Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Government

Efficiency, Financial Management, and

Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on

Government Reform, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:00 p.m.,

Thursday, August 22, 2002 HOMELAND SECURITY

Effective

Intergovernmental

Coordination Is Key to

Success

Statement of Paul L. Posner, Managing Director,

Federal Budget Issues, Strategic Issues

GAO-02-1012T
Page 1 GAO-02-1012T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to be here to discuss issues critical to

successful federal leadership of, assistance to, and partnership with state

and local governments to enhance homeland security. As you are aware,

the challenges posed by homeland security exceed the capacity and

authority of any one level of government. Protecting the nation against

these unique threats calls for a truly integrated approach, bringing

together the resources of all levels of government. The President’s recently

released national strategy for homeland security emphasizes security as a

shared national responsibility involving close cooperation among all levels

of government.1

 In addition, as you know, Mr. Chairman, the House has

passed (H.R. 5005), and the Senate will take under consideration, after the

August recess, legislation (S. 2452) to create a Department of Homeland

Security. Although the bills are different, they share the goal of

establishing a statutory Department of Homeland Security.

In my testimony today, I will focus on the challenges facing the federal

government in (1) establishing a leadership structure for homeland

security, (2) defining the roles of different levels of government, (3)

developing performance goals and measures, and (4) deploying

appropriate tools to best achieve and sustain national goals. My comments

are based on a body of GAO’s work on terrorism and emergency

preparedness and policy options for the design of federal assistance,2

 our

review of many other studies,3

 and the Comptroller General’s recent

testimonies on the proposed Department of Homeland Security (DHS).4

 In

 1

National Strategy for Homeland Security. The White House. Office of Homeland

Security, July 16, 2002. In addition, the Office of Homeland Security issued a companion

publication titled State and Local Actions for Homeland Security identifying measures

state and local governments are taking to improve homeland security.

2

See attached list of related GAO products.

3

These studies include the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Third Annual Report (Arlington, Va:

Dec. 15, 2001); and the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road

Map for Security: Imperative for Change (February 15, 2001).

4 Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO-02-957T

(Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002) and Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency

Has Merit, But Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T (Washington,

D.C.: June 25, 2002).
Page 2 GAO-02-1012T

addition, I will draw on GAO’s ongoing work for this Subcommittee,

including an examination of the diverse ongoing and proposed federal

preparedness programs, as well as a series of case studies we are

conducting that examine preparedness issues facing state and local

governments. To date, we have conducted interviews of officials in five

geographically diverse cities: Baltimore, Maryland; Denver, Colorado; Los

Angeles, California; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Seattle, Washington. We

have also interviewed state emergency management officials in these

states.

In summary:

• The proposed Department of Homeland Security will clearly have a central

role in the success of efforts to enhance homeland security. Many aspects

of a consolidation of homeland security programs have the potential to

reduce fragmentation, improve coordination, and clarify roles and

responsibilities. Realistically, however, in the short term, the magnitude of

the challenges facing the new department will clearly require substantial

time and effort and will take additional resources to make it effective. The

recently released national strategy is intended to guide implementation of

the complex mission of the proposed department and the efforts of other

federal and non-federal entities responsible for homeland security

initiatives.

• Appropriate roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of

government and with the private sector are evolving and need to be

clarified. New threats are prompting a reassessment and shifting of

longstanding roles and responsibilities. Until now these shifts have been

occurring on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis without benefit of an

overarching framework and criteria to guide the process. The

administration’s national strategy recognizes the challenge posed by a

complex structure of overlapping federal, state, and local governments—

our country has more than 87,000 jurisdictions. There are also challenges

in defining the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the private sector.

• The national strategy’s initiatives often do not provide a baseline set of

performance goals and measures upon which to assess and improve

preparedness. Therefore, the nation does not yet have a comprehensive

set of performance goals and measures upon which to assess and improve

prevention efforts, vulnerability reduction, and responsiveness to damage

and recovery needs at all levels of government. Given the need for a

highly integrated approach to the homeland security challenge, national

performance goals and measures for strategy initiatives that involve both
Page 3 GAO-02-1012T

federal and non-federal actors may best be developed in a collaborative

way involving all levels of government and the private sector. Standards

are one tool the national strategy emphasizes in areas such as training,

equipment, and communications.

• A careful choice of the most appropriate assistance tools is critical to

achieve and sustain national goals. The choice and design of policy tools,

such as grants, regulations, and tax incentives, can enhance the capacity of

all levels of government to target areas of highest risk and greatest need,

promote shared responsibilities by all parties, and track and assess

progress toward achieving national preparedness goals. The national

strategy notes that until recently, federal support for domestic

preparedness efforts has been relatively small and disorganized, with

various departments and agencies providing money in a “tangled web” of

grant programs. It notes the shared responsibility of providing homeland

security between federal, state, and local governments, and the private

sector and recognizes the importance of using appropriate tools of

government to improve preparedness.

Homeland security is a complex mission that involves a broad range of

functions performed throughout government, including law enforcement,

transportation, food safety and public health, information technology, and

emergency management, to mention only a few. Federal, state, and local

governments have a shared responsibility in preparing for catastrophic

terrorist attacks as well as other disasters. The initial responsibility for

planning, preparing, and response falls upon local governments and their

organizations—such as police, fire departments, emergency medical

personnel, and public health agencies—which will almost invariably be the

first responders to such an occurrence. For its part, the federal

government has principally provided leadership, training, and funding

assistance.

The federal government’s role in responding to major disasters has

historically been defined by the Stafford Act,5

 which makes most federal

assistance contingent on a finding that the disaster is so severe as to be

beyond the capacity of state and local governments to respond effectively.

Once a disaster is declared, the federal government—through the Federal

 5

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 121 et seq.)

establishes the process for states to request a presidential disaster declaration.

Background
Page 4 GAO-02-1012T

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)—may reimburse state and local

governments for between 75 and 100 percent of eligible costs, including

response and recovery activities.

In addition to post disaster assistance, there has been an increasing

emphasis over the past decade on federal support of state and local

governments to enhance national preparedness for terrorist attacks. After

the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system on March 20, 1995, and

the Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995, the United States initiated a

new effort to combat terrorism. In June 1995, Presidential Decision

Directive 39 was issued, enumerating responsibilities for federal agencies

in combating terrorism, including domestic terrorism. Recognizing the

vulnerability of the United States to various forms of terrorism, the

Congress passed the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of

1996 (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program) to train and

equip state and local emergency services personnel who would likely be

the first responders to a domestic terrorist event. Other federal agencies,

including those in FEMA; the departments of Justice, Health and Human

Services, and Energy; and the Environmental Protection Agency, have also

developed programs to assist state and local governments in preparing for

terrorist events.

As emphasis on terrorism prevention and response grew, however, so did

concerns over coordination and fragmentation of federal efforts. More

than 40 federal entities have a role in combating and responding to

terrorism, and more than 20 in bioterrorism alone. Our past work,

conducted prior to the establishment of an Office of Homeland Security

and the current proposals to create a new Department of Homeland

Security, has shown coordination and fragmentation problems stemming

largely from a lack of accountability within the federal government for

terrorism-related programs and activities. Further, our work found there

was an absence of a central focal point that caused a lack of a cohesive

effort and the development of similar and potentially duplicative

programs. Also, as the Gilmore Commission report notes, state and local

officials have voiced frustration about their attempts to obtain federal

funds from different programs administered by different agencies and

have argued that the application process is burdensome and inconsistent

among federal agencies.

President Bush has taken a number of important steps in the aftermath of

the terrorist attacks of September 11th to address the concerns of

fragmentation and to enhance the country’s homeland security efforts,

including creating of the Office of Homeland Security in October 2001,
Page 5 GAO-02-1012T

proposing the Department of Homeland Security in June 2002, and issuing

a national strategy in July 2002. Both the House and Senate have worked

diligently on these issues and are deliberating on a variety of homeland

security proposals. The House has passed (H.R. 5005), and the Senate will

take under consideration, after the August recess, legislation (S. 2452) to

create a Department of Homeland Security. While these proposals would

both transfer the functions, responsibilities, personnel, and other assets of

existing agencies into the departmental structure, each bill has unique

provisions not found in the other. For example, while both bills establish

an office for State and Local Government Coordination and a first

responder council to advise the department, the Senate bill also

establishes a Chief Homeland Security Liaison Officer appointed by the

Secretary and puts federal liaisons in each state to provide coordination

between the department and the state and local first responders.

The proposal to create a statutorily based Department of Homeland

Security holds promise to better establish the leadership necessary in the

homeland security area. It can more effectively capture homeland security

as a long-term commitment grounded in the institutional framework of the

nation’s governmental structure. As we have previously noted, the

homeland security area must span the terms of various administrations

and individuals. Establishing homeland security leadership by statute will

ensure legitimacy, authority, sustainability, and the appropriate

accountability to the Congress and the American people.6

The proposals call for the creation of a Cabinet department that would be

responsible for coordination with other executive branch agencies

involved in homeland security, including the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the

proposals call for coordination with nonfederal entities and direct the new

Secretary to reach out to state and local governments and the private

sector in order to: ensure adequate and integrated planning, training, and

exercises occur, and that first responders have the necessary equipment;

attaining interoperability of the federal government’s homeland security

communications systems with state and local governments’ systems;

oversee federal grant programs for state and local homeland security

 6

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Responsibility And Accountability

for Achieving National Goals. GAO-02-627T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 11, 2002).

Proposed Department

and National Strategy

Will Guide Homeland

Security
Page 6 GAO-02-1012T

efforts; and coordinate warnings and information to state and local

government entities and the public.

Many aspects of the proposed consolidation of homeland security

programs are in line with previous recommendations and show promise

towards reducing fragmentation and improving coordination. For

example, the new department would consolidate federal programs for

state and local planning and preparedness from several agencies and place

them under a single organizational umbrella. Based on our prior work, we

believe that the consolidation of some homeland security functions makes

sense and will, if properly organized and implemented, over time lead to

more efficient, effective, and coordinated programs, better intelligence

sharing, and a more robust protection of our people, borders, and critical

infrastructure.

However, as the Comptroller General has recently testified,7

implementation of the new department will be an extremely complex task,

and in the short term, the magnitude of the challenges that the new

department faces will clearly require substantial time and effort, and will

take additional resources to make it effective. Further, some aspects of the

new department, as proposed, may result in yet other concerns. For

example, as we reported on June 25, 2002,8

 the new department could

include public health assistance programs that have both basic public

health and homeland security functions. These dual-purpose programs

have important synergies that should be maintained and could potentially

be disrupted by such a change.

The recently issued national strategy for homeland security states it is

intended to answer four basic questions: what is “homeland security” and

what missions does it entail; what does the nation seek to accomplish, and

what are the most important goals of homeland security; what is the

federal executive branch doing now to accomplish these goals and what

should it do in the future; and what should non-federal governments, the

 7

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has

Merit, but Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.:

June 25, 2002).

8

U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve

Coordination but May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting, GAO-02-883T

(Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002).
Page 7 GAO-02-1012T

private sector, and citizens do to help secure the homeland. Within the

federal executive branch, the key organization for homeland security will

be the proposed Department of Homeland Security. The Department of

Defense will contribute to homeland security, as well other departments

such as the Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and Health and Human

Services. The national strategy also makes reference to using tools of

government such as grants and regulations to improve national

preparedness.

The national strategy defines homeland security as a concerted national

effort to 1) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, 2) reduce

America’s vulnerability to terrorism, 3) minimize the damage, and 4)

recover from attacks that do occur. This definition should help the

government more effectively administer, fund, and coordinate activities

both inside and outside the proposed new department and ensure all

parties are focused on the same goals and objectives. The three parts of

the definition form the national strategy’s three objectives.

The strategy identifies six critical mission areas, and outlines initiatives in

each of the six mission areas. It further describes four foundations that

cut across these mission areas and all levels of government. These

foundations— law; science and technology; information sharing and

systems; and international cooperation— are intended to provide a basis

for evaluating homeland security investments across the federal

government. Table 1 summarizes key intergovernmental roles in each of

the six mission areas as presented in the strategy.
Page 8 GAO-02-1012T

Table 1: National Strategy: Six Critical Mission Areas and Key Intergovernmental Roles

Mission Area Key Intergovernmental Roles

Intelligence and Warning • Work with state and local law enforcement to leverage critical intelligence information,

and provide real-time actionable information in the form of protective actions that should

be taken in light of terrorist threats, trends, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

• Provide announcements of threat advisories and alerts to notify law enforcement and

state and local government officials of threats through the Homeland Security Advisory

System.

Border and Transportation Security • Implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 requires

partnerships among federal, state, and local government officials to assess and protect

critical transportation infrastructures and reduce vulnerabilities.

Domestic Counterterrorism • Expand data included in federal databases such as the FBI National Crime Information

Center (NCIC) database and ensure that they are fully accessible to state and local law

enforcement officials.

• Expand the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, representing numerous federal agencies and

state and local law enforcement, to all 56 FBI field offices.

Protecting Critical Infrastructures and

Key Assets

• Work with state and local governments to implement a comprehensive national

infrastructure protection plan to ensure protection for critical assets, systems, and

functions, and for sharing protection responsibility with state and local government.

• Provide state and local agencies one primary federal contact for coordinating protection

activities with the federal government (e.g. vulnerability assessments, strategic planning

efforts, and exercises).

Defending Against Catastrophic Threats • In cooperation with state and local governments, develop additional inspection

procedures and detection systems throughout the national transportation structure to

detect the movement of nuclear materials within the U.S.

• Expand and modernize the Centers for Disease Control Epidemic Intelligence Service to

better train local and state officials in recognizing biological attacks, and state and local

jurisdictions with a population of 500,000 or more will be provided with resources to hire

skilled epidemiologists.

Emergency Preparedness and Response • Working with state and local public safety organizations, build a comprehensive national

incident management system to respond to terrorist incidents and natural disasters, and

encourage first responder organizations to adopt the already widespread Incident

Management System by making it a requirement for federal grants.

• Provide grants in support of state and local preparedness efforts in areas such as:

mutual aid agreements; terrorism-related communications equipment; training and

equipping of state and local health care personnel to deal with chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear terrorism; planning for the receipt and distribution of medicines

from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile; equipping, training, and exercising first

responders to meet certification standards.

• Proposed grant requirements include: compliance with a national emergency

communication plan, progress in achieving communications interoperability with other

emergency response bodies, and annual certification of first responder preparedness to

handle and decontaminate any hazard.

• Consolidate all grant programs that distribute federal funds to state and local first

responders. The First Responder Initiative proposes to increase federal funding levels

more than tenfold to $3.5 billion in fiscal year 2003.

With regard to the costs of Homeland Security, the national strategy

emphasizes government should fund only those homeland security

activities that are not supplied, or are inadequately supplied, in the market,

and cost sharing between different governmental levels should reflect

federalism principles and different tools of government. In terms of the
Page 9 GAO-02-1012T

financial contributions made by state and local government to homeland

security, the strategy acknowledges that state and local governments are

incurring unexpected costs defending or protecting their respective

communities. These costs include protecting critical infrastructure,

improving technologies for information sharing and communications, and

building emergency response capacity. At this time, the National

Governors’ Association estimates that additional homeland securityrelated costs, incurred since September 11th and through the end of 2002,

will reach approximately $6 billion. Similarly, the U.S. Conference of

Mayors has estimated the costs incurred by cities during this time period

to be $2.6 billion.

The proposed department will be a key player in the daunting challenge of

defining the roles of the various actors within the intergovernmental

system responsible for homeland security. In areas ranging from fire

protection to drinking water to port security, the new threats are

prompting a reassessment and shift of longstanding roles and

responsibilities. However, until this time, proposed shifts in roles and

responsibilities have been considered on a piecemeal and ad hoc basis

without benefit of an overarching framework and criteria to guide this

process. The national strategy recognizes that the process is challenging

because of the structure of overlapping federal, state, and local

governments given that our country has more than 87,000 jurisdictions.

The national strategy further notes that the challenge is to develop

interconnected and complementary systems that are reinforcing rather

than duplicative.

The proposals for a Department of Homeland Security call for the

department to reach out to state and local governments and the private

sector to coordinate and integrate planning, communications, information,

and recovery efforts addressing homeland security. This is important

recognition of the critical role played by nonfederal entities in protecting

the nation from terrorist attacks. State and local governments play primary

roles in performing functions that will be essential to effectively address

our new challenges. Much attention has already been paid to their role as

first responders in all disasters, whether caused by terrorist attacks or

natural hazards.

The national strategy emphasizes the critical role state and local

governments play in homeland security and the need for coordination

between all levels of government. The national strategy emphasizes that

Challenges Remain in

Defining Appropriate

Intergovernmental

Roles
Page 10 GAO-02-1012T

homeland security is a shared responsibility. In addition, the national

strategy has several initiatives designed to improve partnerships and

coordination. Table 1 provides several examples of areas with key

intergovernmental roles and coordination. For example, there are

initiatives to improve intergovernmental law enforcement coordination

and enabling effective partnerships with state and local governments and

the private sector in critical infrastructure protection. States are asked to

take several legal initiatives, such as coordinating suggested minimum

standards for state driver’s licenses and reviewing quarantine authorities.

Many initiatives are intended to develop or enhance first responder

capabilities, such as initiatives to improve the technical capabilities of first

responders or enable seamless communication among all responders. In

many cases, these initiatives will rely on federal, state, and local

cooperation, some standardization, and the sharing of costs.

Achieving national preparedness and response goals hinges on the federal

government’s ability to form effective partnerships with nonfederal

entities. Therefore, federal initiatives should be conceived as national, not

federal in nature. Decision makers have to balance the national interest of

prevention and preparedness with the unique needs and interests of local

communities. A “one-size-fits-all” federal approach will not serve to

leverage the assets and capabilities that reside within state and local

governments and the private sector. By working collectively with state and

local governments, the federal government gains the resources and

expertise of the people closest to the challenge. For example, protecting

infrastructure such as water and transit systems lays first and most often

with nonfederal levels of government.

Just as partnerships offer opportunities, they also pose risks based upon

the different interests reflected by each partner. From the federal

perspective, there is the concern that state and local governments may not

share the same priorities for use of federal funds. This divergence of

priorities can result in state and local governments simply replacing

(“supplanting”) their own previous levels of commitment in these areas

with the new federal resources. From the state and local perspective,

engagement in federal programs opens them up to potential federal

preemption and mandates. From the public’s perspective, partnerships if

not clearly defined, risk blurring responsibility for the outcome of public

programs.

Our fieldwork at federal agencies and at local governments suggests a shift

is potentially underway in the definition of roles and responsibilities

National and Regional

Partnerships
Page 11 GAO-02-1012T

between federal, state, and local governments with far reaching

consequences for homeland security and accountability to the public. The

challenges posed by the new threats are prompting officials at all levels of

government to rethink long-standing divisions of responsibilities for such

areas as fire services, local infrastructure protection, and airport security.

Current homeland security proposals recognize that the unique scale and

complexity of these threats call for a response that taps the resources and

capacities of all levels of government as well as the private sector.

In many areas, these proposals would impose a stronger federal presence

in the form of new national standards or assistance. For instance, the

Congress is considering proposals to mandate new vulnerability

assessments and protective measures on local communities for drinking

water facilities. Similarly, new federal rules have mandated local airport

authorities to provide new levels of protection for security around airport

perimeters. The block grant proposal for first responders would mark a

dramatic upturn in the magnitude and role of the federal government in

providing assistance and standards for fire service training and equipment.

Additionally, the national strategy suggests initiatives for an expanded

state role in several areas. For example, there are no national or agreed

upon state standards for driver’s license content, format, or acquisition

procedures. The strategy states that the federal government should

support state-led efforts to develop suggested minimum standards for

drivers’ licenses. In another example, in order to suppress money

laundering, the strategy recommends that states assess the current status

of their regulation regarding providers of financial services and work to

adopt uniform laws as necessary.

Governments at the local level are also moving to rethink roles and

responsibilities to address the unique scale and scope of the contemporary

threats from terrorism. Numerous local general-purpose governments and

special districts co-exist within metropolitan regions and rural areas alike.

Many regions are starting to assess how to restructure relationships

among contiguous local entities to take advantage of economies of scale,

promote resource sharing, and improve coordination of preparedness and

response on a regional basis. In our case studies of five metropolitan

areas, we have identified several common forms of regional cooperation

and coordination including special task forces or working groups,

improved collaboration among public health entities, increased

countywide planning, mutual aid agreements, and communications. These

partnerships are at varying stages of development and are continuing to

evolve. Table 2 summarizes these initiatives.
Page 12 GAO-02-1012T

Table 2: Case Study Examples of Metropolitan Cooperation and Coordination

• Task Forces and Working Groups: To facilitate emergency planning and coordination among cities in a metropolitan area,

officials have joined together to create task forces, such as terrorism working groups, advisory committees, and Mayors’ caucuses.

For example, the Metropolitan Safety, Security, and Anti-terrorism Task Force in New Orleans includes officials from the city and

four surrounding parishes.

• Collaboration with Public Health Entities: Public health departments, emergency medical services, and hospitals are

participating in planning efforts to coordinate use of limited resources such as emergency room capacity, hospital beds, and

medical supplies. For example, in Denver, the Front Range Emergency Medical Service and Trauma Advisory Council involves all

hospitals and rescue squads in a six-county metropolitan area.

• Countywide Planning: In some states, counties serve as the primary coordinating agent and work with cities within their

jurisdiction, other counties, and the state to ensure that they develop and update emergency and disaster plans, provide training,

conduct assessments and exercises, and have adequate emergency resources. For example, King County, Washington has

coordinated development of a Regional Disaster Plan, which includes Seattle and 15 other cities within the county as well as 15 fire

districts, 15 hospitals, 21 water and sewer districts, 12 school districts, and the private sector.

• Mutual Aid Agreements: Cities and counties have used mutual aid agreements to share emergency resources in their

metropolitan areas. These agreements may include fire, police, emergency medical services, and hospitals and may be formal or

informal. For example, Los Angeles has mutual aid agreements between police and fire departments in surrounding jurisdictions

and a range of private sector entities. The state has a Mutual Aid Regional Advisory Commission that facilitates agreements, and

the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) law requires mutual aid agreements for state reimbursement.

• Communications: Cities and counties currently use a variety of methods for communicating among first responders, such as

command centers, using radio, cell phones, and pagers; amateur radio operators; and community alert systems. Some are

considering 800 MHz radio systems to permit interoperability and mobile incident command centers to direct communications

among first responders. King County, Washington has a countywide 800 MHz system and uses amateur radio operators to provide

a redundant emergency communications system.

Although promising greater levels of protection than before, these shifts in

roles and responsibilities have been developed on an ad hoc piecemeal

basis without the benefit of common criteria. An ad hoc process may not

capture the real potential each actor in our system offers. Moreover, a

piecemeal redefinition of roles risks the further fragmentation of the

responsibility for homeland security within local communities, blurring

lines of responsibility and accountability for results. While federal, state,

and local governments all have roles to play, care must be taken to clarify

who is responsible for what so that the public knows whom to contact to

address their problems and concerns. Current homeland security

initiatives provide an opportunity to more systematically identify the

unique resources and capacities of each level of government and better

match these capabilities to the particular tasks at hand. If implemented in

a partnerial fashion, the national strategy can also promote the
Page 13 GAO-02-1012T

participation, input, and buy in of state and local partners whose

cooperation is essential for success.

The proposed department, in fulfilling its broad mandate, has the

challenge of developing a national performance focus. The national

strategy is a good start in defining strategic objectives and related mission

areas, plus foundations that cut across the mission areas. The national

strategy’s initiatives to implement the objectives under the related mission

and foundation areas extend from building capabilities to achieving

specific outcomes.

According to the national strategy, each department and agency is to be

held accountable for its performance on homeland security efforts.

However, the initiatives often do not provide a baseline set of goals and

measures upon which to assess and improve many of its initiatives to

prevent attacks, reduce the nation’s vulnerability to attacks, or minimize

the damage and recovering from attacks that do occur. For example, the

initiative of creating “smart borders” requires a clear specification of what

is expected of a smart border, including consideration of security and

economic aspects of moving people and goods.

Specific performance goals and measures for many initiatives will occur at

a later date. The strategy states that each department or agency will

create benchmarks and other performance measures to evaluate progress

and allocate future resources. Performance measures will be used to

evaluate the effectiveness of each homeland security program, allowing

agencies to measure their progress, make resource allocation decisions,

and adjust priorities. As the national strategy and related implementation

plans evolve, we would expect clearer performance expectations to

emerge. Given the need for a highly integrated approach to the homeland

security challenge, national performance goals and measures may best be

developed in a collaborative way involving all levels of government and

the private sector.

Assessing the capability of state and local governments to respond to

catastrophic terrorist attacks is an important feature of the national

strategy and the responsibilities of the proposed new department. The

President’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposal acknowledged that our

capabilities for responding to a terrorist attack vary widely across the

country. The national strategy recognizes the importance of standards and

performance measures in areas such as training, equipment, and

communications. For example, the national strategy proposes the

Performance Goals

and Measures Needed

in Homeland Security

Programs
Page 14 GAO-02-1012T

establishment of national standards for emergency response training and

preparedness. These standards would require certain coursework for

individuals to receive and maintain certification as first responders and for

state and local governments to receive federal grants. Under the strategy,

the proposed department would establish a national exercise program

designed to educate and evaluate civilian response personnel at all levels

of government. It would require individuals and government bodies to

complete successfully at least one exercise every year. The department

would use these exercises to measure performance and allocate future

resources.

Standards are being developed in other areas associated with homeland

security, yet formidable challenges remain. For example, national

standards that would apply to all ports and all public and private facilities

are well under way. In preparing to assess security conditions at 55 U.S.

ports, the Coast Guard’s contractor has been developing a set of standards

since May 2002. These standards cover such things as preventing

unauthorized persons from accessing sensitive areas, detecting and

intercepting intrusions, and checking backgrounds of those whose jobs

require access to port facilities. However, challenges remain in finalizing a

complete set of standards for the level of security needed in the nation’s

ports, resolving issues between key stakeholders that have conflicting or

competing interests, and establishing mechanisms for enforcement.

Moreover, because security at ports is a concern shared among federal,

state, and local governments, as well as among private commercial

interests, the issue of who should pay to finance antiterrorism activities

may be difficult to resolve.

Communications is an example of an area for which standards have not

yet been developed, but various emergency managers and other first

responders have continuously highlighted that standards are needed. State

and local governments often report that there are deficiencies in their

communications capabilities, including the lack of interoperable systems.

The national strategy recognizes that it is crucial for response personnel to

have and use equipment, systems, and procedures that allow them to

communicate. Therefore, the strategy calls for the proposed Department

of Homeland Security to develop a national communication plan to

establish protocols (who needs to talk to whom), processes, and national

standards for technology acquisition. According to the national strategy,

this is a priority for fiscal year 2003 funding which ties all federal grant

programs that support state and local purchase of terrorism-related

communications equipment to this communication plan.
Page 15 GAO-02-1012T

The establishment of specific national goals and measures for homeland

security initiatives, including preparedness, will not only go a long way

towards assisting state and local entities in determining successes and

areas where improvement is needed, but could also be used as goals and

performance measures as a basis for assessing the effectiveness of federal

programs. The Administration should take advantage of the Government

Performance and Results Act (GPRA) and its performance tools of

strategic plans, annual performance plans and measures, and

accountability reports for homeland security implementation planning. At

the department and agency level, until the new department is operational,

GPRA can be a useful tool in developing homeland security

implementation plans within and across federal agencies. Given the

recent and proposed increases in homeland security funding, as well as

the need for real and meaningful improvements in preparedness,

establishing clear goals and performance measures is critical to ensuring

both a successful and fiscally responsible effort.

The choice and design of the policy tools the federal government uses to

engage and involve other levels of government and the private sector in

enhancing homeland security will have important consequences for

performance and accountability. Governments have a variety of policy

tools including grants, regulations, tax incentives, and information-sharing

mechanisms to motivate or mandate other levels of government or the

private sector to address security concerns. The choice of policy tools will

affect sustainability of efforts, accountability and flexibility, and targeting

of resources. The design of federal policy will play a vital role in

determining success and ensuring that scarce federal dollars are used to

achieve critical national goals. The national strategy acknowledges the

shared responsibility of providing homeland security between federal,

state, and local governments, and the private sector and recognizes the

importance of using tools of government such as grants, regulations, and

information sharing to improve national preparedness.

The federal government often uses grants to state and local governments

as a means of delivering federal assistance. Categorical grants typically

permit funds to be used only for specific, narrowly defined purposes.

Block grants typically can be used by state and local governments to

support a range of activities aimed at achieving a broad, national purpose

and to provide a great deal of discretion to state and local officials. In

designing grants, it is important to (1) target the funds to states and

localities with the greatest need based on highest risk and lowest capacity

to meet these needs from their own resource bases, (2) discourage the

Appropriate Tools

Need to Be Selected

for Providing

Assistance

Grants
Page 16 GAO-02-1012T

replacement of state and local funds with federal funds, commonly

referred to as supplantation, with a maintenance-of-effort requirement that

recipients maintain their level of previous funding, and (3) strike a balance

between accountability and flexibility. At their best, grants can stimulate

state and local governments to enhance their preparedness to address the

unique threats posed by terrorism. Ideally, grants should stimulate higher

levels of preparedness and avoid simply subsidizing local functions that

are traditionally state or local responsibilities. One approach used in other

areas is the “seed money” model in which federal grants stimulate initial

state and local activity with the intent of transferring responsibility for

sustaining support over time to state and local governments.

Recent funding proposals, such as the $3.5 billion block grant for first

responders contained in the president’s fiscal year 2003 budget, have

included some of these provisions. This grant would be used by state and

local governments to purchase equipment; train personnel; and exercise,

develop, or enhance response plans. Once the details of the grant have

been finalized, it will be useful to examine the design to assess how well

the grant will target funds, discourage supplantation, and provide the

appropriate balance between accountability and flexibility, and whether it

provides temporary “seed money” or represents a long-term funding

commitment.

Other federal policy tools can also be designed and targeted to elicit a

prompt, adequate, and sustainable response. In the area of regulatory

authority, the federal, state, and local governments share authority for

setting standards through regulations in several areas, including

infrastructure and programs vital to preparedness (for example,

transportation systems, water systems, and public health). In designing

regulations, key considerations include how to provide federal

protections, guarantees, or benefits while preserving an appropriate

balance between federal and state and local authorities and between the

public and private sectors. Regulations have recently been enacted in the

area of infrastructure. For example, a new federal mandate requires that

local drinking water systems in cities above a certain size provide a

vulnerability assessment and a plan to remedy vulnerabilities as part of

ongoing EPA reviews, while the Transportation and Aviation Security Act

grants the Department of Transportation authority to order deployment of

local law enforcement personnel in order to provide perimeter access

security at the nation’s airports.

In designing a regulatory approach, the challenges include determining

who will set the standards and who will implement or enforce them.

Regulations
Page 17 GAO-02-1012T

Several models of shared regulatory authority offer a range of approaches

that could be used in designing standards for preparedness. Examples of

these models range from preemption through fixed federal standards to

state and local adoption of voluntary standards formulated by quasiofficial or nongovernmental entities.9

As the administration noted, protecting America’s infrastructure is a

shared responsibility of federal, state, and local government, in active

partnership with the private sector, which owns approximately 85 percent

of our nation’s critical infrastructure. To the extent that private entities

will be called upon to improve security over dangerous materials or to

protect critical infrastructure, the federal government can use tax

incentives to encourage or enforce their activities. Tax incentives are the

result of special exclusions, exemptions, deductions, credits, deferrals, or

tax rates in the federal tax laws. Unlike grants, tax incentives do not

generally permit the same degree of federal oversight and targeting, and

they are generally available by formula to all potential beneficiaries who

satisfy congressionally established criteria.

Since the events of September 11th, a task force of mayors and police

chiefs has called for a new protocol governing how local law enforcement

agencies can assist federal agencies, particularly the FBI. As the U.S.

Conference of Mayors noted, a close working partnership of federal and

local law enforcement agencies, which includes the sharing of

information, will expand and strengthen the nation’s overall ability to

prevent and respond to domestic terrorism. The USA Patriot Act provides

for greater sharing of information among federal agencies. An expansion

of this act has been proposed (S1615; H.R. 3285) that would provide for

information sharing among federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies. In addition, the Intergovernmental Law Enforcement

Information Sharing Act of 2001 (H.R. 3483), which you sponsored, Mr.

Chairman, addresses a number of information-sharing needs. For instance,

the proposed legislation provides that the Attorney General expeditiously

grant security clearances to Governors who apply for them and to state

and local officials who participate in federal counterterrorism working

groups or regional task forces.

 9

For more information on these models, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Regulatory

Programs: Balancing Federal and State Responsibilities for Standard Setting and

Implementation. GAO-02-495 (Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2002).

Tax Incentives

Information Sharing
Page 18 GAO-02-1012T

The national strategy also includes several information-sharing and

systems initiatives to facilitate dissemination of information from the

federal government to state and local officials. For example, the strategy

supports building and sharing law enforcement databases, secure

computer networks, secure video teleconferencing capabilities, and more

accessible websites. It also states that the federal government will make

an effort to remove classified information from some documents to

facilitate distribution to more state and local authorities.

The recent publication of the national strategy is an important initial step

in defining homeland security, setting forth key strategic objectives, and

specifying initiatives to implement them. The proposals for the

Department of Homeland Security represent recognition by the

administration and the Congress that much still needs to be done to

improve and enhance the security of the American people and our

country’s assets. The proposed department will clearly have a central role

in the success of efforts to strengthen homeland security, and has primary

responsibility for many of the initiatives in the national homeland security

strategy.

Moreover, given the unpredictable characteristics of terrorist threats, it is

essential that the strategy be implemented at a national rather than federal

level with specific attention given to the important and distinct roles of

state and local governments. Accordingly, decision makers will have to

balance the federal approach to promoting homeland security with the

unique needs, capabilities, and interests of state and local governments.

Such an approach offers the best promise for sustaining the level of

commitment needed to address the serious threats posed by terrorism.

This completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to

any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have.

For further information about this testimony, please contact me at (202)

512-9573 or JayEtta Hecker at (202) 512-2834. Other key contributors to

this testimony include Matthew Ebert, Thomas James, David LavernyRafter, Yvonne Pufahl, Jack Schulze, and Amelia Shachoy.

Conclusion

Contacts and

Acknowledgments
Page 19 GAO-02-1012T

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002.

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces

Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.:

July 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. GAO02-957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

Transferring Control of Certain Public Health Programs Raises

Concerns. GAO-02-954T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Homeland Security

Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO-02-918T. Washington, D.C.: July 9,

2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Biomedical R&D

Coordination but May Disrupt Dual-Purpose Efforts. GAO-02-924T.

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.

Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

GAO-02-927T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002.

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnership

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-901T. Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

May Complicate Priority Setting. GAO-02-893T. Washington, D.C.: June

28, 2002.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

May Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T.

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But

Implementation Will Be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington,

D.C.: June 25, 2002.

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.

Related GAO Products

Homeland Security
Page 20 GAO-02-1012T

National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology and

Information Sharing into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy.

GAO-02-811T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002.

Homeland Security: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private

Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland

Security GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.

Homeland Security: Progress Made, More Direction and Partnership

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002.

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short- and

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7,

2001.

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001.

Homeland Security: Need to Consider VA’s Role in Strengthening Federal

Preparedness. GAO-02-145T. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2001.

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach.

GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues.

GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in the

Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local

Preparedness. GAO-02-550T. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.:

March 25, 2002.

Combating Terrorism
Page 21 GAO-02-1012T

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T.

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.:

March 1, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in

Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-01-162T. Washington, D.C.:

October 17, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism

Program Implementation and Management. GAO-01-909. Washington,

D.C.: September 19, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s

Council on Domestic Preparedness. GAO-01-555T. Washington, D.C.:

May 9, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and

National Strategy. GAO-01-556T. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in

Coordinating Preparedness and Response. GAO-01-15. Washington, D.C.:

March 20, 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination.

GAO-01-14. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2000.

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of

Mass Destruction Training. GAO/NSIAD-00-64. Washington, D.C.:

March 21, 2000.
Page 22 GAO-02-1012T

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and

Biological Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50. Washington, D.C.: October 20,

1999.

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack. GAO/NSIAD-99-163.

Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs.

GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response

Equipment and Sustainment Costs. GAO-NSIAD-99-151. Washington,

D.C.: June 9, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is

Unclear. GAO/NSIAD-99-110. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism. GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency. GAO-NSIAD-99-3. Washington, D.C.:

November 12, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16. Washington, D.C.:

October 2, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments. GAO/NSIAD-98-74. Washington, D.C.:

April 9, 1998.

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination. GAO/NSIAD-98-39.

Washington, D.C.: December 1, 1997.

Homeland Security: New Department Could Improve Coordination but

may Complicate Public Health Priority Setting. GAO-02-883T.

Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002.

Public Health
Page 23 GAO-02-1012T

Bioterrorism: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Role in

Public Health Protection. GAO-02-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 15,

2001.

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness.

GAO-02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Public Health and Medical Preparedness. GAO-02-141T.

Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Coordination and Preparedness. GAO-02-129T.

Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001.

Bioterrorism: Federal Research and Preparedness Activities.

GAO-01-915. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2001.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Improved Risk Assessments and

Inventory Management Are Needed. GAO-01-667. Washington, D.C.:

September 28, 2001.

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness.

GAO/HEHS-00-180. Washington, D.C.: September 11, 2000.

Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and

Biological Attacks. GAO/NSIAD-99-163. Washington, D.C.: September 7,

1999.

Chemical and Biological Defense: Program Planning and Evaluation

Should Follow Results Act Framework. GAO/NSIAD-99-159. Washington,

D.C.: August 16, 1999.

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public

Health Initiatives. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112. Washington, D.C.: March 16,

1999.

Disaster Assistance: Improvement Needed in Disaster Declaration

Criteria and Eligibility Assurance Procedures. GAO-01-837.

Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2001.

FEMA and Army Must Be Proactive in Preparing States for

Emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2001.

Disaster Assistance
Page 24 GAO-02-1012T

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Status of Achieving Key

Outcomes and Addressing Major Management Challenges. GAO-01-832.

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2001.

Managing for Results: Progress in Linking Performance Plans with

Budget and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington, D.C.:

January 4, 2002.

Results-Oriented Budget Practices in Federal Agencies. GAO-01-1084SP.

Washington, D.C.: August 2001.

Managing for Results: Federal Managers’ Views on Key Management

Issues Vary Widely across Agencies. GAO-01-0592. Washington, D.C.: May

2001.

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High

Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000.

Managing for Results: Using the Results Act to Address Mission

Fragmentation and Program Overlap. GAO/AIMD-97-156. Washington,

D.C.: August 29, 1997.

Government Restructuring: Identifying Potential Duplication in Federal

Missions and Approaches. GAO/T-AIMD-95-161. Washington, D.C.:

June 7, 1995.

Grant Programs: Design Features Shape Flexibility, Accountability, and

Performance Information. GAO/GGD-98-137. Washington, D.C.:

June 22, 1998.

Federal Grants: Design Improvements Could Help Federal Resources Go

Further. GAO/AIMD-97-7. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 1996.

Block Grants: Issues in Designing Accountability Provisions.

GAO/AIMD-95-226. Washington, D.C.: September 1, 1995.

Budget and Management

Grant Design

(450149)