An Evaluation of Railroad Safety

May 1978

NTIS order #PB-281169
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 78-600051

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402
T ECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT B OAR D

Congress of the United State s

RUSSELL W. Peterso n

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS., CHAIRMAN DIRECTOR

LARRY WINN, JR., KANS., VICE CHAIRMAN O FFICE OF T ECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT DANIEL DESIMON E

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C. OLIN E. TEAGUE, TEX.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

ADLAI E. STEVENSON, ILL. MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ. W ASHINGTO N, D.C. 2051 0

CLIFFORD P. CASE, N.J. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.

TED STEVENS, ALASKA CLARENCE E. MILLER, OHIO

ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH JOHN W. WYDLER, N.Y.

RUSSELL W. PETERSON

May 8, 1978

Honorable Howard W. Cannon

Chairman, Committee on Commerce,

Science and Transportation

United States Senat e

Washington, D. C. 20510

Honorable Harley O. Staggers

Chairman, Committee on Interstate

and Foreign Commerce

U. S. House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

Gent lemen:

On behalf of the Board of the Office of Technology Assessment,

we are pleased to forward the results of the evaluation of railroad

safety requested by your committees in the Federal Railroad Safety

Authorization Act of 1976.

We believe this evaluation will aid congressional deliberation over proposed railroad safety legislation and hope it will add

a constructive dimension to Government treatment of transportation

safety policy and programs.

s &v

Edward M. Kennedy

Chairman

Sincerely,

. . .

111
FOREWORD

The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1976, P.L.

94-348, required the Office of Technology Assessment to evaluate the

effectiveness of Federal efforts to improve the safety of our Nation’s

railroads. This report provides Congress with a comprehensive and

systematic review of railroad safety. It should assist in current and

future legislative deliberations on railroad safety.

The following pages include: an examination of current accident

and cost trends; a review and evaluation of railroad safety laws,

regulations, and inspection programs; and an overview of current

research, development, and voluntary safety programs. Also included

is a discussion of the relationship of safety and economics in the railroad industry and other issues pertinent to today’s safety problems.

This report is one of several OTA assessments related to railroad

problems and perspectives which have been provided to Congress.

RUSSELL W. PETERSON

Director

Office of Technology Assessment

v
OTA Railroad Safety

Advisory Panel

Donald Bennett*

Associate Administrator for Safety

Federal Railroad Administration

Elmer Garner

Chief, Railroad Branch

NationaI Transportation Safety Board

James Hagen

Senior Vice President for Marketing

and Sales

Conrail Corporation

William Harris

Vice President, Research & Test

Department

Association of American Railroads

John H. Mackinnon

Office of Safety Affairs

Office of the Secretary

Department of Transportation

James Martin

Vice President for Operations and

Maintenance

Association of American Railroads

Ed McCulloch

Vice President

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers

Robert Parsons

Associate Administrator for R&D

Federal Railroad Administration

James Snyder

National Legislative Director

United Transportation Union

*Resigned–November 1977.

vi
OTA Railroad Safety

Project Staff

Robert L. Maxwell, Transportation Program Manager

Lemoine V. Dickinson, Jr., Project Director

Lucia Turnbull

Contractors

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company

R. L. Banks and Associates Thomas K. Dyer, Inc. Gibbs and Hill, Inc.

Alper, Schoene, Horkan and Mann Newman and Hermanson’ Co.

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

Kathie S. Boss Joanne Heming
— — —

INTRODUCTION

The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act, Public Law 94-348 enacted on

July 8, 1976, requested an assessment of railroad safety by the Office of Technology

Assessment (OTA). The study objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the

Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 and related laws in improving the safety of the

Nation’s railroads. Eight specific provisions, in addition to those OTA considered

important, were to be examined. These provisions included:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

A cost-benefit analysis of the railroad safety research and development activities under the Federal Railroad Safety Act and related Federal laws;

An evaluation of trends with respect to railroad employee injuries and

casualties, injuries and casualties to other persons, accidents by type and

cause, and such other data as OTA considers necessary to determine any

significant statistical relationship between safety laws and regulations, and accident rates;

A statistical comparison of railroad accidents reported by each railroad for the

10-year period preceding the date of enactment of this Act;

The cost-benefit and effectiveness of accident prevention resulting from the

methodology used and practices employed by Federal and State railroad safety

inspections under Federal railroad safety laws and regulations;

An evaluation of safety inspection activities conducted by the railroad industry;

An evaluation and analysis of industry research and development relating to

railroad safety and accident prevention;

A cost-benefit analysis of the various Federal laws and regulations relating to

railroad safety; and

The need for additional Federal expenditures for improvements in railroad

safety.

This report responds to the eight specific items requested for study in the following manner. Government and industry research and development activities (items 1

and 6) are evaluated in chapter IX. The analysis of accidents and injury trends (item

2) is contained in chapter V; and the evaluation of Federal, State, and industry inspection programs (items 4 and 5) is described in chapter VIII. Chapter VII of the

report examines existing railroad safety laws and regulations (item 7). A separate

report entitled “Analysis of Federal Railroad Laws Administered by the Department

of Transportation and Related Laws” is published as Volume II and is available

through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS). The statistical comparison of individual railroads’ accident data (item 3) was conducted as background

to the study. Due to the voluminous amount of data, this information is not included in this document. And finally, the need for additional Federal action (item 8)

is discussed in the congressional options section contained under each of the issues

discussed in chapter II.

ix
This document contains the results of the OTA study effort. It provides Congress

with an overview of the railroad safety problems and current efforts to improve

railroad safety. In addition, this document summarizes significant railroad safety

issues and policy alternatives open to Government and concerned parties for improving safety. Suggestions for more detailed research are also identified.

In conducting this study, OTA did not perform a detailed cost-benefit analysis of

various railroad safety activities due to a number of data gathering difficulties. For

example, it was not possible to identify the total cost of railroad safety programs

from the Interstate Commerce Commission Uniform System of Accounts. This accounting system was designed for the purpose of economic rate regulation of railroads, and does not contain detailed safety expenditures. Also, some railroads have

internal accounting systems that identify safety costs. However, these systems are

not comparable from railroad to railroad. Further, a large portion of safety prevention costs are common costs, and as such cannot be specifically identified. However,

even though cost-benefit analyses were not performed, an evaluation of various programs, including research and development, and inspections, as well as laws and

regulations, was conducted,

The assistance and expertise of an advisory panel comprised of representatives

from Government agencies, railroad management, and railroad labor was extensively utilized by OTA in the formulation, conduct, and review of the study. The contributions of these individuals and members of their respective organizations were

significant and extremely important to the outcome of the study. In addition to the

advisory panel, numerous other persons associated with the railroad industry,

Government agencies, and railroad labor organizations provided valuable information for the study effort.

Techniques used throughout the study included a review and analysis of pertinent

safety and railroad literature and interviews with Government, industry, suppliers,

and labor officials. A detailed list of the persons interviewed is included in appendix

A. In addition, statistical, computer, and economic analyses were conducted when

possible. However, study efforts which utilized existing data and analyses were

sometimes limited by the inadequacy of information, diffusion of data sources, and

numerous changes in the data over time.

The information provided by the contractors, and the advisory panel, and the

research and interviews conducted by OTA staff, formed the basis for the final

report.

Special thanks and appreciation are extended to the Railroad Safety Advisory

Panel, and to Lawrence M. Mann, R. Lawrence McCaffrey, Jr., Judith A. Hermanson, and Constance B. Newman for their outstanding support and assistance to

OTA throughout the study effort.

x
SUMMARY

The major findings of the OTA evaluation of

railroad safety activities are presented in this

section. The specific findings of the study effort

are included in subsequent sections of this summary.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

For the 9-year period (1966-74), trackcaused train accidents per ton-mile increased 106 percent. In 1975, the basis for

reporting accidents was changed but the

trend of increasing track-caused train accidents continued in 1975 and 1976.

The combination of deferred maintenance

and increased axle loadings (a factor

designed to increase efficiency) appear to

relate to the increases in property losses

resulting from train accidents. A change in

track-related accidents is unlikely to occur

until there are positive economic changes

in the industry.

Total railroad accident costs accounted

for 3.5 percent of total industry operating

revenues, or $575 million, in 1975.

Casualty claims accounted for approximately 45 percent of total safety-related

losses, and property and lading damage

and loss resulting primarily from train accidents also accounted for approximately

45 percent of safety-related losses in 1975.

Clearing wrecks and damage to livestock

accounted for the remaining 10 percent of

safety-related losses.

Over the 10-year period (1966-75), accident costs increased by 38 percent (when

adjusted for inflation). Casualty claims increased by 46 percent during the 10-year

period, and property and lading losses

resulting primarily from train accidents

increased by 21 percent.

The current railroad safety statutory

framework is adequate for addressing

safety problems. However, Federal efforts

to reduce casualties and property losses

have been impaired by the following types

of factors:

● Accident data have not been adequately

used in determining the nature, extent

or reasons for specific safety problems

and in setting priorities for addressing

problems prior to the initiation of

Federal activity;

Measures of effectiveness have not been

designed into current regulatory, inspection, and R&D programs;

Alternative approaches t o the

regulatory process, such as incentive

programs, have not been systematically

considered; and

In certain areas, such as rail-highway

grade crossings, divided jurisdiction-s

among Federal agencies, and among

Federal and State agencies, and railroads have impaired administration of

safety efforts.

6. A review of Federal regulatory, inspection

and research and development activities

has indicated the following:

●

●

●

In certain cases, a clear rationale has

been provided relating standards or

rules to the specific hazard they are intended to address;

The inspection programs resulting from

the 1970 Safety Act do not have had no

affect on the accident rate. Because inspection implementation is based on existing regulation, current inspection

programs and strategies have not effectively dealt with the safety problems

they are perceived to address; and

A majority of effort (Government and

industry) has been directed at the accident problem resulting primarily in

property losses. Less emphasis has been

placed on the casualty problem and no

strategy has been adopted which has

been directed toward the causes of the

casualty problems.

7. Increased cooperation in addressing

railroad safety problems among all concerned parties and Government agencies

should provide substantially greater opportunity for sizable reduction in property

losses and in casualty losses. There is a

positive trend in cooperative efforts on the

xi
casualty problem as demonstrated in re- cooperation among concerned parties is

cent R&D efforts. Because of the complex essential if further efforts to reduce safety

nature of the railroad system, continued losses are to occur.

xii
CONTENTS

Page

1.

II.

III.

Iv.

v.

VI.

VII.

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RAILROAD SAFETY FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Industry Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accident and Cost Data... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Safety Laws and Regulations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inspection Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Research and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hazardous Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rail-Highway Grade-Crossings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Other Rail-Safety Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Safety Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE CONCEPT OF SAFETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Society’s Responses to the Safety Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

On What Basis Does Society Make Judgments About the Acceptable

Levels of Safety? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Who Influences or Makes the Determinations as to Acceptable

Levels of Risk?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

What Conclusions Can Be Drawn About the Concept of Rail Safety?

HISTORICAL INDUSTRY AND SAFETY OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . .

Early Phase of Railroad Safety Activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Recent Railroad Safety Activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RAILROAD SAFETY PICTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Safety of People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Employee Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Train Service and Nontrain Accidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Safety of Property. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

COST ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Railroad Industry Accident Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summary of Accident Cost Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Accident Cost Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Railroad Industry Preventive Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SAFETY LAWS AND REGULATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Purpose of Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Structure of Federal Railroad Safety Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

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. . . .

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... ,

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,.. .

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v

ix

xi

3

3

4

9

11

13

14

14

16

17

21

33

33

36

37

38

41

41

45

53

53

55

57

61

79

79

79

81

84

87

87

87

. . . Xlll
——

CONTENTS—continued

Chapter Page

Placement of Authority.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Types of Authority Conferred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Structure of Federal Railroad Safety Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

VIII. RAILROAD SAFETY INSPECTION PROGRAMS . ...................107

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107

Federal Inspection Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............109

State Participation Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............120

Railroad Inspection Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............122

Motive and Power Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............123

Analysis of Railroad Inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............125

IX. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. . . . ............................13 1

Cooperative Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................133

Railroad Grade-Crossing Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......135

TankCarResearch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..........135

R&DExpenditures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..136

x. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, RAIL-HIGHWAY GRADE-CROSSINGS,

OTHER RAILROAD SAFETY PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....141

Hazardous Materials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........141

Responses to the Problems Associated With the Shipmentof

Hazardous Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................144

Rail-Highway Grade-Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............148

Analysis of Specific Grade-Crossing Safety Activities. . ..............154

Other Railroad Safety Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........157

APPENDIXES

Appendix A—Persons Interviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......165

Appendix B—Accident Reporting Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..............171

Appendix C—RailroadAccident Trends . . . . . . . . . . .......................181

Appendix D—RailroadSafety Inspection Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........189

Appendix E—Responsesto Railroad Safety Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..199

LIST OF TABLES

Table

No. Page

I. Casualties ResultingFrom Class Iand II RailroadAccidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

2. TrainAccidentsandAssociated Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

3. TrainAccidentsbyContributing Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

4. TrainAccidentsbyClass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

xiv
LIST OF TABLES—continued

Table

No.

.5. Derailments by Contributing Cause . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . .

6. Railroad Accident Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . .

7. Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents. ., , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8. Railroad Casualty Data: 1902-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9. Early Safety Laws andAmendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10. Railroad Fatalities1923-31 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11. Chronology of Railroad Safety Legislation and Related Laws. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12. Volume of Intercity Passenger Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13. Railroad Employment Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14. Employment Costs and Railroad Operating Revenues (in millions) . . . . . . . . . .

15. Intercity Freight Transportation Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16. Railroad Rate of Return . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17. Railroad Technology Utilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . , . . . . . . .

18. Casualties by Type of Railroad Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19. Casualties Resulting From Class I and Class II Railroad Accidents . . . . . . . . . . .

20. Train Service Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .

21. Nontrain Accidents . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22. Train Accidents and Associated Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23. Train Accidents . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24. Train Accidents by Contributed Cause. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25. Train Accidents by Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . .

26, Derailments by Contributing Cause. . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,

27. Costs to the Railroad Industry From Railroad Accidents, 1966-75 . . . . . . . . . . .

28. Railroad Accident Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29. Percentage of Total Railroad Accident Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

30. Enforcement Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31. Track Safety Inspection Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . .

32. Operating Practices Safety Inspection Program Benchmarks . . . . . . . , . . . . . . .

33. Motive Power and Equipment Safety Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34. Signal and Train Control Safety Inspection Program Benchmarks . . . . . . . . . . .

35. Hazardous Materials Safety Program Benchmarks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

36. FRA Research and Development Obligations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , . . . .

37. Total FRA Research and Development Office Expenditures for

Safety-Related Research, 1973-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38. AAR Research and Test Budgets, 1974-77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39. FRA Office of Research and Development Approximation of

Safety-Related Expenditures, 1973-76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40. Actions Required To Ensure Safe Rail Shipment of Hazardous Materials . . . . . .

41. Number of Carriers Reporting to MTB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42. Number of Reports Submitted tomb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43. Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials, Spills, or Explosions, All Accidents .

44. Grade-Crossing Safety Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45. Fatalities for All Grade-Crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46. Federal Government Grade-Crossing Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47. Summary of Program Costs and Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48. Title 23 Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49. Railroad Safety Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

7

8

15

42

44

45

45

46

47

47

48

48

49

54

54

57

59

62

65

66

74

75

82

83

83

95

114

116

118

118

120

136

136

137

137

145

146

146

147

149

150

151

155

155

157

xv
List of Figures

figure

No.

1. Train Service Employee Injuries Normalized by Million Man-Hours of

Employment, 1966-74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Nontrain Employee Injuries Normalized by Million Man-Hours of

Employment, 1966-74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. Number of Train Accidents at Thresholds of $750, Inflated, 1966-74 . . . . . . . . .

4. Percentage of Human Factors, Equipment, Track, and Miscellaneous Train

Accidents, Inflated Thresholds, 1966-74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. How Increase in Use of Detection Systems and Incidence of Roller-Type

Bearings Has Dropped Journals Below Car Dynamics Group (Bolsters,

Side-Bearings, Sills, etc. ) as Major Source of Derailments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. Percent of Mainline, Branchlike, and Yard Track Accidents

at Various Thresholds, 1973 Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7. Track Accidents Normalized by Million Gross Ton-Miles: Total,

Bankrupt and Nonbankrupt Roads, 1966 -74. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

58

60

63

66

68

69

71

xvi
Chapter I

RAILROAD SAFETY FINDINGS
Chapter I

RAILROAD SAFETY FINDINGS

INDUSTRY OVERVIEW

The railroad safety problem at the turn

of the century was characterized primarily

by injuries and fatalities; today property

loss and damage are also important.

The railroad predominance in intercity

passenger and freight transportation at the turn

of the century has been substantially eroded

over the decades by changes in transportation

technology and in the economy, and by Government policy toward various transportation

modes. The impacts upon the rail industry have

been several. First, they have caused a substantial reduction in the railroads’ share of intercity

passenger common carrier traffic from 77 percent in 1929 to 6 percent in 1977. Second, while

the railroads’ total freight traffic (freight

revenue ton-miles) increased by 257 percent

from 1929 to 1975, rail share of the intercity

freight market dropped from 75 percent in 1929

to 37 percent in 1975. Finally, railroad employment dropped by 71 percent from 1929 to

1975. Thus, with fewer passengers and fewer

employees but more freight, the rail safety problem has changed its dimensions from being primarily a casualty problem to being both a

casualty and a property loss and damage problem.

The decline in the financial condition of

the rail industry has resulted in less money

being available for maintaining and improving fixed plant in recent decades.

The rate of return after taxes on railroad investment declined from 5.3 percent in 1929 to

1.2 percent in 1975. Railroads have been greatly

impaired in obtaining or generating necessary

capital as a result of this extremely low rate of

return. Moreover, the rail industry has suffered

such low earnings from raiI operations that it

has been unable to generate internally the funds

necessary to maintain and improve its track and

fixed facilities. Estimates of industry-deferred

maintenance have been approximated at $6.6

billion. ’ The combination of these two factors,

low rate of return and low level of internally

generated resources, has resulted in the industry’s estimated need for $14.5 billionz (exclusive of Conrail) as the total amount needed

to normalize the industry track maintenance

level, and to make necessary capital and track

improvement over the next 10 years.

Railroad safety laws at the turn of the

century were directed at specific safety

problems; recent railroad safety laws have

provided broad grants of authority to

Federal agencies.

In the early 1900’s, the railroad safety laws

enacted by Congress were designed to address

specific safety problems or to implement certain

proven safety technologies or practices. Examples of the early legislation include the

Locomotive Inspection Act, the Hours of Service Act, and the Safety Appliances Act. The

more recent safety laws, such as the Federal

Railroad Safety Act of 1970 and the Hazardous

Materials Transportation Act have provided the

Department of Transporation (DOT) broad

regulatory and administrative powers for dealing with “all areas of railroad safety. ”

1 Richard J. Barber, Assoc., The Railroads, Coal and

the National Energy Pla)l: ATI Assess)nent of the issues,

1977, p. 52.

2 ICC Ex Parte 271, September 1977.

3
4 ● Railroad Safety

ACCIDENT AND COST DATA

The safety of the railroad industry as

shown by available accident data* may be

viewed from two perspectives: the safety of

people and the safety of property.

● The safety of people is measured by

the number of casualties (injuries and

fatalities) and the cost of resulting claims.

● The safety of property is measured by

the loss of and damage to railroad equipment, track, and roadbed (estimated), and

the lading (actual). This loss and damage

occurs primarily in collisions, derailments,

and other train accidents.

Safety of People

There was a general decline of casualties during 1966-74’ * of 29 percent for total fatalities

and 19 percent for total injuries, as shown in

table 1, although some fluctuation did occur

during these 9 years. Generally, the casualty

trends decreased from the initial year to a low

point in either 1972 or 1973 and then increased

in 1974.

—During the 9 years, injuries to employees

constituted the largest percentage of total

injuries (74 percent) while fatalities to persons other than employees, passengers, and

trespassers constituted the largest percentage of total fatalities (65 percent). This latter group was made up primarily of persons

killed in grade-crossing accidents.

After adjustments in employee casualties by

man-hours of employment, fatalities remained

the same during 1966-74 and injuries increased

slightly.

* Unless otherwise specified, the data used in this study

were obtained from the Federal Railroad Administration’s

accident data file.

** Public Law 94-348 requested accident data for the 10

years preceding July 1976. The data for 1975 have not been

used in this report for purposes of comparison with the

data of preceding years because of the substantial changes

in the FRA reporting requirements in 1975, which make

direct comparison infeasible.

Table 1 .—Casualties Resulting From Class I and II Railroad Accidents

(Unnormalized)

Employees Passengers Trespassers Other* Total

Year Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Injuries

1966. . . . . . . .

1967. . . . . . . .

1968. . . . . . . .

1969. . . . . . . .

1970. . . . . . . .

1971 . . . . . . . .

1972. . . . . . . .

1973. . . . . . . .

1974. . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . .

Percent total

168 18,651

176 18,055

150 18,116

190 17,255

172 16,285

123 14,191

133 12,973

161 13,511

144 16,002

23

12

11

6

8

16

47

6

7

1,244

1,054

1,329

862

489

536

680

503

574

678

646

628

627

593

551

537

578

565

702

696

663

674

646

607

614

674

1,815

1,649

1,570

1,476

1,452

1,320

1,228

1,171

1,192

1,417 145,079

7.1 74.3

136

0.7

7,271 5,403 5,862 12,873

3.7 27.3 3.0 64.9

4,955

4,718

4,500

4,565

3,907

3,638

3,691

3,577

3.568

37,119

19.0

2,684

2,483

2,359

2,299

2,225

2,010

1,945

1,916

1,908

19,829

100.0

25,552

24,523

24,608

23,356

21,327

18,972

17,930

18,245

20.818

195,331

100.0

● Other includes all persons not included as employees, passengers or trespassers. (This group was made up primarily of

casualties resulting from grade-crossing accidents.)

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration data.
Ch. 1 Railroad Safety Findings ● 5

—During the 9-year period,

of employee injuries were

the major causes Table 2.—Train Accidents and Associated Costs

(Unnormalized)

Major cause

Getting on or off trains. . . . . . . . . . .

Construction and maintenance

of cars and locomotives . . . . . . . .

Construction and maintenance

of track, ties, and rail . . . . . . . . . .

Stumbling, slipping, and falling

(not on train) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Coupling and uncoupling. . . . . . . . .

Flying or falling objects, burns, etc. .

Percent of total

employee injuries

16.6

12.2

8.9

7.9

5.6

4.8

—During the 9-year period, the major causes

of employee fatalities were:

Percent of total

Major cause employee fatalities

Struck or runover at places other

than public rail-highway crossing* 26.7

Various causes of collisions,

derailments, and other train

accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.9

Coupling and uncoupling. . . . . . . . . 7.0

Stumbling, slipping, and falling

(while on train). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.8

Getting on or off trains. . . . . . . . . . . 5.2

Construction and maintenance

of cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 3.7

● Includes those employees killed while walking or

working along track.

Of all the employee categories, the transportation group (trainmen and enginemen) accounted for 55 percent of employee injuries and

54 percent of employee fatalities. The yard

brakemen and yard helpers, a subset of trainmen and enginemen, have by far the largest

problem as measured by the combination of frequency and severity of injuries.

Loss and damage

to track roadbed,

Train equipment, and lading

Year accidents (million$-current$)

1966.....

1967. . . . .

1968. . . . .

1969.....

1970.. ● . .

1971 . . . . .

1972. . . . .

1973.....

1974. . . . .

6,793

7,294

8,028

8,543

8,095

7,304

7,532

9,698

10,694

117.6

118.0

140.3

161.7

158.4

144.8

140.3

188.4

243.2

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration and Association of American Railroads data.

When train accidents are adjusted for the

monetary threshold** and normalized for

changes in ton-mileage, the increase in train accidents is 16 percent over the 9 years.

When the loss and damage to track, roadbed,

equipment, and lading is adjusted to constant

1975 dollars, the increase is 25 percent.

While train accidents in each of the four

contributing-cause categories* * * all increased

between 1966-74, the largest and most rapidly

increasing contributing cause was track. (Table

3.)

Table 3.—Train Accidents by Contributing Cause

(Unnormalized)

Train accidents

Cause 1966 1974

Human factors . . . . . 1,999 2,236

Equipment . . . . . . . . . 1,843 2,175

Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,428 4,264

Miscellaneous . . . . . 1,523 2.017

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,793 10,694

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration data.

Safety of Property

There was a general increase in train accidents’and a corresponding increase in their

costs over the period 1966-74, as shown in

table 2.

* A train accident is defined as an accident arising out of

the movement or operation of trains and resulting in more

than $750 estimated damage to equipment, track, or roadbed, regardless whether a reportable death or injury occurred.

“ The $750 monetary threshold must be adjusted for

inflation to properly analyze train accidents.

*** Cause categories as defined by FRA.
6 ● Railroad Safety

—When train accidents are adjusted for the

monetary threshold and normalized by

changes in ton-mileage, the increase in

track-caused accidents was 106 percent

during 1966-74, whereas there was no

change in miscellaneous-caused accidents

and approximately a 15-percent decrease in

both equipment- and human-factor caused

accidents.

The most significant area of loss and damage

to property resulted from track-caused train accidents on mainline track rather than on branchIine or yard track.

—The two most significant causes of trackcaused train accidents, based on accident

frequency and severity, were mainline rails

(broken railend, split heard, split web) and

mainline line and surface (improper superelevation, improper alinement, improper

surface of track, soft track).

Two factors that appear to be related to increased track-caused accidents are increased

axle loadings and the level of deferred

maintenance.

—There has been an increase in axle loadings

over the last several years. Part of this has

resulted from the introduction of higher

capacity cars, specifically the 100-ton

freight cars. This factor would logically

have a negative impact on safety due to increased wear and tear on the roadbed

unless the roadbed, is maintained to allow

for these changes.

—It has been estimated that approximately

$6.6 billion of maintenance was deferred

through 1975. The practice of deferring

maintenance will logically have a negative

impact on safety at existing or increasing

levels of use of the track and roadbed.

Thus, a substantial improvement in

railroad safety is largely dependent on the

industry’s financial ability to maintain its

track, roadbed, and equipment.

The largest and most rapidly increasing class

of train accidents over the period 1966-74 was

derailments. (See table 4.)

—When the numbers in the table are adjusted

for the monetary threshold and normalized

for changes in ton-mileage, derailments increased over 40 percent during the 9 years,

while collisions decreased by approximately 15 percent.

Defects in track were the largest and most

rapidly increasing single cause of derailments

during 1966-74. (See table 5.)

Table 4.—Train Accidents by Class

(Unnormalized)

Total train

Year Derailments Collisions Other accidents

1966 . . . . . . .

1967 . . . . . . .

1968 . . . . . . .

1969 . . . . . . .

1970 .., . . . .

1971 . . . . . . .

1972 . . . . . . .

1973 . . . . . . .

1974 . . . . . . .

4,447

4,960

5,487

5,960

5,602

5,131

5,509

7,389

8,513

1,552

1,522

1,727

1,810

1,756

1,529

1,348

1,657

1,551

794

812

814

773

737

644

675

652

630

6,793

7,294

8,028

8,543

8,095

7,304

7,532

9,698

10,694

SOURCE: Federal Railroad Administration.
Ch.I railroad Safety Findings ● 7

Table 5.— Derailments by Contributing Cause

(Unnormalized)

Human

Year Track Equipment factors Misc. Total

1966 . . . . . . .

1967 . . . . . . .

1968 . . . . . . .

1969. . . . . . .

1970. . . . . . .

1971 . . . . . . .

1972. . . . . . .

1973. . . . . . .

1974. . . . . . .

1,388

1,800

2,062

2,400

2,393

2,194

2,481

3,477

4,196

1,550

1,611

1,745

1,863

1,602

1,389

1,344

1,755

1,967

647

668

743

816

765

721

792

1,017

1,043

862

881

937

881

842

827

892

1,140

1,307

4,447

4,960

5,487

5,960

5,602

5,131

5,509

7,389

8,513

SOURCE: Federal Railroad Administration.

Safety of Both Peopleand Property

While train accidents have contributed to virtually all of the loss and damage to property, as

reported to the Federal Railroad Administration

(FRA) they resulted in only l,569 fatalities (7.9

percent of the total fatalities) and 7,887 injuries

(4.0 percent of the total injuries) during 1966-74.

Tank-car accidents must also be viewed as

both a safety of people and a safetyof property

problem.

—During 1969-75, there were 44,43 2

derailments reported. Of these derailments,

more than 500 involved uninsulated pressure-tank cars, of which more than 170 lost

some or all of their lading. Of these occurrences, several accidents resulted in 20

deaths, 855 injuries, and 45 major evacuations of approximately 40,000 persons.

3

Although specific costs are not available, it

has been estimated that accidents involving

these tank cars have resulted in approximately 10 percent annually of all damage

to railroad property, but damage to thirdparty property and loss of lading could not

be isolated for this study.

Cost Analysis

Total costs resulting from railroad accidents

rose 38 percent (using the Consumer Price Index

3 42 Fed. Reg. 46312 (Sept. 15, 1977).

to adjust costs to constant 1975 dollars) and increased from 2.4 percent of operating revenues

to 3.5 percent during 1966-75. (See table 6.)

—The costs resulting from casualties to persons and total property loss and damage

each represented 40 to 50 percent of the

total industry railroad accident costs over

the lo-year period.

—While the number of casualties generaI1y

decreased, the dollar value of claims

resulting from casualties increased, and at a

greater rate than that of the increase in

costs resulting from total loss and damage

to property.

—The increase in the aggregate costs of

casualty claims reflects the fact that the cost

per claim has increased at a rate which is

greater than the rate of decrease in the

number of casualties. Further research is

needed to determine the reasons for the increase in cost per claim.

The total cost of railroad safety programs

cannot be identified.

—The uniform system of accounts does not

isolate such costs.

—Although some railroads have internal accounting systems that identify such COStS,

these systems are not comparable from

railroad to railroad.

—Because a large portion of the safety

prevention costs are common costs, they
8 ● Railroad safety

Table 6.—Railroad Accident Costs

(Dollars in millions)

Accident cost

1968 1975 Percent

Accident cost category Current $ 1975$ 1975$ change

Casualty claim a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $108.5 $179.9 $282.2 + 45.8

Total loss and damage of property . . . . . . 119.2 197.6 240.0 + 21.4

Damage to railroad property b . . . . . . ( 99.0) (164.1) (177.4) + 8.1

Damage to livestock% . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 1.5) ( 2.5) ( 1.9) -26.8

Freight ioss and damage a. . . . . . . . . ( 18.7) ( 31.0) ( 60.7) + 95.9

Clearing wrecks a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.0 38.1 73.2 + 92.1

Grand total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $250.7 $415.6 $575.4 +36.4

Operating revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $10,654.7 $16,401.9

a lnterstate Commerce Commission, Transport Statistics in the United States, Railroad Companies, 1966-75.

bFederal Rai I road Administrate ion, Accident Bulletin Summary and Analysis of Accidents on Railroads in the United

States, 1966-75.

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad and Interstate Commerce Commission data.

cannot be identified, even if an appropriate

accounting system were available, without

arbitrarily allocating such costs among

safety and other operating purposes.

Data Base

Analysis of the FRA data base by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) has provided

some useful insights into the safety problem.

For example, preliminary analyses have been

conducted on railroad accidents occurring to

both people and property.’ 5 Further effort

based on this work should be undertaken to

understand more fully the railroad safety problems and to identify specifically the reasons why

accidents are occurring. Also, individual

railroads have conducted safety analyses of

4A. E. Shulman and C .E. Taylor, Analysis of Nine

Years of Railroad Accident Data 1966-1974, Association of

American Railroads, April 1976.

5 A.E. Shulman, Analysis of Nine Years of Railroad

Personnel Casualty Data 1966-1974, Association of

American Railroads, November 1976.

their specific operations. The transfer of information from these types of analyses to other

railroads could be improved.

The accident data base collected by the FRA

provides a large amount of significant information but has limitations for the following

reasons:

—A substantial number of accidents, are

classified in the undefined category of

“other.” Therefore, their specific causes

cannot be determined. Although the revision in the 1975 cause code attempted to

deal with some of this problem, the condition still exists. A revision was again made

in 1977, but it is too early to determine the

success of these changes.

—Due to the change in cause codes, the data

are not comparable before and after 1975

and make analysis of trends encompassing

years before and after 1975 impractical.

—The changes in reporting requirements for

the 1975 data had the effect of greatly increasing the number of injuries reported to

FRA. This occurred because the reporting

threshold for injuries, measured in days
Ch. I Railroad Safety Findings 9

disabled, increased from “more than one use in guiding regulatory and enforcement acday” to “one or more days. ” Also, the in- tivities appear to be inadequate.

elusion of “occupational illness” and —Although FRA does perform sorting and “receiving medical attention from a physi- tabulations of accidents by various means cian” increased the number of reportable which aid in identifying some of the prob- accidents. lem areas, more in-depth analyses of data

Notwithstanding the limitations of the acci- are necessary to assist in determining

dent data base, FRA analysis of the data and its

—

causes and potential problems.

SAFETY LAWS AND REGULATIONS

The existing Federal safety laws, taken as

a whole, provide sufficient statutory

authority to deal with the existing hazards

of railroad operations.

The early safety laws—aimed at specific

railroad hazards—are supplemented by the

Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, which provides regulatory and administrative powers applicable to “all areas of railroad safety. ”

Likewise, the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act supplements earlier laws dealing with

hazardous materials by providing the Secretary

of Transportation with broad regulatory and

administrative powers to deal with the hazards

posed by the transportation of hazardous

materials.

Repeal of the early safety laws and enactment of their substantive provisions as

regulations would not have a beneficial impact on safety, although certain provisions

of those laws appear to impair their execution unnecessarily.

The early safety laws do not, in general, place

undue rigidity upon treatment of the particular

hazards to which they are addressed. To the extent the laws are obsolete, their existence does

not impair safety or cause other substantial

harm. Thus, the effort necessary to change the

substance of these laws would likely exceed the

benefits of such a change and would distract attention from other important safety issues.

However, there are two provisions which impair

●

●

the execution of these laws:

The definition of time on duty and similar

details in the Hours of Service Act have

spawned much litigation and might have

more appropriately been the subject of a

grant of rulemaking authority to the

Secretary; and

The limited enforcement power available

under most of the early safety laws hinders

action against habitual violators of those

laws or the regulations thereunder.

Generally, the response to a particular

safety hazard has been to adopt a law or

regulation to require or prohibit certain action and thereby eliminate the perceived

cause of that hazard. That response has

been typically made without adequate consideration of alternative responses such as

cooperative programs, collective bargaining and arbitration procedures, and adoption of incentive programs.

The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization

Act of 1976 provides two particularly good and

not atypical examples of this response—the provisions regarding the location of crew quarters

and the requirement for rear-end markers. In

each case, a solution to a hazard was mandated

by law. The law required further detailed

regulation in advance of consideration of alternative courses of action, or a clear understand-
10 . Railroad Safety

ing of the extent of the hazard and its significance relative to other hazards. In making this

response without full consideration of alternative approaches, unnecessary inflexibility and

inefficiency are built into the overall safety program and emphasize an adversarial rather than

cooperative approach to safety.

The uncertainty as to what authority, if

any, the Federal Railroad Administration

has with respect to occupational safety and

health hazards, combined with persistent

but unsuccessful challenges to the authority

of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to regulate such

hazards in the rail industry, has resulted in

a gap in administration and enforcement of

a program to deal with those hazards.

There is no gap in statutory authority to deal

with occupational safety and health hazards

since OSHA has such authority and can exercise

it to the extent FRA does not. However, FRA

has failed to exercise any substantive jurisdiction in this area (other than reporting requirements), in part, because its legislative

authority to do so has been seriously questioned. In addition, OSHA has been hampered

in administering its program on railroad property because of continued litigation as to its

authority, although every appellate court that

has considered it has sustained OSHA’S power

in this regard and now OSHA is able to carry

out its program in most jurisdictions .

Moreover, OSHA and FRA have never reached

agreement as to how responsibility for treatment

of occupational safety and health hazards

should be divided.

In exercising its rulemaking power, FRA

does not articulate adequately the relationship between its regulatory objective and

the requirements of the rule, nor does it

establish measures for later determining the

effectiveness of its rule.

hazard to which the rule is addressed. However,

there is usually no indication as to why the requirements of the rule were established as the

best means for dealing with the hazard in question. While in some instances this relationship

between the hazard and the rule is self-evident,

particularly where performance standards are

used, often there is no indication in the

preambles or the docket as to why a particular

standard or requirement will best eliminate or

reduce the hazard. Moreover, neither the rules

nor their preambles or other related information

provide any measure that can be used to determine the effectiveness of the rules in dealing

with the hazards to which they are addressed.

Analysis of five significant rulemaking

proceedings* involving FRA over the last 7

years indicates the following:

—FRA has worked closely with the industry

in formulating and amending its rules, but

it has maintained a degree of independence

and balance in resolving major issues that

is consistent with its role as a regulator;

—The public record (meaning the agency

docket) generally does not indicate the

specific reasons for FRA’s resolution of the

issues raised in the proceeding;

—In most cases, the public record contains

only superficial cost-benefit analysis of the

rules;

—The public record in most proceedings does

not show any use of pertinent accident data

in formulating the rulemaking objective

and selecting the appropriate means for obtaining that objective (e.g., there is no

analysis to show that a Federal blue signal

(flag) protection rule would meet a particular safety hazard of significance or that

the particular requirements of that rule will

have any impact on safety);

A reading of the preambles and the docket to

FRA’s rules generally indicates the nature of the

● Track safety standards, State participation rules,

power brake rules, blue signal protection rules, and tank

car specifications.
Ch. I Railroad Safety Findings ● II

—Most of these rulemaking proceedings took

a considerable period of time (over 5 years

in one case from advance notice of proposed rulemaking to final action), but FRA

was not usually the sole or even main cause

of this delay. The time each proceeding

took was the result of a variety of factors

including the complexity of the problem

addressed, the degree to which data with

respect to the problem and the solution

were available, the degree of controversy

among special interest groups, the level of

congressional and other public involvement, and the growth and maturity of FRA

as a rulemaking agency. Recent legislation

has limited FRA to 1 year for completing

any regulatory act.

The likelihood that the tools for enforcement of Federal safety laws and regulations

will be effective in inducing compliance is

hampered by (a) the excessive time taken to

collect monetary penalties, (b) the failure to

make effective use of the emergency order

power or any use of the power to issue

compliance orders, and (c) the favorable

treatment accorded bankrupt or financially

weak carriers.

The time between occurrence of a violation

and enforcement of a penalty, usually a fine,

averages approximately 16 months, with many

taking 2 years or more. This clearly reduces the

impact of the penalty as a deterrent to violation

of safety requirements. Moreover, FRA has

issued only seven emergency orders since 1970

and has never issued an order directing compliance. These powers, particularly the latter,

could be far more effective in correcting

habitual violations than collection of civil fines.

Bankrupt or financially weak carriers were

treated more leniently in enforcement of civil

fines, a policy consistent with the need of those

carriers to conserve funds. This reduces the incentive of those carriers to apply limited

resources to correct conditions that are violative

of Federal safety requirements.

INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

The accident rate does not appear to

have been affected by the increased inspection activity.

In assigning a significant portion of its safety

resources to its inspection programs, the FRA

appears to be operating on the assumption that

Federal inspection programs can help to reduce

the accident rate. However, the relationship of

the inspection programs to accident prevention/reduction is difficult to define—given the

number of variables that must be considered

and the fact that adequate measures of effectiveness do not appear to exist. While it would

not be expected that accident reduction would

be the sole measure of the effectiveness of inspection programs, lacking other measures, it

provides one relevant benchmark for assessing

the effectiveness of the inspection efforts. Increased and/or continuing accident rates that

coexist with increased inspection personnel may

indicate that Federal inspection does not provide a significant incentive to comply with

railroad safety standards.

The allocation of inspection funds/personnel does not appear to coincide with the

accident pattern.

From the information available to this study,

it is not apparent what basis the FRA has used

for assigning levels of effort in the five inspection program areas that have been established.

Although track accidents account for the largest

number of train accidents and the largest

amount of property damage, the resources

allocated to this inspection effort at the Federal
12 ● Railroad Safety

level are only half those allocated to the motive

power and equipment inspection program. On

the other hand, while a significant number of

fatalities to employees appears to occur as a

result of human factors, the inspection effort for

operating practices is allocated approximately

one-tenth the funding and half the personnel

allocated the motive power and equipment inspection program. Human factors are not sufficiently understood, so that increased inspection

of those operating practices may not necessarily

be an improvement. There appears to be some

shifts in resource allocation, with motive power

and equipment decreasing and the other programs increasing; nonetheless, the basis for the

shifts, their magnitude, and their timing are not

clearly related to the accident pattern.

There does not appear to be a way, at

present, of determining the effectiveness

and the continued desirability of the State

Participation Inspection Program.

The State Participation Inspection Program

has been controversial from its inception, with

the States and the FRA differing in several

respects as to how it should be implemented and

what the respective roles/responsibilities of the

States and the FRA should be. Several additional factors have complicated participation

from the point of view of individual States;

these factors include lack of an entity having appropriate jurisdiction, lack of funding, lack of

sufficient railroad mileage to warrant and/or

qualify for participation, lack of qualified inspectors, and reluctance to be tied to Federal

funding. Although these factors have played a

part in the development of this program, it is

not possible to say to what extent they have affected its implementation. As with other inspection efforts, adequate measures of effectiveness

for the State Participation Inspection Program

do not exist; however several observations are

pertinent:

—Rate of entry of States into the program

was not as rapid as was originally anticipated.

—Current State participation regulations promulgated by the FRA permit State participation inspection efforts against only

two standards: track and equipment.

—States have, by statute, virtually no e n -

forcement power of their own.

—Participation of States is uneven, i.e., not

all States are participating and some are

participating in one program and not the

other.

The adequacy of the FRA inspection

strategy, the adequacy of the present standards upon which inspections are based, and

the possibility of approaches other than inspection having greater leverage in promoting safety in certain areas presently

covered by the standards, have not been

appropriately addressed in the administration of the FRA safety program.

A significant component of the FRA safety

program relies on the concept of inspection. An

inspection program proceeds on the assumption

that the standards against which it inspects are

correctly conceived and that compliance with

them will enhance safety. It also proceeds upon

the assumption that the inspection program’s

ability to detect noncompliance and to cause the

assessment of penalties is sufficient to make

noncompliance with the standards unattractive.

However, some noncompliance exists and indications are that selective noncompliance with

railroad safety standards occurs for three

general reasons:

1. A number of the standards lack credibility

due to the perception that: a) their

sometimes cumbersome requirements are

not always related directly to safety; b)

their tendency not to differentiate between

potentially serious defects and other

defects; and c) in some cases, enforcement

of the standard is not always feasible.

2. It sometimes costs the railroads less to pay
Ch. I Railroad Safety Findings ● 1.3

a PenaltY when a violation has been

detected or to risk having to pay a penalty

than to stop service.

3. Some railroads are not financially able to

comply across-the-board with all the requirements of all the safety standards.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Railroad safety-related research and

development activity (Government* and

industry) has placed more emphasis on

reducing the causes of property damage

than reducing the causes of human

casualties.

The major research and development efforts

during 1973-76 were directed at track structures

and rolling stock which, except for tank-car

design research, can be expected to have a

greater impact upon the safety of property than

on the safety of people. Those efforts received a

far greater amount of funding applied to

research and development activity than those

directed at major causes of human casualties.

Of the research and development activity

directed at casualties, greater attention has

been focused on grade-crossing accidents

and hazardous materials problems, with

less attention being directed toward

employee casualties.

Most of the research and development activity directed at casualties has been focused on

tank-car design because of its potential for a

catastrophe and on grade-crossing accidents

because of the high number of fatalities and

severe injuries associated with these accidents.

*Does not include funds spent by the Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA) on demonstration projects.

Relatively less attention has been given to

railroad employee casualties.

Moreover, very little research has been done

to identify the chief contributing factors to

employee casualties. For example, even though

there seems to be some recognition that alcohol

or drug abuse may be factors in railroad accidents, as evidenced by the growing number of

industry programs dealing with such abuse,

there has been little research effort to determine

the extent to which alcohol and drug abuse are

safety problems.

Railroad safety research and development appears to have been most successful

in terms of its adoption and utilization by

the affected parties when all interested parties are involved in the formulation and implementation of the research and development effort.

The research on tank-car design, glazing of

locomotives and cabooses (not completed), and

locomotive cab interiors has been conducted

with the involvement of all interested parties

and has been, or is expected to be, very successful in terms of the use of the benefits of this

research by those parties. Conversely, past efforts at standardizing operating rules (only in

part a research effort), establishing railwa y

employee medical standards, and analyzing the

tasks of certain railroad employees were

characterized by a lack of cooperation among

interested parties and in general have not been

successful.
14 ● Railroad Safety

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

The Department of Transportation and

the railroad industry have taken major

steps to deal with one of the most serious

problems associated with hazardous

materials by issuing the October 17, 1977,

tank-car regulations.

In 1974, roughly 65 percent of tank cars

loaded with liquefied petroleum gas, sulfuric

acid, anhydrous ammonia, and liquid caustic

soda were involved in the accidental release of

hazardous materials. The Department of Transportation and the industry acted on data indicating the serious nature of the problem by

conducting research and development and then

proposing and making final regulations covering specifications for tank cars such as shelf

couplers, thermal protection, and tank head

shields. The effective date of the regulation was

October 17, 1977, calling for cars built after

December 31, 197’7, to comply. Further, under

that regulation, retrofitting of existing tank cars

would be completed by January 1, 1982.

This action should reduce the problem associated with hazardous materials significantly,

provided that there is effective monitoring to ensure compliance with the regulation. However,

FRA should ensure the effectiveness of the

regulatory action in reducing accidents.

Additional analysis of the risk and exposure associated with the transportation

of hazardous materials should be conducted to anticipate future problems.

Accident data and trends were important in

initiating regulatory activity which led to the

tank-car standard. Accident data should always

be one tool of the regulatory process. But that

alone is not satisfactory. It is critical to effective

regulation, to ensure safety, that the exposure of

people and property to hazardous materials be

determined.

RAIL-HIGHWAY GRADE= CROSSINGS

Although accidents and fatalities associated with rail-highway grade-crossings

have been decreasing, the problem continues to be a serious safety matter.

Table 7 gives grade-crossing accident data for

1965-75.

Although the numbers are decreasing, the

problem remains serious basically for two

reasons:

1. Grade-crossing accidents continue to be

the major cause of fatalities in railroad

operations, accounting for approximately

65 percent of the fatalities resulting from

all types of railroad accidents.

2. The desirable rate of improvement (i.e.

3,000 yearly protection installations over

the next 10 years and an annual reduction

of 500 fatalities) in grade-crossing accident problems, which was indicated by

the Department of Transportation in its

1972 Report to Congress, has not been

met for a variety of reasons, including

delays in funding until mid-1974.

The environment for solving the railhighway safety problem is complicated by

divided jurisdictions, which is a barrier to

effective treatment of the problem.

The divided jurisdiction and responsibilities

result from the following:
Ch, I Railroad Safety Findings ● 1 5

Table 7.— Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents

Number of

Year accidents

1965 . . . . .

1966 . . . . .

1967 . . . . .

1968 . . . . .

1969 . . . . .

1970 . . . . .

1971 . . . . .

1972 . . . . .

1973 . . . . .

1974 . . . . .

1975* . . . .

3,820

4,097

3,932

3,816

3,774

3,559

3,392

3,379

3,379

3,268

N/A

Accidents

per billion

vehicle miles Killed Injured

4.3 1,534 3,801

4.4 1,780 4,043

4.1 1,632 3,812

3.8 1,546 3,774

3.6 1,490 3,669

3.2 1,440 3,336

2.9 1,356 3,332

2.7 1,260 3,285

2.6 1,185 3,283

2.5 1,220 3,249

N/A 978 4,168

Total Casualties

casualties per accident

5,325 1.39

5,823 1.42

5,444 1.38

5,320 1.39

5,159 1.36

4,776 1.34

4,688 1.38

4,545 1.34

4,468 1.32

4,469 1.36

5,146 N/A

● 1975 figures are not comparable to previous years due to changes in reporting requirements. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &

Company, Inc. (Task IV) projected the number of fatalities in 1976 to be 1,124, based on 6-months of data.

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration and Association of American Railroads data.

–The Federal Highway Administration apportions funds to States by a statutory formula, reserving the right of the Federal

Government through local offices to disapprove certain State-funding strategies.

States may use these funds for a variety of

safety activities concerning gradecrossings.

—Jurisdiction over railroad-highway intersections resides exclusively in the States,

where responsibility is often divided among

several State agencies.

—Railroad companies have the responsibility

for the design, installation, an d

maintenance of train-activated warning

devices to be installed only by railroad

employees or by private contractors

employing members of the railroad union

authorized to make such an installation.

The divided jurisdiction becomes a barrier to

effective treatment of the problem because:

—It is used to explain why measures of effectiveness of specific actions necessary to

properly direct future resources have not

been developed. Federal Highway

Administration officials have not sufficiently analyzed the contribution Federal

dollars have made to the reduction of collision injuries and deaths.

—It allows confusion on the issue of who

should provide and pay for the protection

or other improvements.

—It makes the assurance that new technology

is transferred to all entities requiring solutions to grade-crossing problems difficult.

Technology and interdisciplinary efforts

have provided some solutions to the

rail/highway safety problem, but the basic

problem is the rate of adoption of the solutions.

Solutions Exist. Among the solutions identified are the automatic warning devices. According to a California study, the automatic

warning devices are quite effective in reducing

vehicle-train accidents and casualties at public

railroad-highway grade-crossings. That study

concluded that the installation of automatic

crossing gates can be expected, on the average,

to result in 70-percent fewer vehicle-train accidents per year and an additional 48-percent

fewer casualties per accident.0
16 . Railroad 5afety

Operation Lifesaver, a multidisciplinary approach to grade-crossing safety, operates on the

premise that a successful grade-crossing safety

program depends on engineering, education,

and enforcement. In the opinion of Illinois Cornmerce Commission officials, from the single performance measure—fatalities—the program

was a success. 7

Barriers Exist. The analysis of each gradecrossing in terms of the costs and benefits of

various protections, separations, passive controls (motorist awareness activities), or “no action” coupled with the allocation of necessary

resources has not been and does not appear to

be the strategy the States are following presently.

It may be most difficult to fund all necessary

activities, given the costs of the various alternatives. One study showed the installation of

flashing lights in 1975 to be $16,250 while cost

of the installation of the automatic gates would

be $27,290. That same study did not make the

comparison between the protection devices and

grade separation but other analyses have indicated that grade separations would be 27

times more expensive than the warning devices. g

In addition to the complicated jurisdictional

problem discussed above, there is a barrier to

implementation of the solutions brought about

by the legislative authority of the Federal

Highway Administration. Under FHWA’s authority, the Federal formula for funding does

not take into account the number of gradecrossings in a State or the number of fatalities

per grade-crossing.

OTHER RAIL-SAFETY PROGRAMS

Activities such as use of safety committees, safety incentive programs, and

alcohol and drug abuse programs may be

effective in improving rail safety—in addition to Federal standards, inspection, and

enforcement. However, little is known

about the effectiveness of these programs,

because measurable goals and objectives

have usually not been established.

—Safety committees, some of which are

organized by specific railroads to deal with

their safety problems, and others which are

organized at the national level to deal with

safety problems;

—Incentive programs which provide local

and national awards to railroad employees

and to railroads for good safety practices;

and

—Alcohol and drug abuse treatment pro- A variety of nonregulatory programs conducted by railroads, unions, and Government grams which are designed to provide information and

have the potential of contributing in a substan- counseling to rail

tial way to improving railroad safety. The types employees.

of programs are: Even though many of these programs have

—Information and education programs (in- existed for some time, there are gaps in the

dustry and Government) which include understanding of their effectiveness.

training and public and employe e —There are differences in the methods and

awareness programs; techniques used in railroad training

‘Illinois Commerce Commission, Illinois, Railroad

Grade Crossing Safety Council, “Operation Lifesaver, ” ‘Texas Transportation Institute Study, November

July 1977. 1970,
programs- some programs emphasize onthe-job training, others emphasize classroom training. There are no convincing

studies as to which, if any, method or

methods are more effective than the others.

—The safety committees appear, in concept,

to be a good approach to solving the safety

problems by the cooperative efforts of

some stakeholders. Some studies of the effectiveness of the committees indicate concern about the continuity of the activities

and meaningful participation of all in

safety-policy decisions. 9

---Alcohol” abuse programs were found to be

cost-efiective in a 1976 Naval Weapons

Support Center survey. Similar costeffective studiea were not apparent in other

programs dealing with human problems affecting salety -- such as drug abuse and dif -

ficult family situations.

The railroads and unions should be more

involved in activities required to solve safety problems.

If it is preferable to have less Government involvement in rail-safety matters, which is not

the present trend, then the railroads and the

unions will have to take on more of the burden

in solving the safety

their present efforts

short corn i ngs:

—The unions have

problems. A critique of

indicates the following

minima] data collection

and analysis activities, even though they

gather some employee complaint information and review FRA and AAR data. A part

of the problem relates to the reluctance of

railroad management to share safety information, such as claims data, for fear it

will be used against them. Although

railroads themselves and the AAR are involved in data collection and analysis,

there is some evidence that, for example, in

the hazardous materials area, the data are

not being used to determine the probability

of risks associated with many hazardous

materials.

—Except in the research and development activities, there is little evidence that safety

committees have a measurable impact on

the solution of rail safety problems.

—Neither the railroads nor the unions appear

to have developed sufficient programs to

meet the safety problems of railroad

employees.

SAFETY CONCEPTS

The increased demand for protection

against railroad accidents matches the increasing demand for safety in all industries.

Society continues to demand higher levels of —

safety in all its activities. In the evolution of the

concept of safety in

jor responses to the

century were under

‘Thomas A, Kochan,

the workplace, the first masafety problems in the 19th

common law where the inLee Dyer, and David Dipsky, The

jured worker was protected if the employer was

proved to be at fault. The next major phase of

activity, after the laws were passed requiring

employers to provide safe tools, was the passage

of the Workmen’s Compensation Laws-which

placed a definite responsibility upon the

employer. In more recent times, safety in the

workplace has evolved to provide other protections under laws such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act. The demand for the level of

safety has evolved to a higher level today in all

workplaces, including railroads. In addition,

this evolutionary process has affected the safety

of the public interacting with the railroad

system.
18 ● Railroad Safety

The bases for all safety questions are

trade-offs between the acceptable levels of

risk, the benefits, and the costs.

The individual and society as a whole make

determinations as to the optimal balance which

can and shouId be achieved between the value of

different levels of safety and the cost of providing those levels. It is agreed that critical to

decisions about safety is a determination about

the probability and severity of accidents associated with a product or activity. It is also

understood that the acceptable levels of safety

are not decided upon in a vacuum but rather

there are considerations of their efficacy, and

the distribution of hazards, costs, and benefits.

In order to understand the hazards involved, a

variety of factors may be considered. Among

these are:

the extent to which the action is voluntary

or involuntary; whether the effect is immediate or delayed; whether alternatives

exist; whether the risk is certain or not

known; whether the action is essential or a

luxury; whether the action is or is not

occupation-related; whether the hazard is

common or dread; whether the risk will be

to average people or unusually sensitive

people; whether the activity will be as intended; and whether the consequences are

reversible or irreversible. 10

There is the need to apply methods of

analysis (including cost/benefit) of alternative solutions to safety problems.

10 William w. Lowrance, Of Acceptable Risk (Drawing

from Chauncey Starr and others), William Kaufmann,

Inc., Los Altos, Calif., 1976.

Once there is an understanding of safety

problems, the next step is the identification of

alternative solutions and the selection of the

solution which best addresses the problem. The

selection that is made among the alternatives

must be based on a weighing of their costs and

benefits. Thus, it is necessary that methods of

conducting cost/benefit analyses be developed

and applied specifically for safety-related matters. It is important to note that in developing

such cost/benefit analysis methods, the complex

issue of the value of human life is raised among

others. *

The bases for determining

levels of safety in the future may

acceptable

change.

Decisions about safety in the future will continue to be based in part on risk, efficacy, and

the distribution of the hazards, benefits, and

costs. But there may be additional considerations—given the effect of such activities as

changing patterns of governmental involvement

with the railroads, changes in technology, the

concern about the environmental impact, and

the possibility of new types of hazardous

materials.

* Some judgment of the value of life is implicit in every

safety decision. The methodology dealing with the value of

life and safety improvement in a form amenable to analysis

using the conceptual apparatus of economic theory has

been treated recently by M.W. Jones-Lee in The Value of

Life. That methodology may be effective in quantifying the

costs of injuries and fatalities and in quantifying the

benefits of reduced injuries and fatalities. In any event,

methods need to be developed to facilitate the conduct of

safety analyses of alternative solution’s to safety problems.
Chapter I

ISSUES
Chapter II

ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

Certain issues which impact future Federal

railroad safety policy choices have emerged during the course the this study. At tent ion to these

issues in policy formulation is significant

because of the effects on the level of safety as

well as economic implications for all of the

stakeholder groups ( i.e., group having a

definable interest in these problems). *

For purposes of this report, an issue is defined

as an area of controversy. Therefore the following statements included as issues in the report

will, in all likelihood, be argued upon by concerned stakeholders. These statements of issues

should not be construed as recommendations by

the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA).

1. Should future Government policy be

directed toward the specific reportable

causes of train accidents, as the regulations, inspection, and enforcement programs are now directed, or toward the

possible underlying reasons (i. e., heavier

axle loadings, deferred maintenance, and

the general economic health of the industry )?

2. How should the purposes and criteria for

administering the inspect ion programs be

more clearly defined and the standards

upon which such programs are based be

more adequately designed to meet the

given safety problems they are to address

and to determine appropriate inspection

and enforcement levels?

3<

4.

5.

6.

It

How should differences over primary

responsibility for occupational safety and

health of railroad employees between the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA) be resolved to

enable more effective administration of

the program ?

So that grade-crossing safety can be improved, What must be done to resolve

jurisdictional problems regarding responsibility for implementation of rail-highway grade-crossing programs?

Should State participation in Federal

railroad safety programs and policy be

modified or eliminated?

What needs to be done to increase

cooperation among stakeholders so

various problems within the industry,

now working counter to safety, can be

resolved —and thus permit a more systematic approach to railroad safety?

is not clear from analysis of Government

involvement in railroad safety activity that

these issues have been or are being addressed in

existing policy formulation .

This chapter presents the selected railroad

safety issues. Policy alternatives, researcch questions, and options are outlined pertinent to the

issues.

As a part of the issues formulation, OTA outlined a list of 33 questions which were given to

the Railroad Safety Advisory Panel. Panel

responses to these questions are included in appendix E.

21
22 . Railroad Safety

ISSUE 1

Should future Government policy be

directed toward the specific reportable

track causes of train accidents, as the

regulations, inspection, and enforcement

programs are now directed, or toward the

possible underlying reasons (i.e., heavier

axle loadings, deferred maintenance, and

the general economic health of the industry)?

Over the 9-year period 1966-74, track-caused

train accidents increased over 100 percent. A

substantial amount of the property damage

reported resulted from these accidents.

Many railroads have been unable to generate

the capital necessary to maintain and/or improve their track and fixed facilities. Estimates

of industry-deferred maintenance were approximated at $6.6 billion in 1975. The combination

of deferred maintenance and heavier axle

loading appear to be major reasons underlying

the increases in track-caused train accidents.

Current Federal emphasis has focused on

researching and regulating the technology or

technological problems associated with these

types of accidents. To date, efforts to reduce

train accidents, specifically track-caused,

through regulation, inspection, and enforcement have been largely unsuccessful. However,

as also shown, the extent to which such efforts

have prevented accidents is not known and currently cannot be measured. It should be noted

that it appears that hazardous materials dangers

may continue as long as track problems are a

primary cause of train accidents.

Policy Alternatives

1. Government safety policy should continue

to be primarily directed toward the

specific cause of the train accidents, such

as track problems, rather than addressing

operational practices such as heavier axle

loading or the economic problems of the

industry which result in deferred

maintenance.

2.

3.

4.

Government safety policy should be

broadened to address both specific accident causes and underlying operational

factors. However, Government safety

policy should not address the industry

economic problems.

Government safety policy should be

broadened to address the specific causes of

train accidents and the underlying industry operational and economic factors

impacting such accidents.

Government safety policv should address x .

only specific accident causes, and Government economic policy should be coordinated with safety policy to ensure that

the underlying operational and economic

factors impacting train accidents are

addressed.

Research Questions and Needs

1.

2.

3.

Further research needs to be conducted to

specifically identify the relationship between track-caused train accidents, operational practices (i.e., heavier axle

loadings), deferred maintenance, and the

economic health of the industry. Specific

variables which should be examined and

correlated for individual railroads include

the level of maintenance provided, the

types and locations of train accidents, the

extent and effectiveness to which railroads

employ the practice of “slow ordering” as

a means to offset potential accidents, increased axle loadings, the specific financial resources of the railroad, and the density of traffic movements along specific

routes.

Research should be conducted to determine the relationship of the financial

resources of the industry to its injuries and

fatalities, especially those occurring to

employees.

Research intended to determine optimal

Government safety and economic policy

should be explored. Specifically, findings

relative to capital needs, and routes with
Ch. 11 Issues “ 23

greatest traffic density should be analyzed

in connection with significant safety problems to determine optimum use of Federal

expenditures or resources.

Congressional Options

Oversight hearings may be conducted for

the purpose of discussing with industry and

labor the relationship of train accidents and

industry economic problems.

Congress may conduct oversight hearings

with the Federal Railroad Administration

to explore questions and methods for

systematically addressing the train accident

problems and their underlying causes.

Congress may request the establishment of

an explicit agenda designed to plan and

enumerate specific priorities for research

and development related to train accidents.

Congress may direct future economic

policy or assistance to identify safety accident performance on heavily travelled

routes as a part of criteria for optimization

of Government financial assistance.

Congress may require future Government

safety policy to clearly identify specific and

underlying causes of train accidents prior

to implementation of programs.

Congress may initiate expansion of its safety policy to incorporate measures to address the underlying causes of train accidents.

ISSUE 2

How should the purposes and criteria for

administering the inspection programs be

more clearly defined and the standards

upon which such programs are based be

more adequately designed to meet the given

safety problem they are to address and to

determine appropriate inspection and enforcement levels?

A primary tool of Government railroad safety efforts has been regulation. Both the early

safety laws and more recently the FRSA of 1970

place emphasis upon regulation as the means for

achieving adequate levels of safety in the

railroad environment. The regulations under

these Acts establish standards for track and

equipment as well as operating, inspection, and

reporting requirements for railroads and their

employees. In order to determine industry compliance with these regulations, the Government

has established a system of inspecting facilities,

equipment, and operating practices. The FRA’s

current position is that this inspection force has

the responsibility of monitoring the compliance

of railroads rather than detecting all defects.

The railroads have the major responsibility for

detecting defects and the FRA inspection program is intended to serve as a disincentive to

noncompliance. Where violations of regulatory

requirements are found, certain enforcement action ensues, which usually results in a fine.

This study indicated that there is no statistical

evidence to show that an increase in the level of

Government inspection activity will produce an

improvement in railroad safety in terms of a

reduction of casualties or property loss and

damage. However, this study has also found

that the regulatory programs on which the inspection and enforcement efforts are generally

based—and indeed the inspection programs

themselves—do not contain measures of effectiveness, nor do the regulatory standards clearly

show how the standard will impact a given safety problem. Therefore, an assessment of the effectiveness of inspection activity in terms other

than their relationship to the accident rate has

not been possible. For instance, it is not possible

to say whether Federal inspection has prevented

accidents to any significant extent. Further,

there is no statistical evidence to show that increased monetary penalties will result in an improvement in railroad safety. Finally, this study

was unable to determine what basis was used by

the Government in assigning inspection and enforcement efforts to particular regulatory

programs.

Policy Alternatives

1. Reallocate and/or increase/decrease inspection and enforcement resources with
24 . Railroad Safety

2.

3.

respect to each regulatory program based

on a consideration of (a) the relative importance of that program in terms of the

frequency and severity of the safety

hazard to which it is directed, (b) the effectiveness of inspection in determining

and motivating compliance, and (c) a rate

of inspection effort for ensuring industry

compliance that is based on a determination of the likelihood of a defect or deficiency being discovered.

Maintain current FRA policy—with the

possibility for reallocation and/or increase/decrease of resources—by establishing standards for inspection and

enforcement that maximize industry inspection efforts Further, use Government

inspection and enforcement activity only

to the extent necessary to assure that the

industry is complying with the Government’s requirements.

Reallocate and/or increase/decrease

Federal inspection and enforcement

resources with respect to each railroad,

based on the historical compliance by individual railroads with the particular

regulatory program. Require each railroad to pay a proportion of the costs of

Government inspection and enforcement

activity conducted on its facilities based

on the level of compliance discovered.

Research Questions and Needs

1.

2.

3.

What are the best measures of effectiveness of inspection and enforcement activity for each regulatory program?

On what, if any, regulatory programs do

inspection and enforcement activities have

little or no effect, or have an effect that is

substantiall y smaller than the cost of that

activity?

The goals of any inspection program may

take at least two forms: (a) to motivate

compliance by their enforcement potential, or (b) to detect defects and ensure

compliance by the intensity of the inspection effort. The question as to which approach would be most effective, given the

railroad safety picture, is one that should

be answered before any major restructuring of the inspection effort is undertaken.

The exploration of this question should include an analysis of the resources necessary and the relationship of inspection to

the problems at hand.

4. In what ways, if any, should the penalty

structure be adjusted so as to complement

the inspection strategy adopted by the

Government? For example, if the inspection strategy is designed to monitor compliance in reliance upon the deterrence of

penalties, should the penalties be established at higher levels? On the other hand,

if the inspection strategy is designed to be

so pervasive as to discover most defects

and deficiencies, should the penalties be

relatively low, to assure there are sufficient funds to take corrective action?

Finally, should there be an alternative

penalty structure that could be used in

cases of flagrant noncompliance to account for differences among railroads in

their ability to pay the penalties?

Congressional Options

●

●

●

●

Permit FRA to collect from railroads a portion of the annual inspection and enforcement costs incurred for each railroad for all

regulatory programs.

Permit FRA to apply the penalties collected

to the costs of inspection.

Require FRA to adjust the inspection and

enforcement effort devoted to each program to the frequency and severity of the

hazard at which the program is directed.

Require FRA to determine (to the extent it

has not already done so) the extent to

which industry inspection efforts (with,

possibly, the involvement of rail labor) can

support Government inspection efforts.

Require FRA to establish measures of effectiveness of inspection and enforcement ef -
forts relative to compliance with safety

regulations.

ISSUE 3

How should differences over primary

responsibility for occupational safety and

health of railroad employees between the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA ) and the Federal Railroad

Administration ( FRA ) be resolved to enable

more effective administration of the

program?

safety and health and how far each agency’s

jurisdiction extends. Furthermore, although

Secretary Adams has taken this step to clarity

the situation, there has not yet been a memorandum of understanding entered into between the

FRA and OSHA indicating their agreement as to

this matter. On March 14, 1976, the FRA published a notice in the Federal Register, which

cancelled the FRA proposed rulemaking of

1976. To date, the apprent division between

the two agencies has been as follows: OSHA

having responsibility for safety and health in the

maintenance shops, office buildings, and the

like and FRA having responsibility for safety

with in a broad interpretation of the “rail

operating environment. ”

Policy Alternatives

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Assign responsibility for all aspects of the

occupational safety and health of railroad

employees to OSHA.

Assign responsibility for- all aspects of the

occupational satefy and health of railroad

employees to FRA,

Continue the division of responsibility,

with clarification of the specific responsibilities belonging to OSHA and FRA.

Make a new division of responsibility for

the occupational safety and health of railroad employees between OSHA and FRA.

Place the responsibility for occupational

safety and health of railroad employers

with the railroads.

Research Questions and Needs

1. What constitutes occupational safety and

health and how does that impact on the

operations of the railroad? This definition would be useful if it related specifically to the industry, taking into account the

interaction of employees with various

aspects of the operations.

2. What is the extent to which (occupational

safety and health, by whatever definition,

is a problem railroad empolyees? A

study would be helpful in understanding 

the particular nature of the problems

before decisions as to appropriateness of

expertise may be final 1 v made.
26 Railroad Safety

3. What is the precise nature of the

disagreements between OSHA and FRA?

Are there similar problems in other industries, and what has been their resolution?

Congressional Options

●

●

●

●

Amend the Federal Railroad Safety Act to

clarify congressional intent as to occupational safety and health of railroad

employees.

Require FRA and OSHA to resolve the difficulties between them within a specified

period of time and report back to Congress

on their resolution.

Require FRA and OSHA to measure their

resolution of the problem by assessing occupational safety and health data trends for

railroad employees over a specified period

of time and to report back to Congress.

Amend the laws to prevent Federal intervention in matters ‘concerning the occupational safety and health of railroad

employees.

ISSUE 4

So that grade-crossing safety can be improved, what must be done to resolve

jurisdictional problems regarding responsibility for implementation of rail-highway

grade-crossing programs?

Accidents at grade crossings account for approximately 65 percent of the fatalities arising

from railroad operation. Recognizing the

magnitude of the problem, Congress provided

90 percent funding, under the Federal Highway

Safety Acts of 1973 and 1976, to States for safety improvements to railroad-highway crossings.

However, installation Gf the protective devices

and the expected decrease in fatalities have been

impeded by several factors: (1) the Federal

Highway Administration apportions the funding to States by statutory formula, which is not

based on either number of grade crossings or accidents, but reserves the right to disapprove certain State-funding strategies; (2) jurisdiction

over the highway-grade crossings resides exclusively with the States, but this jurisdiction is,

in many cases, divided among State agencies;

and (3) installation and maintenance of trainactivated warning devices may be done only by

railroad employees or by private contractors

employing members of the railroad union

authorized to do so.

Although both technology and resources exist

to solve the problem, they have not been successfully applied on a large enough scale, to

date, because of jurisdictional problems

concerning responsibility.

Policy Alternatives

1.

2.

3.

4.

Give all responsibility for highway-grade

crossings to the States. Have partial funding available from the Federal Government, with discretion granted to the States

as to how it is to be utilized at grade

crossings.

Place all responsibility for highway-grade

crossings with the Federal Government

and have it allocate resources according to “

its assessment of the priorities.

Give all responsibility for highway-grade

crossings to the railroads, and have par- ,

tial Federal funding available.

Leave the responsibilities as they are Presently defined; but clarify the nature of the

particular roles and the circumstances of

the role for each of the concerned

parties—i. e., Federal, State, and railroad.

Research Questions and Needs

1. A study to determine the characteristics of

the “most dangerous” grade crossings

based on exposure and previous history at

individual grade crossings would aid in

determining what, if any, priority-setting

should be done at the Federal level and

what, if any, specific direction/guidelines

should be provided to States and

railroads.
Ch. 11 Issues ● 27

2. If there is to be an increasing volume of

train traffic and an increase in unit trains,

as appears possible with a renewing interest in coal as an energy source, what

implications will such increases have for

grade crossing safety?

Congressional Options

Establish goals for the reduction of

highway/railroad grade-crossing accidents.

Amend the statute to define more clearly

the roles of various participants in the

program.

Direct the Federal Highway Administration

to confer with the States and the railroads

and report back to Congress within a

specific time period on a clarified

understanding of their roles.

Direct the Federal Highway Administration

to develop priorities and/or criteria for

determining priorities and measures of effectiveness for the program and to report

back to Congress within a specified period

of time as to the effectiveness of the program. The measures should relate at least in

part to the accident data.

ISSUE 5

Should State participation in Federal railroad safety programs and policy be

modified or eliminated?

In the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970,

Congress provided for a program in which

States could participate in the inspection activities of the FRA in order to ensure compliance

with Federal safety standards. This program has

been controversial from its inception, with the

States generally differing with FRA on how the

program should be implemented and on the

States’ rights regarding the program. The FRA

believed that it was responsible under law to ensure that participation by the States would be

consistent with Federal inspection standards and

policy. Thus, it set forth, by regulation, criteria

with which States have to comply in order to be

able to participate.

States—with NARUC (National Association

of Regulatory and Utilities Commissions) as one

of their most vocal representatives—maintained

that they had been guaranteed participation as a

right under the law and that FRA was not correct in circumscribing the possibilities for State

participation in this way. Nonetheless, the FRA

regulations set forth requirements for participation; these requirements include the qualifications that State inspectors must meet. Inspector

qualification has been one of the most contentious questions between FRA and the States.

FRA maintains that a high level of experience is

necessary; the States have argued that it is not

necessary and that, furthermore, they are not

able to find qualified people. Further, they

would not be able to pay them if qualified. At

the present time, the State Participation Inspection Program is limited to inspection programs

for track and for freight car equipment (excluding safety appliances). There are currently

28 State inspectors and 8 inspector trainees in

the equipment inspection program. There are 20

States participating in the track program and 8

States participating in the equipment program.

Participation by States has not been large.

Although the State inspectors are bound by the

same standards and policy as the Federal inspectors, they are responsible to the States rather

than to the FRA. Further, by statute, the States

have enforcement power only if the FRA fails to

act within 180 days. The State inspectors, like

the Federal inspectors, must recommend enforcement action to FRA in Washington, where

the decision is made on whether or not to take

action.

Policy Alternatives

1.

2.

3.

Expand the State Participation Inspection

Program to include other aspects of the

FRA inspection effort.

Leave the State Participation Inspection

Program as it is presently constituted.

Leave the State Participation Inspection

Program as it is presently constituted but
.28 . Railroad Safety

4.

expand the States’ rights under the

program.

Discontinue the State Participation Inspection Program.

Research Questions and Needs

1. In order to make a judgment about the

2

3

desirability of the State participation Inspection Program, an evaluation of its effectiveness, as currently implemented,

should be carried out. What measures of

effectiveness should be established so as to

allow generalizations based on “facts”

rather than “impressions?” What inspector qualification in relation to the tasks

that he/ she is expected to perform should

be required.

What are the State’s views of the program

and their reasons for either participating

or not participanting?

What would be the effectiveness of the

penalty structure and the enforcement

policy of FRA (e.g., with regard to compromising penalties), if the States had enforcement powers?

Congressional Options

● Amend the statute to confer greater powers

to the States.

● Repeal the State participation provision.

● Direct FRA to establish measures of effectiveness for the State Participation Inspection Program, assess the program against

these measures, and report back within a

specified period of time with alternative

courses of action.

ISSUE 6

What needs to be done to increase cooperation among stakeholders so various problems within the industry, now working

counter to safety, can be resolved—and

thus permit a more systematic approach to

railroad safety?

As indicated by the study findings, Government safety programs are currently placing differing emphasis on problems of casualties and

property losses. However, there is a lack of

understanding concerning the causes of these

problems, the rationale for current programmatic emphasis, or the appropriateness and

effectiveness of the mechanisms currently utilized by Government to address today’s safety

problems.

Railroad safety stakeholders generally have

strong beliefs about the proper role of Government, the specific safety problems which should

be addressed, and the various mechanisms

Government should utilize to address these

problems. Moreover, the concerns of the

stakeholder groups regarding Government safety policy have economic as well as safety implications. The positions of the various groups

have often run counter to one another and have

been characterized by a lack of cooperation.

(There are several recent signs toward a positive

trend in cooperation. ) The result of the conflicting views, opinions, and approaches to safety

by all groups has been that Government’s approach to safety generally has been impaired.

Inadequate attention has been placed on accident data, measures of effectiveness have not

been designed into the programs, alternative approaches to safety problems have not been

systematically considered, and jurisdictional

problems between and among various agencies

have arisen.

Policy Alternatives

1. Establish a new method for addressing

safety problems which creates an environment for cooperation; which sets priorities

based on accident data analysis including

accident severity, frequency, and cost;

which examines alternative mechanisms

for addressing safety problems; which

establishes clear measures by which safety

standards and programs can be evaIuated;

and which clearly identifies the appropriate agency or organization responsible

for administration of safety programs.
Reward Question and Need+ b.
Chapter Ill

THE CONCEPT OF SAFETY
Chapter Ill

THE CONCEPT OF SAFETY

This chapter presents a discussion of contemporary concepts of safety and the evolution of

the treatment of safety in the workplace.

The term “safety ” has been defined as: “the

state of being tree from danger or more practically the use of methods and devices that

reduce, control role, or prevent accident s.” That

definition, however, does not provide the

necessary explanation of the concept of safety.

Two question must be considered in order to

understand the concept.

On what basis does society make

judgments about the acceptable levels of

safety?

Who influences or makes the determinations as to acceptable levels of safety?

In order to place the discussion of these issues

in the proper context, below is a brief historical

review of safety problems and society’s response

to those problems.

Safety Problems. The introduction of power

machinery in England in the 18th century

brought to society a higher probability of accidents and personal injuries than it had ever

had in the past. The new machinery had moving

gears, cutting blades, and automatic poweroperation which both enriched the human condition and presented new risks of injury. These

risks of accident and injury were brought to the

workplace and the home, as well as other environments. As technology has become a more

integral part of our lives, so have the accompanying risks. Many of the accidental deaths in

the United States, which have exceeded 100,000

each year since 1963, represent the human safety problem and its technological implication>.

SOCIETY’S RESPONSES TO THE SAFETY PROBLEMS

A review of history reveals that society has

responded various ways to the problems of

safety. Some of the responses were a function of

the era; others a function of the nature 01 the

safety problem. Society’s first response to the

safety problems of the workplace were under

common law -- w’here the injured worker was

prtected if the employer was proven to be at

fault when the worker sued the employer. The

next major rsponse of society was of the type of

protection provided by the laws passed first in

England and then in the United States requiring

employers to Provide safe tools and in other

respects maintain safe working conditions. And

even then the three doctrines of the common law

which supplied the employer with an adequate

defense against suits brought for injured

employees were:

1. The “felIow-servant” rule under Which an

employer was not liable for an injury

resulting from the actions ( careless or

negligent ) of fellow employees:

2. “Contributory negligence” Which provided that the employer is not liable if the

worker’s own negligence contributed

injury;

3. “Assumption of the risk” which included

the theory that an employee accepted the

customary risks of an occupatition when

taking the job.

The next phase of activity relative to safety in

the workplace was the passage of Workmen’s

Compensation Laws which placed a definite

responsibility upon the employer, whether or

33
.34 ● Railroad Safety
Ch. 111 The Concept of Safety• 35

Railroad systems throughout the United States are vital to our

Nation’s supply network.

.

Photos Courtesy of Association of American Railroad
not negligence could be proven. Maryland was

the first State to pass such a law in 1902.

Following passage of the workmen’s compensation laws, there came a variety of other laws

regulating safety in the industrial setting—such

as the Occupational Safety and Health Act

passed in 1970. Society’s primary responses to

promoting domestic safety have been insurance

programs, building and fire control codes, information and education. The history of society’s response to the railroad safety problems will

be discussed in chapter IV of this report. Safety

has always been a consideration in railroad

location, design, construction, and maintenance, although the success of these safety efforts has varied. Accidents and injuries associated with the operation of railroads have

occurred for which private sector safety efforts

have not sufficed. Hence, Government has intervened in railroad safety matters since 1893,

with the passage of the Safety Appliances Act.

A review of the evolution of society’s

response to safety suggests the following:

Human activity involves risks.

Certain risks are acceptable and others

unacceptable.

Of the unacceptable risks, a portion can be

reduced by technology, while another portion can be reduced by information and

education. The balance is beyond the present state of the art.

In some circumstances, where the

marketplace does not reduce the risks sufficient to satisfy the needs and desires of the

public, Government intervenes.

The basis for determining acceptable levels of

safety and what interests are involved in the

decision making process are discussed below.

ON WHAT BASIS DOES SOCIETY MAKE JUDGMENTS

ABOUT THE ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF SAFETY?

When the safety of a product or activity is in

question, the risks from exposure have to be

measured. The measurement is conducted by

making the following inquiries: a) what are the

conditions of exposure (who will be exposed, to

what, and how)?; b) what can be the adverse effects?; and c) what will be the relationship between the exposure and the adverse effects (how

much adverse effect results from how much exposure)? In deciding what are acceptable levels

of safety, understanding the answers to the

questions above is only the first step in the

analysis. Next comes the important step of

determining the risks, i.e., probability of harm

and its severity (for example, how many people

run the risk annually of being injured or killed

at a highway grade-crossing). The analysis then

requires the crucial step of judging safety or the

acceptability of risks. This last step in the

analysis is a normative, political activity, while

the other explorations are more scientific. In

judging safety or the acceptability of risks,

Lowrance suggests the considerations which influence the decisions should include:

The extent to which the action is voluntary or involuntary; whether the effect is

immediate or delayed; whether alternatives

exist; whether the risk is certain or not

known; whether the action is essential or a

luxury; whether the action is or is not occupation related; whether or not the hazard

is common; whether the risk will be to

average people or unusually sensitive people; whether the activit y will be as intended; and whether the consequences are

reversible or irreversible.

With information and analyses of risks, the

decision process should move to a consideration

of efficacy, costs, and the distribution of risks,

benefits, and costs. In the analysis, efficacy, or

the measure of the probability and intensity of
—. —

understanding of safety problems (risk~ ), t }11’

next step is the identification of alternative)1 soluI ions and the selection of the solution which best

addresses the problem, The selection that is

made among the alternatives must be based on a

weighing of their costs and benefits. Thus, it is

necessary that methods of conduction 

cost/benefit analyses be developed and applied

specifically for safety-related matters.

Decisions about safety in the future will continue to be based in part on risk, efficacy ,and

the distribution of the hazards, benefits, and

costs. But there may be additional considerationtions -considering such activities activities as changing

patterns of governmental involvement will the

railroads, changes in technology, the concern

about the environmental impact, and the 

possibility of new types of hazardous materials.

WHO INFLUENCES OR MAKES THE DETERMINATIONS

AS TO ACCEPTABLE LEVELS OF RISK?

authority. All of the stakeholders are capable of

influencing safety decisions i n varying degrees.

Often the decisions are made through traditional marketplace operations. But often is the

legal order that defines the particular factors

that must be taken into account. The legal order

is manifested through legislation, executive and

administrative orders, and judicial decisions.

Further, it is the legal order which from to

time determines the relative weight to be accorded to various of the factors/bases discussed

above.
38 ● Railroad Safety

WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE

ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF RAIL

DRAWN

SAFETY?

As is true of the concept of safety generally,

the concept of rail safety varies with the time,

the issue, the role of various stakeholders, and

the status of technology and customary practice. The level of acceptable risks of accident

and injury is on a continuum where public

values and attitudes toward risks as well as

benefits change. Fifty years ago society tolerated 2,568 fatalities associated with grade crossings. In 1972, a Department of Transportation

report suggested the goal of an annual reduction

in fatalities of 500 persons from an annual fatality rate of over 1,200. What influences have

changed in the acceptable level of risks associated with grade-crossings? Consider the

following:

Society has made a determination that the

frequency and severity of injuries at the

1938 level and the frequency of fatalities

are not now acceptable given:

a. the present technology

b. the cost of accidents and fatalities

c. the willingness of society to pay an

additional price for a new solution to the

problem.

This explains the concept of safety vis-a-vis

grade-crossings. However, it can be said that

the demand for railroad safety generally continues to evolve to higher levels.
. — —

Chapter 

HISTORICAL INDUSTRY AND

SAFETY OVERVIEW
—

Chapter IV

HISTORICAL INDUSTRY AND

SAFETY OVERVIEW

Federal concern for railroad safety has occurred primarily in two phases. The first phase

takiing place during the early part of this century

with the enactment of a series of safety laws

designed to address specific problems of the

times. The second phase occurred in this decade

with the enactment of several laws granting

broad regulatory and administrative authority

to Federal executive agencies to address all areas

of railroad safety.

The nature and dimensions of the railroad

satety problem evolved from the earlier period

to the present. A combination” of factors within

the industry and in the society have both caused

and resulted in the evolution of safety. Among

these factors are: railroad economics and the

changing nature of the U.S. economy and the

transportation system; the physical plant and

the technology utilized by the industry; railroad

employment trends and labor-management relations; and the various levels of legal and

regulatory structures affecting the industry.

This chapter presents a brief, historical overview of the evolution of and factors impacting

railroad safety. It provides a general summary

of how the early safety problems were addressed by Federal laws.

EARLY PHASE OF RAILROAD SAFETY ACTIVITY

During the early phase of railroad safety

history, the casualty problem dominated

Federal and public concern. According to the

data contained in the in the Interstate Commerce

Comminssion (ICC) Accident Bulletins from 1902

to 1911, the casualty problem for both passengers and employees was quite severe. During the

9-year period at the turn of the century, a total

of 33,761 employees and 4, 146 passengers were

killed, and 403,259 employees, * and 113,410

passengers were injured. Table 8 reflects the

casualty problem for 1902-11.

Several factors were probable contributors to

the excessive railroad casualty problem in the

early 1 900’s.

●

●

Railroads were the predominant mode of

“modern” intercity transportation at the

turn of the century. Railroads provided

both freight and passenger transportation

services which were rapidly expanding at

the time. By 1900, over 190,000 miles 01

track were in operation and another 47,000

miles had been laid by 1910.1 In 1890

520,400 passengers were carried by rail

1922, this number had expanded to

537,300,000 passengers. z

Around the turn of the century, rail

employment was steadily rising. In 1890,

there were approximately 750,000 railroad

employees; in 1900, there were 1,0 18,000;
42 ● Railroad Safety

Table 8.—Railroad Casualty Data: 1902-11

●

Employess % of total work force Passengers

Total work

Year Killed Injured force a % Killed % Injured Killed Injured

1902 2,793 35,790 1,189,000 .23 3.01 271 6,323

1903 3,520 42,568 1,313,000 .27 3.24 442 7,855

1904 3,053 42,094 1,296,000 .24 3.25 526 9,002

1905 3,588 51,170 1,382,000 .26 3.70 369 10,514

1906 4,132 59,244 1,521,000 .27 3.90 539 12,112

1907 4,218 64,930 1,672,000 .25 3.88 571 14,324

1908 2,514 49,537 1,436,000 .18 3.45 337 11,643

1909 2,843 57,926 1,503,000 .19 3.85 333 13,593

1910 3,778 (b) 1,699,000 .22 . . 441 12,766

1911 3,322 (b) . .- -. 317 15,278

Total 33,761 403.259 . . . . .- 4.146 ‘1 13.410

a Alfred Chandler, Railroads. The Nation First Big Business.

b Reporting requirements for employee injuries changed in 1910, making date incompatible with 1902-09 time

period.

SOURCE: Interstate Commerce Commission Accident Bulletins: 1902-11.

and in 1910, there were 1,699,000

employees .

3 As evidenced by the passage in

1907 of the Hours of Service Act, railroad

employees were working extended consecutive hours at the turn of the century.4

Railroad technology, as well as specific

technologies which would improve safety,

were evolving at the time and were not

fully in place. As early as 1879, it was

noted that certain technologies such as interlocking and electric signal systems, the

Westinghouse brake, and new forms of car

design would improve safety and were

available. s However, it was not until later,

in part as a result of Federal laws, that these

and other improved technologies were universally adopted. Moreover, though the

technologies utilized in rail operations were

evolving, they were less than optimum

from a safety perspective. Hence, a serious

time lag existed in the application of safety

technologies.

3Chandler, p. 16.

‘Interstate Commerce Commission Activities:

1887-1937, Superintendent of Documents, Washington,

DC, 1937. p. 121.

‘Charles Francis Adams, Railroad Accidents, (G. P. Putnam’s Sons; New York, 1879). p. vi.

These factors describe several characteristics

of the railroad system at the turn of the century

which contributed to the casualty problem.

While the severity of the casualty problem

served as a dramatic, if not psychological,

catalyst to stimulate public and congressional

concern, other factors may have facilitated

adoption of the early laws:

●

●

At the turn of the century, the railroad

labor movement was gaining voice and influence in the political and social system.

Railroad labor unions, as national

organizations, were formed between the

1860’s and the 1890’s. Although early efforts to form a unified railroad labor

organization failed in the late 1800’s, by the

early 1900’s railroad labor unions were

becoming clear economic and political

forces in the railroad system.’

The Interstate Commerce Commission

(ICC) was already established and functioning as a Government regulatory agency

with specific authority for railroad

economic regulation, While the ICC was

responsible for railroad rate regulation,

they were also aware of the status of rail-

‘Chandler, p. 129-132.
Ch. Historical industry and Safety Overveiw ● 4 3

road safety problems and had initiated

some accident data gathering as early as

1888.7

Therefore, as a result of the severity of the

casualty problem, growing public and labor

concern, and the availability of Government

mechanisms, and technological and other solutions, Congress enacted a series of safety laws

during the first part of this century.

From 1893 to approximately 1921, a number

of railroad safety laws were adopted. These

laws were limited in scope, and were drafted to

address particular known aspects of the casualty

problem at the time with specific measures or

remedies. The ICC was given responsibility for

the implementation and enforcement of these

laws.

The scope of the early railroad safety laws

covered a range of areas and problems and

essentially created a system of addressing many

phases of the safety problem. Examples of the

early laws are:

—The Accident Reports Act, which established the system of collecting accident data

on injuries and fatalities and documenting

accident causes. The system today is essentially that established in 1900;

—The Hours of Service Act, which established the maximum number of allowable

hours of service for two classes of

employees: those engaged in or connected

with the movement of trains (with a maximum of 16 consecutive hours of service in

a 24-hour period); and those connected

with train dispatching and train ordering

(with a maximum of 9 to 13 hours on duty

in a 24-hour period); 8

—The Ash Pan Act, which prohibited use of

locomotives equipped with ash pans that

could not be dumped without employees

going under the locomotive for that

purpose;

—The Safety Appliances Act and amendments, which instituted mandatory requirements for the, then available, i m -

proved brake systems and automati c

couplers, and which required standardization of the location and specifications for

appliances such as handholds and grab

irons necessary for employees’ use.

—The Block Signal Act, Safety Testing

Authorization, and the Signal Inspection

Act, which allowed for the research and

which later required the implementation of

automatic signaling systems, interlocking

and other devices which would promote

safety in operations;

—The Locomotive (Boiler) Inspection Acts,

which required railroads and Government

to inspect and test locomotives to avoid

over-running of the locomotives and boiler

explosions resulting from low water levels

in the steam engine boilers;

.

—The Transportation of Explosives and Hazardous Materials Act, which revised the

1866 law;’ and,

—The Federal Liability Act, which addressed

the employee injury, disability, and claims

problem where industry negligence was

proven.

Several significant observations and conclusions can be made from these laws. First, the

focus of most of these laws was usually upon a

limited, well-defined safety problem, and the

grant of authority was intended to deal with the

particular problem. Several examples were:

—The Hours of Service Act, which dealt with

the problem of overworked railroad

employees and the safety hazard they

presented to themselves and others by their

excessive work;

–The Ash Pan Act, which was prompted by

the serious injuries and deaths incurred by

employees emptying and cleaning ashes

from locomotives not equipped with ash

pans; and

7

ICC Activites, p. 125,

8Ibid, p. 121-122. ‘Ibid, p. 12-12.
 ● Railroad Safet y

—The Safety Appliances Act, which focused

on problems resulting from the lack of

standardization and uniformity of railroad

equipment. These laws authorized the ICC

to issue rules prescribing the specifications

for application of safety appliances such as

handholds or grab irons. These laws also

required standardization and implementation of updated brakes and couplers.

A second observation regarding the earlier

laws is that Congress often found the solution to

a particular safety problem in available technology and mandated the use of that technology by

all carriers. The Safety Appliances Act, for example, prescribed the use of automatic couplers

which reduced the likelihood of employee injuries caused by coupling. The Signal Inspection

Law authorized the ICC to prescribe particular

types of devices to help reduce train collisions.

A third observation is that these early laws

basically relied on the same enforcement

mechanism—monetary civil fines plus, in most

cases, inspect ion and /or reporting requirements. Most of the laws carried a penalty

of $100 to $200 per violation and several of the

early laws had criminal penalty provisions.

Several laws required inspections and, in some

cases, reports to or for the Government of the

carriers’ inspection activity (Locomotive Inspection Act ) or of accidents or equipment failures

(Locomotive Inspection Act, Accident Reports

Act, Signal Inspection Law).

Another observation about the early safety

laws is the approach used in the laws for granting authority to the Government, In comparison

to the more recent safety laws, the early laws

are narrowly drawn. This was consistent with

the focus of Congress on specific safety problems at the time.

Finally, it should be noted that each of these

laws was applicable only to “common carriers”

as that term is used in the Interstate Commerce

Act. This was to be expected since that Act had

originally established the scope of the Government’s regulation of rail transportation. However, by using the term “common carrier, ” these

laws are not applicable to certain forms of rail

transportation, such as industrial railroads and

rapid-transit systems.

Table 9 shows the dates of enactment of these

early laws and their amendments. Although not

a precise measure, the fatality rate for

employees and passengers (table 10) showed a

marked decline by the 1920’s. * This reduction

appeared to be, in large part, due to the requirements and activities resulting from the

early safety laws.

Table 9.—Early Safety Laws and Amendments

Year Law Citation

1893

1903

1906

1907

1908

1908

1908

1908

1909

1910

1910

1911

1920

Safety Appliances Act. . 45 U.S.C. 1-7

Safety Appliances Act. . 45 U.S.C. 8-10

Block Signal Systems . . 45 U.S.C. 35

Hours of Service Act . . . 45 U.S.C. 46-66

Federal Employer’s

Liability Act. . . . . . . . . 45 U.S.C. 51-60

Ash Pan Act. . . . . . . . . . . 45 U.S.C. 17-21

Safety Devices Testing

Authorization . . . . . . . 45 U.S.C. 36-37

Transportation of

Explosives. . . . . . . . . . 18 U.S.C. 831-835

Transportation of

Explosives and Other

Hazardous Materials . —

Accident Reports Act. . . 45 U.S.C. 13-60

Safety Appliances Act. . 45 U.S.C. 38-42

Locomotive Inspection

Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 U.S.C. 22-34

Signal lnspection Law. . 49 U.S.C. 26

Between 1920 and 1968, there were only a few

important enactments concerning railroad safety. First, in 1937, the Signal Inspection Law was

largely rewritten to broaden the ICC’s powers

concerning the systems and devices covered by

this law. Second, there was the 1958 amendment to the Safety Appliances Act regarding

adoption of the Association of American Railroad’s rules for inspection, maintenance, and

testing of power brakes. A third significant

*Due to the 1910 change in employee injury reporting

requirements, the injury figures are not compatible with

the early data.
Ch. IV Historical Industry and Safety Overveiw ● 4 5

— .—

Table 10.— Railroad Fatalities 1923-31

Employees Passengers

Total work % of total

Year Killed force killed Killed

1923 1,836 1,879,770 .10 102

1924 1,367 1,777,391 .08 121

1925 1,437 1,769,099 .08 139

1926 1,502 1,805,780 .08 130

1927 1,395 1,760,999 .08 56

1928 1,166 1,680,187 .07 59

1929 1,269 1,686,769 .08 I 72

1930 882 1,510,688 .06 38

—.—1931 615 1,278,175 .05 30

Total 11,469 15,148,858 0-.08 747 —

SOURCE Railroad Transportation A Statistical Record,

1921-63 P. 33

amendment was the 1960 revision of the

Transportation of Explosives Act, which

became known by its U.S. Code designation

“Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles. ”

This revision broadened the law significantly by

expanding (a) the types of materials covered by

the Act to include radioactive materials and

etiological agents and (b) the types of carriers

covered by the Act to include private-contract

and for-hi re carriers. It also centralized the

authority for regulation of the transportation of

such materials in the ICC. The fourth important

amendment was the 1960 amendment to the Accident Reports Act, which led in the following

year to certain revisions in the requirements for

reporting an accident.

In 1965 and 1966, all of the various railroad

safety functions that had been vested over the

years in the ICC were transferred to the Department of Transportation. This primarily occurred by means of the Department of Transportation Act, which centralized all transporRECENT RAILROAD

The recent phase of Federal concern for

railroad safety has occurred largely within this

decade. The characteristics of today’s safety

problem and the industry factors surrounding it

tation safety functions, among other things, in

one executive department—thereby splitting the

safety and economic regulation of each mode.

Several amendments to the early laws were

enacted prior to the more recent Federal railroad

safety activity. Table 11 shows the chronology

of Federal railroad safety activity and the ancillary laws which impacted railroad safety

problems.

Table 11 .—Chronology of Railroad Safety

Legislation and Related Laws

Year Law

1893

1903

1906

1907

1908

1908

1908

1908

1909

1910

1910

1911

1920

1937

1958

1960

1966

1969

1970

1970

1972

1973

1973

1974

1976

1976

1976

Safety Appliances Act

Safety Appliances Act

Block Signal Systems

Hours of Service Act

Federal Employer’s Liability Act

Ash Pan Act

Safety Devices Testing Authorization

Transportation of Explosives

Transportation of Explosives and Other

Hazardous Materials

Accident Reports Act

Safety Appliances Act

Locomotive Inspection Act

Signal Inspection Act

Signal Inspection Amendments

Safety Appliances Amendment

Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles

Federal Claims Collection Act

Hours of Service Amendments

Railroad Safety Act and Hazardous

Materials Act

Occupational Safety & Health Act

Noise Control Act

Highway Safety Act

Passenger Assistance Act

Transportation Safety Act

Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory

Reform Act

Railroad Safety Authorization Act

Highway Safety Act Amended

SAFETY ACTIVITY

are different from the problems at the turn of the

century, As contrasted to the earlier phase, today’s railroad casualty problem is of smaller

dimensions and of a different type, yet of no less
46 ● Railroad Safety

significant concern. However, the other recent

predominant problem area is the increasing

property and lading loss and damage resulting

from train accidents. This is of significant concern to industry and Government, given the current economic condition of the industry.

A number of factors both internal and external to the industry occurred throughout the century which directly and indirectly impacted the

shift and evolution of the railroad safety problem. Chief among these is the change in the industry’s economic health. Among the factors

which have impacted the changes in the safety

problem are:

● Over time, the railroad’s dominance in

intercity passenger transportation has

eroded. As a result of the introduction of

the automobile and the airplane, a

dramatic reduction in passenger travel by

rail has occurred. Today, only 6 percent of

intercity passenger traffic is by rail (table

12). Hence, rail passenger traffic, no longer

constitutes a large percentage of persons exposed to the railroad environment.

● The introduction of the automobile and increased automobile usage have resulted in

the shift in the casualty problem, as

evidenced by the level of grade-crossing

accidents.

●

●

As a result of the economic decline of the

industry and the increased efficiency of

technology, railroad employment has declined dramatically since the early 1900’s.

As previously indicated, railroad employment in 1910 was 1,699,000, whereas in

1975, it was 487,789. From 1929 to the

present, employment declined by approximately 71 percent and total man-hours

worked decreased by approximately 79

percent (table 13). During 1950-75 ,

employment declined by approximately 60

percent and total man-hours worked

decreased by about 67 percent. However,

labor wages as a percent of operating

revenues remained relatively constant over

the 25-year period (table 14). The net effect

of the reduction in employment and total

hours worked was a decrease in the exposure of railroad employees to the

railroad environment, a factor which may

have resulted in a decline in the absolute

number of casualties (injuries and

fatalities).

Another factor which has impacted the

potential for casualties is the increase and

changes in the hazardous materials shipped

by rail. At the turn of the century, the

hazardous materials problem was characterized almost solely by weapons and other

Table 12.—Volume of Intercity Passenger Traffic

Millions of Revenue Passenger-Miles and Percentage of Total (except private)

Year Rail- 70 Buses Air Inland Total Private Private Total (in-

% 70 0/0

roadsa carriers water- (except automo- airplane eluding

ways private) biles private)

1929

1939

1944

1950

1960

1970

1974

1975b

1976b

33,965

23,669

97,705

32,481

21,574

10,903

10,475

10,075

11,000

77.1

67.7

75.7

47.2

28.6

; : ;

; : :

6,800

9,100

26,920

26,436

19,327

25,300

26,700

25,000

25,000

15.4

26.0

20.9

38.4

25.7

74.3

15.1

14.2

13.2

‘ = 3

2,177

8,773

31,730

109,499

135,469

136,432

150,000

-.

2.0

1.7

12.7

42. ?

77.7

76.7

77.7

78.9

3,300

1,466

2,187

1,190

2,668

4,000

4,000

4,000

4,000

44,065

34,938

128,989

68,860

75,319

149,702

176,644

175,507

190,000

175,000

275,000

181,000

438,293

706,079

1,026,000

1,143,440

1,164,000

1,236,000

—

—

1

1,299

2,228

9,101

11,000

11,500

13,000

219,065

309,938

309,990

508,472

783,626

1,184,803

1,331,044

1,351,007

1,439,000

a Railroads of all classes, including electric railways, Amtrak and Auto-Train.

b These are preliminary estimates and are subject to frequent adjustments.

NOTE: Air carrier data from reports of CAB and TAA; Great Lakes and rivers and canals from Corps of Engineers and TAA; some

figures for 1974, 1975, and 1976 are partially estimated by AAR and TAA.

SOURCE: AssociatiorJ ot~n?erlcan /?ai/roads Factbook, 1977 edition, p. 36.
Ch, IV Historical Industry and Safety Overview • 4 7

Table 13. —Railroad Employment Characteristics

Average number

Year employees

1929

1939

1950

1955

1960

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1,686,769

987,943

1,220,784

1,058,216

780,494

639,961

630,895

610,191

590,536

578,277

566,282

544,333

526,061

520,153

525,177

487,789

Decline in the number of

employees:

1929-75 = 719’o

1950-75 = 60%

Total hours worked Average annual Average hours

(straight and overtime) compensation per worked per

(000’s) employee employee, per year

4,411,490 $ 1,743 2,610.4

2,489,689 1,886 2,514.8

2,877,495 3,785 2,358.6

2,503,418 4,719 2,361.7

1,840,590 6,270 2,359.7

1,319,582 7,490 2,061.8

1,294,928 7,734 2,055.4

1,224,800 8,085 2,007.9

1,200,506 8,654 2,034.8

1,173,501 9,274 2,023.3

1,146,445 10,086 2,047.2

1,082,642 11,023 2,004.9

1,051,771 12,213 1,984.5

1,041,214 13,627 2,002.3

1,042,119 14,235 1,966.3

947,279 15,324 1,933.2

Decline in man-hours

worked:

1929-75 = 79%

1950-75 = 67%

SOURCE: Railroad Transportation.’ A Statistical Record, 1921063, p. 32; Statistical Record Addendum, 1965-75.

Table 14.—Employment Costs and Railroad

Operating Revenues (in millions)

Operating % of Iaborcost

revenues Labor cost* to total operating

Year ($000,000) ($000,000) revenues

1929 6,280 2,674 42.3

1939 3,995 1,762 44.1

1950 9,473 4,379 46.2

1955 10,106 5,064 50.1

1960 9,514 5,126 54.0

1965 10,208 5,122 50.1

1966 10,655 5,258 49,3

1967 10,366 5,345 51.6

1968 10,855 5,583 51.4

1969 11,450 5,838 51.0

1970 11,992 6,250 52.1

1971 12,689 6,488 51.3

1972 13,410 7,047 52.6

1973 14,770 7,881 53.4

1974 16,923 8,597 50.8

1975 16,402 8,583 52.3

● Includes wage compensation, health and welfare

benefits, payroll taxes. Excludes pensions.

SOURCE: Railroad Transportation: A Statistical Record

1921-63, p. 20; and Addendum for Years 1965-75, p. 12.

types of explosives. Today, the types of

hazardous commodities shipped have

changed dramatically, in addition to the

amounts shipped (see chapter X).

Of more recent concern is the significance of

the property and lading loss and damage problem. The primary factor contributing to the increase in this problem is the economic condition

of the industry. Several factors have led to the

economic decline and thereby have influenced

the property safety problem.

● Over this century, the amount of freight

transported by railroads has increased.

However, the introduction and growth of

the trucking industry and the increased

usage of water carrier for freight shipments

effectively reduced railroad dominance in

the transportatio n system . In 1929 ,

railroads carried 75 percent of the freight,

whereas today they carry only 37 percent

(table 15). Moreover, restrictive Govern-
48 ● Railroad Safety

Table 15.—lntercity Freight Transportation Characteristics

Millions of Revenue Freight Ton-Miles and Percentage of Total (including mail and express)

Rail- Great Rivers & Oil pipeYear 0/0 Trucks 70 ‘/0 % 70 Air ‘/0 Total

roadsa Lakes canals lines

1929

1939

1944

1950

1980

1970

1974

1975b

1976b

454,800

338,850

746,912

596,940

579,130

771,168

855,582

759,000

796,000

74.9

62.4

68.6

56.2

44.1

39.8

38.6

37.3

36.7

19,689

52,821

58,264

172,860

285,483

412,000

495,000

443,000

490,000

3.3

9.7

5.4

16.3

21.7

21.3

22.3

21.7

22.6

97,322

76,312

118,769

11,687

99,468

114,475

107,451

99,171

102,OOO

16.0

14.0

10.9

10.5

7.6

5.9

4.9

4.9

4.7

8,661

19,937

31,386

51,657

120,785

204,085

247,431

243,039

250,000

;:?

2.9

4.9

9.2

10.5

11.2

11.9

11.6

26,900

55,602

132,884

129,175

228,626

431,000

506,000

488,000

525,000

4.4

70.2

12.2

12.1

17.4

22.3

22.8

24.0

24.2

3

12

3 ; :

778

3,295

3,580

3,430

4,000

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

607,375

543,534

1,088,266

1,062,637

1,314,270

1,936,023

2,215,044

2,035,640

2,167,000

aRai [roads of ali classes including electric railways, Amtrac, and Auto-Train.

bThese are pre[ iminary estimates and are subject to frequent adjustments.

SOURCE: Association of American Rai/roads, 1977 Factbook, p.36.

ment regulatory policy interfered with the

railroads ability to effectively compete with

the other freight transportation modes.

● Railroads’ rate of return on net investment

has generally declined in recent times,

although it has varied by ICC districts (the

southern and western regions have a higher

rate of return than the eastern district (table

16). By 1975, the rate of return was only

1.2 percent, compared with 5.3 percent in

1929. The low rate of return, when combined with increased competition, restrictive Government economic policy, and

noninnovative management practices resulted in the industry’s inability to generate

needed external or internal sources of

funds. As a result, railroads have had to

look for means of reducing expenses. One

such method adopted by the industry was

the reduction in track and roadway maintenance. Estimates of industry-deferred

maintenance (in 1975 dollars) have been

approximated between $6 billion and $7

Table 16.—Railroad Rate of Return

Net railway Rate of Rate of Rate of

Net operating Net return return return

investment income Rate of income* Eastern Western Southern

Year (millions) (millions) return (total) (millIons) District District District

1951 25,055.2 942.5 3*76% 693.2 3.47 3.76 4.74

1955 26,760.9 1,128.0 4.22 927.1 4.19 3.86 5.45

1960 27,452.5 584.0 2.~3 444.6 1.80 3.15 4.17

1985 26,040.6 981.5 3.69 814.6 3.32 3.87 4.16

1970 28,049.7 485.9 1.73 226.6 clef. 3.02 4.50

1975 29,297.3 W65.2 b

350.7 al.59 bl.20 a186.9 W4.4 clef. 2.65 3.98

● Ordinary Income (before extraordinary and prior period items).

aold ICC basis.

bNew ICC (GAAp) basis, after provision for deferred taxes and (after 1973) including equity in undistributed (XiVIltlCJS of affiliates

SOURCE: Railroads—1977 and Beyond, A Congressional Symposium (background material), House Interstate and Foreign Corn

merce Committee, December 1977. Taken from Interstate Commerce Commission Transport Statistics.
Ch. IV Historical industry and Safety Overview ● 4 9

billion.l” Moreover, as stated in AAR

testimony before the ICC, an estimated

$14.5 billion (1975 dollars, exclusive of

Conrail) is needed over the next decade for

fixed facilities to achieve a normalized level

of maintenance and track additions and

betterments to other roadway facilities. ”

The net effect of lack of capital has been deferred maintenance and reduction to improvements in fixed plant.

 Certain railroad technology and equipment

characteristics have changed in the last 25

years. Although the diesel engine was first

introduced in the late 1920’s, it was not

universally adopted until the early 1950’s.

By 1955, there were 24,786 diesel engines in

service (table 17). The introduction of the

diesel had several significant impacts: it im-

‘“Richard J. Barber Associates, The Railroads, Coal and

the National Energy Plan: An Assessment of the Issues,

1977, p. 52,

11September 1977-Statement of R.E. Briggs on behalf of

the AAR, before the ICC, p. 35.

proved efficiency; and it reduced the need

for the additional person in the cab, both

factors having the potential for improving

the economic situation of the industry.

However, as previously noted in table 14,

while employment declined over this same

period, wages remained a relatively constant percentage of total operating

revenues, thus offsetting the reduced labor

force brought on by the diesel engine.

Other areas for reduction of expenses and

improved efficiency and productivity were

sought out. One measure adopted was the

gradual increase in freight car capacity,

which may have been made possible by the

addition of diesel power. The average

freight car capacity was 53.7 tons in 1955

and 72.9 tons by 1975 (table 17). This increased to 73.5 tons in 1976. The net result

of the heavier car capacity was heavier axle

loadings, The gradual increase in axleloadings combined with the practice of

deferred maintenance in recent decades has

had the end result of faster wear and

deterioration of track and roadbed, a factor

Table 17.—Railroad Technology Utilization

Locomotives Freight Average freight Passenger

Year Diesel Steam Electric equipment car capacity cars

1929 22 56,936 601

1939 510 41,117 843

1951 17,493 21,747 780

1955 24,786 5,982 627

1960 —— — . ——

1961

1962 28,104 51 43 4

1963 27,946 36 429

1964 27,837 34 393

1965 27,389 29 362

1966 27,481 25 344

1967 27,309 21 321

1968 27,019 21 305

1969 26,714 21 276

1970 26,796 13 268

1971 26,897 13 250

1972 27,070 13 252

1973 27,550 12 238

1974 27,857 12 215

1975 27,846 12 213

● Includes Amtrak’s Auto-Train.

SOURCE: AAR 1977 Fact book.

2,610,662

1,961,705

2,046,600

1,996,443

——

——

1,850,688

1,814,193

1,796,264

1,800,662

1,862,499

1,822,381

1,800,375

1,791,736

1,784,181

1,762,135

1,716,937

1,710,659

1,720,573

1,723,605

46.3

49.7

52.9

53.7

——

55.7

56.3

56.8

58.3

59.7

61.4

63.4

64.3

65.8

67.1

68.4

69.6

70.5

71.6

72.9

61,728

45,479

42,406

36,871

——

——

25,566

24,602

23,057

21,327

20,016

18,610

15,384

12,426

11,177

8,670

7,589

7,189

6,848

6,471 
50 ● Railroad Safety

which may have contributed to the rise in

track-related accidents and the subsequent

increase in the property damage problem.

In treating the more recent railroad safety

problems, Congress has enacted laws designed

to address all areas of railroad safety. Unlike the

specific measures adopted at the turn of the century, the recent laws have given broad

regulatory and administrative powers to the

various executive agencies. Examples of these

laws are the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970

and the Transportation of Hazardous Materials

Act. (Discussion of the recent laws and regulations resulting from those laws is provided in

chapter VII. ) The evolution of the railroad safety problem reflects the evolution of the industry at large. As the safety problems have

shifted in dimension and scope, so has treatment

of the problems through the legislative and administrative processes.

. .

Air view of Santa Fe Railway’s Barstow, Calif.,

computerized electronic

_- - --

~~-~ -- ~ classification yard— /eft,

- -- ——— ~~- ’

P

w

- - 1 Photo credlf Santa Fe Ra//way

..-

. - pho(os courtesy of Assoc/at/on

t of A mer(can F?a//roacfs

- , :

- . , .

-. .-*. - --
—

Chapter V

RAILROAD SAFETY PICTURE
—

Chapter V

RAILROAD SAFETY PICTURE

This chapter presents an analysis of railroad

accident data and the findings of such analyses

as they relate to railroad safety. The data used

in this study are based on accident information

reported to the Federal Railroad Administration

and include data collected between 1966-74. * A

discussion of the reporting requirements, the

uses of the data, and associated data problems

are presented in appendix B.

The safety of the railroad industry as shown

by available accident data may be viewed from

two perspectives: the safety of people and the

safety of property. The safety of people is

measured by the number of casualties (injuries

and fatalities) and the cost of resulting claims.

The safety of property is measured by the loss of

and damage to railroad equipment, track, and

roadbed (estimated) and the lading (actual ).

SAFETY OF PEOPLE

An analysis of the overall casualty data during 1966-74 shows that 95.6 percent of all injuries and fatalities resulted from train service

and nontrain accidents.** As shown in table

18, injuries and fatalities resulting from all

railroad accidents generally declined during this

period, with the exception of a slight rise in injuries and an increase in fatalities resulting from

nontrain accidents in 1974.

*Public Law 94-348 requested accident data for the 10

years preceding July 1976. The data for 1975 have not been

used in this report for purposes of comparison with the

data of preceding years because of substantial changes in

the FRA reporting requirements in 1975, which make

direct comparison impractical.

* *Through calendar year 1974, the FRA divides railroad

accidents into three major types: Train accident, Train

service accident, and Nontrain accident. Train Service and

Nontrain accidents will be mainly discussed as they relate

to the safety of people (and are defined below) while Train

accidents will be discussed in the next section as they relate

to the safety of property.

Train Service Accident—an accident arising out of the

movement or operation of trains and resulting in a reportable death or injury but less than $750 damage to equipment, track, or roadbed.

Nontrain Accident—an accident resulting in a reportable casualty (injury or fatality) but not caused directly by

the operation or movement of trains.

Total fatalities during the period have

decreased by 28.9 percent. In absolute terms,

fatalities declined from a high of 2,684 in 1966

to a low of 1,908 in 1974, exhibiting a continuous decline throughout the 9-year period.

Injuries in the same 9-year period declined by

18.5 percent. In absolute terms, there were

25,552 injuries in 1966. Injuries then decreased

through 1972 to a low in that year of 17,930.

Total injuries then increased during 1973 to

20,818 in 1974.

The FRA has established five major classes of

persons in reporting casualties. These include

employees on duty, employees not on duty, passengers, nontrespassers, and trespassers. For

this analysis the employees, both on duty and

not on duty, were combined into one class.

Also, the nontrespassers were designated as

“other” for this analysis and included all persons

not included as employees, passengers, or trespassers. This group was made up primarily of

casualties resulting from grade-crossing accidents. Of the total casualties in the railroad

environment for the 9-year period (19,829 fatalities and 195,331 injuries), as shown in table 19,

injuries to employees constituted the largest

percentage of total injuries (74.3 percent) while

fatalities to persons in the “other” category constituted the largest percentage of total fatalities

(64.9 percent).

53
44 . Railroad Safety

Table 18.—Casualties by Type of Railroad Accident

Train accidents Train service accidents Nontrain accidents Total railroad accidents

Fatal- Acci- Fatal- Acci- Fatal- Acci- Fatal- AcciYear ities Injuries dents ities Injuries dents ities Injuries dents ities Injuries dents

1966. . . 214 900 6,793 2,387 16,489 16,839 83 8,163 8,152 2,664 25,552 31,764

1967. . . 170 754 7,294 2,238 15,868 16,240 75 7,881 7,846 2,483 24,523 31,380

1966. . . 142 1,293 8,028 2,141 15,500 15,934 7,815 7,765 2,359 24,608 31,727

1969 . . . 203 1,173 8,543 2,011 14,986 15,388 7,197 7,170 2,299 23,356 31,101

1970. . . 210 627 8,095 1,936 13,878 14,419 79 6,822 6,812 2,225 21,327 29,326

1971 . . . 171 694 7,304 1,792 12,171 12,562 47 6,107 6,068 2,010 18,972 25,934

1972. . . 171 777 7,532 1,704 11,507 11,825 5,646 5,632 1,945 17,930 24,989

1973. . . 149 758 9,698 1,704 11,946 12,384 1 : 5,541 5,538 1,916 18,245 27,620

1974. . . 139 911 10,694 1,692 12,878 13,185 77 7,029 7,017 1,908 20,818 30,896

Total 1,569 7,887 73,981 17,605 125,243128,776 655 62,201 62,000 19,829 195,331264,757

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration data.

Table 19.—Casualties Resulting From Class I and Class II Railroad Accidents

Employees Passengers Trespassers Other* Total

Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Injuries

1966. . . . . . . .

1967. . . . . . . .

1968. . . . . . . .

1969. . . . . . . .

1970. . . . . . . .

1971 . . . . . . . .

1972. . . . . . . .

1973. . . . . . . .

1974. . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . .

Percent total

168

176

150

190

172

123

133

161

144

18,651

18,055

18,116

17,255

16,285

14,191

12,973

13,511

16.002

23

12

11

6

8

16

47

6

7

1,244

1,054

1,329

862

489

536

660

503

574

1,417

7.1

145,079

74.3

136

0.7

7,271

3.7

678

646

628

627

593

551

537

578

565

5,403

27.3

702

696

663

674

646

607

R

674

1,815

1,649

1,570

1,476

1,452

1,320

1,228

1,171

1,192

4,955

4,718

4,500

4,565

3,907

3,638

3,691

3,577

3,566

2,684

2,438

2,359

2,299

2,225

2,010

1,945

1,916

1,908

5,862

3.0

12,873

64.9

37,119

19.0

19,829

100.0

25,552

24,523

24,608

23,356

21,327

18,972

17,930

18,245

20,818

195,331

100.0

● Other includes all persons not included as employees, passengers or trespassers. (This group was made up primarily of

casualties resulting from grade-crossing accidents.)

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration data.

With respect to fatalities, trespassers were the

second highest in number with 5,403 (27.3 percent); employees ranked third overall with

1,417 (7.1 percent); and passengers had the least

amount of fatalities with 136 (0.7 percent). Of

the total injuries, the “other” category registered

the second highest number with 37,119 (19.o

percent); passengers ranked third with 7,271

(3.7 percent); and trespassers had the fewest injuries with 5,862 (3.0 percent).

Trends toward a general decline in fatalities

among trespassers and “other” were evidenced

over the 9 years. Trespasser fatalities declined

by 16.7 percent from 1966 to 1974 and except

for a rise in 1973 showed a continuous decline.

“Other” fatalities declined by 34.3 percent from

1966 to 1974 and continuously decreased to a

low point in 1973 before exhibiting a slight rise

in 1974. Although the absolute number of fatalities decreased from 1966 to 1974 for both employees and passengers, fluctuations were evident during this time.

Injuries declined for all four categories during

1966-74, but in no case were there continuous

decreases registered during this period.

Employee injuries declined by 14.2 percent from

1966-74 and generally decreased to a low point

in 1972 before showing an increase through

1973-74, Although the absolute number of injuries decreased from 1966 to 1974 for passengers, trespassers, and “other,” fluctuations were

noted during this time.
CHI. V Railroad Safety Picture ● 5 5

EMPLOYEE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS

During 1966-74, 146,496 employee casualties

resulting from all railroad accidents were reported, with 145,079 of those being employee

injuries and 1,417 employee fatalities. Also during this time, the total hours worked by employees decreased from 1,346 million man-hours in

1966 to 1,099 million man-hours in 1974

( – 18.4 percent). To properly analyze the

employee casualties, they must be adjusted for

the changes in hours worked. When the numbers of employee fatalities and injuries are normalized for these changes in the hours worked,

the following resulted:

Employee Fatalities Million Man-Hours

1966 1974

0.125 0.131

Employee Injuries Million Man-Hours

1966 1974

13.86 14,56

Thus, after normalizing, there was no identifiable change in employee fatalities while

employee injuries slightly increased.

Employee casualties were further analyzed by

cause of accident to determine why various injuries and fatalities were occurring to employees. This analysis generally combined the

cause codes of both train service and nontrain

accidents to identify those activities which were

resulting in a major portion of the injuries and

fatalities to employees. The results of this

analysis of employee injuries during 1966-74 are

shown below:

Employee Injuries (By major cause of accident)

Percent of tottii

Mujor cause employee injuries

Getting on or off trains. . . . . . . . . . 16.6

Construct ion and maintenance of

cars and locomotives . . . . . . . 12.2

Construction and maintenance of

track, ties, and rail . . . 8.9

Stumbling, slipping, and tailing

(not on train) . . . . . 7.9

Coupling and uncoupling. ., ... . . .5. b

Flying or falling objects, burns, etc. . 4.8

The single major cause, “getting on or off

trains, ” exhibited the highest percentage of all

employee injuries with 16.6 percent. This major

cause includes 44 subcauses, all associated with

getting on or off cars or locomotives. Most of

these subcauses relate to equipment component

defects, slipping or falling for various reasons,

and other miscellaneous reasons. However,

most of these injuries were related to slipping

and falling and miscellaneous reasons. The second leading contributor to employee injuries

was “construction and maintenance of cars and

Locomotives, ” with 12.2 percent. This cause

code was made up of two nontrain accident

causes (“construction and maintenance of cars”

and “construction and maintenance of locomotives”) and is largely comprised of those manmachine interface activities conducted while

servicing and maintaining equipment. The major cause “construction and maintenance of

track, ties, and rail, ” resulting in 8.9 percent of

the total employee injuries, includes similar

man-machine interface activities that relate to

servicing and maintaining track and roadbed.

When the major causes of employee fatalities

are analyzed for 1966-74, the results are:

Employee Fatalities

(By major cause of accident}

Struck or runover at places other

than public rail-highway crossing. 20.7

Various causes of collisions,

derailments, and other train

accidents . . . . . 17. Q

Coupling and uncoupling. . . . 7.0

Stumbling, slipping, and falling

(while on train). . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,8

Getting on or off trains. . . . . 5.2

Construction and maintenance

of cars . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7

The largest single major cause of employee

fatalities was “struck or runover at places other

than public rail-highway crossings, ” with 26.7

percent. This major cause includes those sub-
56 ● Railroad Safety

causes relating to employees killed while walking or working along the track. The next major

cause resulting in 17.9 percent of all employee

fatalities was due to “various causes of coHisions, derailments, and other train accidents. ” A

total of 254 employee deaths (17.9 percent of all

employee fatalities) resulted from this cause

over the 9-year period. A breakdown by number of employee deaths shows that 166 employees died in collisions, 65 died in derailments,

and the remaining 23 died in other train accidents. The third major cause of employee

fatalities, “coupling and uncoupling, ” with 7.0

percent of the total employee fatalities, was

comprised of various man-machine activities involved in coupling and/or uncoupling locomotives and cars as well as coupling and/or uncoupling air hoses, steam hoses, and safety

chains. Three major causes exhibited themselves

with respect to both the employee fatalities and

employee injuries listings. These included:

● “Getting on or off trains, ”

● “Construction and maintenance of cars, ”

and

● “Coupling and uncoupling. ”

The major cause “stumbling, slipping, and

falling” also was seen in both listings. However,

the employee injuries listing included “stumbling, slipping, and falling” in conducting activities not on the train, while the employee

fatalities listing included “stumbling, slipping,

and falling” in conducting activities while on the

train.

An analysis of the employee problem by job

classification was conducted by the Association

of American Railroads to determine if any

casualties were occurring to employees within

specific job categories. This analysis resulted in

the employee category “transportation (train

and engine)” accounting for over 55 percent of

the employee injuries and over 54 percent of the

employee fatalities. The safety problem of injuries and fatalities occurring to the transporta-

‘A. E. Shulman, Analysis of Nine Years of Railroad Personnel Casualty Data 1966-1974, Association of American

Railroads, November 1976.

tion group (train and engine) compared with

other job categories, is shown below:

Total Employee Injuries

Percent of total

lob categories employee injuries

Executives, officials, and

staff assistants . . . . , . . . . . . . . . .

Professional, clerical, and general . .

Maintenance of way and structures .

Maintenance of equipment

and stores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation (other than

train, engine, and yard) . . . . . . . .

Transportation (yardmasters,

switchtenders, and hustlers) . . . . .

Transportation (train and engine) . .

0 . 1

3.4

14.0

15.4

5.5

6.5

55.1

100.0

Total Employee Fatalities

Percent of total

Job categories employee injuries

Executives, officials, and

staff assistants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Professional, clerical, and general . .

Maintenance of way and structures .

Maintenance of equipment and

stores . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation (other than

train, engine, and yard) . . . . . . . .

Transportation (yardmasters,

switchtenders, and hustlers) . . . . .

Transportation (train and engine) . .

1.1

2.0

23.2

15.9

2.6

0.8

54.4

100.0

A ranking procedure was then used to investigate the safety problem of the individual

job classifications within each job category.

This procedure was based on a combination of

accident frequency (measured by the number of

accidents per year) and the severity (measured

by the median days disabled per accident).

When this procedure was used to rank the individual job classifications during the 9 years

from 1966 through 1974, yard brakemen and

yard helpers were ranked first by far in every

year. Section “men” ranked second in 8 of the 9

years. Because of analyses of this type, yard

brakemen have been selected for further study

by the AAR to determine the reasons why these

employees are involved in over 50 percent of the

total employee injuies and fatalities.
Ch, V Railroad Safety Picture “ .57

TRAIN SERVICE AND NONTRAIN ACCIDENTS

As previously stated, over 95 percent of all injuries and fatalities from 1966-74 resulted from

train service and nontrain accidents, The next

two sections examine these two types of railroad

accidents which contribute to virtually all of the

injuries and fatalities,

Train Service Accidents

During the period 1966-74, the absolute

number of train service accidents decreased

from 16,839 to 13,185 (–21.7 percent).

However, during this time train service accidents resulted in 64.1 percent of all injuries

and 88.8 percent of all fatalities resulting from

railroad accidents. A substantial number of

these train service accidents were rail-highway

grade-crossing accidents and are fully discussed

in chapter X. When the injuries resulting from

rail-highway grade-crossing accidents are excluded from the injuries resulting from total

train service accidents, almost 90 percent of the

remaining injuries occurred to railroad employees. During the 9-year period, train service

employee fatalities accounted for 4.6 percent of

total train service fatalities, while train service

employee injuries accounted for 67.1 percent of

total train service iniuries. Of the total .

employee injuries (145,079) and fatalities

(1,417), 57.9 percent of the employee injuries

and 57.5 percent of the employee fatalities

resulted from train service accidents (table 20).

During the 9-year period, employee injuries

resulting from train service accidents decreased

from 10,814 in 1966 to 8,870 in 1974 ( – 18.0

percent). This decrease was not continuous and

exhibited a low of 7,426 in 1972. During the

same period, employee fatalities resulting from

train service accidents decreased from 98 in 1966

to 81 in 1974 ( – 17.3 percent). However, as

shown in table 20, fluctuations occurred

throughout these 9 years. Figure 1 shows the

rate when employee injuries resulting from train

service accidents are normalized by changes in

employment hours worked.

Normalizing the train service empIoyee injuries over the 9 years had the effect of changing

them from an 18-percent decrease to a slight increase of approximately O.5 percent.

Table 20.—Train Service Accidents

Train

Train Train Train service

service service service employee

accidents injuries fatalities injuries

1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,839 16,489 2,387 10,814

1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16,240 15,888 2,236 10,467

1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,934 15,500 2,141 10,580

1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15,388 14,986 2,011 10,186

1970. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,419 13,878 1,936 9,633

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,562 12,171 1,792 8,104

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,825 11,507 1,704 7,426

1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,384 11,946 1,704 7,968

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,185 12,878 1,692 8,870

Train

service

employee

fatalities

98

117

100

98

84

71

: :

81

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 128,776 125,243 17,605 84,048 815

SOURCE: Compflied by OTA from Federal Railroad Adminstration data.
58 ● Railroad Safety

Figure 1.—Train Service Employee Injuries

Normalized by Million Man-Hours of Employment, 1966-74

8 5

8 0

7 5

7 0

6 5

4

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

YEAR

Source A E Shulman C E Taylor Analysts O( Nine Years of Fta//road Ace/dent Data 19667974, Assoclat[on of American Ra{l

roads, April 1976

The severity of the employee injuries

(measured by the frequency of accidents and

median days disabled) resulting from train service accidents was analyzed by the AAR. 2 The

results indicated that the increase in employee

injuries from 1972-74 was not the result of an increase in more severe injuries, but an increase of

less severe injuries.

Employee casualties resulting from train service accidents were further analyzed by cause to

determine the reasons why various injuries and

fatalities were occurring to them. The results of

this analysis for employee injuries during the

period 1966-74 are as follows:

Employee Injuries in Train Service Accidents

(By major cause category)

Percent of total train

service employee

Major cause injuries

Getting on or off trains. . . . . . . . . . . 27.0

Stumbling, slipping, and falling

(not on train) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.3

Coupling and uncoupling. . . . . . . . . 9.5

Flying or falling objects, burns, etc. . 8.1

Operating switches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6

Operating hand brakes. . . . . . . . . . . 5.3

Analyses conducted by the AAR3 further considered the various cause categories of train

service accidents and ranked them (based on frequency and severity) for the 9 years. “Getting

2A. E. Shulman, C. E. Taylor, Analysis of Nine Years of

Railroad Accident Data, 1966-1974, Association of

American Railroads, April 1976.

3A. E. Shulman, C.E. Taylor, Analysis of Nine Years of

Railroad Accident Data, 1966-1974, Association of

American Railroads, April 1976.
Ch. V Railroad Safety Picture 59

on and off trains” ranked first in every year

while “stumbling, slipping, and falling” (not on

cars or locomotives) ranked high in all 9 years.

Other causes to rank high were “struck at places

other than public rail highway crossings, operating hand brakes, and operating switches. ”

When employee fatalities resulting from train

service accidents were analyzed by major cause

for the period 1966-74, the results were as

follows:

Employee Fatalities in Train Service Accidents

(By major cause category)

Per-cent of total train

service employee

Major cause fatalities

Struck or runover in places other

than public rail-highway crossings 33.6

Coupling and uncoupling. . . 8.8

Stumbling, slipping, and falling

(while on train), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,3

Getting on or off trains. . . . . . . . . . 6.5

Contacting fixed structures while

on train . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4

Appendix C presents the trends of each major

subclass of train service accidents for all Class I

railroads during 1966-74. As seen from these

graphs, all the subclasses of train service accidents showed decreases during 1966-74, except

those related to coupling and uncoupling and

operating switches. Although one subclass of

train service accidents (rail-highway gradecrossing accidents) also decreased during these 9

years, as discussed in chapter X, they continue

to be a serious safety matter.

Nontrain Accidents

During the period 1966-74, the number of

nontrain accidents decreased from 8,152 to

7,o17 ( – 13.9 percent). These numbers decreased continuously to 5,538 in 1973 and then

sharply increased in 1974. Nontrain accidents

resulted in 31.8 percent of all railroad accident

injuries and 3.3 percent of all railroad accident

fatalities. During the 9-year period, nontrain

employee fatalities accounted for 51.9 percent

of the total nontrain fatalities, while nontrain

employee injuries accounted for 91.9 percent of

the total nontrain injuries. Of the total

employee injuries (145,079) and fatalities

(1,417), 39.4 percent of the employee injuries

and 24.0 percent of the employee fatalities

resulted from nontrain accidents (table 21).

During the 9-year period, employee injuries

resulting from nontrain accidents decreased

from 7,412 in 1966 to 6,625 in 1974 ( – 10.6 percent). There was a continuous decrease to a low

point of 5,156 in 1973 and then and increase to

6,625 in 1974. During the same 9 years, employee fatalities resulting from nontrain accidents decreased from 49 in 1966 to 37 in 1974

( – 24.5 percent). However, fluctuations ocTable 21 .— Non train Accidents

Non train Non train

Non train Non train Non train employee employee

accidents injuries fatalities injuries fatalities

1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,152 8,163 83 7,412 49

1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,846 7,881 7,130 37

1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,765 7,815 ; : 7,100 42

1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,170 7,197 85 6,574 47

1970. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,812 6,822 79 6,289 42

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,086 6,107 47 5,700 21

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,632 5,646 70 5,199 40

1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,538 5,541 63 5,156 25

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,017 7,029 77 6,625 37

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . 62,000 62,201 655 57,185 340

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration data.
60 ● Railroad Safety

curred throughout the 9 years. When the employee injuries resulting from nontrain accidents

are normalized by changes in employment

hours worked, the rate of employee injuries is as

shown in figure 2.

Normalizing the nontrain employee injuries

over the 9 years has the effect of changing them

from a 10.6 percent decrease to a 9.4 percent increase. The severity of the employee injuries

(measured by the frequency of accidents and

median days disabled) resulting from nontrain

accidents was analyzed by the AAR. 4 The results indicated that the increase in the number

and rate of nontrain employee injuries during

‘A. E. Shulman, Analysis of Nine Years of Railroad Personnel Casualty Data, 1966-1974, Association of

American Railroads, November 1976.

6 0

5.5

5 0

45

4 0

1973 and 1974 was the result of an increase in

less severe injuries and not as a result of more

severe injuries.

Employee injuries resulting from nontrain accidents were then analyzed by cause to determine the major reasons why various injuries

and fatalities were occurring to them. The

results of this analysis for the 9-year period are

shown below:

Employee Injuries in Nontrain Accidents

(By major cause category)

Percent of total nontrain

Major cause employee injuries

Construction and maintenance

of cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.7

Construction and maintenance

of locomotives. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,2

Construction and maintenance

of track, ties, and rail. . . . . . . . 23.2

Miscellaneous nontrain causes . . 24.1

Figure 2.— Nontrain Employee Injuries

Normalized by Million Man-Hours of Employment, 1966-74

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

YEAR

Source A E Shulman, Analysis of Nine Years of Railroad Personnel Casualty Data 19661974 Associaction of American Rail

roads, April 1976
Ch. V Railroad Safety Picture ● 6 1

A similar analysis of employee fatalities

resulting from nontrain accidents by cause for

1966-74 resulted in the following:

Employee Fatalities in Nontrain Accidents

(By major cause category)

Percent of total non train

Major cause employee fatalities

Construction and maintenance

of cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17.9

Operation and maintenance of

track motor cars . . . . . . . 11.8

Miscellaneous nontrain causes 11.8

Operation of miscellaneous

vehicles on public highways. 11.1

Construction and maintenance of

bridges, tunnels, and culverts . 8.1

The two major causes, “construction and

maintenance of cars” and “miscellaneous nontrain causes, ” accounted for 29.7 percent of nontrain employee fatalities and 46.8 percent of

nontrain employee injuries.

Appendix C presents the trends of each major

subclass of cause of nontrain accidents for all

Class I railroads during 1966-74. Again, these

graphs show the significant contribution of nontrain accidents by the two causes “construction

and maintenance of cars” and “miscellaneous

nontrain causes. ” When the major causes of

nontrain accidents were normalized by changes

in employment hours, the two largest contributors to nontrain employee injuries were again

“construction and maintenance of cars” and

“miscellaneous nontrain causes. ” Although

many of these subclass causes exhibited fluctuations throughout the 9-year period, those

related to track improvement (construction,

servicing, and maintenance of ties, tie plates,

and fasters; CS&M of rail; and CS&M of motor

cars and roadway machines) increased 20, 65,

and 61 percent, respectively.

The analysis of nontrain accidents indicated

that many of the specific causes identified

within the major cause categories did not offer

adequate reasons why certain accidents were occurring which resulted in death and injury to

employees. Many of these accidents seem to

result from a breakdown in the interaction between man and machine. However, more study

seems warranted to determine the reasons

behind and causes for these accidents. Special or

in-depth analyses are needed to develop means

for better understanding and alleviating these

safety problems.

SAFETY OF PROPERTY

As previously stated, the safety of property is

measured by the loss of and damage to railroad

equipment, track, and roadbed (estimated) and

the lading (actual). This loss and damage Occurs

primarily in collisions, derailments, and other

train accidents. This section examines the types

of railroad accidents which contribute to virtually all of the property and lading damage*

but only to a small portion of the injuries and

fatalities.

*There is some lading damage that occurs which results

from other than train accidents ( i.e., spoilage, improper

handling, etc. ) This lading damage was not considered in

this study.

Train Accidents

During the period 1966-74, the absolute

number of train accidents** increased from

6,793 in 1966 to 10,694 in 1974 ( + 57.4 percent).

These train accidents resulted in 4.0 percent of

all injuries and 7.9 percent of all fatalities

resulting from railroad accidents. Moreover,

they resulted in virtually all the loss and damage

* *Train Accident—an accident arising out of the movement or operation of trains and resulting In more than $750

damage to equipment, track, or roadbed whether or not a

reportable death or injury occurred.
62 ● Railroad safety

to track, roadbed, equipment, and lading (see

table 22).

Table 22.—Train Accidents and Associated Costs

Loss and damage

to track, roadbed,

Train equipment, and lading

Year accidents [million-current$)

1966. . . . . 6,793

1967. . . . . 7,294

1968. . . . . 8,028

1969. . . . . 8,543

1970. ., . . 8,095

1971 . . . . . 7,304

1972. . . . . 7,532

1973. . . . . 9,698

1974. . . . . 10,694

117.6

118.0

140.3

161.7

158.4

144.8

140.3

188.4

243.2

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration and Association of American Railroads data.

As previously noted, train accidents are

defined as those arising out of the movement or

operation of trains and resulting in more than

$750 damage to equipment, track, or roadbed,

whether or not a reportable death or injury occurs. This monetary threshold of $750 established in 1956 was not revised to take inflation

into consideration until 1974. At this time, the

reporting threshold was increased to $1,750 and

subsequent increases were established for the

years 1957-74. Since the monetary threshold

had remained constant during this time and did

not increase with inflation, there was an overreporting of train accidents. Therefore, adjustments to the total number of reportable train

accidents were required, which reduced these

total numbers. Figure 3 presents the results of

adjusting train accidents for inflation. This adjustment resulted in reducing the number of

train accidents from 6,793 to 5,604 in 1966 and

10,694 to 7,491 in 1974.

Although inflation had an impact on the

number of train accidents reported, the changing operating practices over the 9-year period

also impacted the change in the number of train

accidents. There has been much discussion as to

what is an accurate measure of the railroads’

operating practices. Several have been identified: ton-miles, train-miles, and car-miles.

From the standpoint of freight movement, tonmiles seems to be the best indicator. With

respect to the crew and passenger movement,

train-miles or car-miles may be more appropriate. Since the major business conducted by

the railroads is the transportation of goods, tonmiles was the measurement used in this study

for analysis of changing operating practices

with respect to train accidents. When the train

accidents as shown in table 22 were adjusted for

the monetary threshold and changes in

operating practices, the increase in train accidents over the 9-year period was 15.9 percent.

Table 22 also shows that the loss and damage

to track, railroad, equipment, and lading in-
Ch. V Railroad Safety Picture ● 6 3

11,000

10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6.000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

Figure 3.— Number of Train Accidents at

Thresholds of $750, Inflated, 1966-74

$750

INFLATE D

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

YEAR

Source A E Shulman C E Taylor, Arra/y.s/s O/ A/me Years of R8(/road Acc/derrf Data 1966-1974, Association of American Ral I

roads, April 1976

— . .——

Ch. V Railroad SafetyPicture ● 65

creased in current dollars from $117.6 million in

1966 to $243.2 million in 1974. When those

dollars are adjusted to constant 1975 dollars, using the consumer price index, the increase over

the 9 years is 25 percent.

During the 9-year period, train accident

employee fatalities accounted for 16,2 percent

of total train accident fatalities, while train accident employee injuries accounted for 47.5 percent of total train accident injuries. Of the total

employee injuries (145,079) and fatalities

(1,417), only 2.6 percent of the emp]oyee injuries and 17.9 percent of the employee fatalities

resulted from train accidents (see table 23).

The FRA has established four major contributing cause categories to train accidents.

These include: human factors, equipment

failures; defects in way or structures; and

miscellaneous. Table 24 shows that in absolute

numbers, human factors-caused train accidents

increased by 12. o percent, equipment-caused

train accidents increased by 18.0 percent,

defects in way and structures-caused train accidents increased by 198.6 percent, and

miscellaneous-caused train accidents increased

by 32.4 percent.

When these train accidents are adjusted for

the monetar y threshold and normalized by

changes in ton-mileage, the increase in trackcaused accidents is seen to be 106 percent from

1966-74, whereas there is no change in

miscellaneous-caused accidents and approximately a 15-percent decrease in both equipment

and human factors-caused accidents.

Of the four major contributing-cause categories, track-caused accidents nearly doubled as

a percentage of total train accidents during the 9

years, increasing from 21.0 percent of the total

in 1966 to 39.9 percent of the total in 1974.

Figure 4 shows the percentage of the four cause

categories within these 9 years and is based on

the number of train accidents at the inflated

thresholds. While the remaining three contributing causes declined as a percentage of total

train accidents, the track cause as a percentage

of total train accidents increased by 83.5

percent.

An analysis of train accidents by contributing

cause was conducted by the AAR. This analysis

applied a ranking index (based on the frequency

of train accidents and the median dollar

damage) to each major contributing-cause category in the train accident data over the 9-year

period. 5 With respect to track-related train accidents, the two most common causes were

mainline rails (broken railend, split head, split

web) and mainline line and surface (improper

superelevation, improper alinement, improper

5A. E. Shulman, C.E. Taylor, Analysis of Nine Years of

Railroad Accident Date, 1966 1974, Association of

American Railroads, April 1976.

Table 23.—Train Accidents

— ——

Train Train

Train Train Train employee employee

Year accidents injuries fatalities injuries fatal i ties

1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,793 900 214 417 21

1967. , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,294 754 170 446 22

1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,028 1,293 142 427 8

1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,543 1,173 203 482 45

1970. ....., . . . , ., . . . . 8,095 627 210 354

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,304 694 171 372 31

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,532 777 171 336 16

1973. ......, . . . . . . . . . 9,698 758 149 419 42

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,694 911 139 493 25

Total , . . . . . . . . . . . 73,981 7,887 1,569 3,746 -

254

SOURCE. Compiled by OTA from Federal Rail road Administration data.
66 ● Railroad Safety

Table 24.—Train Accidents by Contributing Cause

Human

Year factors Equipment Track” Miscellaneous Total

1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1970. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1971. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1,999

1,987

2,174

2,339

2,191

1,912

1,853

2,282

1,843

1,897

2,042

2,142

1,890

1,630

1,577

1,992

1,428

1,844

2,128

2,483

2,470

2,276

2,544

3,556

1,523

1,566

1,684

1,579

1,544

1,486

1,558

1,868

6,793

7,294

8,028

8,543

8,095

7,304

7,532

9,698

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,238 2,175 4,264 2,017 10,694

‘The track column is the same as Defects in way and structures.

SOURCE: Federal Rail rOad Administration.

Figure4.— Percentageof Human Factors, Equipment, Track,and

MiscellaneousTrainAccidents, inflated Thresholds, 1966-74

100

75

al

 5 0

25

0

20.3%

31.2%

22.3°/.

Z6270

71

—

9 3 %

6 7 %

050/0

35~o

73

22.4?.

21070

271%

294%

66

—

191%

)05%

?33%

?71”/0

Misce

Track

21.5S ‘1OYC Ianeous

‘6.5Yc

54~o

185? 207%

253% 291? 338%

251?4 209% Equipment

Human Factors

260’% ’03%

2720A 7,1?0 274”4 2467(

67 68 69 70 72 74

YEAR

SOURCE. Complied by OTA from Association of American Railroads data
Ch. V Railroad Safety Picture ● 6 7

surface of track, soft track). These causes

ranked first and second throughout the 9-year

period, indicating the seriousness of these types

of problems.

With regard to equipment-caused accidents,

the analysis showed that the two most common

causes were axles (journals broken, overheating, cold) and trucks (side bearing missing

or defective, improper clearance), Throughout

the analysis period, the axle-caused equipment

accidents had the highest frequency except for 2

years. However, based on the frequency/severity (severity being measured in median dollar

damage) index, it ranked far ahead of the other

equipment causes for 7 out of the 9 years. A recent study has identified car dynamics as a major cause of train accidents (specifically derailments) and has passed journal bearing defects as

the major equipment cause. b Car dynamics

(components related to ride stability other than

wheels, couplers, and draft gear have shown a

steadily upward trend in both the number of

equipment-caused derailments and the dollar

damage caused by these derailments (figure 5).

With regard to human factors-caused train

accidents, the leading causes varied from year to

year, but the most common were “failure to

secure hand brakes, “ “absence of man on or at

leading car being pushed, ” and “excessive

speed. ” The cause code “failure to secure by

hand brake” ranked first in 6 years and second

in the remaining 3 years. Although it is difficult

to determine why this cause code ranked so high

throughout the 9 years, operating practices, ineffective training, personal problems, or

employee apathy may be contributing factors to

these types of human factors train accidents.

This may indicate that more effort in the area of

human factors research and development

should be undertaken. A handbrake study by

AAR is presently underway which includes

human factors analyses.

Within the miscellaneous cause codes, nine

different causes were ranked in the top five

‘Report No. FRA/FORD’77/18, Wayside Derailment Inspection Requirements Study; J.L. Frarey, R.L. Smith, and

A.I. Krauter.

categories within the 9-year period. In 7 of the 9

years, the number of accidents in the category

“accident investigated —other ascertained

cause” exceeded the number of accidents in any

other cause code within the miscellaneous category. With no discrete cause codes available,

the investigation of these types of accidents in

determining countermeasures becomes exceedingly difficult. The number of cause codes

within the miscellaneous causes was reduced in

the 1975 reporting requirements. However,

because of the problems that still exist with the

data, it is too early to determine the degree of

success.

A further investigation by the AAR of the

damages resulting from train accidents due to

the four contributing causes revealed that trackcaused accidents accounted for the largest

percentage of dollar damage per million grosston miles (MGTM).7 Since there had been an increase in track-caused accidents over the 9-year

period, further investigation of track-caused accidents on mainline, branchlike, and yard track

was conducted. The results of this analysis are

shown in figure 6. As the monetary threshold is

increased from $750 to $10,000, the percentage

of yard-track accidents greatly decreased while

those on the mainline track increased by 87.4

percent. The percentage of track-caused branchlike accidents remained fairly constant. This indicates that a large portion of the yard-track accidents resulted in low-cost accidents, while the

mainline track accidents resulted in the higher

cost accidents.

Much has been discussed concerning the

reasons behind the increase in track-related

train accidents exhibited over the past years.

One of these reasons for this increase maybe the

financial capability of the railroads themselves.

For example, a railroad on the verge of financial

collapse may be inclined to divert some of

planned maintenance funds from certain areas

to reduce losses. Furthermore, the poor financial health of a railroad may have an impact on

7A. E. Shulman, C.E. Taylor, Analysis of Nine Years of

Railroad Accident Data, 1966-1974, Association of

American Railroads, April 1976.
68 ● Railroad Safety

Figure 5.— How Increase in Use of Detection Systems and Incidence of

Roller.Type Bearings Has Dropped Journals Below Car Dynamics Group

(Bolsters, Side-Bearings, Sills, etc.) as Major Source of Derailments

50

40

30

20

l o

0

50

40

30

20

10

Dynamics

Dynamics

Journals

64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

o

64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Source Progressive Railroading, November 1977 p 71
Ch. V Railroad Safety Picture ● 6 9

10(

9C

80

70

6(

5(

40

30

20

10

Figure 6.— Percent of Mainline, Branchlike, and Yard

Track Accidents at Various Thresholds, 1973 Data

47 .60/0

13.40/.

39.0 %

38.20/.

15.40/.

46.40/0

$750 $1600

28.50/0

56.60/0

13.1 0/0

13.80/0

Yard

Branchlike

73.1 0/0 Mainline

Thresholds

Source A E Shulman C E Taylor Ana/vsls of Nine ‘fears O( Ra//road Acc/den( Dala f966 1974 Assoclaf (on of Amer(can Rail

roads April 1976
70 ● Railroad Safety

the morale of the employees. With regard to

track-caused accidents, there may be a tendency

to reduce the amount of effort expended in the

yard track programs and, if possible, place these

efforts elsewhere, since most yard track accidents have been shown to result in lower cost

accidents as measured by equipment, track, and

roadbed loss and damage. This point is

strengthened by a statement presented in the

1975 FRA Annual Report:8

As the country’s economic woes have increased, the financial condition of many of

the Nation’s rail carriers has steadily

worsened. The rail industry continues to be

victimized by spiraling operating costs and

sharp declines in traffic which have produced steep revenue losses and financial

deficits. In an interim attempt to stem these

ever-increasing operating deficits, many of

the Nation’s railroads have resorted to deferring some of their planned maintenance

programs, thereby diverting these funds to

reduce the shortfall in revenues. The practice of deferring maintenance has resulted

in a steady deterioration of the rail industry’s physical plant, reflected in recent

years by an alarming increase in the

number of track and equipment-related accidents. A substantial improvement in rail

safety is therefore largely dependent on the

rail industry’s financial ability to maintain

their physical plants.

A recent study estimated that approximately

$6.6 billion of maintenance had been deferred

by the railroad industry through 1970s.9 T h e

practice of deferring maintenance will logically

have a negative impact on safety at existing or

increasing levels of track usage and roadbed.

With respect to determining what impact the

financial standing of a railroad has on its safety

picture, the AAR conducted an analysis of

‘Annual Report by the President to the Congress on the

Administration of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970,

1975,

“Richard J. Barber, Associates, The Railroads, Coal and

the National Energy Plan: An Assessment of the Issues,

1977.

track-caused train accidents for bankrupt and

nonbankrupt roads during the period 1966-74. 10

The results showed that the absolute number of

track-caused accidents was lower for the bankrupt roads than for the nonbankrupt. However,

when normalized by MGTM, the track-related

train accidents for the bankrupt roads were

much higher than those of the nonbankrupt

roads (figure 7). This analysis indicates that

there appears to be a positive relation between

the financial health of the railroads resulting in

various levels of deferred maintenance and

track-caused train accidents.

Another possible reason behind the increase

in track-related accidents may be the usage of

heavier cars, which result in higher axle

loadings and a damaging effect on track. Over

the period 1966-74, the average freight car

capacity increased from 61,4 to 71.6 tons. 11

“Moreover, revenue ton-miles increased from

738.4 billion in 1966 to 851.0 billion in 1974

( + 15.2 percent), while the freight car miles increased from 30.4 billion in 1966 to 30.7 billion

in 1974 ( + 1.1 percent). Using this information

to determine the increase in revenue tons/

freight car, this value increased from 24.3 tons

in 1966 to 27.7 tons in 1974. According to the

Yearbook of Railroad Facts, 1977,12 of the 28,5

billion freight car miles on Class I railroads in

1976, 55.5 percent were made by loaded cars. If

it is assumed that this percentage was similar in

both 1966 and 1974, the increase in revenue

tons/freight car over the 9 years is 14.1 percent,

The use of heavier cars and the increase in trackrelated accidents has led to increased research

by both AAR and FRA.

These two factors, the level of deferred

maintenance and the increased axle loadings,

appear to be related with increased track-caused

train accidents.

The FRA has designated train accidents into

three major classes. These include derailments,

ILIA E Shulman, C.E. Taylor, Analysis of Nine Years of . .

Railroad Accident Data, 1966-1974, Association of

American Railroads, April 1976.

1 ly’earbook of Railroad Facts, Association of American

Railroads, 1977 Edition.

‘21bid.
Ch. V Railroad Safety Picture ● 7 1

Figure 7.—Track Accidents Normalized by Million Gross Ton-Miles: Total,

Bankrupt and Nonbankrupt Roads, 1966-74

2.50

2.25

2.00

1.75

1.50

1.25

1.00

.75

.5C

.25

.10

Bankrupts

Total

Non bankrupts

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Source A E Shulman, C E Taylor Analysis of Nine Years of Railroad Accident Data 1966 1974 Association of American Rail

roads, April 1976
72 ● Railroad Safety
— —

Ch. V Railroad Safety Picture 7.3

Photo Courtesy of National Transportation Safety Board

Louisville and Northern; Tank car derailment; Pensacola, Fla., November 1977; Leaking anhydrous am.

monia.

Photo Courtesy of National Transportatuib Safety Board

Amtrak derailment, Goodman, Miss., June 1976. Bad

track.

Photo Courtesy of National Tramper/af/on Safety Board

New Haven, Ind.; Head-on collision of two Norfolk &

Western Railway trains; October 1976. Human error.

Photo Courtesy of ST LOUIS Post Dispatch

East St. Louis, Ill.; Tank car puncture in switching

yard; 1972; Carrying propylene.
74 ● Railroad Safety

collisions, and other train accidents. Table 25

presents train accidents by these three classes

over the 9-year period 1966-74. It can be seen

from the table that while the number of collisions remained the same over the 9 years, the

“other” train accidents have decreased by 24.7

percent, and derailments increased by 91.4

percent.

When these classes of train accidents are adjusted for the monetary threshold and normalized for changes in operating practices (tonmileage) during the 9 years, collisions decreased

by approximately 15 percent, while derailments

increased by over 40 percent.

One type of derailment which has recently

received much attention is that involving tank

cars. The potential disaster resulting from a

tank car derailment could significantly affect

not only the railroads’ physical property, but

also the health and well-being of the public as

well as possible damage to third-party property.

As an example, during 1969-75, there were

44,432 derailments reported. Of those derailments, more than 500 involved uninsulated

pressure-tank cars, of which more than 170 lost

some or all of their lading. Several major accidents resulted in 20 deaths, 855 injuries, and

45 major evacuations of approximately 40,000

persons. Although specific costs are not

available, it has been estimated that accidents

involving these tank cars resulted in approx-

“42 Fed. Reg. 46312 (Sept. 15, 1977).

Table 25.—Train Accidents by Class

Total train

Derailments Collisions Other accidents

1966 . . . . . . . . . . 4,447 1,552 794 6.793

1967 . . . . . . . . . .

1968 . . . . . . . . . .

1969 . . . . . . . . . .

1970 . . . . . . . . . .

1971 ..., . . . . . .

1972 . . . . . . . . . .

1973 . . . . . . . . . .

1974 . . . . . . . . . .

4,960

5,487

5,960

5,602

5,131

5,509

7,389

8,513

1,522

1,727

1,810

1,756

1,529

1,348

1,657

1,551

812

814

773

737

644

675

652

630

7;294

8,028

8,543

8,095

7,304

7,532

9,698

10.694

SOURCE: Federal Railroad Administration.
Ch. V Railroad Safety Picture ● 7 5

imately 10 percent annually of all damage to

railroad property. Damage to third-party property and loss of lading could not be isolated for

this study. Since this area presents a potential

danger to both people and safety, further efforts

must be taken to ensure that the safety of people

and property are reaIized with respect to tank

car accidents. (See chapter X.)

Because derailments exhibited significant increases over the 9 years, they were selected for

further analysis by contributing cause. Table 26

shows the total number of derailments by contributing cause for the years 1966-74. This table

indicates that the cause “defects in track” was

the 1argest and most rapidly increasing single

cause of derailments during the 9-year period.

Appendix C presents the trends for each

major subclass of derailments for all Class I

railroads during 1966-74. As seen from these

graphs, derailments due to defects in track,

bridges, switches, and signals, or other defects

in roadway; derailments due to negligence of

employees, and nonclassified derailments all increased significantly.

Table 26.— Derailments by Contributing Cause

Human

Year Track Equipment factors Miscellaneous Total

1966 . . . . . . . . . . 1,388

1967 . . . . . . . . . . 1,800

1968 . . . . . . . . . . 2,062

1969 . . . . . . . . . . 2,400

1970 . . . . . . . . . . 2,393

1971 . . . . . . . . . . 2,194

1972 . . . . . . . . . . 2,481

1973 . . . . . . . . . . 3,477

1974. , . . . . . . . . 4,196 .

SOURCE: Federal Ral Iroad Admlnlstration

1,550

1,611

1,745

1,863

1,602

1,389

1,344

1,755

1,967

647

668

743

816

765

721

792

1,017

1,043

862

881

937

881

842

827

892

1,140

1,307

4,447

4,960

5,487

5,960

5,602

5,131

5,509

7,389

8,513

Oneonta, N. Y.; Delaware & Hudson; Tank car derailment; February 1974. Equipment failure.
Chapter VI

COST ANALYSIS
Chapter VI

COST ANALYSIS

This chapter investigates the railroad industry

expenditures in two areas: accident incident

costs and safety prevention costs. Cost data are

generally available from four sources, including

the Interstate Commerce Commission Uniform

System of Accounts, the internal accounting

systems of the railroads themselves, the

Association of American Railroads, and the

Federal Railroad Administration. One of the

problems with the Uniform System of Accounts

is that it was designed for the purpose of

economic (rate) regulation of railroads, and as

such, does not contain detailed safety expenditures. The internal accounting systems utilized

by the railroads provide detailed costs by activities that aid management in performing the

planning and monitoring functions of the

railroads. Unfortunately, most of the existing

accounting systems yield relatively sparse information concerning railroad safety expenditures. Furthermore, since there is no standard

format of internal accounting systems, safety

expenditure categories among railroads are not

comparable.

RAILROAD INDUSTRY ACCIDENT COSTS

Costs to the railroad industry resulting from reasons behind these accidents in an effort to

accidents present a monetary loss that cannot be minimize accident expenditures while maximizretrieved and as such cannot be used to upgrade ing the railroads’ safety and improving the

or improve the industry itself. Therefore, it is in overall financial condition of the industry.

the interest of the railroads to determine the

SOURCES OF ACCIDENT COST DATA

The two major sources of railroad accident

cost data are the Interstate Commerce Commission (Uniform System of Accounts —USOA)

and the Federal Railroad Administration. Each

Class I line-haul railroad, Class I switching and

terminal railroad, and Class 11 railroad is required to file yearly financial reports with the

ICC. These reports are intended to aid the ICC

in regulating the railroad industry. A third

source of industry accident cost data is the

Association of American Railroads. Various

member carriers, representing approximately 95

percent of the United States, Canadian, and

Mexican mileage, submit accident cost data to

the AAR more detailed than those required by

the ICC. The fourth source is the internal accounting systems of the various railroads.

The costs to the railroad industry resuIting

from railroad

categories and

These include:

accidents include three major

a total of five specific categories.

● Injuries to persons.

● Loss and damage of property:

— Damage to railroad property,

— Damage to livestock on right-~of-way,

— Loss and damage of freight.

● Clearing wrecks.

These costs are further explained and analyzed in the following sections.

L)
80 . Railroad Safety

Injuries to Persons

This category includes the costs of injuries to

railroad employees and to persons other than

railroad employees. These costs include direct

claims expense estimates of probable liability,

compensation for injuries or death, transportation, legal, and witness fees.

Damage to Railroad Property

Damage to railroad property (including

equipment, track, and roadbed only) was

reported to the FRA when the damage exceeded

$750.

Damage to Livestock on Right-of= Way

All railroads are required to report costs of

damage to livestock on right-of-way to the ICC

in their annual report. These costs include direct

expenses and related employee salaries, expenses, office rent, and probable liability.

Freight Loss and Damage

As with injuries to persons and damage to

livestock on right-of-way, railroad companies

report freight loss and damage to the ICC.

However, the amount of freight loss and

damage specifically relating to accidents maybe

much less than those costs furnished to the ICC.

For example, freight loss and damage costs are

also reported to the AAR but divided into

various cause categories. 1 These include the

following:

Percent of total

freight Loss

and damage,

1976 data

1.78

4.07

53.24

3.40

5.06

2.54

5.26

0.69

20.69

1.76

0.94

0.64

100.0 0

Cause category

Shortage, packaged shipment . . . . . . . .

Shortage, bulk shipment. . . . . . . . . . . .

All damage not otherwise provided for .

Defective or unfit equipment. . . . . . . . .

Temperature failures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Robbery, theft, pilferage. . . . . . . . . . . .

Concealed damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Train accident (lading only) . . . . . . . . .

Fire, marine, and catastrophes . . . . . . .

Error of employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vandalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The percentage of the total, obtained only for

1976, gives an indication of the contribution of

each cause to total freight loss and damage. The

train accident cause is seemingly the only cause

specifically relating to railroad accidents and

therefore the only cause cost item which should

be included in the category “Freight Loss and

Damage” for this analysis. Over the 10 years

1966-75, lading damage resulting from train accidents as a percentage of total freight loss and

damage increased from 11.2 percent to 19.4 percent and, as previously shown, increased to

20.69 percent in 1976. Another interesting note

is the miscellaneous category —’’All Damage

Not Otherwise Provided For’’ —which represented over 50 percent of the total freight loss

and damage in 1976. This miscellaneous

category impedes the development of measures

for identifying specific causes which could then

be analyzed for reducing these types of freight

loss and damage costs.

Clearing Wrecks

This last item includes all labor in wrecking

service, lading and transferring lading from

wrecked cars, building and removing temporary

tracks, cost of train service, and other supplies

and expenses. These costs are not included in the

damage costs reported to FRA in the accident

reports.

I Association of American Railroads, Operations and

Maintenance Department, Freight Claim and Damage

Prevention Division, Chicago, Ill. (Annual Summary).
—

Ch. VI Cost Analysis ● 8 1

ACCIDENT COST TRENDS

Table 27 presents a 10-year summary of costs

to the railroad industry resulting from railroad

accidents for the period 1966-75. This table

reveals that total industry accident costs rose

approximately 130 percent during this period,

as expressed in current-year dollars. Furthermore, as a percentage of operating revenues,

total accident costs rose from 2.4 percent to 3.5

percent during this 10-year period. As shown in

table 28, the total accident cost in 1966 expressed in constant 1975 dollars, and based on

the consumer price index, was $415.7 million,

while in 1975 it was $575.4 million ( + 38.4 percent). While the number of casualties generally

decreased, the dollar value of claims resulting

from casualties increased, and at a greater rate

than that of the increase in costs resulting from

total loss and damage to property (45,8-percent

increase versus a 21 .4-percent increase). The increase in the aggregate costs of casualty claims

reflects the fact that the cost per claim increased

at a rate which is greater than the rate of

decrease in the number of casualties. Based on

data available for this study, it is difficult to

determine the reason(s) for this occurrence.

Thus, it is recommended that further research

be conducted in this area. The increased costs

for the other major categories, expressed as the

percentage increase or decrease from 1966-75 in

constant 1975 dollars, are presented in table 28.

Some concern may be raised about the use of

the consumer price index to deflate all of the

various cost categories into constant 1975

dollars. Deflating all accident costs with an inaccurate index may lead to more distortions in

the data than if the data were left in current-year

dollars. For example, the “Damage to Railroad

Property” and “Clearing Wrecks” categories

were also deflated using two other indices, the

AAR index of material prices and wage rates

and the FRA reporting threshold index. As indicated in table 28, expenses incurred by railroad companies for damages to property rose

79.3 percent between 1966-75 in current dollars.

Using the AAR index of material prices and

wage rates index to adjust the costs of damage

to property to 1975 dollars, there is a decrease

of 17.3 percent. This compares to an increase of

8.1 percent for damage to railroad property

when the consumer price index is used to adjust

the costs to 1975 dollars. When the FRA index is

used, the costs over the lo-year period for this

category show a 15.7-percent increase. Furthermore, no matter what index is used in these calculations, the increase or decrease in costs is not

continuous, but fluctuates greatly from 1966-75.

Since the AAR index includes many items

which are not directly related to the repair of

equipment, track, and roadbed, it is possible

that the material prices and wage rates index has

overstated price increases for repairs to

damaged property, thereby understating expenses incurred by railroads for damages to

property. On the other hand, the percentage distribution of 40 percent labor and 60 percent

materials used in the development of the FRA

threshold index number may have tempered

price increases for repairing damages to property. The price of labor rose considerably higher

than the price of materials for the 10-year period

1966-75. Since labor prices have been weighted

less in the FRA index, this index understates the

true price increase for repairing damage to property and thereby overstates expenses incurred

by railroad companies in the repair of damage

to equipment, track, and roadbed.

Another example of the problems in using

various indices for deflating costs is presented

with respect to the category “Clearing Wrecks. ”

Again using the consumer price index to adjust

costs to 1975 dollars, table 28 shows that these

costs increased 92,1 percent, compared with an

increase of 218.6 percent in current dollars.

When these costs are adjusted to 1975 dollars

using the AAR and FRA indices, the increase in

costs is 46.8 percent and 105.5 percent respectively. Again, these costs fluctuated from year

to year, as did the costs of damage to railroad

property.
82 ● Railroad safety

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Ch. VI Cost Analysis “ 83

Table 28.—Railroad Accident Cost

(Dollars in millions)

1966 1975 Percent change

Accident cause category Current $ 1975$ 1975$ Current $ 1975$

Injuries to persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $108.5 $179.9 $262.2 + 41.7 + 45.8

Total loss and damage of property . 119.2 197.6 240.0 + 101.4 + 21.4

Damage to railroad property. . . . . (99.0) (164.1) (177.4) + 79.3 + 8.1

Damage to livestock . . . . . . . . . . . (1 .5) (2.5) (1.9) + 21.4 -26.8

Freight loss and damage . . . . . . . (18.7) (31 .0) (60.7) + 224.9 + 95.9

Clearing wrecks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23.0 38.1 73.2 + 218.6 + 92.1

Grand total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250.6 415.7 575.4 + 129.6 + 38.4

Operating revenues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,654.7 16,401.9

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration, Association of American Railroads, and Interstate

Commerce Commission data.

The applicability of the AAR indices to adjust

the costs of clearing wrecks to 1975 dollars may

be suspect in view of the fact that many railroad

companies hire outside contractors to perform

this service. As such, changes in the level of

railroad wage rates may not reflect changes in

actual labor costs of clearing wrecks. In spite of

this fact, the actual cost of clearing wrecks appears to have risen between 1965 and 1975. This

may be the result of an increase in certain types

of accidents and/or increased labor costs.

Although there has been discussion about the

usage of various cost indices in adjusting costs,

to put the total railroad accident costs in

perspective, the consumer price index was used

to adjust the various costs to constant 1975

dollars.

Table 29 presents the breakdown of various

railroad accident costs (previously shown in

table 27) as a percentage of total railroad accident costs by year. As seen, the cost of injuries

to persons averaged approximately 45 percent

of total railroad accident costs, with a high of

49.1 percent in 1972 and a low of 41.7 percent in

1968. The “Total Loss and Damage to Property”

category has also been approximately 45 percent of total railroad accident costs, ranging

from a low of 39.6 percent in 1972 to a high of

48.0 percent in 1968. The cost of clearing wrecks

rose gradually from 9.2 percent in 1966 to 13.8

percent in 1974 and then fell to 12.7 percent in

1975.

Table 29.—Percentage of Total Railroad Accident Costs

1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Injuries to persons. . . . . . . . . 43.3 44.3 41.7 42.2 43.5 47.2 49.1 45.4 42.7 45.6

Total loss and damage

to property . . . . . . . . . . . 47.5 46.0 48.0 47.2 45.0 41.9 39.6 41.1 43.4 41.7

Damage to railroad

property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (39.5) (37.2) (38.7) (37.4) (34.2) (31.3) (30.0) (32.2) (33.2) (30.8)

Damage to livestock . . . . . (0.5) (0.6) (0.5) (0.5) (0.5) (0.6) (O.5) (o.5) (o.4) (o.3)

Freight loss and damage . (7.5) (8.2) (8.8) (9.3) (9.1) (10.0) (9.1) (8.4) (943) (10.6)

Clearing wrecks. . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 9.7 10.3 10.7 11.5 11.0 11.3 13.3 13.8 12.7

Grand total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

SOURCE: Compiled by OTA from Federal Railroad Administration, Association of American Railroads, and Interstate

Commerce Commission data.
84 ● Railroad Safety

RAILROAD INDUSTRY PREVENTIVE COSTS

For the purpose of determining railroad industry expenditures in the areas of safety

prevention, the available database includes the

Interstate Commerce Commission Uniform

System of Accounts and individual railroad internal accounting systems. The Uniform System

of Accounts was designed for the purpose of

economic (rate) regulation of railroads and, as

such, does not contain detailed safety expenditures.

Internal accounting systems utilized by

railroads provide detailed costs by activities

that aid management in performing the planning and control functions. Examination of internal accounting systems is a most effective

way of identifying the level of industry expenditures in the accident/incident and safety area.

However, one of the problems encountered in

examining various railroad internal accounting

systems is that only those safety expenditures

that are directly attributable to each railroad’s

safety functions can be identified. This occurs

because a large portion of safety costs are common costs. The common cost problem occurs

whenever multiple outputs result from a set of

inputs. When this is the case, all of the inputs

contribute, in common, to the production of all

of the outputs, and there is no way of uniquely

assigning an increment of inputs to an increment

in a particular output. Alternatively, reducing

the level of a particular output, say safety, will

not reduce the input requirements and, therefore, the costs. For example, signal systems contribute both to safety and to operational efficiency, and it is not possible to logically allocate

a portion of signal costs to each of these functions.

Another problem associated with identifying

safety expenditures is the lack of standard accounting systems. Even in instances where

railroads have responsibility accounting

systems, the basic structure of the system and

the particular chart of accounts may not be sufficiently comparable to permit a detailed and

comprehensive analysis of safety expenditures.

Since some of the railroad responsibility accounting systems are based on a functional

organization of accounts, while others are based

on an objective organization, this difference in

organization severely limits the comparability

of the accounts. Although all railroads are required to maintain a specific set of accounts for

purposes of reporting to the ICC, these accounts

yield very little information about railroad safety expenditures.

Thus, the total cost of railroad safety programs cannot be identified because:

●

●

●

The uniform system of accounts does not

isolate safety program costs.

Even though some railroads have internal

accounting systems that identify such

costs, these systems are not comparable

from railroad to railroad.

Because a significant portion of safety

prevention costs are common costs, they

cannot be identified. Furthermore, these

costs could not be identified, even if an appropriate accounting system were available, without arbitrarily allocating such

costs among safety and other operating

purposes.
Chapter VII

SAFETY LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Chapter Vll

SAFETY LAWS AND REGULATIONS

PURPOSE OF CHAPTER

This chapter describes briefly and generally

the structure of the Federal laws and regulations

relating to railroad safety and analyzes that

structure to determine its strengths and

weaknesses in terms of its affect on rail safety.

In particular, this chapter indicates the extent to

which gaps or overlaps exist in necessary rail

safety powers, and the impact of the rulemaking

process upon the substance and effectiveness of

the rules produced by that process.

STRUCTURE OF FEDERAL RAILROAD SAFETY LAWS

Chapter IV describes the evolution of Federal

railroad safety laws from those addressing

specific problems with specific solutions to laws

covering all areas of railroad safety and providing broad regulatory and administrative

powers to deal with the safety problems of those

areas. The structure provided by these laws for

executing safety programs is built primarily on

the power to regulate activities or conditions affecting safety, with concomitant powers to conduct inspections to ascertain whether the laws

and regulations are being compIied with, and to

enforce compliance by means of assessing

monetary penalties or taking other legal action.

These powers are the centerpiece of the Federal

Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) of 1970 (45 U.S. C.

~421 et seq.), as well as of many of the early

safety laws.

Supplementing the regulatory, inspection and

enforcement powers are powers to collect accident information, inspect railroad accidents,

conduct research and development, and conduct

testing, evaluation, and training. Under the early safety laws, these supplementary powers

were typically not granted, although the Interstate Commerce Commission could exercise

some of these powers from other authority provided under the Interstate Commerce Act (see

sections 12 and 20). The FRSA remedied this

situation by providing all of the administrative

powers necessary to carry out comprehensive

rail safety programs (45 U.S. C. 437). Similarly, the Hazardous Material Transportation (Haz

Mat) Act (49 U.S. C. $1801 et seq. ) provided the

Secretary with such powers in support of the

regulatory program with respect to the

transportation of hazardous materials.

The early safety laws applied only to “common carriers” as that term is used in the Interstate Commerce Act. This, of course, was to

be expected since that Act had established the

scope of the Government’s regulation of rail

transportation. However, this limitation excludes application of these laws to railroad

systems that are not involved in interstate commerce, such as industrial railroads, rapid transit

systems, and commuter railroads. The FRSA

provides authority of broader application since

it reaches “all areas of railroad safety” (4s

U.S. C. $431(a)). The legislative history of the

FRSA indicates that it was intended to encompass not only “common carriers” but also

every other means of rail transportation (House

Rept. No. 91-1194, p. 16), although recent

litigation has cast some doubt about the applicability of the FRSA to rapid transit (see

Chicago Transit Authority v. Flohr et al,, 7th

Cir., No. 77-1137, Dec. 16, 1977, pet. for

rehearing pending). Similarly, recent legislation

concerning transportation of hazardous

materials has expanded the applicability of

Federal laws on that area to cover not only ship87
88 ● Railroad Safety

pers and carriers of hazardous materials, but authority conferred. It indicates situations

also manufacturers of the containers and where two agencies are each attempting to exerpackages in which such materials are trans- cise certain powers with respect to the same subported (49 U.S.C. ~1804(a)). ject matter area, as well as situations where no

The next section addresses the extent to which agency exercises a particular necessary power,

there are gaps or overlaps either in the place- or an agency’s power is not sufficiently broad to

ment of rail safety authority or in type of accomplish the intended objective.

PLACEMENT OF AUTHORITY

Three areas have been identified as being the

subject of concurrent powers: accident investigations, hazardous materials regulation,

and occupational safety and health. In all other

areas of rail safety, the FRA has exclusive

jurisdiction, although States are permitted to

participate in a limited aspect of the exercise of

that jurisdiction (see chapter VIII).

Accident Investigations

Historically, the ICC had the power under the

Accident Reports Act to “investigate all collisions, derailments, or other accidents resulting

in serious injury to persons or to the property of

a railroad . . . and to make reports of such investigations, stating the cause of the accident,

together with such recommendations as it deems

proper” (45 U.S. C. 40). In 1966, the power to

determine the cause or probable cause of

railroad accidents was transferred to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) by

section 5 of the Department of Transportation

Act. All other powers under the Accident

Reports Act were vested through the Secretary

of Transportation or the Federal Railroad Administration. Section 5 was repealed in 1975,

when NTSB was made an independent agency,

and it retained the power to make the probable

cause determination for all transportation

accidents.

In addition to its limited powers under the

Accident Reports Act, FRA has as part of its

general administrative powers, under the FRSA,

the power to conduct investigations. However,

the same section (45 U.S. C. 437) grants to NTSB

the authority “to determine the cause or probable cause and report the facts, conditions and

circumstances relating to accidents investigated

. . . “ by FRA, which authority can be delegated

to any office in DOT with the approval of the

Secretary.

The NTSB is required by its own enabling act

to investigate and determine the “facts, conditions and circumstances and the cause or

probable cause or causes of any . . . railroad accident in which there is a fatality, substantial

property damage, or which involves a passenger

train. . .“ (49 U.S.C. 1903 (a)(l)(C)). While

there is some difference between the kinds of accidents NTSB is required by its statute to investigate and the kinds of accidents it is

authorized by rail safety laws to investigate, it

has the exclusive power to determine the cause

or probable cause of the accident. FRA, on the

other hand, has residual investigatory powers

permitting it to investigate for its own purposes,

or at NTSB’S direction.

The rationale for establishing NTSB to carry

out the investigation function was that there

should be vigorous investigation of accidents in

all modes of transportation, and continual

analysis of the regulations and programs of the

agencies charged with safety responsibility (49

U.S.C. 1901). The primary objectives of an

NTSB accident investigation were to obtain an

independent determination of the cause or probable cause of an accident and to make recommendations as to how similar accidents can be

prevented (49 U.S. C. 1903 (a)). Even though the
Ch. VIZ Safety Laws and Regulations 89

safety agency for the mode in question (FRA for

a railroad accident) might also investigate the

accident, such an investigation would be for a

different purpose, such as determining whether

its rules had been violated. That agency may be

unable to render an objective assessment of the

causes and conditions surrounding the accident

to the extent that such causes and conditions

might reflect unfavorably upon the policies and

personnel of that agency.

Thus, though there is an overlap in power to

investigate railroad accidents between FRA and

NTSB, NTSB plays a singular role. It’s purposes

are to provide unbiased reports of what happened and why with respect to railroad accidents and to provide objective analysis of how

to reduce the likelihood of recurrence of

transportation accidents and to make the

transportation of persons as safe and free from

risk of injury as possible, However, in carrying

out such a charge, there is the risk that, by

reason of a somewhat myopic focus on safety,

its reports and recommendations will fail to

recognize or provide the means to evaluate the

tradeoffs inherent in safety choices. For example, its recommendation might encompass solutions to safety problems that have costs grossly

in excess of the benefits to be derived. Such a

failure would offset one of the major benefits of

its existence—to provide views that are unencumbered by a constituency or program bias as

to the most cost-effective actions that can be

taken to improve rail safety.

does require the Secretary to consult with the

ICC before issuing any regulation as to the

routing of hazardous materials.

In delegating these powers and duties, the

Secretary has made an important distinction.

Everything under these laws with respect to

railroads which pertains to investigations,

records, inspections, penalties and specific

relief, and consultation with the ICC is to be

carried out by FRA (49 CFR 1.49 (f), (s) and (t));

everything else (primarily establishing policy

and issuing all hazardous materials regulations,

exemptions, and registration certificates) is to be

carried out by the Materials Transportation

Bureau (MTB) (49 CFR 1.53 (e) and (g)), which

is performing the same function for other

modes. The reasons for this division are that it

maximizes the likelihood that there will be

parallel treatment of the handling and transportation of hazardous materials among all modes.

In addition, it minimizes the duplication of staff

functions and applies particular modal experience where it is most needed. Thus, an FRA

inspector who is very familiar with railroads

and their equipment would be most capable of

carrying out the hazardous materials inspections or investigations. On the other hand, there

is also opportunity for conflict where the

specific expertise of hazardous materials does

not concur with the specific expertise of

railroads, and such conflicts, to the extent they

might occur, would do so in the development of

particular railroad regulations concerning

hazardous materials.

Hazardous Materials Regulation

Occupational Safety and Health

There are two basic statutes concerning the

transportation of hazardous materials. The

first, an outgrowth of a 1908 law amended most

recently in 1960, is essentially a criminal statute

prohibiting transportation of certain hazardous

materials except in accordance with DOT

regulations. The second was the Haz Mat Act,

which substantially expanded the powers with

respect to transportation of those materials.

This Act also placed all of the responsibilities

and duties concerning transportation of hazardous materials with the Secretary. However, it

The FRSA and the Occupational Safety and

Health (OSH) Act of 1970 (29 U.S. C. 651 et

seq. ) were each considered and adopted by Congress at about the same time, but originated in

separate committees. While the potential conflict of these two statutes as applied to the rail

industry was obvious, there is very [ittle

legislative history as to how Congress envisioned this conflict being resolved. What little

legislative history there is points to the following allocation: the Occupational Safety and
90 ● Railroad Safety

Health Administration (OSHA) of the Department of Labor would be responsible for (a) all

aspects of health regulation in the rail industry

and (b) those aspects of safety regulation which

do not relate to rail operations. FRA would be

responsible for those areas of safety which do

relate to or involve railroad operations.

The conclusion with respect to health arises

primarily from (1) the fact that neither health

nor safety, though not mutually exclusive

terms, can reasonably be read to include the

other, and (2) the fact that Congress, being

aware of this distinction in this context, did not

seek to add health to FRA’s jurisdiction. (See

text of S. 3061 and H.R. 14417 of 91st Congress,

bills considered contemporaneously with the

bill that ultimately became the FRSA, which

specifically excepted “occupational safety and

health of employees not engaged in railroad

operations” from FRA’s jurisdiction; and hearings before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R.

7068, 14417 and H.R. 14478, 91st Cong., 2nd

Sess., p. 37. ) The conclusion with respect to

safety and the distinction between “occupational safety” and “all areas of railroad safety”

arises from a discussion in the Senate Committee Report accompanying S. 1933, the Senate

version of the FRSA concerning the term

“railroad operations:”

Within an individual railroad company or corporate structure the bill is intended to have application to those matters reasonably related to

the safe movement and operation of rail equipment. Matters not peculiar to the basic purpose

of a railroad company (i.e. providing transportation by rail) are not intended to be considered

as an area of railroad safety. For example, the

safe operation of a lathe while it could be relevant to railroad safety is primarily a matter

common to the lathe operation both inside and

outside of the railroad industry” (S. Rep. No.

91-619, p. 6). (Italics added. )

Thus, there appears to be an intended limitation upon the scope of FRA’s jurisdiction that is

not inconsistent with the scope of the jurisdiction granted to OSHA.

It must be emphasized, however, that there is

very little legislative history concerning the

scope of the FRSA with respect to occupational

health and safety, which makes conclusions

concerning congressional intent somewhat

tenuous. Moreover, none of the court decisions

concerning the OSH Act as applied to the rail

industry have decided the issue of whether FRA

had the statutory authority to regulate occupational health and safety, although that issue has

never been raised in a manner that required the

court to decide it.

The OSH Act, on the other hand, is devoid of

any history relating specifically to the railroad

industry. However, it does have a provision

which is designed to avoid jurisdictional gaps or

overlaps:

Nothing in this chapter (OSH Act) shall apply to

working conditions of employees with respect to

which other Federal agencies . . , exercise

statutory authority to prescribe or enforce

standards or regulations affecting occupational

safety or health (29 U.S. C. 653 (b) (l)).

The railroads have contended, in cases challenging OSHA’S authority to inspect or enforce

its regulations concerning railroad working conditions, that this provision constitutes an

industry-wide exemption because FRA does exercise such authority. Each appellate court that

has considered this issue has rejected the

railroads’ contention and held that OSHA has

jurisdiction to enforce its regulations as to

employee working conditions not covered by an

FRA rule. (Bait. & Ohio RR. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,

et al,, 548 F.2d 1052 (D. C. Cir., 1976); Southern

Pacific Transportation Co. v. Usery, et al., 539

F.2d 386 (5th Cir, 1976); Southern Railway Co.

v. Occupational Safety and Health Review

Commission, et al., 539 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.,

1976).

In each of these cases, there was not any FRA

rule on the subject matter of the particular

violation at issue. Thus, the question of the extent of FRA’s authority will not likely be decided

until FRA issues a rule with respect to occupational safety and health and a violation of either
Ch. VII Safety Laws and Regulations ● 9 1

that rule or the corresponding OSHA rule is

challenged in court. In March 1975, FRA embarked on the rulemaking process in this area

with an advance notice of proposed rulemaking

(40 F.R. 10693), and took the second step of issuing a proposed rule on July 15, 1976 (41 FR

29155). This proceeding was cancelled on

March 14, 1978 (Federal Register, Volume 43,

Number 50, p. 10583).

Shortly after the OSH Act and FRSA were

passed, OSHA and FRA attempted to reach

some agreement as to their mutual jurisdiction

and the best procedure for exercising their particular responsibilities. A very limited Memorandum of Understanding was entered into on

May 16, 1972, but that letter agreement was rescinded unilaterally by OSHA on December 23,

1974. Since then, the two agencies have worked

on a broader “umbrella” agreement but without

any success. On August 5, 1977, in a letter to

the Chairman of the Safety Committee of the

Railway Labor Executives Association, Secretary Adams endorsed a statement of policy

prepared by RLEA to the effect that: (1) FRA

would be responsible for administration and enforcement of all existing railroad safety laws

and regulations; (2) OSHA would be responsible for all health conditions of railroad employment, including among other things such conditions arising in shops and maintenance and

repair facilities; and (3) OSHA would cover all

safety conditions not covered by FRA under (1)

above. In taking this position, the Secretary is

clearly receding from regulation of occupational

health in the rail industry. However, this statement does not answer the other critical issues as

to how far FRA’s jurisdiction can extend with

respect to safety, and how far the Secretary intends FRA to exercise that jurisdiction. Finally,

assuming any type of shared jursidiction, what

reporting requirements should reasonably be

placed upon railroads by the two agencies?

Thus, notwithstanding an attempt to avoid

jurisdictional gaps and overlaps in regulation of

occupational safety and health, there clearly has

been such a gap with respect to administration

of those regulations for railroad employees.

This gap has been created in part by the

railroads’ efforts in contesting OSHA’S jurisdiction (according to OSHA, over the last 4 years

almost 40 percent of all OSHA inspections of

railroads have been contested and only 11 percent of the fines levied have been collected), in

part by what appears to be the low attention

given by OSHA to railroad safety, and in part

by failure of FRA to assert any jurisdiction in

this area. On the other hand, how serious this

gap is in terms of employee safety is not known

precisely. Available statistics for the 1966-74

period simply do not indicate whether or to

what extent the railroad workplace has excessive occupational safety and health hazards,

although a substantial portion of the employee

casualties appear to have occurred outside of

the rail operating environment, indicating that

such hazards do exist.

TYPES OF AUTHORITY CONFERRED

The second perspective from which to deter- Regulatory

mine whether there are gaps or overlaps in the

railroad safety laws is gained by comparing the As discussed above, the early safet y laws

scope and effectiveness of each major type of granted very specific regulatory authority,

authority conferred—regulatory, research and whereas the later laws (mainly the FRSA) grant

development, investigatory (including report- broad regulatory authority. However, the aping), enforcement, and other types of authority. preach to such a grant of authority differed
92 . Railroad Safety

among the early laws. In several instances, they

require that the regulations simply be the rules

of each railroad as modified by the Secretary,

rather than a uniform rule originated by the

Secretary. (See Locomotive Inspection Act, 45

U.S.C. 28, concerning rules for inspection of

boilers, and Signal Inspection law, 49 U.S.C. 25

(c), concerning rules for installation, inspection,

maintenance and repair of signal systems and

related devices. ) In the case of power brakes, the

1958 amendment to the Safety Appliances Act

required the Secretary to adopt the rules of the

Association of American Railroads for the installation, inspection, maintenance and repair

of power or train brakes, and permits amendment “solely for the purpose of achieving safety” (45 U.s. c. 9).

The Locomotive Inspection Act and Signal Inspection law do not present a problem since,

even if the FRA is limited in its authority under

that law, its authority under the FRSA can cover

any gap. However, the limitation on rulemaking with respect to power or train brakes is more

troubling. The problem is basically one of

vagueness—that is, how does one determine

whether a change in those rules is solely for the

purpose of achieving safety. In 1971, the United

Transportation Union challenged a change in

those rules that it felt would reduce safety and,

in any event, had as its primary purpose the

reduction of the costs of power brake inspections under certain circumstances. The court

upheld the rule on the basis of the FRA hearing

examiner’s finding that it would increase safety,

and rejected the contention that the original purpose for the change had any legal effect on the

rule. (United Transportation Union, et al,, v.

U. S., et al., 337 F. Supp. 410, aff’d 406 U.S. 964

(1972).

While the Government’s view of the effect of

the rule in that case was upheld, it leaves open

and subject to question a considerable area of

potential rulemaking. For example, the statutory language and the UTU case would appear

to prohibit modifications to the rules for the

sake of clarity, removing obsolescence, or adjusting to technological change where the

modification did not affect safety per se.

Moreover, this standard for rule modification

seems to have generated sufficient controversy

at least to inhibit the rulemaking process,

thereby tending to preserve the status quo.

Finally, the use of the term “achieving” is not

helpful. The ICC originally interpreted it to permit a modification so long as safety was not

lessened, and FRA adopted this same position in

September 1968. Others, particularly representatives of rail labor, view this as requiring that

the rule modification have a beneficial impact

on safety.

It is not clear why Congress singled out the

rules for power brakes, among all railroad safety rules, for this unique treatment. At the least,

this provision has not contributed, and probably has inhibited, the speed with which such

rules are changed to meet changes in industry

practice or technology.

In contrast to the early safety laws, the FRSA

grants broad rulemaking power in “all areas of

railroad safety, ” which power is to supplement

that of the earlier laws (45 U.S.C. 431. (a)).

Thus, to the extent that there were any gaps,

whether by reason of applicability or substance,

the FRSA was the vehicle to fill these gaps. Indeed, that was its main purpose, particularly in

regard to three subject matter areas—track

standards, freight car standards, and human

factors (e.g. operating rules). Likewise, in the

more limited area of transportation of hazardous materials, the grant of regulatory authority

has been broadened substantially from the

earlier 1908 and 1960 laws by the Haz Mat Act.

However, one gap still remains and that is

with respect to regulation of employees’ hours

of service. While power to so regulate exists

under the FRSA, it would not encompass issuing

regulations to deal with the problems presented

by the Hours of Service Act. That Act provides

regulatory power to FRA only for the very

limited purpose of determining under what circumstances employee sleeping quarters would

be located “within or in the immediate vicinity”

of humping or switching operations. It does not

even provide the power to require reports or

recordkeeping, although FRA has issued such
Ch, Vll Safety Laws and Regulations ● 9 3

rules (49 CFR, part 228) on the strength of other

authority.

In order to make up for this gap, FRA has

issued its “Statement of Agency Policy and Interpretation” of the Hours of Service Act in the

form of an appendix to part 228 of Title 49 of

the CFR (42 FR 27594; May 31, 1977). Its stated

objectives are to: (1) explain FRA’s views on the

1976 amendments to the Act, (2) provide notice

of FRA’s views on issues of construction and interpretation, and (3) provide an educational

tool for those subject to the Act. An unstated

objective was to give its views as much force of

law as possible, which in part accounts for the

public process FRA used in promulgating this

statement and the fact that it is to be published

in the CFR. It’s success in this regard will not be

known until a violation of its interpretation is

contested in court. Courts typically give considerable deference to the views of an agency

charged with administering or enforcing a

statute, but the possibility of such deference is

certainly not equivalent to a regulation in terms

of its legal effect. Even if FRA’s interpretations

have their intended effect, regulatory authority

might still be preferable in order to solve the

many nitty-gritty fact questions that arise in

regard to the Hours of Service Act, and might

thereby lessen the considerable amount of litigation that this Act has spawned since 1969.

Inspections and Investigations

The power to inspect railroad properties and

to investigate the causes of accidents or complaints is, at least in theory, crucial to obtaining

full compliance with rail safety laws, regulations, and orders. Initially, Congress did not

grant the ICC sufficient powers to carry out

these functions. However, in a series of safety

laws beginning in 1908, it extended all of the

ICC’s investigatory, inspection, and enforcement powers to the rail safety laws (see Ash Pan

Act, 45 U.S. C. 19; Safety Appliance Acts, 45

U.S. C. 15; Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles Act, 18 U.S. C. 835 (b); Accident Report s

Act, 4.5 U.S. C. 40; and Signal Inspection law, 49

U.S. C. 26 (d) and (g)). In the Locomotive Inspection Act and Signal Inspection law, Congress took a somewhat different approach of requiring the carrier to do its own inspections of

locomotives and signal systems, in accordance

with its rules as modified and approved by the

FRA. In the case of the locomotives, Congress

established a specific office in the ICC to conduct these inspections. Thus, for these two laws

the inspection system is two-tiered—first the

carrier conducting inspections and then the FRA

checking the carrier’s inspection records and

conducting its own spot inspections.

Section 9 of the Safety Appliances Act (45

U.S. C. 9), the power brake provision W a S

amended in 1958 to have the ICC adopt as its

rules the AAR rules for maintenance, inspection, and testing of power or train brakes. This

amendment was adopted specifically because

the ICC lacked the power to prescribe such rules

to assure compliance. However, these rules do

not have any recordkeeping requirements (such

requirements would probably be impractical in

this context), and the FRA enforces primarily

through unobtrusive spot checking and investigation of complaints.

While the power granted under some of these

laws is rather limited, the investigative

power granted in the Accident Reports Act

covers “all . . . accidents resulting in serious injury to persons or to the property of a railroad

. . . . “ (45 U.S. C. 40). Similarly, the Explosives

and Other Dangerous Articles law permits the

Secretary to conduct investigations as he deems

necessary or proper to the exercise of this

authority under that law. Thus, even though

among the early safety laws there is rather

uneven distribution of the power to conduct investigations, the Accident Reports Act and the

Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles law

provide broad investigatory powers, together

with the power to issue subpoenas, administer

oaths, require the production of documents and

take testimony. However, the investigatory

power under the Accident Reports Act does not

reach accidents which do not cause serious injury to a person or the property of a railroad,

but do cause such injury to the property other

than that of a railroad, such as lading or abutting property.
94 . Railroad Safety

The more recent rail safety laws have also

provided broad inspection and investigation

powers (FRSA, 4 S U.S.C. 431 (a) and (c)),

Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (49

U.S. C. 1808 (a) and (c)). In addition, as discussed above, a separate agency— NTSB—has

been established primarily for the purpose of

conducting investigations of transportation accidents, and in particular must investigate any

railroad accident in which there is a fatality,

“substantial” property damage, or which involves a passenger train. Thus, with the addition of these laws, taking all of the rail safety

laws as a whole, there does not now exist any

important deficiency in the power to conduct investigations, although there are differences

among the various laws in the scope of the

power or duty granted in this regard.

Enforcement *

Three types of enforcement mechanisms are

employed by the various rail safety laws: (1) the

civil fine; (2) a criminal penalty of a fine or imprisonment or both; and (3) a judicially enforceable administrative order or equitable

relief (see table 30). The first type is fairly

uniform over all the safety laws, which is a

monetary civil fine of $250 to $2,500 per violation (up to $10,000 for OSH Act and Haz Mat

Act violations), depending on the seriousness of

the violation. This enforcement mechanism is

by far the most likely to be used for violation of

a safety law, order, or rule, and is also the

easiest to impose and enforce. This is because

the fine is typically small in size, thus not worth

much fight, and can be collected directly by

FRA without litigation as a result of the Federal

Claims Collection Act (FCCA) of 1966 (31

U.S. C. 951 et seq.). The FCCA, which permits

enforcing agencies to compromise and collect

their penalties up to $20,000 per violation, is

designed to relieve the courts and the Justice

Department of the burden that would be im-

*In the lexicon of railroad safety, the process of enforcement begins at the point inspection and investigation leave

off—the finding of a violation.

posed if enforcing agencies could not settle their

claims.

There is no limitation in the FCCA as to the

minimum amount to which a penalty may be

compromised. However, as indicated in table

30, Congress has established such a minimum

for four safety laws in order to obtain “strict enforcement” of the penalty provisions of those

laws. This will result in a higher minimum collection per penalty, although it may not affect

the overall enforcement of the laws. This is

because in seeking collection without litigation,

FRA would still need to compromise at an aggregate settlement figure that, as a percentage of

the total amount claimed, provides sufficient inducement to the railroads not to litigate.

Previously this has been approximately 7S percent and it is not clear whether that percentage

will change as a result of the minimum compromise base.

As to the second type of enforcement mechanisms, criminal penalties, only those relating to

hazardous materials have any viability. The

authority to collect a civil fine in lieu of a

criminal penalty for violation of the Accident

Reports Act was added in 1974 precisely

because it was almost impossible to get a conviction under that Act due to its trivial nature in

comparison to the other matters presented to the

Justice Department and the courts. The criminal

penalty under the Hours of Service Act relates

to only a single noncontroversial requirement

and has never been used. The two hazardous

materials laws each have criminal penalties that

are substantially higher than any of the civil

penalties and these are viable and have been

used, although there does not appear to have

ever been a prison sentence because, among

other reasons, only companies and not individuals have been prosecuted, On the other

hand, it must be emphasized that criminal

prosecution is substantially more difficult to

complete successfully than a civil penalty for at

least three reasons:

1. If the offense is not egregious (e.g. did not

result in a death or serious injury), it is difficult to get the Justice Department (particularly the U.S. Attorney’s Office) to
Ch. VII Safety Laws and Regulations ● 9 5

Table 30.—Enforcement Powers

Civil Criminal

Law penalty penalty Other

FRSA

Safety Appliances Acts

Locomotive Inspection

Accident Reports Acts

Ash Pan Act

Signal Inspection law

Hours of Service

Hazardous Materials

Transportation Act -

Explosives and Other

Dangerous Art icles

OSH Act

$250-$2,500’

$250-$2,500” *

$250-$2,500

$250-$2,500

$200

$250-$2,500’ ●

$500

upto$10,000

None

up to $10,000

None

None

None

$100

None

None

$100-$1 ,000; up

to 1 year in

prison or both

UP to $25,000;

up to 5 years

in prison or both

up to $1 ,000; or

1 year in prison

or both ($10,000 and

10 years if death

occurs)

up to $20,000 or

1 year in prison

or both

Emergency order, injunctive relief,

compliance order

None

Order out of service (applicable only to

boilers)

None

None

None

None

Equitable relief

None

Abatement, notice in lieu of citation

● Cannot be compromised below $250 (45 U. SC. 438 (c))

● ● Cannot be compromised below $250 (31 U.S.C. 952 note)

give it much attention, given its other

workload;

2. The same is true for the court; and

3. Even if the case is brought to trial, the case

must be proved “beyond a reasonable

doubt” rather than by the “preponderance

of the evidence. ”

The third type of enforcement, the judicial or

administrative order directing certain action, is

probably the least used. This power is set forth

primarily in the FRSA (equitable relief is

available under the Haz Mat Act and there is

some order authority under the Locomotive inspection Act ) where it takes three forms:

1. The emergency order issued by FRA under

which a facility or piece of equipment is

ordered out of service because it is in an

2.

3.

This

unsafe condition and thereby creates an

emergency involving a hazard of death or

injury (45 U.S. C. 432);

A court order enjoining actions in violation of the FRSA or enforcing rules or

orders issued under the FRSA (45 U. S.C.

439); and

An order by FRA directing compliance

with the FRSA or the rules or orders

issued thereunder (45 U.S. C. 437),

type of enforcement is generally not

availab-le for use in obtaining compliance with

the early safety laws.

The power to issue orders directing compliance was added in 1974 because previously

the FRA could only fine or seek injunctive relief

where a carrier was continually violating a law
96 Railroad safety

or rule, unless the violation met the test for an

emergency order. If it sought injunctive relief,

FRA would have to go through a full judicial

process before the relief requested would

become mandatory. More importantly, it leaves

to the court the determination of the exact relief

that would be granted. If FRA issues an order

directing compliance, it has control of the terms

of that order. If the railroad does not comply,

FRA can seek court enforcement, in which case

the court simply reviews whether there was a

reasonable basis for FRA’s order. From FRA’s

viewpoint, that is a much more favorable procedure than seeking injunctive relief.

Notwithstanding the effectiveness of the

emergency order and compliance order

mechanisms, these powers have been used very

sparingly. Since 1970, only six emergency

orders and no orders directing compliance have

been issued. This may be due either to the fact

that the conditions warranting such enforcement have not occurred with greater frequency,

or that FRA has been overly cautious in invoking such authority. Certainly the emergency

order by its own terms should be used only

where an “emergency” exists, which is likely to

be infrequent. However, there is no such limitation for orders directing compliance and there is

no apparent reason to indicate why this power

has not been used, particularly in cases where a

substantial number of violations of a law or

regulation have been incurred by a single

carrier.

In sum, there does not appear to be any lack

of or gap in enforcement authority under the

FRSA, but some of that authority may not be

employed with sufficient frequency. On the

other hand, the early safety laws lack the third

type of enforcement authority discussed above

and such authority would be useful in enforcing

those laws for the same reasons as are discussed

above for the FRSA.

Reporting and Recordkeeping

Among the older safety laws, the Accident

Reports Act contains the primary authority

with respect to reports and recordkeeping. The

Hours of Service Act, Ash Pan Act, and Safety

Appliances Act have no such powers or requirements, and the Block Signal law is obsolete. The Locomotive Inspection Act and

Signal Inspection law have similar provisions

requiring the reporting of locomotive boiler and

signal system failures respectively (45 U.S. C.

32, 49 U.S. C. 26 (f)), although in the former, the

failure must be reported only if it results in an

accident causing serious injury or death.

The Accident Reports Act, as the name suggests, requires carriers to report monthly to

FRA all accidents resulting in death or injury to

persons or in damage to equipment or roadbed.

An accident causing damage only to nonrailroad property does not have to be reported

under this Act. The report must indicate the

nature, cause, and circumstances of the

accident.

The FRSA and the Haz Mat Act provide general powers that permit FRA and the Secretary

to require such reports or other information as

are deemed necessary to carry out those laws

(45 U.S.C. 437 (a), 49 U.S.C. 1808 (a) and (b)).

FRA has combined its authority under the FRSA

with that of the Accident Reports Act to obtain

the information in such form and at such times

as it needs (49 CFR 225). NTSB also has authority to require the production of reports and other

written information by Government agencies

and persons engaged in commercial transportation “with respect to any matter pertinent to

transportation safety” (49 U.S.C. 1903 (b) (9)).

It should be noted that unlike FRA and the

Secretary, NTSB is limited as to whom it can require to produce these reports, though it could

itself go out and get any necessary information

from anyone.

As for reports by Government agencies, FRA

is required to submit an annual report on

railroad safety to Congress (45 U.S. C. 440). It

also is to receive from each State participating in

rail safety activities under the FRSA an annual

report, as part of the State’s annual certification, on the rail accidents in that State and the

activities of the State in its participation in rail

safety under the FRSA.
Ch. VII Safety Laws and Regulations ● 9 7

Likewise, the Secretary must give Congress

an annual report on hazardous materials transportation (49 U.S. C. 1808 (e)). NTSB must give

Congress an annual report containing certain

specific safety information (49 U.S. C. 1904)

and, in addition, must issue “periodic” reports

“recommending and advocating meaningful

responses to reduce . . . accidents . . . and prOposing corrective steps . . .“ (18 U.S. C. 1903 (a)

(3)). NTSB also must issue a public report on the

facts, conditions, and circumstances of each accident it investigates (18 U.S. C. 1903 (a) (2)).

All of this reporting when aggregated constitutes a considerable volume of reports issued

each year. This does not include the special

reports and studies that Congress requests from

time to time. Since all of these requirements

were built up over the years, it may be worth examining the extent to which this volume can be

reduced without loss of significant information.

Other Authority

As was stated

quite specifically

above, the early laws dealt

with the particular aspect of

safety to which the law was addressed, and did

not provide broader supplementary powers. To

the extent those powers were necessary, they

were found in the Interstate Commerce Act (see

49 U.S. C. 12 and 20). However, the ICC did not

engage in activities other than those specifically

described in that Act. The FRA inherited this

same authority.

The FRSA was the first broad grant of authority and provides all administrative powers necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act. The

Secretary is specifically authorized to conduct

research, development, testing, evaluation, and

training (45 U.S. C. 437 (a)). In 1974, as a result

of what Congress felt was an overemphasis

placed on research and development at the expense of investigation and enforcement, it limited the amount that could be spent from 1975

appropriations for research and development to

the amount spent for investigation and enforcement. In 1976, Congress amended the DOT Act

to require FRA to have not less than eight

regional safety offices. Both of these amendments indicate the willingness of Congress to

legislate limitations on FRA’s general administrative powers, if in its oversight Congress feels

these powers are not being used effectively.

The FRSA also directs the Secretary to undertake a “coordinated effort” to develop and implement solutions to the “grade-crossing problem’’(45 U.S. C. 433 (b)). It was felt that in so

directing the Secretary, greater attention would

be given to grade crossings, the primary responsibility for which is placed in the Federal Highway Administration (see detailed discussion of

the grade-crossing problem in chapter X).

The Haz Mat Act grants broad administrative

powers to the Secretary and specifically requires

the Secretary to: (a) establish and maintain a

technical staff sufficient to evaluate issues connected with hazardous materials transportation,

(b) establish a control reporting system and data

center, and (c) conduct a continuing review of

all aspects of hazardous materials transportation. That Act also gives the Secretary the

power to require persons involved in the transportation of hazardous materials to register

with DOT not more often than once every 2

years. This power was not sought by DOT and

has not been implemented.

In sum, the FRSA and the Haz Mat Act have

filled in virtually all of the conceivable gaps in

authority relating to rail safety. In fact, in the

last couple of years, Congress has taken steps to

place some limitations on or provide directions

for the use of these powers in order to make

them more effective. To some extent, this trend

presents a problem since the more that flexibility is removed from administration of the rail

safety laws, the less capable Government will be

to meet changing needs. on the other hand,

Congress has been dissatisfied with the way in

which these powers have been exercised (or not

exercised) and thus has found it necessary to

become more specific as to the use of these

powers in order to achieve its goals.

The statutory structure, then, appears to be

basically complete, with the exception of the

need for authority to issue regulations concern-
98 ● Railroad Safety

ing hours of service, greater flexibility in power

brake regulation, and the addition of certain enforcement powers to the early safety laws. If

anything, the existing weakness is one of redundancy and obsolescence rather than inadequacy.

STRUCTURE

However, as Congress has recently shaped this

structure to more specific needs, it has begun to

burden it with provisions that in the Iong run

could hamper effective administration of the rail

safety program.

OF FEDERAL

RAILROAD SAFETY REGULATIONS

The Federal rules and standards pertaining to

railroad safety are established by three entities

(OSHA has been excluded from this discussion

because its regulations do not deal specifically

with the railroad environment): the Materials

Transportation Bureau with respect to transportation of hazardous materials, the Federal Railroad Administration with respect to rail operations generally, and the National Transportation Safety Board with respect to accident

investigation.

The basic scheme of MTB’s rules (49 CFR,

parts 102 and 171 to 199) is to set forth (a) the

list of each explosive and other dangerous article covered by these rules and give its classification (e.g. class A explosive, flammable liquid,

etiologic agent, etc. ) which reflects its most

hazardous characteristic ($ 172.5); (b) the requirements for packaging, marking, and labeling each of these materials depending on its

mode of transportation (part 173); (c) the requirements for loading, unloading, placarding,

and handling of rail cars containing these

materials (part 174); (d) the specifications for

particular shipping containers (part 178); and

(e) the specifications for tank cars (part 179).

These rules are voluminous, minutely detailed,

and highly technical. They have been formulated over decades by a joint effort of the

regulating agency (now MTB, previously the

ICC) and the representatives of all of the

various groups affected by these rules (see list

set forth in $171.7 (c)), particularly the AAR’s

Bureau of Explosives. As this scheme indicates,

these rules form an independent, sophisticated,

and integrated system of restrictions on the

transportation of these materials, and as such

are considerably different from all other rules

applicable to railroad safety. Moreover, they

apply not only to the carriers but also to the

shippers, packagers, recipients, and other

handlers of the materials. Finally, while there is

considerable detail relating solely to railroads,

there is a much greater amount applicable to

other modes, thereby requiring from MTB a

multimodal perspective rather than simply

focusing on the problems of one mode.

Unlike the integrated structure of MTB’s

rules, FRA’s rail safety rules (49 CFR, parts 209

to 236) cover a series of essentially unrelated

matters, reflecting their legislative origins. Part

209 contains FRA’s procedures for enforcing the

Haz Mat Act and for issuing compliance orders

under the FRSA, which were promulgated as a

result of the Transportation Safety Act of 1974.

FRA’s regulations under the Noise Control Act

of 1972 appear in Part 210. Part 211 contains the

various procedures employed by FRA in its

rulemaking and related actions. These were

completely revised and reissued at the end of

1976 as a result of the 1976 amendment to the

FRSA requiring new procedures with specific

time limits for completion of all proceedings to

the extent practicable under the FRSA within 12

months (45 U.S. C 430 (d)). While these procedures cover all rulemaking and related actions

regardless of whether they are taken pursuant to

the FRSA or other laws, FRA stated that it

would observe the 12-month time limit for rules

promulgated under laws other than the FRSA

only “to the extent practicable. ”

Part 212 implements the State participation

program under the FRSA. Part 213 contains the
Ch, VII Safety Laws and Regulations ● 9 9

track safety standards which were the first rules

issued under the FRSA. The companion standards for freight cars are contained in part 215.

Both of the parts set forth the specific design and

performance standards which constitute the

minimum requirements for track and equipment, and also contain the requirements for

inspection by the carrier of their track and

equipment.

Part 216 describes the procedures for issuing a

special notice for repairs or an emergency order.

The former are notices issued by Government

inspectors that (a) require a railroad to take the

locomotive or equipment out of service because

it is not in conformity with FRA’s rules and is

unsafe, and (b) specify the particular repairs

that must be made. Such notices may also be

issued for track, in which case it requires the

carrier to lower the track class, and therefore

operating speeds, until the specified repairs are

made. The emergency order procedures contained in part 216 pertain only to track.

Parts 217 and 218 contain FRA’s requirements

concerning operating rules. This subject matter

area is the third of the three areas (track, equipment, human factors) which the FRSA was to

provide the authority to regulate. Each railroad

has its own set of operating rules timetables and

timetable special instructions for employees,

many of which contain all of the requirements

an employee must follow in performing his job

(these items are referred to in the aggregate as

“operating rules”). Under part 217, these rules,

together with any changes that may be made

from time to time, must be filed with FRA. This

part also requires the railroad to conduct tests

and inspections to determine employee compliance with the rules, to establish a program of

instruction on the carrier’s rules, and to maintain records and report to FRA concerning these

tests, inspections, and instructions.

Part 218 contains the specific operating rules

adopted by FRA— blue signal protection, yard

speed limits, and red flag protection. Each

railroad had a pre-existing rule on these areas,

but FRA felt it was necessary to have a minimum Federal requirement, and thus adopted

these rules after considerable review and discussion by FRA’s Railroad Operating Rules Advisory Committee composed of representatives

of labor and management and State regulatory

officials. Of a similar nature are the recently

issued rules contained in Part 200 establishing

standards and procedures for use of radios,

which, though not technically operating rules,

regulate certain employee actions in much the

same manner as an operating rule. The blue

signal protection rule will be discussed in greater

detail below.

The remaining railroad safety rules relate

primarily to particular laws as follows:

Part Subject Matter Law

221

225

228

230

231

232

233-236

Rearend marking devices

Accident reports,

recordkeeping investigations

Reports and recordkeeping with respect

to ernplo yee hours of

service; appendix of

interpretations

Locomotive design and

performance standards

Safety appliance standards for railroad equipment

Requirements for power

brakes and drawbars

Requirements for signals

and related devices, including reporting requirements and procedures for

obtaining approval of a

system change

Each of these parts contains,

Federal Railroad

Safety Authoriza tion Act (Jt

1976 (Amending

FRSA)

Accident Reports

Act

Hours [>t Service

Act

Locom(>tivc Inspection Act

Safety Appliances

Act

Safety Appliance’\

Act

in addition to its

substantive requirements, the applicable inspection, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements

that formulate the system for assuring compliance. In some cases, they repeat the statutory

penalty for violation of the law or regulation.

However, where the law provides a penalty
100 ● Railroad Safety

range, except in the case of the regulations

regarding accident reports, no indication is

given as to the way in which that penalty range

will be applied. Finally, it should be noted that

while the law indicated above formed the

primary basis of authority for the particular

rule, it is usually not the exclusive basis, the

FRSA being the source of authority to fill in certain gaps under the older laws. For example,

part 225 looks to both the Accident Reports Act

and the FRSA for the authority to require the

reports and recordkeeping that are broader than

that contemplated by the Accident Reports Act.

The NTSB has two sets of rules applicable to

the rail environment—those pertaining to giving

notice of a railroad accident (49 CFR, part 840)

and those pertaining to practice and procedure

in surface transportation accident hearings (49

CFR, part 845). There has been some controversy with respect to the former in that NTSB has

established a different reporting threshold and

required different information to be given than

has FRA under its accident reports rules,

although both agencies require the report to be

made by telephone to the same place. While it is

understandable (but not necessarily desired)

that there are different reporting thresholds,

there does not seem to be any good reason for

different information requirements. At the least,

this difference presents an unnecessary opportunity for confusion.

Having described this overall regulatory

framework, some analysis needs to be given to

the rules themselves and the manner in which

they were formulated in order to consider their

effectiveness in improving railroad safety, Since

it was not feasible to conduct an in-depth examination of all of these rules within a short

period of time, five subject-matter areas were

selected for such an analysis: State participation

regulations, tank car specifications, track safety

standards, power brake rules, and blue signal

protection. These were selected because they

reflect different statutory sources, cover different safety hazards, reflect Governmentindustry-labor cooperation or lack of it, and

cover different time periods.

Analysis of Selected Regulations

The results of the analysis of each of the five

rulemakings are discussed individually, and

thereafter the conclusion concerning the rulemaking process generally is set forth.

Track Safety Standards

The track safety standards were undertaken

because track was the primary area of concern

in rail safety for which there was no existing

Government safety program. The FRSA directed FRA to adopt “initial” standards based on

“existing safety data and standards” within 1

year of the FRSA. FRA began with the track

standards which were issued within 1 year, continued with freight car standards which were

completed 3 years after the FRSA, and then

began consideration of operating rules. The

State participation regulations were also issued

3 years after the FRSA.

In the case of the track standards, it was a

foregone conclusion based upon the legislative

history of the FRSA that track standards were

necessary for safety. Therefore, the issues raised

by the rulemaking centered essentially on

whether the standards FRA was preparing were

based on “existing” data and standards as the

FRSA required. The AAR provided FRA with its

“code of track standards” and its inspection

standards. While FRA acknowledged the need

for its rules to be based on “existing” standards,

it developed its own standards base, in part on

the industry standards and in part on performance criteria it had developed. The proposed rule, a mixture of performance and design

standards, was criticized by the industry as being “recommended practice” rather than safety

minima, and more costly to the industry than

the aggregate “benefits” they provide. The final

rule contained a number of changes that reduced

this criticism, and the result wa~ a rule that has

been relatively uncontroversial.

Several observations can be made from examination of this rule. First, in developing the rule,

FRA worked closely with the indusTrybut main-
Ch, Vll Safety Laws and Regulations ● 101

tained a degree of independence that is consistent with its regulatory role. Second, the rulemaking docket is devoid of any substantive

treatment by FRA of most major issues.

Changes were made from proposed to final rule

on the basis of their being “necessary (or unnecessary) for safety. ” This conclusory treatment seemed to be primarily a result of the lack

of empirical data to support particular standards. Third, the rules were developed without

any formal use of accident or other safety

statistics, at Ieast as reflected in the public

record. Fourth, while various parties submitted

at FRA’s request some rather simple cost-benefit

analyses, there is no indication that FRA used

that information, or any such data that it developed, in arriving at the final track standards.

State Participation Regulations

These regulations were issued to implement

the State participation program established by

the FRSA. The record on the issuance of these

rules indicates a basic philosophical difference

between FRA and most States on this program.

FRA’s approach is one of assuring uniform inspection/quality and uniform application of its

rules. The States’ approach was that the FRSA

had created a “right” to participate in the

Federal safety program and FRA’s stringent requirements for certification and inspector

qualifications deprived many States of this

“right. ” The railroads supported FRA’s position

concerning the need for qualified inspectors.

FRA amended these rules in 1975 to permit use

of trainee inspectors under certain circumstances in order to enable more States to participate. However, the basic difference in approach to this program between FRA and the

States has not been bridged.

The record of this rulemaking also attests to

the independence of FRA in promulgating its

rules, notwithstanding the fact that it provided

the most interested party, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, with

a copy of the proposed rules in advance of their

publication. It also indicates that a cost-benefit

analysis of the rules requirements was not performed. Finally, the rule proceeded from initiation to final action in a relatively short period of

time (8 months) owing in part to the limited

number of interested parties and to the nontechnical nature of its content.

Blue Signal Protection

FRA instituted rulemaking action on this

operating rule with an advance notice of proposed ruIemaking in January 1974. In so doing,

FRA was beginning to deal with the third major

area of safety hazards—human factors or employee failure. FRA chose blue signal protection

because it believed there was very uneven application of the industry rule, known as rule 26,

among various railroads and in some cases

within a particular railroad, with respect to providing blue signal protection for employees

working on, under or between railcars. The

result was, according to FRA, confusion and

uncertainty and a lack of strict enforcement

which can, it felt, lead to tragic consequences.

However, the record does not indicate any

statistical or safety data basis for undertaking

this rule. In response to the Advanced Notice of

Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), the AAR contended that the existing rule, which had been the

industry standard since 1887, was more than

adequate, had the flexibility to meet varying

situations, and had a good accident history. The

labor unions urged FRA to adopt a uniform national rule, rather than a minimum standard

that could be supplemented by each railroad to

meet its needs, and to provide for locking of

switches lined against movement on a track on

which a blue signal is displayed.

Eighteen months after issuing the ANPRM,

FRA issued a proposed rule, and 9 months later

issued the final rule on March 8, 1976. The entire rulemaking record to that point is devoid of

any consideration of the costs or benefits or inflationary impact analyses. In handling t he

various issues, FRA seems to have opted for

strong minimum standards, but excluded rapid

transit railroads from the scope of the rule

because they were operationally so different

from other railroads. While locking of switches
102 ● Railroad Safety

was raised in response to the ANPRM, the

docket of the rule does not indicate that it was

not raised in response to the Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking except with respect to remotely

controlled switches in yards, which FRA did require to be locked. Nevertheless, after the rule

was final, Congress mandated a revised rule requiring the lining and locking of switches that

provided access to track on which a blue signal

is displayed.

This revised rule was adopted on January 5,

1977. FRA estimated the costs of the rule to be

$9.6 million per year and $450,000 at the outset.

Within the constraints placed by Congress, FRA

seems to have considered what were the leastcostly alternatives. Nevertheless, there has

never been any attempt to assess whether the net

benefits provided by the rule, particularly the

requirements for locking and lining of switches,

are in reasonable proportion to the costs of

compliance.

Power Brake Rules

As has been discussed above, the FRA rules

for installation, inspection, maintenance, and

repair of power or train brakes are those established by the AAR as of 1958, and the statute

permits amendment of those rules “solely for the

purpose of achieving safety” (45 U.S. C. 9). The

legislative history of this limitation shows that it

was compromise language intended to prevent

changes in the power brake rules that would

have the effect of limiting the length of trains.

From 1969 to 1971, five changes to the power

brake rules were proposed or considered by

FRA, primarily at the behest of the industry.

Rail labor strongly opposed each of these

changes, contending that they were primarily

for the purpose of providing the railroads with

certain economic savings and could have the effect of reducing safety. However, this position

was rejected both by FRA and by the U.S.

District Court in a case seeking to overturn one

of the changes adopted by FRA. The court

found there was evidence that certain changes in

the testing requirements would increase safety

and sustained the rule. (United Transportation

Union, et al., v. United States, et al., 337 F.

Supp. 410, aff’d 406 U.S. 964 (1972)). F R A

ultimately did not adopt several of the proposed

changes because it found there was not “sufficient supportive data regarding the impact its

adoption would have upon safety” and thus

would not meet the statutory test (41 FR 56678,

December 29, 1976).

This finding points up the real problem

presented by the power brake law: it eliminates

any opportunity to change a rule where there is

not clear evidence that the change will at least

not reduce safety. Such a limitation undercuts

completely the usually desirable practice for an

agency to review its rules and revise them to

eliminate requirements whose burdens exceed

substantially the benefits they provide. There is

a substantial body of opinion, most of it coming

from representatives of railroad management,

that some of the power brake inspection rules

are make-work provisions that have little or no

real impact on safety but have a substantial impact on the efficiency of rail operation. If this

were true (and this study has not established

that it is), FRA is handicapped in enacting

changes that would reduce or eliminate ineffective rules unless there were offsetting changes

that would increase safety. For example, it

could not eliminate a frivolous test required by

the rules at some intermediate point on a train’s

route unless there were other inspection or

testing requirements that could be added which

would offset any reduction in safety caused by

that elimination. This was the procedure

employed in the change which eliminated the requirement of air brake testing on run-through

and unit run-through trains at the point of interchange. In other words, FRA is prevented from

eliminating power brake rule requirements that,

on the basis of today’s cost-benefit analysis, it

would not adopt unless it at the same time

enacts other safety requirements, resulting in a

rule which is as equally restrictive as the original

rule from a safety viewpoint. It is not clear why

power brake rules have been saddled with such

inflexibility, and elimination of this statutory

limitation would offer a valuable opportunity

for FRA to reassess these rules in the light of current safety hazards and operating practices.
Ch, Safety Laws and Regulations “ 10.3

Tank Car Specifications

The revisions to the tank car

were undertaken in response to a

specifications

petition made

by five tank car builders and to a series of recent

accidents involving pressure tank cars transporting hazardous materials. Among the five

rules reviewed in depth, this alone forms a

model for exercise of rulemaking authority.

First, the record indicates a review of safety data

to formulate the regulatory objective. Second, the substance of the rule was developed by

industry and Government cooperation through

the Railroad Tank Car Safety Research and Test

Project Committee, In particular, many of the

technical considerations were worked out as a

result of joint or compatible research. Third,

there was a relatively short time period between

the petition forrt.demaking (March 15, 1976),

the issuance of the proposed rule (November 19,

1976), and the issuance of the final rule

(September 15, 1977). Nevertheless, that time

period might have been substantially shorter

had not the review of the final rule been encumbered by a change in top DOT officers requiring much reconsideration and delay due to

reorganization. Fourth, a cost-benefit analysis

was performed for both the proposed and final

rules and was made available for comment.

While one can take issue with the details of this

analysis, particularly in evaluating the benefits,

it is clear that the significant economic issues

were considered. Finally, the preambles to the

final rule discuss each of the major issues raised

by commenters on the proposed rule and provide some discussion of how these issues were

resolved. Of course, even though this rulemaking was done carefully, it is not issue-free, as indicated by the fact that at least five petitions for

reconsideration have been filed since the final

rule.

In sum, a review of these rulemaking actions

indicates that FRA has generally been quite

balanced in its formulation of rules, responding

to both the industry’s economic concerns and

labor’s safety concerns. However, it has, at least

until very recently, done little to evaluate the

impact of its rulemaking in cost or benefit

terms. Further, it provides very little justification for its resolution of issues raised during the

proceeding. In particular, it has seldom indicated that any of the safety information it

receives or the statistics it develops are used in

making decisions on whether and how to regulate a particular safety hazard. In several instances, it also has acted slowly in taking up or

completing rulemaking actions, although the

causes for those delays were often factors outside its control—such as the degree of controversy among interested parties and the lack

of data necessary to evaluate or establish particular requirements.

On the other hand, FRA has encountered substantial statutory burdens in formulating its

rules. First, in the case of blue signal protection,

it was required to formulate a rule providing a

protection (locking and lining of switches) that

was never adequately addressed either at the initial rulemaking or subsequently in the testimony

before Congress on the provision mandating the

protection. The impact of such legislation is to

focus the attention of the regulating agency on a

particular hazard without benefit of knowing

whether that hazard deserves such attention in

comparison to other hazards, and to mandate a

preventive measure without the benefit of being

able to develop cooperatively or otherwise the

least-costly alternative to reduce that hazard.

Second, the standard required for amendment

of power brake rules may prevent a number of

changes that would make rail operations more

efficient without any significant reduction in

safety. This particular limitation seems in fact to

be designed to prevent modernization of rules

under the guise of assuring safety. Third, the

FRSA requirement for a hearing on any rulemaking activity has resulted in virtually nothing

in the way of new information, but rather has

just been an unproductive time-consuming procedure that must be used. While the requirement

was intended to provide parties with a “right” to

present their views orally, it has become simply

a redundancy since the parties who do participate reiterate their written comments and

seldom, if ever, provide any new information.
Chapter 

RAILROAD SAFETY

INSPECTION PROGRAMS
Chapter Vlll

RAILROAD SAFETY INSPECTION PROGRAMS

INTRODUCTION

Inspection has been conceived by the Federal

Railroad Administration, the States, the railroads, and their employees as being one of the

key components of railroad safety, The theory

is that since both empirical and research information exists as to conditions that give rise to

accidents, inspection by persons knowledgeable

in a particular area will give sufficient warning

when such conditions are developing so as to

allow preventive actions to be taken or when

such conditions have developed to allow corrective action to be taken. Although the theory is

easily understood, the implementation of a

comprehensive inspection program is impeded

by several factors. They include:

Difficulty of precisely identifying the causal

agents in accidents and their correlation

with accidents;

Difficulty of establishing accurate measures

of effectiveness for the inspection activity

because it must depend to some extent on

determining events or conditions that did

not occur which otherwise might have; and

Difficulty of maximizing the resources

available from all parties concerned, given

their differing mandates, areas of responsibility, and thus approaches to the problem.

Despite the impediments, however, an inspection program that depends upon the interlocking efforts of the FRA, the States, and the

railroads is in place. The word “program” is

used here in its broad sense, because the efforts

of the FRA, the States, and the railroads are not

singly conceived and because these efforts do

not always coincide as to motivation or authority. These efforts are predicated upon the common assumption that inspections will prevent

accidents—although the parties may disagree as

to how much inspection (at which levels, by

whom, and with what checks) constitutes an

adequate effort. Important to the assessment of

inspection’s “effectiveness” in preventing accidents is that a framework of prescribed

Federal regulatory powers and specifications in

some way defines many of the inspection efforts. However, at the present time, no clear

way of gauging the causal relationship of inspection to accident prevention appears to exist.

The Federal, State, and railroad approaches

to safety inspection are focused on specific components of the train and its equipment (including track) and of the railroad’s operating

practices. Inspectors generally have to comply

with a different set of requirements for each

component that is the subject of an inspection

program and therefore, inspectors tend to be

highly specialized and perform only one type of

inspection.

Brief overviews of the Federal, State, and

railroad programs follow:

Federal lnspectionl

Federal inspection activities focus primarily

on five major aspects of the railroad. These are:

● Track,

● Operating practices,

s Motive power and equipment,

● Signals and train control, and

c Hazardous materials.

‘Federal inspection programs include that administered

by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

however, this program is not discussed in detail in this

chapter since i t is designed to investigate only serious accidents ( including any that involve a fatality). Thus, its

program is not one that directly bears on the relationship

between a comprehensive inspection effort and the reduction of accidents.

107
108 Railroad Safety

The FRA has enforcement power in each of

these areas, with the ability to assess civil

penalties ranging from $250 to $2,500 per violation in the first four areas and up to $10,000 in

the hazardous materials area, as well as criminal

penalties for hazardous materials. Although the

aim of the FRA program is accident prevention,

it emphasizes the enforcement implications of

the inspection system, since it believes that its

mandate under the law is to monitor carrier

compliance with Federal regulations. The railroad is itself responsible under the law for ensuring that it is in compliance with the regulations and thus also for directly preventing accidents. Therefore, one of the FRA inspector’s

main functions, when lack of compliance is

determined, is to recommend assessment of

penalties to the FRA Office of Chief Counsel.

The inspection effort represents one of FRA’s

most significant safety programs in terms of

dollars and numbers of personnel assigned to it

directly or in support of it.

In FY 1976, for instance, $1,341,964 was expended in direct costs for conducting 1,587,349

individual inspections ranging from record

checks to physical inspection of various aspects

of the railroads’ operations and equipment.

During this same time, there were 386 FRA Office of Safety personnel authorized in the field

and in headquarters for carrying out the inspection program. Three hundred and sixty of these

positions were filled. (See appendix D.)

State lnspection2

The potential scope of State inspection activities was redefined by the Federal Railroad

Safety Act of 1970 (P.L. 94-458). It contemplated a program in which States would

work with the FRA to enforce Federal regulations, with the FRA financing a portion of these

activities. The program that has been developed

is known as the “State Participation Inspection

‘Since this report is concerned with the implementation

of Federal laws, it will not cover any aspects of State inspection effort that are not related to Federal requirements.

Program.” At present, the program permits the

States to inspect in two areas. These are:

 Track, and

 Motive power and equipment.

Their inspection authority in the motive,

power, and equipment areas is limited to freight

car safety standards and does not include safety

appliance standards. State inspectors are responsible to the States for which they work.

Federal authority over them is limited to the

State’s eligibility (including prescriptions for inspector qualifications) for the State Participation Inspection Program and to the monitoring

of the inspection records of performance. The

State inspector, like the Federal inspector, recommends enforcement action to the FRA in

Washington. Only if the FRA fails to act on the

inspector’s recommendation within 180 days

from the date of the violation does the State

have the right to enforce directly under this

program.

In FY 1976, the State program is estimated to

have cost approximately $341,925 in Federal

money, matched by approximately the same

amount in State money. These dollars supported the activity of 29 State inspectors and

trainees. (See appendix D.)

Railroad Inspection

Railroad inspection activities cover all of the

aspects of Federal and State inspections programs. In addition to ensuring compliance with

Federal requirements, railroads use the inspection process to serve as an “early warning

system. ” Inspection provides many railroads

with information as to where preventive maintenance or modification/redirection of other

operating practices may be necessary. The railroad inspection system as it pertains to safety is

monitored internally by management, with its

effectiveness being gauged by the twin results of

preventing accidents and of preventing the

necessity for FRA enforcement action. The FRA

and State inspectors check on the adequacy of

railroad inspection by conducting inspections of

their own to ensure compliance with Federal
Ch. VIII Railroad Safety Inspection Programs ● 109

standards; however, railroad inspections—both FRA or State inspections. Figures are not

by railroad policy and by Federal regulation— available on the total costs of railroad safety

must take place with far greater frequency than inspections.

FEDERAL INSPECTION PROGRAMS

The Federal approach to railroad safety has

included an inspection component, since the

Locomotive Inspection Act was enacted in

February 1911 to check boilers for the safety of

employees and others. Since that time, the Safety Appliances Act3 (45 U.S. C. 1 et seq.), the

Power Brake and the Signal Drawbar Act (45

U.S.C. 9), the Inspection Act (U. S.C. 26), the

Transportation of Explosives and Other

Dangerous Articles Act of 1960 (18 U.S. C.

831-835), the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S. C.

46), and the Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45

U.S. C. 431) have been amended or enacted to

empower the executive branch to enforce safety

regulations promulgated under its authority.

Each of the five principal inspection programs

carried out by the FRA implements portions of

these laws. All of the inspection programs are

posited on the ability of inspectors to measure

the existing conditions against a standard for

which they are inspecting.

Many of the inspection programs were

originally administered by the Interstate Commerce Commission but were transferred to the

FRA in 1967, with the establishment of the

Department of Transportation. There have been

numerous reorganizations and significant personnel increases since 1967. At the present time,

FRA inspection programs are located in its eight

regions. The headquarters Office of Safety,

headed by an Associate Administrator for Safety, has no line authority over the field; each

region reports directly to the Deputy Administrator of FRA. The Office of Safety is

responsible for planning, developing, and administering an effective and comprehensive program to achieve safe operating and mechanical

‘Originally enacted in 1893, the first Safety Appliances

Act, however, did not provide for inspections.

practices in the railroad industry, including the

enforcement of all the Federal laws and related

regulations designed to promote safety of

railroads, as they relate to employees, travelers,

and the general public. 4 In this light, the Office

of Safety provides support to the field activities

through its Office of Safety Programs, which

houses divisions responsible for compliance and

enforcement and program guidance, and its Office of Standards and Procedures, which houses

divisions covering each of the inspection program disciplines as well as a division which

analyzes accident and inspection reports (see appendix D for a schematic representation of the

Office of Safety Organization).

At the present time, there are a total of 221

FRA inspectors at outstations. 5 (See appendix D

for summary by program. ) These inspectors are

stationed in 31 of the 50 States. The safety inspectors are assigned to one of the five specific

inspection programs and work under the supervision of a Supervising Railroad Safety Inspector. While the FRA has placed importance on inspectors having in-depth knowledge/experience

in the substance of a particular program, the

Supervising Inspector is not required to have

similar knowledge in all five programs.

However, a Regional Railroad Safety Specialist

position has been created in each discipline in

each region to provide technical support and

guidance.

‘Taken frc)m FR4 Or,gtit~iz~7tio}z f’bf[~t~f~[~), F]<A 1100,23,

p, II- 149,

‘Figures, which include supervisors and speci~ll~ts, ~rc

taken from “Railrc)ad Safety Assessment, Task 1]]:

Analysis c~f Federal, State, and Railroad Inspection Programs, ” Peat, Nlarw’ick, Nlitchell & CL>., Nov. 30, 1977.

( Hereafter referred to as PMM & Ccl, “Task III”). The tour

Materials Transportation Bureau inspectors are not included in this figure.
120 Railroad Safety

In carrying out the various inspection programs, the FRA emphasizes its monitoring and

enforcement role. It does not view its inspection

activities as a primary means of ensuring that

adequate preventive measures take place,

believing, instead, that such a role is more properly the responsibility of the railroads. The FRA

carries out inspections that flow from six different purposes. They are:

●

●

●

●

●

●

Accident investigation (initiated by FRA),

Emergency situation investigation (initiated

by FRA),

Complaint investigation (initiated by

members of the public, including railroad

employees),

Routine planned investigation (initiated by

FRA),

Petition and application investigation

(initiated by railroads), and

Follow-up investigation (initiated by FRA).

The inspections in all of these categories are intended to determine if the railroad has complied

with Federal safety standards (and, if not, to

make a judgment about appropriate remedial

action and/or penalty assessment). However, in

the case of “petition and application” investigations, the FRA also is seeking to determine

whether an exception to complying with an FRA

regulation should be granted to a railroad requesting an exception. Depending on the situation, the FRA investigations may require several

hours or several weeks to carry out.’ The FRA

stresses the importance of cooperating with the

railroads in carrying out these inspections. In

the case of routine planned inspections, inspectors are instructed to notify the railroads in advance of the inspections. Federal inspectors may

inspect for many aspects of the railroad safety

regulations on their own; however, they generally are accompanied on their inspections by

an employee of the railroad.

6

The term “an inspection” or “an inspection unit” maybe

misleading when used as an output measurement or a way

of assessing effectiveness because of the discrepancies that

exist between the effort required to examine, for example,

a railroad’s time log versus that required to inspect freight

car equipment.

The FRA accords accident investigations the

highest priority. Emergency situation and complaint investigations also are given priority and

are generally handled through headquarters in

Washington. A control number is assigned and

field personnel carrying out the inspections are

monitored. The FRA estimates that about 10

percent of its inspections are complaint investigations, which are handled according to the

inspector’s schedule. However, no matter what

the purpose of the investigation, all inspectors

are expected to identify those elements present

that are likely to cause failures and/or accidents. In addition, general courses, such as

“Railroad Inspector Orientation and Accident

Prevention” offered by the FRA are designed to

provide the inspector with a broader, crosscutting understanding of the variables in accidents than that offered by his specialized experience. This includes ways to recognize

defects and failure modes that could cause accidents, legal implications, human factors considerations, and hazardous materials concerns

in any given situation.

The various inspection programs report to the

Director of Railroad Safety in the field (see appendix D), but aside from the reporting commonality the programs appear to be carried out

in the region independently from one another.

There does not appear to be an overall inspection/enforcement strategy that governs the dayto-day activities of the inspectors.7

There has been a shift in the inspection activity from FY 1974 to FY 1976. The reasons for the

shifts within some of the individual programs

are not immediately clear because of a lack of

data to relate these shifts to the accident pattern.

For instance, freight car inspection increased by

‘Th; approach to each inspection program is discussed

under the section dealing with each program that follows.

However, it is important to note here that in an April 1975

letter to the Secretary of Transportation the GAO recommended that the development of an inspection /enforcement strategy would strengthen the FRA’s inspection program. (See 4/11/75 Eschwege letter to Secretary of

Transportation (B-1 S4497(5)). PMM & Co., “Task III”

also notes lack of accident prevention strategy in the inspection programs, based on the interviews conducted during the course of the study. pp. 1.5-1.6.
Ch. V1lI Railroad Safety Inspection Programs ● 111

approximately 80,000 units, while motive

power inspection decreased by approximately

40,000 (about 50 percent) during the period FY

1974-76. Similarly, inspection of hazardous

materials records decreased dramatically from

75,094 in FY 1974 to 4,968 in FY 1976—and less

dramatically in all other of its activities. The

Signal and Train Control Inspection Program

showed decreases in almost all of its activities,

while the Operating Practices Inspection Program and the Track Inspection Program showed

increases, with the relationship of the individual

activities to the total program remaining more

or less constant.

Total inspection activity declined slightly

during FY 1974-76, indicating that the decrease

in motive power and equipment, hazardous

materials, and signal and train control inspections had not been offset by the increases in

track and operating practices inspections.

Because of the difficulty of relating the specific

components of the individual inspection programs to the accident data, it is not possible to

understand the reasons underlying the timing

and the nature of the shifts. However, the increase in track inspections in all likelihood indicates a response to the high number of trackrelated accidents; similarly, the increase in

operating practices inspections may indicate a

response to the employee fatality problem.

Nonetheless, these two inspection efforts have

been allocated one-half as many dollar and personnel resources and one-tenth as many dollar

and one-half as many personnel resources,

respectively, as those allocated to the motive

power and equipment inspection efforts. (See

appendix D.)

During this same period, inspection

increased from an on-board figure of

1974 to 220 in FY 1976.

Description of Federal

Inspection Programsa

personnel

185 in FY

A brief history and description of each of the

five Federal safety inspection programs follows:

“Appendix D summarizes the inspection efforts and

direct costs for FY 1974-7b.

Track Safety Inspection Program

This program was implemented

standards (49 CFR 213) established

to enforce

under the

Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-458),

beginning in 1972 when the first Federal track

inspector was hired. The track safety standards

prescribe minimum structural requirements and

maximum speed limits for track used in interstate freight and passenger service. They

were proposed on June 23, 1971, and became effective for different types of track (depending

upon when constructed) in October 1971, October 1972, or October 1973. Thus, for at least

part of the time that the track standards were

first in effect, FRA had no inspection force to

monitor compliance.

The track safety standards were based in large

part on industry standards already in use at the

time of their promulgation, as well as on stateof-the-art information that FRA had already

developed. So compliance with the standards

did not pose a difficult technological problem

for the railroads. However, FRA was not able to

staff fully for several years following promulgation of the regulations. A summary of the

numbers of track inspectors follows:

Number of Track Safety Inspectors*

1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977

12 38 39 47 45

3 vacancies

Thus, inasmuch as an inspection program

serves as a deterrent, for at least 2 years following the promulgation of the regulations their

deterrent aspect had minimal impact.

Since its inception, the track safety inspection

program has become increasingly sophisticated,

including the use of automated geometry inspection cars and rail flaw detection cars, both of

which assist the inspectors and industry in

analyzing track geometry for compliance with

‘1’MM & Co., “Tash III, ‘ p. 1, 3.
112 ● Railroad Safety

Track geometry car

\

Photos. Courtesy of National Transportation Safety Board

Rail flaw car
Ch. Vlll Railroad Safety inspection Programs ● 113

Federal standards. In addition, the FRA Automated Track Inspection Program (ATIP) provides computerized analytical support to the inspectors to detect and pinpoint the location of

any deviation from the track geometry standards that had not previously been detected.

Partly as a result of such inspection aids, the

number of cited track defects, violations, and

penalties assessed and collected appears to be

increasing.

Track safety inspectors routinely conduct

spot compliance inspections (both with and

without the aid of automated track geometry

cars) based on such criteria as the deficiencies in

carrier records, population density along tracks,

and number, frequency, and severity of accidents.

The routine inspection is usually carried out

in cooperation with the railroads. The inspector

gives advance notice of the inspection—which

includes the territory to be inspected, a proposed date for starting the inspection, and an invitation for a railroad representative to accompany him on the inspection. For its part, the

railroad usually provides a hi-rail car or motor

car to facilitate the inspection process. Even

though the advance notice of inspection is given

to the railroad, the FRA may consider such an

inspection to be a “spot compliance” inspection.

If the inspection takes place because of a complaint that has been lodged, the inspector informs the railroad of this fact, but he does not

divulge the name of the complainant.

Depending upon the result of the investigation, the inspector may:

Urge voluntary correction of the defect

(usually in the case of defects deemed “not

serious” ),

Cite the railroad for violation of the safety

standards,

Furnish the railroad with a Special Notice

for Repairs (when the track is found not to

comply with speed requirements for the

class at which the track is being used),

which specifies the train speed that which

may be used until repairs are made, or

Issue a notice of track condition which is

precedent to an Emergency Order (when

track contains serious defects) removing

the track from service until repairs are

made.

The effectiveness of the track safety inspection program is particularly important because

of the relatively high frequency (compared to

other accident categories) with which trackrelated accidents occur. For instance, FRA’s

testimony during hearings on the Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1976 (P. L. 94-348)

before the House Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce indicated that track-related

accidents accounted for the largest number of

accidents per million train-miles, despite the increasing number of violations cited. FRA indicated, too, that while the total number of

train-miles decreased between 1974 and 1975

(833.3 million in 1974 to 726.1 million in 1975),

track-related accidents per million train-miles

increased.

For track-related accidents, the increase was

not as great as it was for the other categories;

however, track-related accidents remained the

category of accidents with the highest rate per

million train-miles. In 1974, there were 3.5

track-related accidents per million train-miles;

in 1975, there were 3.7.10 However, the inconsistency of reported data between 1974 and

1975 must be kept in mind. Similarly, FRA’s

testimony before the Senate Appropriations

Committee for FY 1977, indicated that trackrelated accidents increased 10 percent in FY 1976

over FY 1075 and would increase an additional 9

percent in 1977 over 1976.1]

During comparable time periods, however,

the numbers of FRA inspectors also increased,

as did the number of violations reports filed and

the number of claims made against railroads for

noncompliance with track safety standards.

‘“See Federal Railroad safety Authorizatit>n Act Hearings before House Subcommittee on Transportation and

Commerce of the Committee of Interstate and Foreign

Commerce.

‘ ‘See Department of Trzinsportdtion and Related Agencies Appropriations Hearings for- FY 1 Q77 betore the Senate

Commit tee on Appropriate ions.
114 “ Railroad Safety

During FY 1975-76, a total of 549,819 unit inspections were performed covering all aspects of

track safety. During this same time period,

there were 4,940 track violations reports filed

with the FRA. 1~ The number of violations

reports filed in FY 1975 outnumbered those

made in FY 1976 by 10:1. The reason for this

disproportion is not clear since track accidents

increased, the track inspection force remained

constant, and total number of unit inspections

increased slightly during this time period. A

possible explanation may be that while inspection units increased, inspections on mainlines,

where many of the track-related accidents occur, decreased by 11,429. (See appendix D.)

A summary of the pertinent track safety inspection benchmarks for FY 1975 and FY 1976

follows:

Table 31.—Track Safety Inspection Benchmarks

FY 1975 FY 1976

Track-related accidents . . 2,719 3,810

(per 1,000,000 trainmiles)a . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7 ––

Violations reports filedb. . 4,489 451

Number of inspections

conducted . . . . . . . . . . 264,655 285,164

Number of inspectors on

boardd. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 45

aHeari rigs, supra. bpfvlfvl & CO., “Task V“ supra.

cAppendlx D. dAppendix D,

In light of the accident data, it is ironic that

during the past several years, FRA has increased

the staff of the track safety inspection program,

although it still remains about half the size of

the motive power and equipment inspection

staff. Nonetheless, the increase in track-related

accidents does not necessarily mean that the inspection program itself has been ineffective. As

with most problems associated with railroad

safety, an argument may be made that track

‘‘Unit i> uwd here to dcscritw one type of lnspcctic>n —

e.g. , t rach rt’c<~rds, track main 1 ine, track cr(~ssin~s, etc.

Thus, It i~ possible Ior one railroad to have been subjected

to nlorc than onc in>pc’ction un] t. Figure is t~ken from appendix D.

‘‘I’hlhl & CO., Tash \J, pp. L’1, 4-5.

conditions are, in part, a function of the financial health of the railroad industry as a whole

over the past several years. For instance, each

year the cumulative effect of inadequate or

deferred maintenance, dating from several years

ago, may contribute to the increase in trackrelated accidents, particularly in the lower speed

limit track groups. (Track that is placed in this

group may already be in a relatively deteriorated state. ) However, the validity of drawing relationships between deferred maintenance

and track-related accidents is a controversial

issue, and the controversy points, in part, to the

difficulty of assessing the effectiveness of the

track safety inspection program.

It is possible to understand something of the

dimensions of the track safety problem in relation to the inspection program from numbers

such as those in table 31, but it is not possible to

draw certain conclusions about the relationship

of inspection to prevention of accidents—

because it is not possible to say with certainty

how many of the 4,940 violations reports filed

with the FRA during FY 1975-76 in fact

prevented accidents. Furthermore, as to those

accidents that occurred, it is not possible with

the data available to determine how many of

those occurred because of a lack of compliance

with the track safety standards. Neither is it

possible to say which of those would not have

occurred if the inspection program had been

more vigilant. The data available do not allow

determination of how many of the accidents occurred because of intervening variables, which

the track safety standards were not able to anticipate, such as peculiar track/train interaction

due to unusual hazards, for example, climatic

conditions. 14

Operating Practices Safety Inspection Program

The Operating Practices Safety Inspection

Program revolves around inspection and enforcement of the Railroad Operating Rules (49

—

‘ ‘That such conditiorls” could lead to accident~ is in~-

plicitly acknowl~dged in the stdndard’s instruction to inspec t “as so[)n ~~ possible’” ~fter t lood”, st{)rm, or other C)C -

c u rrence.
Ch, VIII Railroad Safety Inspection Programs ● 115

CFR 217). It requires the filing of current

operating rules by railroads with FRA and the

filing of the program of instruction for

employees in the operating rules, as well as certain tests, inspections, and recordkeeping and

the filing of an Annual Report. The Railroad

Accident Incident Reporting Requirements (49

CFR 225) require railroads to report in a

uniform manner those accidents incidents arising out Of their operations and Hours of Service

Rules (49 CFR 228), which implement the Hours

of Service Act (P. L. 91-1 69). It requires that

employees work no more than 12 hours in a 24-

hour period (except in the case of emergency accidents, when 16 hours are allowed) and has

reporting and record keeping requirements.

There has been an enlargement of the Operating

Practices Safety Program. The Blue Flag Protection of Railroad Employees, Operation Rules

99, 93, and Radio Standards and Procedures, all

of which set down safety-related practices to be

observed by employees, have taken effect in

1976 and 1977 Thus, although they have the

potential to affect the human factors accident

rate, they may not have been in effect long

enough. Currenty, there are 42 Operating Practices inspectors onboard making this program

about the same size in personnel as the Track

Safety Inspection program. (See appendix D.)

All of the regulations that come under the

Operating Practices Safety Inspection Program

prescribe the general parameters on safety

within which railroads must operate. Each

railroad is required to do the following in order

to remain in compliance with these regulations:

● Maintain a current file at the FRA, which

must include a copy of its code of operating

rules, its timetables, and its timetable

special instructions; and

 File a program of tests and inspections with

the FRA and conduct tests and inspections

on certain operating employees to determine compliance with its own code of

rules, timetables, and timetable special inst ruct tions.

The FRA’s Office of Safety periodically

reviews the operating rules, and its inspectors

review the efficiency tests. In addition, FRA

conducts periodic inspections of the degree to

which the Hours of Service Act and rules are

complied with (including employee interviews

when there has been an apparent violation) and

the degree to which the railroad accident/ incident records are kept as required, including

records as to highway grade-crossing accidents/ incidents, rail equipment accidents, incidents, and death, injury, and occupational illness incidents.

With the exception of the records inspection,

which has been the basic tool of this inspection

program, this set of regulations provides a problematical enforcement issue for the FRA: how to

determine whether these basically preventive

human-related regulations are consistentl y

observed. Unlike the track-safety regulations,

for instance, violations of the regulations take

place periodically over time and can or cannot

occur, depending on the situation; whereas,

once a track-safety violation occurs, i t continues to exist until corrective action is taken.

Spot-checking is one mechanism that can be

used, of course; however, a violation may not

be detected if it is not the subject of a spot-check

(which must inevitably be a very small sample

of all of the work situations in which the

operating practices regulations apply ) unless an

accident occurs or unless a complaint is lodged

by an employee.

In the event that a complaint triggers the investigation, the inspector is told the identify of

the complainant but is prohibited from revealing this identity to the railroad, unless authorized in writing by the complainant to do so. The

investigation that is conducted must rely to a

great extent upon the relationship of the complainant’s observations (as well as those of other

witnesses) to the railroad’s records. The inspector must make a determination as to wether

the one bears the other out, and, in many cases,

the judgment is finally a subjective one. The

large majority of complaints filed under the program concern an alleged lack of compliance

with Hours of Service requirements.

It is not possible with the data available to

make a judgment as to which of the so-called

“human factors accidents, which caused the
116 ● Railroad Safety

greatest number of employee fatalities, occurred

because of a violation of one of the Operating

practices Regulations. However, since there

were 46215 complaints of violations of operating

practices regulations in FY 1975, it is apparent

that there are some violations. However, as

stated earlier, it is too early yet to say whether

the Operating Practices Safety Inspection Program, with its newly promulgated regulations as

well as additional areas under consideration for

regulation, 16 will have a significant impact on

this category of accidents and how or whether

these new regulations should affect the

Operating Practices Safety Inspection Program.

What remains clear, however, is that prior to

the promulgation of these new regulations, train

accidents in the “human factors” category were

increasing, despite the inspection activities. 17 In

FY 1975, they increased from 1.8 per million

train-miles to 2.8 per million train-miles, a

larger increase than for any other accident

category, However, while the increase in FY

1976 continued, the rate of increase was lower

than that for the other categories. Nonetheless,

the absolute number of train accidents in this

category was second only to track.18

The Operating Practices Safety Inspection

Program, as it is now constituted, began with 30

inspectors in FY 1974 and in FY 1976 reached the

authorized ceiling of 40. However, the relationship between the increase in human factors accident rate (followed by the tapering off of the

rate of that increase) and the safety inspection

program is not clear from the information

available. It is clear, however, that numbers of

violations reports filed by inspectors are increasing along with the accident rate and that

the complaint level is remaining constant.

‘

5

402 of these complaints concerned alleged hours of

service violations, PMM & Co,, “Task III, ” p. II. 78.

‘“The areas under consideration for regulation include

railroad employee training standards, employee qualification standards, engineman medical standards, and Federal

or carrier certification of railroads. PMM & Co., Task III,

p. 66.

“See chapter V of this report for further discussion of

employee fatalities.

‘“See House hearings on Railroad Safety Authorization

Act and Senate Appropriations Hearings for FY 1977,

supra.

A summary of the pertinent benchmarks in

the Operating Practices Safety Inspection Program follows:

Table 32.—Operating Practices Safety

Inspection Program Benchmarks

FY 1975 FY 1976

Human factor accidents . . . 1,678 1,719

(per 1,000,000 trainmiles)a . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.8 ––

Violations reports filedb. . . 831 1,627

Complaints investigated. . 462 466

(of which 402 = (of which 391 =

hours of service) hours of service)

Number of inspections

conducted (records)d . . . 299,154 350,203

Number of inspectors

on boarde . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 32

a Hearings, supra. bpMM & CO., “Task V“ Supra. cPMM

& Co., “Task Ill,” p. II-78. ‘Appendix D. ‘Appendix D.

Motive Power and Equipment Safety Inspection

Program

The Motive Power and Equipment Safety Inspection Program covers locomotive inspection

(49 CFR 230 prescribes safety standards for

locomotives); safety appliances inspection (49

CFR 231 prescribes safety standards for automatic couplers, handholds, and grab irons, ladders, car end platforms, handbrakes, and steps

on switching locomotives); railroad power

brakes and drawbars inspection (49 CFR 2 3 2

prescribes safety standards and inspection criteria for power brakes); and railroad freight car

inspection (49 CFR 215 prescribes minimum

requirements for freight cars). Until 1974, there

was no differentiation made between locomotive inspectors and safety inspectors in other

areas under this program. Since 1974, however,

inspectors under the Motive Power and Equipment Safety Inspection Program have inspected

for all standards that it covers. In terms of both

personnel assigned to it and total dollar cost of

direct inspection activity, this program is the

largest; there are currently 91 inspectors on

board. (See appendix D.)

Inspectors under this program personally inspect all types of locomotives, cars, and trains
Ch. VIII Railroad Safety inspection Programs ● 117

operating within their areas of responsibility.

These inspections are designed to determine

whether the carriers are inspecting and repairing

their locomotives, cars, and trains in ac

-

cordance with federally prescribed standards.

The FRA inspectors, however, generally do not

inspect the rolling stock until carrier personnel

have had a reasonable opportunity to inspect it

themselves. The FRA inspectors may inspect at

any time, but, in the event of a train prepared

for departure, they generally do not delay the

departure for the purpose of performing an inspection. When a defect is found, the inspector

may, by written order, remove the defective

locomotive, car, or train from service. If a

Federal inspector wishes to determine compliance with Federal standards by means of a

test, he may request the carrier to perform that

test and observe it as it takes place.

Inspectors are instructed to cover all inspection points within their territories “as uniformly

as practicable” and to report to Washington on

their inspection activities on or before October 1

every year. Each inspector is expected to know

his own territory and to be familiar with the

condition of rolling stock in that territory. In

devising his inspection strategy, he also is instructed to make judgments concerning the

relative importance of various inspection points

and which of these may require more frequent

inspections than others. These inspections are

carried out within the context of the overall requirement that nine-tenths of the country’s

freight cars have mandatory inspections and

shoppings every fourth and eighth year. The

rest of the freight cars are to be inspected and

shopped every 1 and 2 years.

The inspection program also has been used to

identify a pattern of defects or failures, such as a

higher-than-normal percentage of wheel failures

on a specific type of car. When such a pattern is

identified, the FRA provides the information to

all of its inspectors and cooperates with the carriers and suppliers, as appropriate, to determine

the cause of the failures and to prescribe the

necessary corrective action.

In 1974, the locomotive and safety appliance

inspection activities were combined in the

Motive Power and Equipment Program. The

ceiling for the locomotive inspection program

was 51 and that for the safety appliance program was 64; when the programs were combined, the new ceiling was 75. However, the

operating practices program absorbed most of

the extra positions not allocated to the consolidated program, so the absolute numbers of

inspectors did not diminish. Since consolidation

in 1974, the Motive Power and Equipment Safety Inspection Program ceiling has been raised to

93, of which 91 positions have been filled.

Nonetheless, equipment-related train accidents occur about as frequently as “human

factor” accidents; however, their increase in FY

1976 over FY 1975 was 4 percent as opposed to

2.5 percent for human factors. This category

of accidents, however, may be the one that can

be most directly affected by the enforcement of

safety standards, since there are fewer

possibilities of intervening variables such as

climate or human judgment that will directly

cause equipment failure .20 If the safety standards are soundly based, then it should follow

that compliance with those standards should

lower the rate of such accidents caused by

equipment failure. In FY 1974, equipmen t

failures was the second highest category of train

accident cause, after track failures, In FY 1975,

equipment failures causing accidents increased,

but at a lower rate than failures in both the track

and the human factors categories. As noted

above, however, this slower rate of increase did

not continue into FY 1976. The reason for the

absence of any apparent downward trend in the

equipment-related accident category in light of

the inspection program and the increase d

number of inspectors is problematical. Further,

from the figures in table 33, it appears that there

were 58,166 fewer inspections in FY 1976 than in

FY 1975, with about the same number of inspectors. The reason for this is not clear.

‘“See Senate Appropriations He~rings for FY 1977,

supra.

‘“This statement must obviously be qualified for certain

aspects of the program —e. ~., power brakes —Which set

down requirements that depend upon human beings for

their implemental ion.
118 Ž Railroad Safety

A summary of the pertinent benchmarks in

the Motive Power and Equipment Safety Inspection Program follows:

Table 33.—Motive Power and

Equipment Safety Benchmarks

FY 1975 FY 1976

Equipment accidents . . . . 1,680 1,736

(per 1,000,000 train-miles) 2.3 – –

Inspections conducted. .. 904,560 846,394

Number of inspectors

on board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 8 2

d

aHearings, supra. bAppendix D. cPMM & CO., “Task

Ill,” p. 11.47. dPresent level is 91, see appendix D.

Signals and Train Control Inspection Program

The Signals and Train Control Inspection

Program takes its authority from the Signal Inspection Act (49 U.S.C. 25), which is Section 25

of the Interstate Commerce Act, passed in 1920.

The regulations that implement this Act are contained in Signal Systems Reporting Requirements (49 CFR 233), Instructions Governing

Applications for Approval of a Discontinuance

of Material Modification of a Signal System (49

CFR 235), and Installation, Inspection,

Maintenance and Repair of Signal Systems,

Devices and Appliances (49 CFR 236). These

regulations establish criteria for the testing, installation, and maintenance of signal systems so

as to minimize the possibility of accidents due to

inadequate signals, signal failure, or human error with regard to signals, including automatic

block signal systems, interlocking signals, traffic control systems, automatic train stops, train

control and cab signal systems, and dragging

equipment, slide detectors, and other devices.

The inspection aspect of the Signals and Train

Control Inspection Program requires that the

carrier must perform all testing of safety devices

that might be necessary, but inspection itself

may be carried out by the FRA, regardless of

whether a representative of the carrier is present

at the time of inspection. The inspector must inform the carrier of the existence of any violations of the regulations; however, it falls to his

discretion as to whether such unsafe or defective

condition should be reported to Washington for

prosecution.

Under this program, carried out by 28 FRA

inspectors, each inspector is expected to give advance notice of the impending inspection to the

railroad. However, unlike the other programs,

there are specific requirements as to which items

the inspector may inspect only when accompanied by a representative of the railroad and

which items he may inspect unaccompanied.

The inspector determines what remedial action

is necessary and when it should take place. He

also inspects, after a reasonable period of time,

to ensure that it has taken place. The Signals

and Train Control Inspection Program has

grown from an authorized ceiling of 17 in FY

1970 to 29 in 1976, of which 20 were on board.

Signals and train control accident statistics

often are not broken out and treated separately

by the FRA;21 thus, it is not easy to gauge the

frequency of accidents related to signal or train

control failure or to relate the declining number

of inspections conducted to the accident rate.

However, in order to give an idea of the relative

size of the signal and train control “problems,” a

summary of the pertinent benchmarks for which

information is available follows:

Table 34.—Signal and Train Control

Safety Inspection Program Benchmarks

FY 1975 FY 1976

Signal and train control accidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n/a n/a

(per 1,000,000 train-miles). . n/a n/a

Number of violations. . . . . 187 139

Inspections conducted. . . 82,522 69,226

Number of inspectors

on boardc 

... , . . . . . . . . . 28 28

aPMM & Co., “Task C“ supra. bAppendix D. cAppendix

D.

z I see, for instance{ FRA testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, supra.
Ch. VIIZ Railroad Safety inspection Programs “ 119

Hazardous Materials Safety Inspection

Program

The Hazardous Materials Safety Inspection

Program dates from 1908 and the Transportation of Explosives and Combustibles Act (18

U.S. C. $$831-835). In 1960, the Transportation

of Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles Act

(P. L. 86-710) expanded the definition of those

“hazardous” materials covered to include

“et iologic and radioactive” materials. The FRA

of 1970 further broadened the authority of the

Federal Government to deal with the transportation of hazardous materials and increased

penalties for violations, which included requirements for a central reporting system for

hazardous materials and accidents and an annual review of hazardous materials transportation by the Secretary of the Department of

Transportation.

Under Title I of the Transportation Safety Act

of 1974 (P. L. 93-633), the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) and the FRA both have jurisdiction to inspect for violation of regulations

concerning the shipping of hazardous materials.

MTB has jurisdiction over container manufacturers and intermodal shippers of hazardous

materials; the FRA has jurisdiction for the enforcement of regulations governing railroad

transportation of hazardous materials.

The MTB regulations are found at 49 CFR,

171-179. They set down requirements for handling cars containing hazardous materials. The

cars must be placarded with signs that indicate

the type of hazardous material they are carrying; the signs are specified in the regulations. 22

The hazardous materials covered by these

regulations are as follows:

● explosives,

● gases,

● flammable liquids,

• flammable solids,

• oxidizers,

● poisonous materials,

● radioactive materials, and

● corrosive materials.

“See chapter X for a discussion of the hazardous

materials program development t.

The inspection program, as the division of

jurisdiction implies, is divided between the MTB

and the FRA, with the MTB primarily responsible for container manufacturer inspection and

the FRA responsible for railroad tank car inspection. The MTB has 4 inspectors nationwide

and the FRA has 14. However, FRA recognizes

the need for more inspectors and has requested

an increase. At the present time, the FRA

estimates that approximately 15 percent of the

time of inspectors of other skills is spent on

hazardous materials work. Thus, FRA contemplates relieving this burden and improving the

efficiency of the hazardous materials safety inspection program by creating—in the long

term—a stronger force of hazardous materials

inspectors per region. 23

Hazardous materials inspection activities

have increased significantly during the past

several years, following the increasing amount

of hazardous materials shipped by rail. The

AAR estimates that 1.04 million carloads of

hazardous materials are shipped annuall y

through approximately 50,000 rail shippers’

facilities. z

’

These figures suggest that, given the present

inspection level, the Hazardous Materials Safety

Inspection Program is designed to spot-check

compliance, with potentially high penalties for

noncompliance and recordkeeping checks serving as a general disincentive to noncompliance.

This inspection program differs from the others

in that it is concerned with the involvement of

hazardous materials in accidents and not with

their causing railroad accidents. In a certain

sense, the program is designed as an insurance

program in light of the potential for extreme

damage and injury posed by many of these

materials. If an accident due to defective equipment, human error, or any other cause occurs,

the hazardous materials program is intended to

ensure that the hazardous materials do not compound the seriousness of the accident. Thus, the

inspection strategy of this program might have

23 PNIM & Co,, “Task III” working papers.

24The number of carloads shipped is an elusive figure.

The FRA has estimated that 0.9 million are shipped every 2

years. See PMM & Co., “Task 111”, p. II-59.
120 Railroad Safety

been expected to be somewhat more intensive

than the other programs. On the face, given the

number of inspectors on board and inspections

conducted, this does not seem to be the case.

That the same number of inspectors made about

twice as many violations reports from about

10,000 fewer inspections (reflecting primarily a

decrease in records inspection) in FY 1976 than

in 1975 may be significant in terms of the extent

to which violations occur .25 The Hazardous

Materials Inspection staff ceiling was raised

from an authorized 3 in FY 1970 to 25 in FY

1976. There are now 14 FRA hazardous

materials inspectors on board.

A summary of the pertinent benchmarks in

the Hazardous Materials Safety Inspection Program follows:

Table 35.—Hazardous Materials

Safety Program Benchmarks

FY 1975 FY 1976

Hazardous materials

accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . —— 981

Violations reported b. . . . . . 234 541

Inspections conducted C. . . 36,458 26,933

Number of inspectors

on board d . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 18

a MTB reports. bPMM & ~0 , “Task V“ supra. c4MTB

and 14 FRA inspectors, see appendix D. dAppendix D.

STATE PARTICIPATION PROGRAM

The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 provided for the participation by States in a

cooperative program with the Federal Government to carry out the investigative and

surveillance activities related to safety regulations under the Act. States are eligible to participate if a State agency has regulatory jurisdiction over the subject of the regulations and if the

FRA enters into a “certification” or “agreement”

arrangement with the State. Under “certification, ” the FRA certifies that the State can carry

out certain investigative or surveillance activities in the same way as the Federal Government. There are two stages of certification:

●

●

Initial certification is provided for up to 3

years, during which time the State may

develop its inspector capability to conform

with the Federal requirements as to level of

effort, and

Full certification, at which time a State provides at least the minimum level of inspection effort required.

Under an “agreement,” the FRA agrees with the

State to cooperate in certain areas if the State is

unable to qualify for or is not desirous of ob25 See appendix D.

taining full certification. Federal funding for up

to 50 percent of the allowed, safety inspections

costs is available to States participating in the

program.

To date, the FRA has promulgated regulations to implement the State participation program2

’ and four other sets of safety regulations

under the 1970 Act. The additional four regulations are on: track safety, railroad freight car

safety, railroad operating rules, and railroad accidents/ incidents reports, classification, and investigation. The FRA has promulgated procedural regulations to include two of these programs in the State participation program: track

safety inspection and railroad freight car safety

(equipment only). AS in Federal inspection programs, the State participation program contemplates specialized inspectors for each of the

included regulations.

The FRA began the State participation program in FY 1974, when Federal funding became

available. The interest and level of State participation, however, has not been as high as

might have been expected. By December 1977,

21 States were certified. The growth pattern of

the State participation program follows:

26 CFR 212
Ch. VIZZ Railroad Safety Inspection Programs 121

Growth of State Participation Program

Date Number of States27

7 74 5

3 ‘75 12

10‘ 77 19

12 ‘77 21

The reasons that States have not participated

in greater numbers are varied. They include:

lack of a State entity having jurisdiction, lack of

funding, lack of sufficient railroad mileage to

warrant participation, and reluctance to be tied

to Federal funding. In addition, the State participation regulation has been controversial

with States from the time it was first proposed,

largely because of the high qualifications requirements set down by FRA for inspectors

hired by States. The States believed that they

could not find and/or pay inspectors with the

level of experience and qualifications required

by the FRA. The FRA, on the other hand, did

not want two classes of inspectors for the same

things. Thus, the FRA held firmly that the high

level of experience was necessary. However, the

FRA established the category of inspector

trainees to give the States some flexibility in

their initial hiring. Furthermore, FRA’s Office of

Safety Programs, in conjunction with the Office

of Federal Assistance, has developed training

programs geared to meet the needs of particular

inspectors in particular States. Nonetheless,

discrepancies between the salaries commanded

by Federal inspectors and those that States are

able to pay do exist, and some States report that

they have had difficulty in hiring inspectors.

At the present time, the State inspection program has 28 track inspectors plus 8 trainees (of

an authorized 46 inspectors) and 18 equipment

inspectors (of an authorized 18) on board. (See

appendix D for distribution of inspectors in relation to the Federal program. ) Like the Federal

inspect or, the State Participation inspector

recommends enforcement action to Washington/FRA. By statute, the State can go to court

to prosecute a violation only if the Federal

‘“PMM & Co., “Task II I,” p, III. .!.

Government fails to act within 180 days from

the date of the violation.

In the Track Safety Inspection Program, State

inspectors/trainees work in the State participation program in 14 of the 31 States to which

Federal inspectors are assigned. In five of these

States, the number of State inspectors/trainees

exceeds the number of Federal inspectors; in six,

State and Federal inspectors are equal in

number; and in the remaining three, Federal inspectors outnumber State inspectors. In addition, six States that have no Federal track safety

inspectors assigned to them have State inspectors/trainees participating in this program. The

basis for the assignment of State track safety inspectors is, by Federal regulation, that one inspector be assigned for every 4,400 miles of

track in-State and that each mile of track be inspected once every 2 years.

In the case of the freight car equipment standards, there is greater overlap of Federal and

State inspectors: only one State that does not

have Federal freight car equipment inspectors

assigned to it is participating. Six of the remaining eight States have fewer State inspectors than

Federal inspectors, one has the same number

and one has more. While problems of coordination may occur as a result of the presence of

Federal and State inspectors, the doubling up of

Federal and State inspector assignments does

not necessarily constitute duplication of effort

because Federal inspectors may have inspection

responsibility in States other than the ones to

which they are assigned. The basis for the

assignment of freight equipment inspectors is

the assumption that a .5-percent sample of

freight cars originated and terminated be inspected annually, which number is divided by a

factor developed by FRA that represents the

number of inspection points in each State.

One of the attractive features of the State participation program, from many States’ point of

view, is the possibility of Federal funding for

their safety inspection efforts. However, the

States must submit extensive information to obtain initial certification and on an annual basis

to maintain full certification. Many States have

complained about the paperwork involved, but
122 Railroad Safety

of the States which were critical of the State participation rules at the outset (during the public

comment period on the proposed regulation),

only two—Wyoming and Kentucky—are not

currently in the program.

In order to receive funding, a State must

apply for a grant-in-aid from FRA. Up to 50 percent of the direct and allowable indirect costs

associated with the safety program can be

approved for funding. In applying for this 5 0

percent funding, the State must declare that:

 It will provide necessary funds to finance

costs in excess of Federal payments; and

● Aggregate expenditures for railroad safety,

exclusive of Federal funds, will not fall

below the average level of expenditures

during the 2 fiscal years preceding 1970 or

previously provided to FRA.

In 1977, the FRA funded State track safety inspection at approximately $580,000 and State

freight car safety inspection at approximately

$250,000. These expenditures extended inspection in the track and freight car safety areas by

39 fully qualified inspectors and 6 trainees. (See

appendix D for details of funding. )

RAILROAD INSPECTION PROGRAMS

As stated earlier, the FRA envisions that its

inspection programs are to ensure compliance

with Federal standards rather than to discover

defects and directly to prevent accidents. The

FRA believes that this latter responsibility

belongs properly to the railroads. Furthermore,

it has incorporated certain inspection requirements on the part of the railroads into FRA

regulations. In addition to the Federal view of

their responsibilities, however, the railroads

undertake to perform inspections that accomplish a variety of purposes for the wellbeing of their operation—including safety.

Track geometry, signal systems, and car inspections, for instance, all contain both preventive

maintenance and safety promotion goals.

Although inspections of railroad facilities and

equipment dates back many years prior to

establishment of Federal or State standards and

regulations, the existence of Federal standards

for track cars, locomotives, signal and train

control systems, and train operation has

resulted in a certain uniformity among railroad

inspection programs. This uniformity stems

from prescriptions in the regulations that dictate

such things as frequency of inspection, length of

time employees can be on duty, and the like.

Another phenomenon that has grown in part

from the regulatory structure is the similarity

between most railroad inspection efforts and the

FRA inspection programs. Although divided

along the same programmatic lines, the railroad

inspection programs nonetheless differ in two

key ways from the Federal inspection programs:

Q The railroad inspection programs are

designed to detect defects before they

become serious enough to cause damage or

violate the standards; for this reason,

together with the Federal Government’s requirements, railroad inspection is more frequent than Federal/State participation inspection.

● Frequently, the person charged with the

responsibility of detecting the defect is also

charged with the responsibility of correcting it.

“These comments are contained in the FRA Public

Docket, RSSP-1 and 2.
.

Ch. VIII Railroad Safety Inspection Programs “ 123

TRACK

The charts that follo w summarize the required frequency of inspect

program and type:

Track29

ons by inspect on

.

Class of track Type of track Frequency

1,2,3 Main track Weekly with at least 3

and sidings calendar days between

inspections or before use of

track, if used less than once

a week, or twice weekly

with at least 1 calendar day

between inspections, if the

track carried passenger

trains or more than 10

million gross tons of traffic

during preceding year

1,2,3 Other than Monthly with at least 30

main track calendar days between in

and sidings spections

4,5,6 Twice weekly with at least

1 calendar day between inspections

In add tion to the above, inspections are

made in accordance with the following FRA

regulations:

Each switch and track crossing must be inspected on foot at least monthly, except for

track used less than once a month, in which

case inspection must be made before it is

used.

A search must be made at least once per

year for internal defects in certain classes of

rails. If new rail is inductively or ultrasonically inspected and all internal defects

are removed before or within 6 months

after installation, the next search for internal defects need not be made until 3 years

later.

Special inspection must be made of track

involved in a fire, flood, severe storm, or

other occurrence which might have damaged track structures as soon as possible

after the occurrence.

MOTIVE AND POWER EQUlPMENT30

Freight Car Inspection

The general practice in the industry is to inspect freight cars at interchange points, in major

yards or terminals, and as required by the 500-

mile inspection rule.31 Cars are inspected visually at these points.

As part of the inspection made of cars at

points where cars are placed in trains to detect

such defects as those listed above, dates stenciled on the sides of cars are noted to determine

if any time limits, as prescribed by FRA and/or

29 Track Safety Standards. FRA, Office of Safety, March

1975. (49 CFR 213).

‘

L

’ I’NIM & Co., “Task 111, ” section IV,

“R1/1/rLJL?L{ Freight Car Sc~f~’tw st17}ZLfL2/”1~5, Federa l

R~ilr(>ad Administratic~n, Office of Safety, Tune 197s. (49

CFR215 J.

the AAR,32 have expired with respect to car age

as well as to such periodic attention as:

●

●

●

●

●

Detail inspection of truck components

(wheels, axles, bearings, etc.), couplers,

cushioning units, center sills, body

bolsters, and center plates;

Single-car testing of air brakes (IDT—or indate test);

Cleaning, oiling, and single-car testing of

air brakes (COT&S—or clean, oil, test, and

stencil);

Replacement of plain bearing lubricators;

and

Lubrication of roller bearings.
124 ● Railroad Safety

Further, lading on open cars, such as flats and

bulkhead flats, is inspected to see that it has not

shifted and that it is properly secured, and

closed cars are opened for such inspection when

there is evidence, such as leaning of the car, that

the lading may have shifted.

Cars are usually inspected in train yards by

regularly assigned car inspectors either riding

slowly on a special cart or walking along each

side of a group of cars.

Detail inspection, as well as any necessary

repair or replacement of the components is

made on a repair track or at a car shop. This inspection is made on high utilization cars within

24 months after construction or reconditioning

and within each succeeding 12-month interval,

and on other cars within 96 months after construction or reconditioning and within each succeeding 48-month interval.

After cars are assembled for movement in an

outbound train, the air brake system is tested

for leaks by charging the system and observing

a gauge to ensure that the air pressure losses remain within limits specified by FRA. Such a

test, as well as inspection of the air brake

cylinder on each car for excessive piston travel

(indicating reduced braking force), also is made

at intervals of not more than 500 miles on trains

that move more than this distance without being

disassembled.

Locomotive lnspection23

The locomotive inspection regulations consist

of four subparts which govern tests and inspections for the following aspects of Locomotives:

(a) boilers and appurtenances; (b) steam

locomotives and tenders; (c) other than steam

locomotives and appurtenances; (d) multipleoperated electronic units. Each of these subparts

requires various tests and inspection intervals

for certain of the components that it covers. A

summary of those requirements follows:

33’49 CFR 230

Locomotive Inspection

Inspection interval Test interval

Boilers and appurtenances

 Boiler. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 years (interior)

5 years (exterior)

Inspected and tested before put in service and when sufficient number of

flues are removed to allow interior to be examined

Other than steam locomotive and

appurtenances

 Brake equipment/main reservoir . . . . . . . . . 18 months

● Visible insulation and electrical connections month

. Nonsteam boilers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Whenever sufficient number of tubes

are removed to allow inspection

Steam locomotives and tenders

● Stay bolts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● Steam gauges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

● Safety valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

 Water glasses and gauge cooks. . . . . . . . . . .

Multiple-operated electric units Every 24 hours when in service

● Multiple operated electric units/main

reservoirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 years

● Train signal system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Before each trip

 Insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 year

 Visible insulation/electrical connections . . . 1 month

1 month

3 months

3 months

Before each trip
Ch. VIII Railroad Safety Inspection Programs •125

Signal Inspection Signal Inspection34

Signal mechanisms, switch circuit controllers,

and electric locks are visually inspected for

broken, missing, or worn parts; and signal

mechanisms, electric locks, relays, and lightning

arresters are tested in accordance with the

manufacturer’s specifications. Track switches

equipped with a circuit controller connected to

the switch point are adjusted, if necessary, to

ensure that the control circuits will be open or

shunted, or both, when the switch point is not in

the proper position. Testing of wire and cable

insulation, when dry, consists of measuring the

resistance to the flow of electrical current by use

of a megohmmeter to determine if the resistance

is within the minimum limits allowable by FRA

regulations.

Signal mechanisms . . . .

Switch circuit

controllers. . . . . . . . .

Electric locks. . . . . . . . .

Relays. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lightning arresters . . . .

Wire and cable

insulation:

Not designed for

underground lowvoltage use with

part

underground or in

trunking . . . . . . . .

Not designed for

underground lowvoltage use with no

part underground

or in trunking . . . .

Designed for underground low-voltage

use. . . . . . . . . , . . .

Local signal wiring . .

Lead-covered signal

power cable. . . . . .

Underground signal

inspection interval Test interval

6 months

3 months

2 years

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

pow;r lines not lead

sheathed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ANALYSIS OF RAILROAD INSPECTION

Many of the railroad employees who are

responsible for the various inspections described

above also are responsible for their repair.

Thus, there is an incentive built into the system

for the railroad employee to (a) detect and (b)

eliminate any defect discovered, because he is

accountable for any failure that takes place

whether it be attributed to inadequate inspection or inadequate workmanship. There is no

reason for “passing the buck. ” However,

because the same employee is responsible for

detection/repair of defects for both operational

and safety reasons, it is difficult to ascertain the

direct safety inspection costs incurred by the

railroads. In fact, in many instances, the

railroads do not have cost accounting systems

that are capable of providing such data.

2 years

3 months

2 years

2 years

1 year

5 years

8 years

8 years

8 years

8 years

5 years

Although the quality of inspections varies

among railroad companies, many defects in

railroad facilities and equipment are detected

through inspections performed by the railroad

inspectors. Furthermore, each railroad’s own

operating and safety rules require train inspections by various employees in addition to those

required by Federal or State regulations. Examples of operating and safety rules that require

such inspections are the following, which were

extracted from the rules published by one of the

railroads interviewed as part of this study

:

34 Rliles, Standar~is, aHd I}zstructiom for Railroad Si,gyal

Systms, Federal Railroad Administration, Bureau of

Railroad Safety, November 1969, taken from PMM & Co.,

“Task III, ” Section IV.
126 ● Railroad Safety

Operating Rule No. 714. Employees must,

when practicable, observe passing trains and,

when unsafe conditions are noticed, endeavor to

stop the train and notify the train dispatcher

when possible.

Safety Rule No. 160. Train crews will inspect

their train where stopped for operating reasons

when time permits .35

Nonetheless, despite the high level of inspection effort required, the continuing high accident rate raises questions both about the extent

to which the railroads comply with the inspection requirements as well as about the extent to

which inspection can help to avert accidents.

The effectiveness of the railroad inspection efforts depends, in part, on the thoroughness of

their efforts, their ability to detect “unsafe” conditions, and the degree to which the standards

they inspect against provide appropriate safety

levels.

Furthermore, determining the relationship

between the railroad inspection efforts and the

Government inspection programs, as mentioned

earlier, is problematical because of the unified

operational and safety purposes that inform the

railroad’s own inspection programs, and because of the unquantifiable “motivational power” of the Federal inspection programs. Even if

Federal inspection programs succeed in “motivating” compliance with the inspection requirements, their effectiveness is still contingent on

the same three variables as is the effectiveness of

railroad inspection programs.

The FRA’s ability to motivate compliance

through its inspection program, however,

depends, in part, on how the railroads view the

regulatory requirements and how they view the

penalties for noncompliance. Thus, while raising questions about the “content” of the inspection program requirements, questions must also

be raised about the effectiveness of the penalty

structure. Exploration of these two questions

shows that they are intertwined and that they go

to the heart of the inspection program.

“PMM & Co., “Task III, ” Section IV,

There has been controversy about the penalty

structure. Some are strongly of the opinion that

penalty levels should be raised (either the

minimum, the maximum, or both) in order to

make a violation less tolerable financially to the

railroads. 3b Proponents of this position would

agree with the GAO observation recorded in a

1975 letter to the Secretary of Transportation.

Director of Resources and Economic Development Henry Eschwege wrote:

. . .One FRA inspector we accompanied

observed four freight cars with defective

airbrakes in a train about to depart. . . He

reported these defects to the trainmaster. . .

The trainmaster ordered the train to depart

with the defective freight cars.

A (railroad) official told us that the trainmaster did not have company authorization to operate freight cars with safety

defects; however, a railroader would not

necessarily consider defective brakes on a

few cars intermixed throughout a large

train to be a serious safety defect because

the brake power of the remaining cars

would be sufficient.

The railroad was subject to a fine in this

case, but the FRA inspector said that,

because of the small amount of the fine involved (in this case $250 for each defective

car), it was more advantageous for the

railroad to pay the fine than disrupt a train

which was otherwise ready to leave. 37

Proponents of the argument to raise the

penalty for such violations would point to this

case as an illustration of the insufficiency of

motivation provided by the minimum penalty

established by the statute. They would make an

economic argument that if it had cost more to

move the train under violation than to take it

out of service, the trainmaster would have taken

it out of service. The FRA, on the other hand,

‘“See, tor example, Hmri)zgs O)Z the Federal Railroad

SUfcty Aut}lorizatio?] Act of 1976, supra.

‘74-1 1-7s letter from Henry Eschwege, Director,

Resources and Economic Development Division, U.S.

General Accounting Office, to the Secretary of Transportation, (B-164497(5))
Ch. VIII Railroad Safety Inspection Programs • 127

testified during the hearings on the 1976 Safety

Authorization Act that raising the penalties

would not in itself promote greater safety. In

arguing for the abolition of minimum penalties

rather than for their increase, then-Administrator Hall observed, “Simply penalizing a

railroad which has very little cash to start with

does not help in terms of giving that railroad the

ability to correct the deficiency ."38During those

same hearings, railroad officials echoed those

sentiments, stating that they were abiding by

the safety standards as conscientiously as they

could and that if they had to pay increased

penalties that would mean taking money from

somewhere else.39 This type of discussion may

not do much to illuminate the issue of whether

increased penalties would increase railroad

motivation to comply with safety standards;

however, it does make it clear that “motivation”

must be provided within the “real world” of the

industry’s financial condition and that penalties

are but one variable in that world.

From this framing of the issue, it appears that

the issue of program content may lie dormant

within the controversy about penalties. It is difficult to know how widespread such an occurrence as that cited by GAO is, but if railroads do sometimes make their own judgments

about the relative importance of certain safety

standards (albeit in conjunction with the existing penalties in mind), then perhaps such

judgments indicate something about the nature

of the regulations themselves. Are the standards

used by both the FRA and the railroads to ins pect the appropriate standards? Are they

sometimes skirting around the perceived

periphery of the safety problem, as indicated in

the GAO report? The Association of American

Railroads raised a similar concern about the

nature of the standards being enforced by the

FRA inspection program. In comments to the

Office of Technology Assessment on the issues

surrounding the subject of railroad safety, the

AAR stated its view that the standards are

essentially those used by the railroad industry

for many years and went on to say:

In promulgating these regulations FRA

has not addressed the following questions:

1) have circumstances developed for which

these previously developed recommended

standards are no longer appropriate? 2 ) are

these recommended industry standards not

generally being observed? If so, has that

resulted in additional track- and equipment-related accidents and has that created

a safety problem? 3) were the industr y

standards ever intended as absolute rules,

or as merely recommendations of good—or

of financially justifiable—practices? and 4)

was there real evidence of widespread

“violations” of the industry standards in

the first place, such as would make Federal

adoption justified?40

The first three questions are particularly germane; if the railroad industry itself has questions about the appropriateness of standards for

which it is by and large the source, that may be

reason enough to look beyond the inspection

programs to the substance and the credibility of

the standards against which inspections are

made and upon which any enforcement strategy

must inevitably be based. In this real sense, the

effectiveness of the Federal and of the railroad

safet y inspection programs is interdependent

with the regulations and standards on which

they are based.
Chapter IX

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Chapter IX

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970

marked the beginning of increased Federal interest in railroad safety research and development. The congressional hearings for the Act indicated that accidents caused by human factors,

equipment, and track were believed to be the

predominant causes of the safety problem.

Moreover, the dramatic impact of and the rise

in tank car ruptures as well as the significant

number of railroad grade-crossing deaths were

clearly documented in those hearings. From this

setting, the Federal Railroad Administration

(FRA) initiated its regulatory and research programs. The Association of American Railroads

(AAR) and individual railroads also began to increase research and development activities in

the early 1970’s. An overview of the 7-year span

of research and development activities conducted by the Government shows the following:

Government programs related to railroad

safety have included: track research program and track safety research; a rolling

stock program, including tank car research,

equipment component failure research,

personnel protection, and other research

programs; human factors research; and information and support research programs;

grade-crossing research; and automated inspection and surveillance technology programs. Each of these areas has application

to safety and has been discussed by the

FRA in its various annual safety reports.

However, several programs have been

funded through agency appropriations for

R&D, while others have been funded from

R&D monies made available by the 1970

Safety Act. Therefore, distinguishing between the origin of funds for specific safety

R&D projects is difficult.

Part of Government efforts, time, and

resources have been devoted to establishing

test and research facilities. Included among

the facilities was the development of the

Facility for Accelerated Service Testing

●

●

●

(FAST) Test Track at Pueblo, Colo.

Earlier, the industry relied on the AAR

Technical Center in Chicago and railroad

facilities for much of its research efforts.

Greater research efforts for both Government and industry have been directed at

technological studies of track and equipment R&D, areas which are more related to

the property and lading loss and damage

problem, rather than to human factors

research. Typically, research efforts have

been directed at problems with technological solutions, because it is generall y

assumed that such research has higher

payoff and more clearly measurable results

than human factors efforts. Government

and industry research and development

programs have been no exception to this

rule.

Of the research efforts directed at the

casualty problem, emphasis has been

placed on grade-crossings (where most

fatalities occur) and on tank cars (which

have the potential for the greates t

catastrophe).

Track-related and equipment R&D programs were scheduled to span the decade

before comprehensive research findings

were anticipated. In track and equipment

research, the lack of scientific data, insufficient understanding of track and equipment

life cycles, and lack of knowledge of track

and equipment interaction under a variety

of operating conditions created the situation where research and development, if it

was to be fruitful, had to be directed initially at identifying and understanding the

problems, before solutions could be

developed.

The emphasis on track and equipment R&D

seemed appropriate for both industry and

Government programs, given the frequently

cited accident rates caused by track and equip131
132 ● Railroad Safety

ment, the 1970 congressional mandate, and the

general technology orientation of most

transportation research. Moreover, while FRA

was charged with addressing these problems

through regulation, it was the expressed goal of

the track and equipment research programs that

a more scientific basis for those regulations was

desirable in the future. * As noted in the early

FRA Annual (1972) Safety Report:

Out of the FRA Track Structure R&D

will come recommendations covering the

level of track maintenance required for safe

operation, and concurrent recommendations to the railroads for new track structure with reduced maintenance characteristics. . . . Considerable impact from these

programs is anticipated late in the 1970’s as

track maintenance standards are defined

and railroads act to bring their level of

maintenance up to these standards.

● In track structure research, attention has

been focused on track stability and life cycle, track maintenance, and, to a lesser

degree, on track geometry and wheel rail

compatibility, Initial efforts in the track

structure program went toward establishing the track-test facility at Pueblo from

the high-speed rail R&D appropriations.

Subsequently, research has concentrated

on track componentry and track stability.

The types of track structure efforts have included research on rail structure and stress,

rail performance, track maintenance, track

durability and geometry, and track-testing.

Cooperative efforts between industry and

Government have been extensive in these

areas. The individual AAR efforts have

also been directed in these and other areas

of track research. Examples of specific

track research projects include track-

●

●

●

●

*Initial regulations promulgated were based largely on

existing practices and existing industry standards. By law,

some regulations had to be published within a year of the

enactment of the 1970 Federal Railroad Safety Act.

‘1972 Annual Safety Report to Congress, Federal

Railroad Administration, Research & Development Section.

buckling studies, cross-tie research, and

bolt-hole practice studies.2

In the rolling stock program, Government

and industry research efforts have concentrated on tank car safety, equipment componentry and failure prevention, and the

track-train dynamics program.

The inspection and detection surveillance

research effort has concentrated on

automated track inspection, vehicle

development, data collection, and analyses

utilizing that equipment.

The human factors research conducted by

FRA has consisted of several job analyses,

including those of the train dispatcher,

engineer, and conductors positions, and a

medical qualifications study for selected

railroad employees. Participation by all

concerned parties in these earlier human

factors research efforts was not characteristic of the projects. Generally these projects have not been considered successful,

compared with several more recent efforts.

Other efforts have included research in

locomotive/train handling, cab environment, and on the vandalism problem. In

addition, the Office of Policy and Program

Development initiated the survey of industry alcohol and drug abuse programs

and an industry-wide survey of training

programs.

There have been several cooperative efforts

directed at employee problems, which have

successfully demonstrated cooperation as a

means for obtaining and implementing

safety measures directed at the casualty

problem. Among projects where management, labor, and Government have worked

cooperative y are: locomotive cab

research, glazing research; alcohol and

drug abuse program inventory; and the St.

Louis terminal project, which had safety

implications.

ZI 975, Ninth Annual Report on Railroad Technology

Program, FRA, p. 34.
Ch. Research and Development ● 1.33

● A trend in cooperative research efforts with

labor, management, and Government

working together as an effective means for

improving safety has become more common in recent times. This is evidenced by

cooperative efforts previously mentioned,

as well as by the establishment of the

Railroad Safety Research Board, whose

purpose is to set priorities for safety

research based on accident data and the increased understanding resulting from the

1976 accident analyses. Initial efforts

resulting from this committee are to be

directed toward identifying safety problems related to the yard brakeman, the

employee category with the most statistically significant injury rate.

● T h e only comprehensive research or

analysis conducted on the accident data,

trends, or causes of accidents has been the

1976 Shulman-Taylor Accident and

Casualty Reports conducted by the AAR.

(These reports are covered extensively in

chapter V.)

● Recent labor/management negotiations

have temporarily precluded labor’s continued efforts on all cooperative safety

committees.

COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS

Throughout the course of this study, repeated

attention was called to the need for cooperative

efforts in safety research and development, if

such research was to be either successful from

an analytical perspective or acceptable from the

perspective of those who would be affected by

it. Technological studies related to track and

equipment have typically included railroad and

supplier input to the projects. However, only

recently have any strides been made toward

cooperative efforts in casualty research (the

early establishment of the Locomotive Control

Compartment Committee is one exception to

this). Several cooperative research efforts frequently cited by labor, management, and

Government officials include:

—Locomotive Control Compartment Committee.

—Alcoholism Project.

—Glazing Project.

The Glazing Project was established as a

result of repeated labor concerns and the resulting legislative initiatives about the problem of

objects being thrown at rolling stock and injuring the train crew. Specifically, labor argued

that Locomotive engineers were being unnecessarily subjected to bullets and thrown objects.

As a result of these concerns, the FRA Office of

Safety Research formed a joint labor-management committee to determine the extent of the

problem and to research alternative solutions to

that problem. Accordingly, the AAR collected

data from 52 railroads on missile impacts to

railroads rolling stock for a 2-month time

period. The following information was collected

and analyzed as a result of the effort. “If the

data for the 2-month period is assumed to be

typical, the following table reflects the problem:”3

Number of incidents

Hand-thrown. . . . . .

Guns . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overhead suspension

Slingshot . . . . . . . . .

Once the problem

FRA research team,

Z-month

period l-year

754 4,524

109 654

9 54

5 30

had been identified, the

in conjunction with the

Glazing Project team, conducted field tests of

3

1nternal Memorandum, FRA Office of Safety Research,

Apr. 27, 1977, p. 1.
134 ● Railroad Safety

existing crash-resistant technology to determine

performance specifications for glass in the

locomotives and caboose. As a result of this effort, performance specifications for glass for

new equipment or replacement in damaged

equipment were drawn up. The adoption- of

these standards is awaiting final approval by

railroads early in 1978.4

The Locomotive Control Compartment Committee was established in 1971 as a “laborGovernment-industr y coalition sharing mutual

interest in the study of locomotive crews. ”

Membership on the committee included representatives of FRA, Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers, UTU, and AAR. While this committee’s work is ongoing, its initial efforts began in

the early 1970’s. An initial in-depth analyses,

and ministudy by FRA on locomotive cab accidents and injuries was conducted and a review

of the interior cab design was made. As a result

of this analysis, the locomotive suppliers were

requested to provide clean mockups of cabs

with recommended changes. After the mockups,

17 safety changes and features were adopted.

The equipment purchased since that time has

reflected these changes.5

The Alcohol and Drug Abuse research effort

was initiated by the Office of Policy and Program Development of the FRA. The Office of

Safety within FRA had initiated proceedings for

a regulation prohibiting alcohol use on railroad

property. (Rule G, a part of the railroad standard code, prohibits alcohol consumption on

railroad property. ) Both labor and management

objected to the proposed regulation. The Alcohol Research effort is a two-phased project, with

Phase I completed. Phase I identified those railroads with Alcohol and Drug Rehabilitation

Programs, the type of program being conducted, and the results, if available, of the

programs. b

At the time Phase I was conducted, there were

20 railroad programs identified. Subsequently,

an additional 5 railroads established programs.

The success of many of the alcohol rehabilitation programs was unknown at the time of the

Phase I study, a factor not uncommon to

alcohol research. The types of programs sponsored by railroads ranged from in-house

counseling centers to referral programs for community alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health

centers. ’ Phase II of the alcohol research is

designed to identify several model rehabilitation

programs. The information is to be disseminated to railroads without alcohol programs. Of

significance to the alcohol research effort is the

fact that only recently have attempts been made

to document the extent of the railroad alcohol

problem, while attempts had already been made

in the accident data collection process.

Although the tendency to mute the usage of

alcohol as a safety problem is prevalent in this

society, it would appear that an increased

understanding of one aspect of the human factors problem might become clear if further

research were conducted. Highway fatalities

resulting from alcohol involvement ar e

estimated between 35 and 50 percent. 8

These cooperative research efforts represent

some successful efforts toward human factors

studies. They have been relatively inexpensive

for the results produced. Findings from these efforts have been successfully incorporated into

the industry structure. Moreover, the research

conducted appears to have been pragmatic,

short-term, and responsive to perceived needs at

a given time.

‘Interview with Dr. William T. Harris, AAR, December

1977.

‘Interviews with Mr. Ed McCulloch, Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, and Dr. William Harris, November

and December 1977.

‘Interview with Mr. Theodore Voss, Policy and Evaluation Division, FRA, November 1977.

‘A Survey of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Programs in the

Railroad Industry, FRA-OPPD-ORD 76-283, conducted

by Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, Ind.,

November 1976.

8

Fatal Accident Reporting System, 1975 Annual Report,

DOT, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

(NHTSA), p. 57 and Traffic Safety ’76, U.S. DOT

(NHTS), p. 16.
Ch. 1X Research and Development ● 13.5

RAILROAD GRADE= CROSSING RESEARCH

Federal cooperative efforts on grade-crossing

safety research were begun in 1968, when the

Federal Highway Administration and Federal

Railroad Administration were instructed by the

Secretary of Transportation to form a joint national program. In 1972, a report was submitted

to Congress outlining the extent of the gradecrossing problem and several alternatives for

improving the problem. Since that report, the

railroads and Federal Government have inventoried approximately 402,000 to 410,000 gradecrossings or 98 percent of the Nation’s gradecrossings. 9

(Discussion of railroad gradecrossing programs is included in chapter X.)

In the last 7 years, research and development

efforts on the grade-crossing problem have

focused on development of equipment, materials, and innovations in barrier protection;

identification of and experimentation with

equipment and devices for locomotives in

preventing or minimizing grade-crossing impacts; collisions and crash-worthiness of

vehicles at grade crossings; driver behavior; and

analysis and development of computer models

to assist States in determining the best complement of equipment for different classes of gradecrossings. FRA expenditures on grade-crossing

research during 1973-76 were approximately $3

million, while Federal highway funds for

research over the same period were approximately $1.7 million. 10

TANK CAR RESEARCH

The strong emphasis placed on accidents involving hazardous materials during the hearings

for the 1970 Railroad Safety Act resulted in

quick initiation by the FRA of research efforts to

improve tank car design and performance. The

AAR also has initiated research on the hazardous materials problem. The FRA, AAR, and

Railroad Progress Institute (RPI) then combined

research efforts on the problem.

Over a 5-year period, the tank car research effort involved testing for fire protection, examining the conditions of ruptures, and testing a

number of hypotheses regarding improvements

which could be made in tank car design. The

results of the research now incorporated in

regulations include: thermal protection systems,

safety relief valves of adequate capacity to protect thermally insulated tanks, shelf couplers,

and tank head puncture resistance systems.

The effective implementation dates of this

research and the regulations vary according to

the specific research feature, however, the final

date for retrofitting is 1982. The estimated cost

to the railroad industry is $200 million. Federal

expenditures for tank car research have been approximately $5 million.

In addition to research on tank car design,

growing concern has been voiced by the industry regarding transportation of nuclear

wastes. While the issue has been one of

economics, i.e., rates charged by the industry

for shipping nuclear wastes and the economic

liability of the industry in the event of an accident, discussions also have taken place between

railroad industry and energy officials regarding

the methods and containers to be used in such

transportation and the testing of those containers. To date, the Department of Energy

(DOE) has conducted research related to transportation and containerization to be used in rail

shipments. Current discussions between the

FRA and DOE are focused on potentia} for

cooperative testing of these containers. I ]

‘“Telephone interview with Mr. Sid Louick, Federal

Highway Administration, January 1978.

‘

] Interview with Mr. Lev Peterson, Office of Safety

Research, FRA, December 1977.
136 ● Railroad Safety

R&D EXPENDITURES

Federal expenditures for railroad research and

development applied to contemporary railroad

concerns in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s were

small in comparison with the research dollars

being spent today. As shown in table 36, Federal

research dollars (FRA) increased dramatically

during 1971-76. (Part of this went into construction of the test facility at Pueblo, Colo. )

Moreover, safety expenditures for the period

1973-76 rose from $3.6 million in 1973 to $8.0

million in 1976, or 124.5 percent (not adjusted).

Safety R&D expenditures (Federal Railroad

Safety Act funds) were approximately $20

million during 1973-76, while overall R&D

expenditures related to safety (including FRSA

funds) were approximately $47 million (tables

36 and 37). In 1976, safety R&D accounted for

13.1 percent of total R&D.

Industry expenditures for research and

development also were quite small in the early

1970’s. However, industry resources* from 1973

to 1976 rose by 560 percent, excluding Government contributions, as seen in table 38. In 1977,

safety R&D expenditures accounted for 3.3 percent of the total industry R&D, exclusive of the

Government contribution. Definitionally,

research placed in other categories by the AAR,

typically has been included under safety

research in the FRA annual safety reports.

Table 36.—FRA Research and Development Obligations

(Dollars in millions)

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976

Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –— $3,568 $3,406 $5,023 $8,004

General R& D. . . . . . . . . . . . $ 1,218 $1;G 4 43,534 35,045 35,037 53,206

Total* . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1,218 $12,964 $47,100 $38,451 $40,060 $61,210

Percent safety of total. . . . —— —— 7.6 8.9 12.5 13.1

● Includes obligations from Office of Research and Development, Transportation Systems Center, and Office of Program and Policy Development.

SOURCE: Task IV Report, PMM, & Co., for Office of Safety Research, FRA.

Table 37.—Total FRA Research

and Development Office Expenditures

for Safety-Related Research, * 1973-76

(Millions of dollars)

Program Expenditure

Track structures research. . . . . . . . . . . $20

Inspection and test support . . . . . . . . . 7

Rolling stock. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Human factors & information support. 3

Grade crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & 4 a

● Approximated.

aThis figure includes Federal Railroad Safety Act funds

($20 million) for the 1973-76 time period.

SOURCE: FRA, Office of Safety Research.

Aggregate research and development expenditures of the Federal Government and industry

in 1975 represent only .3 percent of industry

operating revenues (table 38). Given the discrepancy between industry and Government

definitions of safety research and development,

it was not possible to establish the relationship

of safety 1<L’D to total operating revenues. As

*Industry resources is defined as those monies expended

by AAR Research and Test Department; these funds do not

take into account individual railroads R&kD budgets,

although it includes railroad contributions and RPI contributions to the AAR. This definition of industry R&D applies whenever industry R&D is referred to in this report.
Ch. 1X Research and Development • 137

Table 38.—AAR Research and Test Budgets, 1974-77

1974 1975 1976 1977

R&D (excludes Government contribution;

includes suppliers, railroads)* . . . . . . . . . . 5,177,200 5,820,577 9,998,147 12,127,700

Government contribution (includes safety). . 2,517,000 2,258,700 5,906,000 13,548,900

AAR safety expenditures (excludes

Government). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95,000 182,800 420,000 405,550

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,789,200 8,262,077 15,324,147 26,082,150

Percent safety of AAR R&D budget . . . . . . . . 1.8 3.1 4.7 3.3

● Because of the Research and Test Department budget procedures, the tank car, grade-crossing, locomotive

cab, coupler, and track-safety programs have been included in the general AAR R&D column of this table, rather

than as a line item safety account. These programs represented $1,616,000 in 1974, $740,000 in 1975, and $558,750

in 1977. There are safety costs inherent i n most R&D projects specifically dealing with technological problems.

SOURCE: AAR Research and Test Department Biennel Report, 1974-75, 1975-76 draft.

can be seen, the amount of investment by both

Government and industry in R&D, though increasing, is still quite small.

Although not exact, comparison of Government safety-related R&D expenditures for track,

equipment, and human factors shows that the

major thrust of Government research has been

devoted to rail and equipment problems. Of the

total $47 million which has been expended on

safety-related R&D, approximately $12 million

has been spent on research most closely related

to the casualty problem as shown in table 39.

The recent AAR accident analyses have

caused both Government and industry to begin

to rethink their position with respect to safety

R&D. As indicated by the accident analyses examined in chapter V, the significant number of

employee fatalities and injuries do not occur in

track-related accidents. Property damage from

train accidents account for 45 percent of total

cost claims while casualty claims, the majority

of which do not occur because of train accidents, also account for about 45 percent.

Therefore, the lack of R&D expenditures on

human factors and on the casualty problem,

given its equal economic magnitude with equipment and track problems, suggest that some

greater attention may be focused in these areas.

While the previous data on Government expenditures indicates a growth in R&D expenditures, prior to this decade such emphasis was

extremely limited. Railroads usually adopted

technological innovations only after their effiTable 39.—FRA Office of Research and

Development Approximation of Safety-Related

Expenditures, 1973”1976

(Millions of dollars)

Safety-related programs

Track-structures research . . . . . . . . . . $20

Inspection and test support . . . . . . . . . 7

Rolling stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Human factors & information support 3

Grade-crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $47* *

Safety research related to casualties

Grade-crossings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 3.0

Tank car. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.0

Personnelprotection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0

Human factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.4

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12.4

Rolling stock expenditures

Tank carresearch ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5

Equipment component failures. . . . . . 7

Personnelprotection•• . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $14

Human factors Research

Task analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $1.0

Train-handling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Locomotive evaluator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Cab environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Information support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Vigilance and vandalism . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Alcohol and drug abuse. . . . . . . . . . . , .2

Total .,,.,,....,.. , ., . . . . . . $3. 4

‘Indicates those programs related to the casualty problem or human factors research.

● ● Of the $47 million, $20 million was the result of Federal

Railroad Safety Act funds.

SOURCE: FRA Office of Safety Research.
138 ● Railroad Safety

ciency and value were clearly proven and demonstrated to have railroad application. More-

~jver, specific research usually occurred in conjunction with suppliers and only on an incremental basis. As stated in the 1972-73 AAR

Biennial Research and Test Department Report:

In many fields, especially in track and

equipment, the basic principles of design

were established by research completed

many decades ago. Problems encountered

after research was completed were solved

by iterative, trial-and-error laboratory and

field studies. This approach sufficed during

that time that the industry was not required

to make rapid changes to accommodate

new traffic demands or to respond to competitive and regulatory forces. In the last

decade, major changes have been necessary

to provide more transportation service and

to adapt to safety and environmental regulations. Insufficient research had been performed to anticipate these requirements for

change and to provide reasonable alternative solutions. 12

In more recent times, the reasons for the lack

of R&D and the slowness with which innovation

has occurred are numerous. However, the most

apparent causes include: the poor financial condition of the industry at large and its lack of

capital; the comparability problems of making

new technologies co-equals to those already in

usage, particularly in light of the differing life

cycles of massive industry equipment and fixed

plant; and the management philosophy and

practices of the 1950’s and 1960’s, wherein R&D

was not considered a priority in the industry.

Clearly there are several significant points

concerning today’s railroad research, irrespective of whether it is for the general industry or

for safety. Because of the lack of resources, railroad economics have impeded innovation. Innovations which do occur in the present or

future must be cost-effective. Finally, there must

be a systematic economical method for implementation of research findings before there will

be an overall willingness by the industry and interested parties to accept technological or operational change.

Ilprogress in Railroad Research, AAR Research and Test

Department Biennial Report, 1972-73, p. 194.
Chapter X

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS,

RAIL-HIGHWAY GRADE= CROSSINGS,

OTHER RAILROAD SAFETY PROGRAMS
Chapter X

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS,

RAIL= HIGHWAY GRADE-CROSSINGS,

AND OTHER RAILROAD SAFETY PROGRAMS

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

One dimension of the rail safety problem

relates to the shipment of hazardous materials.

Generally “hazardous materials” are those

substances or materials in a quantity and form

which may pose an unreasonable risk to health

and safety or property when transported in

commerce. 1 According to AAR, some 1.04

million carloads of materials, classified as

hazardous, are shipped annually. Other sources

indicate the figure is about 2.5 million and that

7.5 percent of the hazardous materials shipped

by any carrier are shipped by rail. ’ It is conceivable that the 1980’s will see other increases

in the shipments of hazardous materials, Increasing the volumes of hazardous materials

shipped by rail could have an effect on the rate

of accidents—injuries, fatalities, and property

damage. This concern about the level of safety

associated with the shipment of hazardous

materials is based on an analysis of past accident data and information.

c Between 1971 and 1974, there was an

average of 113 railroad accidents reported

to be associated with tank cars each year.

Associated with those accidents were 320

injuries, 3 deaths, 12,217 evacuations, and

property damage of $10 million.3

● During 1974, approximately 8,500 hazardous materials incident reports wet-e filed

with DOT’s Materials Transportation

Board for 550 carriers (all modes). Approximately 7 percent of those were filed by the

rail carriers. Two hundred forty-eight

reports included 32 fatalities and 900 injuries. Eleven of the fatalities involved

gasoline as tank truck (or tank trailer)

cargo in 10 different incidents. Seven

fatalities and 349 injuries involved one liquid propane gas (LPG) tank car incident at

Decatur, Ill. Sixty-nine people were injured

at Wenatchee, Wash., in the explosion of a

tank car containing monomethalamine ammonium nitrate solution. Fifty-four people

were injured at Oneonta, N. Y., in an accident involving the derailment of an LPG

tank car. Roughly 65 percent of railroad

cases involving the unintentional release of

hazardous materials involved tank cars

loaded with LPG, sulfuric acid, anhydrous

ammonia, and liquid caustic soda. ~

‘In the first quarter of 1977, among the top 25 hazardous

materials shipped by rai1 were: ammonia, caustic soda,

liquid propane gas (LPG), sulfuric acid, chlorine, propane,

ammonium nitrate, gax~line, phosphoric acid, crude oil,

methanol, petroleum distillate, vinyl chloride, butane,

motor fuel ant i-knock c{}mpound, bu tad iene, and petr{w

leum naphtha. (The measure: carloads: the ~(>urce [>f in3

1975 FRA Annual Report.

f{~rmat ion: AAR. ) ‘Ffazardo~E Matcrzals l)~ci~ic)~t RcpL~rts, Department of

‘1’MM & Co,, Task I\’. Transportation, hfar. 7, 1975.

141
142 “ Railroad Safety

Photo Courtesy of the Association of American Railroads

Arrow points to insulated pressure tank car head shield—designed to avert puncture of tank by coupler

after accident has occurred.

.’ . .

-- -

Photo Courtesy of Federal Railroad Administration

Tank car torching test— testing ability of insulating material to withstand torching environment.
CH. X Hazardous Materials, Rail-Highway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs • 143

Amtrak tracks; Meets FRA track

standards—Class 4.

Frankfort, Ky.; Tank car derailment; Carry.

ing Hydrocyanic acid; Broken rail;

December 1977.

Tank car punctured by coupler at the

Frankfort derailment shown above.
144 ● Railroad Safety

RESPONSES TO THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH

THE SHIPMENT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

Federal Government

Statutory and regulatory responses. The need

for a hazardous materials safety program was

recognized with the passage of the Transportation of Explosives and Combustibles Act of

1908 (18 U.S. Code, $ 831 to 835). That Act

prescribed the conditions under which certain

explosives were to be shipped in vehicles and

vessels engaged in interstate and foreign commerce. The next major piece of legislation was

the Transportation of Explosives and Other

Dangerous Articles Act of 1960 (P.L. 86-710),

which covered radioactive materials and etiologic agents and extended coverage to the

transportation of the denominated materials by

private and contract carriers. Chapter VII

covers a detailed discussion of the provisions of

the controlling legislation. Suffice it to say that

what controls now is the broadened authority

given to the Department of Transportation

under the Transportation Safety Act of 1974.

Among other things, that Act provided the authority for: the designation of materials as

hazardous materials and issuing regulations for

their safe transportation; establishing a program

of registration of shippers, and container and

packaging manufacturing; and establishing

criteria for handling hazardous materials. A

Materials Transportation Bureau was established in July 1975 and given the responsibility

for coordinating the issuance of regulations and

exemptions concerning the shipment of hazardous materials solely by rail; designating

materials as hazardous; prescribing recordkeeping requirements; imposing sanctions for violations; and collecting and compiling data.

The Federal Railroad Administration has the

responsibility for working with MTB in the

development of standards, data collection, inspections, and general administration of the

rules.

The regulations covering hazardous materials

are discussed in chapter VII. See table 40 for actions required of various parties.

The impact of Federal regulatory action relative to hazardous materials: One activity of the

Materials Transportation Bureau is that of requiring all shippers and carriers to file Hazardous Materials Incident Reports citing any and all

unintentional release of hazardous materials.

The industry response to this requirement indicates that more and more the Department of

Transportation is being assisted in developing

early warning systems and inspection strategies

designed to meet the problem of hazardous

materials shipped by rail. During 1971-76, there

was an increase in the number of rail carriers

reporting incidents. Tables 41 and 42 show the

number of reporting carriers and the number of

Hazardous Materials Incidents Reports submitted between 1971 and 1976. As can be seen

for rail carriers, there was a rapid increase in the

number of reporting carriers and the number of

reports submitted. The increase between 1971

and 1976 of reporting rail carriers was 80 percent. The MTB believes that the increased

reporting results from increased awareness of

the reporting requirements.

Pressure tank cars have been involved in accidents since 1918. Since 1969, there has been a

growing concern expressed about the involvement of uninsulated pressure tank cars in

serious railroad accidents. These concerns led to

the issuance of regulations, effective October

19, 1977, calling for cars built after December

31, 1977, to comply; further, the regulations required retrofitting of existing tank cars. In dealing with the tank-car-safety problem, the Department of Transportation first sponsored

research and development to provide the necessary analysis of the problem of puncture and

rupture of pressure tank cars involved in an accident environment.

The Department of Transportation has issued
Ch. X Hazardous Materials, Rail-Highway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs 145

Table 40.—Actions Required To Ensure Safe Rail Shipment of Hazardous Materials*

Container Rail Federal

Actions manufacturer Shipper carrier Consignee inspectors

Packaging and Loading

Assure that the material is

properly formulated ($173.22)**. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

properly classified (173.22). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

properly packaged (5173.22). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assure that the shipping papers correctly

describe the materials (s173.427). . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assure proper placement and loading of

packaged goods and bulk goods ($1 73.31),

(§174.525) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assure the proper packaging of intermodal

shipments such as portable tank and

highway trailers; and assure proper loading of

the same ($173.32). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assure proper placarding of the rail cars

($174.548) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Train officers, agents, and employees as to

shipping requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Inspection

Ensure compliance with the railroad equipment

and safety standards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ensure compliance with the DOT hazardous

materials regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ensure receipt of properly executed shipping

papers ($174.510). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Understanding FRA and MTB regulations

requiring the proper handling of rail cars . . . . . .

Training personnel in FRA and MTB regulations. .

Audit shipper rail carrier operations to ensure

compliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Incjdent/Accjdent Handling

Supply information on how to control the

problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Supply notice of certain hazardous materials

incidents (~171 .15 and 171 .16) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Unloading

Safely and completely unloading materials and in

the case of tank cars securing valves ($174.560)

Removing placards ($174.562) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

x

x

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . x

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x

x

x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

x

x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

x

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........

x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

● SOURCES: 49 CFR 173ff. Black, W. F. Transporting, Load/rig and Unloading Hazardous Materials Using Railroad Transportation Technical Paper No, MS 75-660, Society of Manufacturing Engineers, 1975, p. 2,

● ● The citations provided are applicable sections of 49 CFR.
— .- —

146 ● Railroad Safety

Table 41 .— Number of Carriers Reporting to MTB

Reporting Carriers Percent

Mode 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976* Total of total

Air carriers . . . . . . . . . 3 11 15 31 40 50

Hwy carriers (for-hire) 233 323 353 3% 392 600 700 6 :

Hwy carriers (private) 54 58 73 82 116 200 22

Rail carriers . . . . . . . . 28 35 35 40 44 43 75 7

Water carriers. . . . . . . 10 8 7 17 23 40 50 4

Total . . . . . . . . . . 328 435 483 551 606 930 1,125’ * See note

● Estimated.

● ● Total number of different reporting carriers during the 6-year period—not the addition of numbers for each year.

(For example–carrier XYZ submitted reports in each year but as the “total” reporting carriers, XYZ is only one reporting carrier— not six.)

SOURCE: Materials Transportation Bureau, from PMM & Co., Task IV.

Table 42.—Number of Reports Submitted to MTB

Reports Submitted Percent

Mode 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976* Total of total

Air carriers . . . . . . . . . 5 32 155 152 150’ 550 41/4

Hwy carriers (for-hire) 1,633 3,613 5,6 : 7,254 8,988 9,900’ 36,550 83

Hwy carriers (private) 258 352 450 361 903 950’ 3,300 71/4

Rail carriers . . . . . . . . 346 337 412 617 617 981 ‘ 3,400 71/’

Water carriers. . . . . . . 13 10 12 26 32 50” 150 l/~

Total . . . . . . . . . . 2,255 4,344 6,016 8,413 4,750 11,898 44,000 See note**

● Estimated.

● ● See note in table 41.

SOURCE: Materials Transportation Bureau, from PMM & Co., Task IV.

a series of regulations covering hazardous

materials. Specific topics covered are: general

handling and loading, handling of placards, explosives, gases, flammable liquids, flammable

solids, oxidizers, poisonous materials, radioactive materials, and corrosive materials. The National Transportation Safety Board has had

some concerns about the effectiveness of the

regulatory activity, specifically:

●

●

NTSB recommended that the Secretary of

Transportation reassess the regulations applicable to the packaging, loading, storing,

and transportation of military munitions.

(Report issued April 2, 1975. )

NTSB recommended that the Secretary of

Transportation publish guidelines describing methods available for conducting safety

analyses that would facilitate the discovery

of detonation risks and standards to be

met. (Report of March 3, 1976. )

NTSB recommended that the Secretary of

Transportation establish regulations for

quality specifications and quality control

procedures in the manufacturing, packaging, and loading of detonable hazardous

materials.

Accident data and trends were important in

initiating regulatory activity which led to the

tank-car standard. Accident data should always

be one tool of the regulatory process. But that

alone is not satisfactory. It is critical to effective

safety regulation to ensure that the exposure of

people and property to hazardous materials be

determined, and this is not being done

systematically. The impact of the inspection efforts is discussed in chapter VIII. See table 43 for

accidents involving hazardous materials.

Training efforts. Both the MTB and FRA have

ongoing training programs in the area of

transporting hazardous materials. Workshops
Ch. X Hazardous Materials, Rail-Higway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs ● 147

Table 43.—Accidents Involving Hazardous Materials, Spills, or Explosions, All Accidents

Cause 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1972 1973 1974 Total

Negligence of

employees . . . . . . . ● ● ‘ * 1 3 5 3 3 3 3 21

Defects/failures of

equipment . . . . . . . * ● ● ● 1 4 4 4 4 5 3 25

Defects in track or

structures. . . . . . . . ● ● ● ● 1 4 1 1 3 2 12

Miscellaneous

causes . . . . . . . . . . . ● * ● * 18 24 41 28 28 37 32 208

Total . . . . . . . . . . ● * ● * 20 32 55 36 36 48 40 267

—

*Miscellaneous causes include: Improper Ioadlng, negligence of nonemployees, malicious acts of nonemployees,

forces of nature, rail-highway grade-crossing accidents, coupling or uncoupling locomotives or cars, stumbling, slipping, falling, caught. etc.

● ” Not available.

SOURCE: FRA Accident Data Base from PM M & Co., Task IV.

and seminars have been conducted to educate

shippers, carriers, and local authorities. These

sessions focus on increasing the “general

awareness” level of those involved in shipping

hazardous materials and most are offered at no

cost to the industry. The Transportation Safety

Institute offers an in-depth, multimodal training

program for shippers and carriers and emergenc}’ service personnel. It is generally recognized

as a very strong hazardous materials program.

The Railroad Industry

Today the railroad industry is involved in inspection, data collection, and training. Up until

1967, the AAR had responsibility (as an agent of

the Federal Government) for furnishing technical input for regulations, furnishing laboratory service, and monitoring container development. 5

Some of the industry’s inspection activities

are through the AAR’s Bureau of Explosives,

which has inspectors on railroad property and

‘Since the passage of the Transportation of Explosives

Act in 1908, the Federal Government has depended on the

Bureau of Explosives, AAR, to furnish technical input, and

so forth, for the Government. Over 200 delegations of

authority were issued to carry out those functions. In 1967,

the general counsel of the Department of Transportation

ruled the delegations of authority illegal.

at shipper facilities inspecting for compliance

with the hazardous materials regulations. As far

as data collection is concerned, in 1975 the AAR

developed a system which identifies hazardous

shipments by rail. AAR believes the system is

accurate within 1 percent of the total volume

shipped (49 series STCC).

The railroad industry—individual railroads

and the AAR—is very much involved in training programs. 6 One type of program is designed

to ensure that employees understand Federal

laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the

proper handling and inspection of hazardous

materials. Railroad personnel interviewed as

part of the assessment indicated that their training programs were monitored by the safety departments of the railroads. They also indicated

that they coordinated their hazardous materials

training programs with FRA, MTB, and AAR.

The latter two organizations provide much OF

the training literature. In addition, AAR's

Bureau of Explosives offers training to rail and

shipper employees on the handling of hazardous

materials.

‘Another type of activity is that of providin~ information in any transportation emergency involving chemicals.

The CHEMTREC service Provided by the manufacturing

chemists association is an example.
148 Railroad Safety

RAIL-HIGHWAY GRADE-CROSSINGS

The Problem

As of December 31, 1975, there were over

219,000 locations where public roads crossed

railroad tracks. In 1975, there were over 11,000

vehicle-train collisions at the public gradecrossings, resulting in over 9700 deaths and 4,100

injuries. In each of the years between 1965 and

1975 over 1,100 people were killed and some

3,200 injured at grade-crossings.

Grade-crossing accidents continue to be the

major cause of fatalities in railroad operations,

accounting for approximately 65 percent of the

fatalities resulting from all types of railroad accidents during 1965-74.

Federal Government Responses to

the Grade= Crossing Safety Problems

The Federal Government has been involved in

providing financial support for projects to

eliminate hazards at railroad/highway intersections since the establishment of the Federal-Aid

Highway Program in 1916. Prior to the passage

of the Federal Highway Safety Act of 1973, a

U.S. Department of Transportation Report to

Congress (August 1972) observed that the total

number of grade-crossings warranting improvement indicated that at least 3,000 protection installations should be made annually for the next

10 years at an expenditure of about $75 million

a year. It was anticipated that completion of

those improvements would eliminate nearly

4,000 motor-vehicle train collisions annually

and save some 500 lives per year. 7

The Federal Highway Safety Act of 1973 had

as one of its goals the elimination of hazards at

highway-railroad grade-crossings. Section 203

of that Act requires each State to maintain a

survey of all railroad-highway crossings and to

‘U.S. Department of Transportation, Report to Congress, Railroad-Highway Safety, 1972.

identify those that may require separation,

relocation, or protective devices. The Act provides 90 percent Federal-aid funding for safety

improvements to railroad-highway crossings on

any Federal-aid highway system, except interstate, and requires at least half of the funds to

be available for protective devices. At a

minimum, each State must provide signs for all

railroad-highway crossings. (See table 44 for indication of eligible activities. )

The Highway Safety Act of 1976 amended

Section 203 by authorizing specific funding for

grade-crossing improvements in the Federal-aid

highway system.

The rail-highway safety programs are complicated by divided jurisdictions and responsibilities, which include:

●

●

●

●

The Federal Highway Administration apportions funds to the States by a statutory

formula, reserving the right of the Federal

Government through local offices to disapprove certain State funding strategies.

States may use these funds for a variety of

safety activities concerning grade crossings.

Jurisdiction over railroad-highway intersections resides exclusively in the States,

where responsibility can be divided between several agencies.

Railroad companies have the responsibility

for the design , instal1ation and

maintenance of train-activated warning

devices to be installed only by railroad

employees or by private contractors

employing members of the railroad union

authorized to make such an installation.

The existence of differing responsibilities,

vis a vis the installation of warning devices,

between the States and the railroad companies results in the necessity for

State/railroad contracts to be executed

prior to the installation of the devices.
Ch. X Hazardous Materials, Rail-highway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs ● 149

Table 44.—Grade-Crossing Safety Programs

Items funded*

Engineering ● ●

Program Protection Elimination Surface Education Other

Federal

Federal Highway Safety Act of 1973

&203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$230 (repealed) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal-Aid Highway Program

23 U.S.C. 130. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23U.S.C. 163.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23U.S.C. 219.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23U.S.C. 322.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23U.S.C. 402.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

State***

Total funding of safety program . . . . . .

Matching Federal funds*** . . . . . . . . .

Support of Operation Lifesaver

(education and enforcement) . . . . . .

Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Industry

Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Maintenance and operation . . . . . . . . .

Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Support of Operation Lifesaver . . . . . .

Training of public officials . . . . . . . . . .

Unions

Support of Operation Lifesaver . . . . . .

x

●

x

●

X

X

X

x

●

x

x

●

X

X• training

x• x ●

enforcement

X•

X supplier

seminars

X

‘Items funded for on system indicated with an ’’X”; for off Federal-aid system with an"-”.

● *’’Protection” Includes installation of automatic devices; elimination includes grade separation; and ‘surface”

means surface improvements.

● **Some of the programs (where States match Federal funds) service off Federal-aid system crossings. Further,

only some of the States, not all, have these programs.

The divided jurisdiction becomes a barrier to

effective treatment of the rail-highway gradecrossing problem because:

—It is used to explain why measures of effectiveness of specific actions necessary to

properly direct future resources have not

been developed, Federal Highway Administration officials have not sufficiently

analyzed the contribution Federal dollars

have made to the reduction of collision injuries and deaths.

—It allows confusion on the issue of who

should provide and pay for the protection

or other improvements.

The impact of Section 203 program s

(problems and successes). As of the end of FY

1977, Federal-aid funds totalling $86 million

had been obligated for projects on the Federalaid system. Funding of the “off-system” program began in FY 1977, and as of September 30,

1977, $17 million had been obligated.

The direct contribution the Federal dollars

have made to the reduction of collision injuries

and deaths is unknown. Federal Highway Administration officials contend that such an analysis would be most difficult—almost impossible—to make, given the divided jurisdiction

and responsibilities between the Federal
150 ● Railroad Safety

Government/State government and the railroads. In other words, FHWA officials have not

been able (and believe it to be impossible) to

determine the extent to which the goals of the

1972 report will be met after the 10-year period

has elapsed. What is known is as follows: a) The

current number of projects funded each year is

estimated to be between 1,200 and l,500; b) the

greatest reduction in fatalities within the

1965-75 period was 242 between 1974 and 1975

(see table 45). These numbers seem low if the

goal of 30,000 installations and 5,000 less deaths

is to be met by 1983. A number of problems and

barriers to an effective program have been suggested above.

Table 45.— Fatalities for All Grade-Crossings

Calendar year Killed

1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,534

1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,780

1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,632

1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,546

1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,490

1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,440

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,356

1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,260

1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,185

1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,220

1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 978

1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,168

SOURCE: Rail-Highway Grade-Crossing Accidents (Incidents Bulletin, FRA.)

One additional problem with the program

couldbe the manner in which the funds are apportioned to the States. The formula does not

take into account the number of grade-crossings

in a State or the number of fatalities per gradecrossing, hence producing in some instances

results which are not optimal. However, Federal

Highway Administration officials note existing

strategies and controls which direct the Federal

dollars to the priority problem areas. This is so,

they contend, because each State is required to

have a method of prioritizing all crossings

which must be based on a hazard index, onsite

inspections, and accident history.

One other possible problem with the pace of

the program could be that the railroads are

reluctant to install automatic systems because of

the potential liability where the systems may

not be fail-safe.

Table 46 describes additional federalIyfunded

programs and states what is known about their

impact.

State Government Programs Designed To

Meet the Grade-Crossing Safety Problems.

Jurisdiction over grade-crossing improvementis

basically at the State government level. State

governments fund safety projects primarily

through the use of Federal funds, although some

States have special funds for: a) railroadhighway intersection improvement projects;

and/orb) the maintenance and operation of the

protection. Often, the State officials having

responsibility for grade-crossing activities initiate safety projects without specific regard to

the funding source. This is not necessarily a

positive feature, because the State officials have

varying authorities under the different funding

mechanisms, and their present strategy may not

be the most cost-effective. The 1972 report to

Congress noted the following:

The net effect of the current division of

responsibility and authority among the

private and public interests involved at the

State and local level results in a fragmented

approach to grade-crossing safety. Where

there is divided public responsibility, frequently none of the involved public agencies have either legal authority or sufficient

resources to make more than token progress in dealing effectively with the problem.

The need for national coordination of an

issue that affects the Nation’s railroad and

highway systems is apparent.

The States were expected to participate in the

National Railroad-Highway Crossing Inventory

and Numbering Project. State officials interviewed noted that the Federal data collection

system was not as effective in assisting them in

planning for safety, because there was no provision for sending accident statistics to the States

on a timely and regular basis.

The States’ priority-setting activities are the

key to solving the highway-grade-crossing safety problem. The U.S. Department of Transpor-
. — —

Ch. X Hazardous Materials, Rail-Highway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs Ž 151

Table 46.— Federal Government Grade-Crossing Programs

Program Description and Status Impact (problems and successes)

Railroad-Highway Crossing Section 163 authorized demonstration A total of $30.9 million had

Demonstration Projects projects in 12 cities for the purpose been appropriated for this pro-

(Section 163, Federal- of protecting or eliminating certain gram through 1977, of which

Aid Highway Act of public, ground-level, rail-highwa y $12.8 million had been obligated

1973, amended by the crossings, relocating railroad lines, by the end of the transition

1976 Act). and constructing overpasses a n d quarter. Three of the projects

underpasses. are under construction; all other

This 1973 provision contemplated 95/5- projects are in the preliminary engior 100-percent Federal funding. The neering stage.

1976 Act authorized four additional

projects and provided for 70/30 matching ratio for the additional cities.

Federal-Aid Highway The entire cost of construction of

projects for the elimination of hazards,

including the separation or protection

of grade-crossings and the relocation

of highways may be paid, and under

certain circumstances, 100-percent

Federal funding may be allowed.

23. U.S.C. 219 The Secretary is authorized to make

project grants to States for the construction and improvement of any offsystem road for such purposes as the

correction of safety hazards, or the

elimination of high-hazard locations.

23 U.S.C. 402 Funds are authorized to carry out State

highway safety programs including

training programs.

Federal-Aid Safer Roads This program required identification Of the more than $72 million obliDemonstration Program of projects for the correction of gated in FY 1976, nearly 40 percent

(Section 430, Highway hazards on all roads off the Federal- was spent on railroad projects

Safety Act of 1973) aid system and the systematic cor- (correcting hazards at rail-highway

23. U.S.C. 405 rection of the hazards. The law pro- grade-crossings).

vialed 90 percent Federal-aid funding.

Repealed by the Federal-Aid Highway According to the 1977 Highway

Act of 1976, Sec. 135 (c) of FHWA Safety Improvement Program Re1976 (now a part of the section 203 port, the program was slow getting

program). started. States were reluctant to

place these programs in a priority

category and had not identified

problem areas to move construction.

Rail Crossings Two demonstration projects were

Demonstration Projects authorized: one, to eliminate public,

23 U.S.C. 322 ground-level, rail-highway crossings

along the Northeast Corridor, except

those of low-hazard potential (which

could be protected by warnin g

devices); the other, to consolidate

and relocate lines bisecting Greenwood, S.C. Railroads were required to

pay 10 percent of the cost of the project.

The Penn Central was not able to

contribute its 10 percent of the

cost of the Northeast Corridor Pro

ject, which delayed the project.

Eventually the States involved

agreed to cover the railroad’s

share. Delay also was caused by

meeting the environmental requirements, holding public hearings, and making design changes.

The total cost estimate for this

program has more than doubled

since 1970 due to design modifications and inflation.
152 ● Railroad Safety

I \ -

.

Scenes of typical grade-crossings found through.

out the Nation. The photo below depicts a near accident involving a car and train.

Photos Courtesy of fhe Assoc/af/on 01 American Ra//roads
—.

Ch, X Hazardous Materials, Rail-Highway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs . 153

tation has developed a computer model to assist

State departments of transportation in determining the optimum allocation of funds and

types of equipment based on accident rates, traffic densities, and terrain. The extent to which

that model or similar models are being used and

whether it is sufficient to make a significant impact on solving the safety problem have n o t

been determined.

Industry Programs Designed To Meet the

Grade-Crossing Safety Problems. Industry efforts fall into the following five categories: a)

data collection and analysis; b) operation and

maintenance of warning devices; c) installation

of warning devices; d) information and education; and e) participation in joint industry and

Government activities such as Operation Lifesaver. There is limited information available on

the railroads’ expenditures for these types of activities, One railroad interviewed for this study

indicated that at one point they collected gradecrossing accident statistics, but when financial

difficulties came, they funded only crossing improvements and other operations. Based then on

the sample of this study, the railroads’ data collection activity is limited. Some of the railroads

do participate in a “near-miss” program, in

which railroad employees complete a “nearmiss” or “failure to stop at grade-crossing”

report. FoIlowing the submission of such reports

to local authorities, the motor vehicle owner in

question is contacted and warned. In general,

railroads maintain grade-crossing devices if the

device is activated by the train. There are instances where the raiIroads have participated in

funding the installation of the warning devices.

An example of industry participation in information and education activities is the rail industry suppliers’ grade-crossing program, involving the conduct of seminars “to educate

State transportation authorities on the latest

available grade-crossing systems.”~

Joint Programs and Efforts Designed To Meet

the Grade Crossing Safety Problems. One major

joint program is Operation Lifesaver, Operation

Lifesaver is based on the premise that a successful grade-crossing safety program depends

on engineering, education, and enforcement.

The Operation Lifesaver program, operating at

the State level, consists of public and private

agencies’ efforts to fund and conduct an integrated effort to “improve, accelerate and continue effective grade-crossing programs. ” Participants in the program may on occasion,

depending upon the State structure, include

State departments of transportation, public

utilities, and education; unions; railroads; and

civic organizations. The engineering aspect of

the program is generally supported by Federal/State funds and consists of some type of

protection devices, and their operation and

maintenance. Education activities could consist

of safety movies used in the schools, on TV, and

in commercial movie houses. The enforcement

activities are carried on by State and local

public officials. One problem with the Operation Lifesaver program is that none of the agencies involved and contacted during the study

had published a thorough analysis of the costs

and benefits of the program. From the single

performance measure, fatalities, the program

was a success in the opinion of Illinois Commerce Commission officials. But that same State

did not publish an analysis of the accident rates

or nonfatalit y injury rates as they relate to

Operation Lifesaver activities, as compared to

other grade-crossing projects.

Federal Highway Administration officials

note also that Operation Lifesaver is effective

only so long as it is in existence. The engineering, education, and enforcement activities must

be on a continuing basis; there cannot be a onetime “awareness” campaign which makes lasting impact. Again, the weakness with this conclusion is the lack of evaluative studies to support it.

“Railway Progress Institute.
154 ● Railroad Safety

ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC GRADE-CROSSING

SAFETY

Relative Effectiveness of

Automatic Warning Devices

According to a California study, automatic

warning devices are quite effective in reducing

vehicle-train accidents and casualties at public

railroad-highway grade-crossings in California. ’ That study concluded that the installation

of automatic crossing gates can be expected, on

the average, to result in 70-percent fewer

vehicle-train accidents per year and an additional 48-percent fewer casualties per accident.

Automatic gates were considered to be superior

to other types of warning devices because they

have a visual and auditory impact on driver

response. The gates help in solving the problem

of inadequate sight distance or general inability

to see or perceive an approaching train. The

gates aid in preventing accidents caused by traffic or rail volumes; accidents caused by trains

operating on multiple tracks; and accidents

caused by distractions and other road hazards.

Automatic devices probably will not prevent

vehicle-train accidents caused by complete

driver inattention, excessive vehicular speed,

violations of the law, or poor driver judgment.

A study of activity between 1960 and 1970

indicated the following relative accident

frequencies:

Accident Accident Severity

frequency deaths injuries

Crossbucks. . . . . . . . . . 1.00 1.00 1.00

Flashing lights. . . . . . . . .33 .54 .57

Automatic gates . . . . . . .13 .25 .46

ACTIVITIES

Cost Variations in Grade= Crossing

Safety Activities

It was determined that in California (1975)

the cost of installing flashing lights was $16,250;

$27,290 for automatic gates, and $190 for crossbucks. The maintenance and operation cost for

flashing lights is $500 annually; $1,000 for

automatic gates. On an incremental basis, then,

in California in 1975 it cost $2,190 a year more

for flashing lights than crossbucks and $1,670

more for automatic gates.

The Texas Transportation Institute analyzed

the relative cost of installing warning devices

versus grade-separation. In 1970 figures, the

total program would have cost $120 million for

installation of the necessary warning devices in

Texas and about $4.5 billion for a complete

grade-separation program.

Elements Necessary for an Effective

Grade-Crossing Safety Program

The report on the California experience concludes that the greater-than-average success in

grade-crossing safety resulted from sufficient

financial support for the installation and

maintenance of the warning devices; the wellmanaged State government effort to provide the

analytical support for crossing-improvement

decisions; and strong safety efforts on the part

of financially healthy railroads. 10

‘California Public Utilities Commission, The Effectiveness of Automatic Protection in Reducing Accident ‘

OR. G. Kennedy, A Review of the California RailroadFrequency and Severity at Public Grade Crossings in Highway Grade Crossing Program, Consad Research CorCalifornia, 1974. poration, Pennsylvania, 1974.
— .

C/I. X Hazardous Materials, Rail-Highuay Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs . Ž155

Federal Funding of Grade-Crossing In FY 1974 and 1975, $38.2 million wa s

Activities obligated and 717 projects initiated under Section 203. Using the goal 3,000 projects initiated

Tables 47 and 48 indicate program costs and at $75 million, suggested in the 1972 Departresults. Although many argue that this is not the ment of Transportation grade-crossing report,

proper way of analyzing the effectiveness of the the program would have required a 47-percent

Federal grade-crossing effort, the facts speak for increase in activity to meet that goal.

themselves:

Table 47.—Summary of Program Costs and Results

1. Section 203 costs 5.

a. Obligated funds

● FY 74: $4,323,420

 FY 75: $33,928,498

b. Authorized funds 6.

 FY 76: $48,150,329

. FY 77 (section 203, 1973 Act): 7.

$81,226,152

 FY 77 (section 203, 1976 Act):

$17,688,814 8.

2. Section 203 results

a. FY 74 and 75—717 projects

b. FY 76: 903 projects authorized 9.

3. Section 230 costs

a. Obligated funds

FY 74, 75: $26,180,800 10.

FY 76: $27,917,750

4. Section 230 results

FY 74,75: 953 projects

Section 322 costs

a. Obligated funds

As of January 31, 1977: $12.5 million

Section 322 results

48 public crossings and 3 grade stops

Section 163 costs

As of transition quarter: $12.8 million

Section 163 results

5 projects are under construction

13 projects are in the engineering phase

Section 210 funds

Obligated FY 74 and FY 75: $65,450

Obligated FY 76: $1,661,250

Section 209 funds

Obligated FY 74 and FY 75: $731,300

Obligated FY 76: $449,950

SOURCE: PMM & Co., Task IV Report.

Table 48.—Title 23 Costs

costs Results

Federal Total Crossings Structures Crossings

Fiscal vear funds funds eliminated reconstructed protected

1965. . . . . . . . . . . . . . $

1966. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1967. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1968. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1969. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1970, ... , . . . . . . . . .

1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

85,848,377 $215,096,245 421 35 319

65,384,470 195,646,396 377 45 250

40,298,099 162,370,184 398 48 295

49,157,015 175,690,265 319 276

48,059,294 178,826,058 282 : 1 221

20,952,022 143,249,929 242 43 167

29,948,764 152,882,583 246 40 178

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157,632,238 189,380,439 233 31 224

1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194,174,814 226,695,715 214 36 165

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110,626,804 142,133,552 134 41 275

1975. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179,070,554 204,562,810 112 40 211

1976. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156,801,293 184,366,905 183 91 365

Transition quarter. . 47,146,825 54,089,292 46 18 118

SOURCE: PMM & Co,, Task IV Report,
156 ● Railroad Safety

OTHER RAILROAD SAFETY PROGRAMS

This study of railroad safety is concerned

primarily with certain basic activities: data collection and analysis by Federal Government

agencies; standards setting; inspection; and enforcement of Federal Government rules and regulations. There are, however, other activities

which support railroad safety efforts. Among

those activities are training, incentive programs,

and employee assistance programs. (See table 49

for list. ) The purpose of this chapter is to describe those types of programs and, where possible, to discuss the program’s costs and impact.

The first types of programs to be discussed

are the railroad Safety Operations Programs.

These are voluntary efforts initiated by the

railroads which often encompass the establishment of safety operating practices and their enforcement, and some forms of data collection

and analysis. Although the safety operationstype programs are initiated and implemented

generally by the railroad companies, some

unions have initiated similar activities. For example, some unions collect and analyze safety

information which comes in the form of employee complaints. As a part of railroad companies’ safety operation programs, operating

rules are published to establish and avoid conflicts in operating procedures. Some of the

railroads participating in the study interviews

indicated that, in addition to publishing operating rules, safety rules often are published

separately for each department, covering such

items as transportation, communication, signal,

and mechanical safety.

Violation of the operating rules often covers

sanctions imposed by the railroad companies—

such as warning notices or possible dismissal.

Inasmuch as the railroads require employees to

apply the operating rules to their actions, enforcement of those rules exists.

Another activity of the railroads is data collection and analysis over and above that required by the Federal Government. As was indicated above, some of the unions collect complaint information, but generally, unions’ data

collection activities are limited. The interviews

conducted in conjunction with the study revealed that the unions do not have internal procedures to collect extensive safety-related data.

Although national union leaders receive and

review some FRA and AAR data, these are not

used other than as general background information by unions for their general advocacy activities. Some railroad management is reluctant

to share safety information with the unions for

fear the data, such as claims data, will be used

against them.

Information and Education Programs are

another general category of safety efforts and

include: a) training programs, and b) awareness

programs, for both the public and employees.

Railroads, unions, and Government are all involved in some type of training program. The

methods and techniques of railroad training

programs vary. Some of the railroad programs

emphasize on-the-job training, others emphasize classroom training, while others use

combinations of the two. One of the railroads

involved in the study interviews described its

training program to include:

At a center built specifically for training,

the program includes classroom work as

well as actual practice in work functions

and safety pertaining to jobs such as

switchmen; brakemen; firemen; repairmen;

and inspectors of cars, locomotives, and

track and signal systems. Prospective locomotive engineers are given practice in train

operation in a variety of operating situations through use of a train simulator.

Upon satisfactory completion of training at

the center, employees are given on-the-job

training at their assigned locations by supervisors and other experienced personnel

before being assigned to a specific job. Included in the overall program for the prevention of injury is training in the proper

execution of such physical tasks as lifting
Ch. X Hazardous Materials, Rail-Higlway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs “ 157

Table 49.— Railroad Safety Programs

Program type

Safety operations Information and education

Operating Data Awareness

Program sponsor

practices Enforcement analysis Training Employee Public

Railroads . . . . . . . . . x x x x x x

Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x* . . . . . . . . . . . . x

AAR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . .

x x x

Federal Government

. . . . . . . . . . . .

x x x x

Joint . . . . . . . . . . . ........::::::::: :::::::::...... . . . . . . x x x

Safety committees

Program sponsor Specific raiiroad National Incentive programs

Railroads . . . . . . . . . x

Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .”. ... ...X... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AFAR . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Federal Government.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......X.Hairriman Memorial..

Awards Institute

Joint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Personnel managementand assistance

Recruitment Protective Alcohol

Program sponsor &promotion clothing &drug Advocacy

Railroads . . . . . . . . . x x x x

Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

AFAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Federal Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x

Joint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .X.-.... ;l:l;:::I:;:lI1 1llllI1lI:JII

heavy objects, throwing track switches,

and getting on and off cars and locomotives.11

Another railroad indicated that new employees are given on-the-job training by supervisors

and other experienced employees until such time

as they are judged by the supervisors to be

qualified for aspecific job.

Most of the current training in the railroad industry is achieved under union contract agreements. The unions generally support apprenticeship or other forms of on-the-job training

where employees learn and earn at the same

time.

11PMM&Co.,TaskIV.

Several agencies of the Federal Government

recently developed training programs and

materials to be used for training both Government and railroad employees. One training program is that of the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) established in 1971 to foster and

promote the development and improvement of

transportation safety by designing and conducting resident and nonresident training programs responsive to modal and intermodal requirements. One of the goals of TSI is to reduce

the number of transportation accidents in the

United States. The types of courses offered by

TSI are: railroad accident investigations; rail

transportation of hazardous materials; locomotive inspection; and railroad track safety

standards. The major users of the TSI courses

are the Federal Railroad Administration inspec-
158 ● Railroad Safety

tors and, to some extent, State employees involved in State participation programs.

Federal Railroad Administration inspectors

for locomotives, cars, and signal systems also

receive formal classroom training in courses

related to their particular discipline. These

courses are offered by suppliers of railroad

equipment. In order to keep pace with technological developments, FRA inspectors attend

these courses related to their particular discipline on a 2-year cycle.

A different type of information and education

activity can be classified as “awareness” programs. Railroads, unions, and Government

have initiated some types of programs for

employees as well as the public. One railroad

used innovative safety materials from the

Japanese National Railroad to stimulate

employee safety awareness. Examples of other

railroad awareness activities directed at

employees are:

● Posters showing employees in unsafe situations as well as descriptions of accidents

related to human error or negligence

resulting in injuries and/or fatalities.

 Specific safety rules selected for review at

the direction of supervisors.

In addition to specific railroad activities, the

Association of American Railroads publishes

posters, the “Safety Talk” bulletin, and various

booklets and bibliographies on safety.

The unions also have been involved in

“awareness” activities. One union organized a

regional safety meeting to include such topics

as: identification of safety hazards; establishment of folIow-up safety activities; and collective bargaining on safety matters. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has sponsored

regional conferences attended by FRA representatives to discuss locomotive inspection procedures and hours of service.

The Federal Government has been involved in

“awareness” activities through the industrial

education program conducted by the Federal

Railroad Administration’s Office of Safety.

Through that program, safety law seminars and

conferences are held for personnel in the railroad industry. The purpose of these seminars is

to bring to local railroad safety officials an

understanding of the existing Federal safety

laws, standards, and regulations. In addition to

the seminars, which have been held in cooperation with the AAR, the American Short Line

Railroad Association, and the Railway Labor

Executives Association, the FRA has made

available to the railroads a list of movies which

describe specific aspects of the FRA safety laws

and interpretations of those laws.

The railroads have been involved in such

public awareness activities as:

●

●

●

Lectures given at schools to impress upon

children the dangers associated with crossing or standing on tracks when trains are

approaching, playing around railroad

yards, and placing objects on tracks that

might cause derailment.

Instructions to personnel of customers in

the proper handling of freight car parts,

such as doors, loading hatches, and outlet

gates.

Informing the public through the media of

accidents; particularly those involving

hazardous materials.

Safety Committees are used to conduct certain safety activities. Some are organized by

specific railroads and cover the safety issues of

that railroad. Others, national in scope, concern

safety issues more universal in nature. In any

event, the safety committees represent different

interests. The railroad companies’ safety committees are generally composed of employee

representatives and supervisory personnel.

These committees meet periodically to discuss

timely safety issues, allow employee representatives to report existing unsafe conditions, and

report on correction of previously reported unsafe conditions. Minutes of meetings are

generally required to be sent to supervisors and

safety department officials. Further, some

railroads have formed safety committees composed of the heads of various departments, such

as safety, transportation, maintenance of way,

etc. These committees meet periodically to con-
CH. X Hazardous Materials, Rail-Highway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs ● 159

sider and often act upon specific safety

problems.

Certain unions are involved in safety issues

through participation in various joint committees where representation could be from the

Government, railroads and suppliers, railroad

and supplier associations, researchers, and the

like. An example of such activity is the Locomotive Cab Committee, where the union representing locomotive engineers, AAR, suppliers,

and FRA are working together to develop significant safety improvements for locomotive cabs.

Incentive Programs have a role in promoting

safety. The railroads design incentive programs

to recognize employees who maintain good

safety records. Examples of specific incentive efforts are as follows:

One program provides for a specified number of employees to be named annually

from among all employees who have

worked that year without an injury. The

winners are awarded cash prizes.

Another program provides an annual safety award-to be made by the president of the

company to the personnel supervised by a

vice-president having the lowest number of

injuries per 100,000 man-hours worked.

A national contest is sponsored by the E. H.

Harriman Memorial Awards Institute. The

competition provides for line-haul railroads to

be grouped according to man-hours worked per

year. In each category, awards are made for

outstanding safety performance. Separate

awards are made to switching and terminal

companies.

Personnel Management and Assistance Programs are other types of safety efforts. These

programs include: a) recruitment, selection, and

promotion activities; b) protective clothing programs; and c) alcohol and drug abuse programs.

First, a discussion of the manner m which the

personnel management system is used to promote safety efforts. Certain railroads attempt to

predict an employee’s future safety record and

use that prediction to determine whether to hire

or promote the candidate. The prediction is

based on: the prospective employee’s work experience and education; physical examinations;

and in some cases mental aptitude tests.

Another safety effort suggested in connection

with personnel management activities is certification of locomotive engineers and the

withdrawal of certification in the event an

engineer is charged with a specified number of

violations, depending upon severity of operating and/or safety rules violated. Railroads

generally support certification as a means of

eliminating “seniority-tenured” engineers who

are not otherwise qualified. Unions are opposed

to it because of the potential labor conflicts that

it could promote and also the possibility of too

much management influence over who is or is

not to be certified.

Safety is often ensured through the use of protective clothing. Special clothing and/or devices

are required (by regulations in some instances

and by the railroads in others) when employees

are performing certain work functions or while

working in certain areas. Examples of such requirements include the use of goggles, a

respirator when spray painting, and hard hats

under certain circumstances.

During the past 10 years, many railroads

have implemented alcohol and drug abuse programs in recognition of the fact that the abuse of

alcohol and drugs does contribute to some

railroad accidents. These programs go beyond

the railroads’ initial response to the problem,

which was to issue a rule similar to Rule G of the

Association of American Railroads Standard

Code of Operating Rules. It stated that “the use

of alcoholic beverages or narcotics by

employees subject to duty is prohibited. Being

under the influence of alcoholic beverage or narcotics while on duty or their use or possession

while on duty is prohibited. ”

In 1976, a survey conducted by the Naval

Weapons Support Center indicated the following about the railroad alcohol and drug abuse

programs:

● Program Policy: General 1 y the older programs in existence (5 to 10 years) limit

treatment to alcoholism problems, while
160 “ Railroad Safety

●

recent programs address other human ailments (drug abuse, marital counseling,

etc. ) in addition to alcoholism. A majority

of the programs operate with labor involvement in program activities and control.

Program Design: Programs emphasizing

treatment for alcoholism tend to-be based

on patterns established by Alcoholics

Anonymous. Employees often volunteer

for the program, although the most likely

circumstance would be where an employee

is referred by the supervisor. The vast majority of the programs surveyed separate

the alcohol/drug abuse program from

disciplinar y proceedings. However, reinstatements of employees with a problem

are more likely if there is successful program treatment.

Advocacy is another way of ensuring the promotion and implementation of safety. The

railroads and the unions serve as advocates for

safety before Congress, the Government agencies, and each other.

Railroad and Union Safety Organization

Within the railroad companies, safety programs appear to be carried out through a variety of organizational arrangements. Among 21

major railroads which explicitly have a chief

safety officer (according to the July-August 1977

issue of The Official Railway Guide), 15 wer e

situated in the operating department, where

employees’ risk-exposure is presumably highest,

and 5 were situated within the personnel department, where safety had been designated as an

independent function.

Every railroad company interviewed as part

of the study (and all others on which information is available) has safety officials assigned to

its headquarters staff and many have full-time

safety supervisors assigned at major operating

locations. In addition to the full-time safety

staffs, which may have as many as 15 individuals, every line and staff observer also is

charged with enforcing and carrying out the

safety programs sponsored and funded by

management. The industry’s official attitude is

that every railroad employee or official is

responsible for safety awareness and safety enforcement.

Unions also are organizing safety activities.

One union contacted as part of the study interview reported the recent creation of a position

of Vice-President for Education and Safety to

coordinate and direct the union’s safety programs.

Findings as to Program’s Costs

and Impact

Little is known about the extent to which

these programs are cost-effective in reducing

railroad accidents, because measurable goals

and objectives usually have not been established. There are, however, certain findings

which should be considered as part of this

study. Those findings are discussed below.

Information and Education program5 0

Assessment interviews indicate that both

railroad and union officials are becoming more

and more safety conscious. Safety training is so

important to one railroad that it offers make-up

classes for employees. Those who do not attend

the make-up safety classes are removed from

service until the classwork is completed. There

has been notable participation in some of the

awareness programs; for example, joint safety

law seminars were attended by 1,100 persons in

1975 and 1,600 in 1976. As was indicated

earlier, there are differences in training

methods; there are, however, no convincing

studies as to their effectiveness.

Safety Committees. Some union officials

have concerns about the effectiveness of unionmanagement safety committees. Union officials

in the course of the study indicated that one

main reason for the desire of the unions to include safety procedures in contracts with

management is the fact that many unionmanagement joint safety processes (committees)

are short-lived. A study of this problem cited

various steps which can be taken to maintain
.

Ch. X Hazardous Materials( Rail-Highway Grade-Crossings, Other Railroad Safety Programs ● 161

the necessary continuity of the joint committees. Among the steps cited were: allow rankand-file involvement; use the minutes of the

committee meetings to develop continuity of action; make monthly joint safety inspections as

part of the committee processes; and have union

members use the committees, instead of the formal grievance procedure, as a forum for dealing

with safety and health problems.

Personnel Assistance Programs (Alcohol and

Drug Abuse). The 1976 Naval Weapons Support Center survey of alcohol and drug abuse

programs in the railroad industry found that

labor involvement in the program results in a

higher percentage of individuals volunteering

for help. The program costs ranged from $2 to

$10 per employee per year in the 20 programs

surveyed, with employee treatment costs almost

always covered by group health insurance. The

study found that the rate of successful intervention averaged 69 percent.
APPENDIXES
Appendix A

PERSONS INTERVIEWED

●

ASSOCIATIONS

Association of American Railroads (AAR) J. A. Risendahl

J. C. Buckingham Safety and Special Services

Safety and Special Services Aviva E. Schulman

William Dempsey Research and Test

President Chuck E. Taylor

W. J. Harris Research and Test

Vice President, Research & Test

M. B. Hargrove ●

Research & Test

Ken Hurdle

Economics and Finance

A. S. Lang

Assistant to the President

Staff Studies

J. E. Martin

●

Vice President

Operations and Maintenance

Railway Progress Institute (RPI)

Robert A. Matthews

Vice President

Rex Wailer

Project Director

Grade Crossing Safety

Short Line Railroad Association

Howard Craft

President

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

 Federal Highway Administration ●

Lucien M. Bolon

Office of Engineering

Jim Carney

Railroad and Utilities Branch

Office of Engineering

Sidney Louick

Development

James L. Rummel

Office of Highway Safety, Pol

Development

Office of Highway Safety, Pol”cy

Cy

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

Thomas Barbour

Enforcement Division

Donald Bennett

Associate Administrator

Office of Safety

W. F. Black

Hazardous Materials Section

Office of Safety

J. Boughers

Planning & Evaluation Section

Office of Safety

165
166 ● Railroad Safety

Federal Railroad Administration (Continued)

J. U. Chrisman

Office of Safety Programs

Ann Cook

State Programs

Office of Federal Assistance

Gene Cox

State Programs

Office of Federal Assistance

E. F. Conway, Sr.

Assistant Chief Counsel

Safety Regulation Division

Stan Ellis

Reports and Analysis Section

Office of Safety

Nancy Fleetwood

Office of Safety

J. T. Furphy

Assistant Chief CounseI

Enforcement Division

Frank Fanelli

Planning & Evaluation Section

Office of Safety

Bruce Flohr

Deputy Administrator (Former)

Robert Gallamore

Deputy Administrator

Richard J. Galvin

Supervisory Specialist, Region III

Tom Harvey

Regional Director of Federal Assistance

W. F. Hell

Acting Regional Administrator

Eastern Region

Bill Johnson

Office of Research & Development

J. A. McNalley

Office of Standards & Procedures

Office of Safety

R. Mowatt-Larssen

Office of Standards & Procedures

Office of Safety

●

●

●

Robert E. Parsons

Associate Administrator

Office of Research& Development

Levitt Peterson

Director, Office of Rail Safety Research

Robert Schramm

Office of Safety

Stephen Urman

Office of Administrator

Railroad Occupation Safety & Health

Specialist

Ted Voss

Office of Policy & Program Development

General Accounting Office (GAO)

Mel Mench

GAO Auditor

William M. Romano

Resources and Economic Development

National Transportation Safety Board

Elmer Garner

Chief, Rail Division

Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA)

Bill Cloe

Statistician

William Funcheon

Area Office Administrator, Chicago

Fred Hetzel

Program Analyst

John Hynan

Deputy Associate Solicitor

Owen Ridenour

Inspector

Janet Spruknan

Safety Engineer

Mike Turner

Program Analyst

Barry White

Regional Administrator, Chicago
Appendix A ● 1 6 7

●

●

●

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ●

Ed McCulloch

Vice President

Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen of America

William Crawford

Legislative Representative

Transport Workers Union of America

William G. Linder

Executive Vice President & Director

Education and Safety

James Sherlock

President, Local 2001, Railroad Division

Albert Tereggio

International Vice President

Director, Railroad Division

United Transportation Union

Robert W. Gruam

Member

John W. McGinness

State Legislative Director, Illinois

Jack Paradee

State Legislative Director, Delaware

Marshall Sage

Legislative Research Director

P. W. Simmons

Assistant Legislative Director, Illinois

James Snyder

National Legislative Director

RAILROADS

Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe

Joe McMillan

Assistant Manager of Safety

R, D. Shaver

Manager of Safety

●

Burlington Northern

Abbott Skinner

Chief Medical Examiner

Belt Railway Company of Chicago

J. Overby

General Superintendent

●

Chessie System

William F. Howes

Vice President

Casualty Prevention Department

John Snow

Vice President

Legislative Affairs

Chicago and North Western Railway Co.

Gordon R. Danielson

Director, Accident Prevention

William Spellman

Assistant vice President

Accident Loss and Prevention

James A. Zito

Vice President of Operations

Conrail

P. M. Brodt

Safety Superintendent

J. A. Flood

Manager, Safety Administration
168 ● Railroad Safety

●

●

●

●

●

●

J. S. Dehl

Manager, Hazardous Materials

W. Hedderman

Chief Safety Officer

M. C. Mitchell

General Superintendent, Safety

B. L. Swieringa

Manager, Training

Duluth Missabe—Iron Range Railway Co.

Charles W. Bailey

Director of Safety & Plant Protection

Florida East Coast

S. F. Stewart

Manager, Insurance/Safety

Illinois Central Gulf

H.F. Davenport

Senior Vice President, Operations

Chris Rochford

Executive Representative

Missouri Pacific

C. S. Baldwin

General Superintendent

Rules and Safety

Philadelphia, Bethlehem, and New England

Railroad

John B. Cornish

Director of Safety and Training

Rock Island

J. J. Button

Director of Safety and Rules

John D. Mitros

Vice President

William C. Hoenig

Chief Operations Officer

N. Swain

Director of Marketing

●

●

●

●

Seaboard Coastline

W. C. Basney

Real Property Attorney

H. M. Davis

Assistant Chief Engineer

Communications & Signals

J. C. Foster

Chief of Motive Power

R. D. Liggett

Chief Engineer

Communications & Signals

J. G. McCormick

General Supervisor, Rules

C. S. Stringfellow

Assistant Vice President, Equipment

Waldo Wingate

General Supervisor, Safety

R. E. White

Rules

Southern Railroad

C. Burnham

Director of Safety

Robert C. Fort

Special Representative

Coleman Longworth

Special Projects

Southern Pacific

Bill Denton

Vice President

Dan Flanagan

Government Affairs Representative

Percy Satterwhite

Assistant Manager, Employee Safety

Terminal Railroad Association

of St. Louis

J. R. Bowman

Chief Engineer

W. J. Compton

Director of Rules& Safety
Appendix A ● 1 6 9

STATES

●

●

●

●

●

Alabama

Jimmy Hooks

Transportation Regional Specialist

Public Service Commission

Connecticut

K. D. Faust

Assistant Chief Engineer

Public Utilities Commission

Delaware

E. M. Chesley, 111

Chief, Regulatory Services

Department of Transportation

IIIinois

Bernard Morris

Assistant Chief Railroad Engineer

Commerce Commission

Ray Morrison

Chief Railroad Engineer

Commerce Commission

Iowa

Les Chesling

Development & Support

Highway Division

Dan Franklin

Administrative Assistant

Railroad Division

Department of Transportation

L. Holland

Railroad Division Director

Department of Transportation

● Indiana

John Dung

Director of Transportation

Public Service Commission

● Maryland

T. L. Lovelace

Assistant Director of Transportation

Public Service Commission

● Michigan

G. F. Robertson

Railroad Safety Inspector

T. J. Trimbach

Railroad Regulation Section

● Minnesota

Gordon Boldt

Chief, Railroad Operations Section

Department of Transportation

Cecil Selness

Rail Development Section

● Missouri

John O. Richey

Office of Safety

Public Service Commission

● New York

Martin Chauvin

Chief, Carrier Safety Section

Department of Transportation

Richard Wiita

Director of Railroad Safety

● Pennsylvania

R. A. Peteritas

Chief Engineer

Public Utilities

● Tennessee

Commission

W. B. Pemberton

Director, Railroad Division

Public Service Commission
170 ● Railroad Safety

● Sperry Rail Services

W. J. Gallagher

President

C E. Kennedy

Operations Manager

J. W. Thomas

Quality Control Manager

● Pullman Standard

Bertram Beers

Vice President—General Counsel

Warren Brown

Vice President

Freight Car Service Engineering

William Marshall

Associate General Counsel
.

Appendix B

ACCIDENT REPORTING INFORMATION

PURPOSE OF ACCIDENT DATA

As indicated in the “Rules Governing the

Monthly Reports of Railroad Accidents’”

“The purpose of reporting to the Federal

Railroad Administration accidents and injuries to persons arising from the operation

of a railroad is to carry out the intent of

Congress as expressed in the Accidents

Reports Act, as amended, namely, the

disclosure of hazards arising in the provision of common carrier transportation by

railroad. ”

The reporting required by the FRA can be

divided into two periods; reporting prior to

1975, and reporting after January 1, 1975 .

Changes to reporting procedures were sufficiently large that comparisons of 1975 and later

accident /incident stat istics with statistics

generated under prior reporting rules are not entirely appropriate for reasons discussed in this

appendix,

Description of FRA Reporting

Requirements

All Class I and Class II railroads, both linehaul and switching and freight and passenger

are required to file monthly reports of accidents

involved in all aspects of railroad operations.

One of the concerns among various railroad

union representatives is the need to have

employees participate in the completion of accident reports—particularly with respect to train

accidents. With respect to the data reported, the

threshold basis for reporting and the organization of the FRA data base changed effective

 Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, “Rules Governing the Monthly Reports of

Railroad Accidents, ” 1968 Revision, Apr. 1, 1967.

January 1, 1975, so that data comparisons and

trend analysis including 1975 data are not comparable to the period 1966-74.

1966=74 Reporting Requirements

Before January 1, 1975, accident reporting

thresholds were:

●

●

●

●

The death of a person at the time the accident occurs or within 24 hours thereafter;

An injury to an employee sufficient to incapacitate him from performing his normal

duties for more than one day in the aggregate during the 10-day period immediately following the accident (a fatality

occurring after 24 hours is reported as an

injury and subsequent fatality);

An injury to a non-employee sufficient to

incapacitate him from performing his vocation for more than one day; and

Damage to railroad track, equipment, or

roadbed exceeding $750 and which also

results in a reportable personal casualty,

resulting from a collision, derailment, or

other train accident.

Under pre-1975 rules reportable accidents

were divided into three types:2

● Train accidents—which include collisions,

derailments, and other train accidents

resulting from the operation of trains,

locomotives, or cars where damage to

equipment, track, or roadbed was in excess

of $750, whether or not a

or injury occurred.

2 Federal Railroad Administration,

Summary and Analysis of Accidents

United States, ” No. 143, Appendix.

reportable death

“Accident Bulletin,

on Railroads in the

171
172 ● Railroad Safety

● Train service accidents—arising from the

operation or movement of trains, locomotives, or cars that result in reportable injuries or death, but not in damage to equipment, track, or roadbed of more than $750

(a train service accident with over $750

property damage would be counted as a

train accident).

● Nontrain accidents—not directly attributable to the operation or movement of

a train, locomotive, or cars, but resulting in

reportable casualties.

The pre-1975 Accident Report Form, Form T,

is shown as figure B-1. In addition to the filing

of monthly accident reports as per Form T, railroads were required to submit a supplement to

each Form T for each reportable train, trainservice, nontrain injury or death, and highway

grade-crossing accident. A verification report

(Form V) was to be forwarded to FRA authorities even though no reportable (train, trainservice, or nontrain) accident occurred during

the month. The responsible reporting officer of

each railroad used this form to attest to the

number of reportable accidents which occurred

during the month, as well as the number of

locomotive and motor car miles run during the

month.

Under the pre-1975 FRA reporting system,

certain accidents/incidents were not to be

reported. In addition to not reporting accidents

below the thresholds previously mentioned, accidents on or near railroad property that were

not attributable to normal operations of a

railroad were not to be reported. Additionally,

casualties arising from “horseplay” or suicides

were not considered reportable.

1975 Reporting Requirements

Beginning January 1, 1975, the Federal

Railroad Administration changed accident

threshold reporting requirements to be:

● All damage to railroad equipment, track,

track structures and roadbed of $1,750 or

more is to be reported (reflecting an effort

to offset the effects of inflation and the

●

●

●

number o f “unimportant” accidents

reported). This was changed to $2,300 in

1977 and will be revised every 2 years;

Every injury to a non-employee, arising

from the operation of the railroad, requiring medical treatment or if death results;

All injuries to railroad employees are to be

reportable if they require medical treatment

or result in loss of one or more work days,

loss of consciousness or transfer to another

job or the injury results in a death; and

Any illness of a railroad employee diagnosed by a physician as arising from the

employee’s occupation is to be reported.

The new reporting forms for rail equipment

accident/incidents, railroad injury and illness

summary, and highway grade crossing accident/incident report are shown in figures B-2

through B-4 respectively.

Effects of Changes in the

Accident Reporting System

The changes in the threshold reporting

outlined above had a significant impact on the

number of accidents/incidents reported by the

railroads. Some of the changes appear to be

subtle, but further explain why numbers of accidents/incidents before and after January 1975,

are not comparable:

Train Accidents

●

●

The “old” rules applied the $750 threshold

to equipment, track, or roadbed, excluding

the cost of clearing wrecks. The “new” rules

applied the $1,750 threshold to on-track

equipment, signals, track, track structures,

and roadbed, excluding the cost of clearing

wrecks, but including labor and all other

costs to repair or replace in kind. This

alteration of included items compromises

the use of an inflation index to compare

“old” and “new” accident statistics reported

as exceeding a dollar threshold;

Though major cause categories have not

been changed, specific cause codes have
Appendix B ● 1 7 3

Figure B-1 .—Accident Report Form

= A R TM EN T O F T RAN SPOR TATION

t .>ERAL RAIL ROAD ADMINISTRATION

FDRM APPROVED

BUDGET BUREAU HO 06 R4008

BU RE AU O F R Al L RO A D S A F ETY

FORM T

MONTHLY REPORT OF RAILROAD ACCIDEN T

(See irutmctions on reverae aide,) SHEET No.

1. REPORTLNG CARRIER 2. CARRIER’S FILE No. 3. FOR THE MONTH OF

1 I ------------------, 19---- -

4. IF “JOIN’r opm AT1o~ oR cR~s~G coLL1- 5. ~ “J(_J~T OPER A~ON*t NAME ROAD W~~E Su pER~T~D~T ~

SION NAME ROADS INV C)LVED. I

IN CHARGE OF TRACK.

G. ~~D OF ACCIDENT 7. FR 4 CLASS & SUB CLASS (s 225.22, 225.23, 225.24)

r~ cl~-SERVICE DNOWRALN

8. NEAREST STATION AND NAME OF STATE WHERE

[

9. DATE OF ACCIDENT

ACCIDENT ~~’RRED I

10. TIME (Use standard)

I

I ------- --A.M. ------- -P.M.

> i. vmm AND W’EATHIZR 12. DAMAGE IN DOLIARS (~rain accidetis ody)

(CHECK APPROPRIATE BOXES) NAME OF ROAD i EQUIPMENT [ TRACK [ TOTAL

13. CA USE (Brt.efly)

54. KIND OF TRACK b5 METHOD OF OPm ATIQ

,

N AND ~G I

‘MAIN -AL Bm ~UX_O. BLOCK SIG. [ AUTO. ‘lRAIN SIWP .uxnumvE

BRANCH MANUAL I pNTERxxrmG ] AUIV. TFWN CUNT. I mwcm TRAIN CAR

L YARD I-I-%4 3=

17. KIND OF TRAIN 18. MOTIT’E POW’ER 19. NO. OF.

CARS N s E h

& Es&&i+

RMco

&Aclrl MPH

G clclao@ –UDD MPH

FOR F.R. A USE ONLY

C 1808 of Per Bon Ago In c ● e o f

thYS d la ab II ity

(a)

“ K 11 led or n tiwe and extant of in] uric e

empl oyee F.R. A. uae cinly

($ 225.50) (b)

\

!

23. FULL DETAIN OF CAUSE, NATURE, AND C IRCU M3TANC ES OF A CCIDI@JT (See 7. Back of Form)

CONTINUE ON RE vERsE SIDE OF SHEET IF NECESSA RY

SIGNATURE TITIX

Form FRA F 6180-15 ( 10-67) REPLACES FRA FORM T
174 ● Railroad Safety

Figure B-2

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL RAI LROAO AOMI NITRATION RAIL EQUIPMENT ACCIDENT/lNCIDENT REPOR T

FORM APPROVED

OMB NO 04 R4CQ8

1 NAME OF REPORTING RAILROAD Amtrak 1. Al”habat,c Code lb 13a Ir”.d A,. <1. mt I“,. w ,, N.

Au!otra, n

f N%M- OTHER RAILROAD INVOLVED IN TRAIN ACC#OLNT INCIE2E NT 2, Alohatm,,c Code 2< R;!lroad Acc, d.n! I.., denl No

3 NAME OF RA1 LROAD RESPONSIBLE F OR TRACK MA IN TENANLE ,,nK/, <“(r,

I

3. AIP},.IX, <C Code 3b R.)lr<, a6 Ac. d,,>, 1“, o,., No

4 u s D OT AAF+ C,RAOE cfiws NG IC3ENTYf ICAT10N NUMOE 8

‘ i

5 L) ATE Of ALL1lIENT IN( (DE NT

‘-[ --

b T It”qi 01 ALCIDLNT IN(. ( [>[ N T

‘Y’h I 12 1 ‘r’ -- -- :“-0-- -VQ

7 TYPE OF ACCIDENT 1-NC IC)F-NT ,, “(<r numh, r ,“ c,,dt b<,. ‘,”R1, < .[,, CODE

1 Oera,lrnm! 3 Rear end coll(won 5 Rdk, ng coll(s Ion 7 R.,1 Hwy L, O,S,, W 9 Ok>slr ”’1 ,,0 t 1 F.r( or t ImI. r, I rUu IuI. 12 O!hei ,,,, < ,/,

2 Head on collmon 4 Side mlltslon 6 Broken t(a(n COIIIS(O,, 8 RR ~(a(k Cro, s,”g 10 Explo, tor> O, Ionar Io” I

8 CA–RS CARRYING

HAZARDOUS MATE RIALS / nt,mh r {J/)

I

9 LAfl S OAMA(, ED OH DC RAW LEO

- ‘1 ‘--

!0 CARS w;;~t+ ~ECt ASED HA2 MAT

—

I

11 PEOPLE E VA CUATE[> , ,,

\ i \

LOCATION

= DIv IS16N 13 NE All EST STATION

‘

- I

14 MILE P O ST , , v,,.,, ,, ,< r,, h r

15 5T ATE 1., ! /< ,[, ? <<d, LODE

I

ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

1 ’ 6

— TEMPL RAT(JRE ‘,,<<>/, // “z)tlur I 7 V(MBIL (TV ,(,}#/( , r! f,, CODE !8 WE A THE R >wt, ,,,,,,

1 0.3VW F

3 Ousk

2 D.+” 4 O.rk

1 clear 2 Cloudy 3 Ra(n 4 Fog 5 Slf,e! 6 SrIw+

OPERATIONAL DATA

‘:+IE:S’ :B::::: II::~ i3d::~~:’:” -’300’’;’’’’’-::

20 SPEF [) r< ,r (,J $/,<< 1 ,,. ,., ’.h’, E,t 21 T RAIN NtJM8& H 2? TIME IABLC DI Nk C T ION

——

l.c)[)t

MPH

1 North 2 S,>uth

Recorded

3 Ed\ I 4 W,51

I

1 M.,,,

2 Ydrd

w

——

PN(NCIPLE LAR (JNI T 311, 1. t ., and Numb.=, J e t P A t >!> r, 1,. ,, I&

( 11 F,r, t Involved

,Jtru Ihd irnit A ,lr,A!,l+, t r,

(21 Causl.g I Im? hot!t, al IIIIII)W,

, Head M,d 1,.(” Rear E,,d

<1 L(XOMOTI Vk UN TS n of, Em!

Lu.’k!d

32 CARS ,,., ,,/

0 %!.,, ”,, . Re,mo, e u Md.. el e RerT,o,,

1

, Fr,, ghl b Pm,

( 1 I T <,,.1 ,“ Tr.,,, Ill Tt)t , ,,, F ,tm,, mP,>I C ,,,,, \I

j

(2) To!al Ow.lled (2) TOM Ch,ra)lt,(!

~

Empty

Frqh, d Pas,

t+

e Cabcxma

I ‘1 ‘-

1 1 I I I I 1 1 I I

PROPER TY DAMAGE (< \/iImJIt d < II\[ ftrc IIIJIIIV Alh)r :, I r, {u{r ~r r< !)ldt I, I

33 EOUIPME MT DA MA(, t

-

I -‘“- ‘---

34 TRACK SIGNAL WAY AND STRUCTURES DAMAG E

—

1$ Is

, f, t hrep zrfc,l[ r [h,r t,qI)Ipr,It r!t < v!i!<! , ,nlb I(J h,, ,<,>c8,1<J h) rJf/rcdJJ ff! I!I, PI { wr[b

ACCIDENT/lNCIDENT CAUSE CODE

Jb PRI MAR > f AU\E cODE 36 L(lVIHIBUTINL. cAUSE Lv[)c 3?

I f “o Ccxk ‘Ivdbldbl,

expla, r, ca. w

CASUALTIES

38 NuME3E R OF PE RSON<> IN JURk [)

\

39 ESTIMATE-U-TOTAL IIA?S [) I$ABI L TY

1

40 NuM9E R 0! f AT AL TIES

CREW (/] I , ,f / HOURS ON DUTY

41 EN GINEER5

1 ‘----

45 FI RE%4E Ii 43 LOt+uucloes 4~ BRAKEMEN

—

45 E NGINEE R

1

46 CONDUCTOR

Hrs MI,,,

[

Hrs h!, ns

47 TYPE 0 NAMt AN(I 1! 1 L f 48 SIb NATUR[ 49 oATE

FORM FRA F 618054112741 RF PLALks F 0!+..4 F RA F blw 15111 ’11 I%ulLt~ IS LBSULE 1 L

,, .,,
#--

‘“\. v

/ Appendix B ● 175

-, ---

Figure B*3

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION RAILROAD INJURY FORM APPROVE D

FE OERAL RAILROAO ADMINISTRATION

AND OMB NO. 04 R4009

ILLNESS SUMMARY SHEET 1 OF

1. N AME OF R E POFI TI NG R A I L R OA D 2 ALI=+IAEJE TIC CODE 3 RE POR T MONT w

6.

1, belcsg first duly sworn, do say upon my oath t hat

(Name 0/ ,z//I<lrl 1)

I am of the railroad aforesaid and as such officer of the said railroad It IS my duty

(Tt{le of O\/tce held by a~liarll}

to have supervision over the record of reportable acc!dent/mcidents arising from the operation of the said railroad, and that I have caused to

be compiled from the said record and to be carefully examined the annexed report of such accident/tncidents occurring during the month named

at the head of this sheet; and that the said report is true and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

subscribed and sworn to before me, a notary public in and for the State and County aforesaid, this day of , 19—.

‘usL%]impress ion seal)

-!

(,vo[ar) Pul)!lc )

.———.— ( SIX rulu re 0/ al jlo n !1

7 MILES RUN DURING MONTH

a. LO COMOTI VE TRAIN Ml LES b. MOTOR TR Al N Ml LES c. v ARD SW I TCHING Ml LES – d. TO TAL

1 1 I

a.

a. EMPLOY E= M 4N140LIRS tiOR K ED I

b. P ASSENG ER T RAIN MILES OP ER A TED

I

c NUMBER OF PAs SEt+C ERS TRANSPORTE D

1

— —

I

FORM F RA F 6180-55 ( 12-74) RE PLACES FORM F RA F 61130-12 WHICH IS OBSOLE TF

GPO 880-963
176 ● Railroad Safelc..

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL RAILROAO ADMINISTRATION

Figure B-4

RAIL-HIGHWAY GRADE CROSSING

ACCIDENT/lNCIDENT REPORT

FORM APPROVEO

OMB NO 04 R4033

1 NAME OF REPORTING ftAILFtOAO

Amtrak 1. Alphabctm Coda lb flmlroad Accwdem, ,lncnjm, N.

Autotram

2 NAME OF OTltER RAILROACI INVOLVED IN TRAIN ACCIOENTIINCIOENT 2a A!phtmtu Coda 28 RoItrcA Acctdmt(lncnjm, N.

3 NAME OF RAILROAO RESPONSIBLE FOR TRACK MAINTENANCE (rtnf/c ..Iry/ W AlphaLwt#c Cad. 3b Rul,tiAcc,*n, /l Iu,*., NO

1

4 U S DOT AAR GRAOE CRIIS-SING IDENTIFICATION NUMBER 5 DATE OF ACCIOENTIINCIOENT 6 TIME OF ACCIOENTIINCIOENT

nwnlh dw ye.’

I I I ‘cl “u

LOCATION

7 NE AREST RAILROAO STATION 8 COUNTY 9 STATE (IwokIWCOde)

I

coo s

I 1 I

10 C IT Y (,{,” o cl(v) 11 HIGHWAY NAME OR NUMBER (,[~voN CKXSI”# m slate)

I ACCIOENT/lNCIDENT SITUATION

HIGHWAY USER INVOLVED RAILROAD EQUIPMENT INVOLVED

12 TYPE 3 Truck Trailer 6 Motorcycle COOE 16 EOUIFW4ENT 3 Tram (xlandtng/ 6 Light loco(s) (movmg)

1 Auto 4 Bus

CODE

7 Pedeslrlan

2 Truck

1 Tram (umfs pulling) 4 Car(s) (mo~mg) 7 L,ght loco(s) (srandmg)

5 School Bus 8 Other (xpectfv] 2 Tram (untls pushing) 5 Car(s) (srandtng) 8 Other ($pt.ctfp]

13 SPEEO (<,,, wM1.IJ W@ .1 ,IIIFQC,I 14 OIRECTION (Xrosr.ph,ca!) CODE 17 PC61T10N OF CAR(UNIT IN TRAIN CODE

1 Nwth 3 East

2 South 4 west

15 P061TION COOE 18 CIRCUt.t5TANCE

1 Stalled IX 2 SmpPOd on 3 Mc-wng over

CODE

1 Train struck 2 Tram struck by

croswng croswng crowng h@way wer h,#way user

19 , COOE

Was the hl~way user and for rail equipment revolved m the #mpact transpwtmg hazardws matereals> 1 Ht~wav user 2 Rail equapment 3 Both 4 Netther I

ENVIRONMENT

20 TEMPERATURE /s/x,,f,,! m,nu,l 121 VISIBILITY (,tn~le mm,) CODE 122 WEATHER (,,,,KI. ,“(,>I cow

1 Dawn 3 Dusk 1 Clear

“F

3 Ra,n 5 Slset

2 Day 4 Dark 2 Cloudy 4 Fog 6 Snw

1“RAIN AND TRACK

23 TYPE OF TRAIN COOE 124 TRACK TYPE USED BY TRAIN INVOLVED COD+

1. Fre@t 3 M!xed 5 Yardl$.wi!chlng 1 Main

2 Pa230nWr 4 Work

3 S#dmg

6 LI$It Locomottve(sl 2 Yard 4 Industry

25 TnACK NUMEtER OR NAME = FRA TRACK CLASSIFICATION 27 NLJMeER OF LOCOMOTIVE UNITS

28 NUMBER OF CARS 29 TRAIN SPEED lrcromkl VMd !~.,.ddk Est 30 TIME TAEILE DIRECTION

MPH Rscofded

CROSSING WARNING

3“’” ‘E’’;’’:” HE:::: H:-::’”a’sfl:?:’;; 1yes2N0 coDE

32 SIGNALED CROSSING WARNING

Was the signaled crossing warning

ldenllfoed m nlem 31 operating?

33 LOCATION OF WARNING CODE 34 CROSSING WARNING INTEflCON CODE 35 CRIISSING ILLUMINATE BY STREET

2 Side of veh!cle ap$.roach

CODE

NECTCD WITH HIGt+wAY SIGNALS LIGHTS OR SPECIAL LIGHTS

1 Both s!des 3 ODDOS#te side of vehtcle aowcmch 1 Yes 2 No 3 Unknown 1 Yes 2 No 3 Unknown

MOTORIST ACTION

36 MOTORIST PASSED STANOING HIGHWAY VEHICLE CODE 37 MOTORIST OROVE EEt41N0 OR IN FRONT OF TRAIN COOE

AND STRUCK OR WAS STRUCK 8Y SECOND TRAIN

1 Yes 2 No 3 Unknown 1 Yes 2 No 3 Unknown

30 MOTORIST , COOE

1 OrWe around or thru the gnte 2 Stopped and then proceeded 3 Otd not SIOP 4 Othef (speclfv) 5 Unknw.wn I

w V IE W OF TRACK 0B5CURE0 ny @nmarJ ohs:mcftonl

3 Passing tra, n

CODE

5 Vegetation 7 Other (SPKI])8)

1 Pecma”ent structure 2 Standing rallrcad eaumment 4 Tc.p@aphv 6 Hmhwav vehicles 8 Not obstructed

,

HIGHWAY VEHICLE PROPERTY DAMAGE/CASUALTIES

40 HIGHWAY VEHICLE PROPERTV DAMAGE (.s! ddl.w damqr’) 41 DRIVER WAS CODE 42 WAS DRIVER IN THE VEHICLE ~ COOE

1 1

I

1 Killed 2 I.wred 3 unnfu~ I I 1 Yes 2 No I

i 1

43 TOTAL NUMBER OF WCUPANTS KILLEO 44 TOTAL NUM9EU OF OCCUPANTS IN JUREO 45 TOTAL NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS mdudcdmcr)

*

4 6 , COOE

IS A RAIL EQUIPMENT ACCIDENT/l NCIOENT REPORT BEING FI LED? 1, Yes 2. No

47 TYPED NAME AND TITLE 40 SIGNATURE 49 13 ATE

FORM FRA F 61B067 (12 741 REpLACES FORM FRA F 618013 (10 67) WHtCH IS OBSOLETE

..0 .60 8.2
Appendix B ● 1 7 7

●

been completely revised, making comparisons difficult; and

Where the FRA formerly assigned cause

codes from written accident descriptions,

railroads are now assigning the most appropriate code from a predefine list.

Personnel Casualties

●

●

The new reporting requirements reduce the

number of days off duty from “more than

one” to “one or more, ” and include

casualties where medical treatment is required, even if less than one day of work is

lost; and

The introduction of occupational illness is

new, and along with the changes above,

make comparisons questionable.

Train Service/Nontrain Accidents

●

●

●

●

Under the new reporting system, casualties

are no longer classified into

and Nontrain accidents;

Train Service accidents and

cidents have been redefined

Train Service incidents and

cidents;

Train Service

Nontrain acand renamed

Nontrain inPersonnel casualties are identifiable only as

involving or not involving a moving train

or piece of equipment; and

There has been an addition of “occurrence”

codes to replace the former cause codes.

These changes make the separation between

train service and nontrain accidents questionable as well as in some cases impossible. Additionally, problems with understanding the

new reporting system have led to questions

about the accuracy of the number of casualties

connected with moving trains or equipment

since reporting personnel may not have been (or

are) sufficiently familiar with the new reporting

system to suffix the occurrence code with a “T”

if the accident involved moving equipment.

However, as of November 1, 1977, in the code

listing, each occurrence code has now been suffixed with the “T” and has been specifically explained to alleviate the potential for future

errors.

Other Changes in 1975

The reporting system instituted in 1975 provides for the reporting of information not

previously required. Such information includes

the following: type of track; car initial and

number: number of cars derailed; number of

engineers, firemen, conductors and brakemen;

number of cars carrying hazardous materials;

number of cars which released hazardous

material; number of people evacuated; FRA

track classification; and annual track density.

Comparison of Pre-1975 and Post-1975

Accident Reporting Systems

Several changes to the reporting requirements —

and definitions regarding accidents have

previously been identified. Although the intent

of these changes has seemingly been to improve

the data system, problems still exist which have

resulted in noncomparability among data and

difficulty in analyzing the data. These are identified below:

●

●

●

●

To reduce the delay in filling out the accident reports, the reported damage to track

and equipment is still an estimate.

Prior to 197’5, FRA clerical employees

assigned accident cause codes to accidents

based on narrative descriptions provided

by the railroads. The procedure now requires the railroad to provide the cause

code, but as previously stated, some

railroad union representatives feel that the

employees should be involved in filling out

the accident report.

Although some of the cause codes were

eliminated and thus reduced, there is still a

substantial portion coded in the accident

cause code “other” category. This inhibits

the successful analysis of accident data to

determine causes.

Due to the change in cause codes, the data

are not compatible before and after 1975

and makes analysis of trends especially for

train service and nontrain accidents impractical.
178 Railroad Safety

● The changes in reporting rules for the 1975

data had the effect of drastically increasing

the number of reportable injuries. This occurred because the reporting threshold for

injuries measured in days disabled was increased from “more than one day” to “one

or more days” as well as other rule changes

regarding the reporting of injuries and

fatalities. Furthermore, the inclusion of occupation illness increases the number of

reportable accidents.

Although changes were again made to the

reporting system in January 1977, problems still

exist with attempting to identify certain accident

causes. Specifically there has been concern over

some of the cause codes in the human error category of train accidents (formerly “Negligence of

Employees”). These still do not specifically identify the reason for the accident.

USE OF THE FRA DATA BASE AND RELATED PROBLEMS

Within the Federal Railroad Administration,

the Office of Standards and Procedures, Reports

and Analysis Division has the responsibility for

data base maintenance, Accident/Incident

Bulletin publication, and data processing of

monthly inspector reports. Sources of data for

performing these responsibilities include only

monthly accident reports filed by railroads and

field inspector reports.

FRA Problems With Use of the

Data Base

Although the Office of Standards and Procedures publishes the Railroad Accident Bulletins

and other summary listings of accidents, they

are not providing an analysis of the accident

data. Although the sorting and tabulations of

accidents, that are published, aid in identifying

some of the problem areas, more in-depth

analyses are necessary to assist in determinirtg

accident causes and potential problems.

In the area of data reliability, there have been

reported difficulties in the transition from the

accident reporting system prior to 1975 to the

new reporting system. Reporting carriers have

occasionally made coding errors or left blank

fields while adjusting to the new system. Attempts have been made to reduce these problems by additional inspections of the accident

records to increase the accuracy of the data.

Other Users of the Data Base

Through the regional offices, or possibly even

independently, States could tap into the system

to upgrade their own programs and provide for

better planning and measuring performance.

Lack of current, timely, relevant data is a handicap to improving State program effectiveness.

Although the railroad’s own data base is not

constrained by FRA requirements, few roads

have developed information retrieval capabilities similar to that being developed by the

FRA. Railroad access to a more current data

base could be a useful adjunct to their own safety programs and convert an otherwise less

meaningful administrative report into a more

meaningful data bank for analysis. It could be

particularly useful for roads to help identify

what other roads are doing in an effort to

strengthen their own programs.

Within the FRA Office of Research and

Development, these statistics are used to guide

research priorities and to delineate categories

for more detailed analysis. The same has been

done by the Research and Test Department of

AAR and the Railroad Research Board.
Appendix B 1 7 9

OTHER DATA BASES AND THEIR APPLICATION

Other sources of accident/incident data investigated in this study included the Association

of American Railroads, the Federal Highway

Administration, the National Transportation

Safety Board, Occupational Safety and Health

Administration and the individual railroads.

These are addressed below:

Association of American Railroads

The AAR relies almost exclusively on accident reports filed with the FRA– specifically

the machine data base which is keypunched

from these accident reports— for use in its

safety related analyses. In its own studies, the

AAR has concluded that the FRA data base is

the best source of industry data available.

Beginning in 1975, the AAR has collected train

accident data from member railroads. Copies of

FRA accident reports are mailed to the AAR and

selected data are analyzed. These data and

analyses provide information on accident trends

to support safety, mechanical, and operational

research programs.

The most recent comprehensive analysis of

the FRA data base has been performed by the

AAR. Two reports entitled, Analysis of Nine

Years of Railroad Accident Data 1966-1974 by

A.E. Shulman and C.E. Taylor, and Analysis of

Nine Years of Railroad Personnel Casualty Data

1966-2974 by A.E. Shulman provide detailed

analysis of accident incident trends in areas of

railroad equipment and personnel. As was previously indicated, both of these publications

supplied excellent background and analysis of

railroad accident and casualty data for this

study.

National Transportation Safety Board

Under the Independent Safety Board Act of

1974 (P.L. 93-633), NTSB investigates and collects data on all railroad accidents that fall into

any of the following categories:

 there is a fatality;

● damages are in excess of $500,000; and

● a passenger train is involved.

NTSB has established certain basic criteria on

investigations in response to the law and has

established certain definitions to interpret the

law:

● extensive damage ($500.000 or more)

● passenger accident (accident of passenger

train over $10,000 in damage)

● NTSB damage may encompass damage to

equipment, tracks, lading, and third party

damage (environment)

Two types of investigations are conducted by

the NTSB:

●

●

Field—a thorough investigation of an accident culminating in a report.

Major—usually an investigation of a

“catastrophic” accident which may have

resulted in a large number of deaths, injuries, or extensive property damage. Such

investigations may involve public hearings

or depositions and result in a major report

with recommendations.

Although NTSB has no enforcement authority, it makes recommendations to the FRA and

the railroad industry/manufacturers. With

regard to number of investigations, NTSB

averages about 12 to 15 major accidents annually and 400 to 500 field investigations.

Federal Highway Administration

The Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA) does not collect railroad related accident data. Highway grade-crossing accident

data are compiled by the FRA.

Individual Railroads

The data collected by the individual railroads

are typically used in identifying target areas for

track and equipment inspection and/or main-
180 Railroad Safety

tenance activities. The AAR indicates that many

railroads also use their accident data to monitor

employee casualty trends and evaluate the effectiveness of their safety programs.

Occupational Safety and Health Ad=

ministration

OSHA does not collect data on employee injuries/illnesses from internal reports. However,

OSHA has an agreement with the Bureau of

Labor Statistics to collect statistics on employee

injuries and illness from employer annual

reports.

States

Most States do collect accident data from the

railroads operating in their jurisdictions. The

level of detail and the type of statistics gathered

varies among the States. In general terms, these

data are not significantly different from FRA

data since, in most instances, the railroads are

required to submit accident reports to the

authorized State agency. However, each State’s

reporting criteria may sometimes be different

from those of the FRA.

In most cases, States find little use for current

FRA data because of the time lag involved in

receiving current accident data and also the fact

that they already collect the most relevant

(regarding State’s priorities) accident/incident

statistics.

Accident/incident data are generally used by

the States for identifying areas where inspection

activities should be increased or decreased. The

data are also used in the development of capital

improvement programs and in determining

areas where more legislative action may be

required.

Due to limited resources in most State

budgets, these data are not used or other data

collected for the purpose of research. However,

some States do analyze accident reports to

determine trends of any type.
—

Appendix C

RAILROAD ACCIDENT TRENDS (1966-74)

Figure C-1 .—Summary of Reported Train-Service

Accidents, All Class I Railroads

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

Accidents Related to Coupling

900

700

~ 1

7 4

Year

Accidents While Operating Locomotives

900 1

800

700

600

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Accidents While Operating Hand Brakes

900

800

700

600

500

400

300.

Accidents While Operating Switches

900

800 I

700

600

500

400

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Accidents to Persons Coming in Contact With

Buildings or Fixtures at Track side

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

1

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

1

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year
— .

182 ● Railroad Safety

Figure C-l.—Summary of Reported Train-Service

Accidents, All Class I Railroads—Continued

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

3,600

3,500

3,400

3,300

3,200

3,100

3,000

2,900

Accidents at Highway Grade Crossings

L

2,800

f

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

1,600

1,500

1,400

1,300

1,200

1,100

1,000

900

80~

I

I

Year

Struck or Run Over by Cars and Locomotives

1

1

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Miscellaneous Train-Service Accidents

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000,

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Accidents While Getting On or Off

Cars and Locomotives

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Figure C.2.—Summary of Reported Nontrain Accidents

All Class I Railroads

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

CS&D of Locomotives

900

800 I

Year

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year
Appendix C ● 1 8 3

Figure C-2.—Summary of Reported Nontrain Accidents

All Class I Railroads—Continued

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

CS&D of Floating Equipment

160

150 I

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Operation of Miscellaneous Vehicles

160, —

on Public Highways

z 1

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Operation of Miscellaneous Vehicles on Other Than

Public Highways

18C

170

160

1 5 0

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

CM&D Miscellaneous Vehicles

180,

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

80 I

m

70

60

50

40

30

18C

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

d

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

CM&D Facilities for Equipment and Vehicles

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year
184 ● Railroad Safety

Figure C-2.—Summary of Reported Nontrain Accidents

All Class I Railroads—Continued

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

CM&D Bridges, Tunnels, Culverts

180

160

140

120

100

80

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

CS&D Stations, Warehouses, Grain Elevators

180

160

140

120

100

: ~

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

CS&D Shop Facilities

 200

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

CS&D Wharves, Docks, Float Bridges, Etc.

175

150

125

100

75

50

25

CS&D Miscellaneous Structures

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

CS&D Cuts, Fills, Retaining Walls, Cribs,

Fences and Signs

120

110

100 I

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

CS&D Ties, Tie Plates, and Fasteners

,

P

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year
Appendix C 1 8 5

Figure C-2.—Summary of Reported F

All Class I Railroads—Co

(No Threshold Inflation Ad

CS&D Rail

900

800 I

700

600

500

400

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

CS&D Other Track Materials

900

850

800

750

700

650

600

550

500

450

400

350

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

CS&D Power Plants and Substations

120

110

100

90,

80 ~

70

60

50

1

40

30

20

f

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Cs

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

I

Iontrain Accidents

ltinued

ustment)

D Transmission and Distribution Systems

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

.- Miscellaneous Causes, All Types of Persons

: 3,600

: 3,50 0

: 3,400

~ 3,300

~ 3,200

g 3,100

: 3,000

2,900

2,800

2,700

2,600

2,500

2,400

2,300

2,200

2,100

2,000

1,900

1,800

1,700

1,600

1,500

. .

. . ~. ,

/

,/ /

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year
186 Railroad Safety

120

110

100

90

80

Figure C-2.—Summary of Reported Nontrain Accidents

All Class 1 Railroads—Continued

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

CS&D Block, Interlocking, and CS&D Motorcars and Roadway Machines

Highway Crossing Signals 330

320

310

300

 29 0

 28 0

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

Year

CS&D Telephone and Radio Communications

 27 0

7 4

 26 0

80

70

60

50

40

z 2 2 0

210

200

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Figure C-3.—Summary of Reported Derailments

All Class I Railroads

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

Derailments Due to Defects in Roadway

180

 17 0

1 6 0

 15 0

 14 0

 13 0

--

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 12 0

Year 11 0

z 1 0 0

Derailments Due to Obstructions on Track

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year
Appendix C ● 1 8 7

180

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

4

Figure C-3.-Summary of Reported Derailments

All Class I Railroads—Continued

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

Derailments Due to Accidents at

Public Highway Crossings

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Derailments Due to Negligence of Employees

900

800

700

600

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Nonclassified Derailments

900

800 I

700

600

500

400

Derailments Due to Brake Defects

180

170

160

150

140

130

120

110

100

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Derailments Due to Coupler Defects

900

800 I

700 I

600

500 I

400

300

200

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

Derailments Due to Other Car and Locomotive Defects

1,600

1,50 0

1,400

1,300

1,200

1,100

1,000

900

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year
188 ● Railroad Safety

Figure C-3.—Summary of Reported Derailments

All Class I Railroads—Continued

(No Threshold Inflation Adjustment)

Derailments Due to Negligence of Nonemployees Derailments Due to Two or More Causes

180

160

140

120

100

80

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year

900,

850

800 I

750

700

650

600

L

100

50

66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Year
I

Region 1

Philadelphia t

I

District Safety Office

Boston t -

Region 2

Atianta t -

1

Region 3

Chicago t -

District Safety

office

Kansas City

I

Region 4

Fort Worth

t -

1

Region 5

San Francisco 1 -

District Safety

Office

Portiand

Figure D-l.— Federai Railroad Administration Office of Safety

FRA

Administrator

Deputy Administrator

Office of Safety I

Associate Administrator, Safety 1

Deputy Associate Administrator

Special Assistant Planning and

Evacuation

4 Unit

AI ? I

Office of Safety Office of Standards

Programs and Procedures

SOURCE: PMM, “Task Ill” working papers.

I J

Compliance and

Enforcement Program Guidance

Division Division

 Motive Power

I

and Equipment

Division

Reports and

Analysis

Division

Hazardous

Materials

Division

-
190 ● Railroad Safety

Figure D=2.— Federal Railroad Adm

and Procedures Under 1

nitration Office of Standards

he Office of Safety

Office of Standards and Procedures

Motive Power and

Equipment I

Division

Locomotive Standards

Freight Car Standards

Power Brake Standards

Safety Appliance Standards

Amtrak Equipment Activities

I ‘

iVision 

Operating Practices

I

Operating Rules Standards

Blue Flag Standards

Railroad Occupational Safety and

Health Standards

Radio Standards

Rear Marker Standards

Accident Investigations

Process Railroad Accident Reports

Process Federal & State Field Inspection Reports

Prepare Replies to National Transportation Safety

Board Recommendations

Prepare Annual Report

Track Standards

Signal Standards

Automated Track Inspection

Program

Bridge and Structures

Activities

I I

Hazardous Materials

Division

Initiate Rail Oriented

Hazardous Materials Regulations

Materials Transportation

Coordination Bureau

SOURCE: PMM, “Task Ill” working papers.
—

Appendix D ● 191

Figure D-3.— Federal Railroad Administration Office of Safety Programs Under the office of Safety

Office of Safety Programs

I

I I

t

Program Guidance Compliance and Enforcement

Division Division

\

Field Program Guidance Complaint Control Program

Manpower Allocation Violation Program

Training (field/state)

Coordinate State Program

Source” PMM, “Task Ill” working papers

Figure D-4.— Federal Raiiroad Administration Regional Administrator

FRA

Regionai Administrator

~

Raiiroad Safety

Specialists

Director of Director of

Federal Assistance Track Equipment Raiiroad Safety

Signal Operations

●

District Office

Chiefs,

Supervisors and

inspectors

SOURCE: PMM, “Task Ill” working papers.
—

192 Railroad Safety

Figure D= S.—Federal Railroad Administration Director of Railroad Safety

Under the Regional Administrator

Director of Railroad Safety

I

Spacialists

OP

MP&E

S&TC

Track

I District/Fieid Offices I

inspectors inspaotor Activities

Equipment Accident Investigations

Operating Practices Complaint investigations

Haz Mat Program inspections

Track Violation inspections

Signal Special investigations

● Supervisory Specialists in:

San Francisco

Philadelphia

Chicago

SOURCE: PMM, “Task Ill” working papers.
Appendix D ● 193

Figure D-6.—Federal and State Participation in Railroad Safety Inspection Programs*

Program Inspector Qualifications / Number: Authorized On-board Place of Assignment

1. Track Safety ● 6 years railroad experience in- FEDERAL 46 (including 41 and ● Alabama

Program

I*/I

eluding 3 recent, progressively 46, including 4 supervisors) 4 supervisors ● California 2

Has a state responsible experience in track supervisors and

construction/maintenance or

● Colorado 1

participation 3 vacancies

component equivalent training including ● Florida 1

working knowledge of track inspection ● Georgia 3

techniques, maintenance methods ● Illinois

and equipment

4 / 3

STATE* 46* 28* and 8* ● Indiana 1*/2

● Ability to examine and interpret trainees ● Iowa 3 / I

records, including computer print- . Kansas

outs IT*/1

● Kentucky 1

● Ability to inspect for the prescribed

maximum loadings and speed ● Louisiana 2

● Ability to prepare comprehensive

● Massachusetts 2

reports ● Minnesota 2’/2

● Skill in conducting investigation of ● Missouri 1*/5

a serious railroad accident ● Mississippi 1

● Montana 1

● Nebraska 1*/1

● New Jersey 1

● New York 2*/I

● North Carolina 1

● North Dakota 1

● Ohio 2 + 2T*2

● Oklahoma 1

● Oregon 2’/2

● Pennsylvania 3“/3

● Tennessee 1

● Texas 4

● Utah 1

● Washington 2“/1

● West Virginia 2T*1

● Wisconsin

● ● does not include vacancies in Maryland, Texas,

California, Massachusetts,

and Illinois

● Arizona I *

● Connecticut I T ’

● Maryland IT*

● Michigan 2“

● New Hampshire IT*

● Vermont 1*

2. Signals and ● 6 years rail industry experience, in- 28, including 26 28 ● California 2

Train Control eluding at least 3 years in the signal 8 specialists and ● Colorado

Inspection and train control field

1

2 district chiefs

Program

● Florida 1

● Progressively responsible experi- . Georgia

Has no state encs must demonstrate knowledge

1

participation of the design, instalation, inspec- ● Illinois 2

component tion, maintenance or repair of rail- . Indiana 1

road signalling or control systems ● Kentucky 1

or knowledge of applicable laws or ● Louisiana 1

ability to conduct accident inveati- . Massachusetts

gations and to prepare accurate,

1

comprehensive accident reports ● Minnesota 1

● Missouri 2

● Maryland 1
194 ● Railroad Safety

Figure D-6.—Federal and State Participation in Railroad Safety Inspection Programs *— Continued

Progmm

2. signals and

Train Control

lnap4ction

Program

(cent’d)

3. Motive Power

and Equipment

Safety lnapection Program

Has state

participation

component 

to freight car

equipment only

4. Hazardous

Materials Safety

Inspection Program

No state

participation

component

Inspector Qualifications 

● 6yeera railroad industry experience,

including 3 years motive power and

equipment experience Z/

● Progressively responsible

experience which demonstrates

knowledge of construction/deaign

of locomotives or freight and pasSengar cam or knowledge of

applicable Iaws/regulations of

either locomotive insoectuib or safety

appliance acts or ability to conduct

accident investigations or to

prepare accurate, comprehensive

accident reports

● 6 years railroad experience, including 3 years progressively

responsible experience in the area

of hazardous materials 2/

● Ability to perform hazardous

materials inspections of carrier

facilities or ability to inspect

shippers’ methods of packaging,

marking, loading, etc. or the ability

to conduct accident investigations

and to write accurate, comprehensive accident reports

Number: Authorized On-board

FEDERAL

91, including

8 specialists and

7 supervisors

STATE”

14 (FRA)

4 (MTB)

91

3 7

14

4

91

18*

14

4

Place of Assignment

● Nebraska 1

● New Jersey 1

● New York 2

ŽOregon 1

● Pennsylvania 2

● Tennessee 1

Ž Texas 2

● Utah 1

● Virginia 1

● Washington 1

● Alabama

● California

● Colorado

● Florida

● Georgia

● 

● Indiana

● Kentucky

● Louisiana

● Maryland

● Massachusetts

● Michigan

● Minnesota

● Missouri

● Montana

● Nebraska

● New Jersey

● New York

● North Carolina

● North Dakota

● Ohio

● Oklahoma

● Oregon

● Pennsylvania

● Tennesse

● Texas

● Utah

● Virginia

● Washington

● West Virginia

● Arizona

 1/2

4

1

2

3

6

2

1

3

1 / 2

2

2

3

6

1

2

6

416”

3

1

7/1”

1

3/1e

8 / 3

2

7

1

2

3 / 2

+

2 / 2

1

● Alabama 1

● California 2

● Georgia 1

● Illinois 1

● Louisiana 1

● Massachusetts 1

● Maryland 1

● Missouri .1

● New Jersey 1

 Pennsylvania 2

● South Caroline 1

Ž Texas 1
Appendix D ● 1 9 5

Figure D-6.— Federal and State Participation in Railroad Safety Inspection Programs *— Continued

Program IInspector Qualifications 1 I Number: Authorized On-board I Place of Assignment

5. Operating ● 6 years experience in railroad in- 42, including 42 42 ● Alabama 1

Practices Safety dustry, preferably in operating 7 specialists and

Inspection Pro-

● California

capacity 5 supervisors

2 2

● Colorado

gram 2

● 3 years must be progressively

No state responsible experience which

● Georgia 2

participation demonstrates knowledge of daily ● Illinois 3

component yard and road operations, or knowl- ● Indiana 1

edge of the hours of service act ● Iowa 1

or knowledge of FRA accident ● Maryland 1

reporting requirements or knowledge of railroad safety practices or ● Massachusetts 3

ability to conduct accident invasti- . Michigan 1

gations and to prepare accurate, ● Minnesota 2

comprehensive reports ● Kentucky 1

● Missouri 4

● Nebraska 1

● New York 1

● New Jersey 1

● Ohio 3

● Oklahoma 1

● Oregon 3

● Pennsylvania 3

● Tennessee 1

● Texas 2

● Virginia 1

● Washington 1

~ Swrce. U.S. Civil Semice Announcement pH–~# 3~”

~Two Yearn specialized experience for GS-9 level; three YCMm for GS-11-12.

● Figuraa taken from PMM, “Task Ill.”
. .

196 Railroad Safety

<

a

IA
Appendix D ● 1 9 7

Figure D-8.—Status Summary at Fiscal Year End for Track Safety lnspectionl

Full

Cert. - No. of No. of Federal Federal Federal

State cert. - Inspectors Trainees Funding Funding Funding

Agree 75 76 77 75 76 77 1975 1976 1977

AL

AZ

CN

IL

IN

10

MO

Ml

MN

NC

ND

NH

NY**

OH

OR

PA

VT

WA

c

FC

A

A

TA

FC

tA

c

A

c

c

A

A

A

A

FC

1 1

1 1

1

1 1 3

1 1

1 2 3

2

1 2

1 1 1

1 1 1

2

1 1 2

1 2 2

4 4 3

1 2 1

1 2 2

1

1 $24,040

29,916

1

1

1 26,496

32,413

1

2 1,466

29,069

22,645

9,956

59,405

$26,652

N/A

51,650

24,915

54,453

52,500

45,931

26,125

29,712

45,916

63,539

14,450

72,065

$33,393

NIA

● 3,06 2

30,325

20,641

51,766

● 7,71 2

 26,970

42,221

36,291

17,709

9,064

* 73,659

15,314

60,651

75,65 6

14,150

60,026

Total 12 20 27 2 6 $235,608 $526,126 $561,032

● Funding Agreements are still panding finalization,

● * The present maximum of inspector level of effort unauthorized by FRA’s State Participation Regulations without a higher level being authorized by the Administrator New York

State is in the process of requesting additional authorization.

 Under Certification for FY 1976,

 Under Full Certification until FY 1977.

‘These figures represent FRA “commitment” baaed on individual state estimates SO, in some cases, they may not coincide with actual expenditures. Taken from PMM, ‘ ‘Task (11, ”

pp. Ill. 14-15.
198 ● Railroad Safety

Figure D-9.—Status Summary at Fiscal Year End for Freight Car Safety Inspection

Full No. of Federal cert.= Federal

State inspector

agree. funding funding

76 77 1976 1977

AL

AZ

MO

OH

OR

PA

WA

c

FC

FC

A

FC

c

t FC

FC

1

1 1

1

1 1

1 1

3 3

1 2

2

$16,063

N / A N / A

* 6,550

18,568

$37,321 51,738

$15,450 70,134

53,546 59,327

28,461

Total 7 12 $106,317 $250,831

● Funding Agreements are still pending finalization.

t Under Certification for FY 1977.
—

Appendix E

RESPONSES TO RAILROAD SAFETY QUESTIONS

In the preparation of this report, OTA outlined a list of 33 issues and questions for consideration and discussion by the Assessment

Advisory Panel. The issues raised were drawn

from a review of the literature, various interviews, and contractor research efforts. As indicated to the panel, the issues would finally be

narrowed down, and panel comments utilized

as inputs for writing the final report.

As a result of outlining the initial 33 questions, the Railroad Labor Executives Association and the Association of American Railroads

(AAR), each with members on the Advisory

Panel, prepared extensive responses to the questions raised by OTA. The responses of each

group were considered before writing the Issues

and Alternatives section to this report. Because

of the merit of each group’s responses to the

questions as well as the time and effort taken in

the preparation of their responses, this appendix

includes the full list of questions raised by OTA

and the responses prepared by the two interest

groups. It should be noted that individual

railroads and labor organizations may or may

not agree in full with the positions taken by

their executive or lobbying organizations.

In formulating the issues finally selected for

the major section of the OTA report, the railroad safety assessment team reviewed and condensed the list of issues initially outlined. The

following is the list of questions initially raised

by the OTA staff.

RAILROAD SAFETY ASSESSMENT ISSUES

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Should safety be explicitly defined in

legislative and regulatory policy or should

safety be defined in general terms?

Should railroad safety legislation be

general in order to permit Government

regulatory and programmatic flexibility

or should it be specifically designed to address particular safety problems or concerns?

Should labor-management relations and

collective-bargaining questions be considered when legislating safety or should

safety questions only be dealt with in such

processes?

How should other criteria such as

economic, environmental and consumer

considerations be taken into account

when legislating or regulating safety?

How should safety legislation include

measures to evaluate its effectiveness?

Should older safety statutes (including

Safety Appliances Act, Ash Pan Act,

Locomotive Inspection Act, Power Brake

7.

8.

9.

100

law, etc. ) be repealed in whole or in part,

be modified and revised for incorporation

into omnibus safety legislation, or should

the laws remain as they are?

Should the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA) continue

to handle the occupational safety and

health aspects of railroad maintenance

shops or should all occupational safety

and health for railroads be assumed by the

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)?

Should Congress follow safety legislative

examples it has set for other transportation modes or should railroads continue to

be treated uniquely in future safety legislation?

Should Congress consider safety policy as

a part of future railroad regulatory reform

legislation or should Congress consider

safety policy separately?

Should Congress consider safety policy as

a part of any future railroad economic

199
200 ● Railroad Safety

11.

12.

13.

140

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

assistance policy or should safety be considered separately?

Should the Government role in railroad

safety be clarified and/or expanded or

should clarification and increased responsibility for safety be handled by railroad

carriers, suppliers, and labor with

Government policy directed strictly

toward public concerns (e.g., hazardous

materials and railroad grade-crossings)?

Should Federal Government policy continue to preempt State regulatory enforcement authority or should State authority

be expanded?

Should the State Participation Inspection

Program, authorized by the 1970 Act, be

repealed, revised, or maintained in its current form?

Should the criteria and procedures for

data collection be revised or should the

current system be maintained?

Should procedures used in analyzing accident and incident data be revised and a

standard set of analyses be conducted or

should the current system remain unchanged?

How should the safety considerations versus collective bargaining considerations of

the Hours of Service law be determined or

is the current relationship of hours of service to safety accurately defined for purposes of compliance?

Should safety standards related to

employee age, qualifications, and training

be set or does the current regulatory

system adequately address these human

factors considerations in safety?

Should specific criteria and research data

be a mandatory part of the rulemaking

process or is the current system adequate?

Should the Federal inspection program be

directed toward monitoring carrier performance records with quantitative and

descriptive goals, should the current

system directed toward inspecting design

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

compliance be continued, or is some combination of the two appropriate?

Should Federal inspectors be required and

trained to inspect a range of technologies

and operating practices or should inspectors be required and trained for specific

railroad equipment inspection?

Should (participating) State inspectors be

qualified and paid according to Federal

standards or should States establish their

own inspector qualifications and pay

scales?

Should attempted Federal improvement of

railroad safety be directed to a system of

enforcement and penalties, or through incentive measures for carrier and

employees, or is some combination of the

two appropriate?

Assuming deferred maintenance correlates

with decreased safety, should the Federal

Government monitor equipment- and

track-maintenance programs, should it rely on existing safety standards, or should

it revise standards to mandate safety

maintenance?

Should Government responsibility in closing potentially unsafe plants or operations

be based solely on safety considerations or

should economic considerations also be

taken into account?

Should Government safety policy for

railroads in extreme financial trouble differ from Government safety policy

toward other carriers or should all carriers’ safety be considered uniformly?

Should the Federal Government require

an expanded safety cost-reporting system

or does the existing system provide adequate safety cost information and definition?

Under what circumstances should

railroads be mandated to carry hazardous

materials or should they have the right to

establish the safety conditions by which

such materials are carried?
Appendix E ● 201

28.

29.

30.

31.

Should safety certification standards be

adopted for railroad equipment or is the

current system of quality control adequate?

Should an established set of priorities for 32.

rulemaking be determined-based on analysis of existing accident and incident data

and available research, or is the current

method of selecting rules appropriate?

How should priorities be established for

research and development?

33.

Should research, development, disseminatake into account existing collective

bargaining and economic factors or

should such technologies preclude those

considerations?

As research identifies technological or

other practices which may impact safety,

how should these considerations be

weighted against other policies such as

economic, environmental, or collectivebargaining factors or should such findings

be considered separate?

To what extent should near-term safety

benefits be considered in lieu of long-term

tion, and implementation of new

technology which would increase safety

economic and/or other long-term safety

policies?

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROAD RESPONSES

Railroad Safety Issues

The Office of Technology Assessment has

prepared an outline/list in which it identifies 33

railroad safety issues. The fact that most of the

issues have been expressed as disjunctive questions, together with the extremely broad implications presented in each part of the issues a s

stated, has made response very difficult—so difficult, in fact, that answers ranging from “yes or

no” to doctoral dissertations have been suggested as equally adequate.

Despite these problems, the Association of

American Railroads has attempted to provide a

response to each of the matters in OTA’s “Issues

Outline. ”

1.

2.

Should safety be explicitly defined in

legislative and regulatory policy or should

safety be defined in general terms?

Should railroad safety legislation be

general in order to permit Government

regulatory and programmatic flexibility

or should it be specifically designed to ad--

dress particular safety problems or concerns?

Safety legislation should be general. Safety

regulations should be specific, but subject to

constant review based on performance and the

causal reasons for any poor performance.

In general the fewer regulations and the less

enforcement the better, consistent with safety

performance.

The essential feature of any safety regulatory

program is that it be responsive to changes in

technology, in operating practices, and in

economic circumstances; and, above all, that it

be responsive to changes in performance.

Legislation which engraves in stone specific

standards or requirements (as, for example, the

Railroad Safety Act of 1976) cannot meet these

requirements to be responsive.

(It is worth noting that the forthcoming DOT

report to Congress under Sections 504 and 901

of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory

Reform Act will identify the inability of

railroads to respond to change as the root cause

of the industry’s problems. The inflexible

Federal program of safety regulation has contributed to that state of affairs. )
202 Railroad Safety

3. Should labor-management relations and

collective-bargaining questions be considered when legislating safety or should

safety questions only be dealt with in such

processes?

An answer cannot be provided that would be

appropriate in all circumstances. However, the

following observations are relevant:

First, it is undeniably true that in the railroad

industry many issues are considered in the

legislative forum—generally at the insistence of

labor organizations—that in other industries

would be dealt with at the collective bargaining

table. The so-called “full crew laws” are typical

examples. Those laws were ostensibly based on

safety considerations, but they were repealed

without union objection in the wake of a collective bargaining settlement of the fireman manning issue. In other industries, the size ,of the

work force is, by and large, a matter committed

elusively to collective bargaining.

Second, there is much to be said for settling as

many of these issues through collective bargaining as possible. The parties are intimately aware

of the relevant facts—much more aware than

outsiders can ever be. And if the issues are

settled in collective bargaining, the economic

consequences of possible alternative courses of

action are likely to be carefully weighed by both

parties.

Third, the Government, accordingly, should

refrain from intruding into an area appropriately reserved to collective bargaining unless the

safety considerations are clear and compelling.

Fourth, where the Government is obliged to

intervene, it should be prepared also to take

whatever steps are necessary to resolve in a fair

fashion other collective bargaining issues directly related to the safety issue. For example,

legislation has been proposed setting a limit to

the length of trains. The railroads do not believe

any sound case can be made for such legislation

on safety grounds. But were the Congress to

conclude otherwise, then the Congress should at

the same time consider the related collective

bargaining issues. One of the main reasons for

the operation of long trains is the labor costs

associated with the size of crews. The railroads

have attempted to reduce crew size since 1959.

Every independent panel that has examined the

issue has concluded that the railroads are correct. If the collective bargaining process proves

unable to resolve this issue, then Congress could

not fairly mandate the length of trains without

establishing the procedures necessary to settle

the directly related issue of crew size. The same

sort of approach would be necessary with

respect, for example, to proposed legislation

further restricting hours of service of operating

employees. In other industries, by and large,

this is a matter for negotiations. If this issue

were to be lifted once again from the bargaining

process, then so too should be the issue of the

method of pay for operating employees, most of

whom are still paid, not by the hour, but by the

mile, with 100 miles equalling 8 hours’ pay—the

consequence being that employees on long runs

often make several days’ pay in less than 8

hours.

4. How should other criteria such as

economic, environmental, and consumer

considerations be taken into account

when legislating or regulating safety?

Safety legislation should explicitly recognize

that economics will necessarily impose constraints on any program aimed at improving

safety, as will environmental considerations.

The impacts of all these criteria should be

determined by the regulatory agency charged

with implementing a safety statute in order to

allow an informed balancing of competing interests and of competing national policies.

Legislation and regulations for the evaluation of

economic and environmental considerations

already exist and further specific provisions are

not necessary.

As for “consumer” interests, they are best

represented by ensuring that the consumer gets

rail transportation (in this case) at the lowest

possible cost consistent with other policy goals.

Safety regulation should be designed to produce the maximum improvement in safety for

the minimum dollars of expense.
Appendix E 203

5. How should safety legislation include

measures to evaluate its effectiveness?

At the present time there is no need for additional legislation on railroad safety. The broad,

sweeping authority granted the Secretary of

Transportation in the 1970 Federal Railroad

Safety Act, to issue rules, regulations, and

standards as necessary for all areas of railroad

safety, is sufficient to permit him to take such

action as is essential to improve the safety of

railroad workers and the public.

In the past, Congress has too often been too

specific in the statutes which have been enacted.

This inhibits changes which are necessary due to

the application of advancing technology or improved operating practices and, through inertia,

many unnecessary statutes remain on the

books.

The regulatory authority now possessed by

the Secretary should be exercised only when accident experience clearly reveals that preventive

measures are necessary, and that, in the absence

of regulations, no improvement will be effected.

Regulations should not be issued on the basis of

one or two isolated incidents, but only when a

continuing and increasing pattern is revealed by

careful review of records and practices.

Results of the imposition of regulations

should be reviewed on an annual basis; if the accident experience has not been reduced over

time, consideration must be given to the repeal

or amendment of the regulation and the

substitution of alternate measures.

6. Should older safety statutes (including the

Safety Appliances Act, Ash Pan Act,

Locomotive Inspection Act, Power Brake

law, etc. ) be repealed in whole or in part,

be modified and revised for incorporation

into omnibus safety legislation, or should

the laws remain as they are?

The older safety statutes (those which preceded the 1970 Safety Act) were enacted during an

era in which no Federal agency had broad

authority to issue safety regulations. Each such

statute was designed to meet a specifically identified need. The needs have changed, but the

statutes haven’t and the DOT should be urged to

convert the still-necessary old statutes (e.g., the

Locomotive Inspection Act and the Power Brake

law) into meaningful, new regulations and to

request repeal of those laws and of the ones for

which no current regulatory mandates (e. g., the

Ash Pan Act) are needed.

7.

In

Should OSHA continue to handle the occupational safety and health aspects of

railroad maintenance shops or should all

occupational safety and health for

railroads be assumed by FRA?

the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970,

Congress granted to the Secretary of Transportation authority to issue rules, regulations, and

standards as necessary for all areas of railroad

safety. The Act also contained provision for

preemption of State regulations covering the

same subject matter. It is obvious that Congress

believed that regulations should be standardized

throughout the Nation, with exception of

unique localized situations less than statewide in

character, and that the FRA (through delegation

from the Secretary) should be the governmental

body directly responsible for the development,

issuance, and enforcement of those regulations

and standards which were deemed essential.

While the 1970 Railroad Safety Act was under

consideration by Congress, the Occupational

Safety and Health Act was being acted upon by

other committees in both houses. Had the Commerce Committees, working on the Railroad

Act, believed the Department of Labor should

have authority to establish safety regulations

applicable to all or part of the railroad industry,

the blanket authority would not have been

granted the Secretary of Transportation. The

OSH Act covered all industries in general, but

contained the provision that it was not applicable to any industry regulated by another

Federal agency which was exercising its authority to establish and enforce safety standards. The

question framed by OTA, thus, misconstrues

the law. FRA has jurisdiction over railroad occupational safety and health, and litigation has

ensued over whether that authority is being “exercised. ” The railroads firmly believe that an industry should be responsible in safety matters to
204 ● Railroad Safety

only one Federal agency and, because DOT is

the agency with the broadest powers, it should

be the all-inclusive, safety regulator for the

railroad industry.

8. Should Congress follow safety legislation

examples it has set for other transportation modes or should railroads continue to

be treated uniquely in future safety legislation?

By posing the question in this form, OTA

may have, without realizing it, recognized the

discriminatory “super-attention” paid to the

railroad industry by Congress. A half century

and longer ago, when railroads were the heavily

predominant means of transporting people and

goods and there was no Federal agency with

overall responsibility for railroad safety. There

may have been justification for Congress to

enact specific rail safety legislation. That need,

if it once existed, has since passed. In 1970, with

the passage of the Federal Railroad Safety Act,

Congress saw fit to provide the Secretary of

Transportation with broad authority for actions

to improve safety. Thereafter, Congress should

have limited its consideration of railroad safety

to oversight hearings to determine how the Secretary was exercising this jurisdiction. Congress

should have refused to consider legislation proposing specific rail safety measures (or other

proposals under the guise of safety) but the consideration continues unslackened.

The Federal Railroad Safety Authorization

Act of 1976 contained amendments to the Hours

of Service Act mandating requirements for crew

quarters and it contained amendments to the

1970 Safety Act requiring “highly visible” rear

markers and revised blue flag rules. None of

these three specific pieces of statutory

enactment—and they are but examples—was

justified by hard evidence, dispassionately

weighed, but that is beside the main point of this

discussion. Where in the oversight of the activities of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety is

there a parallel? In reviewing the statutory implementations of the National Highway Traffic

Safety Administration, is there a pattern similar

to that which exists between Congress and the

FRA? (The ignition interlock fiasco is an example of the reverse kind of oversight. ) Only one

item of congressionally required equipment for

another mode comes to mind—the emergency

locator transmitter (ELT) required for aircraft—

and the general consensus now on that device is

that it should have had some more development

time; that it has probably been about as much of

a source of trouble as it has been a source of

help.

Congress should drastically change its policy

of attempting to pass specific legislation aimed

at narrowly focused problems; history shows

that broad-scale requirements, whether legislative or regulatory, based on “single incident”

statistics have a poor record of achievement and

the best results (e.g., the clean cab project) seem

to flow from the cooperative participation—

perhaps in a nonmandatory forum—of all interested parties in seeking to achieve an agreed

upon common goal.

9. Should Congress consider safety policy as

a part of future railroad regulatory reform

legislation or should Congress consider

safety policy separately?

While fewer economic regulations may result

in a more healthy and thus safer industry, rail

safety should not be an explicit goal of

regulatory reform legislation. Safety problems

are a very indirect function of economic regulation, thus economic regulatory reform legislation need not concern itself with safety as such.

10. Should Congress consider safety policy as

a part of any future railroad economic

assistance policy or should safety be considered separately?

Involving economic assistance with safety

policy would only add another layer of confusion to an already confused subject. The present

programs of Federal financial assistance to

railroads are intended as only interim measures

and safety policy should not be tied up with

temporary programs. If railroads are in business

at all, they can and should pay for their own

safety programs; the more reasonable (from a
Appendix E ● 2 0 5

cost/benefit standpoint) the programs engendered by regulatory schemes, the better the rail

carriers will be able to afford them. Of course,

where public facilities and operations are involved, such as at highway grade-crossings,

public money should also be involved but this is

more a matter of the correct allocation of cost

than it is of economic “assistance. ”

11. Should the Government role in railroad

safety be clarified and/or expanded or

should clarification and increased responsibility for safety be handled by railroad

carriers, suppliers, and labor with Government poIicy direct strictly toward

public concern (e.g., hazardous materials

and railroad grade-crossings)?

Railroad managers recognize and accept the

responsibility for conducting company operations in a manner which will pose no threat to

the safety of their employees and the public;

though the responsibility of the railroads is obvious, Government and labor also have roles in

the promotion of safety.

In the 1970 Act, Congress defined the areas in

which the Secretary of Transportation should

participate and railroad management believes

that Federal activity should go far beyond the

mere issuance of regulations. Regulations have a

relatively limited impact in solving safety problems while much more could be accomplished

by attacking the root causes of accidents

through research, development, testing, and

training.

The railroad labor unions could contribute

toward improving safety by joining management in cooperative programs and by calling

upon their members to give greater attention to

safety than is presently done. Instead of constantly criticizing management and instead of

trooping before Congress and the regulatory

agencies with pleas for the enactment of more

legislation and the issuance of more regulations,

they should work with the carriers in efforts to

reduce hazards and thus to provide a safer environment for their members.

12. Should Federal Government policy continue to preempt State regulatory enforcement authority or should State authority be

expanded?

Federal governmental policy—at least as it

operates through FRA-does not preempt State

regulatory enforcement authority. FRA has a

rather detailed regulatory scheme under which

States may become certified to carry out and

assist in enforcement of many railroad safety

regulations.

In terms of the regulations themselves, AAR

believes that they must be nationally uniform—

except to account for particular local circumstances. Railroads are a national industry

and railroad equipment must be able to operate

freely in all parts of the country. The congressional and judicial policy for national uniformity is sound and should be continued.

13. Should the State Participation Inspection

Program, authorized by the 1970 Act, be

repealed, revised, or maintained in its current form?

The major problem with the State Participation Inspection Program is the constant need to

ensure that State-employed inspectors meet

Federal qualifications.

14.

15.

.

Should the criteria and procedures for

data collection be revised, or should the

current system be maintained?

Should procedures used in analyzing accident and incident data be revised and a

standard set of analyses be conducted or

should the current system remain unchanged?

Issues 14 and 15 will be addressed jointly,

since data analysis procedures could affect the

criteria and procedures for data collection.

The AAR and the railroad industry have been

unable to detect any evidence of systematic,

comprehensive accident/incident data analysis

by the Federal Government. The industry would

encourage and support such analysis. Thus, it is

urged that procedures for analyzing these data
206 ● Railroad Safety

be established and analyses be conducted to provide guidance for the formulation of safety

research and action programs and for monitoring the effectiveness of these programs once implemented.

An objective of FRA data collection and

analysis should be to monitor trends and to

assist the industry with the identification and

priorities of existing and potential safety problems. This data collection and analysis at the industry level should not attempt to pinpoint the

specific nature of each safety problem or to support in-depth analysis. Once the industry-level

system identifies potential problems that appear

significant, appropriate action could include

notification of railroad representatives and

recommendations for corrective action. In some

cases, special studies may be appropriate, requiring the collection and analysis of detailed

data at the individual carrier level to more accurately determine such factors as accident frequency, severity, and specific causes. These

data could then be analyzed to determine

whether the problem deserves a high priority

and, if so, the kinds of research or action that

may be required.

The current FRA criteria and procedures for

data collection are adequate to monitor trends

and provide indications of potential problem

areas which may require more detailed investigation. To substantially enlarge the present

FRA data-reporting requirements in an attempt

problems would result in an expensive and

cumbersome system which would place an unjustifiable burden on the railroad industry,

especially in light of the lack of analysis of the

data now being collected. Further, the determination of the data reporting requirements for

such an expanded system would require anticipation of all potentially significant safety

problems as well as the detailed data necessary

for their in-depth analysis.

AAR’s members believe that the current FRA

safety data system is sufficient for its intended

and justifiable purpose. FRA should be urged to

develop a systematic approach to the anlaysis of

the data available through this system to assist

the industry in the identification of significant

safety problems.

16. How should the safety considerations versus collective bargaining considerations of

the Hours of Service law be determined or

is the current relationship of hours of service to safety accurately determined for

purposes of compliance?

Safety is a legitimate concern of Congress;

collective bargaining—other than guaranteeing

its free availability—is not. Governmental “consideration” of substantive collective bargaining

issues must or could lead to the Government

“taking sides” in the collective-bargaining process and that would be neither fair nor proper. It

would, in fact, destroy the system.

17. Should safety standards related to

employee age, qualifications, and training

be set or does the current regulatory

system adequately address these human

factors considerations in safety?

It is fairly well settled that the age of an

employee is not a proper subject for regulation.

What is significant is the ability of the employee

to perform safely the tasks required in his or her

occupation.

Virtually without exception, the railroads

have each established physical qualifications for

their employees. The qualification standards,

and the railroads’ various requirements about

periodic physical examinations, are not uniform

throughout the industry; this is only natural,

given the fact that they were not developed as a

joint effort. Equal employment opportunity

guidelines and Federal regulations requiring that

Government contractors (including railroads)

hire physically handicapped individuals are a

fact of life and, because of them, rail carriers are

experiencing great difficulty in defending their

physical qualifications standards. Several, in

fact, have been forced to accept into employment individuals whom the medical officers

believe are not physically qualified. AAR’s

members want to avoid hiring persons who are

poor safety risks and they believe that adoption

by FRA of minimum standards for employees
Appendix E 207

will be of great assistance; each of the other

modal regulatory units within DOT has established regulations of this type: the FAA for

flight crews, the BMCS for over-the-road

truckers and the Coast Guard for maritime personnel and the 1970 Act specifically authorizes

the Secretary to act in this matter.

FRA also has the authority to conduct training and could be of assistance to the industry in

the promotion of safety training programs and

in studies which would demonstrate the manner

in which employees could be motivated to perform more safely.

Regulations governing training are not

necessary at this time.

18. Should specific criteria and research data

be a mandatory part of the rulemaking

process or is the current system adequate?

In terms of assessing the environmental and

inflationary impacts of proposed regulations,

the system is designed to be adequate but

seldom functions that way. Impact assessments,

when made, are often perfunctory and inaccurate and, when missing, their lack has been

justified on an inadequate basis. The assessment

of research data is not a requirement and is only

very rarely done.

The result of this process is the formulation of

regulations based on single-incident statistics

(using the Decatur, 111., accident as a basis for

establishing new crew quarters regulations; using the Chicago commuter train tragedy as a

basis for writing legislation on rear end

markers) or the writing of mandatory standards

based on the theoretical calculations of governmental engineers (the requirement for a larger

tank car head shield than had ever been tested in

actual service) or the failure to draft regulations

when supported by data developed in railroad

industry research projects (the long-standing

[and, as yet, incompletely resolved] refusal to

require top and bottom shelf couplers on certain

pressurized, uninsulated tank cars despite overwhelming research data in their favor). Another

aspect of the failure to assess research and accident data is the transferal of industry standards

and guidelines from their intended purpose into

inappropriate areas (the adoption of the good

maintenance practices of the AAR Interchange

Rules by FRA and their reincarnation as Federal

mandatory safety limits; the change in the rear

marker from a railroad designation of the end of

a train into a device to increase conspicuity and,

allegedly, to reduce rear end collisions).

In all of these instances, and in others (such as

the creation of Federal blue flag rules in potential conflict with earlier Federal rules relating to

yard speeds and to rear end flagging a full

the purpose of a regulation would surely have

resulted in better safety standards for the

railroad industry.

19. Should the Federal inspection program be

directed toward monitoring carrier performance records with quantitative and

descriptive goals, should the current

system directed toward inspecting design

compliance be continued, or is some combination of the two appropriate?

Since its inception, the FRA safety program

has been directed toward enforcing compliance

with track and equipment standards. These

track and equipment standards are essentially

those used by the railroad industry for many

years; the FRA did not develop a new set of

standards, but merely cast into regulations the

design standards which the railroads had

already developed. In promulgating these

regulations, FRA has not addressed the following questions: 1) have circumstances developed

for which these previously developed recommended standards are no longer appropriate? 2)

are these recommended industry standards not

generally being observed by the industry; if so,

has that resulted in additional track and

equipment-related accidents and has tha t

created a safety problem? 3) were the industry

standards ever intended as absolute rules, or as

merely recommendations of good—or of financially justifiable—practices? and 4) was there

real evidence of widespread “violations” of the

industry standards in the first place, such as

would make Federal adoption justified?
20. Should Federal inspectors be required and

trained to inspect a range of technologies

and operating practices or should inspectors be required and trained for specific

railroad equipment inspection?

While it might be possible to train some individuals to inspect track, equipment, and

signals it would not be cost-effective nor would

it be possible in all cases. It certainly would be

unrealistic to expect a Federal inspector to

understand the intricacies of electrical circuits,

on one hand, and, at the same time, be able to

interpret a series of super-elevation and horizontal track-alignment data.

The railroad industry specializes its forces to

a large extent and experience has shown that,

for instance, maintenance-of-way and structures personnel require skilled knowledge that is

different from that required of those who maintain locomotives, or rolling stock, or communications and signals equipment. Only rarely, and then usually at middle- to uppermanagement levels, do these employees develop

proficiency in more than one of these fields. The

railroads do not believe that Federal or State

employees who may be experienced in one of

the disciplines could attain the necessary

qualifications in another through a training program of limited length. Judgment is required in

each of these skilled positions and judgment can

only be developed through experience.

There are some inspection activities which

can be performed by persons who do not

possess highly technical backgrounds or who

have not worked in technical fields, but who do

have knowledge of and experience in railroad

operations. For instance, inspections for compliance with federally prescribed operating rules

could be coupled with inspections for hours-ofservice compliance, or accident-reporting, or

perhaps with hazardous materials regulations.

(This latter area is, however, becoming more

complex with each passing month and no doubt

either does or soon will require at least some

degree of specialization. )

Very little could be as bad for a program of

inspection as an incompetent, or under-trained,

or unskilled force of inspectors.

21. Should (participating) State inspectors be

qualified and paid according to Federal

standards or should States establish their

own inspector qualifications and pay

scales?

If the States insist upon a role in inspecting for

compliance with Federal railroad safety regulations, and in enforcing such regulations, the

partnership arrangement as provided for in the

1970 Federal Railroad Safety Act should be

maintained.

The railroads are deeply concerned about the

qualifications of inspectors, Federal or State.

They regard the standards established by the

FRA for track and freight car inspectors as

reasonable and realistic, requiring, as they do,

experience in the railroad industry, with professional technical training substituting to some extent for part of the experience requirement. In

the opinion of the railroads, State inspectors

should possess equal qualifications because the

authority given inspectors, if not prudently exercised, could seriously impair the efficiency of

railroad operations.

Difficulties experienced by States in attempting to recruit qualified personnel for inspector

positions are recognized. The problems of

salary and benefit differences between the State

and Federal scales must be resolved between the

State and Federal agencies; the industry insists

only that qualification standards established by

FRA must be maintained, and not compromised

for the State inspectors.

22. Should attempted Federal improvement of

railroad safety be directed to a system of

enforcement and penalties, or through incentive measures for carrier and

employees, or is some combination of the

two appropriate?

Safety cannot be achieved through the enactment of legislation or the issuance of regulations

with penalties assessed for noncompliance. Improvements in safety performance can be accomplished only through the united efforts of
Appendix E ● 2 0 9

people at all levels of responsibility who are

well-qualified, well-trained, and motivated to

perform their duties in a manner that will limit

the opportunity for accidents to occur.

Congress has given the Secretary of

Transportation far-reaching authority to conduct activities to improve railroad safety. While

this authority includes the power to issue

regulations and mandatory standards, it also

carries the duty to use care in exercising the

authority. Too many regulations are issued

without full or proper justification and, in all

too many instances, they do not provide a solution.

Maintaining strict compliance with each

minor provision of a comprehensive set of

standards is a virtually impossible task. Many

citations are issued for technical violations of a

minor nature, and penalties are assessed. This is

counter-productive because it siphons off

resources and channels them into areas that may

not represent the most pressing problems on a

particular property. If a true safety problem exists and the railroad is aware of it and makes no

effort to correct it, then perhaps penalties are

justified. However, attempts by a Federal agency to bring a carrier to its knees through citations and fines for minor deviations from

published standards will do nothing to improve

safety and will begin to create disrespect for the

law in general and for the regulations of that

agency in particular.

The 1970 Act authorizes the Secretary to

“conduct, if necessary, research, development,

testing, evaluation, and training for all areas of

railroad safety. ” Many of the funds devoted to

the development and enforcement of regulations

could better be expended in these areas.

Through cooperative programs between DOT,

carrier management, and the labor organizations, greater strides could be taken toward the

improvement of the industry’s safety performance.

23. Assuming deferred maintenance correlates

with decreased safety, should the Federal

Government monitor equipment- and

track-maintenance programs, should it rely on existing safety

it revise standards

maintenance?

standards, or should

to mandate safety

The assumption is not justified. Deferred

maintenance is a rather vague and most often

loosely used term. Its most precise and best

meaning refers to a maintenance state in which

the average age of the components in a system

exceeds half the expected life of those components. This is a statistical and economic concept and not one which can be used to pinpoint

dangerous areas or even, except in a broad

sense, to assign priorities for maintenance activities. For example, it is quite possible to have

unsafe conditions in track which has virtually

all new components while, at the same time, a

section of track with statistically defined deferred maintenance can be far superior in terms

of safety and rideability.

Decisions concerning the scheduling and programming of maintenance are largely decisions

of engineering economics. They require an extensive background knowledge of traffic flows,

labor rates, labor productivity, equipment and

material prices and availability and a host of

other factors of which Government representatives have no knowledge and to which they

have no legitimate access. These decisions also

carry with them a measure of responsibility.

The employee in charge, bluntly, may lose his

job if wrong decisions are made. Failure to make

the right decisions can cost lives, jobs, and

property damage —facts of which railroad

management is acutely aware. Governmental

representatives may be aware of the consequences of wrong decisions in this area but they

are insulated from the responsibility for them in

such a way that they should not attempt to

substitute their necessarily more remote judgment, before the fact, for that of those who are,

and should be, in charge.

24. Should Government responsibility in closing potentially unsafe plants or operations

be based solely on safety considerations or

should economic considerations also be

taken into account ?
210 ● Railroad Safety

25. Should Government safety policy for railroads in extreme financial trouble differ

from Government safety policy toward

other carriers or should all carriers’ safety

be considered uniformly?

The closing of operations (taking equipment

or trackage out of service) or the imposition of

maximum speed restrictions can only realistically be done on technical grounds. Introduction of

economic considerations would clothe Federal

inspectors with judgmental prerogatives which

properly belong to railroad management and

which are based on background information to

which only they are privy. Economic considerations, on the other hand, do have a legitimate

role to play in determining kinds of inspections,

frequency of inspections, timing, locations, and

the like.

If inspection criteria are set technically, as

they should be, the financial health of the carrier should not and will not have any bearing on

questions of serviceability. Management decisions about restoration of service or the

methods used to meet minimum standards or

the extent to which minimum standards are exceeded will vary, depending on financial

strength, but these are questions separate and

distinct from compliance with properly

established minimum standards of safety.

26. Should the Federal Government require

an expanded safety cost-reporting system

or does the existing system provide adequate safety cost information and definition?

The only justification for requiring the reporting of any additional safety cost data would be

to help estimate the priorities, costs, and effectiveness of current and proposed safety research

and action programs. The industry is unaware

of any priority or cost-effectiveness estimates

which are currently available or in use by the

Federal Government; nor is it aware of any efforts underway to develop techniques to provide such estimates. Railroads would support

the development and use of a cost-effectiveness

methodology with which to evaluate current

and proposed safety programs and regulations;

however, any expanded safety-cost reporting

should not be required until such methodology

is fully developed and the costs of its data requirements defined and justified.

27. Under what circumstances should

railroads be mandated to carry hazardous

materials or should they have the right to

establish the safety conditions by which

such materials are carried?

The facts are that railroads are required, as

part and parcel of their common carrier duties,

to carry hazardous materials and to carry them

under conditions established by other entities.

The recent Interstate Commerce Commission

decisions requiring the transportation of spent

nuclear materials, the failure of FRA, for years,

to even allow the installation of shelf couplers

on modern tank cars and the scant cooperation

received from the Materials Transportation

Bureau in the recent revision of the hazardous

materials regulations are but examples of the atmosphere within which these materials are carried by the railroads. Despite this, their safety

record is superb.

What is needed in this area is a little more attention paid to those who know how to accomplish the job and a little less paid to those

who are alarmed by the fact that it is being done

at all.

28. Should safety certification standards be

adopted for railroad equipment or is the

current system of quality control adequate?

Under no circumstances should safety certification standards be adopted for railroad

equipment. The railroad industry, through its

AAR Committees, provides adequate control of

railroad equipment and the components authorized for use on cars in the interchange fleet.

The various technical committees are composed of industry experts from 1S to 20 major

freight car owners, in the particular area of the

committee’s responsibility. The committee

members consult with related experts from component manufacturers. There is no way the
Appendix E 211

Government bureaucracy could assemble such

broad-based expertise to respond in a timely

fashion to technical progress in the various

areas offreight car components.

The industry system of initial review and

comments from committee members, subsequent laboratory testing and, finally, limited

testing in the field, utilizing actual railroad environment, has provided adequate quality control. At any stage in the current system of introducing improved components or monitoring

components previously approved, there is

evidence that the industry is capable of responding promptly and effectively.

29.

30.

Should an established set of priorities for

rulemaking be determined-based on

analysis of existing accident and incident

data and available research, or is the current method of selecting rules appropriate?

How should priorities be established for

research and development?

The problems and approaches which apply to

the establishment of rulemaking priorities are

closely allied with establishment of research and

development priorities, so issues 29 and 30 are

addressed jointly.

Analysis of available accident and research

data constitute necessary, but not sufficient, ingredients for the establishment of priorities; at

present, there is every indication that this process, especially its rulemaking side, derives

primarily from the pressure from special interest

groups, the subjective perceptions and appraisals of DOT (FRA) staff members, and the

recommendations of the NTSB. All three of

these sources suffer from the same basic deficiency: They are unable to take proper account

of the total spectrum of railroad safety issues.

NTSB recommendations, for example, are

biased because they are based on investigations

of high-severity accidents. Preliminary analysis

by AAR shows that the criteria used by NTSB to

determine which accidents to investigate renders

these accidents unrepresentative of significant

rail safety issues and, therefore, not useable in

the setting of safety research and action

priorities.

Given the limited dollar and manpower

resources available for safety research and for

the formulation, implementation, and enforcement of safety rules by FRA and the rail industry, it is essential that safety priorities be

established with utmost care. Recent analysis of

all FRA accident and employee casualty data by

the AAR revealed that too much emphasis and

too many resources have been focused on train

accidents caused by track and equipment

failures, whereas the more frequent and serious

accidents were employee casualties which had

no relation to failure of track or equipment.

The focusing of FRA’s emphasis towards the

elimination of human factors accidents will not

be as politically dramatic as the establishment of

standards for tracks or of safety rules for freight

cars, but it will, if it is successful, save more

lives. A reordering of priorities away from collecting large fines for small technical

violations—who, for instance, has ever been

killed by a late-filed railroad accident report?—

will cause FRA to feel enormous pressure from

interests who know full well how to make their

pressure felt, but the courage to go against what

seems to be the popular wisdom is a necessary

ingredient for one who seeks a solution rather

than an arena.

The problem is all the more difficult by the

very nature of its subject. It is comparatively

easy to realize, for instance, that certain indications on a wheel—e.g., shelled tread, cracked or

broken flange, etc. —could lead to premature

failure and thus to write rules outlawing car

wheels with these characteristics. It is a quantum leap upward in difficulty to identify the

early warning signs of impending human

failure. What is there about an engineer which is

analogous to a cracked, broken, or missing

flange? How does a switchman show the kind of

warning that a series of missing tie-plates do?

The answers to these questions are as difficult as

they are important and the sooner all interested

parties get about answering them, the sooner

there will be answers. Congress could help by

encouraging the search instead of misdirecting
.- ——.—

212 ● Railroad Safety

the effort off towards the quest for a perfect rear

end marker; but that, too, will take both the

courage and the convictions of statesmen.

31. Should research, development, dissemination, and implementation of ne w

technology which would increase safety

take into account existing collective

bargaining and economic factors or

should such technologies preclude those

considerations?

From previous answers, it should be obvious

that the railroad industry believes that Congress

should not involve itself in the substance of the

collective-bargaining process and that research

and the development of new technologies

should never be circumscribed by existing collective-bargaining agreements.

32. As research identifies technological or

other practices which may impact safety,

how should these considerations be

weighted against other policies such as

economic, environmental, or collective

bargaining factors or should such findings

be considered separately?

If research efforts identify an opportunity to

improve safety, the restraints of practicality demand an assessment of its costs and benefits and

of its impacts on other priorities and programs,

including the agreements arrived at in collective

bargaining. If there are advantages in all of

these factors, then obviously the findings of

research should be immediately applied. If there

is a serious question as to the cost-effectiveness

of the safety approach, measure, or practice

derived from research, then great care must be

taken so as not to mandate ever-increasing costs

in the search of the ultimate will-o’ -the-wisp: a

total lack of accidents.

There is some hazard in every aspect of life. It

is the object of safety research to attempt to

reduce that hazard. But if the cost of implementation becomes prohibitive, then some alternate

means of providing the service or carrying out

the function will be found. At present, as a consequence of safety research on tank cars, very

substantial expenses are being incurred for improvements, and this means that the rates for

the movement of hazardous materials in tank

cars will certainly increase. Railroad safety will

increase. However, the movement of these

products by other modes (encouraged, perhaps

by the newly created rate disparities) may well

lead to more accidents, because the other modes

are not now required to pursue the safety measures that the railroads are required to follow.

From a national point of view, therefore, action

to increase safety in one mode may decrease

overall national safety. This is an issue which

has not yet received the attention it deserves.

33. To what extent should near-term safety

benefits be considered in lieu of long-term

economic and/or other long-term safety

policies?

Near-term safety benefits which, because of

their costs, affect long-term industry economic

viability must be viewed with great caution.

Total railroad safety can always be ensured by

shutting the railroads down or by driving them

out of business. That is clearly not in order as a

matter of public policy.

As a matter of practicality, it need not happen

if costs and benefits are intelligently considered

and weighed and if implementation of alleged

“benefits” is limited to those with positive

cost/benefit ratios.
Appendix E 213

RAILROAD LABOR EXECUTIVE ASSOCIATION RESPONSES

2. Should railroad safety legislation be

general in order to permit Government

regulatory and programmatic flexibility

or should it be specifically designed to address particular safety problems or concerns?

Federal railroad safety legislation should be

specifically designed to address particular safety

problems and concerns. The most far-reaching

Federal legislation concerning railroad safety

has been general rather than specific. The enactments by Congress of the Safety Appliances Act

in the early 1900’s were designed to correct

specific problems where the railroads had failed

to self-regulate. Even as late as 1970, only 5 percent of the causes of accidents were covered by

Federal laws. Continued deterioration in the

safety picture led Congress to conclude that the

railroads would not, or could not, control the

increases in injuries or accidents without Federal

supervision. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of

1970 delegated authority to the FRA to regulate

all areas of railroad safety. Although the FRA

has the broad authority to regulate and to promote railroad safety, it has failed to do so.

The FRA’s abdication of its responsibilities

forced Congress to enact some specific safety

standards under the Federal Railroad Safety

Authorization Acts of 1974 and 1976. Referring

to the need for legislating the specific safety requirements contained in the Federal Railroad

Safety Authorization Act of 1976, the Senate

Committee on Commerce stated:

The inability of the Federal Railroad Administration and the Nation’s railroads to make

major safety gains continues to be a source of

great frustration to the Committee. . . Many of

the amendments contained in S. 3119 could be

accomplished under the existing regulatory

powers of the FRA. Petitions regarding many of

the matters contained in the amendments have

been filed with the FRA but it has not responded

to the petitions in a timely manner.

* * * * *

These amendments appear to be more appropriate for administrative rather than

legislative action. However, if the agency which

is responsible for implementing the Federal

Railroad Safety Act is going to be unresponsive

to public petitions for rulemaking, the Congress

may be forced to act. S. Rep. No. 94-855, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1976).

The FRA’s record has not improved since the

enactment of the 1970 Act. Thus, Congres s

must fill the vacuum created by the FRA by

enacting legislation to remedy specific railroad

safety problems.

3.

17.

Should labor-management relations and

collective-bargaining questions be considered when legislating safety or should

safety questions only be dealt with in such

processes?

Should safety standards related to

employee age, qualifications, and training

be set or does the current regulatory

system adequately address these human

factors considerations in safety?

There always exists the possibility that some

collective-bargaining matters affecting working

conditions of employees may be interrelated

with safety problems. Nevertheless, railroad

safety involves not only the employees, but the

general poublic. It is no secret that the unsafe

conditions have resulted in many devastating

accidents, causing great damage, injuries, and

deaths to nonrailroad employees. The fact that

a collective-bargaining agreement may not

cover an unsafe working condition which is the

cause of such accidents should not preclude

Congress or DOT from doing so. The railway

labor organizations simply do not have sufficient power to force the railroads to collectively

bargain adequate safety rules. That is, where an

important safety issue has not been resolved by

self-regulation by the railroads or by FRA

regulations, Congress has enacted statutory

standards. The fact that labor-management

relations may be involved should not deter Congress from acting.
214 Railroad Safety

Also, Congress has addressed the issue of

qualifications of employees in the 1970 safety

law and subsequent amendments. Title 45

U.S.C. 431(a) permits the Secretary of

Transportation to establish qualifications of

employees so long as they are specifically

related to safety. However, the Secretary may

not issue regulations which might disqualify an

employee solely because of his age. H. R.Rep.

No. 91-1194 at p. 16.

In summary, we feel Congress has dealt with

both issues the most practical and effective way.

7. Should OSHA continue to handle the occupational safety and health aspects of

railroad maintenance shops or should all

occupational safety and health for

railroads be assumed by FRA?

RLEA believes that OSHA should not only

continue to handle the occupational safety and

health aspects of railroad maintenance shops,

but should also have occupational safety and

health jurisdiction over all other aspects of the

railroad industry. At present, the relationship

between OSHAS jurisdiction and that of FRA is

defined by Section 4 (b) (1) of the Occupational

Safety and Health Act of 1970 (29 U.S.C.

~653(b)(l)). Under that section, OSHA retains

jurisdiction over all aspects of railroading for

which FRA has not actually promulgated occupational safety and health regulations. Only

when FRA has promulgated such regulations

governing a particular working condition

OSHA’S jurisdiction displaced. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co. v. Usery, 539 F. 2d 386 (5th

Cir. 1976), cert. denied, U.S. (October 3, 1977);

Southern Railway Co. v. OSHRC, 539 F. 2d 3 3 5

(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, U.S. (December

12, 1976); Baltimore and Ohio Railway Co. v.

OSHRC, 548 F. 2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

RLEA has supported legislation designed to

alter this situation and confer on OSHA exclusive jurisdiction over occupational safety and

health in all aspects of the railroad industry. We

have reluctantly reached this conclusion

because FRA has proven entirely inadequate to

the task. First, FRA has consistently failed to

promulgate adequate safety standards. For example, as recently as 1976, Congress had to

enact a detailed requirement that trains have

highly visible rear-end markers because FRA

had failed to discharge its regulatory responsibility to do so. P.L. 94-348, Sec. 5, July 8,

1976, 90 stat. 819. By way of explaining the

enactment of specific safety requirements, the

Senate Committee on Commerce stated the

following:

The inability of the Federal Railroad Administration and the Nation’s railroads to make

major safety gains continues to be a source of

great frustration to the Committee. . . Many of

the amendments contained in S. 3119 [the Act]

could be accomplished under the existing

regulatory powers of the FRA. Petitions regarding many of the matters contained in the

amendments have been filed with the FRA but it

has not responded to the petitions in a timely

manner.

**** *

These amendments appear to be more appropriate for administrative rather than

legislative action. However, if the agency which

is responsible for implementing the Federal

Railroad Safety Act is going to be unresponsive

to public petitions for rulemaking, the Congress

may be forced to act. S. Rep. 94-855, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in (1976) U.S.

Conde Cong. and Ad. News, 1535-6.

Since FRA’s record in discharging is responsibility for promulgating safety rules governing

railroad operations is this dismal, it is ludicrous

to believe that FRA will adequately regulate occupational safety and health. To relieve Congress of the burden of having to do FRA’s work

in that field, occupational safety and health

jurisdiciton in the railroad industry should be

exclusively lodged with OSHA.

Second, FRA’s record of enforcing railroad

safety standards is no better than its record in

promulgating them. The rail worker s

represented by RLEA’s constituent unions continually report the complete inadequacy of

FRA’s inspection efforts. These reports are confirmed by views expressed by concerned committees of Congress. For example, the Senate

Committee on Commerce has observed that:
Appendix E ● 2 1 5

Notwithstanding the statistics and the evidence

of increasing deterioration, the Department of

Transportation has permitted the Federal

Railroad Administration to concentrate on activities other than enforcement of rail safety

regulations. Senate Committee on Commerce,

S. Rep. 93-1192, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1084).

Similarly, the House Interstate and Foreign

Commerce Committee has complained that:

The weight of evidence gathered in testimony

before this subcommittee indicated the Federal

Railroad Administration simply was not living

up to neither [sic] the spirit of the Federal

Railroad Safety Act of 1970, nor, in some cases

the letter of the law.

* *** *

The Committee found that the Federal Railroad

Administration has consistently downgraded enforcement and inspection, and has devoted most

of their resources to research and development.

The evidence presented in testimony before this

subcommittee, and in staff research, indicated a

strange set of priorities in this regard, and a conscious effort by the Department to de-emphasize

inspection of rail carriers. H. Rep. 93-1083, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).

The result of this failure to inspect and enforce has been an alarming increase in the

number of railroad employees killed and injured

on the job. FRA has thus demonstrated its incapacity to achieve safety and health protection

for railroad workers. Consequently, OSHA and

not FRA should be charged with that responsibility.

8. Should Congress follow safety legislative

examples it has set for other transportation modes or should railroads continue to

be treated uniquely in future safety legislation?

The only way in which railraods have been

treated uniquely in the area of safety legislation

is that they are subject to grossly inadequate

safety regulations. Responsibility for promulgating railroad safety regulations has largely been delegated to the FRA, which generally

has ignored that responsibility. Because of the

FRA’s abdication of its responsibilities, Congress recently enacted several limited statutes

which address particular safety problems. See,

S. Rep. No. 94-855, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3

(1976); H.R. Rep. No. 93-1083, 93d Cong., 2d

Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. and

Ad. News 7669, 7671.

What may or may not be necessary to reduce

injuries and accidents in other industries is irrelevant. The attitudes of railroad management

toward safety dictate Federal and State supervision. Moreover, the inherent dangers in railroading cannot be compared with other kinds of

industries.

Because numerous railroad safety problems

have not been remedied, safety legislation can

only be characterized as “unique” in light of the

FRA’s unique failure to carry out the duties

delegated to it by Congress.

9.

100

25.

In

Should Congress consider safety policy as

a part of future railroad regulatory reform

legislation or should Congress consider

safety policy separately?

Should Congress consider safety policy as

a Part of a future railroad economic

assistance policy or should safety be considered separately?

Should Government safety policy for

railroads in extreme financial trouble differ from Government safety policy

toward other carriers or should all carriers’ safety be considered uniformIy?

RLEA’s view, questions 9. 10. and 25 are

closely related. They- all involve the relation between railroad safety and the other areas in

which the Federal Government regulates or

assists railroads. We will, therefore, deal with

these three questions together. The final

paragraph of this answer summarizes our views

on each question separately.

In establishing a proper relationship between

Federal railroad safety regulations and other

Federal regulation of railroads, there are two

essential points. First, the process of, and the

criteria used in, setting railroad safety standards

must be kept separate from other regulatory

issues. Second, useful means to supplementing,
216 Railroad Safety

but not supplanting, the primary methods of enforcing Federal safety standards can be built into other regulatory schemes. The following sections discuss these two points in turn.

1. Both the process of setting Federal railroad

safety standards and the criteria used to set such

standards should be separated from the issues

which arise in other facets of Federal railroad

regulation. Setting and enforcing minimum

safety standards for railroads is essential to the

lives and safety of both railroad employees and

the general public. Human lives are concerned

and no amount of money can buy back an amputated leg or a fatally injured worker. Since the

stakes are so high, the citizens of this country

have the right to expect that their Government

will provide them with the maximum achievable

safety protection. In working toward this goal,

considerations of safety and how safety can be

achieved must be paramount. Other regulatory

considerations and issues should enter the question, if at all, only in the most peripheral way.

From this basic proposition, several conclusions follow. First, the task of setting minimum

safety standards for railroads, whether undertaken by the Congress or an administrative

agency, must be segregated from other regulatory issues. Otherwise, the efforts to achieve

the basic goal, maximum safety protection, will

be diluted or lost amidst the controversies surrounding other regulatory problems. For example, if safety policy were comingled with efforts

to reform railroad rate-setting practices, there

would be an irresistible tendency to trade safety

protection off against various rate-setting considerations. Such a trade-off would be inexcusable in light of the public’s right to expect

maximum safety protection from its Government and the railroads that Government

regulates. Similarly, if safety were considered

along with financial assistance to railroads, the

ground would be laid for the railroads to contend that they should be required to comply

with minimum safety standards only if they are

given financial aid with which to do so. Obviously, this proposition is unacceptable. No

crack should be opened through which the railroads can drag it into the debate.

Second, for the same reasons, the process of

establishing and evaluating the primary

mechanism for enforcing Federal safety standards must be kept separate from othe r

regulatory concerns. Safety standards are only

as good as the method used to enforce them.

Therefore, an adequate primary enforcement

system must be established using safety as the

paramount criterion. Inclusion of issues

concerning this primary enforcement mechanism in proceedings or forums in which other

regulatory provisions are also considered would

detract from the necessary focus on safety. Such

a procedure would be unacceptable. Safety and

the enforcement of basic safety standards are

not relative concepts which can be traded off

against other regulatory goals. No such bargaining is permissible where human lives are so

vitally affected.

Third, suggestions that safety regulation and

the protections it affords to human life should

be relaxed in cases of financiall y troubled

railroads must be rejected out of hand. Observance of minimum safety standards must be

viewed as an integral part of railroading. Such

observance is essential to the protection of

human life and is not a luxury which railroads

need indulge in only when they have surplus

funds. As we discuss below, the Federal Government more properly discharges its responsibilities if it provides financial assistance to

help economically weak railroads comply with

safety standards than if it relaxes those standards for such railroads.

For the reasons given, RLEA believes that the

task of setting safety standards and establishing

the primary mechanism for enforcing them

should be governed by considerations of safety

and should not be comingled with other regulatory issues.

2. RLEA does not, however, wish to give the

impression that there should be no relationship

between railroad safety and other regulatory

programs. There are a variety of creative ways

in which other regulatory programs can be used

to help achieve high safety standards by supplementing the primary method of enforcement.

A railroad’s eligibility for financial assistance
Appendix E ● 2 1 7

could be conditioned on achieving high safety

standards. The burden should be on the railroad

to demonstrate its safety record, which it could

do by showing either compliance with Federal

minimum standards or, perhaps, a verified

record of very few accidents. This incentive for

maintaining high safety standards should not,

however, be permitted to replace the primary

enforcement mechanism. That mechanism must

remain intact and effective to ensure maintenance of minimum standards where this incentive program and other supplementary approaches fail.

A second way in which financial assistance

programs can contribute to safety is the suggestion made above that financially weak railroads

be given grants to aid their safety compliance efforts. The making of such grants is a far better

way for the Federal Government to discharge its

obligations to the public and to railroad

workers than is the suggestion that financially

pressed railroads be excused from meeting

minimum safety standards. Being required to

comply with such standards would actually

benefit railroads in financial trouble because

their accident rates would be reduced with a

consequent reduction in the high costs which

flow from serious accidents. Care must be

taken, however, to avoid any suggestion that

railroads need comply with safety standards

only when paid to do so.

Other examples of using general regulatory

schemes to supplement the basic safety program

include conditioning eligibility for rate increases

on the railroad’s demonstration of a good safety

record and requiring that a specified percentage

of each grant of Federal assistance to a railroad

be used for designated safety purposes. Through

these and similar strategies, strong incentives

for safety compliance can be built into many

facets of railroad regulation. However, the basic

task of setting and enforcing safety standards

should, as we point out above, be segregated

from general regulatory concerns.

The foregoing should make clear our position

on the three questions we are addressing in this

answer. As to questions 9 and 10, we believe

that Congress should consider the tasks of setting safety standards and enforcing those standards separately and not as a part of future

railroad regulatory reform legislation or future

railroad economic assistance policy. However,

as we point out, both regulatory policy and

economic assistance can be used to supplement

the basic safety program. As to question 25, we

believe that the Government should, under no

circumstances, relax safety standards for railroads in extreme financial trouble. We do

believe, however, that it maybe appropriate for

the Federal Government to assist such railroads

in complying with safety standards so long as

there is no implication that those railroads need

comply only so long as they are assisted.

11. Should the Government role in railroad

safety be clarified and/or expanded or

should clarification and increased responsibility for safety be handled by railroad

carriers, suppliers, and labor with Government policy directed strictly toward

public concern (e.g., hazardous materials

and railroad grade-crossings) ?

The Government’s responsibility in railroad

safety should be expanded and clarified. The

Federal Railroad Administration has avoided

promulgating and enforcing adequate safety

regulations. History has shown that railroad

carriers, suppliers, and labor cannot be expected

to assume increased responsibility for railroad

safety. The suppliers and labor do not have the

leverage to force the railroad carriers to adopt

adequate safety measures, and the railroad carriers have exhibited a continuing unwillingness

to voluntarily adopt such measures.

The question implies that railroad safety,

other than such safety matters as hazardous

materials and railroad grade-crossings, is of no

concern to the public. On the contrary, the public is vitalkly concerned with railroad safety.

For example, the number one cause of rail accidents in America is track failure. To suggest

that rail accidents caused by track failure or any

other safety deficiency are not of public concern

is absurd. Many track failures have resulted in

explosions from a derailing train.
218 . Railroad Safety

The Committee on Interstate and Foreign

Commerce cited the growing evidence that track

failure is a direct result of industry policy to

defer maintenance. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1083, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1974) U.S. Code

Cong. and Ad. News 7669, 7673-75. So long as

such deferred maintenance continues and the

railroads do not require adherence to the safety

laws, rail safety will not be improved.

12. Should Federal Government policy continue to preempt State regulatory enforcement authority or should State authority

be expanded?

No. Under Section 206(a) of the Federal

Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U. S. C. A., Sec.

435(a)), the Federal Railroad Administration

can assess penalties or obtain injunctive relief in

Federal courts for violations of safety standards.

Pursuant to Section 207 of the Act ( 4 5

U. S. C. A., Sec. 436), if the Secretary has taken

no action on an alleged violation for a period of

90 days, a State may go into Federal court for

relief unless the Secretary has determined in

writing that no violation has occurred.

The States need some independent enforcement authority to support their investigative efforts. The present enforcement mechanism is

cumbersome and is not supportive of State efforts to carry out an effective safety program.

State inspectors are frequently treated with less

respect than is due because the railroads know

that, for all practical purposes, no violations

will be enforced unless the Federal Government

pursues the matter.

There appear to be few, if any, valid reasons

for what amounts to a complete preemption of

State enforcement authority. On the contrary, it

would seem that the States are frequently in a

better position to pursue swift and responsible

enforcement of safety standards. Further, the

States’ concern for the safety of their citizens

and the potentially disastrous local consequences of violations of Federal standards require that the States, at a minimum, be vested

with authority to seek immediate injunctive

relief.

A bill (H.R. 8361) has been introduced in the

92d Congress by Congressman Rooney of Pennsylvania, and referred to the House Committee

on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which

would amend the 1970 Act to allow a State participant to apply for such immediate injunctive

relief in the district courts of the United States.

Enactment of such provisions into law would

greatly enhance the national effort to improve

the railroad safety record.

13. Should the State Participation Inspection

Program, authorized by the 1970 Act, be

repealed, revised, or maintained in its current form?

Section 206 of the Federal Safety Act of 1970

(45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 435) establishes authority for

State participation in the enforcement of Federal

railroad safety standards. Those States certified

to carry out investigative and surveillance activities on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, and those States which have entered into

agreements with the Secretary, provide money

and manpower to ensure that safety regulations

promulgated in Washington, D. C., are, in fact,

implemented throughout the country.

Section 206, as approved by Congress, was

regarded as a key section of the bill. State

regulators had high hopes that it marked the

beginning of a cooperative Federal-State effort

to drive down the depressingly high accident

statistics.

Yet the FRA has interpreted Section 206(a) in

a manner which precludes the States from participating in the enforcement of rail safety laws

passed either before (e.g., the Signal Inspection

Act) or after (e.g., the Hazardous Materials

Transportation Act) the 1970 Act. Such an interpretation, whether or not justified by the

legislative history of the Act, reduces the role

the States may play in improving rail safety and

prevents the States from making maximum use

of available manpower. If a State wishes to

establish a comprehensive safety program, in

which the duties and responsibilities of its employees are clearly defined, it must have authority to enforce all relevant Federal standards.
Appendix E ● 2 1 9

Again, it is difficult to see how the national

goal of reducing all railroad-related accidents

can be achieved when the potentially most effective and concerned party, the State agency, can

approach the problem only in a piecemeal manner. The House bill (H. R. 8361), referred to in

the answer to question 12, would allow participating States to carry out investigative and

surveillance activities in connection with railroad safety laws and regulations in effect on the

date of enactment of the 1970 Actor made effective subsequently.

These provisions of the bill would effectively

modify the 1970 Act to ensure more meaningful

participation by the States and other affected

parties.

18. Should specific criteria and research data

be a mandatory part of the rulemaking

process or is the current system adequate?

RLEA is uncertain as to the precise meaning

of this question. On the one hand, the question

may ask whether Federal railroad safety standards and rules should, whenever possible, be

written in terms of specific, measurable criteria

with which railroads must comply, rather than

in general terms. On the other hand, the question may ask whether the rulemaking process

should be revised to require that safety standards be promulgated only when the need for and

the content of such standards can be determined

by reference to data produced through research

projects. We will address both of these questions in turn.

First, Federal safety standards for the railroad

industry should be written, whenever possible,

in terms of specific requirements and criteria.

Federal railroad safety standards are necessary

because the industry has proven incapable of

maintaining adequate safety standards without

external compulsion. To remedy this situation,

the Federal standards must be readily enforceable. Only standards written in specific

terms will be enforceable because they are the

only ones under which it is possible to determine when a railroad is or is not in compliance.

Furthermore, such precise standards provide an

additional benefit. They encourage voluntary

compliance because both employees and the

railroads know what is expected of them and

that violations will not go undetected for long.

A flagrant example of failure to adhere to

these sound principles can be found in the flagging rules recently promulgated by FRA. That

regulation (49 CFR $218.37) appears, on first inspection, to require flag protection for the rearend of stopped and slowly moving trains. However, closer examination reveals that 49 C FR

~218.37(a)(2)(iv) permits the railroad to

dispense with this requirement simply by issuing

a train order to that effect. The regulation contains absolutely no standards or guidance to indicate the situations in which it would be appropriate for the railroad to issue such a train

order. FRA has thus promulgated an unenforceable regulation because railroads are given

discretion to grant themselves waivers and there

are no standards to guide their exercise of that

discretion. Unenforceable standards such as this

one should be replaced by standards which can

be enforced.

We turn now to discuss whether the setting of

minimum Federal safety standards should await

the availability of research data establishing the

need for and the content of such standards.

RLEA’s answer to this question is emphatically

in the negative.

The best source of information concerning the

need for safety standards and the type of standards which should be adopted is the years of

practical experience possessed by the individuals involved in the railroad industry, both

railroad workers and management personnel.

By drawing on their experience, these individuals can identify necessary regulations

long before researchers obtain the necessary

funding even to begin studying the same problems. Similarly, those with actual experience in

the field can provide workable, common-sense

solutions to safety problems without waiting for

studies and research projects to be completed.

Regulatory implementation of the solutions provided in this manner can save lives and make

railroading safer for all involved. There is no

valid reason not to embody these years of prac-
220 ● Railroad Safety

tical experience in safety regulations as soon as

possible.

Awaiting confirmation of these commonsense judgments through expensive, timeconsuming research projects would be irresponsible. Everyone is familiar with the recurring

phenomenon of heavily funded research projects which, when finally completed, tell us little

more than we already know through observation and common sense. Making the results of

such research a prerequisite to the issuance of

Federal safety standards would merely delay

essential protection for railroad workers and the

public. Such a requirement would only serve to

give those who wish to prevent or delay the promulgation of enforceable Federal safety standards the opportunity to do so by arguing that a

particular regulation should not be promulgated

because the requisite studies have not been completed or are inadequate. These opponents of

safety standards should not be given this excuse

to avoid obviously needed regulation.

For the foregoing reasons, RLEA opposes any

attempt to mandate the use of specific research

data in rulemaking. Such data, when available,

should be considered as part of the overall rulemaking process. However, it should take its

proper place as only one relevant factor, along

with common sense and practical experience in

the field. Research data should not be artificially

elevated to a status more important than its intrinsic worth merits.

21. Should (participating) State inspectors be

qualified and paid according to Federal

standards or should States establish their

own inspector qualifications and pay

scales?

The States should be allowed to establish

their own inspection qualifications and pay

scales. There is nothing in the language or

legislative history of the 1970 Act which requires or specifically allows the FRA to promulgate qualifications for participating State inspectors. The Act itself was modeled after the

Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968 (49

U.S.C. 31674), which did not require State inspector qualifications and under which none

had been promulgated. Nevertheless, the FRA

has procedded to establish minimum qualifications for State inspectors in the two areas where

safety standards have been issued, which are as

stringent or more stringent than those for

Federal inspectors.

Federal inspectors are classified at a GS-11 or

GS-12 level, with a minimum salary in 1976 of

$16,255 and a maximum of $25,200. In addition, there are opportunities for promotion to

supervisory positions at GS-13 and GS-14

levels. In contrast, the starting salary in 10

States is less than $10,000, 21 States have a ceiling of $16,800 or less for senior inspectors, and

only 1 State can pay more than $22,000. Given

the State pay scales and State budgetary problems, it seems clear that FRA’s insistence on

State inspectors meeting the same specifications

as are required for Federal inspectors serves as a

serious deterrent to participation by many

States.

The FRA appears to argue that its standards

are the minimum necessary to ensure that a

State inspector is qualified to perform his tasks.

However, it should also be noted that the standards are patterned after Civil Service Commission job classifications designed to provide, to

the maximum extent possible, uniformity and

equity in Federal hiring practices. Thus, under

present Federal practice, a job applicant must

have 3 years general experience and 3 years of

specialized experience to qualify for a GS-11

position, whether that position is in railroad

safety inspection or aircraft maintenance.

There is simply no justification for attempting

to conform the myriad of State hiring and salary

regulations to the Federal system, yet this appears to be exactly what the FRA is attempting.

Further, there is no reason to doubt that the

States would diligently pursue the goal of seeking out and hiring qualified personnel to serve

as State inspectors for, after all, it is their

citizens who will suffer the most from an inadequate State safety program. Accordingly, the

States should be given the greatest possible

latitude in establishing their own inspector

qualifications and pay scales.
Appendix E ● 2 2 1

23. Assuming deferred maintenance correlates

with deceased safety, should the Federal

Government monitor equipment- and

track-maintenance programs, should it rely on existing safety standards, or should

it revise standards to mandate safety

maintenance?

RLEA believes that regularly conducted maintenance correlates with increased safety and that

the Federal Government, either through legislation or through regulations, should mandate

regular safety maintenance. Railway labor is in

a particularly good position to judge the effectiveness of regular maintenance programs

because the men we represent work on railroads

where the maintenance programs vary from

good to almost nonexistent. Comparing the

safety experience of these railroads can lead to

only one conclusion: where regular, thorough

maintenance programs are conducted, safety

hazards are detected and corrected, thereby

significantly reducing the incidence of accidents

and injuries. On the other hand, where regular

maintenance is deferred, accidents increase.

These views are confirmed by the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce:

The number one cause of rail accidents in

America is track failure. There is growing

evidence that track failure is a direct result of industry policy to defer maintenance. H. Rep. No.

93-1083, 93d Cong., d Sess., reprinted in (1974)

U.S. Code Cong. and Ad. News, 7669, 7673-75.

Only regularly conducted maintenance can be

expected to keep railroad equipment and track

in safe and efficient operating condition. No

Federal inspection effort can eliminate unsafe

conditions, if the basic maintenance program is

inadequate. Therefore, Federal safety regulations should be revised to require not only compliance with minimum standards, but also

regular maintenance. — Failure to require this

most

ment

24.

effective way of keeping track and equipin a safe condition is inexcusable.

Should Government responsibility in closing potentially unsafe plants or operations

be based solely on safety considerations or

should economic considerations also be

taken into account?

RLEA believes that only safety considerations

should be used in deciding when equipment or

facilities are so unsafe that they must be closed

or taken out of operation in order to prevent

death or injurv to Persons affected. As stated

previously, the citezenns of this country have the

right to expect that the Government will provide

them with the maximum achievable safety

protection. Congress has already adopted this

same view. In the Federal Railroad Safety Act of

1970, Congress gave the Secretary of Transportation authority to “immediately issue an

order.. prohibiting the further use of” any facility or piece of equipment which the Secretary

determines is “in unsafe condition and thereby

creates an emergency situation involving a

hazard of death or injury to persons affected”

(45 U.S.C. 432). In 1974, Congress broadened

the authority to permit the Secretary to issue

orders directing a railroad to terminate any action in violation of the safety laws (45 U.S. C.

437(a)). AS the language under both sections

makes clear, the Secretary’s authority to order a

facility closed depends solely on the hazard to

persons affected. See H.R. Rep. No. 91;1194,

91st Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in (1970) U.S.

Code Cong. and Ad. News, 4104, 4116. The

Secretary is not authorized to take economic

considerations into account in making such

order.

In enacting this provision, Congress recognized that, when a facility must be closed i n

order to prevent death or physical injury, there

is no economic consideration which can properly be advanced to keep the facility open.

RLEA heartily endorses this position.

29. Should an established set of priorities for

rulemaking be determined-based on

analysis of existing accident and incident

data and available research, or is the current method of selecting rules appropriate?

The setting of priorities for issuing Federal

railroad safety rules should be based, insofar as

possible, on the expressed needs of the persons
222 Railroad Safety

affected by those rules, including railroad

employees who must spend their working lives

exposed to railroad safety hazards. The persons

exposed to the hazards of railroading are the

ones whose health and lives are at stake and

who have the necessary experience to recognize

safety problems and areas needing regulation.

The present system under which interested persons may file petitions requesting rulemaking

upon which FRA must act within a statutorily

prescribed time limit provides an appropriate

mechanism through which the need for safety

regulations as perceived by the persons affected

by those regulations can be recognized. See 45

U.S.C. 431(d) and 49 C.F.R. ~211.9 et seq.

This procedure could be strengthened by

enacting specific standards to govern FRA’s

decision as to whether to initiate rulemaking

proceedings on a particular petition. At present,

the only standard is that contained in 49 C.F.R.

~211.ll(b), which states that FRA will initiate

rulemaking when the Administrator determines

“that the petition contains adequate justification.” More appropriate would be a statutory

requirement that FRA initiate rulemaking on

each petition unless the Administrator is able to

make a factual finding that the conditions

described in the petition do not pose a hazard to

the safety of railroad employees or the public.

Under this requirement, the Administrator

would not be able to decline rulemaking in cases

where hazards requiring regulation exist.

Establishing a system that requires setting

regulatory priorities based on accident data and

available research would be a step in the wrong

direction. Such a system would not be responsive to the express needs of persons exposed to

railroading hazards. Rather, it would place

responsibility for setting regulatory priorities in

the hands of the regulated railroads and the individuals who determine research priorities.

A priority system based on accident data

would be controlled by the railroads. Except in

those cases where the National Transportation

Safety Board or FRA investigates a major accident, responsibility for reporting accidents is in

the hands of the railroads. The railroads,

without input from their employees, are thus

free to place their own interpretation on the accident and assign to it whatever cause, such as

employee error, suits their purpose. If

regulatory priorities were set by analyzing the

causes of accidents as indicated in the reports

submitted by the railroads, the railroads could,

by manipulating the accident reports ,

manipulate FRA’s regulatory priorities. To

alleviate somewhat the present deficiency in accident reporting, the employee representatives,

on a voluntary basis, should be afforded an opportunity to present relevant factual information concerning safety violations of the carrier.

Reliance on available research to set priorities

would suffer from a similar infirmity. The

availability of research data on which to base

regulations in a particular area depends largely

on whether research projects in that area have

been funded. Some topics will have been

thoroughly researched and others will not. Consequently, priorities based on the availability of

data produced by such research will be determined by the persons who choose the areas in

which research will be conducted. Again, the

result would be to take the setting of regulatory

priorities away from the people in the field who

are in need of the protection and who are in the

best position to determine what type of protection is needed.

The proper role of both accident statistics and

available research should be to aid in evaluating

petitions for rulemaking. When used in this

way, the limits of both research data and accident reports, as described above, should be kept

clearly in mind. Conclusions drawn from such

information should always be tempered with

common sense and knowledge gained through

practical experience.

30. How should priorities be established for

research and development?

It is clear that there is not a single simple solution for establishing research priorities, goals,

and ensuring continuing effectiveness. In addition to supporting FRA safety mandates, the

following considerations are deemed prime fac-
Appendix E ● 2 2 3

tors in any responsible R&D safety activity

justification:

1. Statistical Trends (Accidents, Fatalities, Injuries, Cost). —History is always a good starting

point for determining the relative importance of

problem areas. Reasonably accurate data bases

are necessary but not sufficient to set R&D

priorities. It is extremely difficult to set up in advance and justify a comprehensive system of

data collection which has enough detail to guide

research efforts. In addition, history sometimes

reacts too slowly to newly emerging problem

areas—such as nuclear transport hazards.

2. Evaluation o f Statistica l

Trends.—Statistical trend data must be mixed

with “practical” assessments and inputs from

knowledgeable representatives, who are actively engaged in the railroad processes on a daily

basis. Different perspectives and interpretations

need to be solicited and openly discussed. Frequently, where perceived priorities are made,

more in-depth statistical information may need

to be developed through limited surveys, communications, and investigations. Such data supplements the broader guidelines of the formal

data system.

3. Safety Problems Projections /Predictions.—There are some cases where major

safety concerns may not be revealed in

statistics. Consequently, there is a need to make

projections as to likely future railroad safety

problems. Areas of greatest concern here would

tend to be situations where a singIe accident

might have catastrophic consequences.

4. Will Research Help?—It may be in certain

applications that no new technology is required

to make substantial improvements in safety. In

such cases, even though the statistical problem

is demonstrated, initiation of significant research endeavors may not be appropriate.

In other “grayer” areas, the balance between

the extent of research allocation and probable

benefits must be “traded off.”

5. Extensive Exposure of R&D Activity/Plans.—Priorities for on-going R&D activities need to be continually re-examined from

the viewpoints of current progress and perceptions of incolved parties. Where possible, resources among individual groups should be

maximized by avoiding unnecessary duplication, even though agreed to parallel research

paths by industry/Government groups may be

entirely warranted in significant safety projects—because of recognized constituency differences.

6. “Opportunity” for Immediate Progress/Implementation. —Absolute priorities for

R&D need to be adjusted periodically to reflect

current conditions that may be attractively conducive for swift implementing actions. This

criteria of “the time is ripe” provides the flexibility to realize the difficult implementation

goal of applied research.

7. Potential “Break-Through” Potentials.—Periodically, on-going research findings

may reveal potentials for unanticipated advanced in safety. Any system for establishing

priorities for research and development should

recognize the need to consider diversion of an

appropriate amount of efforts to further

evaluate the feasibility of uncovered potentially

“high reward” technological “break-throughs.”

8. Public/Legislative Requirements. —

Although priorities should be established to anticipate “public” presures, R&D resources must

be allocated to be responsive to public, regulatory, and legislative directives and requests;

whether from local, State, or Federal levels.

The driving thrust in all of the above considerations should be aimed at achieving a

reduction in the rate of personal fatalities and

injuries associated with railroad activities.

31. Should research, development, dissemination, and implementation of new technology, which would increase safety, take into account existing collective-bargaining

and economic factors, or should such

technologies preclude those considerations?

In terms of uncovering potentials for making

substantial improvements in the rate of fatalities
224 “ Railroad Safety

and injuries, R&D efforts should not be unnecessarily “bounded.”

Prejudgments that “the industry can’t afford

to do anything about that” could conceivably

block research activity which might uncover a

larger systematic approach which could not only be economically justified but be attractive

from industry/union/public viewpoints. Within

the realm of established priorities, R&D should

be as “free” as possible—consistent with the application of realistic yardsticks to prevent

“cloud-nine” approaches.

On the other hand, the implementation process must take into account real world

“political,” economic, and collective bargaining

factors.

Dissemination of R&D information should be

virtually unrestricted, extensive, and responsive

to requests from all sources.

32. As research identifies technological or

other practices which may impact safety,

how should these considerations be

weighted against policies such as

economic, environmental, or collectivebargaining factors or should such findings

be considered separate?

Generally, the research role should be viewed

as providing factual support in the technology

regime of the total picture. Appropriate

broader-view forums should be utilized to “mix”

input from R&D and various other “expert”

safety interest groups—to analyze and arive at

decisions/compromises which more fully comprehend the specturm of meaningful considerations.

At times, R&D findings may serve only in a

minor way to assist in effective resolution of the

overall safety problem.

33. To what extent should near-term safety

benefits be considered in lieu of long-term

economic and/or other long-term safety

policies?

Where safety benefits are defined as reduction

in loss of lives, near-term progress should be the

foremost consideration, i.e., every practical opportunity should be seized to assist in this

respect. Where long-term intentions and accomplishments are in direct conflict with contemplated near-term actions, the immediate opportunity should be modified (i.e., if a better 5-

year fatality picture can be convincingly supported). A positive attitude should be brought

to bear on economic implications. Ways in

which public money might be utilized to augment and improve the railroad industry

cost/benefit ratio should be actively explored

for each specific safety improvement proposal.

Research and development efforts should be

conducted toward supporting near-term improvements (within the above philosophy)

while generating guidelines for longer-term

gains (i.e., deal with the existing equipment

retrofit needs while providing the basis for new

equipment safety specifications). This near-term

focus ensures “practicality” and provides a

foundation for the generation of knowledgeable

guidelines for future safety improvement

actions.