period, DCS created four permanency plans for Mother and 

Father that were all ratified by the court. The plans’ requirements included the following: 

submit to random drug screens; complete an alcohol and drug assessment and follow the 

recommendations; refrain from abusing prescription medications and alcohol; complete 

domestic violence classes; complete a psychological evaluation and follow the 

recommendations; complete a parenting assessment and parenting classes; obtain and 

maintain suitable housing; allow DCS to conduct home visits; obtain and provide proof of 

legal means of income; maintain contact with DCS; attend scheduled visits with the 

children; and attend anger management classes. 

The Department attempted to help the parents complete the requirements of the 

permanency plans. Nevertheless, Mother and Father completed very little. Most 

importantly, Mother and Father did not comply with the requirements relating to their 

substance abuse issues. Both refused to submit to several drug screens for DCS, and they 
- 3 -

failed several of the ones to which they did submit. Mother and Father both completed an 

alcohol and drug assessment early on in the custodial period, but DCS required them both 

to complete a second alcohol and drug assessment when they continued failing drug 

screens. Neither completed a second alcohol and drug assessment. Father was required to 

submit to drug screens for the Recovery Court program he was in, and he passed the drug 

screens administered through that program. Those drug screens, however, did not include 

a test for methamphetamine like the ones administered by DCS, which Father failed.

On October 20, 2022, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights. After a one-day trial, the trial court entered an order terminating Mother’s 

and Father’s parental rights on the grounds of severe child abuse and failure to manifest an 

ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the 

children. In the order, the court further determined that termination of Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A parent has a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 

2010) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921 

S.W.2d 170, 174-75 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn. 

1994)). This right is not absolute. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. The Tennessee 

General Assembly has, by statute, established “‘those situations in which the state’s interest 

in the welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent’s constitutional rights by setting 

forth grounds on which termination proceedings can be brought.’” In re Jacobe M.J., 434 

S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re W.B., IV., Nos. M2004-00999-COAR3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 

2005)).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 establishes the grounds and 

proceedings by which parental rights may be terminated. Initially, a petitioner must prove 

that at least one termination ground exists. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1); In re Angela 

E., 303 S.W.3d at 251. The petitioner must then prove that it is in the child’s best interest

to terminate the parents’ rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2); In re Valentine, 79 

S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002). “In light of the interests and consequences at stake, parents 

are constitutionally entitled to fundamentally fair procedures [] in termination 

proceedings.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 522 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Santosky v. 

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982)). 

As our Supreme Court has stated:

Among the constitutionally mandated fundamentally fair procedures[]

is a heightened standard of proof—clear and convincing evidence. Santosky, 
- 4 -

455 U.S. at 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388. This standard minimizes the risk of 

unnecessary or erroneous governmental interference with fundamental 

parental rights. Id.; In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596 (Tenn. 2010). 

Clear and convincing evidence enables the fact-finder to form a firm belief 

or conviction regarding the truth of the facts, and eliminates any serious or 

substantial doubt about the correctness of these factual findings.” In re 

Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596 (citations omitted). The clear-andconvincing-evidence standard ensures that the facts are established as highly 

probable, rather than as simply more probable than not. In re Audrey S., 182 

S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 660 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

Id. Thus, on appeal, we apply the following principles:

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s findings of fact in termination 

proceedings using the standard of review in Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). In re 

Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246. Under 

Rule 13(d), appellate courts review factual findings de novo on the record 

and accord these findings a presumption of correctness unless the evidence 

preponderates otherwise. In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596; In re M.L.P., 

281 S.W.3d 387, 393 (Tenn. 2009); In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 

793, 809 (Tenn. 2007). In light of the heightened burden of proof in 

termination proceedings, however, the reviewing court must make its own 

determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and 

convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights. 

In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d at 596-97. The trial court’s ruling that the 

evidence sufficiently supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion 

of law, which appellate courts review de novo with no presumption of 

correctness. In re M.L.P., 281 S.W.3d at 393 (quoting In re Adoption of 

A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d at 810). Additionally, all other questions of law in 

parental termination appeals, as in other appeals, are reviewed de novo with 

no presumption of correctness. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 246.

Id. at 523-24.

ANALYSIS

I. Termination grounds.

In their brief, the appellants state that they “do not dispute the grounds for 

termination of their parental rights. . . .” Indeed, they did not raise as error the determination 

that grounds for termination exist. Instead, they argued that the children’s best interest does 
- 5 -

not require termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Yet, “in an appeal from 

an order terminating parental rights the Court of Appeals must review the trial court’s 

findings as to each ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s 

best interests, regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on appeal.” Id. at 

525-26. The appellants’ attorney knew of this requirement; he cited the Carrington case in 

his brief. He did not, however, seek to aid this court by bestowing upon us his thoughts 

about the grounds beyond saying they were not contested.1 Failing to raise an issue in the 

listing of issues in an appellate brief would ordinarily be considered a waiver of the issue. 

See Augustin v. Bradley Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 598 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019) 

(stating that “issues that are not properly designated are generally waived even when 

argued in the body of the brief”); see also Newcomb v. Kohler Co., 222 S.W.3d 368, 401 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that a party’s failure “to cite to any authority or to construct 

an argument regarding [a] position on appeal constitutes waiver of that issue”). Under the 

requirements of Carrington, though, we must dive into the cold words of the record to 

ascertain the validity of the grounds.

Severe Child Abuse

The trial court terminated both parents’ parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 36-1-113(g)(4), which states that a parent’s rights may be terminated when:

The parent . . . has been found to have committed severe child abuse, as 

defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found by the 

court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition for 

adoption to have committed severe child abuse against any child[.]

(Emphasis added). Thus, a petitioner may establish this ground by showing that the parent 

was found to have committed severe child abuse in “any prior order of a court.” Nothing 

more need be proved. 

“Dependency and neglect proceedings are separate and distinct from proceedings to 

terminate parental rights.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 536. We have “repeatedly 

applied the doctrine of res judicata to prevent a parent from re-litigating whether he or she 

committed severe child abuse in a termination of parental rights proceeding when such a 

finding has already been made in a previous dependency and neglect action.” In re Kylea 

K., No. E2017-02097-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3084530, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 

2018); see also, e.g., In re Dakota C.R., 404 S.W.3d 484, 497 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012); In re 

Heaven L.F., 311 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2010). Pursuant to the doctrine 

of res judicata, “‘an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or 

 

1 We commend the attorneys for the Department of Children’s Services for noting Carrington and 

addressing the grounds for termination in their brief.
- 6 -

collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights, questions and 

facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the fraud or collusion, 

by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights, questions and facts in issue 

as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial 

tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.’” In re Heaven L.F., 311 S.W.3d at 439 (quoting 

Galbreath v. Harris, 811 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990)).

All the requirements of res judicata are met in this case. In the Warren County 

Juvenile Court’s July 1, 2021 order adjudicating Rylee dependent and neglected, the court 

found that both parents committed severe child abuse on Rylee2 under Tenn. Code Ann. § 

37-1-102(b)(27)(E) (“Knowingly or with gross negligence allowing a child under eight (8) 

years of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled substance that results in the child 

testing positive on a drug screen, except as legally prescribed to the child[.]”). Similarly, 

in the Warren County Juvenile Court’s May 24, 2022 order adjudicating Stormy dependent 

and neglected, the court found that both parents committed severe child abuse on Stormy 

under Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(27)(E). Neither order has been appealed. The orders 

are final.

We affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights based on the ground of 

severe child abuse.

Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Personally Assume Custody 

or Financial Responsibility of the Children

Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14), parental rights may be terminated when:

A parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and 

willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial 

responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and 

physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or 

psychological welfare of the child[.]

“If a person seeking to terminate parental rights proves by clear and convincing 

proof that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the 

first prong of the statute is satisfied.” In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 677 (Tenn. 2020) 

(emphasis in original). Here, DCS showed that ability and willingness was lacking in both 

parents. Neither parent could remain consistently employed. Both Mother and Father have 

thwarted most of the Department’s efforts to inspect their home, but the one inspection 

they permitted did not reveal a home that was safe, clean, and ready for two young children. 

Rather, the home was “noticeably dirty,” with boxes of “stuff” laying around, and food on 

the kitchen counter. One could see through the kitchen floor in places, and “[y]ou could 

 

2 The order mistakenly spells her name “Riley.”
- 7 -

practically fall through it” in other spots. Both parents failed to cooperate with drug tests, 

and the proof gives this Court little confidence that they have overcome their addictions. 

Mother even failed a drug screen two months before trial. 

These facts also support a finding that neither parent has manifested a willingness 

to assume custody or financial responsibility for the children, a finding that requires 

concrete actions, not mere words. Furthermore, over two years after DCS took custody of 

Rylee, both parents are nowhere near completing their permanency plan tasks. Father is 

farther along than Mother, but his efforts are recent. These parents have not shown any real 

interest in the children. They have not inquired about the children or their needs. The 

parents’ attendance at scheduled visitations was poor. Mother was late for approximately 

20 visits, on time for approximately 6, and missed approximately 14. Father was late for 

20 visits, on time for approximately 8, and missed approximately 12. Neither parent has 

made more than token payments for child support unless compelled by jail placement or 

IRS intercept. 

As for the second prong of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14), “placing the child 

in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the 

physical or psychological welfare of the child,” the DCS social worker testified that Mother 

had not maintained sobriety and that “the department cannot see sobriety” in Father. The 

social worker also noted the parents’ failures to complete the requirements of their 

permanency plans. These facts establish a situation where there was a risk of substantial 

harm.

We affirm the termination of both parents’ parental rights based on the ground of 

failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial 

responsibility of the children.

II. Best Interest of the Children

When examining the best interest of the children in the termination of parental rights 

context, we are directed by statute to consider the nonexclusive factors listed in Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1). The statute enumerates factors that the court “shall consider,” In re 

Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 251, but a court is not required to find that each of the enumerated 

factors exists before concluding that it is in the best interest of the child to terminate a 

parent’s rights. In re M.A.R., 183 S.W.3d 652, 667 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). The statute 

similarly does not call for a mechanical determination of each of the statute’s factors, but 

rather the relevancy and weight of each factor will be unique to each case. In re Marr, 194 

S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Therefore, in certain circumstances, the 

consideration of one factor may be determinative. Id. (citing In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 

838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005)). However, this does not relieve a court of its duty to 

consider each factor and, even in cases where one factor is outcome determinative, the 
- 8 -

court must consider all factors and relevant proof that a party offers. In re Gabriella D., 

531 S.W.3d 662, 682 (Tenn. 2017).

In the best interest analysis, the facts considered must be proven by “‘a 

preponderance of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence.’” Id. at 681 (quoting 

In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tenn. 2015)). “‘After making the underlying factual 

findings, the trial court should then consider the combined weight of those facts to 

determine whether they amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the 

child’s best interest[s].’” Id. (quoting In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555). We will 

examine each factor in turn.

Factor A concerns “[t]he effect a termination of parental rights will have on the 

child’s critical need for stability and continuity of placement throughout the child’s 

minority.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(A). Rylee has flourished in the pre-adoptive 

foster home. Stormy has never lived with her parents. They live in a safe and stable 

environment.

Factor B considers “[t]he effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is 

likely to have on the child’s emotional, psychological, and medical condition.” Id. 36-1-

113(i)(1)(B). The social worker testified that Rylee would backslide after seeing her 

parents and told of a highly negative reaction Rylee had when she thought she was going 

to see her parents. The social worker testified that a change in caretakers would also be 

detrimental to Stormy, who has never lived with her parents and is bonded with the foster 

parents. Furthermore, Stormy has several medical conditions that require treatment and 

vigilance. Neither parent has shown an interest in her condition.

Next, under Factors C and D, neither parent knows the needs of the children. As the 

social worker testified, a bond “just does not exist,” and she did not believe it would 

develop. See id. 36-1-113(i)(1)(C), (D) (“Whether the parent has demonstrated continuity 

and stability in meeting the child’s basic material, educational, housing, and safety needs;” 

and “[w]hether the parent and child have a secure and healthy parental attachment, and if 

not, whether there is a reasonable expectation that the parent can create such attachment.”).

Factor E regards “[w]hether the parent has maintained regular visitation or other 

contact with the child and used the visitation or other contact to cultivate a positive 

relationship with the child.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(E). As noted previously, the parents had 

poor attendance at scheduled visitations. Mother was late for approximately 20 visits, on 

time for approximately 6, and missed approximately 14. Father was late for 20 visits, on 

time for approximately 8, and missed approximately 12. There were some visits where the 

children were upset. At least one visit ended early because the parents could not handle 

Stormy.
- 9 -

Factor F considers “[w]hether the child is fearful of living in the parent’s home.” Id. 

§ 36-1-113(i)(1)(F). The record contains no evidence regarding this factor.

Next, Factor G looks at “[w]hether the parent, parent’s home, or others in the 

parent’s household trigger or exacerbate the child’s experience of trauma or post-traumatic 

symptoms.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(G). The social worker believed that putting Rylee back in 

the home from which she was removed “would create a trauma trigger for her.”

Factor H concerns “[w]hether the child has created a healthy parental attachment 

with another person or persons in the absence of the parent.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(H). The 

social worker testified that Rylee had a very strong parental attachment to her foster 

parents, and Rylee refers to them as Mommy and Daddy. Foster mother testified that “we

do everything as a family together. We’re a unit.” Stormy is also bonded with the foster 

parents and to Rylee. 

Factor I considers “[w]hether the child has emotionally significant relationships 

with persons other than parents and caregivers, including biological or foster siblings, and 

the likely impact of various available outcomes on these relationships and the child’s access 

to information about the child’s heritage.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(I). Rylee enjoys ballet. She 

has many friends at church and daycare, and she has lots of cousins who are also friends. 

She has two sets of grandparents who love her. Rylee and Stormy are closely bonded. 

Stormy is also close to members of foster mother’s family.

Next, under Factor J, we consider “[w]hether the parent has demonstrated such a 

lasting adjustment of circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it safe and beneficial 

for the child to be in the home of the parent, including consideration of whether there is 

criminal activity in the home or by the parent, or the use of alcohol, controlled substances, 

or controlled substance analogues which may render the parent unable to consistently care 

for the child in a safe and stable manner.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(J). Neither parent has 

demonstrated a lasting adjustment, and they have completed few of the requirements of 

their permanency plans. Instead, they have mostly been uncooperative. On October 27, 

2021, Father pled guilty to driving on a revoked driver’s license, first offense, and to 

violating the financial responsibility law. Mother failed a drug screen two months before 

trial.

Factor K concerns “[w]hether the parent has taken advantage of available programs, 

services, or community resources to assist in making a lasting adjustment of circumstances, 

conduct, or conditions.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(K). As noted, neither parent has completed 

the requirements of the permanency plans. They were offered a number of ways to receive 

various assessments. Mother completed virtually none and lied on the one she did 

complete. Father has gone through the drug court program, but he has not completed the 

requirements of the permanency plans.
- 10 -

Next, Factor L looks at “[w]hether the department has made reasonable efforts to 

assist the parent in making a lasting adjustment in cases where the child is in the custody 

of the department.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(L). The Department created permanency plans, 

administered drug screens, arranged supervised visits for the parents, gave the parents 

contact information for various providers. and obtained funding for some examinations.

Factor M concerns “[w]hether the parent has demonstrated a sense of urgency in 

establishing paternity of the child, seeking custody of the child, or addressing the 

circumstance, conduct, or conditions that made an award of custody unsafe and not in the 

child’s best interest.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(M). Neither parent has demonstrated a sense of 

urgency. They have completed little to none of the requirements of the permanency plans, 

and the social worker testified that they are basically back to square one on them.

Factor N pertains to “[w]hether the parent, or other person residing with or 

frequenting the home of the parent, has shown brutality or physical, sexual, emotional, or 

psychological abuse or neglect toward the child or any other child or adult.” Id. § 36-1-

113(i)(1)(N). The juvenile court found that both parents perpetrated severe child abuse on 

both children.

Factor O considers “[w]hether the parent has ever provided safe and stable care for 

the child or any other child.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(O). By court order, Stormy was removed 

from her parents’ custody the day after she was born. During Mother’s pregnancy with 

Stormy, Mother and Father failed two drug tests. When Rylee was almost a year old, she 

failed a drug test. Exposure to drugs is not part of a safe or stable environment.

Factor P looks at “[w]hether the parent has demonstrated an understanding of the 

basic and specific needs required for the child to thrive.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(P). The social 

worker testified that the parents had “a lack of interest in the children and what their needs 

are throughout the 28 months of this case.” Neither parent ever reached out to the social 

worker, even once, to check on the children. Moreover, the parents have not demonstrated 

an understanding of Stormy’s unique medical conditions that require special care and 

vigilance. 

Factor Q considers “[w]hether the parent has demonstrated the ability and 

commitment to creating and maintaining a home that meets the child’s basic and specific 

needs and in which the child can thrive.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(Q). The one home inspection 

permitted showed the home to be dirty and dangerous. The social worker has not been 

allowed inside since that inspection. The parents have not followed the permanency plans 

and have not taken the required parenting classes.

Factor R considers “[w]hether the physical environment of the parent’s home is 

healthy and safe for the child.” Id. § 36-1-113(i)(1)(R). A dirty home with holes in the 

floors is neither healthy nor safe.
- 11 -

As to Factors S and T, the parents occasionally made token payments, but the only 

significant payments were due to incarceration for failure to pay child support and an IRS 

intercept. Lastly, both parents told the social worker that they were depressed and stated 

that their drug usage was linked to their mental health. Absent appropriate treatment, no 

reason has been offered in the record that anything would change. See id. § 36-1-

113(i)(1)(S), (T) (“Whether the parent has consistently provided more than token financial 

support for the child,” and “[w]hether the mental or emotional fitness of the parent would 

be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent from consistently and effectively providing 

safe and stable care and supervision of the child.”). 

During oral argument, the parents’ attorney made a rather strident argument that 

drug addicted parents need more time to make the changes necessary to regain custody of 

their children. The best interest analysis, however, is intended to ascertain the best interest 

of the children, not the parents. Furthermore, “the prompt and permanent placement of the 

child in a safe environment is presumed to be in the child’s best interest.” Id. § 36-1-

113(i)(2). No proof in the record rebuts this statutory presumption. 

We agree with the trial court that clear and convincing evidence supports the 

determination that termination of the parents’ parental rights is in the best interest of Rylee 

and Stormy.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against

the appellants, Austin L. and Cassie L., for which execution may issue if necessary.

_/s/ Andy D. Bennett________________

 ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE