ii 

Daso, Dik A., 1959-

Architects of American air supremacy: Gen. Hap Arnold and 

Dr. Theodore yon Kármán / Dik A. Daso.

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references and index. 

1. Aeronautics. Military-Research-United States-History. 2. 

Arnold. Henry Harley. 1886-1950. 3. Yon Kármán. Theodore. 

1881-1963. 4. Air power-United States-History. I. Title. 

UG643.D37 1997 

358.4’00973-dc21 97-26768 

 CIP 

ISBN 1-58566-042-6 

First Printing September 1997 

Second Printing August 2001 

Third Printing January 2003 

Disclaimer 

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily 

represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 

the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. 

Digitize May 2003 from the January 2003 Printing. 

NOTE: On-line pagination and fonts differ from hard copy. 

Photographs are located at the end of each chapter.
iii 

Contents 

Chapter Page 

DISCLAIMER ................................................................................ ii 

ABOUT THE AUTHOR ............................................................... iv 

PREFACE...................................................................................... vi 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................. xi 

1 GENESIS .....................................................................................1 

2 EDUCATING AN AIRPOWER ARCHITECT ..........................9 

3 CONCEPTUALIZING THE FUTURE AIR FORCE ..............55 

4 THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE: THEODORE VON 

KÁRMÁN................................................................................97 

5 THE BLUEPRINT...................................................................127 

6 AIRPOWER UNDER CONSTRUCTION..............................156 

7 CONCLUSION........................................................................189 

APPENDIX A THE MILITARY CAREER OF HENRY 

HARLEY ARNOLD (CADET NO. 4596)............................205 

APPENDIX B WHERE WE STAND .......................................209 

APPENDIX C SCIENCE: THE KEY TO AIR SUPREMACY287 

GLOSSARY ................................................................................392 

BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................395
iv 
About the Author 

A native of the Cleveland area, Dik Daso is a 1981 USAF 

Academy graduate of Cadet Squadron 31, “The Grim Reapers.” 

His flying career began as a T-38 Talon instructor pilot at Laughlin

Air Force Base, Texas. He then flew two tours in the RF-4C 

Phantom, stateside and in Korea. He also flew the F-15 Eagle for a 

short tour before finishing his master’s of arts in American

revolutionary period history at the University of South Carolina

(USC) in Columbia. He taught military and world history at his 

alma mater during the 1992-93 school year. A unique set of 

circumstances allowed him to return to USC, home of the 

Gamecocks, where he completed his doctorate in military history

in March 1996. During 1995, he served as the historian for the 

most recent Air Force science and technology study, New World 

Vistas, where he edited the “Ancillary” volume (14) of the study. 

He has also published articles in the USAF professional magazine, 

Airpower Journal. 

Currently, Dik Daso is a member of the Air and Space 

Operations Directorate in the Air Staff at the Pentagon in 

Washington, D.C. 

v 
vi 

This study highlights elements of technology with which Henry 

H. Arnold and Theodore von Kármán were directly involved. Very 

little is included covering specific air operations during World War 

II, although technology was certainly vital to them. Little is 

included concerning scientific achievement outside of the 

framework of the Army Air Forces, although the effect of military 

technological development on the civilian world, during and 

particularly after the war, is indisputable. More significantly, the 

evolution of American science itself, from empiricism to a more 

German, theoretical approach to problem solution, is only 

indirectly addressed through the evolution of airpower. The 

biographical approach, emphasizing scientific and technological 

elements in Arnold’s and Kármán’s lives, is essential because the 

interaction of personalities, as well as their institutions, is 

inexorably linked to the development of American airpower. The 

importance of the personalities involved precludes a purely 

technological history of the airplane or the Air Force as a system 

within itself. For in the end, it was two men using their broad 

experience and innovative ideas, who created the blueprint with 

which American air supremacy has been built. 

A major theme of this study is how people influence each other. 

Consequently, decisions affecting institutions are molded, not just 

by experience but also by personal influences. This is a history of 

ideas. It is an examination of how the Air Force has come to 

believe itself a military service with its base firmly anchored in 

advanced technology and how those beliefs originated. 

Additionally, it is the story of how airpower technologies evolved 

through World War II. Scientists had a hand in technological 

development, but not the only hand, Government officials directed 

and funded scientific and technological research. University 

professors, a large part of the scientific community, accomplished 

much of the essential research. This posed an interesting problem 

for Kármán because, traditionally, American science had revolved 

around utilitarian values rather than theoretical understanding of 
vii 

military forces. But interaction of all of these, shaped by 

perceptions, vision, and interpersonal experiences, directed the 

actual evolution of airpower. 2

 Underlying the major themes in this 

study is the realization that an integral part of this technological 

evolution was frequently the result not of superior planning or 

wisdom, but of good fortune, or dumb luck and happenstance. 

The Army Air Corps, while led by Arnold, had actually 

jettisoned “conservatism toward technological change” long before 

the end of World War II. 3

 Arnold’s utilization of scientists, but 

particularly his association with Dr. von Kármán, propelled the 

Army Air Forces into a new era by forcing a shift in traditional 

paradigms concerning the airplane and its potential. Kármán’s 

detailed suggestions, manifest in his 1945 science and technology 

forecast reports were supported by postwar Air Force leadership 

and eventually institutionalized by the independent Air Force, 

forming the scientific and technological orientation of today’s 

massive USAF airpower system. Arnold’s selection of Kármán to 

write the first Air Force science and technology forecast ensured 

that the Air Force maintained a strong branch of German style 

theoretical methodology in problem solution in addition to a 

branch that continued using purely empirical methods. 

An examination of technological advances during this period 

shows that Arnold’s command was characterized by three distinct 

technology-related periods. All three periods were determined by 

events and pressures dictated by a combination of America’s 

political, social, and economic involvement during the interwar 

years as well as during Word War II. 

Also, an attempt has been made to level the previously heroic 

characterizations of both Arnold and Kármán, showing that each 

had personal flaws that influenced their judgment, as well as 

other’s perceptions of them, in sometimes unexpected ways. In 

many respects, these men were simply reacting to the events of 

their time, using their life experiences and relationships to untangle 

the web of crisis resulting from world war. Their personal flaws 

along with their perceived flaws of others constitute a crucial piece 
viii 

I shall not discuss many interesting areas of Air Force history 

since they have been covered by others. Operational events, to a 

large extent, have been left to other writers. Several recent works 

have admirably addressed operations, although much is yet to be 

done. Doctrine as an independent subject has been admirably 

examined by Dr. I. B. Holley Jr. and R. Frank Futrell, but, 

although related to the evolution of technology, doctrine is not 

examined independently here. Holley’s conclusions about the 

organizational shortfalls in the Army Air Forces from the First to 

the Second World War are, perhaps, too simplistic in the largely 

unexplored area of science and technology. Benjamin S. Kelsey 

has addressed the foundations of Army Air Corps production and 

procurement in The Dragon’s Teeth: The Creation of United States 

Air Power for World War II and suggests that the foundations for 

America’s massive production efforts were established well before 

the beginnings of the Second World War. Holley has also 

produced a masterful assessment of procurement of aircraft in the 

Army Air Forces. The "nuts and bolts" of this complex piece of the 

Air Force puzzle is meticulously dissected in his monograph, 

Buying Aircraft: Matériel Procurement for the Army Air Forces, 

prepared for the Army Center of Military History. Politics of the 

interwar period, also an important element of this study, have been 

admirably examined in Jeffrey S. Underwood’s, The Wings of 

Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt 

Administration, 1933-1941, a crucial step forward in the military 

historiography of the period. Herman. Wolk’s study, Planning and 

Organizing the Post War Air Force, 1943-1947, is excellent for 

administrative matters. He is currently revising and expanding the 

work for the upcoming 50th anniversary of the Air Force. At this 

time, however, it does not include anything more than a cursory 

look at the administration of scientific elements. Ronald 

Schaffer’s, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War 

II, addresses the issues of ethics and morality as it applied to 

American World War II bombing campaigns. This approach seems 

to have increased relevancy, particularly in the recent controversy 

over the Smithsonian’s Enola Gay exhibit. 4
ix 

Thomas M. Coffey and published in 1982. Contributions for the 

project were made by many of Arnold’s closest associates and 

friends so that it is hardly without bias. Exhaustive personal 

interviews and correspondence formed the backbone of his 

research, and the problems of memory are present at times. An 

excellent summary of Arnold’s personality, authored by Maj Gen 

John W. Huston, USAF, Retired, can be found in The Proceedings 

of the Eighth Military History Symposium, held at the USAF 

Academy in 1978. His article, “The Wartime Leadership of ‘Hap’ 

Arnold,” is not so much about leadership as it is about the 

determination and drive behind leadership. Another short 

biography by Flint O. DuPre, is merely a summary of Arnold’s 

own Global Mission, published in 1949. As is frequently pointed 

out, some dates are wrong and some names are misplaced, but 

Global Mission is still the best account of Arnold’s personal life 

and his private relationships that is available. 5

 

Theodore von Kármán has been the subject of two biographical 

efforts and many biographical articles. The most recent of these, 

The Universal Man: Theodore von Kármán’s Life in Aeronautics, 

by Dr. Michael H. Gorn, traces the professor’s life in its entirety. 

Paul A. Hanle also chronicled Kármán’s life in Bringing 

Aerodynamics to America, which leans more toward his European 

accomplishments and the European scientific climate in the early 

1900s. Together, these two works are an excellent set. The 

research in these two volumes reaches far above that of the Arnold 

works, perhaps a reflection of the tendency of American historians 

to shy away from military topics. 6

 

If the current trend continues, however, military history may be 

on the brink of a necessary reshaping. Gorn, for example, has 

authored a study of the science and technology forecasting process 

in the US Air Force titled Harnessing the Genie: Science and 

Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986. His 

emphasis is an evaluation of the evolution of this process, rather 

than the story of its origins. Yet even this work is now incomplete 

as the Air Force has just completed its latest science and 

technology forecast, New World Vistas, delivered to the secretary 
x 

The photos within this study reflect research done over the past 

two years. Many of these photos have not been seen since the end 

of World War II. Many more have never been published in any 

historical works. With a subject that continually bounces up 

against technological devices of one kind or another, it is often 

easier to show than to tell the reader what exactly they are reading 

about. The appendices include a brief career summary for General 

Arnold, including his West Point records, and Kármán’s two 

summary reports, Where We Stand (includes Parts I and III, which 

have never been published) and Science: The Key to Air 

Supremacy. Rather than a detailed analysis of the documents, they 

have been included in their entirety. 

In addition, I have been fortunate to conduct several interviews 

with individuals who participated in many of the events that 

occurred from 1930 to 1950. From early jet assisted takeoff 

(JATO) participants to original Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) 

members, their contributions have been indispensable. 

Unfortunately, I have been forced to depend upon others for 

material in foreign archives, particularly those in the Public 

Records Office and other British aviation repositories. 

In the end, this project adds the story of an intricate scientific 

and technological evolutionary process to all major works in fields 

which examine Air Force aviation. No single volume contains 

more than brief glimpses into the origins of the ideas behind 

American military airpower as it relates to the development of a 

technological system driven by social, political, personal, and 

military influences. These brief glimpses require clarification and 

expansion. I believe this study serves to fill that void. 

 dad 

18 September 1997 

Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
xi 

1. Perhaps the best discussion of the American propensity to 

pragmatism can be found in, Edward W. Constant II, The 

Origins of the Turbojet Revolution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 1980). The quiet battle that took place in 

American science during the 1930s and 1940s between the 

theoretical engineers and the practical engineers is an 

underlying current in this study. It is my intention to 

demonstrate how the interaction of each of these scientific 

schools affected the development of airpower largely through 

personal and institutional values, beliefs, and interactions. 

2. John M. Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers (Cambridge, 

Mass.: MIT Press, 1985). One thing becomes clear in this book, 

approaches to the history of technology vary tremendously from 

author to author. The Society for the History of Technology has 

acted as a clearinghouse for these over the past several decades 

but only recently has there been an explosion of works in this 

field. 

3. Alex Roland, “Science, Technology, and War,” Technology and 

Culture 36 (supp.), no. 2 (April 1995): S83-S99. 

4. The following are listed in the order mentioned in the text: 

Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe 

(Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1993); I. B. 

Holley Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial 

Weapon by the United States During World War I (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1953). Holley addresses the 

interwar period more directly in “Jet Lag in the Army Air 

Corps,” in Military Planning in the Twentieth Century: The 

Proceedings of the USAFA 11th Military History Symposium. 

1984 USAF Academy, ed., Harry R Borowski (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1986); however, the element 

of American utilitarian methodology versus German theoretical 

approach to problems is not directly addressed; Robert Frank 

Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine: vol. 1, Basic Thinking in 

the United States Air Force, 1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 

Air University Press, 1989); Benjamin S. Kelsey, The Dragon's 
xii 

Holley Jr., Buying Aircraft: Matériel Procurement for the Army 

Air Forces (Washington, D.C.: Center for Military History, 

United States Army, 1964); Jeffery S. Underwood, The Wings 

of Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt 

Administration. 1933-1941 (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M 

University Press, 1991); Herman S. Wolk, Planning and 

Organizing the Post War Air Force, 1943-1947 (Washington, 

D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984); and Ronald Schaffer, 

Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1985). Michael S. Sherry, The 

Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon 

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), is a sweeping 

approach to explain the growth of American air forces from 

both political and intellectual directions. 

5. The following are listed in the order mentioned in the text: 

Thomas M. Coffey, HAP: The Story of the U. S. Air Force and 

the Man Who Built It, General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold (New 

York: Viking Press, 1982); John W. Huston, “The Wartime 

Leadership of ‘Hap’ Arnold,” in Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. 

Ehrhart, eds., Air Power and Warfare: The Proceedings of the 

8th Military History Symposium. United States Air Force 

Academy, 18-20 October 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Office of 

Air Force History. 1979); Flint O. DuPre, Hap Arnold: 

Architect of American Air Power (New York: MacMillan Co., 

1972); and Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: 

Harper and Brothers, 1949). 

6. Michael H. Gorn, The Universal Man: Theodore von Kármán's 

Life in Aeronautics (Washington. D.C.: Smithsonian Institution 

Press, 1992); Paul A Hanle, Bringing Aerodynamics to America 

(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982). 

7. Michael H. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and 

Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988). 
xi 

g

This project, in its entirety, has benefited from the efforts of 

many dedicated individuals. Dr. Michael H. Gorn, from the Office 

of Air Force History, has provided welcome encouragement and 

keen, yet compassionate, criticism. His singular knowledge of 

Theodore von Kármán, and his enthusiasm for the same, has been 

of prime importance during this project. Additionally, my graduate 

committee consisting of Professor Owen Connelly, Professor Alex 

Roland, and particularly Dr. S. Paul Mackenzie have helped me 

maintain focus, condense, rebuild, and discard in places, where 

pride of ownership frequently formed a barrier between logic and 

irrationality. Pointed comments by Maj Gen John W. Huston, 

USAF, Retired, Col Murray Green, USAF, Retired, Mr. Herman 

Wolk, and Dr. Daniel Mortensen were not only appreciated but 

also saved several obvious errors. Those which remain are solely 

my own. 

A number of individuals gave of their time in personal 

interviews. Among these, is Professor William R. Sears, a long 

time Kármán associate and one of his most gifted pupils. His 

impersonation of his Hungarian professor added both humor and 

penetration to that complex man. Professor “Homerjoe” Stewart 

kindly welcomed me into his home on short notice and shared his 

personal experiences with the JATO project and the early days of 

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. Additionally, Dr. H. Guyford Stever 

and Gen Bernard Schriever, USAF, Retired, provided details on 

the early Scientific Advisory Board and early US missile 

development where they had been lacking before. Dr. Ivan Getting 

and Mr. Chester Hasert, both original Scientific Advisory Group 

members (1944-1945), shared personal stories and experiences that 

enriched my understanding of the infant SAG as well as added 

color to the experience of Operation Lusty, the scientist’s invasion 

of Europe. 

During the research phase of this project, many archivists were 

held hostage by my continual questioning, “stacks” requests, and 

fax queries. Among these are the archivists of the Library of 
xii 

and at Silver Hill, Maryland; the California Institute of Technology 

Institute Archives, now housed in the new Beckman Center 

basement; the West Point Archives; and the National Archives at 

College Park, Maryland. Particularly meritorious efforts were 

made by John Bluth at the Jet Propulsion Lab in Pasadena, 

California, Bonnie Ludt at the Caltech Archives, and too many 

members of the Library of Congress staff to name. 

I am indebted to the USAF Historical Research Agency and Col 

Richard Rauschkolb’s meticulous staff. A research grant from that 

institution got this project off to a fine start. The archives at 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, offer a wealth of personal 

papers and unit histories that are essential material for any work in 

the airpower field. Also at Maxwell AFB, I owe many thanks to 

Col Phillip S. Meilinger, dean, School of Advanced Airpower 

Studies, who read early versions of the history and offered careful 

criticism and candid advice. 

More personally, I owe a great debt to Robert Arnold, General 

Arnold’s grandson, who spent the better part of a weekend 

showing me his personal collection of Arnold memorabilia and 

papers. From him I received a unique look into Arnold’s family 

life as well as a new appreciation for California wine. 

Finally, I owe a special thanks to Mr. Duane J. Reed, USAF 

Academy Special Collections. As an Air Force Academy cadet I 

respected his judgment and wisdom on any airpower history 

matter. Today, as an Air Force major, I realize how his dedication 

to cadet education through the years has impacted personal and 

professional lives throughout the USAF. It was during a 1993 

discussion in his office at the Air Force Academy Special 

Collections Branch, that the concept for this project crystallized. 
1 

Genesis 

When the Wright Brothers accomplished America’s first 

powered airplane flight on 17 December 1903, they would have 

been hard pressed to believe that in less than one century, manned 

aircraft would refuel in midair, travel at hypersonic speeds, carry 

tons of cargo in warehouse-size holds, or serve as the primary 

means of international world travel. Their airplane was a device 

that had only one purpose, to lift a man into the sky. Today, 

aircraft perform too many functions to count, using so many 

different designs that even knowing them all is a monumental 

undertaking. But how is it that we have come so far, so fast? 

Important answers lie in the complex relationship between the 

American military and the society in which it exists. Individuals, 

both military and civilian, make decisions based upon perceptions 

and experience as much as upon the presumed capability of a 

particular technology. In the case of the Army and the air weapon, 

this was particularly true. 

This is a story of genesis. It is simple to argue that, today, 

American airpower is a decisive factor on the modern world 

battlefield. Air supremacy demonstrated against Iraq in the 1991 

Gulf War bolsters the case. During World War II, this would have 

been a much more difficult, even impossible, argument to make. It 

was during that war, under the leadership of Gen Henry H. “Hap” 

Arnold, that the Army Air Forces (AAF) earned the recognition 

and respect of the entire world. In retrospect, this was largely due 

to American industrial strength. Mass production of weapons to 

meet the needs of the armed forces reached a fevered pitch during 

World War II. Forever after, this symbiotic relationship has existed 

in reality, although not officially in the lexicon until 1960, as the 

“military-industrial complex.” 

But the state of today’s Air Force cannot be attributed to 

General Arnold or anyone individual. It is possible, however, to 

trace the origins of American air supremacy directly to Arnold’s 

understanding of airpower and the intuitive powers of Theodore 
2 

these men, both assisted by the experience of lengthy, diversified 

professional careers, came together and created that blueprint, 

Toward New Horizons, and finalized it on 15 December 1945. 

Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold 

Henry H. Arnold, a man of vision and determination, was there 

almost from the beginning. Born 25 June 1886, he learned to fly in 

1911 and, with Lt Thomas D. Milling, started the Army’s first 

flying school that same year. By accident, Arnold ended up in 

Washington, D.C. during the First World War where he was 

influential in building a war economy for airplane production in 

1917. Although generally accepted as “too little, too late,” these 

efforts provided Arnold invaluable experience utilized with great 

effect in the Second World War. Between the wars, Arnold was 

involved with a variety of traditionally “unmilitary” uses for the 

Army’s airplanes-forest fire watching, “New Deal” reform support, 

US mail delivery, and air shows. He was keenly aware of the links 

between politics and public opinion to the survival of the Army’s 

air forces. At the same time, Arnold found himself in the middle of 

radical changes in aviation technology. He led 10 Martin B-10 

bombers from Washington, D.C., to Fairbanks, Alaska, 

demonstrating the capability of the Army’s new all-metal 

monoplane. He handled publicity well and frequently used it to the 

advantage of the Army Air Forces. l

 

Although a dynamic public personality, his military methods 

have often been called into question. He was never a very good 

student (see appendix A for his West Point record), although his 

military performance record at the military academy would have 

been considered excellent until his senior, or first class, year. 

During his active duty career, he seemed, at times, harsh and 

abrupt. He sometimes made hasty decisions but was capable of 

rescinding those which, in different light, appeared flawed. His 

loyalty was called into question by his superiors. Nevertheless, as 

World War II approached, circumstances delivered Gen Hap 

Arnold command of the Army Air Corps. 
3 

chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, There was some 

lost motion in those early days, but Arnold straightened that out 

before the war was over.” 2

 He did this, in large degree, by strength 

of his own will and certainty in his decisions. His father’s 

influence, summarized on a photo he scribed for his son Harley in 

1903, was ever apparent. “Fully comprehend what is required of 

you,” it read, “and act with promptness and fidelity.” Others, such 

as the Wright Brothers, reinforced in Arnold that “the ‘will to do’ 

in many cases may make the impossible, possible.” 3

 Laurence S. 

Kuter, a member of Arnold’s trusted advisory council, once wrote 

that it was very unwise to utter the words, “It can’t be done,” 

around the general. Those were fighting words. 4

 

Many descriptive adjectives have been used by contemporaries, 

superiors, and subordinates in describing Arnold: go’er, do’er, 

strong and courageous, tough and rough, turbo-supercharged, a 

steam engine, and leading at a very fast pace. 5

 Gen Emmett 

“Rosie” O’Donnell, USAF, Retired, one of Arnold’s advisory 

council, recalled that, “when confronted by a problem, he solved 

the problem and didn’t try to look for some ideal way to do it. He 

hit it head on. He was a great red-tape cutter.” 6 He had a classic 

type-A personality. Two additional traits: impatience and 

remarkable vision toward the future, are most important in 

understanding Gen Hap Arnold as an airpower pacesetter. 

“I have been impatient all my life,” the general wrote in 1942, 

“and will probably be impatient to get the caisson rolling faster 

when I go through the gates of Arlington but that’s my make-up, 

and that’s that.” 7

 He was unable to tolerate delay and was restless. 

He was unable to sit in one place for very long, unless in a highlevel meeting, and was always in the middle of one project or 

another. 8

 He rejected opposition and was intolerant. His disdain 

for “can’t do” attitudes was well known. 9

 He was, above other 

definitions, restively eager for things to happen. Arnold wanted 

any task to have happened yesterday; no fiddling around, 

particularly during war. His driving personality, mixed with the 

pressures of high command during World War II, contributed 

stresses which probably exacerbated the heart condition that ended 
4 

who had been tagged or Hey, youd in the hall by Arnold. 

Occasionally, when dissatisfied or just to make a point, Arnold 

resorted to a verbal eruption that was not soon forgotten by the 

recipient. 11 

To admit that Arnold was impatient is one thing, to suggest that 

his impatience was deleterious would certainly be incorrect. The 

United States military, facing a war on two fronts separated by six 

thousand miles, could not have been in a more precarious position. 

Airplanes, pilots, and mechanics could not have appeared fast 

enough to diminish the immediate threat of catastrophe. Gen Hap 

Arnold’s “impatience” was exactly what the Army Air Corps 

needed during the early years of American involvement, both 

before and during World War II. 12

 In 1944 Arnold also 

demonstrated that his vision for the future was as important to the 

Army Air Forces as his impatience had been before the war began. 

His flying experience as well as his familiarity with the 

Washington bureaucratic system in two world wars was nothing 

less than a miraculous combination at exactly the right time. 

Theodore von Kármán 

Theodore von Kármán, Hungarian, Jewish, and one of Europe’s 

finest scientific minds, came to America to escape the radically 

changing social and political climate in Germany where he had 

been teaching during the 1920s. Enticed by the deep pocket of the 

Guggenheim Fund, Kármán was convinced that his work could be 

best accomplished in the pleasant surroundings of Pasadena, 

California, at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). 

After severing his official ties with Germany, Kármán became a 

vital scientific voice during the expansion of American airpower. 

He, too, had been molded at an early age by his father’s 

influence. Although Kármán had demonstrated remarkable 

mathematical aptitude in his youth, his father insisted upon his 

study of humanities and the arts. Kármán was formally educated in 

strict German style, and in his young adulthood he enjoyed the 
5 

real world situations like soil erosion and construction-related 

stress problems by using fluid flow dynamics equations. His 

theoretical brilliance, tempered with intuitive practicality, which he 

credited to his father’s pedagogical advice, was harnessed in 

America through a remarkable circle of acquaintances and a 

unique convergence of circumstances. This was true despite the 

tendency of American scientists to ignore theoretical science 

resulting in pragmatic and empirical solutions to engineering 

problems. 13 

But Kármán was not the only European scientist who emigrated 

to the United States. Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, Eugene 

Wigner, Leo Szilard, James Franck, and Edward Teller, for 

example, had also decided that the US offered a safer, more open 

climate for their scientific work. 14 But Kármán brought with him 

an international reputation as the finest aeronautical mind of his 

generation. He also brought the unique ability to see through the 

complexities of a problem, envision a simplified solution, 

communicate the solution to his younger associates, and then, 

knowing the situation would be resolved, move on to the next 

pressing problem. The seeds of his wisdom, having been planted in 

the minds of his colleagues and students, were then free to grow 

and bear fruit. His expertise in aeronautics and his success in 

problem solving became well known to Army Air Forces 

leadership, not only by direct contact, but through the advice and 

recommendation of influential Kármán associates. His enthusiasm 

and scientific intuition was accessible just when Gen Hap Arnold 

and his air forces needed that wisdom most. 

The Evolution of Airpower 

This is the story of the evolution of a technology, more 

correctly, a technological system: airpower. It is this process that is 

examined here. Used throughout the work is the single word 

airpower as it has become conventional to do within Air Force 

circles. Airpower, the word, represents a unification of instrument 

and function and summarily implies much more than just 
6 

power in describing the totality of his air forces, which included 

much more than just combat airplanes used in war. 15 

In the early days, airplanes were a curiosity. By the end of the 

Second World War, the airplane, in all its different forms, was only 

a small part of an intricate system. Since the creation of the Menlo 

Park invention factory by Thomas A. Edison, technological 

systems have been a reality. Initially, early systems included only 

physical components-pieces of the machine itself. From 1876 

through 1925, systems developed into more than just machines but 

also included organizations, people, and other nonphysical 

attributes. “Large systems,” according to Thomas P. Hughes, 

consisted of “energy production, communication, and 

transportation, which composed the essence of modern 

technology.” 16 

The air forces developed all of these elements and many others 

specific to accomplishing aerial combat missions during World 

War II. These included a variety of industrial production efforts, 

massive chains of military logistics support, overseas and 

continental air bases, munitions production of all kinds, radar 

detection webs, technical training schools, steel mills, research and 

development facilities (civilian and military), as well as 

cooperative efforts between Allies. 

In fact, the Army Air Forces were participants in what Hughes 

has called, “the twentieth century’s most characteristic activitytechnological system building.” 17 The development of this 

complex military airpower system, in America at least, functioned 

often as much as a result of personality interactions, perceptions, 

and trust, as it did due to the available technologies, or “gadgets,” 

themselves. The air war effort, in all its different facets, became so 

massive that, to many, even General Arnold, it frequently seemed 

incomprehensible. 18 
7 

1. The Army Air Forces did not officially come into being until 1941. Before 

then, from 1920 to 1926, it was the Army Air Service. From 1926-1941, it was 

the Army Air Corps. On 18 September 1947, the Air Force was officially born. 

Throughout this study, I will attempt to use the appropriate title for the 

appropriate time period. Frequently, the term air forces refers to the air force in 

use at that time, regardless of the official name, to minimize confusion. 

2. Gen Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Retired, oral history interview (OHI) 

number 206, 3 November 1967, United States Air Force Academy (USAFA), 

Special Collections, Colorado Springs, Colo., 40-42. 

3. H. H. Arnold, “Sunday with the Wrights,” 1925-1926, Library of 

Congress, box 227; also located in the Murray Green Collection (MGC), 

USAFA, Special Collections, Colorado Springs, Colo. In the Green notes, he 

described the photograph in notes taken while at the Arnold Ranch in Sonoma, 

Calif. 

4. Laurence S. Kuter, “The General vs. The Establishment: Gen H. H. 

Arnold and the Air Staff,” Aerospace Historian, September 1973, 186. The 

advisory council was a very interesting organization that Arnold initiated early 

in his tenure as commander of the Army’s air forces. It included several officers 

who were assigned directly to Arnold and who had no other function but to 

organize tasks and help out the “thinking process” for the general. Arnold wrote 

to Carl “Tooey” Spaatz on the occasion of their change of command that it was 

one of the most valuable tools he ever had. A more detailed study of the 

advisory council is not offered here but would be a valuable examination for the 

future. 

5. Thomas D. Milling, oral history interview, Columbia University Oral 

History Review (CUOHR), MGC; Benjamin S. Kelsey, interviewed by Murray 

Green, 9 June 1971, MGC; Twining; and Thomas M. Coffey, HAP: The Story 

of the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built It. General Henry H. “Hap” 

Arnold (New York: Viking Press, 1982), 202. 

6. Gen Emmett “Rosie” O’Donnell, USAF, Retired, oral history interview, 2 

December 1967, USAFA/OHI, USAF Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), 

Maxwell AFB, Ala., K239.0512-1476. 

7. Henry H. Arnold to Carl A. Spaatz, letter, 19 August 1942, MGC. 

8. Laurence S. Kuter, “How Hap Built the AAF,” Air Force Magazine 56, 

no. 9 (September 1973): 88-93. 

9. “Reminiscences of Friends and Family: Carl A. Spaatz,” CUOHR. Here 

Spaatz explains General Arnold’s impatience. 

10. Maj Gen Franklin Carroll, interviewed by Murray Green, 1 September 

1972, MGC; James H. Doolittle, oral history interview, 22 December 1977, 

USAFA/OHI, 20-21; Kuter, “The General vs. The Establishment,” 189. 
8 

py pyy 

is more important is that he apparently had the right personality for the situation. 

13. Hugh L. Dryden, oral history interview, CUOHR, AFHRA, 38. Dryden 

said that the difference between American scientists and German scientists was, 

“If the calculations didn’t make practical sense, then the Americans didn’t build 

it. However, if that is what the formulas said, then the Germans decided to build 

it that way.” The definitions of technology, applied science, pure science, basic 

(fundamental) research, and applied technology are elusive, but 50 years ago 

they were not only different than they are now, they often had less delineation 

than does today’s lexicon. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker wrote in their book Winged 

Warfare (New York: Harper and Brothers Pub., 1941), 215, “Research has been 

defined as a systematic investigation of some phenomena ... by the experimental 

method, to discover facts or coordinate them as laws. This is a dry definition 

which fulfills the requirement of the scientist.” It appeared that Arnold 

understood American science perfectly. 

14. Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and 

Technological Enthusiasm (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 389. 

15. Arnold, speech before the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 

(NACA) employees in Cleveland, Ohio, 9 November 1944, film, in the 

possession of Mr. Robert Arnold, Sonoma, Calif. 

16. Hughes, 24-35, 184-85. For further study of the evolution of 

technological systems in America, see Hughes’s notes 1-4, 487-88. I have 

adopted his simple definition of “technological systems” for this study; 

additionally, Martin van Creveld’s, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the 

Present (New York: Free Press, 1989), 153-234, pt. III, “The Age of Systems,” 

offers a broad examination of the growth of military systems of all kinds from 

1830 to 1945. 

17. Hughes, 184-87, 381-98. Quote on 383. Hughes offers an excellent study 

of the evolution of a variety of systems in America and considers many of the 

driving influences behind them. 

18. Henry H. Arnold to Frank M. Andrews, letter, 29 March 1943, found in 

Frank M. Andrews Papers, box 1, correspondence “A,” Library of Congress, 

Washington, D.C. See chapter two for the discussion. 
9 

Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold was not supposed to enter the 

Army. l

 His older brother, Thomas, was to attend West Point and 

continue the Arnolds’ family tradition of American military service 

that began during the War for Independence. Henry Harley, Hap’s 

namesake and great-great-grandfather, had been a private in the 

Pennsylvania militia. Another relative, Peter Arnold, fought with 

Gen George Washington’s army. Thomas G. Arnold, his 

grandfather, had been a nail maker and fought at the Battle of 

Gettysburg during the Civil War. Herbert, Henry’s father, had been 

a physician during the Spanish-American War and served in Puerto 

Rico in 1898. Despite the military legacy, and after attending Penn 

State during the year prior to the West Point admission tests, 

Thomas rejected his parents’ persistent urging to attend West 

Point. So Henry Arnold, then called Harley, inherited the 

opportunity to carry on the family’s military heritage, which he did 

with great distinction. 2

 

Cadet Arnold entered the military academy the same year the 

Wright Brothers flew at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, but horses, 

not airplanes, were his first love. He, along with many West 

Pointers in the class of 1907, yearned for a cavalry assignment. 

The dashing uniforms, the thunder of the charge, and the perceived 

class distinction between cavalry and every other branch of the 

Army, except the Engineering Corps, did not escape observation 

by members of the Corps of Cadets. 3

 One of the youngest cadets 

ever admitted to West Point at 17 years and one month, Arnold 

found a niche at the tradition-laden institution. He became a 

founding member and, eventually, the leader of the “Black Hand.” 

This covert spirit squad was responsible for many of the most 

spectacular student pranks ever accomplished in West Point’s 

history. Harley, called “Pewt” and “Benny” by his friends, had a 

fiery tongue and was frequently late for class. He earned far fewer 

demerits, however, than most classmates during his first three 

years at “The Point” (see appendix A). While leading the 
10 

y g

the window of his room. He had been confined to quarters for a 

disciplinary infraction. 4

 

Arnold also channeled his spirit into sports. He saw frequent 

playing time as a second string varsity football running back, put 

the shot for his class track and field team, and excelled at polo. 

Academically. Harley had an uncanny memory. He “specked” 

(memorized) several pages of logarithmic tables, which was 

impressive but did not raise his final class standing any higher than 

66 out of 111. His standing would have been much lower were it 

not for generally high military discipline marks. Cadet Arnold’s 

last weeks at the military academy were, perhaps, typical for the 

soon-to-be lieutenant. During cavalry drill (cadets still rode horses 

regularly in those days), Arnold was awarded demerits for chewing 

tobacco during formation, an act strictly forbidden. Not only did 

this infraction keep him from many of the graduation festivities, 

but some believed that it provided the necessary leverage for the 

authorities in charge of graduation assignments to issue Arnold a 

ticket straight into the infantry. The cavalry, Arnold wrote, “was 

the last romantic thing left on earth.” 5

 His graduation standing was 

too low for engineering school, and after a brief but high-powered 

struggle, arranged by his father and fought by the new lieutenant 

against his congressman, his senator, and the adjutant general of 

the Army, he accepted his commission and assignment as an 

infantryman. In later reflection, his wife, Bee, summarized the 

situation. “Those with brains got the engineers, but I don’t think 

that Hap was the engineering type at all.” 6 

Lieutenant Arnold “volunteered” for an assignment in the 

Philippine Islands. The secretary of war, the only man in the Army 

who could change his assignment, was in the islands overseeing 

the establishment of new Army posts, and Arnold hoped to plead 

his case personally. He never got that opportunity. For the next two 

years Arnold worked hand in hand with engineering corpsmen 

already mapping various islands and never saw the secretary of 

war. 
11 

In 1909, his unit was transferred to Fort Jay on Governors 

Island, New York. There Arnold became aware of the airplane as 

more than just a curiosity. Although he had seen the Bleriot 

airplane briefly while in France on his roundabout return from the 

Philippines, both the Wright Flyer, purchased in 1908 by the 

Army, and a Glenn Curtiss machine landed at Governors Island 

during his tour. Still trying to escape the infantry, Lieutenant 

Arnold took the entrance tests for the Ordnance Department, which 

held the most promise for early promotion (the lowest rank 

allowed in this division was first lieutenant). While waiting for the 

results of the exams, Arnold received a letter from the War 

Department which offered him the opportunity of a lifetime; the 

chance to learn how to fly. 7

 

Against the advice of his commander, but recognizing an 

opportunity to free himself from infantry ties, he accepted orders 

for flight instruction. Arnold recalled his commanding officer’s 

warning, “Young man, I know of no better way for a person to 

commit suicide!” 8

 The young second lieutenant considered those 

words a challenge. By April 1911, Arnold was in Dayton, Ohio, to 

begin flying lessons at Simms Station, the home of the Wright 

Brothers’ flying school. Arnold joined Lt Thomas DeWitt 

“Tommy” Milling for an introduction to the flying machine given 

by the Wrights at their factory. Together, Arnold and Milling spent 

hours learning how the delicate machine was assembled, 

disassembled, greased, tightened, and repaired. Sharing the 

experience of becoming new aviators, the two young lieutenants 

developed a fast friendship. Arnold was grateful for the time spent 

in the factory because, although the Army had decided to train 

pilots, it had not begun training mechanics or crew chiefs. In 1911, 

every pilot was also a mechanic of sorts. 

Orville and Wilbur Wright normally taught these ground 

lessons personally, but Arnold’s flight instructor was a Wright 

employee named Al Welsh. In fact, it does not appear that Arnold 

ever took a flying lesson with Orville or Wilbur Wright. Between 3 

May and 13 May, Arnold flew every one of his first 28 lessons 
12 

(q[]) 

July 1911. He did not receive his “official” military aviator rating 

until 22 July 1912, as reflected in War Department General Order 

No. 40. 9

Following initial flight qualification, Arnold and Milling crated 

up the Army’s two newest Wright Flyers and followed them by 

train to College Park, Maryland, the home of the first Signal Corps 

flight school. The hours spent on the Wright factory floor began to 

payoff. Arnold and Milling assembled the craft themselves in 

preparation for the opening of the flight school. The only two 

Army pilots were now its only flight instructors as well. Not only 

did they become skilled pilots but they became skilled airplane 

mechanics and dedicated crew chiefs as well. They even created 

the first “dash-1,” the airplane technical manual, which included a 

picture of the craft with each of the parts meticulously labeled by 

hand. 

Flight then was still a fair weather game. As winter approached 

the Washington area, the aviators boxed up their planes and moved 

to Barnes Farm, near Augusta, Georgia, hoping for more temperate 

weather. Although the flyers endured the only blizzard to hit 

Augusta in 15 years, much flying and training, including wireless 

radio work, photography, and even bomb dropping was 

accomplished before returning to College Park in May 1912.10 

For the rest of that year, tragedy seemed to stalk the flying 

community. Wilbur Wright died of typhoid fever on 30 May. Al 

Welsh died in a plane crash in June. In July, Arnold crashed off the 

coast of Massachusetts in a new Burgess/Wright “tractor” airplane. 

It was in that crash that Arnold received the scar on his chin that 

showed distinctively for the rest of his life. Two more Army 

aviators, Lewis C. Rockwell and Corp Frank Scott, were killed in 

September (Scott was the first enlisted man to perish in an aircraft 

accident). In November, it was Arnold who would once again face 

the hazards of early flight. 11 
13 

gy gy, 

College Park, and Washington, D.C., and pin-point a “troop 

concentration.” In winning the award, Arnold had completed the 

reconnaissance course and reported the strength and location of the 

simulated enemy troop concentrations to the event judges. In one 

respect the “contest” was really not a contest at all. Milling, the 

only other participant, had become ill immediately after takeoff 

and was forced to withdraw. The flight did, however, demonstrate 

an actual mission for Army aviation, something the Army air arm 

was still struggling to define (as demonstrated by the variety of 

missions practiced while bivouacked in Georgia). Perhaps because 

of these circumstances, Arnold did not take himself or his 

accomplishment too seriously. The young lieutenant wrote Bee 

that “It [the trophy] certainly is handsome. I figure that it will hold 

about four gallons so I cannot see how you can fill it with anything 

but beer.” 12 

At the end of the month, Arnold, Milling, and the rest of the 

College Park airmen traveled to Fort Riley, Kansas, to participate 

in Army ground force exercises. Arnold’s enthusiasm for flying 

was temporarily doused by a nearly fatal airplane flight on 5 

November 1912. Lieutenant Arnold and an observer, Lt A. L. P. 

Sands, were inexplicably thrown into a spin toward the ground. 

Arnold righted the craft and missed a violent crash by only a few 

seconds and tens of feet. The onboard altitude-measuring device, a 

barograph, clearly recorded a drop of 300 feet in 10 seconds, 

ending up just above the ground zero line. It was too close a call 

for Arnold. He was so rattled that he immediately requested three 

weeks leave and temporarily removed himself from flying status. 

“From the way I feel now,” he explained, “I do not see how I can 

get in a machine with safety for the next month or two.” By then, 

Arnold had earned several aviation firsts: winning the first Mackay 

Trophy, setting several altitude records, and, somewhat more 

dubiously, accomplishing the first successful spin recovery in an 

airplane. 13 
14 

, g gyg 

married Eleanor Pool in September 1913; he was effectively 

removed from the active flying roster. At that time, Army flyers 

were not permitted to marry and remain on flying status. Although 

this requirement softened by World War I, Arnold was relegated to 

ground duties until November 1916. 14 

Although back in the infantry, Arnold never wavered in his 

belief in the importance of airpower. He recalled that in 1913, 

flyers fought a constant uphill battle for acceptance as well as for 

modern equipment. “At that time,” Arnold said, “we in the Air 

Service looked to foreign countries for engines that might give us 

better performance.” 15 Even as a lieutenant, Arnold looked for the 

best technology available, regardless of its origin. 

Not only did the lieutenant look for the best new technology, he 

constantly sought improvements for the machines the Army 

already had. As early as 6 November 1911, Arnold had written 

Orville Wright about his concerns that aircraft did not carry 

enough weight or climb fast enough for military use. Arnold 

suggested increasing engine power and propeller revolutions to 

maximize performance. Brother Wilbur responded with a detailed 

explanation of how to fine-tune the engines, both new and old, and 

explained that the propellers and chains “have a large factor of 

safety and if sudden jerks are avoided, will easily carry 25% more 

power than our present motors give.” 16 But Arnold was not 

satisfied with the response. On 18 November, he again wrote the 

Wrights. “Could we put a 60 or 70 H.P. [horsepower] engine in the 

standard machine and put 2 or 3 more teeth in the engine sprocket? 

This would give us much more power when it was needed but for 

ordinary flying we could fly on less than the maximum power of 

the motor.” 17 Arnold was always pushing for improved equipment 

and maximum aircraft capability, whether it was available or not. 

After his nearly fatal spin, Arnold continued his inquiries, 

initially with a different emphasis. “If machines are inverted and 

given the sand test, what factor of safety should be required? 
15 

Before long, Arnold was back to inquiries about performance 

and design directed at the Wrights. “As it is desired by this office 

to incorporate a stress test of some kind in our specifications for 

machines,” he wrote, “we would greatly appreciate it if you would 

send to us ...the chart showing the travel of the center of pressure 

for various speeds and weights.” Or, “Will you kindly tell me 

what, if any, are the objections to having the propellers turn in the 

opposite direction to what they turn now in your machines.” And, 

“The light scout machines have caused more or less controversy, 

but I think the Signal Corps is at last persuaded as to the necessity 

of having them even though there is no one capable of flying them 

but Milling.” 19 The Wrights always answered his letters in detail, 

but it seemed each response generated two more questions. 

Arnold’s constant inquisitive attitude about aircraft was a result 

of his pilot training and mechanical skills. He was not an 

aeronautical expert, however, and did not always understand the 

science behind or the engineering problems associated with his 

queries. Changing prop direction, for example, would have 

required the Wrights to reverse nearly everything internal to the 

machine. Yet he was never fully satisfied with a machine as it 

stood. As a pilot he wanted safer aircraft capable of higher altitude, 

better load capability, greater range, and faster speed. As a 

mechanic he wanted interchangeable parts, peak engine 

performance, and substantial margins of safety in construction. 

Lieutenant Arnold wanted the best available equipment for the Air 

Service, and he did what he could to get it. 

Just as important as his understanding of up-to-date aircraft 

technology were his experiences while serving in the bureaucracy 

of Washington. During this period he was involved in quelling 

unrest among aviators who were forced to fly substandard planes 

along the Mexican border even as ripples of revolution swept 

through that country in 1913. Arnold’s impossible job was to 

remedy their complaints. Most of these concerned the safety of the 

air machines, and compromises were made by both the staff and 
16 

y g py 

maintained equipment. He also instructed the Signal Corps staff 

about the possibilities for airplanes in combat. 20 Soon Arnold 

found himself back in the infantry and stationed in Manila. But this 

introductory experience in Washington was not wasted over his 

lengthy career. 

From December 1913 through 1915, Lieutenant Arnold 

participated in practice ground attacks on different Philippine 

Islands. During one of these exercises, Arnold watched a young 

lieutenant plan and execute a flawless attack at Bataan. Arnold was 

so impressed that he told Bee upon his return that he had met a 

future Army chief of staff. This young man would become 

Arnold’s friend, commander, and staunch supporter nearly a 

quarter century later: his name was George Catlett Marshall. 

Lieutenant Arnold was gaining experience and contacts that no 

other Army officer could match over a 50-year career. His 

experiences outside of the flying world became as valuable to 

future air forces as his personal aviation experiences. Then, as 

unexpected as his orders to join the Wrights in Dayton had been, 

he received orders to requalify into the Aviation Section of the 

Signal Corps. 

Return to D.C. 

Nineteen fifteen was a watershed year for science, technology, 

and engineering. Albert Einstein offered the “theory of relativity” 

publicly, Alexander Graham Bell made the first transcontinental 

phone call (New York to San Francisco), and the Panama Canal 

was completing its first full year in operation. The establishment of 

the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) in 

1915, marked the beginning of the second major phase of 

American aeronautical development: turning infant theory and 

experimentation into a tangible program of inquiry. 21 
17 

gp

advice became apparent the following year while the Army was 

providing air support for Brig Gen John J. Pershing’s punitive 

expedition into Mexico. One plane was lost before the operation 

even began, while another crashed a few days later leaving only six 

of the original eight for operations. The craft in use, the Curtiss JN3, had insufficient power to climb over the mountains and 

insufficient strength to withstand unpredictable winds and storms. 

Replacements were not immediately available. 22 

Even as the punitive Mexican expedition was under way, and 

having quelled the airmen’s dissent, Arnold was adjusting to his 

new assignment. As the supply officer at the newly established 

Aviation School at Rockwell Field near San Diego he held the new 

“junior military aviator” rating and wore a fresh set of captain’s 

bars. Arnold arrived in May, but his re-qualification training did 

not begin until 18 November 1916. He completed training in six 

days when he soloed again for the first time in over four years. 23

Soon he was off to Panama as commander of a squadron there. In 

Panama he was supposed to find an acceptable location for an air 

base before bringing his squadron to assist in the defense of the 

Canal Zone. No consensus could be reached on a location between 

the Americans-both Army and Navy-and the Panamanians, and he 

was sent back to Washington to take up the matter directly with 

Gen Leonard Wood, commanding general of the Atlantic 

Department. Arnold heard the news of America’s entry into the 

Great War on the ship to Washington on 6 April 1917. He knew he 

would not be back to Panama any time soon. 24 

By August, Col Henry Arnold (temporary) was permanently 

assigned to his wartime post in Washington, D.C., as executive 

officer of the Air Division (the furthest up the chain of his “dozenjobs-in-one”). He had pressed for an assignment to Europe but was 

denied a transfer to the combat zone. Again, his assignment offered 

experience in the administration and, more importantly, the 

buildup of American air forces, which would payoff two decades 

later. Arnold rapidly became an indispensable aid to his superiors, 
18 

g, py, 

considered the biggest headache of the war. Arnold spent most of 

his time traveling around the United States checking on aircraft 

production and development and keeping his superiors informed of 

the slow progress being made in these areas. 25 

All of these problems resulted from America’s policy of 

neutrality which, until February 1917, was publicly supported by 

President Woodrow Wilson. To build the American military, in 

any form, was to abandon neutrality as a policy. Not until German 

unrestricted U-boat warfare threatened American overseas trade 

with continental Europe did public opinion shift dramatically to 

one of active intervention. The interception of the Zimmermann 

telegram, a memo from Berlin to Mexico City seeking a military 

alliance against the United States, added insult to injury, but 

interventionist politics already ensured funding for the military. 

Still, this funding came too late to build a fully functional Air 

Service. 26 

Arnold continued searching for improvements in planes and 

weapons. He teamed up with a task force of civilian scientists and 

produced the first “guided missile,” dubbed the “Flying Bug,” 

which was a beautiful, woodcrafted minibiplane. Early versions 

were simply made of paper maché. It housed a two-stroke Ford 

engine and carried a “warhead” of 200-300 pounds of explosives. 

The Bug had no wheels and was launched from a wagon-like 

contraption that ran on a long section of portable track. The 

“missile” engine was started at one side of the track. When the 

engine was fully revved, the mechanical counter was engaged and 

the Bug was released. When it reached flying speed, it lifted off 

and flew straight ahead, climbing to a preset altitude controlled by 

a supersensitive aneroid barometer. When the Bug reached its 

altitude, the barometer sent signals to small flight controls that 

were moved by a system of cranks and a bellows (from a player 

piano) for altitude control. A gyro helped maintain the stability of 

the craft, the barometer helped maintain altitude, but only the 

design of the wings assured directional stability. The Bug flew 
19 

, g g pg 

prey. The Bug was rarely as deadly, and certainly not as fast, as a 

falcon. 27 

On the Bug team were Lawrence and Elmer Sperry, who had 

spearheaded the Navy’s “aerial torpedo” project a few months 

earlier, Orville Wright, Robert Millikan, and, the primary engineer, 

Charles Kettering. Most test flights were accomplished at McCook 

Field, near Dayton, Ohio. An early test nearly ended in disaster as 

the errant missile flying wildly out of control narrowly missed 

crashing into the reviewing stands. After witnessing the initial test 

of the Bug, Arnold recalled that the gadget flew “like a thing 

possessed of the devil.” 28 Lateral controls added shortly after these 

tests rectified the control problem, which was the result of over 

dependence upon the dihedral of the wings for lateral stability. 

More important than the gadget itself were the members of the 

team, particularly Millikan, who would play a vital scientific 

consultant role in the 1930s and during the Second World War. 

Arnold never forgot his experiences in production, administration, 

scientific experimentation, or testing. Nor did he forget the men 

who had helped create the fledgling force from an unfertilized 

embryo. 

Arnold did, finally, make it over to Europe. He was certain that 

General Pershing would want to bring the Bug into combat as soon 

as possible and went to convince him. Officially his orders were to 

sail by mid-October and become familiar with training 

organization methods in France and combat operations at the front. 

29 His trip was not a success. He immediately fell victim to Spanish 

flu, which was rampant on the East Coast. After recovery, he made 

it to the Western Front during November but only shortly before 

the armistice went into effect. Because the weather was so terrible, 

however, he flew no combat missions. The Bug project died 

shortly thereafter. 30 

Arnold later recalled the importance of many advances that 

occurred in aviation during the war years. Some of the most 
20 

pqpy, 

the establishment of the NACA held promise for the future of 

airplane research and development. Aircraft production, however, 

never reached acceptable levels. For example, even though Liberty 

engines were produced in great quantity, the United States never 

figured out how to build enough aircraft for the engines. By the 

end of the war, 1,213 American built DH-4 aircraft had made it 

overseas, but only about 600 had been sent to the front. 31 Arnold 

had witnessed the production bottlenecks firsthand and would 

remember the consequences of a failed production arrangement 

when he was in a position to do something about it. 

Publicity and Planning 

After returning from Europe and no longer being needed in 

D.C., Arnold received orders back to Rockwell Field. There he 

assumed the post of district supervisor, Western District of the Air 

Service. From January to June 1919, Arnold supervised the 

postwar demobilization of the Western Division. Even while 

dealing with massive reductions in the size of the Army, Arnold 

promoted aviation as best he could. He held air shows and ordered 

his “low flying team” to perform for California crowds. At one of 

these events, Arnold “decorated” movie star Mary Pickford with a 

banner making her an “Honorary Ace.” The positive publicity 

generated by events such as these was desperately needed in the 

immediate postwar years. 32 

Arnold was well aware that public opinion was a powerful tool 

in maintaining support for the Air Service. When Rockwell Field 

closed temporarily, Arnold was transferred to San Francisco as air 

liaison officer for the Ninth Corps Area. A witness to the rapid 

drawdown, Arnold was determined to do what he could to bolster 

support for airpower. On his own initiative, Arnold established 

“fire patrols” over the western region that not only saved thousands 

of acres of timber, but millions of dollars as well. His activities 

caught the public’s attention. A peacetime use for military 
21 

During the years 1919 to 1924 Arnolds working relationship 

with other Army officers began taking shape. William “Billy” 

Mitchell’s zealous approach to creating an independent Air Force 

taught Arnold how not to tackle a political hot potato. Arnold 

recalled that Mitchell had warned him away from outspoken 

methods Mitchell had been using. Mitchell realized that he was 

financially able to survive expulsion from the Army, but most of 

his followers did not come from wealthy backgrounds. Carl 

“Tooey” Spaatz and Ira C. Eaker served under Arnold during his 

next tour, again at Rockwell Field. These men became Arnold’s 

right- and left-hand men over the next two decades. Eaker 

coauthored three books with Arnold, and Spaatz succeeded 

Arnold’s command and become the first chief of staff of the 

independent Air Force in 1947. The amazing “Jimmy” Doolittle 

caught Arnold’s attention after pulling off a dangerous flying stunt 

for a gathered crowd of onlookers. Arnold grounded the young 

second lieutenant for one month but later called on him to 

command the famous raid on Tokyo. 34 

While Arnold successfully pressed for publicity out west, Billy 

Mitchell held most of the headlines everywhere else. On 21 and 22 

July 1921, Mitchell’s bombers sank the German battleship 

Osifriesland, considered unsinkable by most naval officers. The 

wild publicity that followed marked the event as the Air Service’s 

first major victory over the Navy in terms of service roles and 

missions. The seeds of strategic bombing had been sown. 

Another one of Mitchell’s ideas was the “Barling” bomber, a 

six-engine behemoth capable of carrying a 10,000 pound payload. 

Although it seemed logical to build this monster in support of a 

“strategic” bombing mission, its performance was so poor that it 

could not fly over the mountains between Dayton and Washington 

while fully fueled. The Appalachians exceeded its service ceiling. 

But the Barling was not a total loss. Valuable wind tunnel data, 

parts design, and other aeronautical engineering problems were 

addressed and solved during the Barling’s development. In that 
22 

, 

built to get the pattern for the future.” 35 

In the fall of 1924, Arnold was recalled to Washington by Gen 

Mason Patrick, then chief of the Air Service. Patrick, a classmate 

of “Blackjack Pershing,” had been so impressed with Arnold’s 

California performance that he had added a commendation to 

Arnold’s military record (201 file). Before joining Patrick’s staff, 

however, Arnold attended the Army Industrial College in 

Washington. His World War I experience with aircraft production 

had been less than satisfying, and now Major Arnold knew why. 

The Army planners were determined to utilize the American auto 

industry as the primary contractor to manufacture airplanes in time 

of crisis. Arnold lobbied for a different approach. He argued that 

the aircraft industry should remain the major contractor while 

using the auto industry for small parts and other subcontracting 

jobs. This short “college” assignment was one of the most valuable 

of his career, one which he said “was to stand me in good stead in 

later years.” 36 Not only did Major Arnold have a plan for future 

buildups in his mind, but he realized that his civilian industry 

contacts from earlier tours would be essential if a sizable 

production scheme had any hope of success. Glenn Curtiss, Elmer 

Sperry, Donald Douglas, and Larry Bell were only a few of those 

contacts. 

During 1925 and much of 1926, Arnold served as Patrick’s 

chief of information. In this function he was able to keep his eyes 

and ears open to new developments in foreign and domestic 

aviation, in both the civil and military arenas. In a failed effort, he 

attempted to keep Billy Mitchell out of trouble by urging him to 

temper his language and writings while campaigning for an 

independent Air Force. Mitchell, causing too much trouble, was 

“exiled” to Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas, in February 

1925. Mitchell was not gone long. When he returned to face a 

military court-martial, Arnold was his Washington liaison officer. 

By Christmas 1926, with Mitchell “martyred,” Arnold considered 

resigning but gained the resolve needed to endure his own 
23 

pppgppy 

legislators in support of Mitchell’s viewpoint. Arnold was himself 

“exiled” to Fort Riley, Kansas, the Army’s largest cavalry post. 38 

It was at Fort Riley in 1927 that Arnold made his choice to 

remain a military officer. Beyond the malice of his superiors, both 

personally and toward aviation, Arnold believed that he had 

suffered numerous career setbacks. He had never been assigned to 

the cavalry, even after repeated requests. He had been denied any 

opportunity to participate in the American war effort in Europe. He 

had testified on Mitchell’s behalf despite warnings from his 

superiors that by siding with Mitchell he was jeopardizing his 

career. Additionally, the national economic picture was very good. 

The New York Stock Exchange was higher than it had been on the 

same date for the previous five years. Cotton and coffee hit alltime highs in the market, and General Motors reported record 

profits during the week of 23-30 July 1927. 39 Additionally, Arnold 

had reached his 20th year of military service, which entitled him to 

half-pay and full benefits if he were to retire. 

John K. Montgomery, then president of American International 

Airways (a branch of Pan Am), had offered the major a lucrative 

position as the first president of Pan Am Airlines. 40 On 24 July, 

Arnold replied, “As much as I would like to tell you that I will 

resign and take up work with the company, I hesitate doing it on 

account of the obligations which I have with my family.” Further, 

Arnold suggested that he might take four months leave to work for 

Pan Am and then make his final decision. 41 This leave was 

apparently never taken even though Montgomery had called Jack 

Jouett, a mutual military friend of Arnold’s, now stationed in 

Washington, to expedite the leave request. 42 Thus, family 

concerns were foremost on Arnold’s mind at the time his final 

decision was made. Remarkably, Maj Henry Arnold and his family 

remained in the Army. 

Arnold never mentioned his family as a motive in his 

recollections. “I couldn’t very well quit the service under fire,” he 
24 

p

him to “test” anything. He had been banished within the Army. His 

reputation preceded him when he was sent to the “worst post” in 

the country as punishment for his clear violation of official 

regulations. Henry Arnold was lucky he was still an Army aviator 

at all. 

Still, Arnold made the most of his time at Fort Riley. He 

indoctrinated cavalry officers in the uses of airpower. He wrote 

children’s stories about pilots and flying and named the hero after 

his middle son, “Bill Bruce.” In all, he wrote six “Bill Bruce” 

books from 1926 to 1928 and earned about two hundred dollars for 

each one. His unit delivered President Calvin Coolidge’s vacation 

mail for a time. On one occasion he met, flew, and dined with Will 

Rogers, the famous satirist. 45 

He completed this tour and even attended the Army Staff 

College despite the protests of the college’s commandant, who had 

served on the court that had tried Billy Mitchell. After his tour at 

the Army Staff College, Arnold took command of the Fairfield Air 

Service Depot near Dayton, Ohio, in the fall of 1928. In an 

expanded role during 1931, Arnold also served as executive officer 

to the chief of the Materiel Division at Wright Field, Brig Gen H. 

Conger Pratt. It was while in these assignments that Arnold 

developed his understanding of and a distaste for the Army 

research and development (R&D) system. 46 Arnold was sickened 

by the lack of progress he perceived at Wright Field. New in 1930, 

for example, the Douglas O-38 two-seat observation biplane was 

capable of only 130 miles per hour (MPH). “What the hell have we 

gained in twenty years?” he rhetorically asked his son Hank, 

“Nothing!” 47 These perceptions were etched deeply into his 

memory and stayed with him the rest of his career. 
25 

g, 

War I associate, Dr. Robert Millikan, 40 miles away in Pasadena, 

was now Caltech’s president. Winner of a Nobel Prize for physics 

in 1923, he was continuing his cosmic ray research in the face of a 

challenge to its validity by Karl Compton of Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (MIT). Arnold had little understanding of 

the nature of these experiments, which involved moving a lead 

sphere to different altitudes and taking electronic measurements. 

Nonetheless, Millikan had no trouble convincing Arnold to lend 

him a Curtiss B-2 Condor bomber to complete his charged particle 

experiments. Arnold had his mechanics build a special “bomb” 

rack for the sphere, which was affixed to the Condor. These 

experiments were carried out from Canada to Mexico over a period 

of months. As part of this project, measurements were also taken 

underground, in mines, and at a variety of elevations on the earth. 

One time Millikan transported the ball to Lake Arrowhead on top 

of a high mountain peak. Unfortunately, the ball was so heavy that 

it broke through the bottom of the rickety boat in which he was 

transporting the experiment. It sank to the bottom of the lake. 

Arnold recalled that the first time they met following the 

unfortunate mishap, he addressed the professor as “Admiral” 

Millikan. 48 

New Deal reforms, air shows, public relations campaigns, and 

exercises, as well as support of scientific research, kept Arnold’s 

1st Wing busy in the early 1930s. Even though the American 

economy had collapsed, Arnold did not forget the technical 

development of his airplanes. Military funding continued at 

forecast levels into 1934 but faded somewhat with the advent of 

Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) reforms. Air shows at March Field 

were major public events in southern California as they had been at 

Rockwell Field a decade before. Movie stars and celebrities of all 

sorts visited the field on show days. The inevitable result was a 

page of favorable publicity in several newspapers in southern 

California the following day. But perhaps Arnold’s most 
26 

flight of 10 new B-10 bombers conducting a round-trip flight from 

Washington, D.C., to Fairbanks, Alaska. The first all-metal, lowwing monoplane, the Martin B-10 bomber, was the most 

technologically advanced airplane in the US inventory. After a 

solid month’s preparation, Arnold took his planes on the near 

18,000-mile round-trip flight with only one major foul-up and no 

aircraft losses along the way. Planning was meticulous. A poor 

showing would have been a catastrophic embarrassment, 

particularly since the Air Corps was still stinging from its 

lackluster performance while carrying the US mail in the spring of 

1934. 49 The success of the mission brought Arnold a well-earned 

decoration, a trophy, and proof that long-range bombers could 

threaten once unpenetrable and isolated territorial boundaries, both 

those of potential enemies and those of the United States. 

But Arnold always pushed for improvement. His airplanes 

made the trip to Fairbanks, but now the route would have to be 

flown faster or higher. One of his favorite places to search for 

improvements in aeronautics was Caltech. There” Admiral” 

Millikan had gone a long way in fulfilling his dreams for American 

aviation. Caltech had the best wind tunnel facilities in the western 

United States. It had one of the finest academic faculties. The civil 

aviation industry was beginning to locate nearby in southern 

California. Caltech had definitely aroused the interest of the 

commanding officer at March Field. 50 

By March 1935, Millikan, Brigadier General Arnold, and 

Professor Theodore von Kármán. director of the Guggenheim 

Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of Technology 

(GALCIT) wind tunnels had become well acquainted. Kármán 

recalled that he had first seen Arnold as a major, perhaps on one of 

Arnold’s inspection tours to the Los Angeles area while still 

assigned to Wright Field. From 27 December 1929, through 4 

January 1930, Arnold was in the Los Angeles area on an inspection 

tour. Again, from 18 February through 7 March 1930, Arnold 

visited a variety of locations in southern California. After a brief 
27 

ppp

1930, later trips allowed them to meet. “Maj. Arnold,” Kármán 

remembered, “came ‘alvays’ in the ‘vind toonel’ and asked me 

questions.” 51 By 1930, Kármán, second in the field of aeronautics 

only to his former professor Ludwig Prandtl, had come 

permanently to Caltech from Aachen, Germany, enticed by a 

Guggenheim Fund stipend. Arnold’s association with the 

Hungarian professor provided him with a lifelong, personal tutor in 

theoretical aeronautical science and its application to airpower. 

During the first half of the 1930s, both Arnold and Kármán 

developed a similar vision for military aviation: the United States 

needed a cooperative aeronautics establishment which coupled 

civilian scientific and industrial expertise with the practical needs 

of the Army Air Corps. 52 To Arnold, this collaboration meant 

better Air Corps airplanes. To Kármán, it meant great possibilities 

for Caltech and the west coast aviation industry. A decade later 

their vision would become a reality. 
28 

Howitzer, West Points yearbook, also noted the nickname Benny. In his 

youth, Arnold was called “Harley,” his middle name, by family members. One 

account claimed that his “perpetual smile” while flying as a stunt double on an 

early motion picture led a Hollywood producer, who probably could not 

remember his name, to call him “Happy.” This was then shortened. Another 

suggested that Hap, when angry, would involuntarily tighten his lips in an 

insidious smile. This famous smile deceptively portrayed Arnold as happy when 

he was, in reality, quite the opposite. Arnold’s early letters to Bee were laced 

with a variety of pet names. For many years the nickname “Sunny” and “SunnyJim” were used. For a short time the tag “Billikens” was exchanged. Billikens 

was a cartoon character from 1910-1911 (resembling today’s Grinch) which 

featured a tuft of hair and an insidious grin which seemed to reflect Henry’s 

hairline and facial expression. It is most likely that “Hap” is short for “Happy,” 

the name that Bee, his wife, used for him in many of their personal letters. The 

name “Hap” did not catch on in his military/personal correspondence until about 

1930. Until then, many classmates still addressed correspondence to “Pewt,” his 

West Point nickname, while to Bee he was most often “Sunny.” 

2. “Address by Brig Gen H. H. Arnold,” Gladwyne, Pa., 30 May 1938, 

Papers of Ira C. Eaker, Library of Congress, Washington. D.C., box 38, Arnold 

speeches, 2; Mrs. Barbara Arnold, interviewed by author, 6 April 1995, 

Washington, D.C. Mrs. Arnold is the daughter of Donald Douglas and widow of 

the late William Bruce Arnold, General Arnold’s son. 

3. Maj Gen John W. Huston, USAF, Retired, to author, letter, 22 February 

1996. General Huston is currently editing Arnold’s wartime diaries and is an 

authority on General Arnold and his military career. 

4. Gen H. H. Arnold, “Reminiscences of Friends and Acquaintances,” USAF 

Academy, Special Collections, Colorado Springs, Colo. (hereafter, Friends of 

Arnold), Mrs. H. H. Arnold section; see also the Biographical Register of the 

Officers and Graduates of the USMA at West Point New York, supp. vol. 5, 

1900-1910; Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the USMA, June 

1904; and Howitzer, 1907, the student yearbook. All of these are available at the 

West Point Archives. 

5. The Henry H. Arnold Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 

box 262A; West Point, Howitzer, 1907. See also Murray Green Collection 

(MCG), notes from the Columbia University Oral History Review (CUOHR); 

Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949). 7-8; 

a generally accurate but hard-to-find book by Flint O. DuPre, Hap Arnold: 

Architect of American Air Power (New York: MacMillan Co., 1972), 1-14, is a 

shorter version of Global Mission; Henry H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Army 

Flyer (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), 40-41. 
29 

Beadle, a pet name. In the early 1900s, Bea was the short form of 

“Bertha,” a name Mrs. Arnold would have likely found unacceptable. Bee was 

also called “BeeBee” by her own family. 

7. Arnold Collection, Library of Congress, box 3, folder 9. A copy of the 

flight log is also available at the National Air and Space Museum Archives, H. 

H. Arnold folder; see also Global Mission, 1-21. 

8. Arnold, Global Mission, 15. 

9. Arnold’s ratings were FAI airplane pilot certificate no. 29, July 1911; 

military aviator, War Department 1912-1914, July 1912; expert aviator, Aero 

Club of America no. 4, September 1912; and junior military aviator, May 1916. 

Memorandum for Special Assistant to the JCS for Arms Control, 21 September 

1970. Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), 168.7265-8. This 

document contains a study by the Office of Air Force History listing the first 22 

military pilots and their license dates verified in published War Department 

General Order files at the Pentagon. 

10. Arnold Collection, box 3, folder 9; Arnold, Global Mission, 30-38. 

11. Arnold, Global Mission, 35-41. 

12. Arnold to Bee, letter, 20 June 1913, MGC. Arnold loved to have fun and 

a drink was never out of the question in his early career. His father had been 

rather strict about the use of alcohol and did not even permit it at Henry and 

Bee’s wedding, a decision he later wished he had modified to allow champagne. 

Tommy Milling, Arnold’s best man for the affair and a fellow pilot, smuggled 

some liquor up from the Arnold cellar during the reception anyway. It was 

interesting that, after the war, Arnold and Bee were both subjects of a Pabst Beer 

advertisement which showed them at their Ranch in Sonoma Valley, Calif. 

Robert Arnold, interviewed by author, 14-16 July 1995, Sonoma, Calif. 

13. H. H. Arnold, second lieutenant, to commanding officer, Signal Corps 

Aviation School, letter, subject: Report from Fort Riley, 6 November 1912, 

AFHRA, 168.65-38. The first portion of the letter describes the progress being 

made with the various airplanes at Fort Riley. Observation techniques were 

discussed in addition to mention of a number of engine problems. Arnold’s 

disclosure of the near-accident is added at the end of the report in a 

straightforward paragraph explaining the event. Letters from this period are also 

located in the Arnold Collection, box 3, folder 9. Theodore von Kármán 

explained a “spin” this way: “A spin is like a love affair. You didn’t notice how 

you got into it, and it is very hard to get out of.” Hugh Dryden, “Theodore von 

Kármán: 1881-1963,” in Biographical Memoirs (New York: Columbia 

University Press, 1965), 361. 
30 

even a fatality) occurred every 100,000 flying hours. This included combat 

operations in the Persian Gulf War. In 1913 the safety rate equivalent would 

have been 950 deaths per 100,000 flying hours not including major accidents 

where planes could not be repaired. 

15. Gen Henry H. Arnold, USAF, Retired, interviewed by T. A. Boyd, 19 

October 1949, El Rancho Feliz, Sonoma, Calif., transcript in MGC. 

16. Arnold to Orville Wright, letter, 6 November 1911 and Wilbur Wright to 

Arnold, letter, 10 November 1911, Wright Brothers Papers, Library of Congress, 

Washington, D.C., box 9, H. H. Arnold folder. Hereafter cited as Wright Papers. 

17. Arnold to W. Wright, letter, 18 November 1911, Wright Papers. 

18. Arnold to O. Wright, letter, 27 January 1913, Wright Papers. The “sand 

test” was accomplished by flipping the aircraft over and loading the wings with 

sand until the wing spars began to crack. Thus, aircraft strength was determined 

by inverted sand weight which simulated the forces of lift on the wings 

themselves. This test is still used today in modified form, most recently to test 

the wing strength of the C-17. 

19. Arnold to O. Wright, letter, 1 February 1913, Wright Papers; Arnold to 

O. Wright, letter, 23 February 1913, Wright Papers; Arnold to Mr. Wright, 

letter, 15 March 1913, Wright Papers. Orville tried to reassure Arnold that the 

scout ship was the “easiest machine that we build. Its high speed in landing is its 

only drawback. It is a very strong machine and has a larger factor of safety than 

any of the other models.” Wright to Arnold, letter, 22 March 1913, Wright 

Papers. 

20. Maurer Maurer, ed., The U.S. Air Service in World War I: Early 

Concepts of Military Aviation, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force 

History, 1978), 12-13, 19-20: Arnold, Global Mission. 41-43. 

21. Although the NACA was founded as an “advisory” organization, 

loopholes in its organic legislation quickly opened the door to a more researchoriented function. This was the ultimate intent of the drafters of the 1915 rider to 

the Naval Appropriations Act. Dr. Alex Roland, interviewed by author, 15 

February 1996; also see Alex Roland’s book on the NACA, Model Research: 

the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, vol. 1 

(Washington, D.C.: National Air and Space Administration, 1985), preface and 

chap. 1, for further details. 
31 

Institution Press, 1981), 18; Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 

vol. 1, Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960 (Maxwell 

AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989), 19; and Wesley Frank Craven and 

James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. l, Plans and Early 

Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago: University of Chicago 

Press, 1948), 7. Maurer, 75-89. The Air Service sent a few ill-prepared planes 

with Pershing as aerial observation platforms. Before long, many of them were 

destroyed, and several pilots were killed due to crashes. 

23. Washington Service Diary, 1917-1918, Arnold Collection, box no. 3, 

folder 13. 

24. Arnold, Global Mission, 46-47. 

25. Arnold Collection, box no. 3, folder 13. 

26. Dik Daso, “Events in Foreign Policy: The End of American Neutrality, 

1917-1918” (typed manuscript, University of South Carolina, 1994), 1-12, 

author’s possession, Burke, Va. 

27. Many photos are included as well as many of the original documents, 

which described the weapon and its construction. Interestingly, Elmer Sperry 

claimed that he had invented the “Bug” and quit the project in 1919 thoroughly 

disgusted with Kettering. The engine was designed by C. H. Wills, Ford’s 

former chief designer. USAF Museum, “Kettering Bug” folder. 

28. Arnold, Global Mission, 74-76: Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: 

A Century of Invention and Technological Enthusiasm (New York: Penguin 

Books, 1989), 130-34: Stephen L. McFarland, America’s Pursuit of Precision 

Bombing, 1910-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995): 

also Glenn Infield, “Hap Arnold’s WWI Buzz Bomb.” Air Force Magazine, 

May 1974, n.p. 

29. John W. Huston to author, letter, 22 February 1996. 

30. Arnold Collection, World War I Diary. 

31. Maurer, 88; also Arnold, Global Mission, 63-64. 

32. Arnold Collection, photo albums. 

33. Arnold, Global Mission, 92-93. 

34. Ibid., 91-98. For an excellent tribute to “Jimmy” Doolittle, one should 

review the Winter 1993 issue of Air Power History, which was dedicated to the 

life of the aviation pioneer. 

35. Alfred F. Hurley, Billy Mitchell: Crusader for Airpower (Bloomington, 

Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1975), 64-70. For a highly detailed account of the 

trial, see Michael L. Grumelli, “Trial of Faith: The Dissent and Court-Martial of 

Billy Mitchell” (PhD diss., Rutgers, 1991); and Arnold, Global Mission, 109-12. 

36. Arnold Collection, box 3, folder 17; Arnold, Global Mission, 113. 
32 

40. Maj H. H. Arnold to John K. Montgomery, letters, 15 and 24 July 1927, 

John K. Montgomery Papers, Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina, 

Columbia. Hereafter cited as J. K. Montgomery Papers; also Arnold, Global 

Mission. 123-28. 

41. Arnold to Montgomery, letter, 24 July 1927, J. K. Montgomery Papers. 

42. Montgomery to Arnold, letter, 27 July 1927, J. K. Montgomery Papers. 

Included in this letter are the specifics of the salary and perks offered to Arnold: 

presidency of Pan Am; $8,000 per year salary; 300 shares of B stock (voting 

shares); and 1,200 more if he stayed on with the company. 

43. Arnold, Global Mission, 122. 

44. Thomas M. Coffey. HAP: The Story of the U.S. Air Force and the Man 

Who Built It, General Henry H. “Hop” Arnold (New York: Viking Press, 1982), 

126. 

45. Arnold Collection, Billy Bruce folders; recently, David K. Vaughan, 

“Hap Arnold’s Bill Bruce Books,” Air Power History 40, no. 3 (Winter 1993): 

43-49. 

46. Lois E. Walker and Shelby E. Wickam, From Huffman Prairie to the 

Moon: The History of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (Dayton, Ohio: Air 

Force Logistics Command, 1986), 59-61, 149. Arnold had commanded the 

Rockwell Air Depot in California from 1922-1924. He also wrote the history of 

Rockwell Field while he was there. A copy of the manuscript is located in the 

AFHRA. 

47. Col H. H. Arnold Jr., USAF, Retired, interviewed by Murray Green, 

MGC, 29-30 August 1972, Sheridan. Wyo. Lois E. Walker and Shelby E. 

Wickam, from Huffman Prairie to the Moon: The History of Wright/Patterson 

Air Force Base (Dayton, Ohio: Air Force Logistics Command, 1986), 218-19. 

Arnold appeared to be getting used to the system during these two years. He 

directed projects on flame suppression from engine exhausts and contrail 

dissipation; the intent of both was to make American aircraft less visible to 

enemy gunners. Maj Gen Donald J. Keirn, Retired, interviewed by Murray 

Green, MGC, 25 September 1970, Delaplane, Va. 

48. Bowman flew several of Millikan’s experimental missions. His task was 

to orbit a particular area with a 500-pound lead ball at various altitudes up to 

21,000 feet. Bowman felt certain that Millikan introduced Arnold to Kármán at 

Caltech. Brig Gen H. W. Bowman, Retired, interviewed by Murray Green, 

MGC, 23 August 1969, n.l; Arnold, Global Mission, 139. See Robert H. Kargon, 

The Rise of Robert Millikan: Portrait of a life in American Science (Ithaca, 

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982) for a fair description of the Karl Compton 

challenge. 
33 

water from the fuselage. It cranked up on the first try and flew the rest of the 

way to Washington, D.C., much to Arnold’s relief. 

50. Since Clark Millikan, Robert Millikan’s son, had joined the faculty at 

Caltech, Kármán used to differentiate the two by calling Robert, “Old Millikan,” 

to everyone but Old Millikan himself. Dr. Sears is a former student, colleague, 

and friend of Theodore von Kármán, one of only a few who called him by his 

informal name, Todor. William Rees Sears, interviewed by author, Tucson, 

Ariz., 8 July 1995. For an excellent summary of the Guggenheim influence, see 

Richard P. Hallion, Legacy of Flight: The Guggenheim Contribution to 

American Aviation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977). 

51. Theodore von Kármán, oral history interview, USAF Academy, Colo., 

27 January 1960; and Michael H. Gorn. Universal Man: Theodore von 

Kármán’s life in Aeronautics (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 

1992), 81. Also in the NBC newsreel that covered the Rose Garden ceremony 

where Kármán was given the first Medal of Science by President John F. 

Kennedy, Kármán remembered Arnold and his inquisitive nature back in the 

early days (January 1963). Arnold’s flight logs carefully documented his trips to 

California while he was at Fairfield Depot. On one trip, he spent nearly one 

month in the Los Angeles area during which he might have visited Caltech, Old 

Millikan, and later, Kármán. A copy of these logs is located in both the Library 

of Congress, Arnold Collection and the USAF Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, 

Dayton, Ohio, Arnold file. The fact that Kármán ranks Arnold as a major would 

date their initial meetings to sometime before 1 February 1931 when he was 

promoted to lieutenant colonel. 

52. Gorn, 116, 158. 
Class of 1907 

“Pewt” Arnold, West Point sophomore, 1905 

34 
Arnold’s pilot training class, Dayton, Ohio, May 1911. John Rogers

USN, (above center) was the first naval officer to fly a Wright 

machine. Tommy Milling (above right and below) was Arnold’s bes

man when he married Eleanor “Bee” Pool, 10 September 1913. 

35 
Al Welsh (left), a Wright Brothers employee, flew Arnold’s first 28 

instructional flights. Welsh died in a flying accident in 1913. 

The Wrights instilled Arnold’s “will to do” when it came to 

airpower. This early “bulb” exposure was taken of Orville (left) and 

Lieutenant Arnold after an early evening flight at College Park, 

Maryland, July 1912. 

36 
The first airborne radio took as much room as the pilot (1912). 

Arnold and Milling standardized the nomenclature for parts of the 

airplane. It was the first military aviator’s technical manual-today’

“Dash-1.” 

37 
The first Mackay Trophy, awarded to “Lieutenant Henry H. Arnold

29th U.S. Infantry, 9 October 1912.” The three-foot-tall trophy 

resides in the National Air and Space Museum, Washington, D.C. 

On 5 November 1912 at Fort Riley, Kansas, a photographer 

happened to be present to document aerial maneuvers scheduled fo

that day. 

38 
A.L.P. Sands (left) and Arnold (right) were scheduled for an

observation flight. Takeoff and the majority of the flight were 

normal. 

Just after this high-altitude photo was taken, Arnold’s plane entere

a spin as he began his landing pattern. 

39 
A crude recording device, a barograph, captured the 100-meter 

altitude loss in less than 30 seconds, which shattered Arnold’s 

confidence in airplanes at the time. 

The young socialite, Eleanor “Bee” Pool. 

40 
Although George Marshall had once impressed Arnold with his 

tactical skill on maneuvers in the Philippines, Arnold impressed 

Marshall by utilizing American scientists to improve the Air Corps

Here they visit Randolph Field during the war. 

In 1916, after regulations prohibiting married officers from flying 

were relaxed, Arnold was sent to North Island, California, to regain 

his flying qualifications. Captain Arnold served as supply officer 

until November when he began flying again after nearly four years 

on the ground. 

41 
His checkout took all of a week. 

Arnold at his War Department desk during WWI, the youngest 

colonel in the Army. 

42 
The “Flying Bug” was America’s first guided missile. During the 

development of the weapon, Arnold met such notables as “Boss” 

Kettering, the “Bug’s” inventor, Elmer Sperry, Henry Ford, and Dr

Robert Millikan. The “Bug” was launched from a wagon-like 

carrier and was to fly directly ahead toward the enemy. After a 

predetermined number of engine revolutions had occurred, a cam 

fell into place that allowed the wings of the small biplane to fold up

The “Bug” would fall from the sky, and its 250-pound payload 

would explode. 

The team was composed of civilians and members of the other 

services as well. Arnold is at the far left. 

43 
Not all tests were successful. 

“The Bug.” 

44 
“The Bug.” 

Generals Pershing and Arnold in San Diego after the Great War. 

45 
Arnold Inspects the first “Liberty” engine produced for combat use

The DH-4 was used well after the First World War. Arnold never 

forgot the lesson of obsolete surplus after the war. Shown here is 

Mason Patrick’s personal DH-4B. 

46 
District Supervisor, Western District of the Air Service, Rockwell 

Field, 1919. 

The Rockwell Field Low Flying Team included a young Lt James 

H. Doolittle (second from right). 

47 
They frequently performed for stars like Mary Pickford, “Honorary 

Ace” of the day. 

Their formations thrilled the California crowds.

48 
Brig Gen William “Billy” Mitchell stands under the Barling 

Bomber with the development team. Mitchell was instrumental in 

getting Arnold back into the flying game in 1916. 

Arnold and Spaatz in November 1919. Arnold often reminded 

Spaatz, who changed the spelling of his name 10 years after this 

photo was taken, of the importance of civilian scientists to the Air 

Forces. 

49 
Arnold and Ira C. Eaker at Los Angeles in 1932. Together these tw

were an unbeatable public relations team. 

The Barling Bomber in flight. This six-engine behemoth did not 

even have enough power to fly over the Appalachian Mountains. 

50 
Arnold (second from left) served under H. Conger Pratt (far right) 

at Wright Field in 1928 and 1929. Here Orville Wright, “Tooey” 

Spaatz, and “Benny” Foulois gather for a few moments. 

The O-38. “What the hell have we gained in twenty 

years....Nothing!” 

51 
Dr. Robert A. Millikan. This portrait hangs in the Athenaeum, the 

faculty club at the California Institute of Technology. 

Arnold loaned WWI acquaintance R. A. Millikan a Curtiss B-2 

“Condor” bomber like this one for use in his continuing cosmic ray 

experiments while he was commander at March Field, California. 

52 
The B-10 was a major advance in aircraft technology. 

Arnold presents Secretary of War Dern with a totem pole from the 

frontier. Arnold earned his second Mackay Trophy for the mission

53 
Arnold took 10 of the first all-metal monoplanes from Washington 

to Alaska and back. The positive publicity helped salve the wounds 

of delivering the mail but also opened the eyes of America to the 

long-distance capabilities of airpower. 

54 
55 

Conceptualizing the Future Air Force 

In January 1936, Arnold was transferred back to Washington. 

Maj Gen Oscar F. Westover had taken over as chief of the Air 

Corps and had convinced Gen Malin Craig, chief of staff, that he 

needed Arnold as his assistant. Another candidate for that job was 

General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force commander, Brig Gen 

Frank M. Andrews. Andrews and Westover had clashed regarding 

independence of the air arm. Westover, who had opposed 

separation from the Army throughout his career, and Arnold, 

perhaps having learned a lesson about bucking the system at too 

high a level, agreed that remaining part of the Army held definite 

advantages for the Air Corps, particularly in the area of logistical 

support. From that point, Andrews’s career took a different path 

from Arnold’s. By 1939, Andrews had moved over to the general 

staff under George Marshall, and Arnold held command of the Air 

Corps. 

Arnold recalled that, “the entire family said good-by, in tears, to 

March Field.” More than sunny California, Arnold hated leaving 

his position of operational command. l During his first two years 

back in Washington, Arnold handled a hodgepodge of 

administrative and public relations problems. But it was during 

these years as Westover’s assistant that his views on science, 

technology, and the Army Air Corps (AAC) gained nationwide 

attention even in the midst of internal Air Corps turbulence. 

On 1 March 1935, the GHQ Air Force had become a reality 

based on the recommendations of the Baker and Drum Boards. 

Those boards had recommended the formation of a general 

headquarters air force capable of organizing independent air 

operations as well as direct support of the ground forces. GHQ also 

supported the Army’s responsibility for coastal air defense. The 

GHQ Air Force was the first manifestation of a truly independent 

air arm, including an independent mission, within the Army. 

Essentially, the Air Corps had become a branch of the Army, like 

cavalry and infantry. GHQ represented the combat arm of the 
56 

controlled tactical bases, which remained under the control of 

Army corps area commanders. During times of war, GHQ would 

be assigned directly to the battlefield commander. The dual 

command situation never proved effective or efficient and, 

although an improvement over earlier arrangements, was never 

totally satisfactory to aviation branch leaders. 

Six months after the formation of the GHQ Air Force, an Air 

Corps study known as the Browning Board recognized the 

detrimental effect the dual structure was having on the Air Corps. 

Col William S. Browning’s panel recommended a consolidation of 

Air Corps structure that would place the GHQ under the command 

of the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. Although this 

recommendation was adopted in practice it was not until June 1941 

when the Army Air Forces were officially established, that the 

situation was finally resolved. Army Regulation (AR) 95-5, Army 

Air Forces, 20 June 1941, defined the function of each level of 

command. The chief of the Army Air Forces was also to act as 

deputy chief of staff for air (and by February 1942, a member of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff) and in that capacity was directly 

responsible to the secretary of war and the Army chief of staff for 

all air operations. Unity of command was finally achieved within 

the Army Air Forces. Arnold used this to ensure, among other 

things, continued scientific and technological advances in his 

command. 2 

Even before restructuring took place, Arnold chaired a 

committee formed in 1936 to examine how best to create a 

“balanced air program.” There was nothing unusual in his report; 

in fact, it followed very closely the recommendations made 

previously by the Drum Board. The numbers reflected in each 

report for personnel and planes were similar. Surprising today but 

realistic at that time, the forecast for airplanes required was only 

1,399 in 1936 increasing to a meager 2,708 in 1941. 3 Although 

Arnold’s report was primarily an attempt to reckon with depression 

budgets, no mention was made of scientific research or 

technological development. Rather, the program’s primary concern 

was to save dollars in all areas except purchasing airplanes. 
57 

Western Aviation Planning Conference, Arnold summarized his 

philosophy for creating an aeronautical institution in America 

second to none. 

Remember that the seed comes first; if you are to reap a harvest of 

aeronautical development, you must plant the seed called experimental 

research. Install aeronautical branches in your universities; encourage 

your young men to take up aeronautical engineering. It is a new field but 

it is likely to prove a very productive one indeed. Spend all the funds you 

can possibly make available on experimentation and research. Next, do 

not visualize aviation merely as a collection of airplanes. It is broad and 

far reaching. It combines manufacture, schools, transportation, airdrome, 

building and management, air munitions and armaments, metallurgy, 

mills and mines, finance and banking, and finally, public securitynational defense (emphasis in original). 4 

Arnold, in this statement, had issued the broadest description of 

the evolving technological system of airpower, even if he didn’t 

make a distinction between empirical versus theoretical research. If 

the Air Corps had little money for research and development, then 

perhaps universities and industry could be persuaded to find some. 

After all it had been the Guggenheim Fund that had fostered 

aeronautical departments at several universities almost a decade 

earlier. 5 No matter the source, experimental research was the key 

to future airpower. 

Arnold had very cleverly linked Air Corps development to 

civilian prosperity in the aviation industry, hoping that civilian 

institutions would pick up the fumbling research ball while the Air 

Corps was struggling just to acquire planes. His ideas reflected the 

Millikan philosophy,” that of bringing the center of aeronautical 

science in America to Caltech, which had shaped that university 

since the 1920s. This philosophy, coupled with Arnold’s 

realization that airpower was a complex system of logistics, 

procurement, ground support bases, and operations, guided his 

vision for future growth. 6 Arnold’s approach to airpower 

development was actually the first mention of what became the 

military-industrial-academic complex after World War II. 7 

In addition to bolstering industrial and public support for the 

technological advancement of the Air Corps, Arnold was 
58 

before. In particular, responsibility for aeronautical research was 

not well defined between the branches, further slowing Arnold’s 

efforts there. Nevertheless, the GHQ was the first crack in the 

foundation of Army control over airpower. 8 

As was all too frequent an occurrence in these early years of 

aviation, a tragic aircraft accident took the life of General 

Westover on 21 September 1938. Arnold was now the top man in 

the Air Corps. Arnold’s experience in Army aviation had prepared 

him for the tasks ahead, and now he was in a position to tackle 

these problems. 

When Arnold “shook the stick” and officially took command of 

the Air Corps on 29 September 1938, many military aviation 

projects were under consideration both at Wright Field and at the 

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics facility at Langley: 

radar, aircraft windshield deicing, jet assisted takeoff (JATO) 

system (actually a rocket), and a host of aircraft and engine design 

modifications. Many of these projects were related to the brand 

new B-17, an aviation technology leap in itself. 9 Arnold wasted 

no time in calling the “longhairs” to a meeting at the National 

Academy of Sciences (NAS) under the auspices of the Committee 

on Air Corps Research to solve these problems. 10 It was no 

surprise that Arnold immediately accelerated Air Corps R&D 

efforts. In his first message as Air Corps commander, Arnold 

devoted a separate paragraph to the subject that reflected his public 

views on airpower. “Until quite recently,” he said, “we have had 

marked superiority in airplanes, engines, and accessories. That 

superiority is now definitely challenged by recent developments 

abroad. This means that our experimental development programs 

must be speeded up.” 11 But his views were already common 

knowledge to most airmen. 

Assisting the “speeding up” process, Guggenheim Aeronautical 

Laboratory, California Institute of Technology (GALCIT) and the 

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) sent representatives 

to this NAS meeting. Vannevar Bush and Jerome Hunsaker, of 

MIT, grabbed the windshield deicing problem for their institution 
59 

Kármán that he never understood how a serious engineer or 

scientist could play around with rockets.” l2 Arnold knew that 

GALCIT had already demonstrated some success in that area. The 

condescending attitude held by the MIT elite did not go over well 

with General Arnold. From this meeting onward, Arnold thought 

of Bush as something less than forward looking, despite his 

excellent, even pioneering record in electrical engineering. The 

case of Vannevar Bush was a classic example of how a talented 

individual had been dropped from confidence because of personal 

perceptions. 

On the other hand, Millikan and Kármán, representing 

GALCIT, eagerly accepted the JATO challenge, an attitude that 

Arnold no doubt appreciated. JATO represented potential funding 

for the struggling GALCIT Rocket Research Project, established in 

1936. This project, also known as GALCIT Project number 1, was 

established by Dr. Kármán and Dr. Frank Malina, and exists today 

as the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). 13 It was after this NAS 

meeting that the Arnold/Kármán association officially began. 

Arnold saw Kármán as a useful tool, a tap for recognizing 

undeveloped technologies. Kármán saw the Army Air Corps as a 

worthy recipient of his services. More importantly, however, the 

funding Arnold made available seemed bottomless and helped 

Caltech maintain its status as the leading aeronautical university in 

the country. Kármán was dedicated to helping the Army but was 

also dedicated to Caltech, the GALCIT, and Robert Millikan. 

Nonetheless, this alliance, above all others which Arnold held with 

scientists and engineers, proved one of the most significant and 

engaging collaborations in the early history of American airpower. 

This meeting was just the beginning of Major General Arnold’s 

push toward making science and technology an integral part of the 

Air Corps. He even invited Gen George C. Marshall to a luncheon 

with the visiting scientists. Marshall wondered, “What on earth are 

you doing with people like that?” Arnold replied that he was 

“using” their brain power to develop devices “too difficult for the 

Air Force engineers to develop themselves.” 14 The realization 

that civilian help was the only way to ensure that the AAC had the 
60 

was utilizing them. By including Marshall in this circle of 

scientists, Arnold began winning support for advanced technology 

from the highest ranking Army officers. 

Not only did Arnold utilize the advice of these scientists, he 

gathered information from civilian aviators as well. One in 

particular influenced Arnold’s commitment to technology. In late 

1938, Arnold had exchanged letters with Charles Lindbergh, who 

was touring Europe. In his correspondence, Lindbergh expressed 

concern over US lethargy in airplane development. “It seems to 

me,” Lindbergh wrote, “that we should be developing prototypes 

with a top speed in the vicinity of 500 mph at altitude ... the trend 

over here seems to be toward very high speed.” 15 This revelation 

worried Arnold. In March 1939, Arnold established a special air 

board to study the problems Lindbergh had addressed. By April 

1939, Arnold had convinced Lindbergh to accept an active duty 

commission as a member of the study group. This group, known as 

the Kilner Board, produced a five-year plan for research and 

development within the Air Corps. The report was shortsighted in 

many respects but did represent the immediate needs of the air 

arm. Jet propulsion and missiles, for example, were not even 

considered. 16 

Lindbergh’s impact was immediate but short-lived. In a written 

recommendation for the NACA, Lindbergh gained support for an 

expanded aeronautical research facility to be located at Moffett 

Field, California. The funding was approved on 15 September 

1939, the same morning Lindbergh spoke out against American 

participation in the European war on three major national radio 

networks. President Roosevelt tried to dissuade him from taking 

his views directly to the nation. “Lindy” was a skilled 

communicator. After his historic flight, the Guggenheim Fund had 

invested $100,000 to subsidize a national tour expressly designed 

to generate support for aviation. By the late 1920s, Lindbergh had 

toured over 80 cities and influenced millions of Americans. In 

many respects, Lindbergh became the American spokesman for 

aviation. 17 As such, his words carried an inordinate amount of 

influence. Fearing his effect on public opinion, FDR promised 
61 

caught in the middle of the presidential offer but there was never 

any doubt in the general’s mind that Lindbergh would turn down 

such an offer and speak his own mind. Arnold was right. 

Consequently, Lindbergh “resigned” his commission, but Arnold 

had already taken his earlier warnings to heart. 18 

Arnold’s public campaigns reflected Lindbergh’s warnings. In 

January 1939, while speaking to the Society of Automotive 

Engineers in Detroit, Arnold reemphasized that America was 

falling behind in aircraft development. He attributed this failing to 

an inadequate program of scientific research. “All of us in the 

Army Air Corps,” he stated, “realize that America owes its present 

prestige and standing in the air world in large measure to the 

money, time, and effort expended in aeronautical experimentation 

and research. We know that our future supremacy in the air 

depends on the brains and efforts of our engineers.” 19 His 

dedication to continuous research, experimentation, and 

development was more focused and more defined than it had ever 

been, and now he carried the message across the country. 

Arnold’s official correspondence reflected the same 

commitment to R&D. In a memorandum to the assistant secretary 

of war dated 2 March 1939, Arnold vigorously defended proposed 

funding for research and development. 

The work of the large number of aeronautical research agencies in this 

country should be afforded government support and encouragement only 

through a single coordinating agency which can determine that the 

individual and collective effort will be to the best interests of the 

Government. The NACA is the agency designated by law to carry out 

basic aeronautical research and its own plant and facilities cannot cover 

all phases of development Furthermore, there are many public or semipublic institutions whose students or other research personnel are willing 

and anxious to perform useful investigation that will contribute to a real 

advancement of the various branches of aeronautical science. 20 

As a member of the NACA Main Committee since taking over the 

Air Corps, Arnold attended the committee meetings regularly and 

was familiar with the workings of the group. More importantly, he 

was acquainted with the other main committee members who 

together read like a “Who’s Who” in American aviation. Aside 
62 

Shortly after this memo was sent, Arnold established an official 

liaison between the NACA facilities at Langley Field and the Air 

Corps Materiel Division at Wright Field. Arnold assigned Maj Carl 

F. Greene to the post in an effort to tighten the relationship 

between the two organizations. 21 The attempt to consolidate R&D 

programs was valiant, but time was running short. Conflict in 

Europe assured that the relationship never matured. 

Toward Production R&D 

The expanding war in Europe indicated that a posture of 

readiness was prudent and necessary for the United States. From 

the day that Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Arnold 

realized that all American production efforts would be needed just 

to build enough aircraft of designs already on line to create a 

fighting air force. “For us to have expended our effort on future 

weapons to win a war at hand,” he wrote to General Spaatz in 

1946, “would be as stupid as trying to win the next war with 

outmoded weapons and doctrines.” 22 While the outcome of the 

war was in question, and even though the US was not yet directly 

involved, Arnold emphasized R&D only to improve weapons or 

aircraft by using technologies that were already on the drawing 

board. Essentially, from September 1939 until the spring of 1944, 

the majority of Army Air Force R&D efforts were dedicated to 

short-term improvements in existing technologies. 23 

By May 1940, FDR had called for a fivefold increase in aircraft 

production in America. Producing 50,000 planes each year seemed 

a tall order to everyone but Arnold, who had recommended an 

even greater number despite his staffs conservative estimates. Gen 

Lauris Norstad, USAF, Retired, a member of Arnold’s Advisory 

Council, recalled the process that led to Arnold’s recommendation. 

The general had called all his top people together in 

Washington. “Gentleman, here is our opportunity to tell people in 

authority and to tell the country what we need. The president has 

asked for this figure. I am going to give you until tomorrow 
63 

Dont hold yourselves back to restrictions of budgets under which 

we have been trained in the last few years.” The following morning 

Arnold announced, “Gentleman, I am going to call on you to give 

me your figures. Again, I will tell you, be bold.” The first officer 

suggested an additional squadron at Atlanta; the second asked for a 

squadron at Oklahoma City and so on. “Gentlemen, at the outside, 

even with replacements, this adds up to about 100 planes. To hell 

with you! I’m going over to the White House now, and do you 

know what I’m going to tell the President? I am going to tell the 

President that we need 100,000 airplanes.” He did. 24 

Arnold’s World War I production experience had demonstrated 

to him the expansion capabilities of American industry, a lesson he 

did not forget. Apparently FDR had learned a lesson from World 

War I as well. The Wilson administration’s policy of neutrality had 

prevented any serious preparation for war until it was too late for 

American industry to gear up for mass production of any air 

weapons. FDR’s decision to build planes, and lots of them, based 

largely upon the advice of his trusted advisor Harry Hopkins and 

Arnold, ensured that American industrial strength would make a 

decisive impact during the war. By July 1940, Arnold had begun 

his campaign of personal encouragement in the factories. The spirit 

behind his enthusiasm was a direct result of the lessons he had 

learned in the last war. 

I can remember the last World War-when in the beginning the American 

aircraft industry had a capacity of less than 100 planes a year. I saw one 

factory sign a contract eighteen months later to deliver 100 planes a day. 

... The American aircraft industry today is incomparably superior in 

every regard to the state it had reached even at the close of the last war... 

So, make no mistake about it. we shall train the mechanics, we shall train 

the flyers, and we shall build the planes. 25 

Consequently, most of Arnold’s time in the months prior to Pearl 

Harbor and in the early years of American involvement was spent 

towing factories, arranging training courses for new pilots, 

establishing bases of operations, haggling over congressional 

legislation, and encouraging the factory workers, who he believed 

were vital to the creation of real American air supremacy. He 

personally spent the time touring factories because he feared that 
64 

Panama Canal Zone, in January 1941. 

As you know we are leaning over backwards to give everything to the 

British. Very little is coming to us. ...Engines are the neck of the bottle 

more than anything else and England has priority on engines. So, taking 

everything into consideration, aircraft production insofar as getting 

airplanes for U.S. units is more or less of a mess, and no matter what we 

do in this matter there will be no relief for several months in the future. 

...All I can say is that we hope to get planes to everyone-but at this 

writing it is only a hope. 26 

For General Arnold, R&D was not an immediate answer to 

American production woes in 1941. His faith in the power of the 

American mass production line was a direct result of his World 

War I experience. 

The total production effort that followed these early letters of 

despair shocked everyone, including Arnold. By April 1943, the 

four star wrote back to Lieutenant General Andrews, now air 

commander in the European theater, “By God, Andy, after all these 

years it was almost too much-I don’t imagine any of us, even in 

our most optimistic moments, dreamed that the Air Corps would 

ever build up the way it has. I know I damn well never did.” 27 

Airplane production became one of the major reasons for 

American airpower’s evolution into a massive technological 

system by 1944. Until the early years of World War II in Europe, 

the American aircraft industry was still in its infancy. The war 

forced it into early adolescence. Despite the many challenges 

inherent in the massive buildup of airplanes, Arnold still found 

time to push for a few untested technologies that showed 

exceptional promise while also pressing his field commanders to 

use “science” to advantage whenever possible. 28 

Propellerless Aircraft 

The most spectacular of these technologies was the JATO 

program that Caltech had been working since the NAS meeting in 

November 1938. Since it was most desirable to build aircraft that 

carried heavy bomb loads, the problems of high-wing loading on 
65 

by take-off considerations. One of the many methods ...proposed 

for the elimination of this difficulty involved the use of auxiliary 

rocket jets to augment the available thrust during take-off and 

initial climb.” 29 The net result was an increase in range for a 

desired payload. Frank Malina, Homer Joe Stewart, and the rest of 

the “suicide club” spent most of 1940 and the first half of 1941, 

developing the JATO system. By summer, Malina’s team was 

ready to flight test the device. Capt Homer Boushey flew an Air 

Corps “Ercoupe” from Wright to March Field, the selected spot for 

the test, late in July 1941. After a failed static firing resulted in a 

spectacular explosion, the rockets were affixed to the underside of 

the Ercoupe’s wings, near the wing roots. After the failed static 

firing, it was decided to accomplish an anchored test firing of the 

rockets physically attached to the plane. Although this test was 

more successful than the previous one, fragments of burning 

propellant and a small piece of a nozzle had still burned a forearmsized hole in the underside of the Ercoupe tail. “Well, at least it 

isn’t a big hole,” one of the onlookers observed. A successful 

airborne confidence firing test of the rockets was completed on 6 

August, but the big test was yet to come. 30 

On 12 August, despite the ominous results of the previous tests, 

Boushey strapped into the Ercoupe, now loaded with six JATOs, 

three under each wing. William Durand, long-time friend of 

Kármán, NACA charter member, and chairman of the NACA’s 

Special Committee on Jet Propulsion, had been invited to witness 

the JATO flight test. A test aircraft, a Piper Cub, piloted by Dr. 

Clark Millikan, idled next to the Ercoupe waiting for the soon-tobe rocket plane to release brakes. Both aircraft revved their motors 

and released their brakes. In a matter of only a few seconds, having 

reached the predetermined speed, Boushey ignited his rockets. In a 

cloud of smoke, followed shortly by the crack of the rocket 

ignition, the Ercoupe catapulted into the air and over the 50-foot 

banner that marked the calculated height after rocket ignition. The 

Piper Cub appeared to climb in slow motion. The JATO had been a 

remarkable success. 31 
66 

propeller. To cover up the fact that the prop had been removed, the 

Ercoupe’s nose was plastered with safety posters as if it were 

undergoing some form of repairs. One of the posters read, “Be 

Alert, Don’t Get Hurt!” At least the JATO team had a sense of 

humor. Kármán calculated that 12 JATO motors would be required 

to accomplish the first American rocket-powered airplane flight. 

On 23 August Boushey strapped in one more time. Kármán had 

calculated that at least 25 knots of ground speed would be needed 

for the test to work properly. But how to accelerate to the required 

speed without a working prop? A standard pickup truck fitted with 

a long rope pulled out on the runway in front of the propless 

Ercoupe. Boushey grabbed the rope like a rodeo bull rider and held 

on while the truck accelerated to the calculated 25 knots. Boushey 

released the rope, fired the rockets, now twice as loud and smokey, 

and hurtled 10 feet into the air on rocket power alone. He had 

enough runway left to make a safe landing straight ahead. 

Additional testing continued in both solid and liquid auxiliary 

propulsion for the next decade. 32 Arnold pushed this program 

because it demonstrated potential for increasing the combat range 

of his heavy bombers. 

Although not initially the most spectacular of all the Air Corp’s 

scientific and technological research programs, Arnold’s direct 

involvement in bringing the British, “Whittle” jet engine to 

America, beginning in April 1941, illustrated his personal 

commitment to technology and its application to the American war 

effort. As in 1913, Arnold could have cared less where the 

technology came from; if it benefited the Air Corps, he wanted it. 

So it was with the “Whittle” engine and the development of 

American jet aircraft. 33 

Throughout 1938, Arnold had received Lindbergh’s reports, 

which suggested that some German pursuit planes were capable of 

speeds exceeding 400 MPH. 34 He had also assigned Lindbergh to 

the Kilner Board in an effort to project R&D requirements for the 

Air Corps. Whether Lindbergh had been duped by the Nazis on 

preplanned factory tours during his visits to Germany turned out to 

be irrelevant. Lindbergh suggested that the Air Corps begin 
67 

technologies and equipment forced a confrontation with George 

W. Lewis, director of aeronautical research at the National 

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. “Hap,” at that moment not 

very happy, wanted to know, “why in the name of God we [in the 

Army Air Corps] hadn’t got one [a 400-plus mph fighter].” Lewis 

replied, “Because you haven’t ordered one.” 35 Arnold was 

furious. A lengthy dialogue followed during which Arnold 

discovered that Lewis was well aware that the technology to build 

faster planes had existed for some time. Lewis had not suggested 

building one because it was not the NACA’s function to dictate 

what the military should or should not build. To Arnold, the 

NACA was not acting like a true team player. The general might 

have even considered Lewis’s attitude unpatriotic. 36 This incident 

overshadowed the many successful programs the NACA had 

undertaken during Arnold’s tenure. 

Having lost trust in the workings and leadership of the NACA, 

Arnold resorted to other civilian agencies in an effort to capitalize 

on “Whittle” jet engine information made available to him by Air 

Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal in April 1941. Although the 

NACA took steps toward jet engine development directed by the 

1941 Durand Board, formed in March 1941 at Arnold’s request, 

importing the plans and an engine from Britain was the general’s 

personal achievement. 37 In September, he took these plans and 

created a separate, super secret, production team including Larry 

Bell, of Bell Aircraft, and Donald F. “Truly” Warner of General 

Electric (GE). GE was selected because of previous work done 

under the guidance of Sanford Moss on “turbosupercharging,” a 

process similar to the turbojet concept. 38 The project military 

representative was Col Benjamin Chidlaw. This Bell/GE team was 

so secret that only 15 men at Wright Field knew of its existence. 

The contracts with GE had been handwritten and transmitted in 

person by Arnold’s personal liaison, Maj Donald J. Keirn. Keirn 

recalled that the first GE contract was for a turboprop and was 

being built in Schenectady, New York, while the “Whittle” engine 

project was undertaken at West Lynn, Massachusetts. The three 

Durand Board engine teams-one at Westinghouse, a second 
68 

absolute secrecy .39 Good Mother of God, General Arnold,

Chidlaw asked bewildered, “How do you keep the Empire State 

building a secret?” Sternly, Arnold replied, “You keep it a secret.” 

40 

The super secret engine was assembled at Lynn, Massachusetts 

under the project title, “Supercharger Type #1.” At Larry Bell’s 

factory, the airframe project received an old program number so as 

not to arouse any suspicion. The workers themselves were 

segregated from each other so that even the members of the team 

were not totally sure what they were building. The AAF officer 

who was to be the first American military man to fly a jet, Col 

Laurence Craigie, never revealed his mission even to his wife, who 

found out about it in January 1944 with the rest of the country. 

Craigie recalled that “the only project I know of that was more 

secret was the atomic bomb.” 41 

On 2 October 1942, the Bell XP-59A flew three times. The first 

two flights were piloted by Bob Stanley, a Bell test pilot and 

Caltech graduate, and the third was flown by Col Laurence 

Craigie, the first military man to fly the American jet plane. In 

actuality, the plane had flown for the first time during taxi tests on 

30 September and again on 1 October, but Larry Bell insisted that 

the first flight was not “official” until the brass hats were present as 

witnesses. 42 The internal “cloak of secrecy” was so effective that 

the general NACA membership had heard only rumors of the 

technology. Only William Durand himself had been informed of 

Arnold’s “Whittle” project but had been sworn to secrecy. The day 

the XP-59A flew, he was the only member of the NACA who 

knew of the existence of the plane. In fact, he was at Muroc the 

day of the “official” first flight. 43 

It was not until 7 January 1944 that the rest of America, 

including Mrs. Craigie, found out about the flight. The Washington 

Post carried the inaccurate front page headline, “U.S. Making 

Rocket War Plane,” which detailed the events of 15 months before. 

44 The development of the XP-59A can legitimately be called the 

first Air Force skunk-works project. 
69 

improve Army Air Forces capability. Once aware of a particular 

technology, he decided whether it was applicable to AAF airplanes 

or their combat capability. As late as January 1939, for example, 

Arnold had stated, “Because of the high efficiency and flexibility 

of operation of the controllable propeller as it exists today, it will 

be many years before any means of propulsion, such as rocket or 

jet propulsion, can be expected on a large scale.” 45 But British 

engine developments, coupled with the underpinnings of early 

American turbojet concepts, and the promising work done at 

GALCIT Project no. 1 during 1940, convinced him that jets and 

rockets held significant potential for his air forces. Arnold always 

wanted the most advanced capabilities for his airplanes. But during 

this period, he wanted them within two years, no later. 46 

Once convinced, he gathered trusted scientists, engineers, and 

officers together. Then, using the force of his personality, he 

directed what he wanted done with the technology. His teams were 

given considerable latitude in accomplishing the task and rarely 

failed to produce results. 47 Some who had served on these “Hapdirected” task forces had private reservations about specified tasks. 

“You never thought the things he asked you to do were possible,” 

one Douglas Aircraft engineer recalled, “but then you went out and 

did them.” 48 Colonel Chidlaw’s XP-59A team was one glittering 

example. 

The XP-59A was an exceptional program in that it violated 

Arnold’s general tendency from late 1939 until mid-1944 to 

expend R&D efforts only on current production equipment. But 

Arnold saw the possibility for unbelievable capability from 

continuous research concerning jets. He envisioned aircraft capable 

of speeds exceeding 1,000 MPH and, despite criticism, completely 

believed in the future of jets. Arnold, having seen the British 

Gloster Meteor during its initial ground tests, realized that the first 

jets would not be the production models. Instead, he felt it more 

important to get a jet aircraft flying and then work on the 

modifications necessary to make it combat worthy. Perhaps he 

remembered the lesson of Billy Mitchell’s “Barling” bomber, 

which had provided vital data and production techniques even 
70 

an improved formula for high-speed, high- temperature turbine 

blades in return for all available British jet experimental data and 

an engine. As it stood, jet aircraft did not have the necessary range 

to be of much value to the AAF, which would soon be flying 

missions from England to Germany. Consequently, until the 

problem of limited range was solved, the production effort was not 

pushed as hard as that of combat-ready aircraft. For that reason, 

American jets did not contribute directly to World War II victory. 

49 Arnold’s push for the B-29 “Superfortress” can be better 

understood, however, in light of Arnold’s perception of the 

importance of combat range to mission success. This was 

particularly true for operations in the Pacific, although the airplane 

was not designed specifically for that theater. 

Radar, Bugs, and Aphrodite 

Another Hap directed project was established while the XP-59A 

was under development. In May 1942, Arnold ordered the 

formation of the Sea-Search Attack Development Unit (SADU). 

This unit was composed of scientists from MIT, the National 

Defense Research Committee (NDRC), and operations personnel 

from the Navy and the Air Forces. Total control of all assets 

having to do with submarine destruction-research and 

development, production, even combat execution-fell to this 

organization. Arnold viewed this specific task with such high 

priority that he attached the unit directly under his command, 

eliminating all bureaucratic obstacles to mission accomplishment. 

50 Having seen early “American-version” radars at Fort 

Monmouth as early as May 1937, General Arnold was satisfied 

with the potential that radar had demonstrated and pushed hard for 

combat capability in that area. The multicavity magnetron that 

made short-wave radar practical was a British invention. In April 

1942, Dr. Edward L. Bowles, from the MIT Radiation Laboratory 

(RADLAB), was assigned as a special consultant for radar 

installations. Arnold’s commitment and Bowles’ expertise helped 

make the SADU an extremely effective unit. Arnold reminded 
71 

search radars during the campaign against the submarine was 

mainly instrumental in ending the menace of the U-boats. Germany 

had no comparable radar, or any countermeasures against it. In 

fact, for a long time the Germans were not even aware of what it 

was that was revealing the position of their subs so frequently.” 51 

As Arnold counted on Caltech for much of his aeronautical advice, 

he depended on MIT for similar advice concerning electronic 

advances, particularly radar. 

In fact, it was German (and eventually Japanese) treachery in 

the conduct of the war, particularly with U-boats, that jolted 

Arnold into an attempt to rekindle an earlier pet project: the 

“Flying Bug.” Although using the World War I surplus Bugs was 

considered until 1942, the idea was finally dismissed due to the 

relatively short range of the weapon (only 200 miles). Other 

projects, however, did result from this initial rekindling. 

In the fall of 1939, Arnold wrote his old friend Charles 

Kettering, now vice president of General Motors, wanting to 

develop “glide bombs” to be used if war came. What he wanted 

was a device that could be used by the hundreds and that might 

keep his pilots away from enemy flak barrages. Arnold wanted the 

weapon to glide one mile for each thousand feet of altitude, carry a 

sizable amount of high explosive, have a circular error probable 

(CEP) less than one-half mile, and cost less than seven hundred 

dollars each. Kettering was convinced that it could be done fairly 

quickly. By December 1942 the GB-l (glide bomb) was well under 

development, and by spring 1943 it was being used in Europe. 

Although the GB-l provided some protection to American airmen, 

it was highly inaccurate. Since the AAF held closely to the 

doctrine of precision bombing, the GB-l was quickly shelved. 52 

The GT-l, a glide torpedo, was somewhat more successful and saw 

some use in the Pacific theater. The development of the glide bomb 

series of weapons, which later included radio steering and 

television cameras, demonstrated one thing very clearly. General 

Arnold was not completely sold on precision bombing doctrine. 
72 

and even more valuable maintenance time. By late 1943, General 

Arnold had directed Brig Gen Grandison Gardner’s Eglin Field 

engineers to outfit these “Weary Willies” with automatic pilots so 

that the airplanes, both B-17s and B-24s, could be filled with TNT 

or liquid petroleum and remotely flown to enemy targets. The idea 

behind Project Aphrodite was to crash the orphan aircraft into the 

target-a large city or industrial complex-detonating the explosives. 

General Spaatz utilized several of these “guided missiles” in 

August 1944 against targets in Europe. They were largely 

unsuccessful because they were easy to shoot down before they 

reached the target area. At Yalta, shortly after the first “Willies” 

were used in combat, the British vetoed further Aphrodite missions 

because of possible German retaliation to the undeniable “terror” 

nature of the weapon. “Weary Willies” were grounded after Yalta, 

much to General Arnold’s disappointment. 

Interestingly, Aphrodite was clearly a nonprecision weapon 

system. Yet, Arnold staunchly supported its development even 

before Germany launched V-1 and V-2 attacks against England in 

the early morning hours of 13 June 1944. Not only were Willies 

capable of carrying large amounts of explosives, using them as 

guided missiles assured that none would remain in American 

stockpiles. Arnold remembered the painful Liberty engine lessons 

from World War I production days. He didn’t want B-17s flying a 

decade after this war was over as the DH-4 had done. 53 

The importance of Aphrodite was not its impact on the outcome 

of the war. Arnold had no great hopes for the ultimate 

effectiveness of these “area” weapons. Rather, Aphrodite 

demonstrated Arnold’s willingness to supplement precisionbombing doctrine in an effort to save the lives of American airmen, 

particularly since he was feeling confident that the war in Europe 

was, essentially, under control by late spring 1944. In a staff 

memo, Arnold explained that he didn’t care if the Willies were 

actually radio controlled or were just pointed at the enemy and 

allowed to run out of gas. 54 Aphrodite did provide an opportunity 

to test new automated piloting technology in a combat situation. 

Additionally, and more importantly, destroying “weary” bombers 
73 

Although Arnold was determined to rid the inventory of useless 

machines, in combat he generally preferred manned bombers to 

Willies. In November 1944, Arnold reminded Spaatz of the 

salvage rules for damaged aircraft. “The accelerated activities of 

our fighting forces in all theaters makes it increasingly important 

that we utilize our material resources to the maximum, not only for 

the sake of the economy, but also in order that the greatest possible 

pressure be brought to bear against the enemy.” 55 The 

experienced Arnold realized that to win a war one side must “try 

and kill as many men and destroy as much property as you can. If 

you can get mechanical machines to do this, then you are saving 

lives at the outset.” 56 At this point, though willing to try nonprecision methods on occasion, Arnold realized that technology 

had not surpassed the abilities of manned bombers in accuracy or 

guile for accomplishing that mission. 57 

Back to Buck Rogers 

Having established and tested his working pattern, General 

Arnold began actively planning for the future of airpower. NACA 

methodology under George Lewis left Arnold feeling let down, 

particularly in the field of advanced aircraft research. 58 And 

although Wright Field had been vital to AAF production research 

and problem solving, personnel shortages made long-range studies 

a simple impossibility. Additionally, Arnold said he was irritated 

with the Materiel Division engineers’ no-can-do attitude. Perhaps 

frustrated was a better description. Arnold once told a gathering of 

Materiel Division engineers “I wish some of you would get in and 

help me row this boat. I can’t do it alone.” 59 Finally, any request 

for formal assistance from Vannevar Bush-now chief of the Office 

of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), even though it 

and its predecessor the National Defense Research Committee 

(NDRC) had played a vital role in weapons development during 

the war, particularly with radar and the atomic bomb-was not an 

option for Arnold. Bush’s attitude toward the JATO Project had 

proven to Arnold that, although an excellent electrical engineer, 
74 

engine had the NDRC been brought into the jet engine business,

sarcastically adding, “but who am I to argue with Hap Arnold.” 60 

The general and the OSRD chief held widely different views 

concerning military involvement in R&D. Bush believed that the 

military should be excluded from any type of research other than 

production R&D. Arnold was adamant in the belief that long-term 

R&D also required military input lest the civilian world drive the 

development and implementation of airpower doctrine and policy. 

Their personal differences likely began to develop during 1938 and 

1939 when Bush held the reins at the NACA and Arnold served on 

its executive committee. It appeared that they just did not like each 

other. 

Over the years, Arnold and Bush had come in contact while 

serving as members of the NACA and while working 

NDRC/OSRD affairs during the war. It was during these years that 

Arnold was introduced to Bush’s views on civilian science and its 

relationship to military affairs. Bush believed that the highly 

technical nature of the World War II environment required the 

efforts of scientists and engineers to ensure ultimate military 

victory. So did Arnold. Bush realized that the backbone of 

American R&D was nestled in the armed services and their 

laboratories. So did Arnold. Unfortunately, during times of 

national emergency, Bush concluded that the military was forced 

to concentrate on production research as opposed to basic research. 

Although not “forced” into this, it was the choice General Arnold 

had made. In fact, many of Dr. Bush’s ideas were similar to those 

Arnold had supported during the early war years. The friction that 

developed between these two men was rooted in Bush’s views on 

civilian versus military control of long-term military R&D. 61 

In 1942, for instance, Bush had recommended the formation of 

a group to supersede the War Production Board that included 

“research people” having the authority to alter war production 

plans. This meant, of course, that the military might have to 

abdicate some measure of control over its doctrine (as reflected in 

the production decisions made by Bush’s scientists). Further, Bush 

advocated formation of an independent civilian group of scientists 
75 

and valuable ideas are much more likely to come to fruition if they 

can develop their formative stages among groups of independent 

scientists and engineers before being subjected to the rigors of 

military association [emphasis added].” 62 What this meant, in 

short, was that after scientists filtered ideas, only those that they 

felt had merit would be passed along to military planners. In 

essence, Bush, as leading scientific advisor to the president, would 

have had a personal hand in directing military doctrine and 

planning. The idea that a civilian scientist, outside the boundaries 

of the military establishment, would hold such power was 

unacceptable to Arnold as well as other military leaders, 

particularly those in the Navy. 

Bush’s ideas for control of military R&D were not a secret. In 

fact, during the war he pressed so hard for acceptance of those 

ideas that Jerome Hunsaker, his closest working companion from 

MIT, cautioned him against continued attempts to force the issue 

of civilian “filtering” prior to military input. Hunsaker believed 

that the Army and Navy “would develop resistance of a vigorous 

nature” to squelch these concepts. To diffuse any possibility of 

conflict, Hunsaker, after admitting that he did not see how Bush’s 

scheme could work, offered several options for future 

consideration concerning scientific advice in the decision-making 

process. “My advice,” Hunsaker ultimately wrote, His to let this 

matter rest for the present and not bring it up before your Council 

until something clear and specific can be presented for discussion.” 

63 Despite this advice, Bush remained a “separatist” concerning 

inputs from military leadership into the path for military R&D. 

These views effectively prevented him from having any serious 

impact on the future of Army Air Forces planning in any form. 

Most of the research problems Arnold addressed during the war 

were related to the immediate needs of the AAF. The “Whittle” jet 

engine problem was, perhaps, the only exception. Arnold likely 

justified the project based on his acquisition of British plans and 

hardware that, essentially, brought the Air Forces up to speed with 

the rest of the world. While dealing with these short-term research 

problems, which always involved available technologies, Arnold 
76 

NACA, exasperation with Wright Field, and the incompatibility of 

OSRD/NDRC philosophy with Arnold’s convictions convinced 

him that, if he were to have an effective long-term plan for the 

AAF, an independent expert panel of free-thinking civilian 

scientists given initial direction by the AAF was the only answer. 

As he had said in different ways on several occasions, the future of 

American air supremacy depended on the brains and efforts of 

engineers and scientists. 

Now that the European war was winding down and the air war 

was definitely won, Arnold once again turned his thoughts to the 

distant future of the Air Force. His call to action came in the form 

of a memo from an old friend and supporter of airpower, Gen 

George C. Marshall. On 26 July 1944, Marshall wrote, “The AAF 

should now assume responsibility for research, development, and 

development procurement.” 64 The impatient General Arnold saw 

an immediate opportunity to act. Arnold had already decided that 

America’s leading aeronautical scientist, Theodore von Kármán, 

whom he had known and trusted since the early 1930s, was the 

man he needed at the head of the Army Air Forces Long Range 

Development Program. 65 
77 

1. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and Brothers, 

1949), 152-53; Herman S. Wolk, Planning and Organizing the Post-War Air 

Force, 1943-1947 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1984), 12-15. 

2. Wolk, 20-31. 

3. “Report of Special Board Appointed to Make Up a Balanced Air 

Program,” 5 August 1936, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), 

145.93-96; see also Herman S. Wolk, 12-20. 

4. Brig Gen H. H. Arnold, assistant chief of the Air Corps, address to the 

Western Aviation Planning Conference, 23 September 1937, AFHRA, 

168.3952-119. This belief in research may have been the result of earlier 

association with Dr. Robert Millikan. In 1934, Millikan had warned military 

officials through the executive Scientific Advisory Board, established in the 

summer of 1933, that “research is a peace-time thing and ...moves too slowly to 

be done after you get into trouble.” Quoted in Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for 

the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45 (New Haven: Yale 

University Press, 1977), 123. 

5. Richard P. Hallion, Legacy of Flight: The Guggenheim Contribution to 

American Aviation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977). This book 

summarizes the entire story of the Guggenheim influence on the early years of 

American aviation. 

6. Henry H. Arnold, “Air Lessons from Current Wars,” address, Bond Club, 

Philadelphia, Pa., 25 March 1938. Arnold emphasized the foundations of 

airpower as not just planes but also “the number of flyers, mechanics, and 

skilled artisans available...and the size and character of the ground 

establishments we lump under the general name ‘air bases.’” Ira C. Eaker 

Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., box 58, Arnold Speeches. 

Hereafter cited as Eaker Papers. 

7. Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of 

Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 200-201. 

8. Maurer Maurer, Aviation in the US Army, 1919-1939 (Washington, D.C.: 

Office of Air Force History, 1987), 319-43. 

9. Henry H. Arnold to Oscar Westover, letter, 18 May 1937. Murray Green 

Collection (MGC), Library of Congress, box 55. For a list of the NACA 

projects, see the NACA Executive Meeting Minutes, National Archives Annex, 

College Park, Md. 
78 

of the Spanish Civil War. One of Arnold’s 1938 speeches covered the Civil War 

in great detail and concentrated on the uses of airpower. Ira C. Eaker, transcript 

of oral history interview, 19 October 1978, Oral Interview Series, US Air Force 

Academy (USAFA), Colo. 

11. Maj Gen H. H. Arnold, chief of the Air Corps, “A Message from the 

Chief to the Corps,” 30 September 1938, National Air and Space Museum 

(NASM) Archives, Arnold Folder, Washington, D.C. This message was 

Arnold’s first as chief following Westover’s death. 

12. Theodore von Kármán and Lee Edson, The Wind and Beyond: Theodore 

von Kármán, Pioneer in Aviation and Pathfinder in Space (Boston: Little, 

Brown and Co., 1967), 243; Kármán, oral history interview by D. Shaughnessy, 

27 January 1960, USAFA Special Collections, 2. 

13. There are detailed accounts of this meeting in the Robert Millikan 

Collection, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 9.15 (roll number 10). In a 

letter from Mason to Arnold, 5 January 1939, Mason summed up the results of 

the NAS meeting of the “longhairs.” 

14. Arnold, Global Mission, 165-66; see Sherry, The Rise of American Air 

Power, 186-88. 

15. Charles Lindbergh to Henry H. Arnold, letter, 29 November 1938, 

AFHRA, 16865-40. 

16. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, vol. 6, Men and Planes (1955: new imprint, Washington, D.C.: 

Office of Air Force History, 1983), 178-80. 

17. Leonard S. Reich, “From the Spirit of St. Louis to the SST: Charles 

Lindbergh, Technology, and Environment,” Technology and Culture, April 

1995, 365-67; see also Robert E. Herzstein, Roosevelt and Hitler: Prelude to 

War (New York; Paragon House, 1989), 226-31; and Jeffery S. Underwood, 

Wings of Democracy: The Influence of Air Power on the Roosevelt 

Administration, 1933-1941 (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University 

Press, 1991), 111. 

18. Charles A. Lindbergh, Charles A. Lindbergh: Autobiography of Values 

(New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1976), 190-92. 

19. Maj Gen H. H. Arnold, “Performance and Development Trends in 

Military Aircraft and Accessories,” speech given before the Society of 

Automotive Engineers, Detroit, Mich., 11 January 1939, AFHRA, 168.3952-

119, 15-16. 

20. Arnold to the assistant secretary of war, letter, 2 March 1939, AFHRA, 

167.8-33. 
79 

1938 to April 1946. 

22. Arnold’s detailed comments are in response to a news article critical of 

Air Force leadership during the war. Arnold feared that the hostile tone might 

influence funding in the Congress and warned Spaatz to read it carefully. Arnold 

to Spaatz, letter, 9 November 1946, St. Francis College, Spaatz Papers, box 256. 

23. H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare (New York: Harper & 

Brothers, 1941), 239. Arnold summed up what would become his wartime R&D 

philosophy, “Sacrifice some quality to get sufficient quantity to supply all 

fighting units. Never follow the mirage, looking for the perfect airplane, to a 

point where fighting squadrons are deficient in numbers of fighting planes.” 

24. Gen Lauris Norstad, transcript of oral history interview, AFHRA. 

K239.0512-1116. By 1944, America was producing over 120,000 airplanes per 

year. 

25. Message, Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Fifty Thousand Airplanes.” to a joint 

session of Congress, 16 May 1940. Reprinted in Eugene Emme’s, The Impact of 

Airpower: National Security and World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van 

Norstrand Co., Inc., 1959), 69-72; also H. H. Arnold, “The New Army Air 

Force,” Army Magazine, 29 July 1940, AFHRA, 168.3952-122, 1939-1940. For 

a more detailed look at the lessons that might have been learned after the First 

World War, see I. B. Holley, Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial 

Weapon by the United States During World War I; A Study in the Relationship 

of Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons 

(1953; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 

chapter IX. 

26. Arnold to Frank M. Andrews, letter, 22 January 1941, Frank M. Andrews 

Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., box 1, corr. A. Hereafter cited 

as Andrews Papers. 

27. Arnold to Andrews, letter, 29 March 1943, Andrews Papers, box 1, corr. 

A. 
80 

you should have on your staff a free thinking technical man who is not tied 

down with current logistics, current modifications, and current procedure in any 

way. This man’s main mission in life should be to sit there and weigh the 

information received. ...then advise you what action should be taken by you to 

outsmart the Germans. ...This technician should also have a staff of two or three 

more scientists who would help him diagnose German moves and the motives 

behind them. At this writing, I have nobody in mind at all for this long-haired 

technical job, but if you think well of the plan I will rake up somebody and send 

him over to you, and I will also send the assistant scientists to sit there and help 

him.” This philosophy carried over into his directions to Kármán’s mission in 

the fall of 1944. 

29. Clark B. Millikan and Homer Joe Stewart, “Aerodynamic Analysis of 

Take-Off and Initial Climb as Affected by Auxiliary Jet Propulsion,” 14 January 

1941, original report in the custody of Dr. Homer Joe Stewart, Alta Dena, Calif. 

30. Dr. Homer Joe Stewart, interviewed by author, 21 July 1995, Alta Dena, 

Calif. 

31. Stewart interview. Dr. Durand had been named chairman of the Jet 

Propulsion Committee on 24 March 1941. This committee, instigated by Arnold 

and created by Vannevar Bush, the NACA Main Committee chairman, became 

known as the Durand Board. See Alex Roland, Model Research: the National 

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: 

Scientific and Technical Information Branch, National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration [NASA], 1985), 189. 

32. Stewart interview. Dr. Stewart confirmed the JATO story told in 

Kármán’s autobiography, except to correct the fact that Boushey was a captain, 

not a lieutenant; Kármán and Edson, 249-51; photos from the JPL archives in 

Pasadena revealed the safety poster sayings. 

33. The story of why America did not develop the jet engine earlier may be 

traced to its tendency toward utilitarian uses for “science.” The story, a 

fascinating study in the evolution of American science, is expertly covered by 

Edward W. Constant II, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution (Baltimore: 

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980). 

34. Charles Lindbergh to Arnold, letter, 29 November 1938, AFHRA, 

16865-40. 

35. John F. Victory, oral history interview, number 210A, October 1962, 

USAFA Oral Interviews, USAFA, Colorado Springs, Colo. Victory was the first 

employee of the NACA in 1915 and served as secretary throughout the period of 

this study. 
81 

offer data without being asked by the Army Air Corps first. Arnold certainly 

saw this attitude as an obstacle to rapidly expanding the size and capability of 

the air arm; Hugh L. Dryden, oral history interview, Columbia University Oral 

History Review (CUOHR), MGC, 23. Dr. Dryden substantiates the basis of the 

500-MPH story. 

37. Vannevar Bush to Jerome C. Hunsaker, 10 March 1941, Bush Papers, 

box 53, Hunsaker Folder, Library of Congress. 

38. Maj Gen Frank Carroll, interviewed by Murray Green, 1 September 

1971, Boulder, Colo., transcript in MGC, roll 12; also James O. Young, “Riding 

England’s Coattails: The U.S. Army Air Forces and the Turbojet Revolution” 

(Edwards Air Force Base [AFB], Calif.: Air Force Flight Test Center History 

Office, 1995). 

39. Maj Gen Donald J. Keirn, interviewed by Murray Green, 25 September 

1970, Delaplane, Va., transcript in MGC, roll 12. Keirn proves that there were 

two separate engine projects at GE at the same time; see also Roland, for 

Durand Committee discussion. 

40. Gen Benjamin Chidlaw, interviewed by Murray Green, 12 December 

1969. Colorado Springs, Colo., transcript in MGC, roll 12. The question of why 

the United States was so late entering the jet age is expertly examined in 

Constant II, 150-75 in particular. He cites the American tradition of empiricism 

as the reason that “radical” technologies were not produced ahead of more 

theoretically oriented countries like Germany and England. 

41. Lt Gen Laurence Craigie, interviewed by Murray Green, 19 August 

1970, Burbank, Calif., transcript in MGC, roll 12. Additional information on the 

“Whittle” can be found in the Arnold Collection, Library of Congress, box 47. 

Walt Bonney, representing Bell Aircraft Corporation, was tasked to answer a 

flood of calls which resulted after the Washington Post story was released on 7 

January 1944. In his press release he emphasized the total secrecy of the project 

beginning in September 1941. Bonney did write a brief history of jet propulsion 

to placate the mass inquiries, but the secret nature of jet propulsion was 

protected. Walt Bonney, Bell Aircraft Corporation, 11 January 1944, NASM 

Archives, Jet Propulsion Folder. Arnold’s, “Second Report of the Commanding 

General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War,” 27 February 1945, 

AFHRA, 168.03, tells the story from his perspective. “Never has a plane been 

built in this country under greater secrecy,” 76; also Young; also Ezra Kotcher, 

“Our Jet Propelled Fighter,” Air Force, March 1944, 6-8, 64. 

42. Gen Laurence Craigie, USAF, Retired, and Gen Franklin Carroll, USAF, 

Retired, interviewed by Murray Green, MGC. Craven and Cate mistakenly state 

that Craigie was first to fly the jet; also see Daniel Ford, “Gentlemen, I Give 

You the Whittle Engine,” Air and Space, October/November 1992, 88-98. 
82 

44. “U. S. Making Rocket War Plane,” Washington Post, 7 January 1944, 1. 

45. Maj Gen H. H. Arnold, “Performance and Development Trends in 

Military Aircraft and Accessories,” speech given before the Society of 

Automotive Engineers, Detroit, Mich., 11 January 1939. 14. AFHRA, 168.3952-

119. 

46. Young, 12. 

47. Laurence S. Kuter, “How Hap Arnold Built the AAF,” Air Force 

Magazine 56, no. 9 (September 1973): 88-93. 

48. F. W. Conant, CUOHR, in MGC. Conant worked for Donald Douglas 

during this period. Not to be confused with James B. Conant of MIT. 

49. Brig Gen Godfrey McHugh, interviewed by Murray Green, 21 April 

1970, Washington, D.C., transcript in MGC; Colonel F. Lyon to Arnold, letter, 

September 1941, in MGC ref: Arnold Papers, box 43, Library of Congress; Maj 

Gen Frank Carroll, interviewed by Murray Green, 1 September 1971, Boulder, 

Colo., transcript in MGC, roll 12; Arnold interview with T. A. Boyd, range was 

a major factor in determining which weapons or aircraft to build. The problems 

for Germany, at least in home defense, did not involve worries about range; and 

Ford, 88-98. 

50. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in 

World War II, vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 

(1955; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 550. 

51. Arnold to Spaatz, letter, 9 November 1946, Spaatz Papers, Library of 

Congress, box 256; Stimson Diaries, 1 April 1942, in MGC, roll 12, documents 

Bowles’s assignment as special consultant; Spaatz to Arnold, letter, 1 September 

1944; Arnold to Spaatz, letter, 12 September 1944, in MGC, roll 12; Arnold to 

Oscar M. Westover, letter, 18 May 1937, in MGC. 

52. Arnold to Kettering, letter, 3 November 1939, reprinted in MGC, 638. 

This letter marked the beginning of controllable missile development which 

included powered and nonpowered bombs and missiles of all kinds; Arnold to 

Spaatz, letter, n.d., in MGC ref: Spaatz Papers, Library of Congress, box 8, 

record MM. “Obviously, this is an area weapon,” Arnold wrote; Brig Gen Oscar 

Anderson, memorandum to George Stratemeyer, 2 April 1943, in MGC ref: 

Arnold Papers, box 137; also Craven and Cate, vol. 6, 253-62. 
83 

Crossbow and Allied countermeasures, see Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea 

Cate, vol. 3, Europe: Argument to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (1955; 

new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 525-46. In 

Jacob Neufeld’s, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force 1945-1960 

(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990). It is pointed out that 

Navy Lt Joseph P. Kennedy Jr. was killed while flying a Weary Willie mission, 

10. 

54. Lt Gen Fred Dean, interviewed by Murray Green, 20 February 1973, 

Hilton Head, S.C., transcript in MGC, roll 12; Arnold to Spaatz, letter, 22 

November 1944, reprinted in MGC, roll 12. 

55. Arnold Staff Memo, 2 November 1944, Arnold Papers, box 44, Library 

of Congress; Arnold to Spaatz, letter, 22 November 1944, in MGC, roll 12. To 

clarify the different “Willy” projects, “Weary Willy” aircraft were flown to the 

enemy battle lines, then the pilot set the automatic pilot and bailed out in 

friendly territory. “Willy Orphan” was totally radio controlled and was remotely 

launched and guided into enemy territory sometimes from a mother ship which 

followed it to enemy territory. Aphrodite was also totally radio controlled, 

normally from the ground. 

56. Arnold, Bowles, Ridenour, telephone transcript, 9 August 1944, in MGC, 

roll 12. 

57. The circular error probable for bombs dropped during World War II 

during American daylight missions was 3,200 feet for a 2,000 pound bomb. 

During Desert Storm, CEP for the same size bomb using precision guidance was 

three meters for over 80 percent of the bombs dropped. Dr. Richard P. Hallion, 

Air Force historian, interviewed by author, 28 August 1995. 

58. Roland, vol. 1, 192. Arnold did not give up on NACA altogether. In 1944 

he pressured Donald Marr Nelson to push the construction of the Jet Engine 

Facility in Cleveland, Ohio. This facility became the test center for the engines 

that Arnold had kept secret in earlier years. Ironically, the facility was named 

after George Lewis, the research director most directly responsible for Arnold 

and Kármán’s distrust. 

59. Grandison Gardner, CUOHR, 11-13, 33. Gardner refers to Arnold’s 

hesitation to use Wright Field engineers for important projects. Tactical research 

was even taken away from Wright Field and moved to Eglin AFB under 

command of Gardner for this very reason; also see Lt Gen Donald L. Putt, oral 

history interview by J. C. Hasdorff, 1-3 April 1974, Atherton, Calif. AFHRA, 

K239.0512-724, 24. 

60. Maj Gen Donald J. Keirn, interviewed by Murray Green, 25 September 

1970, Delaplane, Va., transcript in MGC, roll 12. 
84 

had been involved in conflicts with the military services before. Specifically, he 

had butted heads with Naval Vice Adm Harold G. Bowen, and in that case, had 

forced Bowen’s removal from his position. Harvey M. Saplosky, Science and 

the Navy: The History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton: Princeton 

University Press, 1990), 

17-18. 

62. Vannevar Bush, “Research and the War Effort,” speech to the American 

Institute of Electrical Engineers, New York, 26 January 1943. Bush Papers, 

General Correspondence, box 174. 

63. Jerome Hunsaker to Vannevar Bush, letter, 24 March 1942, Bush Papers, 

General Correspondence, box 53. 

64. Marshall to Arnold and Gen Brehon B. Somervell, Army Services of 

Supply commander, letter, 26 July 1944, in MGC, roll 12. 

65. Getting, interviewed by author, 9 November 1994. Dr. Getting believed 

that Arnold had consulted Dr. Edward Bowles before deciding upon Kármán to 

head the SAG. Arnold respected Bowles’ opinion and had been impressed by 

this work on the SADU. He trusted his views on the direction for science and 

technology for the Air Force. Getting, however, gives too much credit to 

Bowles. This is understandable considering his World War II RADLAB 

association with Dr. Bowles. 
After formation of the GHQ Air Force in 1935, Andrews (far 

left) visited Arnold at March Field, California. 

Today, the Jet Propulsion Lab is a massive complex nestled 

in the foothills just north of Pasadena, California. 

85 
Arnold with Harry Hopkins in October 1943. Hopkins was 

an airpower advocate and had a positive influence on FDA 

concerning the evolution of that technological system. 

A JATO rocket engine about 18 inches long. 

86 
Capt Homer Boushey in the Ercoupe at March Field. 

The results of the ground test run were less than spectacular. 

87 
NACA’s William Durand (center) was present for the initial 

JATO tests. Later, he would be sworn to secrecy during 

development of the first American jet aircraft. 

The Ercoupe clears the 50-foot banner during the test run.

88 
The second angle shows the test aircraft piloted by Clark 

Millikan. 

Kármán calculates the number of engines required for a 

JATO-only takeoff. 

89 
Twelve canisters were needed, the propeller was removed, 

and the nose was covered in safety posters. “What about 

tomorrow if I meet with an accident today?” 

Arnold is greeted by Dr. George Lewis during a November 

1944 trip to Cleveland. 

90 
Arnold departs for England in April 1941 on the “Clipper.” 

The “Super Secret” XP-59A team. Bell test pilot, Bob 

Stanley; program director, Col Benjamin Chidlaw; liaison 

officers, Maj Don Keirn and Mal Ralph Swofford; and Larry 

Bell. 

91 
The British get a look at their modified “Whittle” engine, the 

A-1. GE engineers made a few modifications to the original

design that increased efficiency. 

Bob Stanley and Col Laurence “Bill” Craigie flew the first 

three flights of the XP-59A “officially” on 2 October 1942 at 

Muroc. 

92 
Larry Bell (left), Col Bill Craigie, and Dr. William Durand 

were all present for the “official” test flight. 

93 
At Wright Field in 1945, Orville and the first military jet 

pilot, Bill Craigie, watch an F-80 fly at the AAF Fair. In 

only four decades, Orville had seen the evolution of their 

invention into an immense technological system. 

19 August 1940, Boss Kettering (left), Arnold, and William 

S. Knudsen discuss production plans. The massive effort, at 

times, surprised even Arnold. 

94 
The GB-1 was specifically designed to keep aircraft away 

from enemy flak belts. 

Two were loaded on specially modified B-17s and, although 

ineffective, were a stepping stone to “smart bombs.” 

95 
“Weary Willie” aircraft served a dual purpose, they 

eliminated useless surplus from the inventory and furthered 

development of remote piloted “missiles.” 

96 
97 

The European Influence 

Theodore von Kármán 

Near Budapest, Hungary, in the spring of 1881 von 

Sköllöskislaki Kármán Todor was born to Helen and Maurice von 

Kármán. Todor, “gift of God,” was the couple’s third healthy son 

and soon demonstrated remarkable mental skills marking him as 

the brightest of their offspring. Helen, who carried the bloodline of 

many gifted scientists, and Maurice, adept at social matters, 

offered a rich family backdrop during Todor’s formative years. At 

age six, Todor showed off for visitors by multiplying six-digit 

numbers in his head with the speed of a present-day calculator. At 

16, Todor was awarded the Eötvös Prize as the finest mathematics 

and science student in all of Hungary. 1 This was only the 

beginning of an academic, scientific, and engineering career which 

would have few equals in the first half of the twentieth century. 

In the early 1900s, after a very successful secondary school life, 

Kármán took up studies with Professor Ludwig Prandtl, noted 

expert in fluid mechanics, at the Göttingen Mathematical Institute. 

Göttingen, steeped in German traditional education practices which 

separated teachers and students as well as theory from application, 

stifled Todor’s social and mental spirit. He had become 

accustomed to the cafe lifestyle of Budapest and in 1908, bereft of 

motivation and money, he traveled to Paris; a journey which 

transformed his life. In March 1908, the daughter of a close friend, 

divorced and a likely love interest, dragged the young professor to 

an early morning aerial demonstration at a Paris airstrip. The flight 

he witnessed was performed by a craft which appeared like a “box 

kite made of sticks, wood and paper,” and it intrigued him. From 

that moment, Kármán dedicated himself to the infant science of 

aeronautics-a different kind of fluid dynamics. 2 Following his 

new-found interest in the wind (or ‘vind’ as he pronounced it), 
98 

After only three short years at Aachen, Professor von Kármán 

found himself in the midst of World War I. In the summer of 1915, 

while German armies enjoyed success on the Eastern front, 

Kármán assumed the post of Director of Research of the AustroHungarian Aviation Corps at an aircraft factory near Vienna. At 

his post he did pioneering work on helicopters, machine 

gun/propeller synchronization, and fuel tank protection. This was 

his first real contact with military officials and air operations. 3 

After the war, Kármán was persuaded to serve as Minister of 

Education in the Károlyi government, a progressive, democratic 

regime. Count Mihely Károlyi sympathized with western ideas but 

could not hold power after harsh territorial terms were levied 

against Hungary. It was not long before the radical, Communist 

Béla Kun government took control, from March to August 1919. 

Kármán succeeded in enacting several major educational reforms 

in the Hungarian system in this short period of time, most of which 

had been initiated under the Károlyi government. But he soon lost 

interest in government service after witnessing the harsh backlash 

of terrorism instituted during the brief administration of Adm 

Nicholas Horthy, which included the torture and execution of 

peasants, workers, and Jews. Béla Kun’s hasty exit from the scene, 

and the turmoil which followed, convinced the young professor 

that his previous job at Aachen, not a political career, held the best 

opportunity for his continued aero- nautical research. In the early 

autumn of 1919, after he was assured that his Aachen position was 

still available, Kármán moved to Vaals, Holland, a small village 

near the institute just across the German border. His mother and 

sister followed in 1921. 4 

During the early 1920s, Kármán rebuilt the aeronautical 

laboratory at the institute which had suffered five years of neglect 

and misuse during the war. His pioneering work on the nature of 

turbulence quickly surpassed Prandtl’s and thereby raised the 

status of his laboratory and its experimental work. By building on 

the work of his mentor, Kármán established a rivalry between his 

institute and Göttingen which grew in intensity until Kármán’s 
99 

which he advocated practical applications of what most German 

academics considered “pure science” at his home in Vaals. Both of 

these activities drew frowns from more traditional academics who 

still held to strict separation of student/teacher relationships as well 

as the purity of the “formula” itself. By the mid-1920s, even 

Prandtl demonstrated these tendencies by withholding Kármán’s 

name from a promotion list because of his Jewish/Hungarian 

ancestry. 

By 1926, the Aachen Institute had reached the pinnacle of its 

potential within the German educational system. Enrollment had 

approached its apogee and could never have surpassed Göttingen 

which received greater state subsidies and, traditionally, enrolled 

the children of a great percentage of Germany’s elite families. 

Uncontrolled inflation had eaten away at budgets and enrollment 

countrywide, but Aachen suffered disproportionately because of 

the lack of state support and influential familial attendance. 5 

American Opportunity 

While Kármán’s world was slowly disintegrating at Aachen, the 

scene in American aeronautics showed great promise. The 

Guggenheim Fund had begun selecting schools to receive 

significant aeronautical department stipends. The Guggenheims, 

both Harry and his son Daniel, “wanted to make aviation practical, 

safe, and of great value to the commercial development of this 

country.” 6 Initially, these schools were concentrated on America’s 

east coast. But after a diligent, well-argued case was made by 

Robert Millikan, Caltech also appeared on the list of seven 

universities which were to launch American aeronautics into 

competition with the Europeans. 7 The key to Millikan’s case was 

Theodore von Kármán and his methodology. Although Harry 

Guggenheim himself favored Prandtl, Millikan was convinced that 

the younger, more vibrant and practical Kármán was a more 

appropriate addition to the Pasadena scene. 8 
100 

Division. During this period, Millikan met Colonel Arnold who 

was serving as, among other things, assistant director of the Office 

of Military Aeronautics in Washington. 9 After the war, Millikan 

took the chairmanship of the Caltech Executive Council in 1921 

(university president). His goals were to thrust Caltech science 

programs to national preeminence and to bring aviation interest 

and industry to southern California. 10 Millikan believed that 

science, “knowledge of the facts, the laws, and the process of 

nature,” was vital to American destiny as long as it was applied 

properly to practical uses, such as aviation. Others held similar 

beliefs but it was Millikan, supported by Guggenheim Foundation 

money, who accelerated the building-up process at Caltech. 11 

Daniel Guggenheim himself took an interest in Caltech, Millikan, 

and the possibility of luring a notable European away from the 

Continent. By 1926, Millikan had convinced Kármán to visit 

Caltech. 

Even before informing the Guggenheims that Kármán was the 

first choice for the Caltech position, Millikan had begun what 

evolved into a lengthy courtship with the soft-spoken Hungarian 

scientist. Intrigued by the offer to visit Caltech, Kármán accepted a 

$4,000 stipend which Millikan had offered to act as a consultant 

for the new GALCIT wind tunnel, still in the planning stages. The 

money was more than many faculty at Caltech made in one year, 

indicating the seriousness which Millikan placed upon landing 

Kármán at the Pasadena school. In light of the financial problems 

facing German institutions, it was impossible for Kármán to refuse 

the opportunity. Over the stiff protest of his aging mother, Helen, 

Kármán, and his little sister, Pipö, set out to America in the early 

summer of 1926. Helen von Kármán was convinced that America 

was a haven for Europe’s criminals and societal dregs and could 

not be convinced otherwise. Kármán had earlier committed to a 

trip to Japan and in an effort to escape that obligation, he doubled 

his consultation fee to $4,500 ($750/month). The Kawanishi 

Machinery Company didn’t flinch at the demand and Kármán 

revised his arrival date to early in 1927, accommodating both 
101 

After paying an introductory visit to the Guggenheim Mansion 

in New York, the Jewish-Hungarian professor and Pipö traveled to 

California by rail. For the next two months, Kármán modified the 

design which had been drafted by Millikan’s son, Clark, and 

Professor Arthur L. “Maj” Klein, a young but impressive 

aeronautics faculty member. Kármán radically changed the tunnel 

design in structure, layout, and capability. The most significant 

advancement was placing the motor inside the tunnel, near the 

wind-producing propeller. This maximized efficiency by utilizing a 

short drive shaft, characteristic of the newest European wind 

tunnels. With the design complete and accepted by Robert Millikan 

over the design of his own staff, Kármán saw little reason to 

remain at Caltech any longer that fall. Tunnel construction would 

be well handled from then on by Caltech faculty members. 

Although Kármán continued acting as tunnel consultant, his 

function as the brains behind the concept had concluded. It was 

time for the young professor to move on. He traveled back east 

where he delivered several lectures at other Guggenheim schools; 

MIT and New York University (NYU), as well as the NACA and 

even for the Army Air Corps (AAC). His NACA speech must have 

had bittersweet impact as Max Munk, a fellow Prandtlite, had just 

been fired by George Lewis, the Aeronautical Research Director. 

Then he delivered Pipö to her ship bound for France. He traveled 

to Japan, arriving in January, to complete his obligation to the 

Kawanishi Company. 13 

In Kobe, Japan, Kawanishi representatives, aware of Kármán’s 

strenuous travel schedule, had arranged for a minivacation at a 

Japanese resort hotel. Surrounded by excellent food, lovely 

women, and plenty of time to relax Kármán enjoyed this welldeserved interlude. By mid-January he was hard at work helping in 

the modification of yet another wind tunnel, this time for the 

Japanese. He appeared to have a particular fondness for Japanese 

culture and Japanese women. His photo album retained a large 

number of snapshots of his acquaintances, while his house (in 

Pasadena at least) was loaded with Japanese trappings and 

furniture. 14 While in Japan, he designed the first wind tunnel 
102 

World War II aircraft. Once again, in characteristic style, Kármán 

did not remain in Japan to see the wind tunnel project to its 

completion. He left in the late spring and returned to Aachen. 

Kármán had planted the seeds for improving Japanese wind tunnel 

design just as he had done over the years in Germany and more 

recently at Caltech. 15 His reputation as a project initiator was well 

developed by the time he arrived permanently in the US. 

Although enthusiastic enough in 1926 to accept part-time 

research associate status, Kármán did not immediately commit to a 

move. For the next two years, Kármán divided his time between 

Caltech and Aachen. During this period, the young Hungarian 

began to feel the uneasy squeeze of German social and political 

upheaval. He had been abandoned to a certain degree by his former 

professor, Ludwig Prandtl, in the early 1920s. The situation had 

not improved by 1928. There were too many Jewish, non-German 

professors employed in Germany already. Hyperinflation had also 

lessened the financial support which the institution retained and 

enrollment continued to drop. Even Aachen showed little promise 

for great advancement and Kármán, despite protests from his 

mother, began to talk of a move west. 16 

Other incidents troubled Kármán in these years of radical 

changes in Germany. On one occasion, the professor was driving 

back home to his village in Holland. The street which crossed the 

German border had been blockaded, preventing his easy return. 

This condition existed for several days. One day, a heavy rain had 

made the road very slick and Kármán. not totally used to driving 

his new “Buick,” slid helplessly into the wooden barrier. 

Surrounded by a quartet of German soldiers, Kármán was told that 

not only must he pay the fine for breaching the gate but also offer 

reparations for the damaged materials. “Instead of having to pay 

you,” Kármán loudly announced, “you should pay me. I have 

abolished a needless barrier between two friendly nations.” 17 This 

incident summarized both the attraction and the revulsion of 

Kármán’s institute. Kármán supported international cooperation on 

matters of science and because of that view enrolled many foreign 

students in his aeronautical programs at Aachen. The diversity of 
103 

Göttingen definitely did not favor such extra-Germanic relations. 

On another occasion, one of the professor’s most dedicated 

students appeared at work with a swastika adorning his jacket. 

Kármán called the graduate student to his office where he 

reminded him that citizens of a “civilized nation like Germany” did 

not wear those symbols, particularly since they were offensive to 

others. The student, ashamed, removed the insignia. The blanket of 

anti-Semitism spread beyond the student body. A Jewish student 

had been indicted by a campus fraternity on a particular matter. 

The report from the organization began. “Mr.___, Hungarian 

Semite.” While the hearing before the University Senate continued, 

some faculty members had agreed that the infraction had earned 

the abuses. Kármán questioned the right of the fraternity to tag the 

student by his origin as had been done. “I must ask whether in the 

German Republic, where there is an equality of races, is it right for 

a student fraternity to designate a student by his origin.” The senate 

agreed that the indictment was anti-Semitic as well as nationalistic 

and chastised the fraternity for its approach to the problem. 

Kármán noted later, “At that time the majority of the Senate were 

still reasonable. A year later, the climate changed.” 18 

By the end of 1928, Millikan had formally asked Kármán to 

move to Caltech as the full-time director of the GALCIT. His 

salary was to be $10,000 each year coupled with complete control 

of the laboratory, its function, and its entire budget. Added to the 

deal, in the spring of 1929, was the directorship of the Daniel 

Guggenheim Airship Institute in Akron, Ohio, which provided an 

additional $2,000 each year in salary for minimal consulting work 

which could be accomplished from Caltech. Incidentally, this 

position was awarded to Kármán by Harry Guggenheim himself, 

over the head of the University of Akron’s president, George F. 

Zook. Zook’s first choice had been professor Jerome C. Hunsaker 

of MIT and the Goodyear-Zeppelin Corporation. These 

enticements were enough for Kármán but not for his mother and 

sister who strenuously protested the possibility of a move. But 

political events and social changes eventually convinced even 
104 

In the summer of 1929, it was apparent that the political and 

social climate in Germany had irrevocably changed. The Aachen 

Institute had agreed to hold a symposium exploring the new 

science of supersonic aerodynamics. The details had been arranged 

two years before, while Kármán was in Kobe, Japan. The gathering 

of 70 notable scientists was to occur, by chance, on the “Day of 

Shame,” the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, 

28 June. One of the Aachen student associations found out that five 

visiting scientists were to be vested with honorary degrees. These 

men represented, unfortunately, countries which had fought against 

Germany in the First World War. Without a word to Kármán, the 

rector struck out the honorary degree ceremony from the program. 

In a rare fit of anger, Kármán denounced the rector in front of the 

senate. He implied that students did not make university policy and 

this occurrence showed how cowardly the rector’s solution had 

been. One of Kármán’s colleagues remarked, “You must honor 

their national feelings.” His anger grew. “Students are here to 

learn,” the professor indignantly replied, “not to make politics.” 20 

Nationalism and anti-Semitism were two political trends which 

Kármán feared. Perhaps he should have been more compassionate. 

After all, the Treaty of Trianon, signed one year after Versailles, 

evoked similar emotional responses in Hungarians who spent many 

years attempting to regain territory yanked form them by their 

supposed “friends” after World War I. In any case, Kármán clearly 

understood the power of nationalism and the possible 

consequences of uncontrolled nationalistic sentiments. 21 

In October 1929, Kármán finally agreed to Millikan’s offer and 

promised to arrive in Pasadena by the spring of 1930. Even after 

the collapse of the American stock market, Kármán’s salary and 

contract provisions were secured and irrevocable. It was an 

agonizing decision for the professor, which he said had been made 

for political rather than professional reasons. Hyperinflation had 

crippled Aachen in the early 1920s. Economically the institute 

never fully recovered. Unemployment was rapidly rising as a result 

of the worldwide depression. Anti-Semitism was becoming more 

overt and German nationalism only compounded its impact. Even 
105 

little doubt, however, that despite the changing political climate, 

Kármán was not in physical danger. Despite his ancestry, his 

accepted excellence in aeronautics would likely have protected him 

from direct Nazi persecution. After all, it was Hermann Göring’s 

staff who had queried Kármán about serving in a position as an Air 

Ministry consultant. It was the Air Marshal himself who once said: 

“Who is or is not a Jew is up to me to decide.” 22 

In addition, the rivalry between Aachen and Göttingen was 

becoming less competitive because of the disparity in funding and 

enrollment between the universities. The atmosphere which he had 

seen in the United States was more than appealing, it was 

compelling. His salary was to more than triple in real terms. He 

was to hold total control over two aeronautics laboratories. He was 

to be the most honored aeronautical professor in the entire country, 

and it was all to happen immediately. Kármán saw the opportunity 

to escape the increasingly unpleasant political and social climate of 

Germany, improve his standard of living, expand his influence in a 

new world where his methods (both theoretical and practical) were 

praised rather than belittled. But he also realized that Caltech 

offered an opportunity to continue the professional rivalry between 

himself and Prandtl while at the same instant separating himself 

from his teacher’s tremendous European influence. For Kármán it 

was Caltech or nowhere. 23 

Kármán had summarily declined a job offer from Dr. William 

Durand of Stanford University in the midst of his first American 

visit. This was significant because Durand was well respected 

worldwide as one of America’s leading scientists. (In fact, Kármán 

had insisted that the Guggenheims publish a series of aeronautical 

texts to be used in all the Guggenheim schools. This six-volume set 

titled, Aerodynamic Theory, was edited by Dr. Durand and is still 

used today.) The reason he declined the Stanford position seems 

clear. He had just left an environment where he was “second 

string” to Prandtl. Clearly, the Stanford job would have placed him 

in a similar situation. Kármán looked upon Durand with a great 

deal of respect. In fact, he credited Durand with “bringing about a 

transition from purely empirical, practical engineering to a 
106 

social turmoil, allowed a much broader professional influence, an 

element of the move which Robert Millikan and the Guggenheims 

continually suggested. “I always had believed,” Kármán agreed, 

“that the goal of my life was to eliminate the gap between 

scientific theory and application, and I had the impression that it 

would be a particular challenge to reach this goal in the United 

States.” 25 Additionally, he could not overlook the personal 

benefits of salary (income tax was only one percent of earnings 

and Kármán frequently joked about that as the reason for his 

decision), comfort, or prestige. It would have been difficult for 

anyone to pass on such an offer. 26 

Practical Applications 

Theodore von Kármán had always admired Sir Isaac Newton. 

Newton was the quintessential theoretical scientist as well as a 

practical engineer. Not only had Newton postulated the Universal 

Law of Gravity but had also, for example, designed a footbridge 

over a river near his alma mater, King’s College, in Cambridge, 

England. 27 Kármán emulated Newton and, throughout his career 

in aerodynamic theory, maintained a strong interest in the actual 

engineering of his formulations as well as applications of his work 

to worldly problems. 

Practical applications of Kármán’s theories were reflected in a 

variety of traditionally nonaeronautical projects. Not including the 

professor’s work in theoretical fluid dynamics, he helped redesign 

the ill-fated Tacoma Narrows Bridge which was destroyed by 

gusty northwestern winds on 7 November 1940. Kármán also used 

wind tunnels to study soil erosion and proposed methods of 

controlling these effects. He made calculations which helped in the 

construction of dams, most notably the Grand Coulee Dam. To 

repair cracks which had developed in the dam, Kármán suggested 

treating the structure like a “thin plate” resembling an aircraft 

fuselage panel, an approach new to civil engineering. After the 

suggested “stiffeners” were installed on the dam, the necessary 

resistance to “buckling stresses” was created, thereby saving the 
107 

with a crash landing in a potato field. 28 

In fact, it was his application of fluid mechanics coupled with 

his theoretical understanding of science which impressed Millikan 

so much. Yet Kármán never believed that theoretical aerodynamics 

should be sacrificed at the expense of practical applications of the 

science. Together, knowledge of theory and ingenuity in 

application were synergistic, inseparable. Clark Millikan, for 

example, once suggested that Caltech aeronautics be divided into a 

“scientific” division and a more “applied” division, similar to the 

system which existed at Göttingen. “But I am not Prandtl,” 

Kármán explained. That division never occurred. 29 

A story best illustrates the Kármán/Millikan professional 

relationship. Dr. William R Sears, gifted Kármán student and also 

a professor at Caltech and Cornell for many years, remembered 

how Kármán’s advice got him his first job at Caltech. In early 

1939, Sears had been offered a position on the MIT aeronautics 

faculty but preferred to stay at Caltech if an opening was available. 

Sears notified Dr. Millikan of his desires but he required an answer 

in fairly short order. After a few weeks with no response, Sears 

called Dr. Millikan’s secretary to set up an appointment to discuss 

the issue. There happened to be an immediate hole in “Old 

Millikan’s” schedule, so Sears dashed from his GALCIT office 

down the stairs and out the building. There stood Kármán who, in 

his usual, curious way queried, “Bill, Vere are you going’?” 

Sears replied, “I’m going over to see Dr. Millikan.” “You vill 

see Old Millikan? Vhat vill you tell him?” 

Sternly Sears explained, “I’m going to tell him that I want to 

know, right now, whether I am going to be kept here at Caltech to 

do what I want to do or if I will have to do it at MIT.” 

Kármán took the cigar out of his pocket, knocked the ashes off a 

little bit and said, “Ja. But I vould not say in those vords.” 

“Well what words would you use?” Sears asked. “Now Bill, 

you tell Dr. Millikan this: Yes it is true that I am mainly interested 
108 

“I can’t say THAT!” Sears whined while rolling his eyes. 

Disappointed, he went to Dr. Millikan’s office. 

Millikan was seated at his desk and asked Sears to come and sit 

down. “Now Sears, what is it that you want to do?” Well, Sears 

told Millikan just what Kármán had suggested and after he had 

finished, Millikan leaned back in his chair with his fingertips 

touching and quietly announced, “I think we have a place for you 

here.” 30 

This story emphasizes several important points. First, by the 

late 1930s, Kármán understood Robert Millikan perfectly. He 

knew that “Old Millikan’s” goals for his institution were linked to 

commercial, industrial production (jets, wings, rockets, weather 

measuring devices, etc.). Kármán was also aware that pure 

scientists had more difficulty learning how to apply their trade to 

real-world problems. The need for applied scientists was part of 

Millikan’s plan to make Caltech a leader in the national aircraft 

industry by getting research funding from companies like Boeing, 

Douglas, and the military. 

The major role which Millikan played at Caltech during this 

time was that of a fund raiser. When possible, Millikan allowed his 

staff to stray from Caltech as long as there was a payback, in either 

funding or prestige, at some later time. Millikan’s ability to bring 

in the “kilo-bucks and mega-bucks” was what kept Caltech going 

in the early years of aviation. Millikan’s adroit manipulation and 

acquisition of staff and funding allowed Caltech’s scientists to 

pursue “cutting edge, frontier issues.” Caltech scientists examined 

supersonic and transonic flight and a small group had even begun 

pursuits in rocket propulsion by the end of the decade. Kármán, 

therefore, was not the only one at Caltech who realized the 

importance of practical applications of scientific theory. In fact, it 

was Millikan who offered Kármán the GALCIT job based on this 

very criterion. 31 In the long term it was an offer which benefited 

not only Millikan’s school but the United States as well. 
109 

Lauritsen, who ushered in the electrical industry to Caltech, and 

Thomas Hunt Morgan, leading geneticist in the US and eventual 

Nobel laureate for medicine in 1933. Millikan became a “pied 

piper” for American scientists assuring the university’s success 

during tough fiscal times. 32 He even convinced Albert Einstein to 

lecture at Caltech from 1930 to 1932, on an associate basis. 

Kármán’s acquisition, Millikan’s Nobel Prize winning reputation, 

the newest possible facilities, as well as the standing of oilier 

academic staff members, over time made Caltech the most vital 

and most renowned of the Guggenheim-funded schools. 33 For 

two decades, Kármán served Caltech as the leading figure in 

aeronautics in America, and it was with Caltech that his loyalties 

remained strongest throughout his career. 

By 1933, Kármán, who had held his position open at Aachen 

since his departure in 1930, was forced to make a final choice. The 

new Nazi Ministry of Education informed the professor that his 

leave of absence would no longer be continued. He was given the 

choice of resigning or resuming his teaching responsibilities during 

the following semester. In his resignation letter, he sarcastically 

and somewhat boastfully wrote, “I hope that you will be able to do 

for German science in the next years as much as you accomplished 

in this year for foreign science.” 34 His final professional link to 

Germany was cut. 

Loyalty aside, Kármán’s varied interests were part of his 

universal appeal. While such well-knowns as Jerome Hunsaker 

(former naval aeronautical engineer, chair of MIT’s aeronautical 

engineering department, and NACA member) and Vannevar Bush 

(chair of the NACA Executive Committee) had shunned jet and 

rocket engine R&D, Kármán was encouraging the study of 

“unconventional ideas.” 35 Although solving theoretical problems 

was Kármán’s strength, he was not afraid to challenge accepted 

theory or, when necessary, get his hands dirty during experimental 

evaluation. On at least one occasion, the professor climbed into his 

wind tunnel with a handful of modeling clay, and modified an 

airplane wing root which he suspected of causing high-speed 

turbulence. The modification became known throughout the world 
110 

the final version of the Douglas DC-3, one of the worlds most 

successful aircraft. His theories on high speed turbulence were 

instrumental in the successful penetration of the sound barrier, a 

barrier many believed would never be broken. 36 It was no 

accident and a certain irony that Kármán was so widely sought out 

that he contributed a great deal to aeronautics in Germany, Japan, 

and the United States. Even while at Caltech, his influence 

continued throughout the aeronautics world. His 1935 Volta 

Conference address, which treated the problem of drag in 

compressible fluids, reinforced the German scientist’s ideas for the 

swept back wing which was incorporated into the eventual 

development of the ME-262-a project already ahead of the Allies’ 

jet programs. 37 

Never one to believe others without logical evaluation, Kármán 

also felt that “to be always logical is horrible.” 38 His thinking 

process set him apart from others who supported large working 

groups as the only avenue to problem solution. Kármán recounted 

an instance where, during a visit to a Midwestern industrial 

factory, he noticed a cartoon which defined “Teamwork vs. 

Individual Effort.” In the frame titled “Individual Effort,” five 

jackasses were pulling a bail of hay in five different directions. In 

the frame titled “Teamwork,” were the same five asses pulling the 

hay in the same direction. Kármán could not help but remark that 

this illustration “might apply to jackasses but not to scientists.” 

Although he found usefulness in study groups, he believed that 

individual creativity was often suppressed, sometimes because of 

the reputations of more respected members of the groups. 39 

Essentially, younger members of groups were afraid to speak up 

for fear of having their own prestige crushed by a more 

experienced, more highly respected, and sometimes less 

knowledgeable member. Kármán said, “In the long run I still think 

that the finest thoughts come not out of organized teams but out of 

the quiet of one’s own world.” 40 
111 

This is not to say that the professor was a stereotypical, 

introverted scientist. He was also a gifted teacher. He was well 

prepared and organized for each lecture. The countless equations 

which covered his chalkboards were a thing of beauty. William 

Sears, once a Kármán student, recalled, “The lines were straight, 

properly aligned, and legible.” 41 Kármán also had the ability to 

pass his knowledge to students outside the classroom environment, 

at any time and at any place. A former student and contributor to 

Toward New Horizons, Frank Wattendorf, related an incident 

which demonstrated the point. While still at Aachen, Wattendorf 

and Kármán frequently worked late at the professor’s home. The 

last streetcar available for Wattendorf’s return home left around 

midnight. One night, while walking to the station, Kármán 

envisioned a new approach to the problem at hand, creating a 

simplified physical concept of turbulence. Upon reaching the 

streetcar, the professor scribbled his new formula on the side of the 

car, explaining his thoughts as he went along. The patient 

conductor finally insisted that the men either board or depart as the 

hour was very late. Wattendorf, although he understood the basic 

process described during the lesson, could not recall the steps in 

the proper order. Unfortunately, the eager student could not see the 

writing which was now etched into the outside skin of the streetcar. 

After jumping off and then back on the car at each stop, he finally 

transferred the professor’s work to his student notebook. The 

process was preserved after an all-night session in which 

Wattendorf refined the equations and graphed the final results of 

the computations. 42 Kármán had envisioned the final solution 

while his assistant, gaining valuable experience, crunched the 

numbers validating his professor’s “happy thought.” 43 

It was another of Kármán’s students, Frank Malina, who 

summarized the unique abilities which the professor possessed and 

which the Wattendorf story neatly portrays. First, he had the gift of 

“creative scientific conception at its highest level.” Second, he was 

expert at “clarifying and reducing to clear and transparent form, 

material which had been before confused and hence only 

imperfectly comprehended.” Finally, Kármán had the knack of 
112 

solutions could be obtained, which solutions could then be 

improved by successive approximation.” 44 These “successive 

approximations” were completed by his students or his staff and, 

over time, earned him the reputation as an idea initiator or seed 

planter, a reputation he carried throughout his American career. 

It was also common practice for Kármán to invite students and 

faculty members to his spacious Pasadena home for midweek 

gatherings consisting of Hungarian food and “shop talk.” During 

the gathering, he mingled with his guests, Jack Daniels or plum 

brandy and a cigar in hand, spreading his enthusiasm for science. 

His home, regardless of the continent, was a true source of spiritual 

strength. His mother and sister were constant companions and 

confidants as well as a link to his rich European heritage, although 

more than one of Kármán’s students believed that Pipö was more 

of a hindrance than a help in his day-to-day work. 45 The festive 

atmosphere was reminiscent of the cafe scene from which he had 

emerged almost 30 years before, often including famous 

Hollywood guests and high-ranking military officers but rarely 

including German beer, which he missed a great deal. 46 

The casual relaxation of the situation was ideal for learning. The 

professor’s teaching method centered around a comprehensive, 

“broad based” belief that scientists should learn some engineering 

and engineers should learn some science. He had a unique ability 

to explain complex solutions in rather simple terms which was 

important to his belief that students learned by progressing “from 

the specific to the general,” from localized phenomena to the 

overall interaction of all the phenomena in a generalized form. 

Kármán held the belief that: “Any difficult engineering problem 

would profit from going back to basics.” 47 Additionally, he 

explained, “I do not consider science as a trade. I consider science 

much more as an art. Science is an organization of your 

impressions, of your experiences, visual, hearing, by logical 

methods.” 48 Kármán also insisted upon open idea exchange, in 

the classroom or with colleagues, even if a solution appeared 

flawed. He resented, for example, Robert Goddard’s insistence 

upon total secrecy during his early rocketry experiments because it 
113 

Goddards suspicious nature limited the impact of his work. 

Additionally, Goddard was more interested in patents for his work 

than sharing his results through professional journals. 

Perhaps some of Kármán’s resentment was the result of an 

earlier attempt to include Goddard in the JATO project for the 

Army Air Forces. Frank Malina had gone to visit Goddard’s lab 

where he was received politely but sent away without any new 

information. Later it was revealed in Goddard’s diary that he 

intentionally withheld his research from Malina. “Kármán sent 

Malina to get information. I did not show him anything.” To those 

at Caltech working in the field of rocketry, this made Goddard an 

inventor rather than a kindred scientist. 49 Yet, even under difficult 

circumstances, Kármán was able to point out absurdity or 

inconsistencies without destroying a relationship or squelching 

enthusiasm. 50 His teaching ability was undoubtedly one reason 

why Arnold, a man of somewhat basic academic ability, came to 

like and respect Kármán as he did. Kármán’s wind tunnel lessons 

were at the heart of this respect. 

Wanted: Idea Generator 

More significantly, Kármán took exception with those who 

sought his advice and then refused to share the results of his 

wisdom. In 1930, while Kármán was testing the GALCIT wind 

tunnel efficiency rating, Eastman Jacobs, sent by NACA Research 

Director Dr. George Lewis, monitored the project closely. The 5.6 

to 1 efficiency rating was roughly equal to the best wind tunnels 

available in Europe. Kármán, keeping true to his belief that all 

information should be openly shared, allowed Jacobs complete 

access to the results for his report to Lewis. 51 In 1933, Clark B. 

Millikan, son of the Nobel laureate and Kármán’s colleague at 

GALCIT, had requested data from a NACA experiment on 

boundary layer control (BLC); that is, air flow very close to the 

surface of an object moving through fluid. His request was flatly 

refused. Lewis’ excuse was that the data was too preliminary. It 

had long been NACA policy to withhold preliminary test results 
114 

evolution of an antagonistic relationship between the GALCIT and 

the NACA which had an unexpected impact during the Second 

World War. 52 

Over the next five years, the level of cooperation did not 

improve. Twice during the period Kármán had proposed the 

construction of a supersonic wind tunnel. Twice Lewis had turned 

him down. Lewis’ rationale for refusing Kármán’s wind tunnel 

request was illuminating. Since the limiting airspeed of an aircraft 

propeller was approximately 500 MPH, to design a wind tunnel 

which produced wind speeds two or three times that speed was 

ludicrous. Of course the planes which Kármán had in mind were 

not to be powered by propellers. As early as 1932, Kármán had 

publicly discussed the possibility of building a l,000-MPH aircraft. 

A Pasadena newspaper carried the headlines in October that year. 

“Kármán Caltech Workers Plan 1000 mph Rocket Plane: New 

Type Engine Would Suck Air in Front, Blow it Out Back.” 

Kármán explained that the motor would consist of a small tunnel 

running the length of the aircraft. “It would draw air at the front, 

expand it at the center, and force it out under great pressure at the 

rear. ... Such an engine would give the ship a speed of 1000 mph 

in the stratosphere,” 53 Apparently, George Lewis was never 

briefed on the California newspaper article. 

Driven by the belief that high-speed aircraft were a definite 

possibility, better wind tunnels became one of Kármán’s greatest 

obsessions. In 1942, for example, he approached Vannevar Bush, 

head of the Office of Scientific Research and Development 

(OSRD), for fifty thousand dollars for a preliminary study leading 

to the next generation of supersonic wind tunnels. “Is this the best 

thing you can do for your country?” the chairman asked. Kármán 

attributed his rebuke to that of a good man holding “limited 

vision.” 54 

Again in 1938, Clark Millikan resubmitted his request for 

Freeman’s boundary layer data. Again, Lewis refused to release 

the results. These unreasonable and seemingly arbitrary refusals 

substantiated Kármán’s picture of the NACA as a managed 
115 

contracted by the NACA to research boundary layer air flow 

around concave and convex wing forms. Kármán’s team proudly 

submitted their findings to Dr. Lewis. Lewis ridiculed the report as 

“nothing new” and merely a repeat of prior NACA 

experimentation. Since the NACA had not shared their data with 

the GALCIT, Lewis’ claims held little merit with Kármán. Kármán 

told Lewis a story which reflected his opinion of the importance of 

the GALCIT report. There was once an explorer whose name was 

Columbus. He was challenged to find a new sea route to the Indies. 

Although he failed at his primary task, the work he accomplished 

was generally regarded as successful. From that time forward, 

Kármán had a disparaging impression of NACA, its policies, and 

its leadership. 56 The clash of personalities, in this case, Lewis 

versus Kármán, resulted in the clash of institutions, GALCIT 

versus the NACA. 

In 1939, while Caltech scientists were working on the JATO 

problem, Arnold told Kármán of his belief that experimental 

research was the only way to get and keep American aeronautics 

on top in the world. Arnold wanted to know what type of 

equipment the Air Corps needed to begin the process. Kármán 

suggested a high-speed wind tunnel be built at Wright Field, one 

which required 40,000 horsepower to operate. This was the same 

tunnel Lewis had already refused at the NACA. At that time it was 

a revolutionary piece of equipment. Arnold immediately found 

funding for the project. When George Lewis heard of the Air 

Corps’ attempt to invade the sanctity of NACA research, he flatly 

opposed any form of military R&D whatsoever. Further, if there 

was to be a 20-foot wind tunnel at all, the NACA would build it 

and would ensure it would be designed by the one man who could 

do the best job on its design. 

“And who is that?” Arnold asked Lewis. 

“Kármán.” 

“You’re too late. He’s designing the wind tunnel for me.” 57 

Arnold had zeroed in on Kármán’s unique mastery of aeronautics 

as a tool for the Air Forces, a choice which Lewis unwittingly 
116 

perceptions on the deficiencies within the NACA. 

It is probable that the NACA, in following its directive to study the 

“problems of flight,” concerned itself overly with the device, with the 

vehicle of flight. Either the scope of the NACA has been interpreted 

narrowly, or complimentary subsidization should have been established 

as fruitful and unexplored fields of research became apparent. The 

NACA’s treatment of the “problems of flight” might be compared to the 

use of a government subsidy solely for the technical development of the 

automobile without paying any attention to roads and other 

complementary facilities. Those factors which enabled the airplane to 

operate over vast distances or which make it a vital element in the social 

and economic structure were neglected. 58 

Despite his reputation as a gifted research scientist, aeronautical 

engineer, and teacher, Kármán remained a man of humility. During 

his lifetime, he shared the company of Einstein, Henry Ford, 

Daniel Guggenheim, Ghandi, Jane Mansfield, Orville Wright, 

Pope Pius XII, Joseph Stalin, and President John F. Kennedy, a 

diversified lot to be sure. The ease with which he moved through 

these impressive social and political circles demonstrated that, 

although he was aware of his personal standing as a renowned 

scientist, he sought no status or reward for it. On one occasion, 

Kármán made a trip from Caltech out to Princeton University. One 

of his former students, Dr. Joseph Charyk, was a young faculty 

member there. 

“Vile I’m there,” Kármán casually asked, “I might see my good 

friend Einstein, Vould you mind calling him up and getting a 

date?” 

“You know I can’t call Einstein and get a date’“ Charyk replied 

incredulously. 

“Ja, just call him up and tell him I’d like to see him.” 

Charyk finally made the connection and Einstein warmly 

welcomed the professor during his Princeton visit. Dr, Charyk 

recalled his great fortune as he was invited to come along to meet 

the great physicist, a courtesy Kármán extended to his best 

students. 59 In the case of Einstein, Kármán showed remarkable 

interest in those who were experts in unfamiliar fields of study. 60 
117 

The professor once said, The greatest progress in my lifetime has 

consisted of the elimination of what I call the scientific 

prejudices.” 61 During his life he successfully breached barriers 

between engineers and scientists, work and leisure, art and science, 

students and teachers, home and classroom, thinkers and laborers, 

as well as “long hairs” and military men. While at Caltech, 

Kármán developed a similar vision to that held by Gen Hap 

Arnold; both realized the advantages of a cooperative aeronautics 

establishment between civilian scientists and military men working 

together on the same team. Arnold realized the potential impact 

which technological advancement held for his Air Forces. Kármán 

realized the potential gains for his university which Army funding 

would allow. 62 

General Arnold had once tried, illegally, to convince legislators 

to establish policy based upon Billy Mitchell’s vision of an 

independent Air Force; and it earned him an all-expense-paid trip 

to middle-of-nowhere Kansas. By now, however, Arnold realized 

that it was only a matter of time before the dream of independence 

for the Air Forces would be realized. 63 Arnold’s imagination 

went far beyond the thinkable present; it was clearly visionary. 

Men who served with Arnold during the war said that Arnold was 

the only prominent military officer to have possessed a broad 

enough view or a clear enough understanding of the potential 

capability of science to alter the complexion of the air service. 64 

Arnold realized that the technical genius needed to fulfill his vision 

could only be found far beyond the military in the universities and 

in civilian industry despite the fact that he himself was not a person 

of deep scientific or engineering training. He needed an idea 

generator, a seed sower, a catalyst. He realized that scientists and 

engineers were the kind of people who were going to bring him the 

ideas he needed. 65 It was Kármán who best summarized this 

vision in terms the general appreciated. “You certainly know that I 

always admired your imagination and judgment,” Kármán wrote 

after the war, “and I believe that you are one of the few men I have 

met who have the format to have at the same time your feet on the 

ground and your head over the clouds-even on the days when the 
118 

which might ignite the torch for the future of the Air Force, Arnold 

felt compelled to alert his long-time acquaintance, Nobel laureate 

and Caltech’s president Robert Millikan, to Kármán’s temporary 

departure from that university’s staff. 
119 

1. I am indebted to Dr. Michael Gorn for his insights into Theodore von 

Kármán’s personality and for his book, The Universal Man: Theodore van 

Kármán’s Life in Aeronautics (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 

1992), 3-5, from which much of this material was derived. 

2. Theodore von Kármán and Lee Edson, Wind and Beyond: Theodore von 

Kármán, Pioneer in Aviation and Pathfinder in Space (Boston: Little, Brown and 

Co., 1967), 41-43; Gorn, 19-22. 

3. Hugh L. Dryden, ‘Theodore von Kármán, 1881-1963,” Biographical 

Memoirs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 345-84; Gorn, 29-30. 

4. Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present (New 

York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1970), 178-80; Kármán and Edson, 89-95. 

The Károlyi government came to power during what Kármán called the 

Chrysanthemum Revolution, reflecting the dense petalled red flower used as 

their symbol. “I remember that it was a rather friendly revolution,” he later 

recalled; also Gorn. 31. 

5. Gorn, 33-38. Although Gorn suggests that Aachen reached stature as great 

as Göttingen, this was really only true because of Kármán’s standing in the 

scientific community. Enrollment, funding, and prestige advantages still 

belonged to Prandtl’s institution. See also Paul A. Hanle, Bringing 

Aerodynamics to America (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), 105-115. 

Hanle’s work details the university system political interplay and implies a 

much deeper and divisive political agenda between the professors at Göttingen 

and other German universities. Kármán’s non-German origins were detrimental 

to his advancement as the 1920s progressed. 

6. Richard P. Hallion, interview for New World Vistas, 28 August 1995, 

tape, Bolling AFB, D.C.; also see Hanle, chap. 2. Hanle details Millikan’s quest 

for Guggenheim funds. 

7. Richard P. Hallion, Legacy of Flight: The Guggenheim Contribution to 

American Aviation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 46-53; and 

James H. Doolittle oral history interview (OHI), 26 September 1971. For an 

excellent summary of Millikan’s influence at Caltech see Dr. Judith Goodstein, 

Millikan’s School: A History of the California Institute of Technology (New 

York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1991). 

8. Gorn points out that Prandtl’s popularity in the US was largely the result 

of the wide range of publicity which Göttingen had received in America. 

Kármán, at this point in his career, was not universally known except to 

aeronautical scientists throughout the world; Hanle, chap. 5 is a detailed 

discussion of Prandtl and his methodology. Chapter 6 focuses on the differences 

and the interaction between Prandtl and Kármán. His primary source research is 

excellent. For the differences between the two scientists see particularly page 

65. 
120 

81-82. 

10. The Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory of the California Institute of 

Technology (GALCIT): The First Twenty-five Years (Pasadena, Calif.: Caltech, 

1954); also Gorn, 39-40, 56; and Kármán and Edson, 124. 

11. Kargon, 119; and Kármán and Edson, 151. 

12. Kármán, 121; Gorn, 44; Hanle, 104. 

13. Kármán and Edson, 124-25; “The Triple Alliance: Millikan, 

Guggenheim, and von Kármán,” Engineering and Science, April 1981, 23-25; 

and Alex Roland, Model Research: the National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics, 1915-1958, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: National Air and Space 

Administration, 1985), 93-97. 

14. Kármán Papers, photo collection. Of the dozens of photos taken during 

his trip to Japan, several show Kármán arm in arm with one, two, or three 

women. One small collection of photos is a series showing a Japanese woman in 

various stages of undress and, finally, nude. Apparently, this was a very relaxing 

trip for the young Hungarian. 

15. Kármán and Edson, 121, 129-33. Kármán respected Kawanishi himself 

as a man of “liberal and visionary tendencies”; Gorn, 48-49. 

16. Gorn, 41, 50-54; also Hanle, 115. 

17. Kármán and Edson, 140. 

18. Ibid., 142-43; Gorn, 51. 

19. Kármán and Edson, 145; Gorn, 52-53. 

20. Kármán and Edson, 144-45. 

21. Gilbert, 178-80. In addition to reparations, the major sticking point for 

Germany concerning the Treaty of Versailles, Hungary’s army was limited to 

35,000 men and three-fourths of its territory and two-thirds of its population 

were ceded to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. See Hanle, 120-22, 

for Prandtl’s nationalistic tendencies. 

22. Quoted in Kármán and Edson, 146. From Alan D. Beyerchen’s Scientists 

under Hitler (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), chap. 1. It could be 

concluded that not even Kármán’s longtime service and scientific excellence 

would have prevented his persecution and removal from his university post. 

Gilbert, 270-77, also offers a brief summary of the events surrounding Kármán’s 

departure. 

23. Gorn examines the continued rivalry between Kármán and Prandtl which 

existed in one form or another until the GALCIT was well established as a world 

leader in aeronautics in 1935. See Gorn, 61-64; also Hanle, 125, 134; and 

Kármán and Edson, 141. 

24. Theodore von Kármán, The Collected Works of Theodore van Kármán 4 

vols., 1953-1963 (London: Butterworths Scientific Publications, 1956). 
121 

onset of World War II; Robert Millikan to Guggenheim, letter, 9 July 1929, 

Guggenheim Fund Papers, Library of Congress, box 4; also Robert Millikan to 

Kármán, letter, 26 August 1929, Kármán Papers, 4.1; and Kármán and Edson, 

141. 

26. Chester Hasert, interviewed by author, 9 November 1994. The one 

percent interest story was part of this interview. 

27. Kármán and Edson, 295-96; also Sears, 229. In fact, Kármán kept a 

separate Sir Isaac Newton file in his personal papers and displayed a slide of 

Newton during his introductory lecture on aerodynamics. 

28. Kármán and Edson, 207-8; also Kármán, interviewed by Shirley Thomas, 

transcript, January 1960; Sears, 210-11. 

29. Sears, 55. 

30. Dr. Sears told this story, accent and all, during his 1995 interview. He 

insisted that the story showed how well Kármán understood Millikan and his 

philosophy for Caltech. For the published version of the story, see Sears, 92-93. 

31. William R Sears, interviewed by author, 8 July 1995, tape, Tucson, 

Ariz.; also Richard P. Hallion, AF Historian, interview for New World Vistas, 

28 August 1995, tape, Bolling AFB, D.C. 

32. Kármán and Edson, 147-48. 

33. Richard P. Hallion, Legacy of Flight: the Guggenheim Contribution to 

American Aviation (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), 187. Of the 

five original schools, Hallion gave separate consideration to Caltech and lumped 

all the others into one comprehensive chapter. Without a doubt, Caltech stood 

above the other schools in overall impact. 

34. Kármán and Edson, 146. 

35. Kármán, oral history interview, US Air Force Academy; see also Frank J. 

Malina, “Memoir on the GALCIT Rocket Research Project, 1936-1938,” 6 June 

1967, JPL (prepared for the First International Symposium on the History of 

Aeronautics, Belgrade, 25-26 September 1967); Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, 

Concepts, and Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 1, 

1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1989), 219-20. Van Bush 

had stated, “I don’t understand how a serious engineer or scientist can play 

around with rockets.” There was a definite view that “science was very much 

against rocketry” during the late 1930s, said Kármán. 

36. Kármán, interviewed by Shirley Thomas; Gorn, 58. 
122 

who explained that his idea for the swept wing came from Kármán’s Volta 

lecture. Kármán reportedly smacked his forehead as he recalled the substance of 

the lecture. 

38. Kármán and Edson, 233. Kármán agreed with the German poet Goethe, 

who said, “some logic is desirable, but to be always logical is horrible.” 

39. Ibid., 307. It was thinking which eliminated the element of individuality, 

like George Lewis’ firing of Max Munk in 1926, which Kármán was so much 

against. 

40. Ibid., 247, 307; Kármán, interviewed by Shirley Thomas, transcript, 

January 1960; Lee Edson, “He Tamed the Wind,” Saturday Evening Post, 3 

August 1957, 77. 

41. Sears, 211. 

42. This story was recounted by Hugh Dryden, 353. Dryden was a personal 

friend and colleague of both Wattendorf and Kármán. He also served as 

Kármán’s deputy during the first Scientific Advisory Group study, “Toward 

New Horizons: SCIENCE, the Key to Air Supremacy, Commemorative Edition, 

1950-1992” (Wright-Patterson AFB. Ohio: Headquarters Air Force Systems 

Command History Office, 1992). 

43. Kármán and Edson, 136-37. 

44. As quoted in Dryden. 

45. Sears, interviewed by author, 8 July 1995. Dr. Sears told the story of the 

“little” sister interrupting technical discussions with petty comments often 

placed well out of the context of the conversation. Kármán shrugged them off 

and continued to go about the business at hand after the interruption was over: 

Homer Joe Stewart, interviewed by author, 21 July 1995. “Homerjoe” echoed 

Sears’ view that Pipö was at times an annoyance, but he also related that 

Kármán never allowed anyone to interrupt him while he was speaking to her. 

46. Gorn, 55. 64. Part of the “festive” atmosphere was provided by a ‘huge 

red banner with oriental writing all across it. Kármán hung this banner across the 

long empty upper wall across from his living room windows. He brought the 

banner back from one of his oriental adventures. The sign, as translated by one 

of his Chinese students (probably H. S. Tsien) read, “After the show, come eat at 

Joe’s”: not very philosophical but it looked good. Homer Joe Stewart, interview 

with author, 21 July 1995. Pasadena, Calif.: also Sears, 209, 

47. Sears, interviewed by author. 

48. Ibid., 211; Gorn, 35, 68; and Kármán. interviewed by Shirley Thomas, 5, 

10. 
123 

50. 

50. Gorn, 68, 83, 157. 

51. Kármán and Edson, 126-27; see Gorn, 166-67, note number 5. A 

summary of the NACA/GALCIT rivalry is located here. 

52. Roland, vol. 1, 538. 

53. “Kármán Caltech Workers Plan 1000 mph Rocket Plane,” unknown 

newspaper, 21 October 1932. Kármán Papers, Caltech, 157.1. 

54. Kármán and Edson, 230. 

55. Ibid., 224-25: and Roland, vol. 1, 97-98,548. 

56. Sears, interviewed by author; also Kármán and Edson, 297; also Sears, 

230-31. 

57. Kármán and Edson, 226. 

58. H. H. Arnold, “Science and Air Power,” Air Affairs, December 1946, 

193. 

59. Dr. Joseph Charyk, interview for 50th Anniversary of the Scientific 

Advisory Board (SAB), 25 September 1994. 

60. Kármán, interviewed by Shirley Thomas; Lee Edson, “He Tamed the 

Wind,” Saturday Evening Post (3 August 1957), 69: Gorn, 107, 156. It would be 

interesting to know if Einstein and Kármán ever discussed military issues while 

at Caltech together. An interesting article by Ilse Bry and Janet Doe “War and 

Man of Science,” Science 122 (11 November 1955): 912-13, presents Einstein’s 

views on the responsibility of scientists to mankind. In this view offered in 

1950, Einstein suggested that a “lamentable breakdown” in discipline had been 

caused by scientific zeal. Possible impact on human life and death had not been 

considered. 

61. Kármán, interviewed by Shirley Thomas. 

62. Gorn, 116, 158. It is also interesting that the professor and the general 

were just as comfortable with the Hollywood crowd as they were with members 

of the political and scientific hierarchy in America. 

63. James H. Doolittle, oral history interview, USAF Academy (USAFA), 22 

December 1977, 4. 

64. Godfrey McHugh, interviewed by Murray Green, 21 April 1970, MGC, 

roll 12. McHugh was the administrative assistant to the Scientific Advisory 

Group at its inception in December 1944: and Gen Bernard Schriever, interview 

with author, 9 November 1994, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, 

D.C., Lt Gen Don Putt, USAFA/OHI, 1-3 April 1974; Jimmy Doolittle, 

USAFA/OHI, 21 April 1969; and Hugh Dryden, flight interview, February 

1960, AFHRA, K146.34-41, 22-23. 
124 

Ancillary Volume (Washington, D.C.: USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 1996). 

Schriever quoted a letter from Arnold’s son Bruce which he believed described 

the general perfectly; “He [Arnold] would be the first to admit that he was no 

genius, but he was an extremely innovative person and was able to utilize his 

imagination in a way that the crudest model could, in his eyes, become a 

successful product in the future.” 

66. Kármán to Arnold, letter, 7 December 1949, Kármán Papers, 124. 
First Lieutenant Kármán served in the Austro-Hungarian 

Army during World War I. 

Among other aeronautical projects, he made significant 

progress in the development of a “captive observation 

helicopter.” 

125 
Kármán’s home in Pasadena, California. 

The separate “school house” located in the backyard where 

much of the casual learning took place. 

126 
127 

The Blueprint 

Although General Arnold had probably already decided on 

Kármán as the man he needed to create the long-range forecast for 

the AAF, he spent a great deal of time in conversation with Robert 

Millikan verifying his choice. Recall that Kármán had already been 

a special consultant to the Air Corps and to Arnold since 1940 at 

Wright Field during the construction of the high-speed wind 

tunnel, not to mention his participation in the JATO project. 

Millikan agreed that Kármán had the broad base of knowledge and 

experience to head such a study. Despite his friendship with 

Arnold, the prospect of losing the world’s leading aeronautics 

professor to the Pentagon must have disappointed Millikan. But he 

realized that the Army Air Forces were in a scientific bind. He 

later pointed out that the cooperation which flowed from Caltech to 

the AAF may not have occurred “had it not been for the fact that 

you [Arnold] and I have had so many things in common, not only 

in the last war but in the inter-war period. It has been a very great 

delight, as well as profit, to me to be able to swap ideas with you 

and to try to assist in your problems.” l

 Kármán, the primary 

subject of Millikan’s letter, had problems of his own. 2

 

In May 1944, Kármán had been advised that surgery was 

required for a nagging stomach ailment (he called it a “carcinoma” 

in his autobiography). The trouble had evidently started in the 

summer of 1941 when he visited the Mayo Clinic for a stomach 

problem. By mid-July, the surgery had been completed and 

Kármán was recuperating at the Westbury Hotel in New York 

City. He felt well enough to ask Clark Millikan for information on 

continuing programs at the GALCIT. Although, according to Dr. 

Robert Millikan, Kármán was supposed to have been at a 

“sanitarium” near Bolton Landing, Lake George, New York, for a 

month’s recuperation, he was never there for more than two weeks 

at a time. 3

 

As July turned to August, General Arnold called “Old Millikan” 

to set his plan for the future of the Air Forces into motion, 
128 

cabled Kármán (who was actually at the Westbury) at Lake 

George, New York. “Have been wanting to see you for some time 

but have just heard that you are ill.” The message continued, 

“Hope it is nothing serious and am wondering what the chances are 

of your coming down sometime in the next couple of weeks.” 4

The cable was forwarded to the professor immediately. Kármán 

responded the following day, Saturday, 5

 August, “Please let me 

know [at] New York City Westbury Hotel whether my visit first of 

next week would be agreeable. Please give the time convenient to 

you. I am also at your disposal at any later date.” 5

 The new 

address was annotated in pen on the return message by Arnold’s 

secretary. Acting with customary swiftness in matters of science 

and technology, Arnold arranged to meet the professor Monday or 

Tuesday morning on the tarmac at LaGuardia airport near 

Kármán’s New York hotel. This spared Kármán an uncomfortable 

trip to Washington and gave Arnold a half-day- break from his 

hectic Pentagon office. 6

 

The LaGuardia meeting holds a somewhat legendary place in 

the history of Air Force scientific and technological development. 

Kármán recalled the details of the meeting but many of the dates of 

the events detailed in his autobiography for that fall were 

inaccurate. Nevertheless, when Arnold’s plane arrived, jostled by 

the rough winds of a passing cold front, Kármán was transported 

by an Army staff car to the end of the runway where the general 

joined him after deplaning. Arnold dismissed the military driver 

and then, in total secrecy, discussed his plans for Kármán and his 

desires for the forecasting project. Arnold spoke of his concerns 

about the future of American airpower. How would jet propulsion, 

radar, rockets, and other “gadgets” impact that future? 

“Vhat do you vish me to do?” Kármán asked. 

“I want you to come to the Pentagon and gather a group of 

scientists who will work out a blueprint for air research for the next 

twenty, thirty, perhaps fifty years.” 7

 After promising to give all of 

the orders on Kármán’s behalf (the professor insisted on that 

caveat), Arnold hopped back in his plane, the deal done. Kármán, 
129 

scientists for help. The timing of Arnolds request was not an 

accident. 

Several key elements in wartime operations had been realized 

and only after D day was Arnold convinced that Allied victory in 

Europe was a foregone conclusion. The air war had become almost 

routine. At that point it was merely a numbers game: Allied air 

strength versus dwindling Axis air capability. The Normandy 

invasion had been carried out under the umbrella of complete air 

supremacy. The P-51 had been operating successfully with drop 

tanks for several months and results were positive. Once again, 

even though Arnold himself admitted the near-fatal mistake of 

waiting to develop the long-range capability of the P-51, range was 

the determinant of success. And most importantly, B-29 production 

had increased to near acceptable combat levels. This long-range, 

heavy bomber was Arnold’s Pacific trump card. He had devoted a 

great deal of personal effort to ensure its development, despite 

initial severe engine problems. Only after he was confident that 

these production and procurement programs were succeeding did 

the general return to his pre-September 1939 “future-of-the-AirForce” mode of thinking. 8

 

Before the GALCIT chief joined Arnold in Washington, he had 

contractual work with General Electric (GE) to finish. On August 

11, the same week he met with Arnold, he also met with Hans 

Kraft of the Turbine Engine Division, Steam Research Section at 

GE, Schenectady, New York. “It was really a great pleasure for me 

to see you in such good health again that we could do some real 

work, last Friday,” Kraft wrote on 16 August. 9

 For the rest of 

August and much of September, Kármán worked to close out his 

affairs with GE, feeling better every day. In the last week of 

September he relocated to the Raleigh Hotel in Washington. By 

October 1, he pronounced himself “completely recovered” in a 

return letter to Dr. William Sears, now employed at Northrop 

Aircraft. 10 

General Arnold and Dr. von Kármán were in “continual 

conference” after the LaGuardia encounter. Kármán recalled that 
130 

wild. 

 This challenge fit perfectly into Kármáns philosophy as 

the following example illustrates. On 3 April 1941, Kármán joined 

a number of consultants at Walt Disney Productions to evaluate the 

possible applications of animated cartoons to problems of national 

defense training. After viewing four specific examples of Disney’s 

animation capability, which varied from full animation of entire 

processes to partial animation mixed with real instruction, Kármán 

offered this comment. 

When you have a process like airflow, for example, or the buckling of a 

structure, some animation is necessary. But from my point of view, what 

you call semi-animation is a great discovery, especially for instructional 

films. ...I think the main thing is that students have imagination. You see, 

an animated film leaves nothing for the imagination. What we need in 

teaching is 200% animation, and 80% the student’s imagination, and I 

think these films are marvelous for that. 13 

Kármán’s philosophy was tailor-made for fulfilling Arnold’s 

charge. 

To ensure the accomplishment and excellence of this crucial 

task, Arnold imposed no completion deadline, a luxury later 

rescinded, and insisted that Kármán’s group travel to all foreign 

countries and assess their aeronautics programs. He would then 

make a bold final report: a viable forecast for attaining future 

American air supremacy. 14 

Arnold stuck to his modus operandi. Planning for the 

establishment of the forecasting group itself was totally secret, 

almost “cloak and dagger.” 15 Just as Arnold had secretly given the 

jet engine problem to the Bell/GE team in 1941, he now gave the 

critical task of forecasting the requirements for obtaining future air 

supremacy to Kármán and his scientists. To accomplish his 

mission, Kármán was officially designated as AAF consultant on 

scientific matters on 23 October 1944, one month after his arrival 

in the District of Columbia. 16 

Kármán was so hard at work ironing out the early details of 

organization that, at the other end of the country, his other boss, R. 

Millikan, was somewhat distressed that the professor had not 

communicated his personal status or intentions with Caltech from 
131 

October. 

Had several conferences with Arnold he will see you probably this week. 

I definitely recommend not to refuse his demand. Consider extremely 

important working out [here] for him. Program on scientific basis 

midway between negative attitude to new ideas and overoptimism 

concerning so called unlimited possibilities of science. Doing this job 

well also highly important for future of aeronautical research at Caltech. 

He told me you thought I am the right person. I strongly desire to devote 

about six months to this job. Feel well recovered but definitely 

inadvisable for me to plunge into administrative and st[r]enuous duties of 

ORDCIT and GALCIT for several months. 17 

This message illustrated that Kármán had his institution as well as 

the AAF in mind when he accepted Arnold’s offer. Certainly, 

Caltech stood to benefit both financially and prestigiously having 

the great professor as chairman of the AAF study. Millikan, now 

placated, realized the potential gains and by the end of the month 

had even authorized other Caltech faculty to participate in the 

scientist’s exploitation of Luftwaffe secret technology-better 

known as Operation Lusty (Luftwaffe Secret Technology). Kármán 

was free to serve the AAF but the element of potential long-term 

impact on Caltech and the GALCIT had not passed unnoticed. 18 

In addition to the institutional impact, Kármán worried about 

his personal financial affairs. After he had already committed to 

this Washington assignment, Kármán was informed about the 

military’s strict “conflict of interest” laws. These laws required that 

all contractual obligations Kármán held with firms associated with 

government projects be terminated. For Kármán, of course, that 

was nearly all of his consulting obligations. General Arnold’s legal 

staff “recommended” that the professor terminate all affiliation 

with Northrop Aircraft, General Electric, and his own Aerojet 

Engineering Corporation. Somewhat uncharacteristically, Kármán 

replied on the same day to the instructions issued by Col Robert 

Proctor, a member of Arnold’s executive staff, and guaranteed 

compliance with “the recommendations. It is interesting to note 

that, although Kármán was prohibited from active negotiations 

with Aerojet, he was permitted to retain his stock interest in the 

company which he founded with four “other Caltech scientists. 19 
132 

element of avarice. His concern with pay, certainly well founded in 

light of the requirements of government service, revolved around a 

California lifestyle which included an enormous home, two 

servants, a live-in family, and frequent parties and gatherings. This 

lifestyle was expensive. It must also be remembered that when he 

resigned from his position at Aachen in 1933, he also forfeited his 

pension and retirement benefits which had accumulated over three 

decades of service. His undeniable interest in the progress of 

rockets, particularly JATO-type projects, became a very lucrative 

part of his association with the AAF. Although difficult to prove 

that Kármán intentionally pushed projects toward Aerojet 

Engineering, it is undeniably true that the professor and his four 

investment colleagues benefited from military contracts during and 

long after the war. By 1944, Aerojet held military contracts 

totaling more than 5.2 million dollars. Kármán once said, “As part 

of my participation in the military, my conviction is that even if the 

research and development is made for military purposes, the 

experience shows in civil aviation profits. So I believe that what 

will help in the military is not only for making war, but contributes 

very much to the progress of technology in general.” 20 In this 

instance, “profits” likely was intended to mean, “benefits.” But the 

monetary linkage Kármán saw between civil and military projects 

was undeniable. It was his Aerojet stocks which eventually 

provided him a small fortune from a relatively small $1,500 initial 

investment. 21 

In light of War Department legal requirements and his constant 

concern over future financial security, Kármán took steps ensuring 

his immediate financial stability. Perhaps at the direction of Robert 

Millikan, Kármán wrote a lengthy plea to Mr. James R. Page, 

chairman of Caltech’s Board of Trustees, requesting continued pay 

at Caltech during his consultancy in Washington. He explained that 

government regulations required the termination of previous 

contracts to prevent potential ethical problems. On the other hand, 

legalities prevented the War Department from paying anything 

beyond $25.00 each day and no provision existed for covering 

living expenses in Washington. Further, Kármán raised the point 
133 

spending most of his time in Washington working on wartime 

issues. 22 In the end, he was retained on the salaried roster during 

the war years. There was no denying that Caltech and Kármán 

were rewarded by his participation in Arnold’s advisory group. 

Caltech saw continued investment by the Army in meteorology, 

aeronautics, and rockets over the next three decades. Kármán 

reaped the rewards of military investment through stock ownership 

and prestige. Nonetheless, the benefit to the Army Air Forces 

largely overshadowed these personal and institutional economic 

issues. 23 

The Scientific Advisory Group 

Kármán’s first unofficial report was organizational in nature. In 

it he named Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, longtime head of the National 

Bureau of Standards (NBS), as his deputy. The month of 

November 1944 was one of endless conferences and establishment 

of “relations with the various agencies in the labyrinth of military 

and scientific aviation.” 24 Arnold followed with official written 

instructions on 7 November. This four- page letter set the 

boundaries within which the Scientific Advisory Group report was 

to remain. These boundaries were not very restrictive (see 

appendix B). 

Except perhaps to review current techniques and research trends. I am 

asking you and your associates to divorce yourselves from the present 

war in order to investigate all the possibilities and desirabilities for 

postwar and future war’s development as respects the AAF. Upon 

completion of your studies, please then give me a report or guide for 

recommended future AAF research and development programs. 25 

Initially, Kármán’s group was called the AAF Consulting Board 

for Future Research (AAFCBFR), but apparently AAFCBFR was 

too long an acronym even for the Army. The panel was 

redesignated the SAG on 1 December 1944, by Headquarters 

Office Instruction (Hal) 20-76, and assigned directly to General 

Arnold. 26 
134 

chance to exploit the work which German scientists had done over 

the last five to seven years. By January 1945, Kármán’s 

handpicked, scientific team of “thirty-one giant brains” had joined 

him in Washington and began executing the monumental task. 

Initially Kármán met internal resistance to a few of his choices for 

the board. One of these, Sir William Hawthorne, was an 

Englishman. Col Frederick E. “Fritz” Glantzberg, Kármán’s 

military assistant, voiced his objection to having any “foreigners” 

on the board. Kármán reminded the colonel that Arnold wanted the 

best people, regardless where they came from. Glantzberg relented, 

“The British were, after all, our Allies.” Next, Kármán insisted 

upon adding a naval officer who had also been one of his students, 

William Bollay. The colonel ground his pencil and insisted that the 

professor had gone too far. Kármán responded with a simple 

question, “But Colonel, the Navy are surely our Allies, too?” 

Glantzberg thought for a moment and finally stated that they were, 

“not as close as the British, but a damn sight closer than the 

Russians.” 27 For administrative reasons, neither of these served on 

the board until 1949; but Arnold wanted the best and he didn’t care 

where they came from. 

Arnold, now a five-star general, insisted that the group throw 

conservative thinking to the wind. Kármán then reminded the 

scientists, in his quiet, Hungarian, “broken-English,” that they had 

to deliver on their promises. Not unexpectedly, the younger 

members of the team found working in the SAG the “equivalent of 

a semester of grad school each day.” 28 In mid-January, Arnold 

suffered a severe heart attack and was forced to retreat to Florida 

for a recovery period. The general described his condition to Lois, 

his daughter, in mechanical terms. “Apparently one of my 

cylinders blew a gasket and I had to get down here to have an 

overhaul job done. ...While I was here they checked my 

lubrication, ignition, and gasoline system and they said they were 

working alright.” 29 Fortunately, Arnold had already given Kármán 

his marching orders. 

Meetings were held the first week in February, March, and 

April during which basic research for individual reports was 
135 

the group was to search for ways to secure scientific insight in a 

standing Air Force.” Second, they were to ensure the continued 

interest of American scientists in the future of the Air Force. Last, 

the group was to educate the American public in the necessity of 

maintaining a strong Air Force. 30 These objectives may have 

seemed remarkably vague, but specifics in design and engineering 

were not really part of the overall SAG task. This sweeping view 

had its origins even before America entered the war. In the 24 

February 1941 issue of the Pasadena Star News, Kármán was 

quoted by reporters as saying: “So rapid has been the development 

of military aircraft during the present war, it is impossible to 

forecast what performance limits will be obtained by warplanes 

before the war ends.” 31 For reasons such as this, a broad approach 

was always in Kármán’s mind. 

From February through April, Kármán and Dryden finalized the 

project design, attempted to make plans which would 

accommodate Arnold’s request that they visit as many foreign 

countries as possible, and started the messy process of obtaining 

security clearances for the scientific team. As one might suspect, 

the process involved in establishing this “secret” organization and 

planning its itinerary was a paperwork nightmare. After resolving a 

few security clearance problems which were generated by the 

diversity of the group’s members, the Operation Lusty team waited 

for the liberation of scientific targets on the continent. 

In late April 1945, SAG members departed for Europe to 

inspect liberated enemy laboratories. Operation Lusty, which 

Kármán called, “unlikely but pleasant,” fulfilled Arnold’s 

insistence that the SAG travel the world and investigate the most 

advanced scientific and technological aeronautical information 

available. 32 Lusty was the code name for a much larger 

operational exploitation expedition of European technologies by 

the US Army. The SAG was only one small part of the entire task 

force. Arnold’s instructions, via his deputy, Lt Gen Barney Giles, 

to Gen Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, the European Allied air commander 

were nonetheless clear. “May I ask. ...in view of the importance of 

this project that you give it your personal attention.” 33 Spaatz, who 
136 

Arnold had informed Spaatz of his belief in the value and the 

importance of these long-haired scientists.” 34 Arnold had already 

secretly established the SAG as proof of his commitment in this 

area. 

Spaatz’s immediate cooperation was vital to the success of the 

SAG portion of Operation Lusty which began with their arrival in 

Paris on 1 May 1945. One member of the Lusty team, H. Guyford 

Stever, noted the critical nature of timing during the allied 

advance. Stever recalled that local looting was often a problem but 

the Russians were the real concern. More significantly, Stever 

mentioned that “until this von Kármán mission, we had to piece the 

enemy’s facts together. Now we had the advantage of actually 

talking to the German scientists and engineers, seeing their 

laboratories, and hearing them describe their total programs.” 35

Dr. Hugh Dryden, Kármán’s deputy, echoed Stever’s conclusion. 

“I think we found out more about what had been going on in the 

war in a few days conversations with some of these key German 

leaders, than all the running around and digging for drawings and 

models...could bring.” 36 Firsthand rather than second- or 

thirdhand information made seeing the German scientific picture 

much easier. Only after Kármán arrived was the totality of the 

German scientific effort revealed. 

To preserve that scientific picture, the American teams boxed 

up everything they could and immediately shipped it off to Wright 

Field. In one location, Navy exploitation teams had been the first 

to arrive after liberation. They quickly boxed up the hardware and 

technical data in large crates and labeled them, “U.S. Navy.” Two 

days later, Army teams made it to the same location whereupon 

they crated the Navy boxes in larger crates and relabeled them, 

“U.S. Army.” 37 For these reasons, some good and some apparently 

ridiculous, immediate access to targets was crucial. Spaatz 

provided the capability to meet these requirements. 38 His personal 

involvement in the early days of the SAG helped strengthen his 

own understanding of its capabilities during his tour as the first Air 

Force chief of staff. Among the most surprising discoveries during 

the “scientist’s invasion” were a jet-powered helicopter built by 
137 

and plans for V-3 (intercontinental) rockets. Of greatest interest 

were thousands of linear feet of data and documents which 

accompanied these projects. Upon close examination, many of 

these confirmed the path that American science had already taken. 

Some, the jet-powered helicopter for instance, were a total 

surprise. 39 

Near the end of June, seeing the opportunity to get into Russia, 

Kármán had asked Arnold if it might be possible for him to attend 

the 100th anniversary of the Soviet Academy of Science. Arnold 

granted the request but specified that he not stay long in Moscow 

and that Glantzberg be made aware of his travel plans. During his 

month back in Europe, “he was very happy making and renewing 

friendships and acquaintanceships of people in Europe, and also 

having something to do with the rebuilding of science in Europe, 

on the continent.” 40 His gregarious nature was paying dividends. 

While in the Russian capital, he noted the large number of books 

published by the State Publishing House. He attributed the vast 

knowledge which many Russian scientists held to this propensity 

to publish wide varieties of material. 41 

The professor, seeing an opportunity to visit his brother in 

Budapest from his current location, which he recalled in his 

autobiography was his intention all along, set out in search of air 

transportation to his old home. Unfortunately, he neglected to 

inform his military aides of his changing plans. After several futile 

attempts, Kármán happened upon an old friend of his from 

Hungary, Dr. Albert Szent-Gyögyi, a prominent biochemist, who 

was traveling back to Budapest on a military transport plane. 

Kármán immediately followed him and got on board. Though 

delayed a day in Kiev because of bad weather, Kármán finally 

made it to Budapest where his brother still lived. 42 The professor 

failed to consider the consequences of his unauthorized travel for 

those assigned to watch over him. 

Colonel Glantzberg and Col Godfrey McHugh were those men. 

Initially, reports of Kármán’s disappearance were met with terrible 

fear. Was he shot? Was he kidnapped? McHugh finally traced the 
138 

Italy to Budapest in a B-25 specifically to retrieve the errant 

professor. The entire crew was interned in a nearby convent upon 

landing (fortunately the translator accompanying them was a 

beautiful young woman or they might have been thrown into a 

Budapest prison). In fact, the professor was straightening out his 

brother’s banking affairs in Budapest. But the story was not yet 

over. While in Budapest, Glantzberg’s B-25 had been siphoned of 

fuel. Only emergency fuel remained in the “Tokyo” tank (a carryover from the Doolittle raid). They were forced to land in Belgrade 

and were again interned for landing without permission. After 

some quick talking, the rescue team was given enough gas to make 

a safe landing in Italy. The “narrow escape” was completed. This 

incident was a rare instance where Kármán demonstrated a blatant 

disregard for military policy and, in fact, had endangered himself 

and those tasked to rescue him. 43 The affair also demonstrated, 

however, his supreme dedication to his family. 

Where We Stand 

After six weeks of traveling throughout the devastated, 

European countryside, the professor met Arnold, now recovered 

from his January setback, in Paris on 13 July 1945, to discuss the 

team’s initial findings. General Arnold was traveling to join 

President Harry Truman at Potsdam and was pressed for time. He 

asked the professor to prepare a report summarizing these 

discoveries. Kármán submitted Where We Stand on 22 August, in 

satisfaction of that request (see appendix B for the report). 

Where We Stand, a summary of the exploitation of German 

science and technology which Kármán’s men had unearthed, began 

by listing a set of eight aspects of aerial warfare which, Kármán 

believed, had become “fundamental realities.” They were 

1. that aircraft-manned or pilotless-will move with speeds far beyond the 

velocity of sound. 

2. that due to improvements in aerodynamics, propulsion and electronic 

control, unmanned devices will transport means of destruction to targets 

at distances up to several thousand miles. 
139 

4. that defense against present-day aircraft will be perfected by target 

seeking missiles. 

5. that only aircraft or missiles moving at extreme speeds will be able to 

penetrate enemy territory protected by such defenses. 

6. that a perfect communication system between fighter command and 

each individual aircraft will be established. 

7. that location and observation of targets, take-off, navigation and 

landing of aircraft, and communication will be independent of visibility 

and weather. 

8. that fully equipped airborne task forces will be enabled to strike at far 

distant points and will be supplied by air. 44 

In addition, the report sought to explain why Germany was 

advanced in some areas and behind in others. Inherent in the title 

was Kármán’s evaluation of US posture in regard to foreign 

scientific developments. 

For example, German achievements in aeronautics were not 

attributed to superior scientists, rather, German superiority was due 

to “very substantial support enjoyed by their research institutions 

in obtaining expensive research equipment such as large 

supersonic wind tunnels many years before such equipment was 

planned in this country.” 45 These tunnels supported development 

in the field of transonic and supersonic wing design to the point of 

“practical application.” These ideas were only being discussed in 

America, and this realization was made by none other than the 

chief of the leading aeronautics laboratory in the country, the 

GALCIT. Kármán added a warning, “We cannot hope to secure air 

superiority in any future conflict without entering the supersonic 

speed range.” Additionally, the report stated that, “The V-2 

development was successful not so much because of striking 

scientific developments as because of an early start, military 

support, and boldness of execution.” 46 An early start, unlimited 

funding, and bold execution of German scientific plans became a 

recurring theme throughout the report. 

There were also areas where the US held substantial leads over 

the Axis. The most glaring of these was in radar development. 
140 

It must be realized that radar is not a facility of attachment which will 

occasionally be used under bad conditions. Rather, the Air Force of the 

future will be operated so that radar is the primary facility, and visual 

methods will only occasionally be used. ...Hence, in an all-weather Air 

Force, radar must be the universally used tool for bombing, gunfire, 

navigation, landing, and control. The whole structure of the Air Force, 

the planning of its operations, its training program, and its organization 

must be based on this premise. The development and perfection of radar 

and the techniques for using it effectively are as important as the 

development of the jet-propelled plane. 47 

This realization, today, appears the most prescient of all those 

made during a period where the Army Air Force’s primary 

doctrine (in Europe certainly), that of precision, strategic bombing, 

was based primarily on the ability to visually acquire the intended 

target. 48 He also pointed out that the Germans had failed to keep 

stride with the rest of the world because, “Most of the development 

took place in industrial laboratories ...but the very brilliant group 

of German physicists in universities were never called in to 

participate. Consequently, while engineering design was good, 

imaginative new thinking was lacking.” Kármán could always tell 

where imagination and the element of individual brilliance was 

missing, be it in his students or in notable scientists. Further, 

Kármán predicted that, “The ability to achieve Air Force 

operations under all conditions of darkness and weather contributes 

more than any other single factor to increasing the military 

effectiveness of the air forces. Hence, any research program 

designed to overcome the limitations to flight at night and in bad 

weather will pay big dividends.” Adding a caveat, realizing that the 

technology behind radar was rapidly being improved, the professor 

suggested that the Air Force “must be alert in swiftly utilizing any 

new developments.” 49 

By emphasizing radar, Kármán also indirectly assured MIT’s 

future share of military research projects. During the war it had 

been the MIT Radiation -Laboratory (RADLAB) which had 

worked toward American radar excellence. Generally, much as 

Caltech held the reins of AAF aeronautical science, MIT directed 

AAF radar programs. In fact, the addition of Dr. Edward Bowles to 
141 

aeronautics in earlier years. The rivalry which developed between 

these schools was more friendly than Caltech’s rivalry with the 

NACA because both schools held particular expertise in different 

areas of technological development, and, for the most part, both 

respected each other’s accomplishments. 50 

Radar was a specific technological device but Where We Stand 

was also broad in its scope. The report addressed the idea of an Air 

Force school for scientists and engineers, continued relations with 

the civilian scientific community, continued cooperation with 

national agencies concerned with scientific research, and made 

more mundane but important suggestions concerning techniques 

for measurement taking and data collection during 

experimentation. Perhaps the most interesting recommendation 

was not directly related to accomplishment of scientific research or 

development; it concerned problems of organization. 

It is necessary that the Commanding General of the Air Forces and the 

Air Staff be advised continuously on the progress of scientific research 

and development in view of the potentialities of new discoveries and 

improvements in aerial warfare. A permanent Scientific Advisory Group, 

consisting of qualified officers and eminent civilian scientific 

consultants, should be available to the Commanding General, reporting 

directly to him on novel developments and advising him on the planning 

of scientific research. 51 

It was this last recommendation which was passed along to Tooey 

Spaatz by Arnold before he left the scene in February 1946. Spaatz 

took it to heart and established the Scientific Advisory Board as a 

permanent group which met for the first time on 17 June 1946. It 

was not, however, attached to the commanding general but had 

been relegated to the deputy chief of Air Staff for research and 

development, Gen Curtis E. LeMay. 52 The SAB had nevertheless 

survived the end of the war and was established as an organization 

with the express purpose of providing scientific advice to higher 

levels of Air Force leadership. The imperfection of the new system 

would eventually be repaired. 

After the initial report was published, Kármán began the 

arduous task of compiling the SAG’s detailed work. Suddenly, the 
142 

war was taking its toll. In mid-September, General Arnold had 

suffered yet another serious heart attack. 

Toward New Horizons 

Perhaps fearing the worst, Arnold cabled Kármán, still in 

Europe, wondering if the report might be finalized by 15 

December 1945. To accommodate the ailing general, Kármán 

canceled his upcoming trip to Japan and sent a few of his team 

members to the Orient instead. From October through December, 

work proceeded at a frenetic pace. After many sleepless nights, the 

draft version of the final report, Toward New Horizons, was 

delivered to Arnold’s desk on 15 December 1945. 53 Kármán’s 

summary volume, Science: The Key to Air Supremacy, introduced 

the 12-volume “classified” report (see appendix C for the summary 

report). 54 In essence, the summary volume amplified the tenets of 

the August report with a few significant additions. Kármán’s threepart volume addressed the problems associated with “research and 

development from the point of view of the technical requirements 

which the Air Forces must meet in order to carry out its task, 

securing the safety of the nation.” The third chapter elaborated 

upon correcting the organizational and administrative problems 

which had been addressed in Where We Stand. Most notable of 

these elaborations was a plea for government authority to “foster,” 

not “dictate,” basic research. 55 This type of long-range, extremely 

detailed study was the first of its kind ever accomplished in 

American military history. Along with Where We Stand, it was to 

serve as the blueprint for building the Air Force during the next 

two decades. 

In completing the report, Kármán stuck to his standard 

methodology. He provided general guidance which, if followed, 

would result in the eventual supremacy of American airpower. 

Once the formula had been provided, he moved on to the next 

pressing problem. “A man will put energy into a certain piece of 

work and once he gets it done he’s very likely to go on to 

something else and leave it.” Dr. Edward Bowles continued, “I 
143 

been generated, He [Kármán] had young guys to pick them up 

and run with them.” 57 

General Arnold was so interested in the possibilities of future 

airpower development that, based upon Kármán’s preliminary 

report, he offered his personal perceptions of the SAG’s 

importance to General Spaatz. Arnold reminded the man who 

became his successor that the Air Forces had no great scientists in 

their ranks. Military research and development (R&D) labs had 

stagnated during the war, largely due to increased production 

requirements and personnel shortages. Outside civilian help had 

been required during the war to meet development of aircraft 

power plants and structural design problems. Only through 

civilians had scientific and technological potential been realized. 

Arnold reminded Spaatz that: “These men did things that the 

average Army officer could never have accomplished. We must 

not lose these contacts.” 58 
144 

1. Dr. Robert Millikan to Henry H. Arnold, letter, 5 September 1945, Murray 

Green Collection (MGC), roll 12. 

2. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and Brothers, 

1949), 532; and Thomas A. Sturm, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its 

First Twenty Years, 1944-1964 (1967; reprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air 

Force History, 1987), 3-4. 

3. Theodore von Kármán medical records in folder 1523, Caltech Archives, 

Beckman Center, Pasadena, Calif.: William Rees Sears, interviewed by author, 8 

July 1995, tape; also F. W. Thomas to Kármán, letter, 19 May 1944, Caltech 

73.6; Clark Millikan to Kármán. letter, 18 July 1944, Caltech 73.6; Robert A 

Millikan to Henry H. Arnold, letter, 3 August 1944, Caltech, Millikan 

Collection, folder 16.19. Additionally see Theodore von Kármán and Lee Edson, 

Wind and Beyond: Theodore von Kármán. Pioneer in Aviation and Pathfinder in 

Space (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 267-70; and Kármán, interviewed 

by Shirley Thomas, January 1960. 

4. Henry H. Arnold to Theodore von Kármán, telegram, Lake George, N.Y., 

4 August 1944, library of Congress, Arnold Papers, Kármán Folder. Arnold’s 

secretaries addressed Kármán as Carmen, Prof. Kármán, Mr. Kármán, etc. 

5. Theodore von Kármán to Arnold, radiogram, 5 August 1944, Library of 

Congress, Arnold Papers, Kármán Folder. 

6. It was obviously sometime in early August that Arnold met with Kármán 

to discuss the foundations of the SAG, not in September as is generally thought. 

7. Kármán and Edson, 268. See also weather analysis in the previous note. 

8. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 

War II, vol. 6, Men and Planes (1955; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of 

Air Force History, 1983), 218-19. 

9. Hans Kraft to Kármán, letter, 16 August 1944, Schenectady, N.Y., Caltech 

6012. 

10. Kármán to Sears, letter, 30 September 1944, Washington, D.C., Caltech 

27.44; Millikan to William Knudsen, letter, Caltech, 3 October 1944, Caltech, 

Millikan Collection, 16.19. 

11. Kármán and Edson, 267-68; Millikan to Knudsen, letter, 3 October 1944. 

12. Henry H. Arnold to Carl A Spaatz, letter, 6 December 1945; Arnold to 

Ira C. Eaker, letter, 22 May 1945, MGC; also Wesley Frank Craven and James 

Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in WW II, vol. 6, Men and Planes (Chicago: 

University of Chicago Press, 1948), 234; and Thomas A Sturm, The USAF 

Scientific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty Years, 1944-1964 (Washington, 

D.C.: USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, 1967), 37. 
145 

, , ; y p

after the war was nearing completion, 15 April 1945, in MGC. 

15. On 25 October, in a reply to a letter from Lt Gen George C. Kenney 

concerning future planning, Hap detailed more than 30 specific actions 

pertaining to aircraft production and design, but he did not mention the Kármán 

project which had already been initiated. Arnold only added a brief clue in a 

postscript, “There is still more that is being prepared now but will not be 

actuated until the Post-War Period.” On 9 November 1944, Arnold spoke to the 

NACA Aeronautical Research Laboratory where he cryptically told the 

gathering of scientists and engineers that when the AAF got stuck in a 

development problem or when looking toward the future of aeronautics, 

“normally we go to the NACA and ask you people to do that work for us 

[emphasis added].” But Arnold would not go to the NACA this time. 

16. Scientific Advisory Board, 1944-45 file, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 

17. Kármán to R. Millikan, 2 October 1944, Caltech 20.28. 

18. Brig Gen F. O. Carroll, Chief, Engineering Division, Wright Field to R. 

Millikan, 12 September 1944; confirmation on 29 September via Western 

Union, Millikan Papers, Caltech, 16.19. 

19. Col Robert Proctor to Kármán, letter, 20 November 1944, and Kármán to 

Arnold, letter, 20 November 1944. Millikan Papers, 16.19. It should be noted 

that this exchange is found in Robert Millikan’s papers. This certainly increases 

the chance that Millikan had been informed as to Kármán’s impending financial 

dilemma. 

20. E. C. Bowles to G. C. Marshall, letter, 11 August 1944, MGC, roll 12, 

ref: Library of Congress box 45; and Kármán interview, 12 January 1960, 

USAFA. 

21. Hugh L. Dryden, “Theodore von Kármán: 1881-1963,” Biographical 

Memoirs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 356; Michael H. Gorn, 

he Universal Man: Theodore von Kármán’s life in Aeronautics (Washington, 

D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 154-57. Kármán died with a net 

worth value of nearly one-half million dollars. In 1963 this was a fairly large 

fortune considering that his enormous California home was valued at only 

85,000. His will dispersed only a fraction of the money in his portfolio. The rest 

was dispersed by Edward Beehan, executor of the estate. 

22. Kármán to Mr. James R Page, letter, 22 November 1944, Millikan 

Papers, 16.19. Kármán traced his entire pay history from his arrival in the ‘s and 

requested back pay and a substantial raise. He also mentioned that is servants 

received $100 each month from “Uncle Same [sic]” which was only $50 less 

than his projected monthly pension. Page was in the hospital and the response 

was late if it was ever made official at all. 
146 

was not until two decades later that the term was officially used for the first 

time, the existence of the Military-Industrial complex as early as the 1940s was 

undeniable. 

24. Kármán’s first report for the SAG, 23 November 1944, in MGC; Kármán 

to Clark Millikan, letter, 4 November 1944, Caltech, 736; and Gorn, 99. 

Kármán’s and Dryden’s close association during 1944 and 1945 resulted in a 

lifelong respect between the two men. Kármán showed his admiration in a letter 

on the occasion of Dryden’s appointment as director of research for the NACA 

in 1947, replacing George Lewis. “I feel that a new era starts not only in the 

history of that institution, but also in the history of American Aeronautical 

research. ...You know that I not only appreciate your friendship and scientific 

achievement, but also the splendid way in which you can eliminate difficulties 

caused by red tape and vanity.” Kármán to Dryden, letter, 3 October 1947, 

Caltech 83.1. The jab at Lewis is unmistakable. 

25. Arnold to Kármán, letter, 7 November 1944, Washington, D.C., SAB 

944-45 file. 

26. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.; 

Kármán’s first report for the SAG, 23 November 1944, MGC, ref: Library of 

Congress, box 79; and Gorn, 99-100. H. H. Arnold Papers, HOI 20-76, MGC, 

Library of Congress, box 40; Arnold to Kármán, letter, 7 November 1944, SAB. 

27. Kármán and Edson, 269-70; and William Rees Sears, Stories from a 

Twentieth Century Life (Stanford, Calif.: Parabolic Press, 1993), 219. 

28. Kármán, interviewed by S. Thomas; and T. F. Walkowicz, “von 

Kármán’s Singular Contributions to Aerospace Power,” Air Force Magazine, 

May 1981, 60-61; Gorn, 47. 

29. Arnold to Lois Snowden, letter, 22 February 1945, MGC. 

30. Sturm, 5. 

31. “No Way to Predict Future of Warplane Performance,” Pasadena Star 

News, 24 February 1941, Caltech, 157.2. 

32. Kármán, oral history interview, USAFA, Colo.; Chester Hasert, 

interviewed by author, 10 November 1994, National Academy of Sciences, 

Washington, D.C.; also Operation Lusty folder, AFHRA. Arnold’s heart attack 

in mid-January did not interfere with the operation of the SAG. He had already 

given them their marching orders before he was taken ill. He spent the next few 

months in Florida recuperating before the SAG investigated European scientific 

laboratories. 

33. Lt Gen Barney Giles to Spaatz, letter, 19 April 1945. Caltech 902; 

Kármán and Edson, 272; Gorn, 103-5; and Kármán, oral history interview, 

USAF Academy, Colo. 

34. In a reply to an earlier letter praising radar developments, Arnold wrote 

Spaatz on 12 September 1944, affirming his trust in scientists, MGC, roll 12. 
147 

37. Homer Joe Stewart, interviewed by author, 21 July 1995. 

38. H. Guyford Stever, interviewed by author, 18 May 1995. Dr. Stever was 

working with the British RADLAB (radiation laboratory) as part of the MIT 

exchange team when Lusty operations began. He was attached to Kármán’s 

group in the place of Dr. L. DuBridge, who was unavailable. Stever is a former 

chairman of the SAB from 1962-1964 and a former presidential science advisor. 

39. Ibid., tape and transcript, Washington. D.C.; and Dr. Richard P. Hallion, 

interview for New World Vistas, 28 August 1995, tape. Bolling AFB. D.C.; and 

MGC, roll 12, Summary of memo from Kármán to Arnold, 30 July 1945, which 

documented the group’s travels to that point. New World Vistas is the most 

recent Air Force science and technology forecast completed (in draft) 15 

December 1995. 

40. Sears, interviewed by author, 8 July 1995. 

41. Kármán and Edson, 289. 

42. Ibid., 287-89. 

43. Godfrey McHugh, interviewed by Murray Green. Washington, D.C., 21 

April 1970, MGC, roll 12; and Kármán and Edson, 289. 

44. Theodore von Kármán, Where We Stand: First Report to General of the 

Army H. H. Arnold on Long Range Research Problems of the Air Forces with a 

Review of German Plans and Developments, 22 August 1945 (Wright- Patterson 

AFB, Ohio: Air Force Materiel Command History Office), 12. Sturm has 

summarized the early efforts of the SAG in USAF Scientific Advisory Board, Its 

First Twenty Years, which includes the evolution and decline of the group 

through 1964; Alan Gropman has nicely summarized the report itself in “Air 

Force Planning and the Technology Development Planning Process in the PostWorld War II Air Force-The First Decade (1945-1955),” in Military Planning in 

the Twentieth Century: The Proceedings of the Eleventh Military History 

Symposium, USAF Academy, 10-12 October 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Office 

of Air Force History. 1986), 154-230. 

45. Kármán, Where We Stand, 5. 

46. Ibid., 8, 12, 21. 

47. Ibid., 75-76. 
148 

American doctrine had been clearly spelled out at the Air Corps Tactical School 

(ACTS) since 1935 as “the full-blown theory of high-level, daylight precision 

bombardment of pinpoint targets.” Eighth Air Force Commander, Lt Gen Ira C. 

Eaker, was a 1936 ACTS graduate. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps 

Tactical School, 1920-1940 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 

1992), 68-70; and Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment American Bombing in 

World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), overemphasizes the 

AAF’s use of radar in the European theater and misses altogether the impact of 

“area bombing” during the war. The Strategic Bombing Surveys clearly 

concluded that morale was not damaged as much as Schaffer implies. For an 

excellent summary of the report see, The United States Strategic Bombing 

Surveys, Summary Volume, 30 September 1945 (reprint; Maxwell AFB, Ala.: 

Air University Press, 1987), 34-39. 

49. Finney, 77-79, 83. 

50. Jack H. Nunn, “MIT: A University’s Contribution to National Defense,” 

Military Affairs, October 1979, 120-25. Nunn emphasized a long relationship 

which MIT carried on with the Navy, also in the radar and aeronautics field. Dr. 

Ivan Getting, a member of the MIT RADLAB during these years, recalled that 

the rivalry is today overplayed. The fact was that, in the 1930s and 40s, travel 

between east and west in the US was time consuming and inconvenient. MIT 

and Caltech were separated by distance, not by philosophy. Getting, interviewed 

by author, 9 November 1994. 

51. Ibid., 88. 

52. Sturm, 14-15. 

53. Kármán and Edson, 290; Gorn, 113-14. 

54. Theodore von Kármán, Toward New Horizons, vol. 1, Science: The Key 

to Air Supremacy, 15 December 1945, 13. 

55. Kármán, Toward New Horizons, reprinted version, 69-84. Although 

future attempts were made to repeat the forecast, none made such a monumental 

impact on the structure or the vision of the US Air Force. The originals of the 

Kármán Report are located in both the Arnold and Spaatz Papers in the Library 

of Congress as well as at the Air Force Materiel Command Archives at WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio, and the Pentagon Library. 

56. Dr. Edward Bowles, interviewed by Murray Green, 6-7 May 1971, 

Wellesley Hills, Mass., in MGC, roll 12. 

57. Dr. Homer Joe Stewart, interviewed by author, 21 July 1995. The ideas 

ranged from unique approaches to problem solution, normally a not-yet-tried 

differential approximation, to thoughts on experimental methodology. 

58. Arnold to Spaatz, letter, 6 December 1945, MGC. 
Camouflaged laboratories were “invaded” by Operation 

Lusty team members as soon as they were liberated. 

During Operation Lusty, Kármán caught up with his old 

professor, Ludwig Prandtl. “H. S.” Tsien looks on during 

one of their conversations. 

149 
Some of the aeronautical treasure found during Operation

Lusty. Wind tunnels at the Hermann Goring Institute, mines 

which housed V-1 and V-2 construction operations, and 

hardware. Missile test sections, “jet” powered helicopters, 

and swept-back wing forms hanging in the tunnels. 

150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 

Airpower under Construction 

By linking up with Kármán, Arnold solved for the Air Force 

one of America’s basic scientific problems, that of dependence 

upon empirical research. Kármán brought his theoretical and 

applied aerodynamics ideas to America and Arnold used them as 

the cornerstone of the infrastructure for future American Air 

Forces. Even before Toward New Horizons was released, Arnold 

had enacted other programs related to long-term planning for the 

Army Air Forces (AAF) based on Kármán’s first report, Where 

We Stand. The ailing general acted quickly fearing certain postwar 

budget cuts as well as to defuse the impact of another science and 

technology forecast authored by Dr. Vannevar Bush, Office of 

Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) chairman. Bush’s 

report had been released in July 1945 just before Where We Stand 

was completed. 

The Bush report, Science: The Endless Frontier, recommended 

a course for scientific research in America. This report, which 

largely reflected Bush’s personal views, would have eliminated the 

military from performing any form of “long-range scientific 

research on military problems,” just as he had suggested in 1942-

43. 1

 In fact, there were no military members on the “committees” 

which compiled Bush’s information. The participants were 

university professors and members of industry. Additionally, the 

report reemphasized his pessimistic views on rocketry and its 

applications. What made matters worse, Bush had the president’s 

ear. 2 By 1949 and 1950, Bush’s significant government influence 

apparently contributed to congressional defeat of appropriations 

large enough to go forward with the Air Force’s Atlas rocket, a 

technology advocated in the first Kármán report. 3 

In 1949, with his publication of Modem Arms and Free Men, 

Bush revealed his true feelings about “military men,” views which 

Arnold may have suspected all along. 
157 

py y y y 

those who have spent a lifetime developing and utilizing science. 

Military men have arrived rather generally at the first stage, where they 

can grasp the value of a device before them; they have by no means 

arrived at the second, where they can visualize intelligently the devices 

of the future. Yet military planning for the future that ignores or 

misinterprets scientific trends is planning in a vacuum. Military men are 

therefore in a quandary; there is a new and essential element in their 

planning that they do not understand. To leave it out is obviously absurd. 

To master it absolutely is impossible. 

He continued: 

The days are gone when military men could sit on a pedestal, receive the 

advice of professional groups in neighboring fields who were maintained 

in a support or tributary position, accept or reject such advice at will, 

discount its importance as they saw fit, and speak with omniscience on 

the overall conduct of the war. For one thing, professional men in 

neighboring fields have no present intention of ‘kowtowing’ to any 

military hierarchy, in a world where they know that other professional 

subjects are just as important in determining the course of future events 

in the nation’s defense as are narrowly limited military considerations. 

...The professional men of the country will work cordially and seriously 

in professional partnership with the military; they will not become 

subservient to them; and the military cannot do their full present job 

without them. 4

 

This exposition, a reflection of Bush’s perceived experiences with 

the military since the late 1930s, could only have forced a wide 

grin from the retired general who knew that he had done the right 

thing by establishing the Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) in 

1944. Kármán agreed with Arnold: “the concept of civilian control 

(such as advanced by Vannevar Bush) would only injure progress 

in Air Force research. Such research should be dispersed among all 

the people and their institutions. The Air Force should feel free to 

call on anyone who it thinks would be helpful in carrying on its 

program.” 5

 Thus, there existed two significant ideological 

differences between Dr. Bush and Dr, von Kármán: (1) Bush did 

not believe that military men were capable of “visualizing 

intelligently the devices of the future,” while Kármán was 

singularly impressed by many Army Air Forces thinkers, 

particularly Arnold, and (2) Bush insisted that civilian science 

should direct military long-range planning, while Kármán insisted 
158 

who would do the research (civilian scientists were the only 

qualified individuals at that time) but who would decide what 

research to pursue, and how specific projects would be decided 

upon, particularly long-term R&D programs. 

In spite of Bush’s report, which was geared toward the future of 

national (rather than uniquely Air Force) scientific development, 

Toward New Horizons (appendix C) and Kármán’s earlier report, 

Where We Stand (appendix B), established a long-range forecast 

and a blueprint for achieving future superiority of the American 

military airpower system. 

SAG to SAB: Evolution 

The Army Air Forces witnessed three distinct periods relating 

to the institutionalization of the Kármán reports. The first of these 

began in mid-1945 and lasted through Arnold’s retirement in 

February 1946. Both Arnold and Kármán were actively involved, 

independently and as a team, in establishing the groundwork for 

institutionalization of science and technology within the AAF. The 

second period-the Kármán years-were characterized by the 

professor’s active involvement in the follow-up and 

implementation of major recommendations made in Toward New 

Horizons. The third and most extensive period began with 

Kármán’s resignation as Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) 

chairman and continues even today. This later period may be 

characterized by the maturation of the SAB as an institution-the 

period of independent SAB actions. 

During the first period mentioned above, Arnold expanded his 

multiaxis attack on the problem of long-term scientific and 

technological planning for the Air Force beyond the establishment 

of the SAG. In December 1945, while wartime funds were still 

available, General Arnold created the Office of Scientific Liaison 

(OSL) in the Pentagon and appointed Col Bernard Schriever as its 

director. Its purpose was to maintain direct contact with civilian 

scientists working in industry and at universities throughout the 
159 

and the general gave the bride away as a stand-in father. Schriever 

had flown as a commercial pilot in the exceptionally poor weather 

conditions of the northwestern United States from 1934 to 1938 

and offered Arnold advice on all-weather operations-advice Arnold 

requested to improve military capability. He was totally dedicated 

to Arnold as a friend and as a subordinate. Schriever served as 

director of the OSL for four years and went on to act as the officer 

most directly responsible for the development of American 

intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) as the commander of the 

Western Development Division (also known as the Air Force 

Ballistic Missile Division [AFBMD]) formed in 1954. 6

 

By January 1946, Arnold had allocated $10 million of his 

military budget to Douglas Aircraft Corporation for a one-year 

study of future warfare called Project RAND (this blossomed into 

a three-year, $30 million program). During this first year, a Project 

RAND mathematician delicately pointed out that not all military 

problems revolved around math and science. Some problems were 

best investigated by historians, political scientists, and economists. 

In 1947, although only 150 were employed there, a “humanities” 

division was formed at RAND in response to this suggestion. In 

May 1948, fearing conflict of interest questions between the Air 

Force and Douglas Corporation, the entire division broke away 

from Douglas forming the first, nonprofit Research and 

Development Corporation (RAND) in America. 7

 

The stated goal for RAND was to provide a “program of study 

and research on the broad subject of intercontinental warfare.” 8

 It 

was to offer long-term, unbiased, thoughtful research to Air Force 

planners. By 1950, over 800 men and women were employed in 

support of that task. 9

 In truth, RAND served another purpose in its 

early days; to act as a counterbalance to Dr. Bush’s formulation for 

the future of American scientific research. Arnold’s establishment 

of Project RAND was the direct result of the general’s association 

with Dr. Edward Bowles and industrial as well as familial ties to 

Donald Douglas. 10 In the case of RAND, Arnold acted 

independently of Kármán’s direct influence or suggestions. 
160 

developments, particularly in guided missiles. Influenced to act by 

Kármán’s initial report Where We Stand, the general’s vision for 

the potential of “unpiloted things” for future air forces was 

reinforced. 11 Although he had officially retired in February, a plan 

for the April 1946 guided missile program had been determined 

and approved during his last months in command of the AAF. A 

total of $34 million had been allocated to 28 different AAF guided 

missile projects. 12 Arnold’s fears concerning the budget were 

more than accurate. In 1947, the military budget was slashed in 

typical postwar downsizing and the guided missile budget fell from 

$34 million to $13 million forcing cancellation of 10 programs 

already underway. Only short-term projects holding potential for 

completion in a minimum amount of time were continued. Of the 

surviving programs only one was a long-range, rocket-propelled 

missile (ICBM-type)-the MX-774B, which was under contract to 

Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation (Convair). 13 Thus, 

although Arnold recognized the need for development in missiles, 

budget constraints limited Air Force programs in this area until the 

national political climate was once again altered by an external 

threat. 

Arnold’s final official contribution to the incorporation of 

recommendations made in Kármán’s reports was to convince 

General Spaatz to activate a permanent version of the Scientific 

Advisory Group as part of his staff. 14 Kármán felt so strongly 

about this particular recommendation that he immediately pursued 

action on the subject. Only five days after transmittal of the 

original Toward New Horizons summary volume he sent Arnold a 

detailed memorandum explaining the importance of the formation 

of such a group. Kármán wrote, 

It is my strong belief that the necessity for scientific advice will come up 

frequently in the future and that the Commanding General should have 

available a permanent group of scientific advisors of high standing, who 

are familiar with the needs of the AAF, but whose main activities are 

outside the AAF. ...It is my belief that such a group would not duplicate 

any of the work of the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of 

Research and Development, since it would not be concerned with any of 

the current research projects, but would give the Commanding General 
161 

Spaatz, Arnold insisted that Toward New Horizons should be 

used as a guide for scientific and pre-planning people for many 

years to come.” A meeting was suggested to talk about the 

formation of a permanent organization. To attend were Lt Gen Ira 

C, Eaker, deputy commander AAF, and Maj Gen Curtis E. LeMay, 

deputy chief of staff for R&D, General Spaatz, and Arnold. 16 

By 9 January 1946, the concept of a permanent advisory group 

was agreed upon but one stumbling block remained. LeMay, who 

had been selected by Spaatz for the R&D command, wanted 

control of the new advisors, a suggestion which Kármán rejected. 

17 In response to LeMay’s attempt to take control of the board, 

Kármán reiterated his insistence that the “Scientific Advisory 

Group to the Commanding General AAF, will inform the 

Commanding General of new developments in science and the 

results of fundamental scientific research which offer possibilities 

for the solution of Air Force problems.” The words “Commanding 

General” appeared in eight of 10 paragraphs, a total of 10 times in 

the brief two-page memo. Also included were definitions of board 

functions which included personnel structure, meeting schedule, 

and the possibility for establishing “temporary panels” to 

participate in “special studies.” 18 Arnold, feeling obliged to let 

Spaatz make the final decision himself, unofficially transferred 

command to Spaatz in January 1946. 

Realizing that his dream of preparing a blueprint for future 

American Air Forces had been completed, and that his health was 

rapidly deteriorating, Arnold retired from active service in 

February 1946 (see appendix A), the same month that the original 

charter for the SAG expired. The last formal meeting of the AAF 

Scientific Advisory Group was held on 6 February 1946. Arnold 

addressed the group and thanked them for their super-human 

efforts during the past year. He also decorated SAG members with 

the Meritorious Civilian Service Award and asked that they 

continue to support the scientific aspects of the Air Forces even, 

and especially, in times of peace. On 1 March 1946, Kármán 

resigned his government position as AAF scientific advisor, ending 
162 

Stagnation 

During the second week of February, LeMay had once again 

initiated actions to put the scientists under his control. Kármán 

realized what Spaatz and LeMay did not understand. LeMay’s 

research and development organization was concerned with “the 

over-all program of current projects, the relative priorities 

assigned, the elimination of unnecessary items, and the possible 

requirements for new items. Our program is to maintain a strong 

healthy program of current research and development.” 20 Placing 

Kármán’s panel into that type of environment was in direct 

opposition to its previous function. Times had changed, however, 

and with Arnold’s exit, the forceful LeMay took control of the 

newly designated Scientific Advisory Board which met for the first 

time in June. 

Kármán, who had accepted the leadership of the SAB despite 

his misgivings about its attachment to LeMay rather than Spaatz, 

called the first meeting to order on 17 June 1946. Now facing huge 

reductions in forces and funds, the SAB had little immediate 

capability to enact many specific recommendations from Toward 

New Horizons. The new peacetime commander, although he 

openly supported continued scientific research for the Army Air 

Forces, lacked the determined, forward-looking drive of the 

wartime General Arnold. Coupled with the lack of working funds 

and the less-than-perfect reporting arrangements, the previous year 

of hard work seemed almost a waste of time. 21 

LeMay’s responsibilities as deputy chief of Air Staff for R&D 

were largely tied to here-and-now requirements. Consequently, the 

SAB began to stagnate. LeMay’s memoirs shed a bit more light on 

other possible explanations for the failure to utilize the board. “I 

certainly hadn’t been screeching with enthusiasm about my new 

duties,” LeMay recalled, “but it didn’t take me long to become 

mighty interested. It was strictly a management job. I didn’t know 

much about research and development.” 22 Things got so tedious 
163 

Getting why he quit the SAB, Getting replied, Because you 

weren’t doing anything.” 

Schweinhund!” muttered Kármán. 23 

Getting’s disgust confirmed what Kármán had already realized, 

that there had been no implementation of the SAG’s 

recommendations other than the imperfect establishment of the 

board itself. Kármán later offered the insightful explanation that 

“firmness with Russia was not yet elevated into a national policy 

and national defense was not a matter of deep public concern to a 

nation in peace and complacent over its A-bomb strength. It 

seemed to me that only a few of the more conscientious Air Force 

officers were interested in the long-range future of the Air Force.” 

24 The newly formed SAB was caught up in the traditional 

demobilization of the military which had occurred after each 

American war and national attitudes toward advancement in 

military technology were muted. Arnold’s departure, budget cuts, 

new leadership, and a major reorganization of the national defense 

organization which created the independent Air Force on 17 

September 1947-taken together nearly snuffed the SAB out of 

existence. Lt Gen Donald L. Putt, SAB military director from 1948 

to 1952, recalled that the SAB “almost went out of existence in 

1948 because nobody was paying any attention to it. It was not 

being asked to advise which was the reason it was set up in the first 

place, and it almost disappeared.” 25 The traditional Kármán 

ideological germination period which took place after his initial 

“seed-sowing” turned out to be a few years longer than the normal 

one or two years associated with traditional Kármán projects. It 

was in the face of such adversity that Kármán led the SAB forward 

without his long-time friend Hap Arnold. 

The second period of implementation of Kármán’s studies 

began without the dynamism of General Arnold or the bottomless 

funding which the Army Air Forces had enjoyed during the 

previous five years. The newly formed SAB, now reporting to Maj 

Gen Curtis E. LeMay, forwarded its first set of program 

recommendations-the results of its June meeting-to General Spaatz 
164 

restructuring of forces included within these proposals was enough 

to cancel any recommendation. 26 

Almost as important as lack of funding was the simple fact that 

the SAB was a new organization within a large, established 

bureaucracy. The SAG (established in 1944), whose purpose was 

to produce the Air Force’s long-range science and technology 

blueprint, was disbanded. There were questions which originated 

in the staff about what function the new board would actually 

serve. Would they be relegated to immediate issues? Would they 

have a forecasting function? Some officers, in the face of budget 

constraints and Air Force reorganization, saw no useful purpose for 

the SAB at all. Others, although realizing its possible importance 

in providing advice on scientific matters, were at a loss when 

deciding just how this might be accomplished. The fledgling SAB 

was going through growing pains. There existed no organizational 

precedent for such a permanent group. Kármán and his military 

staff made up procedures and policies as the need for such arose. 

And, although Kármán had a “remarkable capacity for picking 

people who knew the long-term significance of their scientific 

fields,” confusion at all levels of the Army chain of command 

concerning the possible uses of the SAB hindered its effectiveness. 

27 

By May 1947, Kármán began to realize, as did many of the 

SAB members, that something was wrong. “Crystal gazing” was 

one appropriate function for the SAB, but the major forecast for 

the future had already been accomplished. Kármán determined that 

the SAB function logically entailed not only the future of science 

in the Air Force, but was also related to the immediate present. 

“We should also establish a certain procedure,” Kármán now 

emphasized, “which will make it possible for the military 

establishment to use the services of the individual board members 

for urgent problems.” 28 Kármán also suggested that other 

administrative changes should include forming specific standing 

committees for specific Air Force problems, offering SAB help to 

Air Force field agencies, and clearly defining other roles and 
165 

An important change, one which allowed greater latitude in 

self-definition, occurred later that year. General LeMay left for 

Europe in September 1947 to assume command of the United 

States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). 29 He was replaced by Lt 

Gen Laurence Craigie, commander of the newly established 

Directorate of Research and Development. 

New Vitality 

Lieutenant General Craigie, the first American military man to 

pilot a jet aircraft, had a much greater understanding of the 

importance of R&D than LeMay. Craigie had been involved with 

Arnold’s XP-59A project from the beginning and was absolutely 

aware of the importance of R&D to the success of the AAF. 

Kármán, realizing this, immediately convinced Craigie that the 

SAB needed to report directly to the chief of staff, as he had 

recommended in Toward New Horizons, rather than through other 

R&D channels. He also suggested that the board add a military 

director of sufficient rank to get things done around the Pentagon 

when necessary. This was not a new approach either. In December 

1945, Kármán had emphasized that the successful accomplishment 

of the SAG’s mission was assured because of Arnold’s insistence 

that they disregard current projects, and that they reported directly 

to the commanding general. The professor had reemphasized the 

recommendation in 1946 to LeMay who disregarded the advice. 30

Spaatz, following Craigie’s careful explanation of the problem, not 

only supported the recommendations, he enacted them 

immediately. On 14 May 1948, the Spaatz- Kármán agreement 

went into effect as Air Force Regulation (AFR) 20-30, the SAB 

charter. These ups and downs were largely a result of the massive 

restructuring process which was extricating the Air Force from the 

Army. The process was finalized in the summer and enacted 18 

September 1947. 31 By April 1948, with Craigie’s help, initial 

administrative obstacles had been removed and with Kármán still 

acting as the chairman, the SAB and the independent Air Force 
166 

The existence of the SAB was not only the result of Kármán’s 

Toward New Horizons recommendations and Arnold’s broad 

support of the document, but also a result of Kármán’s tenacity in 

seeing that his recommendations were implemented properly, even 

if not immediately. 32 Additionally, help was rendered by 

individuals who supported Arnold’s and Kármán’s dedication to 

the importance of science and technology. 

With the SAB poised to function as Kármán had originally 

visualized, he was now ready to pursue further implementation of 

recommendations from Toward New Horizons. Craigie, who saved 

the board from extermination, held the military directorship until 

September 1948 when he was replaced by Maj Gen Donald L. 

Putt. Putt had studied under Kármán at Caltech and now the two 

came together again, teacher and student. It was the Kármán/Putt 

combination which actually assured the utilization of the SAB 

from November 1948 onward. 

During the mid-November SAB meeting Kármán took the 

opportunity to reemphasize the need for the Air Force to “lay down 

the leading principles of their own policy and establish the 

foundation of organized research in their own realm,” which he 

had established in the 1945 report. 33 Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg’s 

reply reflected the immediate impact of Kármán’s November 1948 

SAB report. In a 7 April 1949 statement to the SAB, Vandenberg, 

who had replaced Spaatz as Air Force chief of staff wrote, “I am 

determined that our research and development activities shall have 

adequate support in funds, facilities, and properly-trained 

personnel, and that the USAF shall continually increase the 

efficiency and effectiveness of our development work on new 

aircraft, missiles, and air defense systems.” His memo finished 

with a request for the SAB to provide him with the “ultimate plan” 

for Air Force research and development facilities. 34 A study, 

however, is not a facility, but in this case it was the first step 

toward a total reorientation of Air Force R&D policy. 35 

The SAB’s first legitimate “special” study was led by 

Electronics Panel member Louis N. Ridenour, dean of the 
167 

members and seven nonmembers-one of these was Dr. James H. 

Doolittle-which established the working standard for SAB ad hoc 

studies from that time onward. It was also with this committee that 

Kármán’s role in the SAB slowly began to change. Kármán did not 

sit on the committee itself. Instead he oversaw the SAB as an 

entity and was involved with establishing committee composition 

rather than participating in individual committee function. The 

professor was tending his SAB garden. 

Meanwhile, Kármán decided that he could no longer devote 

adequate time to his California responsibilities. In March 1949 

Kármán resigned his position as director of the Jet Propulsion Lab 

(JPL) and as chairman of the GALCIT although he remained a 

member of the faculty. 36 The professor was then free to devote 

time pursuing institutionalization of his 1945 recommendations. 

On 11 July 1949 the Ridenour Committee met for the first time 

and Vandenberg challenged them to “give us a picture of what we 

ought to be doing but what we are not doing.” 37 The Ridenour 

Committee spent the next two months touring Air Force facilities 

and contemplating the proper direction for Air Force R&D. In 

September the report was given to Kármán who approved it and 

passed it along to General Vandenberg on 21 September 1949. Not 

surprisingly, Kármán approved the report quickly. It reflected his 

original recommendations on R&D restructuring now almost five 

years old. The two major tenets of the report were to reorganize the 

Air Staff ensuring that R&D functions were isolated from logistics 

and to establish a separate command for R&D, one not tied to 

procurement. 38 Kármán’s 1945 recommendations read, “In the 

special case of the Air Forces, two solutions have been proposed: 

(1) the establishment of one Air Staff section for research and 

development; and (2) a supervising and directing agency attached 

to the office of the Chief of Staff.” 39 Administrative changes were 

not addressed in detail because another committee, organized at the 

Air University was examining those issues at Vandenberg’s 

direction. 
168 

reorganization of the Air Forces R&D establishment. The 

combination of recommendations generated by these independent 

yet similar reports, coupled with the smooth salesmanship of Dr. 

Jimmy Doolittle, convinced Muir Fairchild and Vandenberg that a 

separate R&D command was the logical next step, something 

Kármán had advocated since 1945 and the Air Force was now able 

to direct without Army interference. 40 

On 23 January 1950 the Air Force established the office of the 

deputy chief of staff for development on the Air Staff and the Air 

Research and Development Command (ARDC), exactly as 

Kármán had envisioned the institution in the first place. Less 

directly, but definitely by design and personal influence, Kármán’s 

initial recommendations concerning scientific ideas and staff 

organization were finally institutionalized within the Air Force’s 

organizational structure. The first tangible result of this 

restructuring came in the form of an ARDC study prepared by Maj 

Gen Gordon SaVille, deputy chief of staff for development, which 

recommended that a “systems approach” to new weapons be 

adopted. By that SaVille meant that development of a weapon 

“system” required development of support equipment as well as 

the actual hardware itself. This approach, although not the direct 

result of Arnold’s philosophy of airpower, certainly reflected the 

evolution of the Air Force into a system building organization and 

“gained immediate acceptance” from the Air Staff. 41 Again, the 

establishment of ARDC was assisted by a group of followers, 

dedicated to Kármán’s scientific ideology, and their ability to 

convince others of the importance of his philosophy to the Air 

Force. 42 Kármán’s ideology was slowly being embedded into the 

science and technology foundation of the Air Force due to his own 

perseverance as well as the concerted efforts of those who had 

adopted that ideology. 

While the Ridenour/Doolittle Committee findings were being 

discussed, Kármán was concurrently pursuing the establishment of 

an Air Force aeronautical research facility. In Toward New 

Horizons he wrote, “The Air Forces must be authorized to expand 

existing AAF research facilities and create new ones to do their 
169 

In its first meeting, the SAB had established a standing committee 

to provide advice on advanced wind tunnel developments but 

budget constraints loomed large over any possible action 

recommended by this panel. 44 When the National Advisory 

Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) learned of the AAF’s plan 

they immediately formulated a wind tunnel plan of their own. The 

competition between the NACA and the AAF eventually resulted 

in the formulation of the National Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan. 45 By 

May 1948 a bill had been introduced to the Congress which would 

have provided funding for a facility like the one Kármán 

envisioned in his 1945 report. Adjournment of the 80th Congress, 

however, preceded a vote on the bill. In essence, the Air Force and 

the NACA (as well as other organizations, particularly the US 

Navy) had been at odds over the proposal for an independent Air 

Force aeronautics center for the last four years. Nonetheless, by 

early 1949, the combined funding bill was once again ready for 

congressional approval. At that point, Kármán took an active yet 

limited role in the proceedings. The professor wrote directly to W. 

Stuart Symington, secretary of the Air Force, urging a swift 

activation of the facility to insure American airpower preeminence. 

Following several months of debate and delay, bill S-1267 passed 

the Congress in August 1949 authorizing the Unitary Plan (Title I) 

and the Air Force Plan (Title II). It is interesting to note that the 

NACA, then headed by Dr. Hugh Latimer Dryden, former deputy 

of the SAG, testified in favor of the Air Engineering and 

Development Center (AEDC) portion of the plan marking an overt 

change in the NACA/Air Force relationship which had existed to 

that point. For the next year, additional funding requests were 

authorized and one of Kármán’s lifelong pursuits became an Air 

Force reality. 46 The AEDC was renamed for General Arnold in 

1950. 

The final approval and establishment of the AEDC was part of 

an extremely complex set of interactions between people, 

institutions, and ideas. The origins of the National Unitary Wind 

Tunnel controversy, however, may be directly linked to Kármán’s 

original SAG report, and subsequent standing committee, which 
170 

Propulsion chapter of Toward New Horizons. Wattendorf had 

written a memo to Gen Franklin O. Carroll, chief of the 

Engineering Division, Air Materiel Command (AMC), dated 19 

June 1945, containing a proposal for a new Air Force development 

center based on his Operation Lusty experiences in Germany. 47

Without the instigation of the SAB, the National Wind Tunnel 

Facility would likely have been a NACA-dominated institution. As 

it ended up, the NACA was relegated to serving industrial needs 

while the Air Force obtained the go-ahead for its planned facility. 

Despite the House Armed Services Committee’s insistence that the 

military installation was to be used for “evaluation” purposes, there 

was no doubt that Kármán intended the AEDC to be used as a 

major research and development center for Air Force aeronautical 

endeavors. 48 

The AEDC did not come easy. The old story of controversy and 

bureaucratic posturing which had plagued jet engine development 

in the early 1940s was at the heart of the wind tunnel debate in this 

instance as well. 49 The Air Force, however, had finally eclipsed 

many other institutions in its attempt to maintain its own R&D. 

The AEDC, in reality, was the manifestation of the NACA’s final 

collapse. The NACA’s research philosophy which “valued process 

over prescience, the team over the individual, experiment over 

theory, engineering over science, incremental refinement of the 

existing paradigm over revolutionary creation of new paradigms,” 

had seen the end of its usefulness. 50 Kármán’s theoretical 

approach to scientific and technological applications had been 

established within the Air Force system and was ready to fill the 

void. 

The decade of the fifties opened with promise for the 

accomplishment of many more of the challenges set in 1945 by the 

SAG. Military funding once again became available as the Soviet 

threat grew and even more so during the Korean War. In fiscal 

year 1950, the Air Force received $238 million for R&D. In 1951 

the total reached a staggering $522.9 million. 51 The reality of an 

ever increasing role for military aviation technology toppled many 

skeptic’s arguments against continued military research and 
171 

handle them all, even with an increase in staffing provided for by 

the ballooning budget. 52 Kármán’s perseverance had entrenched 

the SAB in the hierarchy of the Air Force and the crisis of war 

fertilized its rapidly expanding roots. Germination of Kármán’s 

original SAG report was complete. All that remained was for the 

professor to move on to some new pursuit as was his usual method. 

The establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) provided Kármán that opportunity. As far as Kármán’s 

association with the Air Force was concerned, his quest for the 

formation of an international SAB signaled the transition from the 

“Kármán years” to the third developmental period-the emergence 

of the SAB as its own institution. 

Throughout the Korean War, Kármán continued to act as SAB 

chairman but spent less time concerned with SAB matters and 

more time pursuing the possibility of establishing a Paris-based 

scientific board in the style of the Air Force’s SAB. Kármán 

named the proposed organization the NATO Advisory Group for 

Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD). The concept 

earned immediate support from William Burden, special assistant 

for R&D to the Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter. Kármán 

convinced Maj Gen Gordon SaVille of the potential for such an 

organization in the face of the developing cold war. Despite stiff 

opposition from the US Navy (again) the NATO AGARD became 

a reality on 24 January 1952. For the first two years, the US Air 

Force was appointed as AGARD’s executive agent and Kármán 

was offered the chair. 53 The professor’s belief that scientific ideas 

were best shared openly and internationally saw the perfect forum 

in the concept of the AGARD. 54 But he did not immediately 

resign from the SAB. The Russian’s successful detonation of a 

nuclear weapon in 1949 had provided one last challenge for 

Kármán-one which he intended to finish. 

It was the clamor of ICBM development which finally 

established the SAB as an independent entity and carried it into its 

third period of development. From 1950 to 1953, the SAB formed 

several different committees which evaluated the potential of 
172 

which depended upon other experts to accomplish their tasks. 

Kármán was only involved as an approving authority to the final 

reports which these groups offered. Yet his ideas remained a vital 

part of the organization for many years through the participation of 

his former students and close associates in SAB matters. By 1953, 

Kármán was totally satisfied with the structure and philosophical 

approach taken by board members in discharging their function. 55 

The March 1953 establishment of the Nuclear Weapons Panel 

was a result of the successful detonation of an American 

thermonuclear device in November 1952. The “Mike shot” 

illuminated additional possibilities for the use of nuclear power in 

a variety of weapons. Kármán selected the committee chair, Dr. 

John von Neumann, formerly of the Manhattan Project, based upon 

his expertise in the nuclear field. Also on the committee was Dr. 

Edward Teller, who was co-credited by many with the 

development of the theory which enabled the hydrogen bomb, as 

well as “practically every top nuclear physicist we had in the 

country.” 56 The SAB ad hoc “von Neumann Committee” 

determined that a 1,500 pound “dry” hydrogen device had become 

a possibility. The comparatively low weight and increased yield 

allowed a relaxation of accuracy requirements and thereby 

lessened the required size of the missile itself. This was remarkable 

since the first test detonation device had to be loaded aboard a ship 

as it was too heavy for air transport. General Schriever, the project 

officer for the ICBM program, recalled that this revelation also 

meant that a practical, nuclear warhead equipped ICBM was a 

near-term possibility. 57 

National attention to Soviet nuclear programs coupled with the 

Eisenhower administration’s desire for frugality resulted “ in the 

establishment of a committee to study missile organization in 

America. Trevor Gardner, special assistant for R&D, assigned 

John von Neumann as the chairman of this group, also known as 

the Teapot Committee. 58 Armed with the knowledge just gained in 

the SAB Nuclear Weapons Panel report, von Neumann and his 

group expanded upon the possibilities for both hardware and 

organization of national missile programs in America. The 
173 

for obtaining these weapons with highest national priority. 

 The 

Soviet’s test of its first hydrogen weapon in August 1953 

supported the general feeling that the Soviets were further 

advanced than the US in missile development and added urgency 

to these recommendations. 

The results of von Neumann’s report were carried by Gardner to 

James R. Killian, acting presidential science advisor and president 

of MIT. Rapid advances in ICBM development were supported by 

the results of the “Bravo” nuclear test accomplished on 1 March 

1954, which proved the potential for lighter, more powerful 

warheads advocated in the report. By 14 May, the administration 

had agreed with the findings of the report. The establishment of the 

Western Development Division (WDD) charged to proceed with 

utmost speed in establishing an ICBM program was the direct 

result of the Teapot Committee’s recommendations. 60 But General 

Schriever, first commander of that organization, gave credit to the 

SAB rather than the Teapot Committee. He said, “To the SAB I 

give full credit for providing the credibility that we needed to 

proceed on a program of the magnitude of the ballistic missile 

program.” 61 After the WDD was activated on 2 August 1954, the 

US proceeded with the development of the Atlas ICBM, the first in 

a series of ICBMs which were an integral part of every national 

defense policy which followed. 62 The SAB had demonstrated its 

importance to both the Air Force and the nation during the early 

days of nuclear weapons development. 

Kármán had witnessed the entire process from his offices in 

Paris and Washington. He had even approved the initial SAB 

Nuclear Weapons Panel report in 1954. But his personal 

involvement in nuclear panel reports after that was basically nil. 

The independent success of the SAB and its individual members 

must have given him the reassurance that he needed concerning the 

standing of the board because he resigned as SAB chairman in 

September 1954, one month after the establishment of the WDD. 

Kármán had witnessed the SAB blossom as an Air Force 

institution. Not, only that, the SAB had been utilized by the Air 

Force and the nation in making critical decisions concerning 
174 

establishing the infrastructure and the mind set within the 

government which preceded the arms race between the United 

States and the Soviet Union. 63 

Kármán offered the reason of ill health to Gen Nathan Twining 

for his resignation. This may only have been partially true as he 

once used a similar excuse with Robert Millikan immediately after 

General Arnold had asked him to form the original SAG. 64 The 

confidence he felt in the success of the SAB as an institution 

within the Air Force gave him the final impetus he needed to move 

on, concentrating solely on AGARD. 65 Yet his resignation did not 

mean an end to his influence. General Twining made him chairman 

emeritus for as long as he lived to permanently link the name of 

the SAB’s renowned founder to that organization and the Air 

Force. 66 Additionally, several of Kármán’s former students, his 

closest Guggenheim Aeronautics Laboratory, California Institute 

of Technology (GALCIT) associate Dr. Clark Millikan being one, 

remained members of the SAB. Additionally, General Putt was 

once again its military director. In this way, the professor’s 

ideology was carried forward within the SAB for another decade. 

67 

Kármán’s direct SAB influence had come to an end, at least 

temporarily. Even before his resignation went into effect, General 

Putt asked the professor to chair another long-range forecast for the 

Air Force. The professor’s response was initially negative. He had 

just arrived back in Paris and was buried in the process of forging 

the AGARD into an SAB-type organization. This task was 

particularly difficult because of the international cooperation 

required to coordinate policies and events. Understandably, he 

refused to begin such a study in 1954. 68 If nothing else, Putt was 

persistent. At regular intervals for the next two years he sent Mr. 

Chester Hasert to Paris in an effort to convince the former 

chairman to reconsider his 1954 decision. But Kármán felt, at that 

time, the SAB did not hold the expertise required to perform a 

broad-based study of the Toward New Horizons variety. 

Advancement in technology had simply come too far for a small 

panel of experts to tackle as they had in 1945. 69 
175 

National Academy of Sciences to complete the work and the SAB 

was relegated to a participatory, rather than a leadership, role. 

Kármán had accepted the chair for the study and selected Dr. Hugh 

Dryden, his deputy for Toward New Horizons, and Dr. H. Guyford 

Stever as his primary assistants during that summer. Although ties 

to the SAB were fairly strong between individuals, the institution 

of the SAB itself was basically a nonplayer in the 1957-1958 

Woods Hole Summer Study. Making matters worse, many of the 

non-SAB participants flatly refused to discuss military issues as 

they pertained to space operations. The report was headed in a 

lack-luster direction until the launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957. 

At that point, although the study was not even completed, it was 

scrapped in the face of public furor over the perceived crisis. 70

This was a clear indication of the importance of public opinion 

upon the success or failure of scientific forecasts. Dr. Stever 

recalled that “the significance of space was completely 

underestimated, not only by our military services but by society in 

general. As a consequence, when Sputnik appeared, we had a crisis 

of major proportions.” 71 

Although a second Woods Hole study was completed in the 

summer of 1958, it was too late to repair the perceived lack of 

action within the military concerning space operations and 

satellites. In essence, it was a failed attempt to “save face.” The 

Woods Hole Summer Studies had cost the Air Force over 100,000 

and had produced nothing of significance-a disappointment for 

Kármán, but to him not a surprise. 72 The lesson to be learned from 

the 1957-58 study was that national public opinion actually held a 

great deal of influence over the success or failure of government 

studies. In this case, the immediacy of the sputnik crisis cast an 

extremely dark shadow over the importance of long-range thinking 

when a perceived national failure existed in the immediate present. 

Dr. Hans Mark, secretary of the Air Force from 1980 to 81, 

once remarked that “the best way to judge a laboratory by its 

junkyard. If the junkyard is too clean, then the laboratory isn’t 

taking any risks. And if it’s really too full of junk, you’ll recognize 

that nothing is really coming out.” 73 Considered in that fashion, a 
176 

ideology concerning military operations there. With the 1958 study 

hind him, Kármán returned to Europe and the Parisian cafe scene 

where he resided on-and-off until his death in 1963. 

Meanwhile, the SAB continued its important work for the Air 

Force. Throughout the next four decades, successes and a few 

failures marked the accomplishments of the SAB. One SAB 

member perceived that over time, “the more advanced 

technologies were, the more involved the SAB became.” 74 From 

1955 to 1995 the SAB has accomplished over 350 studies (not all 

successes). They included such projects as aircraft nuclear 

propulsion, the “Dyna-Soar” program, wing strengthening and 

modification of the C-5A Galaxy heavy airlift aircraft and F-111 

(TFX) fighter, and remotely piloted vehicles. Recommendations 

involving arms control, space technology, directed energy 

weapons, composite materials, and Global Positioning System 

(GPS) usage and development also highlight SAB 

accomplishments. The list was diverse, broad in scope, and often 

international in consequence. 75 These studies fell into one of the 

three categories-immediate projects, midterm projects, and longrange forecasts categories which Kármán himself had established 

in 1948. The nature of the studies continued to reflect Kármán’s 

original charter which emphasized broad-based approaches to Air 

Force problems. 76 The emphasis placed upon the importance of 

these established missions was reemphasized from time to time. 

Dr. Robert Loewy, SAB chairman 1973-1977, and Dr. Gene 

McCall, the current (1995) chairman, both reaffirmed the 

importance of these three missions during their tenure. 77 

Yet attempting to prove that Kármán’s ideology is still 

influential in today’s Air Force has remained an interesting 

challenge. In November 1994, Secretary of the Air Force Dr. 

Sheila Widnall, and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Ronald 

Fogleman, issued a challenge to Dr. Gene McCall and the Air 

Force SAB at the SAB’s 50th anniversary celebration. General 

Fogleman, who attended graduate school at Duke University where 

he studied history, spoke first. “Close Air Force operator and 

scientific community ties are as important today as they were when 
177 

Staff and other senior Air Force leaders about technologies which 

might be relevant ten or twenty years from now.” 78 Then Dr. 

Widnall took the podium and spoke jointly for herself and the 

chief: 

I want to set a challenge for the SAB. As we celebrate the legacy of 

General Arnold and Dr. von Kármán, General Fogleman and I would like 

you to look toward the promises of the future. We want you to rekindle 

that constant inquisitive attitude toward science. So today, on this fiftieth 

anniversary of Arnold’s challenge to Kármán, I would like to issue a 

challenge to today’s Scientific Advisory Board. I challenge you, once 

again, to search the world for the most advanced aerospace ideas and 

project them into the future, Fifty years ago the SAG stepped up to the 

challenge of writing Toward New Horizons. Today, let’s begin the search 

for New World Vistas. 79 

New World Vistas, the most recent Air Force science and 

technology study, and the first one completed under the singular 

direction of the SAB since Toward New Horizons, was presented 

to the secretary of the Air Force and the chief of staff on 15 

December 1995 at the Pentagon-exactly 50 years after the first 

study was turned over to Arnold. 80 Clearly, Arnold’s vision and 

Kármán’s intellectual legacy live on, not only in the minds of 

today’s Air Force leaders, but in their actions as well. 

Accomplishment of this particular study occupied nearly all of the 

SAB’s working schedule for the better part of an entire year. 81 As 

to the ultimate success of New World Vistas, time will judge. But 

if the current national frenzy for technological advancement 

revolving around computer power continues into the foreseeable 

future-reflecting national support and acceptance of technological 

progress-the chances for success and eventual institutionalization 

of its findings are much greater than they were at the time of 

sputnik and Woods Hole. 

Kármán once ruminated about the idea that reports do not make 

policy, administrations do. 82 The support which Toward New 

Horizons eventually received, largely a result of his own 

perseverance, compared with his unpleasant professional 

experience at Woods Hole, convinced him of the truth in that 

thought. On 31 January 1996, Dr. Widnall and Dr. McCall held a 
178 

contained within the 2,000-plus page study. That night, on ABC 

World News Tonight with Peter Jennings and on Cable News 

Network (CNN)-over a video segment which demonstrated “brainwave” aircraft control, advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), 

and a smattering of concepts for yet-to-be developed nonlethal 

weapons-the secretary’s words were transmitted to millions of 

American news-watchers. “I can guarantee you,” she stated 

emphatically, “that this report will not sit on the shelf and gather 

dust.” It seemed that Dr. McCall could not contain his grin. 
179 

1. Vannevar Bush, Science: The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945). 

2. Ibid. The report also suggested that rockets and long-range missiles were 

hopelessly expensive and a long way off in the future. As a comparison, Toward 

New Horizons which predicted a 6.000-mile range missile in its rocketry section 

(see appendix C); also see Lee Edson, “He Tamed the Wind,” Saturday Evening 

Post, 3 August 1957, 24, 76-78; and Theodore von Kármán with Lee Edson, 

Wind and Beyond: Theodore von Kármán, Pioneer in Aviation ad Pathfinder in 

Space (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 271-72. 

3. Theodore von Kármán, “Pilotless Aircraft,” in Where We Stand: First) On 

to General of the Army H. H. Arnold on Long Range Research Problems of the 

AIR FORCES with a Review of German Plans and Developments, 22 August 

1945 (see appendix B); and Kármán and Edson, 300. 

4. Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of 

Science in Preserving Democracy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), 252-

53. It is interesting to note the differentiation Bush makes between 

“professional” men (men of science), and military men. His tone is also bitter in 

the extreme which may reflect his disappointment in never breaking the military 

decision-making barrier. Dr. Bush may be the reflection of civilian scientists and 

the Manhattan Project. In this, the most expensive and secret R&D program of 

the war, civilians were particularly dominant both politically and scientifically. 

5. Kármán and Edson, 294. Parenthesis are Kármán’s. 

6. Gen Bernard A Schriever, USAF, Retired, interviewed by author, tape, 9 

November 1994, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., and 

telephone interview with author, 12 March 1996, Washington, D.C. General 

Schriever recalled that the OSL changed names a few times in its short history 

and its functions were eventually absorbed by other Air Force organizations; 

also Herbert F. York, Arms and the Physicist (Woodbury, N. Y.: American 

Institute of Physics Press, 1995), 211-12. 
180 

Donald Douglas, Edward Bowles, and General Arnold were present; Robert 

Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, and Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United 

States Air Force, vol. 1, 1907-1960 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 

December 1989), 478; Kármán and Edson, 302; I. B. Holley, “Jet Lag in the 

Army Air Corps,” 167-73. The Ford Foundation began contributing funds for 

RAND projects in 1948. By 1959, Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) 

and NASA were also linked to RAND projects. By the mid-1970s RAND was 

working on projects for state, local, and private organizations, the Air Force 

being only a small part of the organization represented by the RAND Project Air 

Force division. Gen Lauris Norstad believed that Dr. Edward Bowles had a great 

deal of influence over Arnold’s decision to form RAND. Lauris Norstad, 

interviewed by Murray Green, 15 July 1953, MGC, roll 12. 

8. “An Introduction to Project Air Force,” RAND Publication CP-77 (Santa 

Monica, Calif.: RAND, June 1990), 1-3. 

9. Dr. Courtland Perkins, “Impromptu remarks given at the National 

Academy of Sciences,” transcript, 10 November 1994, on the occasion of the 

50th anniversary of the SAB. Differentiated from the SAB, RAND produced 

studies and research papers while the SAB gave direct advice to the Air Force 

chief of staff. This role was eventually expanded to include the secretary of the 

Air Force as well. 

10. Martin J. Collins, “Internalizing the Civilian: RAND and the Air Force in 

the Early Cold War,” typed manuscript of speech given at the 1993 Annual 

Society for the History of Technology (SHOT) meeting; and Mrs. Barbara 

Arnold, interviewed by author, 6 April 1995, Arnold’s son, William Bruce, 

married Barbara Douglas. 

11. Described in Futrell, 205 and 262, note 68. Arnold frequently referred to 

missiles as unpiloted craft as the term ICBM had not yet been officially coined. 

12. Jacob Neufeld, Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-

1960 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1990), 26-27; so Futrell, 

239. 

13. Neufeld, 28-33, and 239; also see Max Rosenberg, The Air Force and the 

National Guided Missile Program, 1944-1950 (Washington, D.C.: USAF 

Historical Division Liaison Office, June 1964), 75-85. 

14. Theodore von Kármán, Toward New Horizons, vol. 1, Science: The Key 

to Air Supremacy, 15 December 1945, 14.12a. 

15. Theodore von Kármán to Henry H. Arnold, letter, 20 December 1945, 

SAB, 1944-45 file. 

16. Henry H. Arnold to Carl A Spaatz, letter, 21 December 1945, SAB, 

1944-45 file. 

17. Gen Curtis E. LeMay and MacKinlay Kantor, Mission with LeMay: My 

story (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1965), 395. 
181 

19. Thomas A. Sturm, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board: Its First 

Twenty Years, 1944-1964 (Washington, D.C.: USAF Historical Division 

Liaison Office, 1967), 13; Michael H. Gorn, The Universal Man: Theodore von 

Kármán’s Life in Aeronautics (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 

1992), 118-19. 

20. Curtis E. LeMay to Carl A Spaatz, letter, 3 January 1946, SAB, 1946 

file. 

21. Dr. Hugh Latimer Dryden, interviewed by Donald Shaughnessy, Air 

Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA). Maxwell AFB, K14634-41, 6-37; 

Sturm, 15-18; Gorn, 118-19; also M. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie: Science and 

Technology Forecasting for the Air Force, 1944-1986 Washington, D.C.: Office 

of Air Force History, 1988), 2-17; LeMay and Kantor, 395-97. 

22. LeMay and Kantor, 396. 

23. Dr. Ivan Getting, interviewed by author, tape, 9 November 1994, 

National Academy of Science, Washington, D.C. Schweinhund means pig-dog 

in literal translation but, according to Getting was more likely to be used 

between people who had close or familiar relationships. 

24. Kármán and Edson, 298. 

25. Lt Gen Donald L. Putt, oral history interview, 1-3 April 1974, AFHRA, 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., K239.0512-724, 77. 

26. LeMay to Spaatz, letter, 29 August 1946; Spaatz to LeMay, letter, 4 

September 1946, SAB, 1946 file. Funding was a key issue at this time. The basic 

structure of the board was, however, protected by this action. 

27. Dr. H. Guyford Stever, interviewed by author, 18 May 1995; also see 

Sturm, 16-19; also Dr. Ivan Getting, interviewed by author, 9 November 1994. 

28. SAB meeting minutes, 17-18 March 1948, SAB, 1948 file; also quoted in 

Sturm, 24. Stated another way, “We shouldn’t forget the more remote purposes 

and the desired projection into the future. ...But certainly the voice of Minerva 

should be heard on the current problems.” Kármán at 4 February 1947 SAB 

meeting, SAB, 1947 meeting minutes. 

29. LeMay and Kantor, 400-1. 

30. Arnold to Spaatz, letter, 21 December 1945, SAB, 1944-45 file. Perhaps 

Spaatz recalled Arnold’s advice, “Attached is a recommendation from Dr. von 

Kármán concerning the future of his group. I believe that when you have a 

chance to read the report, you will agree with me that it is an exhaustive report, 

and one that should be used as a guide for scientific and pre-planning people for 

many years to come. After you read this over, I would like to have a talk with 

you about it.” 

31. Dr. H. Guyford Stever, interviewed by author, 18 May 1995; and Sturm, 

25-26. 
182 

report’s content. It is possible, but impossible to document, that many of those 

who reacted with indifference to the SAB had not been “read-in.” Less than 50 

copies of the report were produced and even fewer circulated within the Air 

Staff in 1946. Dr. Ivan Getting commented that the secrecy of the project limited 

its impact outside the Air Force. Henry H. Arnold, to Maj Gen Edward M. 

Powers, letter, 8 January 1946, SAB. This letter discusses the basic distribution 

of the report. See also Getting interview. 

33. Kármán, Science: The Key to Air Supremacy, 101; and Theodore von 

Kármán to Hoyt S. Vandenberg, letter, 15 January 1949, SAB, 1949 file. 

34. Gen Hoyt S. Vandenberg, memorandum to the Scientific Advisory 

Board, 7 April 1949, found in USAF Scientific Advisory Board meeting minutes 

of 1949. 

35. What may be the “real story” behind the 7 April 1949 memo is much 

more intriguing and instructive than the actual occurrence of events. In his oral 

history, Lt Gen Donald Putt recounted the “plotting” which occurred within the 

SAB to get the chief of staff involved in R&D. Putt asked Vandenberg to 

address the spring meeting of the SAB as a show of support. Vandenberg agreed 

as long as Putt provided him with a speech. The SAB team, reflecting Kármán’s 

interest in facilities development, drafted the speech which included the request 

for the SAB study. Kármán approved the speech and the plan ahead of time. The 

speech was actually delivered (read) by the deputy chief, Muir S. Fairchild at the 

board meeting. In essence, Kármán and the SAB had drafted their own study 

request. The result of that request was the Ridenour/Doolittle Report. Putt, 79-

80. 

36. Gorn, Universal Man, 124. 

37. SAB Special Committee minutes, 11 July 1949, SAB. 

38. SAB Special Committee minutes, 3 November 1949, SAB. 

39. Kármán, Science: The Key to Air Supremacy, 142. 

40. Futrell, 276-78. 

41. Dennis J. Stanley and John J. Weaver, The Air Force Command for 

R&D, 1949-1976, The History of ARDC/AFSC (Washington, D.C.: Office of 

History, HQ AFSC, 1977), 190; and Futrell, 486. 

42. In this case, Putt played an active role but it was Dr. Jimmy Doolittle 

who spent many hours explaining the value of the Ridenour Report to 

Vandenberg and Fairchild. For this reason, the report is frequently referred to as 

the Ridenour/Doolittle Report reflecting his importance to its acceptance. Putt, 

81-89. 

43. Kármán, Science: The Key to Air Supremacy, 102d. 

44. Gorn, Harnessing the Genie, 46. 
183 

National Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan are described here. One interesting omission 

in the discussion concerns the relationship of General Arnold and A. E. 

Raymond of the Douglas Corporation. It was only two months before 

Raymond’s appointment as the NACA chairman of a special panel on 

supersonic laboratory requirements that $10 million AAF dollars had been 

earmarked for Douglas Corporation to establish Project RAND. Raymond, 

Bowles, and Arnold had devised the plan for RAND in mid-1945. This possible 

connection between establishment of the AEDC and an apparent disregard for 

Wright Field funding (which is where the $10 million came from) which Arnold 

had apparently demonstrated might have made perfect investment sense in this 

light. 

46. Raymond W. Jones, “History of Arnold Engineering and Development 

Center, 1944-1951,” typed manuscript, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala., K215.16, 

3-16. 

47. Dr. Frank L. Wattendorf, “Historical Aspects of the Oetztal (Modane) 

Wind Tunnel,” typed manuscript, 22 October 1981, AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, 

Ala., K168.15103. Attachments to this article contain copies of Wattendorf’s 

original reports from 1945; Jones, “History of ARDC,” 4. Kármán and Edson, 

298; also Stever. 

48. Kármán, Science: The Key to Air Supremacy, 102d (appendix C) “to 

expand existing AAF research facilities and create new ones to do their own 

research.” It could not be stated any more clearly; also Roland, 217-21. Roland 

points out that the NACA, although it had apparently been relegated to a thirdranked position among the military and industry, in actuality was never limited 

in its use of the Unitary Wind Tunnel facility. 

49. Roland, 201-05. 

50. Ibid., 98. 

51. Futrell, 487. 

52. Sturm, 44-45. 

53. Gorn, Universal Man, 124-29. Dr. Gorn offers an excellent summary of 

the AGARD formation. This material originated from those pages. 

54. Theodore von Kármán, interviewed by Shirley Thomas, January 1960. 

55. Minutes of SAB Executive Committee meeting, 30 March 1953, SAB. 
184 

Teller were fellow Hungarians who had emigrated during the 1930s. It is from 

this Nuclear Panel association that author Michael Sherry in The Rise of 

American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 

University Press, 1987), 201-3, likely has drawn his discussion concerning a 

“darker attraction” which these three men shared. “The technology of death 

itself,” as Sherry has described it, is compelling, borders on journalism, and is 

unsupported. Kármán had very little to do with the state of nuclear affairs in 

America during the war years. 

57. Dr. John von Neumann, “Nuclear Weapons Panel Preliminary Report.” 

US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 23 March 1954; General Schriever, 

interviewed by John Primm, 27 September 1994; and Futrell, 488. 

58. The official name of the group was the Air Force Strategic Missile 

Evaluation Committee. Futrell, 489. 

59. Neufeld, 93-94; Sturm, 47-48; and Schriever, “50th Anniversary of the 

SAB.” 

60. Dr. H. Guyford Stever, interviewed by author, 18 May 1995; also Stever, 

US Air Force oral history interview by Dr. Michael Gorn, 20 April 1989; and 

Dr. Ivan Getting, interviewed by John Primm, 20 September 1994, Coronado, 

Calif.; and Neufeld, 104. 

61. Schriever, “50th Anniversary of the SAB.” 62. See Neufeld, for the 

evolution of the ICBM program during this period. 

63. Sherry. 186-89. Sherry’s discussion recognizes that the AAF under 

Arnold were leaders in utilizing civilian scientific advice. He fails to explain 

how the AAF decided which scientists to believe and why. 

64. Theodore von Kármán to Robert A. Millikan, letter, 2 October 1944, 

Caltech 20.28. 

65. Mr. Chester Hasert, interviewed by author, 9 November 1994. Mr. 

Hasert confirmed that Kármán had looked “tired” during visits he had made to 

his old professor in Paris from 1952 to 1954. Hasert was an original SAG 

member and continued service on the SAB as an active duty AF officer; also 

Sturm, 66-67. 

66. Nathan F. Twining to Theodore von Kármán, letter, 31 December 1954, 

SAB. 

67. These students were Dr. Pol E. Duwez, Mr. Chester Hasert, Dr. 

Homerjoe Stewart, and the most famous, Dr. Clark B. Millikan who remained a 

member of the board through the following decade. It is interesting to note that 

Kármán selected Clark Millikan as his successor at GALCIT and the JPL after 

his resignation of both chairs in 1949. It is likely that Millikan represented the 

“young talent” to whom Kármán traditionally entrusted projects which he 

himself had started. Dr. Homerjoe Stewart, interviewed by author, 21 July 1995. 
185 

, g , 

69. Mr. Chester Hasert, interviewed by author, 9 November 1994; also 

Hasert to author, letter, 24 May 1995. 

70. Gorn, Universal Man. 137-43. 

71. Dr. H. Guyford Stever, interviewed by Michael H. Gorn, April 1989. 

72. Gorn, Universal Man, 143-44. It is interesting that in Sturm’s history, the 

Woods Hole report, although not an official SAB project, is never mentioned. 

73. Dr. Hans Mark, remarks at the “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 10 

November 1994. The collection of speeches given at the 50th anniversary is 

included in New World Vistas, ancillary vol. (Washington, D.C.: SAB, 1996) 

and should be publicly available by mid-1996. 

74. Mr. Harry Hillaker, remarks at the “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 10 

November 1994. 

75. Dr. Courtland D. Perkins, remarks at the “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 

10 November 1994; Mr. Harry Hillaker, remarks at the “50th Anniversary of the 

SAB,” 10 November 1994; Dr. Robert G. Loewy, remarks at the “50th 

Anniversary of the SAB,” 10 November 1994; Dr. Alexander H. Flax, remarks 

at the “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 10 November 1994; and the USAF 

Scientific Advisory Board Commemorative History, 9-10 November 1994. A 

member of the SAB for nearly its entire existence, Dr. Ivan Getting is generally 

credited with developing the Global Positioning Satellite concept. 

76. SAB Meeting Minutes, 17-18 March 1948. 

77. Loewy, remarks at the “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 10 November 

1994; Dr. Gene McCall, interviewed by author, 20 July 1995, Newport Beach, 

Calif. 

78. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman remarks at the “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 

10 November 1994. 

79. Dr. Sheila E. Widnall remarks at the “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 10 

November 1994. 

80. This briefing was given by Dr. McCall in the SECAF conference room. 

All 12 New World Vistas Panel chairs were in attendance as were the Secretary, 

the Chief, and an array of three-star staff officers. Author in attendance, 15 

December 1995. 

81. SAB 1994 and 1995 office files. 

82. Theodore von Kármán. interviewed by Shaughnessy, 10. 
Arnold awards Kármán the Meritorious Civilian Service 

Medal after the SAG’s first year. Arnold retired the 

following year while Kármán continued as SAB chairman 

for the next decade. 

The first Scientific Advisory Board meeting, June 1946. 

“The Boss” at the head of the table. 

186 
The Arnold Engineering and Development Center (AEDC) 

was one of the many legacies of SAG recommendations. 

The 1995 Scientific Advisory Board met at Maxwell Air 

Force Base in May. 

187 
The SAB, chaired by Dr. Gene McCall, delivered New World 

Vistas, the most recent science and technology forecast for 

the Air Force, on 15 December 1995. 

188 
189 

Conclusion 

During tile years covered by this examination, tile fledgling 

Army Signal Corps evolved from a service comprised of two pilots 

and one plane into a complex system of personnel, institutions, and 

machines. Along the way, powerful personalities and organizations 

both helped and hindered airpower’s technological development. 

Their sway, whether positive or negative, whether actual or 

perceived, contributed to the complexity of planning for the future 

of airpower. Authority wielded by these functionaries did little to 

simplify tile imbroglio inherently resulting from tile uncertainties 

of a rapidly expanding wartime environment, and caused even 

greater anxiety during tile rapid demobilization following tile 

conflict. Yet there were those who realized that the complex 

problems involved in planning for a powerful Air Force, an Air 

Force for tile future, was not just important but essential. The task 

of designing that functional blueprint fell to tile expertise 

encompassed within tile Scientific Advisory Group, formed by 

Gen Hap Arnold and directed by Dr. Theodore von Kármán, in 

1944. 

“Arnold’s vision and concern for tile future,” one historian 

wrote, “were as important a contribution as his build-up of the 

Army Air Arm during World War II.” 1

 Others claimed that it was 

the blend of Arnold’s political acumen and Kármán’s unique 

persona, which combined theoretical brilliance with commonsense application ability, that established the foundation for tile 

research and development bent in tile US Air Force. 2 Lt Gen 

James H. “Jimmy” Doolittle, who chaired the Scientific Advisory 

Board from 1955 to 1958, offered the unique perspective of a highranking military officer who also held a scientific doctor of 

philosophy (PhD) from MIT. 

General Arnold was unique in his ability to anticipate and prepare for the 

future, and when he got together with Theodore von Kármán it was a 

very fortunate thing indeed, because while General Arnold was not a 

highly technical man he did understand the importance of science and 
190 

Although their individual and joint contributions were vital, it 

was the actions which resulted from the collaboration between 

these men and the impact which those actions had on the evolution 

of the technological system of airpower which first began molding 

the fledgling Army Air Forces in 1945 and continues to shape the 

independent Air Force today. 

In the early days, the airplane was simply an object of 

technological achievement. By 1944, the airplane was only a part 

of a technological system which Arnold defined as “Air-Power.” 4

Thomas P. Hughes, author of American Genesis: A Century of 

Invention and Technological Enthusiasm, described another part of 

the growing technological system with which Army Air Forces 

were secretly involved during World War II. In describing the 

Manhattan Project as “more than just a scientific endeavor,” 

Hughes had really described the state of affairs in the US Army Air 

Forces. “Thousands of workers, engineers, and managers as well as 

scientists labored in the heart of the Manhattan Project. [It] was an 

industrial development-and-production undertaking dependent on 

scientific laboratories and scientists for essential technical data and 

theoretical understanding of various processes.” 5

 Yet it was not 

possible to separate the Manhattan Project from airpower because 

the final test required the interaction of both systems to achieve 

ultimate resolution. In 1995, the complex relationships between 

systems is even more difficult to unravel. Dr. Eugene E. Covert, 

SAB chairman from 1982 to 1986, has suggested that “research 

[itself] as is needed for the Air Force is becoming more and more 

as a system.” 6 While Dr. Michael I. Yarymovych, chairman of 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Advisory Group for 

Aeronautical Research and Development in 1995, has gone one 

step further. “When we talk about the world bathed in information, 

or bathed in data that has to be turned into information, the sources 

to the war fighter are myriad. It’s a system of systems-a space 

system with an aerial system with UAV with ground sources, all of 

this together provides the picture to the war fighter.” 7

 

The system Arnold once understood has evolved much further 

since his retirement in 1946. The complexity of weapon systems 
191 

day be known as the megasystem of airpower. There is certain 

irony in the fact that the interrelated systems which Dr. 

Yarymovych described are the direct result of an explosion of 

computational power, a development which Kármán and the SAG 

(and nearly everyone else at that time) missed altogether. 8

 

The transition from machine to complex system began even 

while the airplane was still in its infancy. Arnold’s experience with 

aircraft included both technical aspects and personal ones. His 

early career, from his West Point days to those spent in 

Washington, saw the first use of airplanes in combat. Arnold was 

personally involved in related areas of World War I technological 

development, like the “Bug,” which others in uniform had only 

heard of by rumor. His involvement with the earliest military 

utilization of these technologies brought him into contact with the 

inventors, the designers, the researchers, the teachers, and the 

supporters of aeronautics. Robert Millikan, Orville and Wilbur 

Wright, Boss Kettering, Donald Douglas, Larry Bell, Elmer 

Sperry, Harry Guggenheim, and particularly Theodore von 

Kármán, were only a handful of these. Through his association 

with the airplane and aeronautics in general, Arnold became part of 

a technology/personality circle which provided him with the 

background and familiarity with both theoretical and applied 

aeronautics which he used to the benefit of his Army Air Forces. 

In retrospect, it seems amazing that Arnold attained a position 

of high command in the Army. He and his father had protested his 

first assignment directly to his congressman and senator. He had 

crashed one brand-new airplane and nearly killed himself in a 

second when the Army only had a handful of the craft (not totally 

uncommon in those days). He violated Army regulations, 

ostensibly on Billy Mitchell’s behalf, and was “exiled” for the 

infraction. He was the recipient of official report cards which 

called him, among other things, “untrustworthy.” He had ample 

opportunity to “bail out” of the Army and assume the top position 

for the fledgling Pan Am Airline. Yet, in spite of it all (and 

because of some behind- the-scenes support from a few high 

ranking supporters), he stayed with the Army until 1946. His 
192 

World War II. 

Because Arnold was instrumental in “rowing the Air Force’s 

science and technology boat” while acting as its commander, it is 

less difficult to understand why his commitment to long-term 

scientific research changed during wartime. In September 1939, 

Arnold shifted away from almost every form of research and 

development which he believed would not immediately (six 

months to within 2 years) impact the outcome of the war. 9

 With 

few exceptions, Arnold’s efforts in production, and production 

R&D through 1944, provided massive fleets of technically 

advanced aircraft and weapons which were used by both the 

Americans and the Allies. The jet airplane, an apparent exception 

to his rule of “production R&D only” during the war years, held so 

much potential that he felt obligated to take the risk involved in 

research and development in that area. Arnold himself saw jet 

aircraft as a “signpost to the future,” rather than a tool for the 

present. 10 Again, his personal contacts within the industrial sector, 

his World War I experience, as well as his tour at the Industrial 

College of the Army were vital to the eventual success of 

American industrial mobilization efforts. He believed, and 

expressed his belief to General Spaatz, that it was more important 

to fight the war with the best weapons at hand, which included 

technological refinement for those existing systems, than to hang 

hopes on futuristic weapons which might not make it into the 

combat zone in time. Arnold himself, during his middle period (fall 

1939 to late spring 1944), had shifted back to an approach which 

favored the American tradition of empiricism. When Arnold felt 

that the inevitable victory was assured, he once again turned his 

efforts to long-term planning for the Air Forces. His decisionswhich shifted the basic direction of the Air Forces during the “war 

years,” toward, then away, then back toward long-term R&D-were 

shaped by both internal and external political and economic factors 

as well as deficiencies in the interwar Army administrative system. 

In this regard, the Air Forces acted much like any other social or 

governmental group and Arnold acted much as any other national 

leader. He acted within the established guidelines for his service 
193 

which characterized American scientific activity. It is evident that 

Arnold did not understand the intricacies of empiricism or 

theoretical science. But that did not matter. He selected Kármán, 

who represented the theoretical school, because of previously 

demonstrated success and a personal bond which had developed 

over years of informal association. His choice, therefore, insured 

that the Air Force ended up taking the theoretical-the German 

approach to science and technology-rather than the purely 

American approach based upon pragmatic applications of science 

determined by empirical research. 

Theodore von Kármán brought to America a background of 

European scientific training. His highly disciplined theoretical 

mind, tempered by a Newtonian ability to apply theory to practical 

problems, bucked the American tendency toward utilitarianism in 

problem solution. His rapid climb to excellence assured that his 

circle of acquaintances included every top European scientist in 

every discipline by the time he left Aachen in 1930. His work 

rivaled Prandtl’s and, in one famous case, surpassed the 

accomplishments of his former professor. 11 His high-speed 

aerodynamics theories were instrumental in the success of the Bell 

X-1 program. 12 But his defining characteristic was a singular 

ability to plant intellectual seeds which younger, enthusiastic 

aerodynamic gardeners tended until scientific or technological fruit 

had fully ripened. Students, colleagues, and coworkers like Dr. 

William R. Sears, Dr. Homerjoe Stewart, Dr. Frank L. Wattendorf, 

Dr. Clark B. Millikan, Dr. H. Guyford Stever; Guggenheim 

Aeronautics Laboratory, California Institute of Technology staff 

members, not to mention the SAG and the Army Air Forces, were 

shaped by this propensity. 

Kármán’s arrival in America was attributable to world political 

events. Had the American economy precluded the Guggenheims 

from establishing an aeronautical trust fund, he would have 

remained in Europe with many of his German colleagues. Had the 

nature of German nationalism been less violent or more inclusive, 

Kármán might have felt secure remaining at Aachen. Had antiSemitism been kept in check, Kármán might also have remained in 
194 

played a pivotal role in both bringing Kármán to America and then 

introducing him to General Arnold in the early 1930s. This was 

how Kármán’s experience and circle of friends eventually collided 

with Arnold’s. 

Arnold’s and Kármán’s relationship demonstrated the 

complexities of institutional and interpersonal impact on the 

evolution of airpower. Arnold’s positive relationship over the years 

with men of Millikan’s reputation and influence, directly and 

indirectly affected the evolution of American military airpower by 

shaping Arnold’s ideas about the importance of science and 

technology to the Army Air Forces. It is unlikely that a committee 

of any sort would have nurtured the contacts and earned the trust of 

the American scientific community that Arnold had achieved 

individually. 

Those who left a negative impression upon both Arnold and 

Kármán were equally as important as those making a positive one. 

Dr. Vannevar Bush, although a talented electrical engineer, had 

proved to both the general and the professor that he lacked 

intellectual vision. Their impression of Bush undoubtedly 

influenced the amount of trust which they placed in the National 

Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (beginning while Bush was 

in charge there) and the National Defense Research 

Committee/Office of Scientific Research and Development system, 

which Bush later chaired. George Lewis, NACA director of 

aeronautical research, although an adequate administrator, had 

continually demonstrated shortsightedness in the area of wind 

tunnel development and high-speed aircraft design. For many years 

Arnold and Kármán had witnessed firsthand Lewis’ tendency 

toward strict bureaucratic function and research by committee. To 

Arnold, Lewis had not participated as an integral member of the 

Army Air Forces’ team. To Kármán, Lewis had not demonstrated 

either the element of individual brilliance or intellectual freedom 

which the professor considered essential to successful R&D 

efforts-traits Kármán traditionally passed along to his students, 

associates, and organizations. It was ironic, at least in the case of 

Arnold and Kármán, that these negative influences, experienced 
195 

having similar goals for American airpower, Arnold and Kármán 

found it comfortable working together in the pursuit of American 

air supremacy. 

“A Close-Run Thing” 

Where We Stand and Toward New Horizons were the result not 

only of a general’s vision and a scientist’s brilliance, but also of 

many external influences and experiences which both of these men 

carried with them as decision makers during World War II. The 

SAG had created a monumental wish list for the Air Force and 

offered recommendations for the future of airpower. That blueprint 

was only the first major step. In coming years, after fiscal restraints 

and national attitudes were forced into a national defense paradigm 

shift generated by the cold war, functional plans were finally 

devised and hardware programs funded in an effort to achieve the 

seemingly “Buck Rogerish” predictions which Toward New 

Horizons had envisioned. 

The Arnold/Kármán team, although it existed officially for only 

15 months, from November 1944 to February 1946, created the 

plan which has since evolved into the science and technology 

infrastructure of today’s Air Force. 13 Arnold established Project 

RAND, the Office of Scientific Liaison, and funded dozens of 

guided missile programs before postwar demobilization and 

inevitable budget cuts slowed the procedure. Kármán and the SAG 

assumed the strenuous task of traveling the world in search of the 

most advanced technologies, constantly mindful of how these 

advances might be applied to American airpower. In the end, it 

was Arnold’s realization that such a study was needed and 

Kármán’s unique ability to apply scientific findings to the practical 

technological needs of the Air Force which-helped along by 

lifelong associates at opportune times and places-produced a report 

having great potential for long-term success. 

But it was a close-run thing. Success was not guaranteed. After 

Arnold’s retirement, the Air Forces faced monumental obstacles in 
196 

constant flux. The reorganization of the National Military 

Establishment into the Department of Defense only added to the 

quagmire. Somehow Kármán was able, by the nature of his 

association with both officers and scientists, to keep the newly 

formed SAB from stalling. He nurtured its structure and its 

function in the face of misunderstanding, other’s agendas, and, at 

times, lack of interest until it was capable of independent growth. 

By 1954, a decade after the process began, Kármán’s vision guided 

by his own perseverance was directly responsible for the genesis of 

the SAB. But Arnold’s ghost was never far away. During this 

period Arnold’s previous associations with officers, industrialists, 

and scientists continually surfaced. Among them Gen Bernard 

Schriever, Lt Gen Laurence Craigie, Lt Gen Benjamin Chidlaw, 

Larry Bell, Donald Douglas, and Dr. Edward Bowles were all vital 

to the eventual institutionalization of Toward New Horizons. 

Only after Kármán was certain that the SAB would thrive did 

he resign his chair. Similarly, just as Arnold’s influence continued 

in the presence of others, so too did Kármán’s. Former students, 

colleagues, and friends who had been educated by or employed 

with the professor carried his broad-based, practical applications 

approach to problem solution as part of their own methodology. 

Arnold’s drive and Kármán’s method had become the Air Force’s 

foundation for science and technology matters and were 

represented by the institutionalized SAB. 

Dr. Harold Sorenson, SAB chairman from 1990 to 1993, 

observed that “the impact of the Scientific Advisory Board for the 

Air Force is often a very long-term thing. That is, if we point to a 

specific study, if it’s only a year or two old, often it’s hard to point 

to the direct impact it’s going to have.” 14 The Global Positioning 

System, the complex avionics suite for the F-22 air superiority 

fighter, and composite materials are all examples of studies fitting 

Sorenson’s observation. 15 Perhaps it is more appropriate to 

examine a much broader tenet from Kármán’s original report. In 

Toward New Horizons the professor concluded that the Air Force 

of the future would be required to: (1) reach remote targets swiftly 

and hit them with great destructive power; (2) secure air 
197 

and (4) defend our own territory and bases in the most efficient 

way. 16 On the occasion of her challenge to the SAB on 10 

November 1994, Dr. Widnall reiterated Kármán’s words adding, 

“Does this sound like Global Reach/Global Power?” 17 Global 

Reach/Global Power is to the Air Force what the Hippocratic oath 

is to a doctor, it defines the profession. Whether a hard trail of 

evidence exists as proof linking Arnold and Kármán to the 

ideological philosophy today’s Air Force is largely irrelevant. The 

fact is that current leadership attributes the Air Force’s scientific 

and technological ideology to Arnold and Kármán and has ordered 

sweeping actions based upon the belief that the Arnold/Kármán 

philosophy, manifest in Toward New Horizons, has proven itself 

prophetic. Thus, as the SAB represents tangible evidence of both 

Arnold’s and Kármán’s continuous institutional influence, a 

statement like the comparative one made by the Air Force 

secretary represents intangible evidence of their continuing 

ideological influence. 

The Essence of the Task 

Airpower institutions have evolved erratically since the days of 

the First World War. In his book, Ideas and Weapons: Exploration 

of the Aerial Weapon by the United States During World War I, I. 

B. Holley has concluded that, “the postwar [World War I] Air 

Service made use of only a relatively small portion of the 

experience of the war regarding the problem of weapons.” 18 One 

lesson which was learned, however, was that quality was better 

than quantity as far as weapons were concerned. Arnold had 

internalized that lesson. Unfortunately, the administrative systems 

which might have assured such high-quality weapons 

development, or at least a process for their institutionalization, 

were neglected. Another lesson learned, and perhaps the most 

significant one, concerned unity of command. According to 

Holley, “The available evidence shows that after the war the Air 

Service learned the importance of organization for decision and 

established channels of command for unified, decisive, and 
198 

very development which allowed Arnold to act as a stopgap, a 

committee of one, ensuring that the lessons of the Great War had 

not fallen on totally deaf ears. Arnold acted as the tangible link 

between the lost lessons of World War I and the institutionalization 

of science and technology which became a reality after World War 

II. Ordering the blueprint which became the scientific and 

technological cornerstone of American airpower is Arnold’s; 

legacy-creating it was Kármán’s. 

It is accurate to say that the interwar years were not a period 

during which airpower was “building up.” When Arnold took 

command in 1938, however, he immediately utilized his 

experience and personal contacts to ensure that his World War I 

experience was not wasted. He overcame 20 years of institutional 

neglect in what turned out to be a very short time. Arnold made 

decisions based upon information provided to him by his circle of 

scientific and technologically oriented friends, particularly those 

who had ties to Europe. It was Lindbergh’s 1938 letter, for 

example, which convinced him that faster, more capable planes 

were necessary if the Army Air Forces were to dominate the air 

war. Foreign doctrine and weapons, although not examined by a 

dedicated organization, were examined by Arnold and his staff 

from the late 1930s through the end of the war. Additionally, 

Arnold himself acted as the Army Air Forces’ “continuing liaison 

with science.” Not only was he familiar with most available 

technologies, the jet engine being a late addition to that list, but he 

had earned the respect of many gifted scientists throughout his 

long career. 

The American story of radar, jets, and rocket development, 

without General Arnold in command, would certainly have 

proceeded at a slower pace, or in some cases not at all. Arnold’s 

desire for the best available technology of the highest quality, 

regardless of its source, was instrumental in America’s acquisition 

of jet propulsion, guided missiles, intercontinental ballistic missile 

theory, and advanced aeronautical designs during the closing years 

of World War II. These acquisitions were made despite the 

organizational and personal failures of the NACA and the 
199 

and using the best available people and equipment was also 

applied to the formation of the SAG in 1944. Although it was true 

that many functional Army Air Forces scientific and technological 

research organizations were not formalized until after World War 

II, it is inaccurate to conclude that lessons from the earlier war did 

not influence decisions concerning weapons, doctrine, 

procurement, science, technology, research, and development 

during the Second World War. Arnold, by his presence alone, 

ensured that they did, particularly in the fields of science and 

technology. 

What the Army Air Forces lacked in science and technology 

organization before Pearl Harbor was rectified after V-E Day. 

Many of the institutional lessons seemingly lost after World War I 

were finally addressed and incorporated, largely because of the 

recommendations of Kármán’s 1945 reports for General Arnold. 

During Arnold’s command, he carried forth the lessons which he 

had learned over his career and used them advantageously despite 

the fact that adequate institutional organizations for incorporating 

both mundane and “Buck Rogerish” ideas did not yet exist. 

“A report does not make a policy,” said Kármán, “It depends on 

the administration.” 20 Arnold complemented that statement with 

one of his own shortly after he retired. “Successful research, being 

the product of inspiration, cannot be purchased like a commodity. 

It is the product of the human mind-of intellectual leadership. ...All 

of the funds and facilities devoted to research will be wasted unless 

at the same time America possesses competent intellectual 

leadership. ...The proper cultivation of the human mind is the 

essence of the task.” 21 The continued evolution of the Air Force as 

a technological system within the boundaries of a complex and 

influential American society has been determined by the realities 

inherent in those statements during these past five decades. 
200 

1. John W. Huston, “The Wartime Leadership of ‘Hap’ Arnold,” in Alfred F. 

Hurley and Robert C. Ehrhart, eds., Air Power and Warfare: The Proceedings of 

the 8th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 18-20 

October 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1979), 181; Gen 

Bernard Schriever, interviewed by author, 10 November 1994, “He was the most 

visionary person I’ve ever seen, yet he was an operator from the word go,” 2. 

2. Hugh L. Dryden, “Memorial for Theodore von Kármán, 1881-1963” 

(Memorial Proceedings, US Air Force Academy Special Collections, 28 May 

1963), 7; also James H. Doolittle, OHI, 21 April 1969, 9, USAFA, Colorado 

Springs, Colo. 

3. Doolittle. 

4. Henry H. Arnold, speech at the NACA laboratories in Cleveland, Ohio, 

transcript, Murray Green Collection (MGC), roll 12; motion picture, March 

AFB, Calif. Original film at the Arnold Ranch, Sonoma, Calif. 

5. Thomas P. Hughes, American Genesis: A Century of Invention and 

Technological Enthusiasm (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 383. 

6. Dr. Eugene E. Covert, remarks, “Proceedings of the ‘50th Anniversary 

Meeting of the SAB’ Symposium,” National Academy of Sciences, Washington, 

D.C., 10 November 1994, videotape. 

7. Dr. Michael I. Yarymovych, interviewed by author, videotape, 20 July 

1995, Newport Beach, Calif. 

8. The term megasystem was broadly defined in Merritt Roe Smith, and Leo 

Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological 

Determinism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), xi, as “intricately 

interrelated technical systems-a system of systems.” More recently the term was 

linked to “modern military power” by Eliot A. Cohen, MA Revolution in 

Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), 53. 

9. Henry H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare (New York: Harper 

and Brothers Publisher, 1941), 238-39. 

10. Henry H. Arnold, “Air Force in the Atomic Age,” in One World or 

None, ed. Dexter Masters and Katharine Way (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 

1946), 30; also James O. Young, “Riding England’s Coattails: The U.S. Army 

Air Forces and the Turbojet Revolution” (unpublished typed manuscript, 

Edwards AFB, Calif.: AFFTC History Office, 1995). The debate over whether 

or not Arnold’s staff had kept him as well informed concerning jet development 

in the US as they could have is a complicated one. His actions in 1940, such as 

funding the high speed tunnel at Wright Field, seem to indicate that he was 

aware of the “Kotcher Report” of 1939. Remember, too, that these developments 

would have taken place during what I call Arnold’s early “technological Phase 

II, Sept 1939-spring 1944,” where production and production R&D took 

precedence over all other projects. The turbojet engine, in the early days, did not 
201 

Arnold’s apparently late push into jet propulsion. Actually, this fit well with his 

wartime R&D restrictions. 

11. Dr. William Rees Sears, interviewed by author, 8 July 1995; and Michael 

H. Gorn, The Universal Man: Theodore von Kármán’s Life in Aeronautics 

(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992), 62-63. 

12. For a detailed account of the X-1 project, see Louis Rotundo, Into the 

Unknown: The X-l Story (Washington, D. C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 

1994); for Kármán’s direct contribution I have relied on a personal interview 

with X-1 test pilot, Brig Gen Charles “Chuck” Yeager, interviewed by author, 

10 June 1994, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 

13. Schriever interview. He said about Arnold, “There’s no question, his 

greatness was that he created the infrastructure. He visualized the kind of 

infrastructure that the Air Force needed to really get into the technology age.” 

14. Dr. Harold W. Sorenson, interview for “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 

27 September 1994, Pentagon, Washington, D. C. 

15. SAB studies examining the Global Positioning System (GPS) were 

initiated in the 1960s. Impact upon the commercial market as in cars and 

portable GPSs was not a consideration when the project began. The F-22, 

advanced air superiority fighter, incorporates an internal avionics suite which 

has set the standard for future military systems and has also been influential in 

commercial designs like the new Boeing-777. Composite studies initiated in 

1965 resulted in technology which has revolutionized aircraft construction but 

also many commercial products like skis and tennis rackets. Dr. Ivan Getting, 

interviewed by author, 10 November 1994; Dr. Harold W. Sorenson, remarks, 

“Proceedings of the ‘50th Anniversary of the SAB’ Symposium,” National 

Academy of Sciences, 6 hours, 10 November 1994, videotape: Robert Loewy, 

remarks at “50th Anniversary of the SAB.” 

16. Theodore von Kármán, Toward New Horizons, vol. 1, Science: The Key 

to Air Supremacy, 15 December 1945, 1.12a-d. This document, Kármán’s 

summary volume, is appendix C. 

17. Dr. Sheila E. Widnall, remarks at the “50th Anniversary of the SAB.” 

18. I. B. Holley Jr., Ideas and Weapons: Exploitation of the Aerial Weapon 

by the United States During World War I; A Study in the Relationship of 

Technological Advance, Military Doctrine, and the Development of Weapons 

(1953; new imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 176. 

The following discussion in the text is based on Dr. Holley’s summary and 

conclusions. 

19. Ibid., 177. 

20. Theodore von Kármán, interviewed by Donald Shaughnessy, 10. 
202 

Dr. McCall insisted that the report, to be effective in the long term, must be 

supported by at least two generations of Air Force military and civilian 

leadership. The report, without high-level support and funding, would be useless 

if not institutionalized almost immediately. Perhaps he is also a student of 

history. Gen Lew Allen, Air Force chief of staff, suggested the long-term impact 

of the Kármán reports. “The Air Force devoted itself to ensuring that its 

weapons systems would be at the cutting edge all of the time, and invested 

wisely in people and in organizational mechanisms and in the actual projects and 

developments which allowed those technological advances to occur. The 

leadership of the Air Force over all those 45 years deserves tremendous credit 

for being a very major portion of the victory over the Soviet Union by making 

that technological superiority be clear and unambiguous at all times.” Gen Lew 

Allen, interview for the “50th Anniversary of the SAB,” 20 September 1994, 

Calif. 
Arnold’s dream for the future of airpower was manifest in 

technology like the P-80. 

In retirement Arnold remained an active public advocate of

airpower. Here he recalls early flying at Simms Station. 

203 
 “The Elder Statesman of Aeronautics.” 

204 
205 

The Military Career of Henry Harley Arnold 

(Cadet No. 4596) 

Born: 25 June 1886, Gladwyne, Pa. 

Died: 15 January 1950, Sonoma, Calif., age 63. 

CADET RECORD (all numbers refer to class standing rather than a % grade)

SUBJECT 1903/04 1904/05 1905/06 1906/07 

Overall 

Ranking 

82/136 63/119 61/113 66/111 

Conduct 25 27 21 52 

Demerits 

(actual) 

45 66 36 105 

Military/Drill 97 X 70 78 

Engineering X 73 X 47/62 

Math 74 49 X X 

English 103 94 X X 

French 98 89 X X 

Spanish X 94 X X 

Drawing X 70 51 X 

Philosophy X X 66 X 

Chemistry X X 53 X 

Hygiene X X 94 X 

Law X X X 100 

History X X X 89 

Gunnery X X X 54 

Military 

Efficiency 

X X X 76 

Deportment 

and 

Discipline 

X X X 60 
206 

1 Aug 1903 Entered West Point, the Military Academy 

14 Jun 1907 Graduated 

5 Dec 1907 Fort William McKinley, P. I. 

9 Apr 1908 San Mateo, P .1., and various other temporary 

locations 

18 Jun 1909 En route to US through Asia and Europe 

1 Oct 1909 Governor's Island, N. Y. 

20 Apr 1911 Aviation School, Dayton, Ohio, Simms Station 

15 Jun 1911 College Park, Md. Aviation duty as 

instructor/supply officer 

25 Nov 1911 Augusta, Ga. Same duty 

15 Apr 1912 Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 

1 May 1912 College Park, Md. 

1 Jul 1912 Connecticut maneuvers 

5 Aug 1912 College Park, Md. 

1 Oct 1912 Fort Riley, Kans. (near fatal spin) 

15 Nov 1912 Washington, D.C. Duty in Office of the Chief 

Signal Officer 

1 Sep 1913 Fort Thomas, Ky. Infantry 

25 Nov 1913 En route to Philippine Islands 

5 Jan 1914 Fort William McKinley, P. I. 

5 Jan 1916 En route to Madison Barracks, N.Y. 

15 Mar 1916 Madison Barracks, N. Y. 

20 May 1916 Aviation School at San Diego, Calif., North Island 

5 Feb 1917 Panama Canal Zone 

20 Mar 1917 Washington, D.C. Asst. executive and executive 

officer, Air Division, Signal Corps; board control 

member; asst. director Military Aeronautics; 

director of Military Aeronautics 
207 

10 Jan 1919 Rockwell Field, Coronado, Calif. District 

supervisor, Western District, Air Service 

30 May 1919 Crissy Field, San Francisco, Calif. Air Officer, 

9th Air Corps Area 

17 Oct 1922 Rockwell Field, Calif. Commanding officer, Air 

Depot. 

15 Aug 1924 Washington, D.C. Student, Army Industrial 

College 

Mar 1925 Graduated AIC, then assigned to the Office, Chief 

Air Corps 

Mar 1926 Marshal Field, Fort Riley, Kans. (“Exile.” Wrote 

Bill Bruce books.) 

Aug 1928 For Leavenworth, Kans. Student, General Service 

School 

12 Jun 1929 Graduated, then to Fairfield Air Depot, Ohio. 

Commanding officer; chief, Field Service 

Section, Materiel Division, Air Corps; executive 

officer, Materiel Division 

29 Oct 1931 En route March Field, Calif. 

26 Nov 1931 March Field, Calif. Commanding officer 

17 Jan 1936 Washington, D.C. Assistant chief of the Air Corps 

29 Sep 1938 Chief of the Air Corps 

20 Jun 1941 Chief, Army Air Forces 

9 Mar 1942 Commanding general, Army Air Forces; Member, 

Joint Chiefs of Staff; Member, Combined Chiefs 

of Staff 

21 Dec 1944 General of the Army (5 star rank) 

9 Feb 1946 Office of the Chief of Staff 

3 Mar 1946 End tour 

30 Jun 1946 Retired with disability (heart problems), 43 years 

service 

7 May 1949 General of the Air Force 
208 

1 Aug 1903 Cadet 

14 Jun 1907 Second lieutenant, 29th Infantry 

10 Apr 1913 First lieutenant of Infantry 

20 May 1916 Captain, Aviation Section, Signal Corps 

23 Sep 1916 Captain of Infantry 

27 Jun 1917 Major, Aviation Section, Signal Corps 

5 Aug 1917 Colonel, temporary, Signal Corps 

15 Jan 1918 Major, temporary, Infantry 

30 Jun 1920 Captain, permanent grade 

1 Jul 920 Major of Infantry (transferred to Air Service 11 

August 1920) 

1 Feb 1931 Lieutenant colonel, Air Corps 

2 Mar 1935 Brigadier general, temporary, Air Corps (one 

source: 11 Feb) 

22 Sep 1938 Major general, chief of Air Corps (30 October, 

deputy chief of staff Army for air matters) 

15 Dec 1941 Lieutenant general 

19 Mar 1943 General 

21 Dec 1944 General of the Army 

30 Jun 1946 General of the Army, Retired 

7 May 1949 General of the Air Force 

This appendix is compiled from a variety of sources kindly 

provided by the West Point Archives. For the most part, the 

assignments and promotions are assembled from the “graduate” 

update magazine and the Howitzer, student yearbook. 
209 

The Army Air Forces (AAF) Scientific Advisory Group (SAG) 

was activated late in 1944 by General of the Army H. H. Arnold. 

He secured the services of Dr. Theodore von Kármán, renowned 

scientist and consultant in aeronautics, who agreed to organize and 

direct the group. 

Dr. von Kármán gathered about him a group of American 

scientists from every field of research having a bearing on 

airpower. These men then analyzed important developments in the 

basic sciences, both in the United States and abroad, and attempted 

to evaluate the effects of their application to airpower. 

This volume is one of a group of reports made to the Army Air 

Forces by the Scientific Advisory Group. 

NOTE: The entire set of reports is available to researchers at the 

Pentagon Library and the USAF Historical Research Agency at 

Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama. 
Where We Stand 

First Report 

to 

General of the Army H. H. Arnold 

on 

Long Range Research Problems of the AIR FORCES with a 

Review of German Plans and Developments 

Theodore von Kármán 

Director 

Scientific Advisory Group 

Army Air Forces 

22 August 1945 
211 

II. Where We Stand ......................................................214 

 Supersonic Flight ................................................214 

 Pilotless Aircraft .................................................223 

 Propulsion Methods in the Making .....................235 

 Atomic Energy for Jet Propulsion .......................256 

 Jet Propelled Aircraft ..........................................259 

 Tailless Aircraft ..................................................262 

 Aerodynamic Miscellanea ..................................263 

 The Art of Radar .................................................270 

 Infrared Developments ........................................277 

III. Problems of Organization ........................................280 

IV. List of Tables ..........................................................283 

V. List of Figures ..........................................................283 

VI. Index of Toward New Horizons ..............................284 
212 

INTRODUCTION 

The present war started on both sides with “conventional” 

weapons and equipment; “conventional” because their principles 

of action, design, and performance were fundamentally known to 

the enemy. During the war both sides produced equipment and 

weapons of astonishing effects which will certainly change the 

whole picture of future aerial warfare. 

This report is concerned with the main fields in which 

significant advances have been made and tries to show “where we 

stand” with some indications as to “where we shall go.” 

For future planning of research and development, the following 

new aspects of aerial warfare have to be considered as fundamental 

realities: 

1. that aircraft-manned or pilotless-will move with speeds far 

beyond the velocity of sound; 

2. that due to improvements in aerodynamics, propulsion and 

electronic control, unmanned devices will transport means of 

destruction to targets at distances up to several thousand miles; 

3. that small amounts of explosive materials will cause 

destruction over areas of several square miles; 

4. that defense against present-day aircraft will be perfected by 

target seeking missiles; 

5. that only aircraft or missiles moving at extreme speeds will 

be able to penetrate enemy territory protected by such defenses; 

6. that a perfect communication system between fighter 

command and each individual aircraft will be established; 

7. that location and observation of targets, take-off, navigation 

and landing of aircraft, and communication will be independent of 

visibility and weather; 

8. that fully equipped airborne task forces will be enabled to 

strike at far distant points and will be supplied by air. 
213 

Therefore, such an evaluation is not attempted in this report. 

However, the development of this new source of energy will 

certainly make the supersonic airplane and the automaticallyguided pilotless-aircraft even more efficient and will materially 

extend their range. Hence the progress in utilization of nuclear 

energy will strengthen and accelerate the trends of aeronautical 

developments advocated in this report. 

Several topics, such as television, weather, medical research, 

airborne armies, etc., are not mentioned in this report. They will be 

treated in my final report. 

This report was prepared with the collaboration of all members 

of the Scientific Advisory Group. 
214 

Supersonic Flight 

Supersonic flight appeared before 1940 as a remote possibility. 

Supersonic motion was considered as characteristic of artillery 

shells; level flight supported by wings was thought to be confined 

to the subsonic speed range. Some people talked of the stone wall 

against which we were running by trying to fly faster than sound. 

One of the main results of bolder and more accurate thinking, 

and more experimentation in the last few years, is the fact that this 

stone wall disappeared, at least in our planning, and will disappear 

in actual practice if efforts are continued. 

I believe the first engineering analysis presented in this country 

was contained in a report by myself and my collaborators early in 

1944. It was shown in this report that an airplane of 10,000 lb 

gross weight, and 80 lb/sq ft wing loading, can climb to 40,000 ft 

altitude, reach a speed of 1000 mph, and fly at this speed for five 

minutes. As the propulsion device, a ramjet was considered. 

The two main requisites of supersonic flight are the 

development of air frames which are aerodynamically efficient in 

the supersonic range and the development of lightweight efficient 

propulsion units. 

The German contribution to the problem of supersonic flight is 

mainly on the aerodynamic side. No particular advance has been 

made by them in power plants such as the ramjet and turbojet for 

extremely high speeds. The Germans tested these power plants 

only at subsonic speeds. Their main contributions to aerodynamics 

were as follows: 

1. By wind-tunnel testing and by firing of winged missiles, it 

was shown that the passing of sonic velocity does not entail any 

stability difficulties if the transition is made in a relatively short 

time by rapid acceleration. 
215 

be designed for supersonic flight. 

These German achievements are not the result of any 

superiority in their technical and scientific personnel, however, but 

rather due to the very substantial support enjoyed by their research 

institutions in obtaining expensive research equipment, such as 

large supersonic wind tunnels, many years before such equipment 

was planned in this country. 

Supersonic Wind Tunnels 

There is no doubt that we were slow in recognizing the 

necessity of supersonic wind-tunnel research. I myself tried to 

persuade the Chief of Ordnance, after my return from a trip to 

Europe in 1937, to install a supersonic tunnel at Pasadena. General 

Barnes decided in 1942 to build such a tunnel at Aberdeen Proving 

Ground. The design was based on model studies carried out 

between 1940 and 1942 at the California Institute of Technology. 

Wright Field and NACA are building supersonic wind tunnels but 

until recently only one small tunnel with a cross section of 7.5 x 

7.5 in was available. As the missile program made the need for 

supersonic aero- dynamic data urgent, the Budget Bureau of the 

Government ordered hearings with the idea rather of restricting 

than encouraging the construction of such vital instruments of 

research under the slogan of “avoid duplications.” 

The picture of the situation on the other side is given by Figs. 1 

and 2, which cover German supersonic wind tunnels in operation 

and under construction. 

It seems to me that the Air Forces have to recognize the fact that 

the science of supersonic aerodynamics is no longer a part of 

exterior ballistics but represents the basic knowledge necessary for 

design of manned and unmanned supersonic aircraft. The Air 

Forces have to provide facilities and include this field in their 

research, development, and training programs. 
Figure 1- German Supersonic Wind Tunnels (operation 1945) 

216 
Figure 2 - German Supersonic Wind Tunnels (Construction 1945) 

217 
218 

The main difficulty of flying at speeds near and beyond the 

velocity of sound is, of course, the extremely low lift-drag ratio of 

the airplane due to excessive drag. The range of an airplane, for 

example, is directly proportional to this ratio. Wing theory and 

wing design for subsonic airplanes were worked out with rather 

surprising success in this country and we were ahead of the 

Germans in this field. However, in the field of transonic and 

supersonic wing design, the Germans developed to the point of 

practical application ideas which were only in the discussion stage 

here. 

The optimum lift-drag ratio of the wing of a very well designed 

subsonic airplane, the Mustang, is shown in Fig. 3. It is seen from 

the same figure that the lift-drag ratio for a rectangular supersonic 

wing at a Mach number of 2 is less than that of an old-fashioned 

biplane cell. This is the point where new ideas must step in. 

One such idea is that of the arrowhead wing (pfeilflügel), first 

suggested in a scientific paper by A. Busemann in 1935. This was 

a dormant idea until revived with success by German scientists and 

designers in the period 1942-1945. 

The arrowhead wing is based on the thought that sweeping back 

the wings reduces considerably the effective Mach number of the 

wing and so lowers the resistance. As a matter of fact, if the 

sweepback is sufficiently large, the shock wave can be eliminated 

even at supersonic speeds over the greater part of the wing. I 

include here two photographs (Fig. 4) which belong to a series of 

experiments carried out at my suggestion in the Aberdeen 

supersonic wind tunnel in April, 1945, before I went abroad. These 

experiments were made at a Mach number of 1.72. It is seen that 

the straight wing produces a strong shock wave at the leading edge 

which fails to appear in the case of the swept-back wing. Robert 

Jones of the NACA announced similar suggestions in a report in 

June, 1945. The German scientists carried out comprehensive 

investigations on the problem. The two longer illustrations in Fig. 

3 show the improvements of lift-drag ratio which can be realized 

by proper wing shapes. The Germans found that the reduction of 
which the compressibility effects increase the drag and cause 

stability troubles, can be pushed to higher values by large

sweepback of the wings. This result was utilized in several of their

last airplanes, for example, the Messerschmitt-Lippisch design of

their rocket interceptor, the Me-163. 

Figure 3 - Optimum Lift-Drag Ratios 

219 
 

Figure 4 - Sweepback Effect on Shock Wave. 

220 
221 

I believe that for the realization of supersonic flight the 

following engineering researches are indicated: 

1. Complete airplane models with actual operating power plant 

should be tested for performance and detailed improvements in 

supersonic wind tunnels at supersonic speeds. For this purpose 

supersonic wind tunnels of large test sections are necessary so that 

not only the components, such as wing and fuselage, but a whole 

airplane as well can be studied for optimum design. 

2. Since wind-tunnel testing in the speed range in the immediate 

neighborhood of the sonic velocity is unreliable, research in this 

speed range should be supplemented by special flying research 

airplanes in order to obtain performance data as well as flow 

mechanics data at high speeds. For the success of these tests, a 

complete, careful instrumentation and flight-testing technique has 

to be developed so that accurate and detailed flow information can 

be obtained. 

3. Methods of launching the airplane by various auxiliary power 

plants such as rockets, should be investigated. One promising 

means of launching is to combine the take-off and climb into one 

single step by rockets as shown in Fig. 5. The transition through 

the velocity of sound will be then very fast and the rockets can be 

dropped when spent. No long runways will be necessary and the 

main power plant, turbojet, or ramjet, can be designed most 

efficiently for supersonic operation only. 

4. Landing is facilitated by the fact that the fuel consumed is a 

large percentage of the initial weight. However, to enable landing 

at a safe low speed, deceleration and lift increase by appropriately 

directed rocket thrust during the last few seconds of descent may 

be necessary, as shown in Fig. 5. This method of landing has to be 

studied. 

Only through such a program of research can the problem of 

supersonic flight be satisfactorily solved. Of course, from the point 

of view of tactical usage of supersonic aircraft, the result of this 

research program is only the first step. There still remains the 

question of working out the best ways of using an aircraft of 
the intensive research indicated. We cannot hope to secure air 

superiority in any future conflict without entering the supersonic 

speed range. 

Figure 5 - Supersonic Airplane: Take-off and Landing 

222 
223 

German Development of Guided Missiles 

and Pilotless Aircraft 

The German effort on guided missiles and pilotless aircraft was 

aimed at three tactical problems: (1) the bombing of Allied ships, 

both naval and merchant vessels; (2) long-range strategic bombing 

of England; and (3) defense against Allied bombers. Some thought 

and effort had also been given to the problem of the long-range 

strategic bombing of America by unmanned missiles. 

Development of high-angle and glide bombs to answer the first 

problem was started about the end of 1939 or the beginning of 

1940 and resulted in the PC-1400-FX and Hs-293 missiles, first 

used in August and October, 1943. Both missiles were direct-sight 

radio-controlled and became unusable as soon as air superiority 

was lost. 

The well-known V-1 and V-2 were used to meet the second 

problem, which arose after the failure of the attempt to bomb 

England by conventional aircraft because of the efficient British air 

defense. Although the fundamental scientific research and 

development work on these missiles had its root in projects 

initiated for other purposes early as 1935, the focusing of effort on 

the tactical problem of long-range bombing of England appears to 

have started in 1941. 

The history of development of the buzz-bomb (V-1) is quite 

interesting. An inventor, Paul Schmidt, had a development contract 

from the Air Ministry for an intermittent jet motor in 1935. The 

work proceeded slowly. About November, 1939, Diedrich, of the 

Argus Motor Company, who had been working for the Air 

Ministry on exhaust pipe jet-propulsion nozzles, began work on 

intermittent combustion in an open pipe. In 1940, the Air Ministry 

brought Schmidt to the Argus Company and combined the 

developments. The first successful motor was completed in 1941. 

This motor development itself was intended for use in aircraft. 

About that time the ground forces development of the large V-2 

rocket, which was started at a very early date, was delayed. Since 
224 

combination of small airplane with intermittent jet motor as a 

substitute for the same purpose. The V-1 was thus conceived and 

became a development of the air forces. Its code name was 

originally Kirschkern (cherry pit) because it was merely to be spit 

out against England. 

Fieseler Aircraft Company was selected to build the air frame. 

The development tests were made at the Air Ministry laboratory at 

the Luftfahrtforschungsanstalt Hermann Goering, Braunschweig, 

in the 2.8-m high-speed wind tunnel. The original model of the V1 was not very good, the net thrust of the motor being zero at 380 

mph. About 60% of the operating time of this wind tunnel was 

needed for nearly a year to bring the development to its present 

stage. 

The first reconnaissance photograph of the V-1 was taken by 

the British at Peenemünde in April, 1943, and bombing made 

Peenemünde uninhabitable by August, 1943. The first operational 

use of the V-1 was on 12 June 1944. 

The V-2 or long-range rocket was known as A-4 or Apparat 4. 

The first of the series, A-1, was fired in 1935 at Kummersdorf. It 

was a small rocket of aluminum construction, 100-kg thrust, 

intended for use on aircraft. 

Dr. von Braun, leader of the Peenemünde group which 

developed the V-2, was a student of Professor Hermann Oberth, a 

well-known inventor and writer in the field of rockets, who had 

published books on interplanetary rocket travel. A group of 

Oberth’s students became interested in rockets and organized an 

amateur rocket group. All were well-trained scientists. In 1935, Dr. 

von Braun was employed by the German War Department and sent 

to Peenemünde. In 1941, von Braun brought Oberth there as head 

of the Patent Section. By 1941, Peenemünde was an active test 

station. The Me-163 was brought there in September, 1941 and in 

October, 1941 flew at a speed of 1,003 km hr (about 623 mph). In 

October, 1941, the first supersonic wind-tunnel tests were made on 

a projectile at a Mach number of 4.4. After the bombing of 

Peenemünde in August, 1943, the activities were decentralized. 
225 

1944. 

Development of guided missile defense against bombers began 

early in 1943. The missiles were all rocket-propelled and, in their 

final development, many were to be automatically controlled with 

homing devices and equipped with proximity fuses. Many of these 

missiles (X-4, Hs-298, Schmetterling, Rheintochter, Enzian, and 

Wasserfall) reached their final testing and early production stage 

but with direct-sight radio control only. The electronic 

developments, homing devices. and proximity fuses lagged behind 

the vehicle and propulsion unit developments. The X-4 air-to-air 

missile was provided with an interesting direct wire control to 

avoid the possibility of jamming, present with radio control. Two 

of the wings carry at the tips spools of fine wire long enough to 

permit a range of three miles while maintaining direct wire 

connection between the missile and the control aircraft. The wires 

can be fed out at speeds of more than 400 mph. None of these 

missiles were used against our bombers. The German situation 

became so critical indeed that development of complicated guided 

rockets was stopped in February, 1945, in favor of concentrating 

on small, unguided rockets to be used in large numbers. 

The German military agencies, research institutions, and 

industrial designers devoted a large effort to guided missiles and 

considered them very promising weapons. In August, 1944, there 

were some 25 projects for homing devices under developments. 

The major research laboratories of the air and ground forces made 

many wind-tunnel and flight tests, some at high supersonic speeds, 

and made many theoretical studies of problems related to guided 

missiles and pilotless aircraft (Fig. 6). 

Perhaps the most important result of the German effort in this 

field was to show that winged missiles are superior in performance 

to finned missiles. Thus, the next stage in the development of the 

V-2 rocket was to have been the addition of wing. The necessary 

wind-tunnel tests had been made in connection with the 

development of the winged ground-to-air rocket Wasserfall and 

ballistic computations had shown that this change alone would 
226 

shown in Fig. 7. 

The German scientists believed, although some German 

engineers in industry disagreed, that the ultimate guided missile 

would be completely automatic in its operation. Although for quick 

development and for test purposes they favored the use of manual 

radio control, their long-range plans contemplated first automatic 

blind tracking of the missile and target, then the connection of the 

two tracking devices through a computer to the radio control 

channels, and finally the use of a homing device for the last part of 

the trajectory and a proximity fuse. 
Figure 6 - German “Feuerlilie” Rocket 

227 
Figure 7 - Rocket Models for Supersonic Wind-Tunnel Tests 

228 
229 

Peenemünde group of scientists, working for the ground forces, 

was the most capable missile research group in Germany. It is 

important for us to note that one element in their success was the 

fact that they had under a single leadership in one organization, 

experts in aerodynamics, structural design, electronics, 

servomechanisms, gyros and control devices, and propulsion; in 

fact, every group required for the development of a complete 

missile. The letters and papers in the files of industrial groups, like 

Messerschmitt, show rapid progress in the field of vehicle and 

propulsion, the fields in which the firm itself had qualified people, 

but delay after delay on controls and electronic devices which had 

to be secured elsewhere. The Luftwaffe research laboratories made 

little progress in the actual development of specific weapons, 

largely because of the absence of electronics experts and their lack 

of facilities for the construction of experimental missiles. 

In addition to the German view that the final guided missile 

would be completely automatic in operation, the possibilities of 

long-range strategic bombing were fully understood. There is no 

question but that the diversion of the efforts of the Peenemünde 

scientists in 1943 to the development of an antiaircraft guided 

rocket delayed the introduction of the winged V-2 rocket (A-9) and 

its successor, the transoceanic rocket (A-9 plus A-10). Drawings 

and computations had been completed for the A-10, a rocket 

weighing 85 T with a thrust of 200 T to be used as a launching 

rocket for the A-9, accelerating it to a speed of 3,600 ft/sec. The 

motor of the A-9 would accelerate it further to a speed of 8,600 

ft./sec, giving it a range of about 3,000 miles. Some consideration 

was given to the design of one version of the A-9 carrying a pilot. 

The Scientific Advisory Group agrees that the German results of 

wind-tunnel tests, ballistic computation, and experience with the 

V-2 justify the conclusion that a transoceanic rocket can be 

developed. 

The principal German advantage in the field of guided missiles 

was the lead in time in the development of rockets, which were 

considered to have serious military applications as early as 1935. 

Much effort was put into this field and as a result the supporting 
230 

commercial sources. In this respect they lead us. The V-2 

development was successful not so much because of striking 

scientific developments as because of an early start, military 

support, and a boldness of execution. In the electronic field, radar 

in particular, we are definitely one or two years in the lead, 

although we have not put as much effort in the experimental 

determination of the limits of application of acoustic and infrared 

devices. 

Pilotless Aircraft from Viewpoint of the Air Forces 

The Air Forces have rather thoroughly explored the field of 

guided high-angle and glide bombs released from aircraft. This 

program is undoubtedly well known to the Commanding General 

through the AMC progress reports. It includes preset glide bombs 

controlled by an automatic pilot, high -angle and glide bombs 

remotely controlled by radio with and without television repeatback equipment, and high-angle and glide bombs homing by light, 

heat, and radar. During the war period there were many projects 

and the number tended to grow continually. In this early stage of 

development there was not much possibility for real systematic 

planning. It should be possible now to reduce the number of 

projects to those meeting definite military requirements and to 

standardize on a small number of missiles. These standardized 

missiles should be used to continue research and development on 

homing devices. 

Our endeavors in pilotless aircraft in the proper sense include, 

in addition to the successful reproductions of the V-1 type, a few 

promising beginnings. However, the Air Forces should realize that 

the task is far beyond the scope of inventing gadgets and trying to 

make them work. There is urgent need of a systematic analysis of 

the various tasks which manned airplanes equipped with bombs, 

guns, and rockets perform, and which now may be performed by 

pilotless craft. 

In other words, two developments have to meet for successful 

solutions of the problems: The tactical viewpoint must lead to the 
231 

improved accuracy. 

However, beyond that the implications of the accomplishments 

of the German Peenemünde group and of the recent development 

of the atomic bomb by United States and British scientists, future 

methods of aerial warfare call for a reconsideration of all present 

plans. A part, if not all, of the functions of the manned strategic 

bomber in destroying the key industries, the communication and 

transportation systems, and military installations at ranges of from 

1,000 to 10,000 miles will be taken over by the pilotless aircraft of 

extreme velocity. The use of supersonic speeds greatly reduces 

errors due to wind drift and other atmospheric conditions and the 

tremendous zone of damage of the atomic bomb diminishes the 

required precision. Hence, the difficult control problem is made 

easier. 

For the future long-range strategic bomber, the Scientific 

Advisory Group foresees two types of pilotless aircraft, both with 

wings, one with a high trajectory reaching far into the outer 

atmosphere, and the other designed for level flight at high 

altitudes. The first one can be considered as a further development 

of the V-2 rocket. In fact, this was planned by the German 

scientists. By using two or more step-rockets for the acceleration, a 

very high speed is imparted to a missile, perhaps as high as 17,000 

mph or more, to give ranges of several thousand miles. In this case, 

the wings are required mainly for control purposes, but they also 

serve to extend the glide path in the lower atmosphere. The 

German scientists have suggested a second type of trajectory 

requiring less initial energy, in which the wings are caused to curve 

the path of the missile when it returns to the region of increasing 

air density so that it rebounds to great heights. After a number of 

rebounds the winged missile settles down to a steady glide. Such a 

trajectory would seem difficult to control accurately (Fig. 8). 

The second future strategic bomber is a supersonic pilotless 

aircraft, flying at altitudes of from 20,000 to say, 60,000 ft. It 

appears to us now that the speed will be about twice the speed of 

sound and that the aircraft will be powered by a turbojet motor. An 
at 40,000 ft (Fig. 9). 

Figure 8 - 6000-Mile Rocket 

232 
Figure 9 - Supersonic and Subsonic Airplanes 

233 
234 

or more probably by a ramjet. The fully automatic radar beam 

guiding methods of control of the type suggested but not 

experimentally tried, by the Germans will probably be used for 

guiding, supplemented by simplified heat-homing devices and 

proximity fuses. 

The present facilities and organization for research and 

development of pilotless aircraft appear inadequate. It cannot be 

expected that such complex problems can be successfully solved 

by any group which is specialized in only one of the several fields 

which are involved. 

Leadership in the development of these new weapons of the 

future can be assured only by uniting experts in aero-dynamics, 

structural design, electronics, servo-mechanisms, gyros, control 

devices, propulsion, and warhead under one leadership, and 

providing them with facilities for laboratory and model shop 

production in their specialties and with facilities for field tests. 

Such a center must be adequately supported by the highest ranking 

military and civilian leadership and must be adequately financed, 

including the support of related work on special aspects of various 

problems at other laboratories and the support of special industrial 

developments. It seems to us that this is the lesson to be learned 

from the activities of the German Peenemünde group. 
235 

Introduction 

The following classification embraces the most important novel 

methods of propulsion emerging from the war years, utilizing 

atmospheric oxygen: 

Suggested 

Designation 

German 

Designation 

Reciprocating Engine + 

Ducted Fan 

Motor Jet ML 

Gas Turbine + Propeller Turboprop PTL 

Gas Turbine + Ducted Fan Turbofan ZTL 

Gas Turbine + Jet Turbojet TL 

Continuous Jet, 

Compression by 

Aerodynamic Ram 

Ramjet L 

Intermittent Jet Pulsojet IL 

These systems are shown schematically in Figs. 10a and 10b. 
Figure 10-A - Various Propulsion Systems 

236 
Figure 10-B - Various Propulsion Systems 

237 
238 

propelled airplane which was flown in Italy a few years before the 

war. Probably it will be found heavier and less efficient than some 

other systems. All elements of the various systems were known 

long before the war in the patent literature. The fact that they 

succeeded in becoming practical realities is due to several causes: 

1. Fast airplanes and missiles required propulsion systems 

independent of the use of propellers. 

2. Military use justified the design of engines with relatively 

poor fuel economy, if they are lighter and less bulky than 

conventional reciprocating engines and/or could offer themselves 

to simpler manufacturing methods. 

3. The science of aerothermodynamics, especially research on 

combustion in high-speed airflow made great progress in the war 

years. 

4. Metallurgy found new high-temperature-resisting materials. 

5. Bold and progressive designers created prototypes of turbines 

and compressors which conventional engineering considered 

impossible. 

The progress made in combustion technique, lightweight 

construction, and materials is here to stay and development will 

continue. In addition, proper scientific study and further research 

will make at least some of the new propulsion systems equally or 

more economical than the conventional engines are now. On the 

other hand it may also happen that the competition of the novel 

ideas will induce designers of reciprocating engines to produce 

some radical improvements in their own field. In the following 

pages, Allied and German developments in the new propulsive 

devices are compared in some detail. Before discussing the most 

important types, I include here as a matter of interest a 12-year 

plan for the period 1938-1950, which the man responsible for 

engine research in the German Air Ministry published in a secret 

document in July, 1943, although it does not appear to me as a 

very well-balanced and far-seeing project. 
239 

production, without particular regard for quality, utilizing readily 

available material, simple manufacturing methods, and generous 

tolerances. At the same time studies were to be initiated in 

preparation for the second period. Results of the first period are 

shown in mass production of turbojets such as the BMW 003, the 

Jumo 004, and the Heinkel-Hirth 011. 

Second 4-Year Program (1942-1946). This period had the 

objective of developing the following items: 

1. Improved turbojets of higher power, capable of operation at 

higher altitudes. (Example: BMW 018 for 7700-lb thrust.) 

2. Gas turbine + ducted fan units. 

3. Gas turbine + propeller combination. (Example: BMW 028 

for 12,000 hp at 500 mph at sea level.) 

4. Ramjet. 

5. Research and design studies on a gas turbine with heat 

exchanger for long distance flights. This has the German 

designation GTW. 

6. Reciprocating engine + ducted fan units. 

7. Research and development on the explosion-type gas turbine. 

One of the ideas on this subject was the use of a pulsojet, such as 

the V-1 motor, as a source of gas for operating a turbine. 

Third 4-Year Program (1946-1950). Development to a 

working state of the following items was visualized for this period: 

1. Gas turbine with heat exchanger (GTW system). 

2. Reciprocating engine + ducted fan units. 

3. The intermittent or explosion-type gas turbine. 

TURBOPROPELLER AND TURBOFAN 

It is general opinion that simultaneously with the development 

of the jet reaction principle for fast airplanes the gas turbine with 

propeller or fan drive will have wide applications for airplanes of 
240 

other hand, it is expected that further research will help the gas 

turbine attain at least the same efficiency as reciprocating engines 

now have. It will then have the additional advantages of lighter 

weight, simpler construction, and absence of the vibrations 

inherent in reciprocating engines. 

The thermal efficiency of existing gas turbines is still 

considerably lower than that of reciprocating engines at their 

optimum operating conditions. However, many methods not yet 

completely developed are available for improvement of the 

efficiency and associated reduction of fuel consumption of the gas 

turbine. Heat exchangers help to recover the energy of hot exhaust 

gases; intercooling between compressor stages and reheating 

between turbine stages increase the cycle efficiency. Finally, the 

replacement of the rotating compressor and combustion chamber 

by a reciprocating system, for example, a free-piston gas generator, 

allows the use of high pressures and materially lowers the fuel 

consumption. It is extremely desirable that all of these avenues of 

further development be thoroughly investigated. An interesting 

German suggestion, a free-piston gas generator with doughnutshaped housing for the pistons, is shown in Fig. 11. The arrowhead 

wing principle applied to the design of high-speed propellers for 

reducing compressibility effects and increasing efficiency is also 

shown in Fig. 11. Table I outlines German and Allied turboprop 

and turbofan, and high-speed propeller developments. 
Figure 11 - German Engine and Propeller Developments 

241 
242 

Note: No detailed list of Allied projects is presented since most 

of the active projects are Classified 

ITEM GERMAN PROJECTS REMARKS 

Turboprop BMW 028; Adaptation of 

BMW 018, 12,000 hp at 500 

mph at sea level, wt. 7700 

lb. Design stage. 

Jumo 022; Adaptation of 

012,8000 hp at sea level. 

Primary design only 

Daimler-Benz 021; 

Adaptation of Heinkel-Hirth 

011, 4000 hp at 500 mph at 

25,000 ft. Design stage 

only. 

U.S. leads Germany in 

having a low-powered 

turboprop in experimental 

operation, namely, the TG100. Germany leads U.S. 

in development of highpowered unit, namely the 

BMW 028. Recommend 

U.S. push development of 

larger powered units. U.S. 

needs greater capacity in 

compressor and turbine test 

facilities, and wind tunnels 

for testing large gas turbine 

nacelles. 

High-speed 

propellers 

Tests of swept-back 

propeller blades at DVL, 

Berlin, and AVA Göttingen, 

show improved efficiency at 

high-speed flight. 

Intensive investigation of 

sweptback propellers in 

high-speed wind tunnels 

recommended for U.S., 

since it shows possibility 

of increasing top speed of 

propeller-driven aircraft. 

Turbofan Design studies by Junkers, 

Heinkel, BMW. 

Recommend immediate 

evaluation of this drive for 

application to U.S. aircraft. 

Free-Piston 

Gas 

Generator 

Junkers reciprocating free 

piston and LFA rotating free 

piston. 

Rotating free piston shows 

promise of decreased 

weight and size over 

reciprocating free piston. 

Recommend German 

development be evaluated 

whether advantageous for 

applications in U.S. 

The principles and main design characteristics of turbojet 

engines for airplanes were known before the war in all countries. 

Endeavors in private industry in England and Germany started at 

about the same time, in 1935. Our own industry was somewhat 

discouraged by official studies which were certainly much too 
243 

subsidizing this development than was the English government. 

The American development started with directives from General 

Arnold. As far as the centrifugal type of compressor is concerned, 

the U.S. units were based on Whittle’s design, utilizing our own 

experience with turbosuperchargers. The independent development 

of the axial-type compressor started about the same time. In the 

German designs, both centrifugal and axial types are used; with 

emphasis on the axial. The progress of the actual prototypes in 

Germany is illustrated by a timetable taken from a German report; 

dated 2 November 1944, shown in Fig. 12. 

The comparative merits of Allied and German turbojet units are 

shown in Fig. 13. It is seen that the Germans were ahead as far as 

the sizes of units are concerned; but they were trailing slightly both 

in specific weight of the engine and in its specific fuel 

consumption. 

In Table II, I am including a list of detailed research problems 

which may be helpful for planning future research in the field of 

gas-turbine and jet engines, as well as in the field of turbojets. 

None of these problems was solved in Germany with decisive 

success; but most of them were carefully studied in German 

laboratories. The status of German research is indicated with some 

remarks concerning the outlook and recommendations. 

The present application of turbojet engines is for propelling 

airplanes at the upper end of the subsonic range. Although the 

propulsion efficiency of the jet is relatively low at such flying 

speeds, its application is justified by lightness of weight and 

simplicity of construction of the jet engine in comparison with 

reciprocating engines, and because the efficiency of propeller drive 

decreases somewhat at flight speeds approaching sonic velocity. 

On the other hand, the propulsive efficiency of jet drive is 

increasing with increasing velocity; hence, we have to consider the 

possibility of using the turbojet as a propulsion unit for very high 

speeds, for example, speeds well beyond the velocity of sound. 

Due to the importance of this subject, I initiated a Scientific 

Advisory Group study of estimated turbojet performance at speeds 
244 

by materials, the turbojet should outperform the ramjet up to a 

speed of 1.5 times the speed of sound, and that with increased 

temperatures still better performance would be obtained. This is in 

direct contradiction to a widespread belief existing at the present 

time that a compressor is useless for supersonic speeds, and that 

the simple ramjet becomes the logical propulsion system. Many 

other engineers seem to believe that neither the turbojet nor the 

ramjet is capable of functioning above the speed of sound, and that 

rocket propulsion is the only possible drive for supersonic flight. 

We do not believe that this is correct. Our analysis has definitely 

shown the feasibility of using turbojets for supersonic flying 

speeds. If the turbojet should be used for supersonic missiles, an 

expendable type turbojet must be designed in such a way that the 

manufacturing costs do not become prohibitive. The Scientific 

Advisory Group several times emphasized the importance of a 

study of expendable turbojet designs. German reports also include 

suggestions for the same type of development and at least one 

project was under way. 

The divergence of opinions among various experts on this 

subject shows the necessity of further fundamental investigations 

which best can be done in supersonic wind tunnels. 

It is our belief that the use of higher speeds will also affect the 

aerodynamic design of turbines and compressors. The rotational 

speed of turbomachines is today often restricted by our lack of 

knowledge of supersonic flow patterns. The development of 

supersonic turbomachinery may lead to further reduction of the 

weight and frontal area of jet propulsion units, and materially 

improve the performance of manned and unmanned airplanes. 
Figure 12 - Timetable of Turbojet Development 

245 
Figure 13 - Characteristics of Turbojets 

246 
247 

Recommend. 

HIGHER TEMPERATURES 

High Temp. Alloys DVL end Industry. U.S. materials superior. 

Should push research on 

fatigue Improvement. 

Ceramic Blades LFA end AVA. U.S. not behind. Research on 

improving brittleness needed. 

Cooled Turbine 

Blades 

Air-cooled; BMW, et al. Water cooled; 

Schmidt, LFA Sodium cooled; Rietz, 

AVA. 

Evaluation of German watercooled and sodium-cooled 

technique recommended. 

HIGHER TAKE-OFF THRUST 

Tail Pipe Burning Used in Jumo 004. Increased lake-off thrust 

important for turbojets. 

Liquid Injection Experiments with H2O, HNO3, N2O. Results promising but more 

thrust increase needed. 

Overspeed at Takeoff Not much done. German units handicapped by 

materials. 

Variable-Area 

nozzles 

Moat German Jet engines have 

adjustable tail cones. 

Development should also 

include adjustable stator vanes. 

AERODYNAMIC IMPROVEMENTS 

Compressor Blading Research at Göttingen, Stuttgart. Little 

research on increasing stage pressure 

rise by slots, flaps, and boundary layer 

suction. Extensive plans for test 

equipment at Braunschweig, Göttingen, 

30,000 hp aerodynamic components 

laboratory planned at Ötztal. 

Germany slightly ahead due to 

earlier start. German 30,000 hp 

Ötztal components laboratory 

exceeds in scope all U.S. 

plans. Recommend a full scale 

AAF components test 

laboratory to supplement basic 

research of NACA, which 

should also be expedited. 

Nacelle 

Aerodynamics 

Wind-tunnel tests on jet-engine nacelles 

at Braunschweig, Stuttgart. Ötztal 

100,000 hp, 27 ft. Diam, M=1.0 wind 

tunnel for testing full-scale jet nacelles 

(80% complete) 

Present German and U.S. wind 

tunnels inadequate in size and 

speed for jet nacelle lasts. 

Germans had 100,000 hp 

tunnel under construction. 

Recommend large high-speed 

tunnel of similar size be 

included in plans for AAF 

equipment. 

 CYCLE IMPROVEMENT 

Intercooling and 

Reheat 

Design studies by industry. German emphasis on mass 

production of turbojets 

postponed applied work on 

cycle improvement U.S. work 

should be encouraged. 

Regeneration Design studies by industry; AVA 

ceramic heat exchanger. 

Recommend systematic 

research on efficient, lightweight, heat exchangers. 

Closed Cycle No evidence of serious consideration. Recommend Ackeret-Keller 

system at Escher Wyss, 

Zurich, be evaluated in terms 

of aircraft application, 

especially with use of helium. 
248 

Subsonic Missiles Design studies of expendable turbojets 

to replace Argus tube of V-1.

Recommend development of 

expendable, simple constructed 

turbojet for missile application.

Supersonic Missiles No indication of German thought on 

supersonic turbojet applications

Recommend further studies of 

supersonic turbojet and 

construction of experimental 

model. Supersonic wind-tunnel 

facilities for tasting propulsion 

units at supersonic speeds 

urgently needed.

Ramjet 

Ramjets and rodsets are the simplest and lightest propulsive 

devices for aircraft and missiles. The fuel consumption of the 

ramjet is rather high and, therefore, in the whole field of jet 

propulsion, it occupies a place between the rocket and the turbojet. 

Unlike the turbojet, it does not use any mechanical compressor, the 

compression being obtained only by ram. Therefore, it is indeed a 

pure aerothermodynamic engine, without mechanical moving 

parts. Its maximum efficiency occurs naturally at very high flight 

speed. Hence, it is most suitable for propulsion of aircraft and 

missiles at transonic and supersonic speeds, especially for short 

flight durations. This is the reason why the idea of using ramjets, 

although it was suggested decades ago, lay undeveloped until 

today, the age of high-speed flight. 

For maximum ram efficiency, the design of the entrance 

diffusers for transonic and for supersonic speeds is somewhat 

different as shown in Fig. 14. 

Due to its promising future, the ramjet is being intensively 

developed by the Allies; it was earlier developed by the Germans. 

The situation is outlined in Table III. 

A comparison of efforts shows that, although the Germans have 

run some wind-tunnel tests on their designs, we are not far behind 

in this initial phase of ramjet development. In fact, part of our 

effort is wisely directed toward the basic problem of combustion, 

thus insuring rapid future progress. 
Figure 14 - Ramjets 

249 
250 

GERMANY ALLIES 

1943 

Fa. Walter Co. of Keil designed a 

ramjet which was tested at LFA up to 

M=.85. Fuel consumption 7 lb/hr/lb of 

thrust. 

1943 

Combustion research was 

started at National Bureau of 

Standards and MIT. 

1944 

Focke-Wulf Co. designed a short 

ramjet which was tested at LFA up to 

M=90. The fuel was first vaporized 

before burning. Fuel consumption 

lower than Walter ramjet. 

Further Allied development data 

classified CONFIDENTIAL. 

1944 

W. Trommsdorf designed a ramjet 

projectile stabilized by spin. Few 

initial trials not successful. 

1944 

E. Sanger and A. Lippisch suggested 

use of coal in ramjet as fuel. 

Combustion research done at 

Göttingen. 

1944 

Supersonic diffuser for ramjet was 

studied both at Göttingen and LFA. 

Pulsojet 

The engine used for the German V-1 flying bombs was the first 

successful example of a pulsojet. The difference between the 

pulsojet and the ramjet is that the former utilizes the resonance 

effect of the duct to obtain higher combustion pressures; there-fore, 

a better fuel economy is realized in the pulsojet than in the ramjet, 

which operates without resonance effect and depends on ram 

compression only. Also, due to this difference in operating 

principle, the pulsojet can produce a static thrust while the ramjet 

cannot. However, it is the general belief, substantiated by 

theoretical analysis, that the advantages of a pulsojet over a ramjet 

gradually disappear as the speed of flight increases. For supersonic 

speeds, the ramjet may be the lighter power plant, with the possible 

further advantage of smooth thrust. However, it seems to me that it 
251 

engine are available. 

German development of the pulsojet was started by Paul 

Schmidt, the inventor, as early as 1935. As previously mentioned, 

its application to the flying bomb, V-1, must be considered as a 

temporary expedient, used only when the development of the V-2 

rocket missile was delayed. The history of the pulsojet is shown 

schematically in Table IV. It is seen that, although the Germans 

were the first to have a working pulsojet, their more recent efforts 

have produced only limited success. The development program in 

the U.S., while started late, is more thorough and should yield 

reliable data for judging the comparative merits of the pulsojet and 

the ramjet in the near future. 

TABLE IV 

Pulsojet Development 

GERMANY UNITED STATES 

1935 

P. Schmidt started to develop the pulsojet under 

the auspices of GAS. Perfected an ignition 

device for 50 Cycles/sec but found ignition 

unnecessary once engine was running. 

Complicated fuel injection. 

U.S. projects still classified SECRET 

1939 

Argus Motor Co., Berlin, also started to work on 

the pulsojet They had a cumbersome intake 

valve shaped like a spiral, but simple fuel 

injection. 

1940 

The simple injection system of Argus was 

combined with the Schmidt spring air valve. 

Flight tests made. 

1941 

Decision made to apply the Argus engine to the 

V-1. 

1941 to 1944 

Continued research to increase the thrust of the 

V-1 engine, both by static and wind-tunnel tests. 

By removing part of the obstruction to the air 

flow, DFS Group has increased the thrust from 

660 to 880 lb. A conical inlet for more air flow 

by P. Schmidt increased the static thrust to 1500 

lb. 
252 

hitherto mentioned in that the rocket does not utilize atmospheric 

oxygen. Its performance is, therefore, practically independent of 

altitude; in fact, the thrust produced increases somewhat when the 

outside pressure decreases. It functions best outside of the dense 

part of the atmosphere. As a matter of fact, it is the only propulsion 

device for the upper stratosphere and the stellar interspace. 

Rocket propellants are either liquids or solid mixtures with 

moderate or slow rates of burning. Gaseous propellants require 

bulky containers and are, therefore, impractical. One class of the 

liquid propellants is called monopropellants; i.e., liquids which 

under action of igniters or catalyzers decompose and generate a 

large volume of hot gases. The expansion of the hot gas through 

the rocket nozzle accelerates the gas and generates the thrust. The 

bipropellants or the multi- propellants are propellants consisting of 

two or more components. One component is the oxidizer which, 

when brought together with the other components in the rocket 

motor, sustains a vigorous combustion reaction and generates a 

large quantity of hot gas. The hot gas, in turn, produces the thrust 

by expansion through the nozzle. The combustion for some 

propellants has to be started by igniters or catalyzers. But there is a 

class of bipropellants, such as the combination of nitric acid and 

aniline, which is spontaneously inflammable when the components 

are brought into contact in the rocket motor. 

One of the important findings of the study on rockets carried 

out by the Scientific Advisory Group is the fact that, barring the 

use of atomic energy, the optimum performance of all possible 

combinations of chemicals used as rocket propellants is not greatly 

different. Two methods of comparison can be used; comparison 

can be made on a constant weight-of-propellant basis or on a 

constant volume-of-propellant basis. The propellant which has the 

highest impulse per unit weight is the liquid oxygen and liquid 

hydrogen combination. But the propellant which has the highest 

impulse per unit volume is the nitric acid and aniline combination. 

The extremely low density of liquid hydrogen makes very large 

tanks necessary for its storage and, thus, practically rules out its 
253 

very important in guided antiaircraft missiles which have to travel 

at high speeds in relatively dense atmosphere. The German choice 

of a nitric acid propellant for such missiles is believed to have been 

prompted by this advantage. 

As a matter of interest, I shall include here the definitions of a 

few novel terms in German rocket engineering. 

Monergol: Monopropellant 

Hypergol: Bipropellant or multipropellant that is spontaneously 

inflammable when the components are brought together in the 

motor. 

Ergol: The inert part of the fuel component in the “Hypergol.” 

For instance, the aromatic gasoline in the mixture with aniline for 

nitric acid. 

Initiator: The active pan of the fuel component of the 

“Hypergol.” For instance, the aniline in the mixture with aromatic 

gasoline for nitric acid. 

Katagol: Monopropellant which is decomposed by catalyzer 

charged in the motor. 

Liquid propellants are generally stored in tanks in the body of a 

missile and have to be forced into the rocket motor by one of the 

following methods: 

1. Gas, under pressure, acting on the liquid surface in the 

propellant tanks. The gas can be obtained either from high-pressure 

storage tanks or from a gas generator, using part of the main 

propellant itself or a separate solid propellant for this purpose. 

2. Liquid pumps. The pump has to be driven by a gas turbine 

using hot gas from a small combustion “pot” fed by a part of the 

main propellant supply or by an auxiliary propellant. 

At present, the gas-fed systems are generally heavier than the 

pump-fed systems for durations longer than 30 sec and thrusts 

larger than 4,000 lb. The gas generator system is, of course, lighter 

than the gas-under-pressure system due to the saving of the gas-
254 

really large-scale production for expendable weapons is 

considered. 

Rockets as means of propulsion have been developed in the 

United States with two main applications in mind. The first 

application is the artillery rocket and the second application is the 

assisted take-off of heavily loaded airplanes from small airfields 

and possible short-duration boost to achieve high performance. As 

actual operational experience was accumulated, it became evident 

that the requirement for large airfields, for landings by battleweary pilots, and the power boost of conventional engines by 

water injection, practically eliminated the necessity for assisted 

take-off as far as land based bombers are concerned. However, 

some recent developments indicate a renewed interest in rockets. 

These developments are: 

1. Long-range winged missiles, rising to extreme heights where 

the rocket is the only power plant which can operate without the 

assistance of atmospheric oxygen. 

2. Guided antiaircraft missiles with a rocket as the main 

propulsive unit or as the launching device. 

3. Launching of supersonic, long-range, pilotless or manned 

airplanes. 

The task of the rocket in launching and take-off of supersonic 

airplanes and winged missiles is not fully covered by the term 

assisted take-off. In fact, the rocket will in many cases be the main 

source of power for take-off of such aircraft. 

Both in the U.S. and in Germany, after rocket engineers had 

succeeded in constructing liquid-fuel rocket motors of several 

minutes endurance, the idea came up to use rockets as sole power 

plants on manned airplanes capable of short duration flights. In 

Germany, such an airplane (the Me-163B) actually was used in 

combat as an interceptor. However, it is doubtful whether such an 

airplane will be justified after power plants of almost similar light 

weight as the rocket motor but with much lower fuel consumption, 

like the ramjet, become available, and after perfected target-
255 

The historical development of rockets by the Germans is 

summarized in Table V. It is seen that the Germans were forced by 

the requirements of the war to develop cheap and easily 

manufactured propellants and to accept the difficulties of handling 

such propellants as nitric acid and hydrogen peroxide. 

There is no doubt that the various applications for rocket motors 

mentioned above fully justify the statement that rocket research 

and development have become one of the most important 

responsibilities of the Air Forces for the future. It is true, of course, 

that many applications of the rocket concern the ground and naval 

forces. However, the Air Forces should maintain leadership in 

rocket development as a main and an auxiliary source of power for 

manned and pilotless aircraft; they should develop their own 

facilities for testing rocket propulsion devices; and they should 

secure a free hand in maintaining the collaboration of the best 

scientific personnel and the best equipped laboratories in the 

Nation. Our early perfection of long-duration solid-propellant 

rockets, and the promising results obtained with nitric-acid aniline 

and nitro-methane liquid propellants should be further exploited. 

The propulsion of long-range winged missiles and antiaircraft 

missiles, and the take-off of supersonic aircraft are important Air 

Forces applications which call for powerful progress in rocket 

engineering. 
256 

p

GERMANY 

1. The German solid propellant for artillery rockets has a wide operating temperature range of 

from –40° to 140°F. 

2. To obtain smooth burning at pressures below the critical pressure of the solid propellant, a 

spring- loaded regulator valve is fitted to the motor. 

3. The handling of 80% concentration of H2O2 was relatively safe. Long duration H2O2 and 

methyl alcohol and hydrozine hydrate rocket was perfected for Me-163B. Turbine-pump 

system functioned well. 

4. The difficulty of producing enough H2O2 and the advantage of high density of nitric acidaniline propellant for guided missile application forces the Germans to use the latter. 

Improvements are made to shorten ignition lag, even after the addition of inert component to 

the fuel. 

5. Film cooling and evaporative cooling was developed, particularly for high performance 

propellants such as liquid oxygen and alcohol. 

6. Early trial on monopropellant not successful. The Schmidding propellant, a mixture of 

methyl nitrate and methyl alcohol, was not reliable. 

UNITED STATES 

Projects all still classified SECRET 

Atomic Energy for Jet Propulsion 

Based upon the published values of the measured heat of fission 

of U235, it is calculated that the available energy of this material is 

3.120 x 1010 BTU per pound. This is more than 1,500,000 times 

the lower heat value of gasoline, the most powerful fuel generally 

used today. The study of chemicals suitable for fuels or rocket 

propellants indicates that no really radical improvements in the 

BTU per pound ratio can be expected within the frontiers of 

molecular reaction. It will be possible to produce fuels and 

propellants more suitable for certain types of engines, increase 

their safety, improve their handling quality, and lower their costs 

of production. Nevertheless, no hope for spectacular improvements 

in range and speed performance of aircraft can be derived from 

further development of conventional fuels. Use of atomic energy as 

fuel, however, will radically change this situation. 

The question of whether or not and how atomic power can be 

produced continuously and at a constant rate suitable for 

propulsion cannot be discussed in this report. Let us transfer our 

thoughts to an era in which the fundamental aspect of the problem 

already has been solved. 
257 

generation for stationary purposes. In the latter case the cost is the 

governing factor; in transportation, it is the cost and the weight of 

the fuel to be carried. In high-speed aerial transportation the 

importance of weight transcends the importance of cost. Hence, it 

may be concluded that the extremely expensive atomic agent, now 

having been developed as an explosive, will be used for propulsion 

and probably jet propulsion. 

In speculating on the possible use of atomic energy for this 

purpose we have to change our usual concepts. For example, the 

weight of the fuel proper is certainly negligible. In other words, the 

available energy is almost unlimited. The problem is how much of 

this energy we shall be able to utilize in an engine of limited size 

and limited weight, where the weight of the engine includes all 

materials which have to be carried in the vehicle besides the 

atomic fuel proper. 

Let us consider, for example, the case of rockets. We shall 

exclude the use of the disintegration products as working fluid for 

the rocket. The temperature of the disintegration products alone 

without dilution would be too high for any known or possible 

engineering materials to resist. Since temperature is the limit, the 

most efficient expansion process for the fluid is the isothermal 

expansion, with the temperature of the gas kept at the maximum 

allowable value by constant reheating. Inasmuch as one obtains the 

highest exhaust velocity by using a working fluid with the least 

possible molecular weight, hydrogen should be used. Then 

assuming a maximum temperature of 8,000°F, which would 

require cooling, of course, and a chamber pressure of 100 times 

atmospheric pressure, we can obtain a specific impulse of 1,365 lbsec/lb of hydrogen carried in the vehicle. This means that the 

specific propellant consumption of rockets would be reduced from 

the present day value of 18 lb/hr/lb of thrust to 2.6 lb/hr/lb of 

thrust. This is a great reduction, even though the ratio is far below 

the spectacular figures for the ratio of the effectiveness of atomic 

and conventional bombs. However, the use of atomic energy 

would certainly allow the construction of rocket-driven pilotless 
258 

As to jet-propulsion devices using atomic energy with 

atmospheric air as working fluid, the fuel consumption itself again 

would be negligible. The size and performance of the craft driven 

by atomic power would depend mainly on the weight of the 

auxiliary materials like moderators, and devices for cooling and for 

controlling the rate of energy production. Of course it is difficult 

today to make any estimate of the bulk and weight of such 

equipment. 

The most interesting feature of such a propulsion system is that 

the overwhelming part of the weight to be carried by the vehicle is 

independent of the endurance and only a very small portion of the 

weight is proportional to the flying time or the range desired. In 

other words, if one succeeds in reducing the engine weight to the 

limiting value which makes flight at a certain speed possible, very 

small further reduction of the weight would increase the range 

almost without limit. 

It seems to me that there are possibilities in the development of 

nuclear energy for jet propulsion which deserve immediate 

attention of the Air Forces. To be sure there are problems still to be 

solved requiring inventive activity of specialists in nuclear physics. 

However, the main problems are engineering problems requiring 

inventive genius of the same order but different kind. We have to 

convert the energy liberated by the nuclear reaction into heat of 

such temperatures as needed for our propulsive devices. Important 

problems to be solved are in the nature of heat transfer, resistance 

of materials to heat, corrosion, etc. It appears necessary to find 

away, within the limits of necessary security, for engineering talent 

which could be used to accelerate the progress in the field of 

propulsion. It would secure us the conquest of the air over the 

entire globe without range limitations. 

It is my feeling that the Air Forces should, as soon as possible, 

take the lead in investigating the possibilities of using nuclear 

energy for jet propulsion. 
259 

Of the novel power plants mentioned in this report, only the 

turbojet and the liquid-fuel rocket motor have been successfully 

used on aircraft. 

Our Bell P-59 (turbojet), Lockheed P-80 (turbojet), and Ryan 

FR-l (reciprocating engine and propeller plus turbojet) are all well 

known to the Commanding General. 

The Germans had developed and used some jet-propelled 

aircraft in combat and had others under development. This is 

shown in Table VI. 

For future fundamental planning, a very careful choice of 

propulsion systems is necessary. It is possible to make a basic 

analysis, computing for various systems the sum of the specific 

weight of power plant and fuel required to travel at a given speed 

for a certain endurance. Then the optimum power plant is the one 

for which this sum has a minimum value. However, it is 

impossible to decide rigidly from such a simple study which type 

of propulsive system is best for a certain purpose. Beside the 

minimum specific weight of the power plant and fuel, many other 

aspects enter the picture. One important factor is the frontal area of 

the engine. Then also the structural weight of the airplane is 

influenced by the choice of power plant. The jet-propelled airplane 

has the advantages of not requiring a minimum ground clearance 

for the propeller, and of being comparatively easy to maintain. On 

the other hand, jet propulsion introduces aerodynamically difficult 

problems such as the intake and ducting of very large quantities of 

air. 

No one has doubts about the great future propulsion in military 

aircraft. However, such general statements as “one or two years 

from now all fighters and bombers will be jet propelled” should be 

replaced by careful, scientific analysis which secures jet propulsion 

its proper place, but does not exclude other combinations such as 

the turboprop or, in the case of extreme ranges, the reciprocating 

engine and propeller. The choice of the most efficient power plant 

must not be influenced by any general feeling that the propeller 

appears obsolete. 
260 

and vibration problems originating from interference between the 

jet system and the air frame. However, the Air Forces should, in 

cooperation with aircraft designers, initiate a comprehensive highspeed wind-tunnel test program in order to obtain further 

information in this field. The ATSC took the first step in such a 

program by holding a meeting between NACA, industry, the Navy 

and the ATSC in late summer, 1945. However, any program which 

is undertaken will be severely restricted and handicapped for a 

long time by the lack of high-speed wind tunnels of sufficiently 

large size. 

The two rocket airplanes mentioned in Table VI, the Me-163B 

and the Natter, are of special interest because pure rocket motors 

were their sole source of power. The Me-163B was more or less 

conventional in that take-off and climb were accomplished under 

its own power. However, the Natter was intended to be launched 

nearly vertically by means of two or four solid-propellant 

launching rockets. It was to be aimed at a point 2 km behind the 

point of collision so that attack on a bomber could be made from 

the rear. This rocket-propelled interceptor was armed with 24 

rockets of 7.3-cm caliber. After the rocket ammunition is 

exhausted, the airplane is caused to disintegrate; the nose section is 

allowed to fall freely and be expended but the air frame with rocket 

propulsion motor and the pilot are saved by parachutes. A former 

Luftwaffe pilot, who had been convicted of some crime, acted as 

test pilot in the first flight of the Natter and was killed. 
Table VI - Characteristics of German Jet Airplanes 

261 
262 

may be made unnecessary by the development of more economical 

propulsive devices of light weight, and perfection of target-seeking 

electronic or heat devices which would eliminate the need for a 

pilot. However, I highly recommend that the rocket-type of 

airplane be developed at the present time for research purposes. 

One advantage of rocket drive in this case is the possibility of 

exact thrust measurement, which is extremely difficult for any 

other propulsive system. These research airplanes would be very 

useful for studying performance flow conditions, and flight 

mechanics. 

Tailless Aircraft 

In Germany, tailless aircraft were intensively developed by A. 

Lippisch and by the Horten brothers. The Junkers’ designers did a 

considerable amount of engineering study on large tailless 

airplanes but none were actually constructed. 

Lippisch worked on the design of tailless airplanes at DFS 

beginning in 1936. He designed a series of about eight aircraft, 

before the time when he came in contact with Messerschmitt and 

developed the Me-163A and Me-163B. Stability problems were 

encountered at high speeds and the Me-163B was “redlined” at a 

Mach number of 0.80 (590 mph at 25,000 ft). Satisfactory stalling 

characteristics were obtained by a special low-drag fixed slot at the 

wing tips. A vertical tail was found necessary for satisfactory 

directional stability. Lippisch’s latest design was the P-11, a 

tailless aircraft with two turbojet engines. The critical Mach 

number was estimated to be 0.92 (about 680 mph at 25,000 ft); 

wind-tunnel tests indicated a drag coefficient as low as 0.0063. 

The Horten brothers flew their first tailless aircraft in 1935. 

They received no support from the Air Ministry until February, 

1945, following the publication of a photograph of a Northrop 

tailless airplane in “Interavia.” Their design was to be powered 

with two Jumo 004 turbojet engines. Computed high speed was 

about 600 mph. 
263 

The Northrop XP-56 was a pusher-type, flying-wing fighter. 

This airplane was flown only a few times and indications were, 

from these tests, that the performance was short of, expectations 

and that difficulties in control were encountered. Unfortunately, 

wind-tunnel tests necessary to trace the basic reasons for these 

difficulties could not be carried out, because no high priority could 

be attached to merely experimental projects. 

Theoretical studies here and abroad show significant advantages 

(for example, longer ranges) for tailless aircraft over tailed aircraft, 

especially in the case of gross weights of 150,000 lb and more. Of 

course it must be assumed that the tailless aircraft is made stable 

and maneuverable without measures which would compromise the 

performance. The recent recognition of the advantage of sweptback wings for very high speeds makes the tailless airplane 

particularly attractive also for transonic airplanes. It is the opinion 

of the Scientific Advisory Group that the development of tailless 

aircraft should be encouraged; however, actual construction should 

be supplemented by extensive wind-tunnel investigations of 

methods for improving stability and control at high speeds. 

Aerodynamic Miscellanea 

By aerodynamic miscellanea, I mean auxiliary items which 

contribute to the advance of the aerodynamic art. The items which 

I now consider are: 

1. Flow Measurement Techniques, 

2. Laminar Flow Wings, and 

3. Boundary Layer Control. 

A discussion of these miscellanea follows, with a brief review 

of German developments and comparison with our own. 
264 

instrumentation appeared somewhat below our own, although in 

some instances they had surpassed us especially in fields such as 

supersonic aerodynamics where their basic facilities were more 

advanced. On the other hand, their electronic equipment was 

generally inferior to ours. 

In high speed air flow, in both the transonic and supersonic 

range, instruments which project into the air stream cause 

excessive disturbance of the flow. For this reason, both German 

and Allied aerodynamic instrument development work was 

concentrated largely on methods of studying air flow by methods 

which do not disturb the flow pattern. 

Several interesting German developments were: 

1. Combination Schlieren and interference methods which show 

both density gradients and lines of constant density on the same 

observation screen or photographic plate, as shown in Fig. 15. 

2. A novel X-ray method of measuring density, which makes 

use of the fact that the absorption of an X-ray beam is dependent 

on the density of the medium through which it passes. 

3. A corona method of measuring velocity, which utilizes the 

fact that the potential of a corona discharge varies with the speed 

of the air passing by. 

4. A spark method of determining local temperature, by 

measuring the local speed of sound, at which the disturbance, 

caused by a spark discharge, travels. 

A brief comparison of German and Allied developments in 

measurement technique is given in Table VII. 
Figure J5 - High-Speed Airflow Photographs 

265 
266 

pp

Interferometer Extensive development at LFA, AVA, WVA for 

measuring density in high-speed air flow; 

nothing new in principle but considerable 

development of details. LFA has a system 

whereby simultaneous Schlieren and 

interference pictures are recorded on the same 

photo plate. 

U.S. development by 

Ladenberg, Princeton. 

Also small project by Dr. 

Williams, Pasadena 

U.S. application lagging 

German. 

X-Ray 

Method 

This method used at Kochel utilizes principle 

that absorption of X-Ray beam is a function of 

the density of the medium through which it 

passes. Ionization meter is calibrated In terms of 

density. 

Unknown to Allies. 

Schlieren 

Method 

All supersonic wind tunnels have associated 

Schlieren equipment. Largest mirrors are 1.2 m 

in diam, under construction for Kochel, 1 m by 1 

m Mach number 7.0 tunnel. 

Used In the few existing 

Allied supersonic wind 

tunnels. 

Spark 

Method 

A spark creates a disturbance traveling at the 

speed of sound. Measurement of the local speed 

of sound determines the local temp. Developed 

by WVA. 

Application to temperature 

determination unknown to 

Allies. 

Ultrasonic 

Waves 

Generation of high-frequency waves affords 

another method of determining temperature by 

means of measuring a local velocity of sound. 

Application to temperature 

determination unknown to 

Allies. 

Hot Wire Some work at Göttingen but not very advanced. U.S. Developments. 

especially by Dryden. 

NBS; also by Liepmann. 

CAT; superior to Germans. 

British work also more 

advanced than Germans. 

Corona Aachen development of corona for velocity 

measurement. 

Experimental development 

by Lindvall, CIT, in 1935. 

Not continued. Some work 

at MIT. 

Doppler 

Method 

Method developed at Fassberg for measuring 

speed in the jet of rocket by means of the 

Doppler effect. 

This method not used by 

Allies for measuring speed 

of rocket discharge. 

Electromagnetic 

Balances 

Used in many of the intermittent wind tunnels. 

such as, LFA. AVA. WV A, to measure transient 

forces. 

lin common use in U.S. 

wind tunnels. Electronic 

technique in general 

superior to Germans. 

Piczoelectric 

Capsules 

Used at LFA for measuring transient forces. This method also used by 

Allies for special purposes. 

Half 

Models 

This technique is used at WV A; convenient for 

measuring pressures, hinge moments, etc. 

This technique also used at 

CIT. 

Cavitation Similarity between cavitation and 

compressibility phenomena used for qualitative 

work in water channels on simulated critical 

compressibility conditions. 

Water channels not used by 

Allies for simulated 

compressibility effects. 

Simulated 

Turbojets 

For wind-tunnel models, small high-speed 

compressors are used to simulate internal flow. 

and alcohol is burned to introduce heat. 

Not used as yet by Allies 

for wind tunnel models of 

jet aircraft. 

Flexible In some supersonic wind tunnels, continuous Flexible walls have been 
267 

used for several years by 

NACA and in England. 

Half-Open 

Jets 

In some supersonic tunnels the test section is 

partly closed and partly open. This is said to 

decrease wall interference, especially through 

transonic range. 

This technique is not yet 

used by the Allies for 

supersonic flow. 

LAMINAR FLOW WINGS 

In this field we were far ahead of the Germans. In the following 

paragraphs, the German development status will first be given, 

followed by our own. 

German Developments 

According to the German dynamicist Schlichting, German work 

on laminar flow airfoils did not start until about the end of 1938. 

By 1940, Schlichting considered that the fundamentals were 

known. Drag coefficients as low as 0.0027 were reached at a 

Reynolds Number of 5 x 106

, but the German scientists were 

unable to retain the low drag at higher Reynolds Numbers. They 

were handicapped by lack of suitable low-turbulence wind tunnels. 

On one occasion, Prandtl reported: “Suitable wind tunnels for the 

conduct of airfoil investigations at sufficiently high Reynolds 

Number and at low turbulence are lacking in Germany. On the 

other hand, it is known that in the U .SA particular installations 

created for this purpose are working exceptionally vigorously in 

this field.” 

Tests were made on a Japanese laminar flow airfoil, on three 

airfoils derived from one member of an obsolete NACA Series 

27215 (which was described in a captured French secret report), 

and on a few airfoils designed by Schlichting. The Germans also 

had some information on a Russian laminar flow airfoil obtained 

from a captured report. 

The Germans never used laminar flow airfoils on aircraft. They 

were astonished and mystified by the performance of the Mustang 

and made many wind-tunnel and flight tests. They gave the 

following tabulation of wing profile drag coefficients (obtained by 
268 

He 177 0.0109

Me 109B 0.0101

Ju 288 0.0102

FW-190 0.0089

Mustang 0.0072

The German comment is: “The drag of this only foreign original 

airfoil tested up till now is far below the drag of all German wings 

tested in which it should be remembered that it was tested without 

any smoothing layer.” 

Another writer says: “A comparison of flight measurements 

shows quite unmistakably that the Mustang is far superior 

aerodynamically to all other airplanes and that it maintains this 

superiority in spite of its considerably greater wing area.” 

Allied Developments 

The NACA began investigations of laminar flow airfoils in a 

low-turbulence wind tunnel in the spring of 1938, and the 

encouraging nature of the results obtained (without details) were 

described in the Wilbur Wright Lecture of the Royal Aeronautical 

Society on 25 May 1939, and in the NACA Annual Report for 

1939. In June, 1939, an advance confidential report by Jacobs was 

released. A summary was published in March, 1942 in confidential 

form. The most recent summary was released in March, 1945, and 

this summary has been kept up to date by supplementary sheets. 

As indicated in the summary of German developments, the 

Allies are far ahead in low-turbulence wind-tunnel equipment and 

in knowledge of laminar flow airfoils and their application to 

aircraft. Drag coefficients as low as 0.003 at a Reynolds Number 

of 20 x 106

 have been obtained. 

A summary of the present state of knowledge is given in the 

NACA restricted report L5C05, “Summary of Airfoil Data,” by 

Abbott, von Doenhoff, and Stivers, March, 1945. 
269 

about reached a practical state. A discussion of German and Allied 

developments follows. 

German Developments 

Considerable work was done on boundary layer control at 

AVA, Göttingen, starting in 1925. The first airplane with boundary 

layer control was built and flown in 1932. 

From about 1942 on, work was intensified. Schwier obtained a 

maximum lift coefficient of 4.3, using pressure jet boundary layer 

control in wind tunnel tests. In July, 1943, Stüper obtained a 

maximum lift coefficient 3.8 in full-scale flight tests with boundary 

layer control by suction. The maximum lift coefficient on his 

airplane without boundary layer control was 1.9. About the same 

time, a maximum lift coefficient of 3.4 with boundary layer control 

was reported in wind-tunnel tests of a four-motored airplane which 

was to be developed by Junkers. A unique suction and pressure-jet 

boundary layer control system was used. Air was sucked in over 

the inboard portion of the wing, just ahead of the flaps, and blown 

out over the outboard portion of the wing, just ahead of the 

ailerons. In November, 1943, Wagner outlined work which was 

done at Arado, shoving a maximum lift coefficient of 4.0 to be 

possible. 

All German investigators noted that the internal wing ducting 

required and the power required to drive the boundary layer control 

equipment constituted serious obstacles to the successful, practical 

application of boundary layer control. However, it was felt that 

these obstacles could be successfully met. At the end of the war, an 

Arado transport airplane, having low landing and take-off speeds 

because of boundary layer control, was in service in the German 

Air Force. 

United States Developments 

An L-1 airplane was equipped with boundary layer control by 

suction. The maximum lift coefficient was 3.5 without boundary 

layer control and 3.6 with boundary layer control. The landing 

speed of the modified L-1 was considerably higher than that of the 
270 

Boundary layer control has an important application in making 

low landing speeds possible on high-speed aircraft. It also appears 

that the potentialities of boundary layer control in the transonic 

speed range have never been systematically evaluated. We found 

that some interesting work was done by Ackeret at the Institute of 

Technology in Zurich, Switzerland. The Scientific Advisory Group 

recommends that an intensive research program on boundary layer 

control be undertaken by the Army Air Forces. 

The Art of Radar 

INTRODUCTION 

The last four years of war-stimulated research have resulted in 

the development of equipment and techniques in the radar and 

electronics field which offer possibilities of profoundly affecting 

the whole concept of future air force operations. These devices 

have already passed the laboratory stage, and nearly 

$3,000,000,000 worth of radar equipment is now in actual combat 

use in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. Thus, the 

fundamental ideas in the field have been thoroughly proven and are 

definitely here to stay. 

In spite of the rapid progress made in a relatively short time, the 

technique in this field is still in its infancy. Enormous possibilities 

lie ahead, and additional research, both on the technical and on the 

operational side, will pay huge dividends in more effective air 

force operations. 

At the same time, the rapid introduction of new and miraculous 

devices has led to the feeling among the uninitiated that anything is 

possible by the use of electronics. It is, therefore, of greatest 

importance to understand thoroughly the limitations as well as the 

possibilities of radio, radar, and electronic equipment in order to 

avoid raising impossible hopes and in order to eliminate 

unnecessary and ill-conceived research and development 

programs. 
271 

example: 

1. The human eye cannot see in darkness or through fog, 

clouds, and rain. Radar is not at all limited by darkness or by 

fog, and to only a slight extent by heavy clouds and rain. 

2. The human eye determines only roughly and with difficulty 

the distance to an object which it sees. Radar determines the 

distance rapidly, accurately, and continuously. 

3. The human eye can pick up or see objects such as airplanes 

only at distances of a few miles. Suitable radar can see airplanes at 

distances up to 200 miles. 

4. The human eye, aided by optical instruments, can get 

accurate data on bearing, elevation, and range of only one distant 

object at a time, and considerable time is required for such 

determinations. Radar can determine and display these data within 

a few seconds for all objects in view over an enormous area, in the 

best cases up to a radius of 200 miles. 

These features of radar open up many possibilities, such as: allweather day and night air operations; an increase in accuracy and 

versatility of bombing, gunfire, and navigation; the control from 

the ground or from the air of major air force operations; provision 

of information and controls to relieve the overburdened pilot, both 

in navigation and in combat; and, the accurate remote control of 

pilotless aircraft. 

Furthermore, it must be realized that radar is not a facility or 

attachment which will occasionally be used under bad conditions. 

Rather, the air force of the future will be operated so that radar is 

the primary facility, and visual methods will be only occasionally 

used. Bad weather or darkness are normally prevalent from 60 to 

90% of the time, and predictions of good weather at remote points 

fail to be realized from about 25 to 50% of the time. Hence, in an 

all-weather air force, radar must be the universally used tool for 

bombing, gunfire, navigation, landing, and control. The whole 

structure of the air force, the planning of its operations, its training 

program, and its organization must be based on this premise. The 
272 

plane. 

GERMAN RADAR DEVELOPMENTS 

Broadly speaking, the radar art in Germany at the end of the war 

was in about the same state as it was in this country and England in 

early 1942. The Germans did not realize the possibilities of 

microwave radar, for example, until they inspected equipment shot 

down in British and American airplanes. Furthermore, they were 

forced, during the latter years of the war to concentrate their efforts 

on defensive measures and hence, never developed a concept of 

the offensive use of radar. Finally, the British and American 

jamming and countermeasures techniques were so effective that 

over half of the German radar development talent was forced into 

the task of developing anti-jamming measures, to protect their own 

existing radar equipment. This did much to stop progress in the 

development of new radar techniques. 

The beginnings of German radar took place at as early a date 

(1936) as the corresponding developments in the United States and 

England. By the beginning of the war the Germans had an early 

warning system of good design and were making progress on 

equipment for control of fighter aircraft and for antiaircraft 

artillery. The German scientists felt that 50 to 60 cm was about the 

shortest wavelength that could be practically employed in radar 

and concentrated very considerable engineering talent on the 

development of a variety of equipments at this wavelength. Their 

engineers considered the development of microwave techniques, 

but discarded this possibility as impractical because no adequate 

transmitter at such frequencies was known to them. The equipment 

they had in use at 50 to 60-cm wavelengths, however, was 

excellent in its engineering design and very large quantities were in 

actual use. 

Germany suffered seriously through the lack of a good 

organization of their radar and electronics development effort. 

Most of the development took place in industrial laboratories such 

as those of Teietunken, but the very brilliant group of German 
273 

thinking was lacking. The industrial engineers complained that 

they received no intelligent and understanding cooperation from 

any of the military agencies. They believed that the top military 

commands had no conception of the importance of radar and 

electronic equipment. On the other hand, the university scientists 

did not take the initiative to mobilize their efforts themselves as 

was done in the United States and England. The close coordination 

which existed in this country between both technical and 

operational military officers, the industrial laboratories, and the 

university scientists was completely lacking in Germany. Some 

attempt to remedy this situation; was made in late 1944, but the 

effort never got going before the end of the war. The development 

work was scattered widely throughout the country, largely due to 

the disruptive effects of Allied bombing, and the various agencies 

and laboratories worked independently and without adequate 

coordination. 

The only German radar put into extensive tactical use was that 

designed for air warning and air defense. Early warning stations, 

ground-controlled interception stations, antiaircraft fire control 

equipment, and airborne aircraft interception equipment were all in 

effective use. The techniques used by the Germans for navigational 

assistance to bombers on offensive missions during the Battle of 

Britain did not utilize radar, but employed elaborations of the 

United States airway navigational aids. Ingenious radio beam 

techniques were employed and in some cases these were made to 

operate bomb computing devices in the aircraft. However, the 

British jamming of these radio beams was very effective, in spite 

of strenuous efforts continuously made by the Germans to change 

frequencies and otherwise alter their techniques to avoid jamming. 

The concept of using microwave airborne radar for bombing and 

attack on shipping apparently did not come until British and 

American planes carrying such equipment were shot down over 

German-occupied territory. The capture of this equipment created 

a considerable sensation among German scientists and military 

experts. A large effort was immediately undertaken to copy this 

equipment. However, no sooner had a start been made on copying 
274 

developed by the Allies caused the Germans to start work on l-cm 

and shorter wavelength devices. Their efforts became so scattered 

thereby that apparently no microwave equipment at all was ever 

put into production. In addition, the efforts of the engineers were 

also diverted to improving their air-defense equipment and to 

finding methods of avoiding Allied countermeasures, so that the 

positive efforts to develop radar for new offensive uses were 

greatly retarded. The concept of using radar for the ground control 

of tactical and strategic air operations, so successfully employed by 

the U. S. 8th and 9th Air Forces, apparently never occurred to the 

Germans, even though some of their ground equipment could have 

been adapted to this purpose. 

The development of rockets and other unmanned missiles was 

far more actively pursued in Germany than the development of 

electronic equipment. As a result, apparently no advanced 

electronic or radio control methods for their missiles comparable 

with Allied developments ever got beyond the paper or laboratory 

stage. Had the Germans had an active coordinated electronic 

development program comparable to that built up by the Allies and 

had this been combined with their missile work, some dangerous 

weapons might have resulted. Various ideas were reported by 

individual workers for the control of missiles but the aerodynamics 

laboratories apparently did not have adequate electronic talent and 

the electronic engineers were largely cut off from contact with the 

aerodynamic work. Only the most successful missile development 

organization, the Peenemünde group, had a qualified electronic 

engineering section. 

RADAR FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE AIR FORCES 

The ability to achieve air force operations under all conditions 

of darkness and weather contributes more than any other single 

factor to increasing the military effectiveness of the air forces. 

Hence, any research program designed to overcome the limitations 

to flight at night and in bad weather will pay big dividends. 
275 

in and near airports and of landing under conditions of bad or zero 

visibility. Although there is room for great technical development 

of the radio and radar aids to landing and traffic control, one of the 

chief problems is the development of a system in which all 

conceivable aids will be properly integrated and used together. 

This can only come as a result of extensive experience and a 

comprehensive program of trials. 

Radar has revolutionized methods of air navigation. The 

development of microwave radar, which permits the use of narrow 

beams, enables the continuous presentation to the navigator of a 

more or less recognizable map of the surrounding country. In its 

earliest and crude form little more than cities, towns, and coastlines 

could be distinguished; but modem developments give sufficient 

resolution to identify many features of the landscape such as rivers, 

streams, bridges, and rail lines and make feasible the use of 

ordinary maps. In addition, heavy storm clouds make themselves 

evident on the radar screen. Over the sea, radar contact flying is 

restricted to areas within sight of identifiable land, but radar “sees” 

at distances up to 50 or 100 miles. 

The possibilities of direct radar navigation are greatly extended 

by the use of strong, readily identifiable, artificial echoes provided 

by radar beacons, the radar equivalent of optical beacons or 

lighthouses. Radar permits the measurement of distance to the 

beacon and its bearing within the inherent accuracy of the radar 

equipment carried on the aircraft. By measurements on two 

beacons, the position of the aircraft can be determined. 

Microwave systems give essentially short-range navigation. For 

long ranges the pulse techniques of radar are applied to longer 

waves, for example, in the Loran system. Here two pairs of ground 

stations emit synchronized pulses. In the aircraft the pulses are 

received and the time difference between the arrival of the pulses 

from the members of a pair is measured. This locates the aircraft 

on a hyperbolic line of position and two such lines give a fix. The 

airplane carries only a receiver and the traffic capacity is 

unlimited. 
276 

on of such operations under the many conditions where visual 

bombing is not possible. Only a beginning has been made in the 

development of radar bombsights and much remains to be done to 

improve their precision, their versatility, and over-all operational 

usefulness. 

Tremendous improvement in the control and marshaling of air 

forces appears possible through the medium of airborne radar. 

Control of air operations includes military functions, involving 

radar surveillance of movements of friendly and enemy aircraft, 

and the guidance of our own planes on their missions. 

The future development of control radar falls into two 

categories: radar for the defense of this country, and radar for 

attack. It is not necessary to say more about the defensive 

possibilities of ground control radar. The problem of the future is 

chiefly an economic one; to install sufficient stations to surround 

the country completely is possible and necessary. Since these 

stations can be easily integrated into the airlines navigational net, 

the investment will be of great peacetime value. While in 

peacetime the network will be extremely valuable, in war it will be 

our protection against sneak attacks and against air raids of all 

descriptions. Control radar for offensive warfare will undoubtedly 

develop to the point where a unified command of air operations is 

possible throughout the whole operation. The commanding general 

will see the disposition of his own and enemy forces, whether 

piloted or pilotless, and be able to instantly modify his plans. 

Radar also has been used in aerial fighting for aircraft 

interception, for range finding, for tail warning, and for fire 

control, particularly in the defense of heavy bombers. Future 

developments of radar equipment for fighters are largely dependent 

on the extent to which it is found desirable to control fighters by 

ground equipment of increased range and resolving power. Fire 

control and associated radar equipment for heavy bombers can be 

made indefinitely more and more complex. An analysis to 

determine whether one should abandon such air battleships seems 

in order, before developing more complicated equipment which 
277 

The radically altered military situation produced by the 

development of guided missiles has been discussed previously. 

The development of radar and other detection and navigation 

devices has provided a wealth of technical means for locating and 

guiding missiles. The essential problems which radar can solve are 

those of locating the missile, locating the target, and transferring 

intelligence to and from the missile. The present fundamental 

limitation is that the missile cannot be followed over the horizon. 

This limitation has to be circumvented by providing one or more 

relay stations, putting the controlling radar in an aircraft, or by 

shifting the location problem to the missile itself. Long-range 

guidance will be combined with homing devices for attack against 

certain targets, for example, ships. 

The application of radar to guided missiles brings in new 

problems because of the large scale on which missile warfare must 

be planned. Radar components of much simpler design must be 

developed. 

Most of the problems mentioned above require, before all, 

engineering skill and talents for clever adaptation and combination 

of recently developed principles and methods. However, the art of 

radar is so new that limitations which appear today may soon 

disappear because of novel discoveries. The Air Forces must be 

alert in swiftly utilizing any new developments. 

Infrared Developments 

The military applications of infrared and heat radiation are for 

(1) signaling, (2) identification, (3) detection, (4) communication, 

and (5) guiding of heat-homing missiles. 

GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS 

At the onset of the war, the Germans assumed that the Allies 

would employ infrared equipment and consequently produced in 

limited quantity a simple phosphor infrared detector as a 

countermeasure. These instruments were very insensitive 
278 

lead to improved instruments. 

Very intensive work was done in Germany on the development 

of electron image tubes. However, this work was not unified and 

there appears to have been considerable duplication of effort and 

lost motion due to a lack of full interchange of information. The 

performance of the tubes was quite good but none of the designs 

was suitable for large quantity production. Furthermore, instead of 

concentrating on the manufacture of one type, they attempted to 

produce four or five different types. The telescopes used with the 

image tubes were elaborate and complex in the extreme; for 

example, one driving and gun sighting telescope had 17 glass 

elements mounted in a structure weighing more than 25 pounds. 

Because of this, German production was only just getting started at 

the close of the war. A total of 1,000 to 3,000 units was built, but 

almost none of these ever saw combat duty. 

The Germans appeared not to have developed a signaling and 

identification system using tholofode cells. In the field of infrared 

communication equipment (optiphones), the Germans were 

somewhat ahead of the Allies in that they had at least 3,000 units 

in field service. These units are not technically superior to the 

developmental model built in the United States. 

The German work in the far-infrared field (heat) was not very 

extensive, the only work reported so far being a number of shipdetecting units for detecting and determining the range of ships off 

shore. 

ALLIED DEVELOPMENTS 

The British concentrated work on a simple electron image tube 

suited primarily for signaling and identification, although it was 

used experimentally for such purposes as driving, gun aiming, etc. 

Production started about 1941 and the instruments were used on 

the British Isles throughout the war. For security reasons, few were 

used on the Continent but some, together with a few U.S. 

instruments, were used in North Africa. 
279 

later. Their first use in large numbers was by the Navy for signal 

communications. Later the Army put into the field a gun-sighting 

and reconnaissance unit. These were used almost exclusively in the 

Pacific. 

Airborne applications have been found practical but the various 

technical difficulties were overcome too late for field use. 

Detection of aircraft by infrared telescopes was found not to be 

feasible. 

No communication systems for speech transmission were put 

into production. 

Very intensive work has been done on heat sensitive elements 

for guided -missiles, the production in some instances running into 

fairly large figures. Recent tests of the VB6, a heat-homing missile 

developed by NDRC Division 5 in collaboration with ATSC, have 

been very successful. 

The possibilities of infrared and heat-seeking devices are 

certainly not yet fully explored. It will be one of the important 

research fields of the Air Forces. The importance of this branch of 

physical research will be enhanced by the fact that many industrial 

and military establishments still try to obtain relative safety by 

going under ground. 
280 

ORGANIZATION 

Problems of Organization 

The following problems relating to the long range research and 

development program of the Air Forces deserve consideration: 

1. Scientific Planning: It is necessary that the Commanding 

General of the Air Forces and the Air Staff be advised 

continuously on the progress of scientific research and 

development in view of the potentialities of new discoveries and 

improvements in aerial warfare. A permanent Scientific Advisory 

Group, consisting of qualified officers and eminent civilian 

scientific consultants, should be available to the Commanding 

General, reporting directly to him on novel developments and 

advising him on the planning of scientific research. The scientific 

material collected by the organizations for military intelligence (G2 and A-2) should be made available to this group for evaluation. 

Correspondingly, the scientific branch of G-2 and A-2 should be 

greatly strengthened by qualified personnel and facilities. 

2. Research and Development within the Air Forces: It is 

necessary to organize a broad training program for officers in 

scientific and engineering fields, not merely to impart information 

on scientific and technical matters but to accustom them to 

working in cooperation with scientific institutions and scientists. 

Officers with engineering training on engineering duty should 

not be handicapped as regards promotion because of long tenure of 

the same assignment or time spent in acquiring advanced 

education. An officer in charge of a laboratory or proving ground 

can be really useful only if he holds the position for a sufficient 

time to become thoroughly acquainted with the subject matter and 

personnel. 

The position of rank of officers responsible for research and 

development in the Technical Services should be made 
281 

command. 

Methods of appointment, compensation, and management of 

scientific personnel should be freed from those restrictions the 

Civil Service regulations which make government: service 

unattractive to first-rate scientists. 

Specific comments and proposals in regard to the organization 

of research in the AAF will be made in my final report. 

3. Securing the Interest and Collaboration of Scientific 

Institutions and Individual Scientists: The Air Force should have 

access to the best qualified scientific talent and the best equipped 

laboratories of the nation for collaboration on their problems. 

Experimental investigations desired by the scientific leaders the 

Air Forces to be carried out in any laboratory should be obtained 

by direct contract for the services desired. 

It is recommended that the interest of scientists in classified 

problems be cultivated by sponsoring a society for military 

sciences whose membership and publications would be restricted 

in conformity with security regulations. AAF personnel shall be 

given membership in this society and permission to discuss and 

publish the results of their endeavors in the classified publications 

of the society. 

Interchanges of military and civilian personnel of the Air Forces 

should be made with civilian scientists working in other 

institutions. Temporary assignment of AAF personnel to civilian 

laboratories and civilian scientists to Service Laboratories and 

proving grounds would serve this purpose. Also by this method, 

the AAF would be able to develop a scientific reserve corps 

familiar with current military problems a pool for active service in 

war time. 

4. Cooperation with National Agencies Involved in the Planning 

of Scientific Research: There are in existence several national 

agencies concerned with scientific research having a bearing on 

aerial warfare. These are the National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics, the Research Board for National Security, and the 
282 

supplement the work of the Office Scientific Research and 

Development in peace time. 

These agencies fulfill important functions in the national search 

picture. We believe, however, that it would be a mistake to assign 

complete responsibility for the long range development of new 

weapons to civilian agencies, leaving to the Air Forces only the 

functions of service testing of new weapons and the improvement 

of existing weapons. Since the Air Forces have knowledge of the 

strategic and tactical requirements, they should carry the primary 

responsibility for long range planning, with all possible advice and 

cooperation from other agencies. 

For a fuller utilization of the research talent and facilities of the 

country, I propose the establishment of an Aeronautical Research 

Board, composed of representatives of the Army Air Forces; the 

Bureau of Aeronautics; Navy Department; the Civil Aeronautics 

Administration; the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics; 

the aircraft industry; the air lines; and the aeronautical sciences. 

The primary function of the Board should be the making of 

recommendations on research contracts to the contracting agencies, 

and on needed research facilities to be built at government 

expense, on their operation and location; and to serve as a clearing 

house for aeronautical research information. 
283 

List of Tables 

TABLE NO. TITLE 

I Turboprop and Turbofan Developments 

II Gas Turbine Propulsion Research Problems 

III Ramjet Development 

IV Pulsojet Development 

V Development of Rockets 

VI Characteristics of German Jet Planes 

VII Flow Measurement Techniques 

V. LIST OF FIGURES 

List of Figures 

FIGURE NO. TITLE 

1 German Supersonic Wind Tunnels in Operation 

2 German Supersonic Wind Tunnels Under Construction 

3 Optimum Lift-Drag Ratios 

4 Sweep back Effect on Shock Waves 

5 Supersonic Airplane: Takeoff and Landing 

6 German Feuerlilie Rocket 

7 Rocket Models for Supersonic Wind Tunnel Tests 

8 6000 Mile Rocket 

9 Supersonic and Subsonic Airplanes 

10a Various Propulsion Systems 

10b Various Propulsion Systems 

11 German Engine and Propeller Developments 

12 Timetable of Turbojet Development 

13 Characteristics of Turbojets 

14 Ramjets 

15 Performance of Rocket Propellants 

16 High Speed Airflow Photographs 
284 

HORIZONS 

Index of Toward New Horizons 

A Report to General of the Army H. H. Arnold by the AAF 

Scientific Advisory Group 

VOL. NO. TITLE AUTHOR 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VOLUMES 

I Science, the Key to Air 

Supremacy 

Dr. Theodore von 

Kármán 

II-I Where We Stand Dr. Theodore von 

Kármán 

II-2 Technical Intelligence 

Supplement 

AERODYNAMICS AND AIRCRAFT DESIGN 

III-1 High Speed Aerodynamics H. S. Tsien 

III-2 The Airplane: Prospects 

and Problems 

W. R. Sears, I. L. 

Ashkenas, and 

Captain C. N. Hasert 

III-3 Future Airborne Armies Major T. F. 

Walkowicz 

III-4 Aircraft Materials and 

Structures 

N. M. Newmark 

AIRCRAFT POWER PLANTS 

IV-1 Gas Turbine Propulsion F. L. Wattendorf 

IV-2 Experimental and 

Theoretical Performance 

of Aeropulse Engines 

H. S. Tsien 

IV-3 Performance of Ramjets 

and Their Design 

Problems 

H. S. Tsien 
285 

of Solid and Liquid Fuel 

Rockets 

IV-5 High Temperature 

Materials 

Pol Duwez 

AIRCRAFT FUELS AND PROPELLANTS 

V-1 Research on Hydrocarbon 

Fuels for Aircraft 

Propulsion 

W. J. Sweeney 

V-2 Solid Propellants for 

Rockets and Other Jet 

Propelled Devices 

L. P. Hammett 

V-3 Liquid Propellants for 

Rocket-Type Motors 

A. J. Stosick 

V-4 Possibility of Atomic 

Fuels for Aircraft 

Propulsion of Power 

Plants 

H. S. Tsien 

GUIDED MISSILES AND PILOTLESS AIRCRAFT 

VI-1 Present State of the 

Guided Missile Art 

H. L. Dryden 

VI-2 Selected Guided Missiles 

Now Developed or Under 

Development 

H. L. Dryden 

VI-3 Heat and Television 

Guided Missiles 

G. A. Morton 

VI-4 Radar Aids for the 

Guidance of Missiles 

I. A. Getting 

VI-5 Radar Homing Missiles H. L. Dryden 

VI-6 Automatic Control of 

Flight 

W. H. Pickering 

VI-7 The Launching of a 

Winged Missile for 

Supersonic Flight 

H. S. Tsien 
286 

Vacuo 

EXPLOSIVES AND TERMINAL BALLISTICS 

VII-1 General Considerations on 

Explosives and Explosions 

G. Gamow 

VII-2 Properties of High 

Explosives 

D. P. MacDougall 

VII-3 Terminal Ballistics and 

Destructive Effects 

N. M. Newmark 

RADAR, COMMUNICATIONS AND WEATHER 

VIII-1 The Use of Radar in Air 

Forces Operations 

L.A. DuBridge, E. 

M. Purcell, and G. 

A. Valley 

VIII-2 RADAR-A Discussion of 

Future Trends of Interest 

to the Army Air Forces, 

with SUPPLEMENTDefense Against the 

Atomic Bomb 

L.A. DuBridge, E. 

M. Purcell, and G. A 

Valley 

VIII-3 Aircraft Radio 

Communication 

Equipment 

G. A. Morton 

VIII-4 War and Weather I. P. Krick 

AEROMEDICS AND PSYCHOLOGY 

IX-1 Future Trends of Research 

in Aviation Medicine 

Colonel W. R. 

Lovelace, II 

IX-2 Recommendations for a 

Program of Post War 

Psychological Research 

C. W. Bray 
287 

SCIENCE: The Key to Air Supremacy 
288 

TOWARD NEW HORIZONS 

A Report to 

General of the Army H. H. Arnold 

Submitted on behalf of the 

A.A.F. Scientific Advisory Group 

By 

TH VON KÁRMÁN 

Science, the Key to Air Supremacy 

15 December 1945 
289 

Letter of Transmittal ....................................................................293 

AAF Scientific Advisory Group ..................................................296 

Science: The Key to Air Supremacy 

Chapter I: Science and Aerial Warfare. ................................297 

Chapter II: Analysis of Research Problems ... ......................306 

Move Swiftly and Transport Loads 

Through the Air....................................................306 

Locate Targets and Recognize Them...................331 

Hit Targets Accurately.........................................342 

Ability to Cause Destruction................................347 

Function Independently of Weather 

and Darkness........................................................351 

Defeat Enemy Interference ..................................356 

Perfect Communication from Ground 

 to Air and from Air to Air.................................364 

Defend Home Territory. ......................................368 

Chapter III: Problems of Organization 

with Recommendations........................................373 

Fundamental Principles for 

 Organization of Research..................................373 

Cooperation between Science 

 and the Air Forces.............................................374 

Cooperation between Industry 

 and the Air Forces.............................................378 

Adequate Facilities in the 

 Air Forces for R&D ..........................................380 

Induction of Scientific Ideas in Staff 

 and Command Work. .......................................383 

Scientific and Technological Training 

 of Air Forces Personnel. ..................................383 
290 

7 November 1944 

MEMORANDUM FOR DR VON KÁRMÁN: 

Subject: AAF Long Range Development Program 

1. I believe the security of the United States of America will 

continue to rest in part in developments instituted by our 

educational and professional scientists. I am anxious that Air 

Forces postwar and next-war research and development programs 

be placed on a sound and continuing basis. In addition, I am 

desirous that these programs be in such form and contain such well 

thought out, long range thinking that, in addition to guaranteeing 

the security of our nation and serving as a guide for the next 10-20 

year period, that the recommended programs can be used as a basis 

for adequate Congressional appropriations. 

2. To assist you and your associates in our current concepts of 

war, may I review our principles. The object of total war is to 

destroy the enemy’s will to resist, thereby enabling us to force our 

will on him. The attainment of war’s objective divides itself into 

three phases: political, strategic and tactical. Political action is 

directed against the enemy’s governing power, strategic action 

against his economic resources, and tactical action against his 

armed forces. Strategical and tactical actions are our main concern 

and are governed by the principles of objective, surprise, 

simplicity, mass, offensive, movement, economy of forces, 

cooperation and security. 

3. I believe it is axiomatic that: 

a. We as a nation are now one of the predominant powers. 

b. We will no doubt have potential enemies that will constitute a 

continuing threat to the nation. 
291 

contemplated. 

d. Our prewar research and development has often been inferior 

to our enemies. 

e. Offensive, not defensive, weapons win wars. Countermeasures are of secondary importance. 

f. Our country will not support a large standing army. 

g. Peace time economy requirements indicate that, while the 

AAF now receives 43% of current War Department appropriations, 

this allotment or this proportion may not continue. 

h. Obsolete equipment, now available in large quantities, may 

stalemate development and give Congress a false sense of security. 

i. While our scientists do not necessarily have the questionable 

advantage of basic military training, conversely our AAF officers 

cannot by necessity be professional scientists. 

j. Human-sighted (and perhaps radar or television assisted) 

weapons have more potential efficiency and flexibility than 

mechanically assisted weapons. 

k. It is a fundamental principle of American democracy that 

personnel casualties are distasteful. We will continue to fight 

mechanical rather than manpower wars. 

l. As of yet we have not overcome the problems of great 

distances, weather and darkness. 

m. More potent explosives, supersonic speed, greater mass 

offensive efficiency, increased weapon flexibility and control, are 

requirements. 

n. The present trend toward terror weapons such as buzz bombs, 

phosphorous and napalm may further continue toward gas and 

bacteriological warfare. 

4. The possibility of future major wars cannot be overlooked. 

We, as a nation, may not always have friendly major powers or 

great oceanic distances as barriers. Likewise, I presume methods of 
292 

different weapon will replace the airplane? Are manless remotecontrolled radar or television assisted precision military rockets or 

multiple purpose seekers a possibility? Is atomic propulsion a 

thought for consideration in future warfare? 

5. Except perhaps to review current techniques and research 

trends, I am asking you and your associates to divorce yourselves 

from the present war in order to investigate all the possibilities and 

desirabilities for postwar and future war’s development as respects 

the AAF. Upon completion of your studies, please then give me a 

report or guide for recommended future AAF research and 

development programs. May I ask that your final report also 

include recommendations to the following questions: 

a. What assistance should we give or ask from our educational 

and commercial scientific organizations during peacetime? 

b. Is the time approaching when all our scientists and their 

organizations must give a small portion of their time and resources 

to assist in avoiding future national peril and winning the next 

war? 

c. What are the best methods of instituting the pilot production 

of requited nonrevenue equipments of no commercial value 

developed exclusively for the postwar period? 

d. What proportion of available money should be allocated to 

research and development? 

6. Pending completion of your final report, may I ask that you 

give me a short monthly written progress report. Meanwhile, I 

have specifically directed the AC/AS, OC&R (General Wilson) to 

be responsible for your direct administrative and staff needs. Also, 

as I have already told you, I welcome you and your associates into 

my Headquarters. May I again say that the services of the AAF are 

at your disposal to assist in solving these difficult problems. 

 Signed 

H. H. Arnold 
293 

IN REPLY REFER TO: 

15 December 1945 

General of the Army H. H. Arnold 

Commanding General, Army Air Forces 

Washington 25, D. C. 

Dear General Arnold: 

In your basic memorandum of the seventh of November 1944, 

you directed me to prepare a report as a guide for recommended 

future Army Air Forces research and development progress. 

In cooperation with a group of selected associates, experts in 

various branches of the sciences involved, I have tried to review 

the scientific requirements involved in the functions of the future 

Air Forces, and I submit herewith the results of our study. 

The first volume contains a discussion of the relation between 

science and aerial warfare; an analysis of the main research 

problems of the air forces, from the point of view of its functions; 

and recommendations on organization of research. The twelve 

volumes which follow contain thirty-two scientific monographs, 

with detailed research programs in specific fields. 

The general conclusions of this study may be summarized as 

follows: 

1. The discovery of atomic means of destruction makes a 

powerful Air Forces even more imperative than before. This 

subject is discussed in Chapter I of the first volume. 

2. The scientific discoveries in aerodynamics, propulsion, 

electronics, and nuclear physics, open new horizons for the use of 

air power. 

3. The next ten years should be a period of systematic, vigorous 

development, devoted to the realization of the potentialities of 
294 

and communication, remote-controlled and automatic fighter and 

bomber forces, and aerial transportation of entire armies. 

4. The research problems, as analyzed in Chapter I of the first 

volume, should be considered in their relation to the functions of 

the Air Forces, rather than as isolated scientific problems. 

5. Therefore, development centers should be established for 

new types of equipment and for making novel methods suggested 

by scientific discoveries practical. Such development centers for 

definite tasks are more efficient than separate laboratories for 

certain branches of science. 

6. The use of scientific means and equipment requires the 

infiltration of scientific thought and knowledge throughout the Air 

Forces and, therefore, certain organizatory changes in recruiting 

personnel, in training, and in staff work. Pertinent suggestions are 

made in Chapter III of the first volume of this report. 

7. A global strategy for the application of novel equipment and 

methods, especially pilotless aircraft, should be studied and 

worked out. Full application of air power requires a properly 

distributed network of bases within and beyond the limits of the 

continental United States. 

8. As new equipment becomes available, experimental pilotless 

aircraft units should be formed and personnel systematically 

trained for operation of the new devices. 

9. According to the outcome of a practical testing period, a 

proper balance between weapons directed by humans, assisted by 

electronic devices, and purely automatic weapons should be 

established. 

10. The men in charge of the future Air Forces should always 

remember that problems never have final or universal solutions, 

and only a constant inquisitive attitude toward science and a 

ceaseless and swift adaptation to new developments can maintain 

the security of this nation through world air supremacy. 
295 

a. What assistance should be given or asked from our 

educational and commercial scientific organizations during 

peacetime? 

b. Is the time approaching when all our scientists and their 

organizations must give a small portion of their time and resources 

to assist in avoiding future national peril and winning the next 

war? 

c. What are the best methods of instituting the pilot production 

of required nonrevenue equipments of no commercial value 

developed exclusively for the post war period? 

d. What proportion of available money should be allocated to 

research and development? 

Recommendations on the first three points are included in the 

sections of the report dealing with cooperation between science, 

industry, and the Air Forces. I am somewhat reluctant to give a 

definite answer to your fourth question. I prefer to submit the 

following consideration. The money to be allocated for research 

and development should be related to the cost of one year’s aerial 

warfare. It appears that spending for research in peacetime five 

percent of one war year’s expenditures, in order to be prepared for 

or avoid a future war, is not an exaggerated drain on the nation’s 

pocketbook. A quick inquiry showed that our large industrial 

concerns spend a percentage of this order of the total sum involved 

in their year’s business for research. If in peacetime 15-20 percent 

of the sum spent in a war year were allowed for total expenditures 

of the Air Forces, the amount required for research and 

development should constitute 25-33 percent of the total Air 

Forces budget. 

Respectfully yours, 

 Signed 

TH. VON KÁRMÁN 

 Director 

AAF Scientific Advisory Group 
296 

The AAF Scientific Advisory Group was activated late in 1944 

by General of the Army H. H. Arnold. He secured the services of 

Dr. Theodore von Kármán, renowned scientist and consultant in 

aeronautics, who agreed to organize and direct the group. 

Dr. von Kármán gathered about him a group of American 

scientists from every field of research having a bearing on air 

power. These men then analyzed important developments in the 

basic sciences, both here and abroad, and attempted to evaluate the 

effects of their application to air power. 

This volume is one of a group of reports made to the Army Air 

Forces by the Scientific Advisory Group. 

Dr. Th. von Kármán 

Director 

Colonel F. E. Glantzberg 

Deputy Director, Military 

Dr. H. L. Dryden 

Deputy Director, Scientific 

Lt Col G. T. McHugh, Executive 

Capt C. H. Jackson, Jr., Secretary 

CONSULTANTS 

Dr. C. W. Bray Dr. A. J. Stosick 

Dr. L. A. DuBridge Dr. W. J. Sweeney 

Dr. Pol Duwez Dr. H. S. Tsien 

Dr. G. Gamow Dr. G. E. Valley 

Dr. I. A. Getting Dr. F. L. Wattendorf 

Dr. L. P. Hammett Dr. F. Zwicky 

Dr.. W. S. Hunter Dr. V. K. Zworykin 

Dr. I. P. Krick Col D. N. Yates 

Dr. D. R. MacDougall Col W. R. Lovelace II 

Dr. G. A. Morton Lt Col A. P. Gagge 

Dr. N. M. Newmark Lt Col E. W. Williams 

Dr. W. H. Pickering Major T. F. Walkowicz 

Dr. E. M. Purcell Capt C. N. Hasert 

Dr. G. B. Schubauer Mr. M. Alperin 

Dr. W. R. Sears Mr. I. L. Ashkenas 

Mr. G. S. Schairer 

LAYOUT & ILLUSTRATION 

Capt M. Miller Capt T. E. Daley 
297 

Science and Aerial Warfare 

Introduction 

1.1 There have been two wars on a world scale in our time, in 

which the pendulum of victory seemed at first to swing far out in 

the direction of our enemies before indicating the final decision. In 

the First World War, victory or defeat was decided mainly by 

human endurance. Science and technology played an important but 

to some extent a secondary role. It is true, of course, that the 

superiority of the Allies in the design and production of tanks, as 

well as the paralyzing effect of the complete blockade on all 

branches of German industrial production, contributed very 

essentially to Germany’s defeat in 1918. However, the complete 

exhaustion of human endurance on the German side was the main 

factor in the decision. The second war had, from the beginning, a 

technological character. The overwhelming technological 

preparation of Germany secured her first brilliant successes on the 

European continent. The shortcomings of the Luftwaffe in strategic 

bombing and the lack of experience of the German Army and its 

consequent poor preparation for amphibious operations, caused the 

attack against England to be stillborn. The mounting tide of Allied, 

especially American, air power became finally the main factor in 

Germany’s defeat. Even in the East, although the bravery and 

endurance of the Russians were perhaps the most important factors 

in stopping the German Army, the Russian march of victory to the 

West could not have been achieved without technological 

superiority, due partly to Russian and partly to American 

production. An interesting sign of the technological character of 

this war is the fact that the time in which superiority in aircraft 

could be achieved was predicted, based on figures of industrial 

potential, at the beginning of the war. The predictions were fairly 

well verified by the actual events. 

1.2 In addition to the technological character of this war, a new 

aspect became evident, which did not appear so obviously in the 
298 

discoveries have been used in all wars since ancient times; it is 

related, for example, that Archimedes concentrated the heat of the 

sun by means of large mirrors to destroy enemy ships. However, 

never before have such large numbers of scientific workers been 

united for planned evaluation and utilization of scientific ideas for 

military purposes. Outstanding results of such planned cooperative 

research are, on our side, radar and atomic bombs, and on the 

German side, jet-propelled missiles. 

1.3 The recognition of the growing technological character of 

modem war partly emerged from the experiences of the First 

World War, and the scientific character of any future warfare 

becomes obvious in the light of the war which has just ended. In 

this report an attempt is made to formulate some of the 

consequences of this conception for the program of the Air Forces. 

The Position of the Air Forces in a Scientific Warfare 

1.4 Until recently it was not generally recognized that destruction 

from the air is the most efficient method for defeating an enemy. 

This fact has now been proved by the results obtained in Germany 

and Japan. However, after the use of the atomic\bomb, a strange 

change of opinion took place. Many leaders of public opinion seem 

to believe that destruction by means of a few airplanes or missiles 

carrying atomic bombs is the only method of future warfare, 

making a strong air force superfluous. Others say that international 

control of atomic energy will-make war impossible for time to 

come. 

1.5 We believe that all possible aspects of the complex problem 

introduced by this new scientific achievement must be considered: 

First, we must consider the possibility that international control 

of atomic energy cannot be achieved in such a manner that the use 

of atomic destruction by potential enemies is impossible. 

Second, the case has to be considered that international control 

of atomic energy will be achieved by agreement; it must be 

recognized, however, that such control will probably have to be 

supported by force. 
299 

organizations, the possibility of desperate attacks against the 

United States or its vital interests somewhere on the globe cannot 

be excluded. 

1.6 The first assumption (international control of atomic energy 

cannot be achieved) means total war, with full use of atomic 

energy on both sides. Atomic energy will be used in the form of 

explosives, and, in all probability, as a means for jet propulsion. 

Atomic engineering and atomic industry will be simply a part of 

the war-making potential of a nation, perhaps the most important 

one. Consequently, one of the first aims of warfare will be the 

destruction of this potential. Fortunately, at least at present, 

production of atomic energy requires rather extensive plants, 

which can hardly be completely hidden and made safe against 

destruction. Of course, great effort will be expended upon keeping 

secret the places of research, development, and production. Hence, 

it will be one of the fundamental problems of the intelligence 

service to gather the most accurate information possible 

concerning these potential targets and evaluate it from the 

scientific, technological, and military points of view. 

1.7 It can be assumed that the first attack in any war will be against 

targets connected with the production of atomic devices for 

destruction and propulsion. It is evident that such an attack will be 

the primary responsibility of the Air Forces. The places of research 

and production will certainly be removed as far as possible from 

the land and sea frontiers. An attempt will be made, of course, to 

annihilate the enemy’s installations by bombs carried by piloted 

and pilotless airplanes. However, because of intricate defense 

measures by the enemy, who will probably put the most important 

installations underground, it may be necessary to land troops and 

to occupy certain territories. Thus, all aspects of modem aerial 

warfare may enter into the picture; strategic bombing, air 

superiority, and airborne armies. 

1.8 It is evident that preparations must be made for strategic 

bombing of enemy targets involved in atomic work, by proper 

location of bases, especially bases for pilotless airplanes. In the 
300 

requirements of warfare on land and on sea. Todays strategic 

considerations refer to the three-dimensional space surrounding the 

globe. They must be worked out with the same imagination and 

thoroughness displayed by old-time strategists in solving the 

problems of attacking and defending certain lines extending on the 

surface of the earth, or certain points which controlled traffic on 

the seas. 

1.9 It may be argued that the devastation and loss of life caused by 

atomic bombs is so tremendous that total atomic warfare will never 

occur. I believe the answer is the following: No man in the past 

centuries could, by any stretch of the imagination, foresee the 

devastation and loss of life produced by two consecutive wars in 

our time. Humans adjust themselves rapidly to new concepts. What 

is considered an incredibly large loss of life today may appear 

inevitable in years to come. I believe we must agree with Dr. 

Einstein’s view that, even in case of total atomic warfare, humanity 

and human civilization will not disappear. The number of lives lost 

in the two wars, which were separated by a relatively short 

interval, appears to us certainly disastrous. However, there is no 

proof that economic pressure and human passion cannot produce 

conflicts which lead to the annihilation of one-half or two-thirds of 

the population of a country. Preparedness certainly has to make 

provisions for such possibilities. 

1.10 The second assumption (that international control of atomic 

energy will be achieved but will require support by force) seems to 

be the most probable solution of the atomic problem within the 

next decades. Then, the main responsibility of the Armed Forces 

will be the enforcement of international agreements. Here again the 

nation must rely on a powerful air force. It will be necessary to 

strike at any arbitrary point of the globe, to strike swiftly and 

forcefully. History shows that international agreements have not 

protected the signatories and have not prevented wars, either 

because there were no means available for swift and forceful 

action, or because political reasons prevented their use. No branch 

of the Armed Forces except the Air Forces can perform the 

required action in time to be effective. 
301 

excluded in spite of international agreement). However, in the 

latter case the matter of efficient defense must be emphasized. It 

must be realized that a one hundred percent safe defense is 

impossible. It is easier to make offensive action efficient by 

scientific means than defensive action. The high speed of pilotless 

airplanes and missiles makes them almost safe against a hit; no 

effective means is yet known for stopping such missiles, once they 

are launched, and, the fact that one single airplane or missile is 

able to drop a bomb of immense destructive power puts an almost 

impossible task on the air defense. All that we can hope is that 

absolute air superiority, combined with highly developed and 

specialized warning and homing devices, will help us to erect an 

impregnable aeroelectronic wall, which will reduce to a minimum 

the possibility of any enemy device slipping through undetected 

and undestroyed. 

The main conclusion of these considerations is the necessity for 

a powerful air force, which is capable of: 

a. Reaching remote targets swiftly and hitting them with great 

destructive power. 

b. Securing air superiority over any region of the globe. 

c. Landing, in a short time, powerful forces, men and firepower, 

at any point on the globe. 

d. Defending our own territory and bases in the most efficient 

way. 

1.13 It is evident that only an air force which fully exploits all the 

knowledge and skill which science has available now and will have 

available in the future, will have a chance of accomplishing these 

tasks. Aerodynamics, thermodynamics, electronics, nuclear 

physics, and chemistry must reunite their efforts. In the following 

section, a short review is given of the most important scientific 

facts. These facts are important elements to be considered in 

selecting and training personnel and developing equipment for the 

future Air Forces. 
302 

limitations imposed by nature upon man, created to live on the 

ground, but nevertheless endeavoring to move in the unlimited 

space surrounding our globe. 

1.15 As the problem of heavier-than-air locomotion was solved in 

principle by the discovery of the airplane, speed and range were 

confined to narrow limits. Weather and night appeared as 

insurmountable obstacles, and human skill seemed to be an 

indispensable element for diverse uses of the airplane in peace and 

war. 

1.16 Science has already removed many of these limitations: 

a. By gradual improvement in aerodynamic design, the velocity 

and economy of the airplane have been greatly increased. Airplane 

designers have continuously endeavored to eliminate all possible 

drag which impairs economy, i.e., the parasite drag, by attempting 

to make the aircraft essentially into a flying wing; the turbulent 

friction of the air by creating laminar flow around the wing. In 

recent years our knowledge of supersonic phenomena has 

increased the velocity of the airplane and brought it closer and 

closer to the speed of sound, which for a long time appeared as a 

natural upper limit. This knowledge has opened the door for 

winged aircraft, both piloted and pilotless, to the threshold of 

velocities faster than sound. Until now only unmanned ballistic 

devices have attained such speeds. 

b. Novel propulsive systems, using the reaction or jet principle, 

have facilitated the reaching of high speeds, because of their 

reduced weight and increasing efficiency with increasing speed. 

These systems replace the conventional engine and propeller at 

high speeds because the efficiency of a propeller decreases greatly 

when very high speeds are attained. The rocket principle makes 

propulsion independent of the use of the atmospheric air and 

rocket-driven aircraft are able to reach extraordinary attitudes [sic] 

in an extremely short time. 

c. By gradual improvement, both in aerodynamic design and in 

engine construction, the performance and economy of airplane 
303 

capacity of our cargo aircraft is an indication of improved 

economy. Although essential improvements in aerodynamic and 

engine design can be expected to increase airplane economy 

further, the amount of heat which can be released by combustion of 

our most efficient fuels per unit weight or per unit volume, 

imposes a serious limitation on any large increase in range with 

conventional fuels. The use of nuclear energy, however, may 

radically change this situation and help to reach almost unlimited 

ranges, at least in the case of aircraft which do not carry human 

beings. 

d. Navigation and instrument flying were greatly aided by use 

of the radio even in its early stages of development. The recent 

extension of the spectrum of radiation down to centimeter and 

millimeter wavelengths, and the application of the pulse and echo 

principles of radar, opened fundamentally new possibilities in the 

struggle of aviation against weather, clouds, and darkness. Blind 

landing, blind bombing and location of remote and invisible 

objects (aircraft or targets) are paramount examples of the 

contributions of radar technique. Seeing through darkness by night 

and seeing through clouds by day became routine facts in military 

aviation. Fighter control from the ground became an important 

element in warfare. It appears that a wide-open field exists for 

progress in communication and other applications of radio and 

electronics which are discussed at length in “Radar and 

Communications,” by other members of the AAF Scientific 

Advisory Group. 

e. Gradual improvements in gyroscopic devices led to the 

automatic pilot, which materially relieves the human pilot. In 

addition, the development of gyro and servomotor devices made 

possible a great variety of remote control systems. Since we are 

able to transfer optical impressions by television devices, aircraft 

or missiles can be piloted to distant points from the ground or from 

the air by remote control. Radar location devices similarly can be 

applied to the remote control of aircraft. 
304 

homing bomb was in use by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific at the 

close of the war. Infrared (heat) radiation proved to be one of the 

most promising methods. Radio, infrared, and radar have been 

applied to the problem extremely useful in automatic fire control. 

Along with automatic homing, the design of automatic computers 

became a great practical domain of military engineering. 

g. Combination of methods of automatic and remote control 

with homing devices will lead to a complete solution of the 

problem of pilotless aircraft, having tremendous speed, 

extraordinary range and ability to hit targets accurately. Although 

pilotless aircraft will never completely eliminate manned aircraft, 

they obviously will take over certain missions. Both in the German 

and in the Japanese theaters, our strategic bombing forces brought 

utter destruction to our enemies with the clocklike accuracy of a 

great machine. The future aim is to build up, for this purpose, a 

war machine in the proper sense of the word, consisting of 

technical devices only, and yet directed in all details by the mind 

and staff of some master strategist of the air. 

Plan of Analysis 

1.17 The abundance and variety of applications of scientific ideas 

and devices in aerial warfare, sketched very briefly above, put a 

tremendous task before the men responsible for the future Air 

Forces. For the most part the scientific foundation of the 

applications mentioned has already been laid, and other 

applications will emerge as scientific research continues to be 

productive of new knowledge. 

1.18 The scientific-technological questions are only a small part of 

the whole problem. We are fully aware that a report prepared by 

men of science can contribute only a small part of the solution. 

1.19 Chapter 11 of this volume analyzes the problem of research 

and development from the point of view of the technical 

requirements which the Air Forces must meet in order to be able to 

carry out its task, securing the safety of the nation. It appears that 

the main requirements in which scientific methods, scientific 
305 

a. Move swiftly and transport loads through the air. 

b. Locate targets and recognize them. 

c. Hit targets accurately. 

d. Cause destruction. 

e. Function independently of weather and darkness. 

f. Defeat enemy interference. 

g. Perfect communications from ground to air and from air to 

air. 

h. Defend home territory. 

1.20 Chapter III contains recommendations of an organizatory 

character as follows: 

a. Fundamental principles for organization of research. 

b. Cooperation between science and the Air Forces. 

c. Cooperation between industry and the Air Forces. 

d. Adequate facilities in the Air Forces for research and 

development. 

e. Induction of scientific ideas into command and staff work. 

f. Scientific and technological training of Air Forces personnel. 

1.21 Further volumes of this general report contain individual 

studies prepared by members and collaborators of the Scientific 

Advisory Group on the main scientific topics. They may be used as 

a kind of guide for the direction of future research, starting from 

the present state of the art toward the realm of the unknown to be 

revealed in the years to come. 
306 

Analysis of Research Problems 

Move Swiftly and Transport Loads Through the Air 

2.1 This fundamental problem can also be described as the 

problem of the aerial vehicle. It includes the design and 

construction of manned and unmanned aircraft, subsonic and 

supersonic. 

2.2 Looking back to the past, the aeronautical engineer certainly 

can be proud of the performance of the present day airplane. 

Speed, rate of climb, and range have been multiplied by factors of 

considerable magnitude in the twenty-seven years since the end of 

the First World War. A great portion of the progress was achieved 

during the last decade in the six years of conscious preparation by 

the Army Air Forces and in the four years of actual warfare. 

However, if the problem of war in the future is considered, we 

conclude that our best present type airplanes are still far from 

doing the job which they will have to achieve. 

Range vs. Speed 

2.3 The two great problems of aerial locomotion are range and 

speed. The ideal solution is a combination of both. 

2.4 Range is imperative because of the global character of aerial 

warfare. We have to reach enormous ranges, distances as great as 

half of the length of the equator, in order to be able to attack and 

occupy points located anywhere on the globe. With the possible 

exception of an airplane driven by atomic energy, the design of 

aircraft to carry very heavy loads to shorter ranges is essentially 

the same problem, because of the interchangeability of fuel and 

pay load. 

2.5 Speed is imperative for effective action, safety against enemy 

countermeasures from the ground, and superiority over enemy 

aircraft. 
307 

see clearly the fundamental relations between range and speed. The 

range of an airplane depends on three factors: (1) ratio between 

drag and lift, (2) fuel consumption per unit thrust horsepower, and 

(3) ratio between the weight of the fuel and the total weight of the 

airplane, at the beginning of the flight. The first factor is 

determined by aerodynamics of the airplane, the second, by 

aerothermodynamics of the propulsive system, and the third, by 

construction and material. 

2.7 The critical factor is the lift-drag ratio, which decreases 

abruptly at the approach to sonic velocity and in the supersonic 

range never again attains the favorable values realized in the 

subsonic regime. Even if we are very optimistic as to the future 

developments of our supersonic aerodynamics, it is improbable 

that the extreme ranges possible for subsonic airplanes can be 

realized for supersonic planes. On the other hand, the belief that 

supersonic flight is restricted to extremely short ranges is too 

pessimistic. For instance, if atomic energy can be used for 

propulsion, the range of jet and rocket planes will increase to 

unprecedented values. However, even with present fuels, 

improvements can be expected in the design of jet propulsion units 

which would bring the range of supersonic planes to 1500-2000 

miles in the substratosphere and 3000-3500 miles in the 

stratosphere. 

2.8 In the example represented by the diagram, the ranges are 

shown for two values of the ratio between fuel and initial weight, 

0.5 and 0.7. For the lift-drag ratio and the thermal propulsive 

efficiency of the propulsive system, best current values are used, 

and the flight is assumed to be carried out at the optimum values. 

The ranges given for level flight at 20,000 ft altitude; fuel for takeoff and climb is not considered. 

2.9 The ranges realized or realizable with present engineering 

methods are discussed in detail in the report, “The AirplaneProspects and Problems” by W. R. Sears and I. L. Asbkenas, in the 

SAG report Aerodynamics and Aircraft Design. The attainment of 

the values shown in the diagram, page 15, necessitates 
308 

used in the supersonic range. At supersonic speeds the frontal area 

of the engine required for given thrust is the greatest impediment 

and must be greatly reduced. The ranges given in the diagram 

should be considered as goals of a systematic effort of the next 

decade to be achieved by close cooperation between airplane and 

engine research groups. 

Air Plane Types 

2.10 No attempt is made to write the specifications for the aircraft 

of 1965; however, it appears possible to indicate certain general 

functional requirements of future aircraft. The following 

classification is based on the analysis of the functions of the Air 

Forces given in paragraph 1.12. 

2.11 The first function of the Air Forces is to reach swiftly, and hit 

with great destructive power, remote targets. Two classes of 

aircraft will be used for this function: 

a. An aircraft which carries the means of destruction to the target 

and returns to its base or lands at some other predetermined base. 

This is the bomber in the proper sense of the word. 

b. An aircraft which is expendable and hits the target by means of 

remote control or automatic homing, i.e., a pilotless bomber. 

2.12 The development of bomber aircraft, in the proper sense of 

the word, will probably continue for a few years the trend followed 

in recent years. However, it is not envisioned that bombers will 

continue to grow in size. Increase of size cannot continue to 

increase speed and range indefinitely, but may be necessary to 

permit carrying sufficient defensive armament. Such armament in 

the future would include radio-controlled high-speed missiles, 

launched from the bomber, which would serve as fighter cover in 

case of necessity. The greatest increase of speed and range must be 

accomplished by improvements in aerodynamics and propulsive 

methods. 

2.13 In the field of pilotless bombers the goal is the intercontinental missile. We assume a system of bases distributed in 
309 

be developed for this purpose. The first type should be a highaltitude, pilotless, jet-propelled bomber, with a speed equal to 

about twice the velocity of sound. This pilotless bomber will carry 

either atomic or conventional bombs. Launched by rockets or lifted 

to high attitude by piloted airplanes, it will be capable of level 

flight up to a range of 2500 to 3000 miles. The second type aimed 

for should be an ultrastratospheric pilotless bomber, equipped with 

wings, but not designed for level flight in the atmosphere. It should 

be endowed with extreme velocity during the acceleration period. 

The wings will be used for two purposes: (1) to increase the length 

of the trajectory, and (2) to secure a controllability which is not 

possible with the pure V-2 type projectile. The propulsion of this 

type of pilotless bomber will be accomplished by the rocket 

principle. 

2.14 Atomic energy may be used for propulsion in both types of 

pilotless bombers, thus increasing their ranges to an unprecedented 

extent. (Cf. 2.51 to 2.56) 

2.15 To secure air superiority various types of combat aircraft will 

be needed. Tactical requirements will determine their design. The 

two principal categories will always be bombers and fighters, 

although there will be overlapping of the duties of these, as at 

present, and some bombers and fighters will also be developed for 

highly specialized auxiliary tasks, such as photo reconnaissance. 

The very large battleship of the air, bristling with defensive 

armament, seems destined to give way ultimately to smaller 

bombers having superior performance, fighter control, etc. 

2.16 An important problem is the development of special aircraft 

for airborne armies. These aircraft must be capable of cruising at 

comparatively high speeds, while still retaining the ability to land 

and take off at safe, low speeds from small fields. Vigorous 

application of jet-assisted take-off, boundary layer control, highlift devices, and deceleration devices on troop-carrier aircraft can 

make this possible. Troop-carrier airplanes must also be specially 

designed for rapid and easy loading and unloading of bulky items 

of ground equipment. 
310 

like) must be air-transportable. However, the number of different 

types and sizes of troop-carrier airplanes developed must be kept 

down to a practical minimum. There is immediate need for an 

over-all study of the weight and dimensional characteristics of 

every item of equipment in the Army. Only a complete study can 

show what types and sizes of future troop-carrier aircraft are 

required to move the Army by air with greatest possible efficiency. 

However, the entire burden of making the Army air-transportable 

must not be allowed to fall solely on the aircraft designer. There 

must be established a means of control over the weights and 

dimensions of Army equipment to insure that future equipment 

will be capable of being carried in future aircraft. This can be done 

and must be done without compromising battlefield requirements 

in any way. The cargo airplane and ground equipment 

development programs must be coordinated at frequent intervals 

by an agency charged with the specific responsibility of making 

the Army capable of movement by air. 

2.18 Gliders were used on a large scale (and with great 

effectiveness) for the first time in the airborne operations of World 

War II. The development of gliders and glider techniques must be 

continued since, at the present time, this is the safest, cheapest, 

most acceptable method of landing heavy equipment during the 

assault phase of an airborne operation. New glider developments 

should stress the following: adequate crash protection for crew and 

cargo; low landing speeds and use of deceleration devices for 

shortening the length of landing ground roll; rapid unloading 

through wide, rear-loading doors; adequate protection against 

small-arms fire for pilot and copilot; greater aerodynamic and 

structural efficiencies through the use of high-lift devices and 

metal construction; and the use of assisted takeoff techniques for 

decreasing the length of take-off run required by glider-towplane 

combinations. New gliders (towed-aircraft) must be and can be 

easily designed for rapid conversion to low-powered transports. 

This will eliminate some of the major shortcomings of gliders 

because ferrying to combat theaters and use as short-haul 

transports between airborne missions will be possible. The 
311 

behind the lines cannot be overemphasized. Promising new 

techniques for the assault landing of heavy equipment must be 

developed and evaluated tactically. Important among these are the 

assault transport, the method of dropping heavy equipment by 

means of parachutes and decelerating rockets, aircraft with 

jettisonable cargo compartments, and rotary-wing aircraft. Stable 

(nonoscillating) parachutes with lower opening-loads must be 

developed for paratroopers. 

2.19 The possibility of attacks by single aircraft with disastrous 

effects makes the defense of our frontiers, industrial equipment, 

and bases one of the most important tasks of the Air Forces. 

Piloted and pilotless interceptors are envisaged as the main 

instruments of defense. Speed and controllability are the main 

requirements for this type of aircraft. 

Aerodynamic Problems 

2.20 Improvements in the lift-drag ratio proportionately increase 

the range of an airplane. Therefore, efforts should be concentrated 

to attain such improvements. In 1935, an eminent American 

aerodynamicist, who, ironically enough, later became instrumental 

in the development of the laminar wing, declared that in his 

opinion no more major progress can be expected in aerodynamic 

science. He referred to the fact that with the discovery of the wing 

theory, lift and drag became calculable quantities, and the 

performance of the airplane could be fairly exactly predicted. Also, 

the designer learned the rules of streamlining and methods of 

eliminating superfluous drag by “cleaning up” the airplane. By use 

of systematic and detailed wind-tunnel tests, this cleaning up 

process became almost perfect, so that further improvements can 

be expected only in exceptional cases. However, even in the fairly 

well explored subsonic speed range, new possibilities appeared 

with the discovery of the laminar wing section and the efforts to 

design an efficient flying wing. 

2.21 The concept of the laminar wing is based on the fundamental 

fact that when the flow in the boundary layer of a surface moving 

in air is laminar, the surface friction is very much less than in the 
312 

design, endeavor to keep the boundary layer laminar over a portion 

of the wing surface by means of an appropriate shape of the 

section. This method was applied in the design of quite a few of 

our modern airplanes, with considerable success. The proposal was 

first received with skepticism. Several objections were raised: that 

the expected effects of drag reduction could only be obtained if the 

wing surface is extremely smooth, and that the beneficial effect 

could only be attained for small values of the lift coefficient, thus 

restricting the benefit of the reduced friction to certain flight 

attitudes. Nevertheless, it appears that the initial successes of the 

laminar wing are so encouraging that in future research we should 

strive to go the whole way, i.e., to try to secure laminar flow in the 

boundary layer by positive measures along the entire wing and in a 

large range of angles of attack. It is known that theoretically this 

aim can be attained by the so-called boundary layer control. 

Results along this line are already available, for example, in the 

tests carried out by Professor J. Ackeret and his collaborators at the 

Technical University at Zurich. It is true that the process requires 

extremely smooth surfaces with relatively narrow slots extending 

spanwise along the wing. This might cause practical difficulties 

(for example, in the case of icing). However, looking into the 

future, extreme smoothness might be realized by materials now in 

the making, and it will certainly be worth-while to put in a great 

amount of research work to eliminate other possible practical 

obstacles. There is even the possibility of eventual elimination of 

conventional movable control surfaces, by use of boundary layer 

control to effect changes in lift and moment. 

2.22 The same principle can be applied also to reductions of the 

drag of airplane; for example, bodies with circular cross sections. 

In the case of wings, it will be bodies, if necessary to subdivide the 

wing into a number of compartments with individually regulated 

boundary layer control. In the case of bodies, it might be sufficient 

to apply the control at a few critical cross sections. 

2.23 The fundamental idea of the flying wing is the elimination of 

the parasite drag contributed by such parts of the airplane as do not 

produce lift. The tailless airplane is an even more controversial 
313 

control is placed in the wing involves control force characteristics 

which are different from those occurring in conventional airplanes. 

Much discussed problems are the proper method of securing 

directional stability, and the best arrangement for sweepback. As a 

matter of fact, the designs which have been produced up to now 

have not yet brought a final decision concerning the relative 

advantages and disadvantages of the flying wing and the tailless 

airplane. However, as the global character of aerial transportation, 

and especially aerial warfare, becomes more and more evident, it is 

apparent that our present airplanes are inadequate to meet the 

demand for range. Therefore, the two methods promising essential 

aerodynamic progress, namely boundary layer control and tailless 

design, should be explored with adequate facilities. 

2.24 The large decrease in the value of the lift-drag ratio at the 

Mach number of about 0.8 is due to the rather sudden increase of 

the drag of the airplane. This increase is essentially due to the fact 

that the relative velocity of the air locally becomes larger than the 

velocity of sound. Simultaneously with the increase of the drag, 

difficulties are encountered, in most cases, in the stability and 

control of the airplane. Generally these phenomena are designated 

as compressibility effects; we prefer to use the designation 

“transonic problem.” Obviously, in order to extend the speed limit 

of highspeed airplanes, a thorough investigation of the 

aerodynamic phenomena in the transonic range is needed. As a 

matter of fact, the aerodynamics of both the subsonic and 

supersonic ranges are better known than that of the transonic 

range, which extends approximately between the Mach numbers of 

0.8 and 1.2. One reason is that the mathematical analysis is 

extremely difficult, since the flow around the airplane is partly 

subsonic and partly supersonic. Another great difficulty is caused 

by the unreliability of wind-tunnel tests in this range. Flight tests, 

dropping tests, and measurements on models carried by rockets are 

the main sources for experimental information. 

2.25 Fighters and interceptors now in the making operate actually 

at the border of the transonic range. Hence, every method which is 

able to raise the limit of the rapid drag increase is of great 
314 

sweepback. This method is generally used now in the design of fast 

fighters and interceptors. Designers are seeking means to reduce 

the excess weight and the difficulties in stability and control 

connected with the swept-back wing shape. However, this solution 

is not necessarily a final one. When our knowledge of aerodynamic 

phenomena in the transonic range has been more firmly 

established, we may find methods for eliminating the separation of 

the flow behind the shock wave, and the fundamental trouble, 

namely the occurrence of shock waves. In the subsonic range 

aerodynamic research brought rich returns. It can be expected that 

the same process will repeat itself and will lead to the solution of 

the transonic problem. 

2.26 One of the main questions in the supersonic speed range is the 

feasibility of long-range flight. The supersonic airplane 

necessitates very high wing loading with small size of the wing. 

Hence, in most cases, the volume available in the wing for fuel or 

pay load is very small, and a disproportion appears between the 

sizes of the wing and the fuselage. In other words, the resistance of 

the body in comparison with the resistance of the wing is much 

greater than in the case of the conventional subsonic airplane. It 

appears that the best solution is offered by a fuselage of large 

fineness ratio. A rather thorough investigation of the problem was 

made by the Scientific Advisory Group on this question. These 

investigations suggest that, assuming a given ratio between fuel 

and total weight and a certain space required in the fuselage, the 

range is essentially a function of the altitude at which the 

supersonic flight takes place. The diagrams on pages 347 and 348 

show an example of the variation of range with altitude. The ideal 

application of such a supersonic airplane is the pilotless bomber 

(Cf. 2.13). Similar types of supersonic airplanes will serve as 

pilotless interceptors (Cf. 2.19). The best speed range for the latter 

device may be between 1.2 and 1.5 times sound velocity. 
315 
316 
317 

than in the case of subsonic planes calls for study of an all-wing 

design. However, supersonic flight requires wings with small 

thickness-chord ratio. Hence, one can create sufficient space only 

by using a wing shape of very small aspect ratio. It is fortunate 

that, in the supersonic range, triangular-shaped wings give 

relatively high lift-drag ratios in comparison with other plan forms. 

Hence, for manned interceptors a series of all-wing airplanes 

should be tried, eventually with a small cockpit for a pilot. Such a 

series should extend from a tailless airplane similar to the Me-163 

to pure triangular-shaped airplanes. 

2.28 Besides the lift and drag properties, the questions of stability 

and control are the most important. The change of the flow regime 

introduces difficulties in the transonic range. But also in the pure 

supersonic range, very little is known about the efficiency of 

aerodynamic control surfaces and control forces. This field needs 

thorough exploration by all means available, starting with windtunnel tests and ending with flight tests. Possibly in addition to 

conventional means, displacements of weights or direct control of 

the pressure distribution by modification of the flow, as in the case 

of boundary layer control, are necessary. 

2.29 The difficulties of landing are much more serious for 

supersonic than for subsonic airplanes because of their high-wing 

loading. The wing loading decreases with altitude and supersonic 

airplanes designed for stratospheric flight may land without special 

devices. However, systematic investigations are necessary of highlift devices suitable for use on the thin, sharp-nosed airfoils that are 

desirable for supersonic flight. This must include the problem of 

raising the maximum lift of triangular, low-aspect-ratio wings, and 

particularly of reducing the extremely large angles at which such 

wings now attain their maximum lift. In addition, devices such as 

rockets, which produce simultaneously deceleratory thrust and 

increase of lift for the short period of landing should be studied. 

Propulsive Problems 

2.30 All our airplanes actually used in the war were propelled by 

propellers driven by reciprocating engines. However, the progress 
318 

our own experimental jet-propelled airplanes, enable us to choose 

the best propulsion system for any future project. In broad lines, 

the merit of a propulsive system is determined by two figures: the 

weight which has to be installed in the airplane for unit thrusthorsepower, and the fuel consumption per thrust-horsepower-hour. 

It is evident that for flight of short duration, small engine weight 

has the determining influence; for long duration flight, low fuel 

consumption is more essential. Fuel consumption per thrusthorsepower is determined by the efficiency of the engine and the 

propulsive efficiency of the system. At the present moment the 

reciprocating engine is still more economical than the gas turbine, 

and at subsonic speeds the propeller has higher propulsive 

efficiency than the jet. However, looking into the future, the 

following considerations appear important. 

2.31 It appears to be rather difficult to attain radical improvements 

in the efficiency of reciprocating engines, whereas a wide open 

field is available for improvements in the case of the gas turbine. 

Hence, efforts should certainly be concentrated on developing the 

gas turbine for propeller drive, in order to secure the advantages of 

light weight, freedom from vibration, and reduction of nacelle drag 

connected with this system. Between the various engine systems, 

an intensive competition can be expected, to reach the best fuel 

economy at the lightest possible weight and the smallest space 

requirement. 

2.32 The pure gas turbine has the advantage of simplicity, light 

weight and small dimensions. The reciprocating engine has at 

present an advantage over the simple gas turbine chiefly due to its 

utilization of higher pressures. However, it should be pointed out 

that the advantage of the reciprocating engine holds for the 

cruising condition only, but maximum power output the gas 

turbine equals or surpasses the reciprocating engine in fuel 

economy. 

2.33 There are many ways of improving the performance of the 

pure gas turbine, for instance: 

a. Higher combustion temperature. 
319 

d. Intercooling between compressor stages. 

e. Reheating the air between turbine stages. 

f. Use of separate turbine for propeller drive. 

g. Regeneration by the use of a heat exchanger to extract heat 

from the turbine exhaust, and utilize this heat to warm the air 

entering the combustion chamber. 

These improvements involve partly metallurgical problems in 

search of better materials, partly aerodynamic problems, finally 

design problems to avoid undue penalties in size, weight, and 

complexity. 

2.34 Improvement of reciprocating engines appears possible by 

utilization of somewhat higher pressure ratios, but in the pure 

reciprocating engine this tends to be offset by loss of heat in the 

exhaust. A promising development is the so-called compound 

engine in which the exhaust of a reciprocating engine drives a gas 

turbine which feeds back into the drive shaft. In this way the 

pistons of a reciprocating engine are used partly to drive a 

crankshaft and partly to serve as a gas generator for driving a gas 

turbine. The free piston-type of engine represents the extreme in 

this compounding principle. In this system the pistons are used 

solely as gas generators, and the products of combustion are used 

entirely to run a gas turbine. Both the compound engine and the 

free piston engine have not been explored enough to judge their 

ultimate possibilities. 

2.35 With the practical realization of the gas turbine, the entire 

field of propulsion, aerial, maritime, and ground transportation 

came into a revolutionary stage. Science and industry are 

feverishly working on the analysis of related aerodynamic and 

thermodynamic phenomena, improvement of materials and 

construction. Undoubtedly in this field the Air Forces will receive 

in the next decade the benefit of many developments initiated by 

others. However, it will be necessary to give industry orientation in 

the direction of requirements of the Air Forces. Many of these 
320 

extreme altitude and large excess power for short duration. 

2.36 Jet propulsion will be generally used for transonic and 

supersonic speeds, i.e., in the speed range where the propulsive 

efficiency of the jet is superior to that of the propeller. However, 

the light weight of jet devices may justify their use also at lower 

speeds. For example, combined propeller and jet drive enables an 

airplane to cruise economically with the propeller drive at lower 

speed and reach high speeds for short duration by means of 

additional jet propulsion. 

2.37 The various jet-propulsion systems utilizing hydrocarbon 

fuels in the atmosphere are listed in the SAG report Where We 

Stand, by Theodore von Kármán, as follows: 

Reciprocating engine + ducted fan + jet Motorjet 

Gas turbine + ducted fan + jet Turbofan 

Gas turbine +jet Turbojet 

Continuous jet, compression by aerodynamic 

ram 

Ramjet 

Intermittent jet Pulsojet 

2.38 The chief limitations of the motorjet are those associated with 

the reciprocating engine. Since the reciprocating engine has a large 

frontal area in comparison with the gas turbine, units of large 

power become difficult to accommodate in the duct. The motorjet 

is considered a transition stage between the conventional enginepropeller combination and the turbofan. It is not considered, 

therefore, an important item in a long-range propulsion program. It 

is interesting to note that the Japanese also had a motorjet which 

they considered an interim jet motor pending development of the 

gas turbine. 

2.39 In the turbofan the gas turbine drives, besides its own 

compressor, a larger compressor or fan in a duct. It appears to be a 

promising development for filling the speed range between the 

turbopropeller and turbojet. It has the advantage of greater 

efficiency over the turbojet in the high subsonic or transonic speed 

range because it moves a larger mass of air. It also has the 
321 

high Mach number. There has been very little development on this 

system up to the present, and much applied research is needed; for 

example, wind-tunnel testing at transonic speeds on gas turbineducted fan combinations in various duct arrangements. 

2.40 The turbojet development of the last five years proved the 

practicability of the system beyond doubt, and realized 

considerable progress both in the size of units and in fuel economy. 

On the other hand, many problems are unsolved and call for 

intensive research. In addition to the problems related generally to 

gas turbines and discussed above, two methods of producing 

excess thrust are under investigation: afterburning in the tail pipe, 

and fluid injection. At present requirements of high thrust for a 

given frontal area and of fuel economy are conflicting, which 

constitutes a difficulty for the application of current turbojets to 

supersonic aircraft. However, possibilities for further improvement 

show definite promise of eliminating this difficulty and should 

make future turbojets applicable to supersonic flight provided 

sufficient development is concentrated on the subject. Since 

turbojets have an excellent propulsion efficiency at supersonic 

speeds, the effort of adapting them to this speed range should bring 

valuable returns. Supersonic aerodynamics applied to the blade 

design of compressors and gas turbines also should bring worthwhile gains. For use in pilotless airplanes, expendable turbojets 

should be developed to have an endurance only slightly greater 

than that required by their mission. 

2.41 With increasing flight velocity, the inlet air pressure to a 

turbojet compressor increases due to ram compression. When the 

aircraft is flying at sonic velocity, the ram pressure is 

approximately twice the atmospheric pressure and an efficient duct 

design is able to utilize a high percentage of this pressure. For 

supersonic velocities beyond Mach number 2, the air pressure due 

to ram compression can be many times the astrospheric pressure 

and we can well dispense with the mechanical compressor and 

hence the turbine of the turbojet. The unit will then consist of an 

entrance air diffusor, the combustion chamber, and the exit nozzle. 

This is the ramjet. The ramjet is thus essentially a supersonic 
322 

that for flight Mach numbers exceeding 2, the specific fuel 

consumption of the ramjet could be as low as two pounds per hour 

per pound-thrust. This is comparable with the specific fuel 

consumption of the turbojet. However, the ramjet has the further 

advantage of light weight due to much simpler construction and 

higher thrust per unit frontal area due to the higher combustion 

temperature permitted by the absence of highly stressed moving 

parts. 

2.42 It seems then that the ramjet is the logical power plant for 

supersonic flight with speeds greater than twice the speed of 

sound. Of course for short duration boost, even applications at 

subsonic or transonic speeds may be considered. However, here 

the fuel consumption of the ramjet is high. Furthermore, the drag 

of the duct when not in use is very large. Therefore, if a turbojet or 

turbofan is the main power plant of the aircraft, then a wiser plan is 

perhaps to inject fuel into the tail pipe of the main engine for 

obtaining a short burst of large thrust. 

2.43 For supersonic application, it is essential to reduce the frontal 

area of the duct for low drag. This means a small combustion 

chamber cross section and high flow velocity. Efficient and intense 

heat release at high flow velocity is one of the most urgent 

problems in ramjet development. This problem and the problem of 

efficient diffusor and exit nozzle design have to be solved by 

concentrated efforts with the help of high speed wind tunnels. 

2.44 The high fuel consumption of ramjets at subsonic velocities is 

due to the low pressure in the combustion chamber obtainable by 

ram. By carrying out the combustion in a confined chamber, like 

an explosion, the pressure at the end of combustion can be raised. 

This is the pulsojet. Its feasibility was first demonstrated by the 

engine of the German V-1 flying bomb. This type of engine in its 

present form has a fuel consumption between the ramjet and the 

turbojet in the subsonic and transonic range. Thus, its advantage in 

simplicity compared with the turbojet is counterbalanced by the 

high fuel consumption. Therefore, the answer to the question of 

whether it will be used for propelling pilotless aircraft in these 
323 

improving the fuel economy by improved injection and 

combustion methods. 

2.45 At supersonic speeds, the present type of pulsojet with the 

spring valve is definitely inferior to the ramjet. However, 

theoretical considerations show the possibility of removing the 

valve and depending on the inertia of the air column for valve 

action. If this could be done, then the performance of pulsojet 

would be comparable with that of the ramjet. Here the choice 

between pulsojet and ramjet is difficult because of present meager 

knowledge of these power plants. Only continued experiments can 

answer this question. 

2.46 Jet-propulsion devices using chemical propellants without the 

benefit of the atmospheric air are called rockets. The combustion 

in the rocket motor is made possible by having the oxidizer and 

fuel contained either in a single compound or in separate 

compounds. In the first case, we have the monopropellant; in the 

second case, the multi propellant. Since the oxidizer is carried in 

the propellant, where as for the thermal jets, the oxidizer, oxygen, 

is supplied by the atmosphere, the specific consumption of 

propellant is much higher for rockets than for thermal jets. For 

rockets, this value is generally 14 to 16 lb/hr/lb-thrust. However, 

the rockets have two distinct advantages when compared with 

other types of jet-propulsion devices: First, the installed weight per 

pound of thrust of the power plant, excluding the propellant, is 

extremely small. For instance, the power plant weight for the V-2 

rocket is only 0.03 lb/hr/lb of thrust. The second advantage is that 

the thrust of the rocket is independent of the forward motion and 

the altitude. In fact, the thrust of the rocket even increases slightly 

with increase in altitude. These characteristics of the rocket motor 

immediately indicate that their most efficient applications must be 

either (1) for short operating duration so that the total weight of the 

power plant plus the fuel is small in spite of the heavy 

consumption, or (2) at extremely high altitudes so that no other 

power plant can produce sufficient thrust. 
324 

reduce specific consumption. The future development must rely on 

detailed improvement of the characteristics of the propellant so 

that a more compact and efficient power plant can be designed. 

Since gas propellants require bulky containers, they are impractical 

for use in aircraft. Therefore, we are restricted to solid and liquid 

propellants. The solid propellant may be the lightest unit if the 

application calls for very short duration, for example, one to 30 

seconds. Such applications are: assisted take-off, launching of 

pilotless aircraft, and boosting of aircraft during flight. Such 

boosting may be necessary when the aircraft has to pass through 

the sonic range of velocity. For short-time solid-propellant rockets 

are able to develop a very high thrust. If the application calls for 

somewhat longer duration, the liquid-propellant rocket will be, in 

general, more desirable. There are three methods of feeding the 

liquid propellant into the rocket motor, namely: by use of a 

pressurized gas, by means of a gas generator which produces the 

necessary gas pressure, and by pumping. The first method can be 

applied only for very short duration. For longer duration, one of 

the two other methods must be applied where the gas generator 

may be simpler in design and construction than the pump. 

2.48 If the rocket is to operate in the dense atmosphere of lower 

altitudes, as in the case of antiaircraft missiles, the drag of the 

missile is of primary importance. We wish to reduce the frontal 

area and, hence, the volume of the missile. Then the propellant 

should have the highest impulse per unit volume. At present, the 

best propellant in this respect is the nitric acid-aniline combination. 

If the rocket is to operate in the rare upper atmosphere, for 

example V-2 rockets, the drag of the missile is of secondary 

importance. Then, the propellant should have the highest impulse 

per unit weight. At present, the best propellant in this respect is the 

liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen combination. The extremely 

low temperature of the liquid hydrogen may cause difficulties in 

the design. A more practical choice may be the combination of 

liquid oxygen and liquid hydrazine. 

2.49 For more efficient design of the liquid-propellant rockets, 

improvements can be expected when we have a better 
325 

long-duration rockets. 

2.50 In case of solid propellant rockets, our aim in research and 

development should be a more versatile propellant or a series of 

propellants which can cover the range of applications as to 

operating duration and operating ambient temperature. Much 

reduction of the unit weight can be achieved by reducing the 

pressure in the motor during burning without causing unstable 

combustion. 

2.51 Since the end of the war, the importance of atomic energy has 

become more and more evident. Without doubt extensive research 

will be done in all countries with the goal of using atomic energy 

as a source of power. From the point of view of aircraft propulsion 

the problem is centered on the question: Can we replace the 

combustion chamber of a rocket or a thermal jet by a nuclear 

reaction chamber? In the case of the rocket we have to transfer the 

heat released by the nuclear reaction to an appropriately related 

working fluid, in the case of the thermal jet, to the air. 

2.52 The nuclear process in a system containing fissionable atoms, 

for example, a uranium pile, is characterized by the so-called 

multiplication factor. This factor indicates the increase of the 

number of neutrons produced by nuclear fission for every free 

neutron present in the system at a given time. If the multiplication 

factor is larger than unity, a chain reaction occurs. The number of 

neutrons, the number of atomic fissions, and the amount of 

released energy increase exponentially with time. If the 

multiplication factor is larger than unity, a chain reaction occurs. 

The number of neutrons, the number of atomic fissions, and the 

amount of released energy increase exponentially with time. If the 

multiplication factor is smaller than unity, the process stops. The 

first case corresponds to an explosion in a combustion chamber; 

the second case is analogous to an expiring flame. Hence, in order 

to substitute release of atomic energy for steady fuel combustion, 

one needs a system in which the multiplication factor is exactly 

one. One needs a method which regulates the process in such a 
326 

2.53 As a matter of fact, such systems are already operating, for 

instance, in the manufacturing process of plutonium. However, 

they operate at the present time at low temperatures and are 

relatively heavy. At the level they now operate, they would be 

prohibitive for any aircraft or propulsive device. To be sure, the 

consumption of material per kilowatt hour is negligible, practically 

zero. However, the initial weight is large. By use of concentrated 

fissionable material the weight can certainly be reduced and one 

can imagine that the present difficulties of increasing the 

temperature at which the release of heat takes place will be 

overcome. However, two great impediments would remain: (1) 

The amount of fissionable material required for the process 

represents a very high cost and investment in comparison to the 

power used in any mission of a pilotless aircraft. (2) The strong 

neutron and gamma radiation makes the application in a piloted 

aircraft difficult if not impossible. 

2.54 However, atomic engineering is at the beginning of its history 

and it can be expected that if the problems are clearly recognized 

they will also be solved. Evidently the first stage of development is 

finished: We have systems with a tremendous ratio between energy 

available for release and weight. However, we have no possibility, 

as yet, of releasing energy at any reasonable rate without using a 

minimum amount of material which represents an immense 

reservoir of energy out of all proportion to the energy actually 

needed for one flight, with the exception of the case in which the 

same fissionable matter is used both for propulsion and warhead. 

Assuming that the problem of energy release is solved, the 

following situation would be realized as far as aircraft propulsion 

is concerned. 

2.55 In the case of the rocket ship, which does not use air, a 

working fluid has to be carried in the rocket. One will choose the 

lightest gas, i.e., hydrogen, since for the same energy released, 

hydrogen will give the greatest exhaust velocity and, therefore, the 

greatest thrust per unit weight of material consumed. It is estimated 

that if we are able to produce sufficiently high temperatures and 
327 

would increase more than thirty times the range of V-2 type 

rockets using chemical propellants and would make rocket 

navigation possible up to the highest altitude beyond the 

stratosphere. The “satellite” is a definite possibility. 

2.56 If the substitution of nuclear reaction chambers for fuel 

combustion chamber in ramjets and turbojets, is feasible, the 

question of range would automatically be solved. In other words, if 

a jet-propelled aircraft with atomic combustion chamber could 

carry itself in the atmosphere, it would have practically infinite 

range, since its fuel consumption is practically zero. For this 

purpose an atomic engine weighing as much as eight or nine 

pounds per brake-horsepower would be acceptable for use in large 

bombers for subsonic flight, but for greater performance, such as 

supersonic speeds, a better specific engine weight would be 

necessary. This weight must include all moderators and regulating 

devices, and radiation shielding. 

2.57 The application of atomic energy to the propulsion of manned 

airplanes will probably be out of the question for a very long time 

because of the difficulty of protecting efficiently the personnel 

from the disastrous effects of radiation. The necessary shielding, at 

least at present, implies prohibitive weight. However, for a 

pilotless airplane there are definite possibilities. The problem 

should be attacked urgently and with adequate personnel and 

means. 

Problems in Materials 

2.58 Aircraft materials have been perfected continuously and new 

materials studied with much promise. Nevertheless, it can be stated 

that we do not yet have the ideal material which would fulfill both 

the requirements for strength and for aerodynamic behavior. 

Whereas, for slow airplanes it was sufficient that the elastic limit 

of the material be not surpassed, for high-speed airplanes it is 

essential that the aerodynamic shape of wing and body be 

maintained with a minimum of deformation, avoiding any local 

waviness. Also, a perfectly smooth surface is necessary, and the 

possibility of keeping the surface smooth in service. These 
328 

well as development of methods of fabrication and production to 

take full advantage of the material properties. 
329 

devices. Great advances have been achieved during the past five 

years. However, the investigations were generally made by purely 

empirical methods, without consideration of the fundamental 

character of the solid state of metals from the physicist’s point of 

view. This more fundamental approach will definitely open ways 

to new horizons in a field where old concepts and methods seem to 

yield diminishing returns. For application to individual design, a 

closer understanding of the particular requirements in each case 

will also aid greatly in material development. We must choose 

among the multitude of material properties (such as elasticity, 

plasticity, yield characteristics, impact strength, fatigue strength, 

etc.) the most important ones for a given design, and not require 

the optimum in every aspect. This means a closer analysis of the 

stresses of machine parts, especially under dynamic and high 

thermal stress conditions. 

2.60 An entirely new possibility is the introduction of ceramics as 

a construction material. Ceramics are particularly heat resistant, as 

the melting points of these materials are generally much higher 

than those of the metals. However, the strength of the ceramics 

now known is usually too low to be used for high stressed parts. 

On the other hand, ceramics have not been developed for such 

purposes before, and much remains to be learned. Two points need 

to be mentioned particularly: (1) The cost per pound of the ceramic 

material for machine parts could be many times that of the 

industrial ceramic materials now used, and thus the possible choice 

of basic components is much wider. (2) The ceramics can be used 

as a coating on metallic parts, and thus the temperature resisting 

property could be combined with the high strength property. 

2.61 A different approach to the problem of increasing the inlet gas 

temperature in turbines consists of cooling the parts of the engine 

exposed to high temperatures. The cooling problem brings up new 

requirements for the material. Thermal conductivity and thermal 

extension may become more important than creep at high 

temperatures. The recently proposed method of cooling by 

injecting the coolant through a porous material will promote the 

development of new alloys. 
330 

of operation. In view of the very high temperature involved in the 

combustion of rocket fuels, liquid-cooled chambers and nozzles 

have been used for long-duration units. The erosion of the nozzle 

has been a very difficult problem from the material point of view. 

It seems, however, that erosion occurs only if the temperature of 

the surface reaches some critical value. Nozzles made of very soft 

material (aluminum) have been used successfully when properly 

cooled. It appears that the conditions the material should satisfy to 

operate properly in a liquid cooled unit are different from those 

required for an uncooled unit. In the first case, metals can be used 

almost exclusively. Thermal conductivity, thermal extension, and 

machinability are the essential factors in this case. In the second 

case, most metals will not stand the combustion chamber 

temperature, and the use of high melting point metals (tungsten, 

molybdenum, tantalum) and of ceramic materials seems to be 

justified. 

2.63 In the design of nuclear reaction chambers, quite different 

characteristics of the material must be considered, especially the 

absorption of neutrons, alpha particles, and radiation, combined 

with high temperature. 

Rotary-Wing Aircraft 

2.64 No mention has been made so far of aircraft different from the 

airplane type. Certainly rotary-wing aircraft, in spite of serious 

limitations, have military applications in airborne operations, as 

well as a host of special duties such as rescue, liaison, etc. The 

application of jet propulsion to rotary-wing aircraft is worthy of 

further investigation, and other forms of rotary-wing aircraft, such 

as the cyclogyro and gyrodyne, should be more fully explored. A 

somewhat fantastic idea is a helicopter driven by atomic energy 

which could serve as an observation station for a very long period 

of time at considerable altitude, reporting data to the ground or to 

an airplane. 
331 

the advantage of large cargo carrying capacity. Aerodynamic 

development and development in propulsion may considerably 

increase the speed of the airship. Since the greatest portion of the 

drag of an airship consists of skin friction, laminar boundary layer 

control may cause a very essential reduction of the drag. Another 

less important improvement could be derived from a rear propeller 

drive, consisting of shrouded propellers located in the stern of the 

ship. Boundary layer control, of course, would probably require a 

construction material suitable for forming a smooth surface with 

sufficient local strength. 

Locate Targets and Recognize Them 

3.1 In order to accomplish its mission the Air Forces must not only 

be able to move swiftly and transport loads through the air but the 

movement must be directed to bring the aircraft or missile and its 

means of destruction from a base to the vicinity of a military target 

which may be anywhere on the globe. The target must then be 

recognized. The technical problem is one of locating two objects, 

the aircraft or missile, and the target, with respect to some frame of 

reference and of bringing the two locations in coincidence by 

guiding the aircraft or missile. It is convenient to consider the 

problem in three successive phases: (1) reconnaissance, or 

obtaining advance knowledge of where targets are to be found so 

that an attack may be planned; (2) navigation, or guiding the 

aircraft or missile from the base of operations to the vicinity of the 

target; and (3) recognition of the target immediately prior to its 

attack. 

Reconnaissance 

3.2 The basic frame of reference for locating targets is an accurate 

and precise survey map of the earth’s surface, but before targets 

can be located on a map, we must first know that they exist. The 

first procedure will undoubtedly be to make factual surveys of 

enemy industry, transportation systems, and military installations 

by the usual methods involving agents traveling within enemy 

territory, study of prewar economic data, and similar methods. The 
332 

of man, including aerial photographs, radar, heat detectors, 

detectors of radioactive materials, etc. The enemy will try to 

disguise his main factories and other installations by camouflage 

and decoy targets and will try to interfere with the operation of our 

scientific aids, for example, by providing smoke screens and by 

electronic jamming. We must, therefore, employ a variety of 

means, comparing the results of one against the others. This 

problem of determining precisely where the target is located in the 

first place requires the judgment which can only be supplied by the 

human brain, and cannot be entrusted wholly to any single 

mechanism as may perhaps be possible in the navigation and attack 

problems. 

Aerial Photography 

3.3 If accurate maps of the enemy’s territory are not already 

available they must be provided by our own forces and the most 

feasible method is by means of aerial photography. Methods of 

aerial photography have been highly developed and will continue 

to be useful even if aircraft fly faster and higher. It may happen 

that difficulty is experienced with clouds and haze in which case 

radar methods can be used as discussed in the next section. Maps 

made from aerial photographs may or may not show the actual 

location of all possible targets but they will show the shape and 

location of cities, important rivers, coastlines, mountains, and other 

natural features and they will serve as the basic frame of reference 

for location of strategic and other fixed targets. 

3.4 Aerial photography is also used for detailed surveillance of 

enemy territory and for the detection of specific military targets. 

The long period of time which is available for the study of 

reconnaissance data usually enables the detection of decoys and 

camouflage and permits exact location of the target. Concealment 

by camouflage can generally be defeated by color photography or 

stereoscopic photography, both of which have been highly 

developed. Few pigments useful for optical camouflage match the 

colors of the surrounding territory so perfectly that they cannot be 

detected by color photography with suitable selected filters. 
333 

application of paint. 

Radar Surveys 

3.5 Useful maps can be made by photographing the indicator scope 

of an airborne radar and the detail is greater the narrower the radar 

beam, i.e., the shorter the wave length for a given antenna size. It 

is, in fact, desirable to provide special reconnaissance radar 

equipment in a special aircraft whose express function is to provide 

large and clear map-like presentations of the terrain suitable for 

photographing. Such records are useful not only for making the 

usual line maps but as guides to bombardiers when radar methods 

of bombing are used. Radar reconnaissance can be made at night 

and through clouds. It penetrates the nets and cloths commonly 

used as camouflage materials, and may even penetrate natural 

cover like forests under certain conditions. 

3.6 Cities and large industrial installations are usually easily 

detected in radar photographs. Smaller targets can be detected 

under suitable background coordinations. Objects surrounded on 

one or more sides by water such as bridges, piers, ships, etc., are 

easily detected by modern radar equipment. 

Heat Surveys 

3.7 Underground installations cannot be detected either by aerial 

photography or by radar, and other means must be sought. Any 

large industrial plant uses considerable amounts of power which is 

eventually turned into heat by friction in the machines, losses in 

electric motors, electric lights, air compressors, etc. In an 

underground plant the heat must be conveyed to the surface 

through a suitable ventilating system except in very unusual 

circumstances. The hot air exhaust pipe may be detected by 

sensitive heat meters carried in reconnaissance aircraft. The same 

equipment is effective in detecting optically camouflaged 

industrial plants and in differentiating between real and decoy 

targets. 
334 

detecting the presence of submarines. These devices dropped from 

aircraft into the sea contain microphones to pick up underwater 

noise and a radio transmitter to relay the information to the 

reconnaissance aircraft. It is practicable to use similar devices 

against surface and underground targets which give off 

considerable noise as is the case for many types of industrial 

plants. 

Magnetic Methods 

3.9 The present war has also brought the development of magnetic 

methods of detecting submerged submarines. In principle the same 

methods should be applicable to the detection of underground 

factories. Because of their short range of detection these devices 

are not at present highly practicable for this purpose. 

Atomic Power Plants 

3.10 Plants engaged in the manufacture of materials for atomic 

bombs or atomic power plants may be detected not only by the 

heat given off but by the special types of radiation from them 

which penetrates considerable thickness of earth. Suitable airborne 

equipment can probably be designed for the detection of such 

radiation. 

Navigation 

3.11 Having fixed the geographical location of the enemy targets 

the next step is to bring the aircraft or missile to the vicinity. The 

central problem of navigation is to determine quickly and 

accurately the geographical position of an aircraft. The ideal 

situation is to have available continuously the position of the 

aircraft regardless of weather conditions, preferably in the form of 

a plot on a map showing the history of the flight up to the present 

moment. As the speed of the aircraft increases, the time required to 

obtain the position must be reduced. For example, an aircraft flying 

at 1200 miles per hour traverses 20 miles in one minute, and it 

would be necessary to reduce; the time to less than three seconds if 
335 

Position Finding 

3.12 The methods available for locating the position of an aircraft 

may be classified in various ways. They will be discussed here 

under the headings visual methods, dead reckoning, and radio and 

radar methods, the greatest emphasis being placed on the radar 

methods because they seem to offer the greatest possibilities of 

attaining the ideal. 

Visual Methods 

3.13 When the ground is visible, the position of the aircraft may be 

obtained by referring to visible landmarks such as cities, railroads, 

rivers, mountains, lakes, lighthouses, etc., and comparing them 

with a map. This simplest method of navigation, known as air 

pilotage or piloting, is useful primarily over land in clear weather 

and over territory for which maps are available. 

3.14 Over the oceans, also over land and above clouds when 

celestial objects are visible, the methods of celestial navigation 

may be used. This procedure amounts fundamentally to a 

determination of the position of the aircraft relative to the 

geographical position of one or more celestial bodies which is 

known if the time is known. Much ingenuity has been exercised in 

developing aids for converting the observed data into position of 

the aircraft in the shortest possible time. Attention should be given 

to the problem of automatic celestial navigation of pilotless 

aircraft. 

Dead Reckoning 

3.15 Dead reckoning is the method of estimating position by 

keeping an account, or reckoning, of the course and distance from 

a previously known position. The basic observed data are the air 

speed and the compass course, but suitable corrections must be 

made for air temperature and pressure to give true air speed, for 

declination and deviation to give the true heading, and for the 

wind. 
336 

instruments for measuring true air speed in conjunction with a 

device known as an air position indicator. In this device, the 

compass heading is combined with true air speed automatically to 

give latitude and longitude, starting from an initial setting at a 

known position. The mechanism takes account of the fact that a 

degree of longitude is of varying length at different latitudes and 

functions accurately except at very high latitudes. The compass 

corrections may be set in manually from time to time. 

3.17 When science has perfected a satisfactory ground speed 

indicator not dependent on ground stations, the mechanized deadreckoning system, or ground position indicator, will be a most 

effective navigational aid. Its weakness is that the errors are 

cumulative and that it must have been in operation continuously 

from some known position. Its advantage is that the equipment is 

all on the aircraft and operation is not dependent on receiving radio 

transmission over long distances. The method of dead reckoning is 

the one method that is always available. 

3.18 The navigation employed in the V-1 and V-2 long-range 

missiles was essentially that of dead reckoning. In the case of V-1, 

the altitude was automatically controlled, the heading was 

determined by a magnetic compass which monitored the 

directional gyro of the autopilot, and the distance was measured by 

an air log. At the preset distance the bomb was made to dive on the 

target. In the case of V-2, the navigation occurred during the 

burning period of the rocket motor. The vertical heading was 

controlled by an elevation gyro, the azimuth by a radio beam, and 

the propulsion was cut off when a fixed speed was reached as 

determined by an integrating accelerometer. 

3.19 The accuracy obtainable by dead-reckoning methods is of the 

order of from two to five percent of the range from the last known 

position, the exact value depending not only on the type of 

measuring instruments and computers but also on atmospheric 

conditions. For example, the accuracy of current air position 

indicators is such that the error infrequently exceeds four percent 

and averages about two percent. The errors of measurement and 
337 

of error is the variability and uncertainty of the wind. This error 

decreases as the speed of the missile or aircraft increases. 

Radio and Radar Methods 

3.20 Prior to the introduction of radar techniques, many radio aids 

to navigation had been developed. Two-way radio telephone 

communication and the broadcasting of meteorological 

information are of incalculable assistance to navigators. For 

regular air routes the system of radio beams radiating from radiorange beacons and the radio marker beacons enable navigation 

under conditions of zero visibility. This system has been highly 

developed for commercial air transport in the United States. The 

beam defines a specific track in space, enabling correction to be 

made for wind drift. The information is independent of any 

transmission from the aircraft and the number of aircraft which can 

receive the information simultaneously is unlimited. However, 

there are technical difficulties at the radio frequencies used by the 

present system associated with the effects of the terrain and of the 

ionosphere on radio transmission at those frequencies. The trend is 

toward the use of higher frequencies and to methods dependent on 

microwaves and pulse transmission. 

3.21 Before radar, there was extensive development of aircraft 

radio direction finders, and homing devices, and of systems of 

aircraft location by direction finding from ground stations. 

Information so obtained was used for occasional computation of 

position as a fix in connection with navigation by dead reckoning. 

The most highly developed form of radio direction finder is the 

automatic radio compass which gives direct readings of the bearing 

relative to the axis of the aircraft of any radio station to which it is 

tuned. Indicators are available which combine this indication with 

that of a flux-gate magnetic compass. The same technical 

difficulties are encountered as for the radio-range system at the 

frequencies commonly used because of the effects of terrain and 

ionosphere on the transmission giving rise to night effects, multiple 

and bent courses, etc. In any system based on direction finding the 

errors increase with the range. Perhaps the most elegant beam 
338 

accuracy of the order of 10 at ranges up to 1000 or 2000 miles. 

3.22 Radar has developed many new techniques which are 

described in greater detail in the reports of the radar consultants, 

Radar and Communications. The development of microwave radar 

makes it possible for the navigator to “see” the terrain under blindflying conditions and to use the simplest of all methods, air 

pilotage. In X-band and shorter wavelengths, the resolution is 

sufficient for identification of rivers, streams, bridges, rail lines, 

and other surface features. In addition, the range of radar vision is 

greater than that of the eye, so that over the sea, land may be 

“seen” at ranges of from 50 to 100 miles. When over land, or at sea 

with the aid of radar buoys, drift may be determined and combined 

with an air position indicator to give a ground position indication. 

An accuracy of the order of two percent of the distance traveled 

since the last fix is attainable. This method of radar navigation 

requires no ground stations. 

3.23 The pulse techniques of radar have given rise to the 

development of a new technique of position finding based on 

measuring distances rather than directions to known points, hence 

called telemetric. The known points may be marked by radar 

beacons which provide strong identifiable artificial echoes. When 

“interrogated” by receiving a signal from a microwave transmitter 

in the aircraft, the beacon transmits an echo, and the time interval 

from pulse emission to receipt of echo is a measure of the distance. 

Even a single beacon enables a fix within the accuracy set by the 

width of the radar beam. Much greater precision is obtained by 

measuring simultaneously the distance from two beacons, the 

procedure used in the British “H” system and Shoran. The traffic 

capacity of this type of system is limited. 

3.24 Another telemetric method is the hyperbolic method in which 

pairs of ground stations emit synchronized pulses. The pulses are 

received in the aircraft and the time difference between the arrival 

of pulses from the member of a pair is measured. This locates the 

aircraft on a hyperbola and two such hyperbolas give a fix. The 
339 

3.25 The range of microwave systems extends to the optical 

horizon or only slightly beyond. For long ranges a relatively low 

radio frequency must be used. The hyperbolic system of navigation 

operating at frequencies of two megacycles per second or lower is 

known as Loran. The standard system now in use has a range over 

water of 700 nautical miles by day and 1400 miles by night with 

errors of from 0.1 to 10 miles depending on the geometry of the 

lines of position. A system under development is expected to have 

a range of 1200 miles by day and 2000 by night with errors of from 

one to two miles at 1000 miles. Laboratory techniques of pulse 

comparison indicate the possibility of improving the accuracy by 

an order of magnitude. 

3.26 The process of hyperbolic navigation may be compared with 

that of celestial navigation. The determination of lines of position 

is essentially similar except that the mathematics is more 

complicated. However, the unchanging character position obtained 

from fixed reference stations in contrast to the moving stars 

permits precomputation. Charts may be prepared in advance for 

pairs of stations and the results are permanently useful so long as 

the stations are maintained because the lines of equal time 

difference are fixed with respect to the surface of the earth. 

3.27 There is no technical obstacle to a complete mechanization of 

the receiver so that the output is either in the form of dial counters 

giving Loran coordinates or a plotting board which will plot the 

position continuously on a Loran chart. It is then a short step to 

connect the output to the rudder so that a predetermined track may 

be followed automatically. 

3.28 Since hyperbolic navigation requires only a receiver on the 

aircraft or missile, and the traffic capacity is unlimited, it is the 

most promising system for the control of large numbers of longrange ground-to-ground pilotless aircraft. As now visualized, 

special ground stations would be adjusted so that the hyperbolic 

line of position corresponding to a fixed time difference for which 

the missile receivers are set passes through the target. Aircraft 

could be launched from many points in a large area, all following a 
340 

position to the target. The attitude would be controlled 

independently and the dive to the ground would be initiated by 

reaching the appropriate position line of a second pair of ground 

stations. This type of attack could be operated without close 

coordination between control group and launching crews; their 

operations would be practically independent. 

Magnetic Methods 

3.29 The use of the compass for determining direction on the 

earth’s surface is well known. It has been repeatedly suggested that 

additional measurements on the earth’s magnetic field may yield 

another method of navigation. Thus, in theory, measurements of 

the magnetic dip and of magnetic field strength give two numbers 

which could serve as coordinates of position to be related to 

ordinary geographic coordinates by suitable surveys. The principal 

weakness of the method is that a recent survey over the territory to 

be traversed is necessitated by the secular variation of magnetic 

properties. In addition, the accuracy would be severely limited by 

diurnal variations and magnetic storms as well as by the lack of 

suitable airborne instruments. The method may be worthy of some 

further study. 

3.30 It is probable that no single method will answer all of the 

navigation problems of piloted and pilotless aircraft. However, 

there are available scientific methods and techniques in rich variety 

which make possible continuous knowledge of position 

independent of adverse meteorological conditions. 

Recognition of the Target 

3.31 As the aircraft or missile approaches the general vicinity of 

the target, the bombardier, gunner, operator, or the mechanism of 

the pilotless missile (if of the target seeking type) must find and 

recognize the target preparatory to the attack. Most of the methods 

useful for reconnaissance are also useful for recognition with the 

exception of photography which takes too much time. 

3.32 In the case of large and extended targets such as cities, 

factories, or other major installations above ground, when the 
341 

aerial photographs and maps. The photographs, maps, or sketches 

may be constructed in relief to show the appearance when 

approached at the normal approach altitude and thus facilitate 

recognition. 

3.33 Photographs of radar indicator scopes obtained on 

reconnaissance missions may be used in the same manner as aerial 

photographs as an aid to recognition. 

3.34 Skilled operators have no difficulty in recognizing many types 

of targets directly on the radar indicator. Cities, bridges, piers, 

ships, islands, beaches at the coast line, and aircraft can all be 

recognized without difficulty. Special techniques are available for 

detecting moving targets which are especially useful for aircraft 

detection but which are also applicable to ground targets under 

some conditions. 

3.35 If agents are available in the enemy territory, they may mark 

targets otherwise invisible by portable radar beacons or, in special 

cases, such marking beacons may be dropped from the air. 

3.36 Radar methods may be used to follow the aircraft or missile 

from ground control stations and to direct the pilot or actually 

remotely control the aircraft to a target whose map location is 

known by previous reconnaissance. 

3.37 The reconnaissance methods using heat detectors, detectors of 

special types of radiation from radioactive materials, magnetic 

measurements, or acoustic radiosondes dropped on the ground may 

find application in recognition of special targets. These methods as 

well as radar are applicable to the homing control of missiles. In 

fact any target possessing any peculiarity as to physical properties 

which set it off from its background can be recognized by a 

suitable homing intelligence device. 

3.38 Especially in the case of pilotless aircraft, the operation of 

recognition and control may be carried out at a remote point by the 

aid of radio repeat-back of information from a television camera or 

a radar search set. 
342 

Guidance and Homing of Missiles and Pilotless Aircraft 

Radar and Communications 

Hit Targets Accurately 

4.1 The degree of accuracy required for successful strategic 

bombing is one of the most discussed topics of aerial warfare. 

Visual bombsights were designed for so-called pin-point bombing. 

However, war experiences show that this type of bombing is 

applicable only to a limited extent, because of weather and enemy 

interference. Hence, in most cases pin-point bombing has to be 

replaced by area-bombing, i.e., by bombing with an accuracy 

obtainable by radar blind aiming, by dropping the bombs 

simultaneously from a large formation, or by missiles equipped 

with automatic pilot. In the future, bombing in large formations 

will probably be prevented by improved antiaircraft devices. It will 

be necessary to revise bombing equipment in the light of future 

methods of strategy, including the use of atomic bombs. 

4.2 The ability to hit targets accurately is dependent on the 

aerodynamic performance of the bombs, meteorological 

conditions, the accuracy of the bombsight, and the abilities of the 

bombardier. The study of the aerodynamic characteristics of 

bombs at low speeds has been well developed, but further research 

is needed in the transonic region. A considerable loss in accuracy 

of bombing from high altitude, originally attributed to the effect of 

high speed on the aerodynamic characteristics, was finally traced 

to structural failure of the fins. However, there is some evidence of 

an adverse effect of high speed on stability for certain types of 

bombs. 

4.3 Bombers require bombsights in order to hit the target. In 

general, it can be said that the faster an airplane travels the less 

accurately it can drop its bombs. If bombers are actually going to 

fly at speeds around 1000 mph it cannot be said with certainty that 

present bombing precision can be improved upon or even 

maintained in spite of ever increasing complexity of the 
343 

the bombardier will have a significant effect on precision. 

4.4 Any self contained bombsight has two parts, the sighting 

means and the computer. In optical bombsights the sighting means 

is a telescope; in radar bombsights it is a radar. There are only 

trivial differences in computer design in the two cases. 

4.5 The faster the bomber flies, the farther ahead the sighting 

means must see; above 400 or 500 mph only radar can see far 

enough and there is no sense in trying to develop optical 

bombsights for such aircraft. 

4.6 But a fundamental difficulty with radar is that in order for it to 

see far and also clearly, its antenna must be wide; this is a tendency 

in flat contradiction to aerodynamical trends for high-speed 

aircraft. 

4.7 The design of bombsight computers aims not only at accuracy 

but at decreasing the time required for manipulation after the target 

is recognized. This has a profound effect on what is required of the 

associated radar since the more time required to adjust the 

computer the farther away the target has to be recognized, and 

there is a practical limit to this. The recent war has seen the 

beginning of the development of computers suitable for use in dive 

and glide bombing as well as for offset bombing, i.e., sighting at 

some more easily recognizable point whose position relative to the 

target is known. These developments give greater freedom of flight 

path to the bomber. 

4.8 Pilotless bombers whose range is limited to less than 

approximately 100 miles may be entirely directed by means of 

precision ground-based devices employing radar principles. 

Extensions of the Shoran equipment to automatically control such 

aircraft can be perfected. 

4.9 For longer ranges, studies should be made of the use of 

airborne relay stations such as airplanes, rotary-wing aircraft, or 

missiles, and of combinations of ground based directors with a 

homing device in the vehicle. In order to achieve long range the 

ground stations must operate on relatively long wavelengths such 
344 

vicinity of the target, whereupon the homing device may take over 

control. 

4.10 Studies of the optimum locations of Loran stations for this 

purpose should be undertaken; the possibility of mounting such 

stations on submarines should be explored. The possibility of longrange guiding by automatic celestial navigation should also be 

investigated. 

4.11 The homing devices used may react to any radiation emitted 

from the target or may, radar-like, themselves illuminate it. Radio 

waves, thermal radiation, light, and certain of the high-energy 

radiations from nuclear reactions may be considered as practical 

for homing purposes; if the device homes on radiation emitted 

from the target, then to a certain extent it can automatically 

recognize the target. Thus, a device made to home only on gamma 

rays would only home on unshielded atomic power plants, whereas 

one made to home on radio waves would neglect atomic power 

plants in favor of radio transmitters. This advantage is not so 

favorable as it sounds however, since the possibility of erecting 

decoy targets always exists, even for atomic energy plants. 

4.12 For extremely high-speed missiles like V-2 the homing 

problem is made very difficult by the extremely long range 

required of the detecting device. 

4.13 Magnetic airborne devices are not regarded as offering good 

prospects for guiding pilotless aircraft. It is to be doubted whether 

devices sensitive to sound will be of any use either. 

4.14 Means for guiding missiles may be ground-based or air-based 

regardless of whether the missile itself is launched from ground or 

air. The particular tactical need will determine which of the four 

possible combinations should be used. It may prove upon further 

study that the guiding and launching means should be similarly 

based. 

4.15 The most difficult problem in launching missiles from the air 

is to launch them in the proper direction, if the target is nearby, so 

that they will require a minimum time of flight. The proposed 
345 

4.16 While use is made of all available aerodynamic knowledge in 

the design of pilotless bombers, especially in the field of transonic 

and supersonic aerodynamics, there are many special problems 

introduced by the use of homing devices which must be solved if 

high accuracy is to be attained. For greater accuracy the missile 

should look in the direction of travel of its center of gravity except 

as corrections for wind and target motion are introduced by a 

course computer. An aircraft of conventional design operates at a 

variable angle of attack dependent on load and speed, and 

boresight errors would arise as discussed by Dr. H. L. Dryden in 

“Present State of the Guided Missile Art,” Part I of the SAG report 

Guided Missiles and Pilotless Aircraft. 

4.17 Perhaps the major problem in the design of a pilotless bomber 

is the coordination of all elements to give stable operation without 

excessive hunting, i.e., systems coordination. The tag 

characteristics of the intelligence device and of the autopilot and 

associated servomechanisms are perhaps the most important 

factors, but the stability and accuracy are dependent on many other 

factors including the aerodynamic characteristics of the missile. 

4.18 In addition to bombs released from manned airplanes or 

carried by guided pilotless bombers, guns and rockets play an 

important role in aerial warfare. Rockets, stabilized either by tail 

fins like a bomb or by spin like a shell, are one of the important 

new developments of the present war. Comparatively large 

missiles may be fired and continually improved with better 

knowledge of the aerodynamics of rockets and with the 

development of rocket-sighting devices. Their effectiveness by the 

application of proximity fuses has greatly increased. 

4.19 The development of fire-control equipment has had little 

difficulty in keeping ahead of the development of guns. The range, 

accuracy, and rate of fire of the guns are not at all of a magnitude 

commensurate with the needs of aircraft traveling at supersonic 

speeds. Problems which must receive increased attention are the 

adaptation of guns and aircraft so that neither the aerodynamic 

performance of the aircraft nor the effectiveness of the gun is 
346 

make superior gunsights if the guns are not also improved. 

4.20 Many of the present computers for antiaircraft fire are based 

on the assumption that the two aircraft are traveling in straight 

lines. This assumption does not give sufficient accuracy. A 

fundamental study should be made of the types of paths usually 

followed by aircraft in combat and gunsights should be redesigned 

on the basis of the results of the study. 

4.21 As the speed of airplanes increases to the supersonic range, a 

further limit on accuracy is imposed by the unalterable reaction 

time of the human operator. In principle, this difficulty can be 

overcome by making machines which are more and more 

automatic. Some progress had been made in this direction in the 

experimental radar-controlled guns which could be locked on any 

desired aerial target and thereafter would automatically keep the 

guns pointed at it. If such devices can be developed of sufficiently 

low weight, the man would be called upon only for the will to 

fight, a trait which so far has not been built into any automatic 

device. 

4.22 It is certain that instruments of control will become more 

complicated in structure as they are required to perform more and 

more functions formerly carried out by men. The problem of 

instrumental reliability and satisfactory operation then becomes 

urgent. 

4.23 Reliability can only be assured by a continuing program of 

development not only of the instruments themselves but also, and 

equally important, of the component parts of which they are made. 

Such development of improved components may not be adequately 

supported by the ordinary economic forces of peacetime 

competition and heavy financial support by the Air Forces may be 

necessary. 

4.24 Satisfactory operation can only be assured by careful selection 

and training of personnel and above all by careful designing of 

instruments in accordance with the psychological and 

physiological needs of the men who are supposed to operate them. 
347 

It would be the prime purpose of this group to insure that the 

design of aircraft, of the offensive armament, and of the 

instruments meant to control them are coordinated so that one 

integrated fighting machine comes out. The present tendency to 

design an airplane and then hang on guns, rockets, bombs, radar, 

and sighting devices as a multitude of accessories must cease. 

Ability to Cause Destruction 

5.1 The war which just ended was the first one in which aerial 

bombing played a decisive role. An immense amount of work was 

put into the development of bombs, bombing instruments, and 

bombing tables. Much of the present knowledge of the results of 

bombing and the effectiveness of bombs was obtained by 

systematic observation and analysis. A new branch of terminal 

ballistics developed, dealing with the effect of bombs on their 

targets. Since the heat released by our present molecular explosives 

is near the possible upper limit, great attention was paid to the 

most efficient use of the limited amount of energy. Then with the 

appearance of the atomic bomb, the destructive power of one bomb 

was made equal to the effect of 20,000 tons of explosive. The 

question arises, should the efforts for further improvement in 

construction and use of conventional bombs be continued, or 

should the whole material available be worked up for the archives 

and further study be concentrated on the atomic phase of the 

problem. 

5.2 It is true that after the discovery of the gun, archery gradually 

became a sport instead of a military art. This process of 

substitution was slow; however, analogous processes in our age 

may become very rapid. Hence, we might argue that atomic bombs 

are the future means of destruction and we may forget about 

conventional bombs. The arguments against this theory are the 

following: 

(1) Production facilities of atomic bombs may be limited, so 

that their use will be restricted to the most important actions. (2) In 

many cases of future warfare we shall not be willing to use means 

of utter destruction. (3) Economic and political reasons may 
348 

5.3 Fundamental features of nuclear processes involved in the 

functioning of the present atomic bomb do not permit making them 

of considerably smaller power than those which have been used 

against Japan. The answer to the question whether the development 

of conventional bombs should be continued depends to a great 

extent on whether the developments of nuclear science will 

produce a variety of bombs in a range of sizes, adaptable to various 

missions. The gap between the effect of the largest conventional 

and the present atomic bomb is immense. Warfare is directed 

primarily to securing the safety of our nation and not to the 

indiscriminate destruction of others. Hence, it appears that the 

most reasonable channel for development of atomic weapons is to 

investigate the possibility of smaller capacities. No one can tell 

today whether and to what extent this is possible. Since there is no 

guarantee that atomic bombs can be substituted completely for 

conventional bombs, the work on development and improvement 

of conventional weapons must be continued. 

5.4 I believe the Air Forces should concentrate its effort upon: (1) 

getting full information about the destructive power of the present 

atomic bombs; (2) studying the possibilities of the adaptation of 

atomic bombs to various missions which proved to be effective 

against the war potential of the enemy in the last war; (3) studying 

the possibilities of developing smaller size nuclear bombs perhaps 

by using nuclear reactions other than fission; and (4) making 

comparative studies of efficiency and costs of past methods of 

strategic bombing and future methods using pilotless bombers 

loaded with either atomic or conventional explosives. 

5.5 Special study should be made of the problem of destruction of 

underground establishments. In the last war submarine berths were 

attacked with bombs, but with practically no success. It must be 

anticipated that a considerable portion of the key industries of 

possible enemies will be located underground in order to escape 

bombardment. Probably attack on communications leading to the 

underground factories and depots gives the best possibility of 

successful neutralization of such underground establishments. 
349 

War Department have shown that one pound of high explosives 

exploding within the wing of an airplane will cause sufficient 

damage to produce a crash or at least make return from a mission 

improbable. However, additional study is needed of the damage 

from blast and fragmentation at distances within the range of 

proximity fuses. In this application of fragmentation as a means of 

destruction, considerable progress has already been made by the 

application of scientific principles to develop controlled 

fragmentation, controlled both as to size and general direction of 

travel of the fragments. The theory of blast is now well developed; 

from this theory, for example, it has been estimated that 20,000 

tons of TNT, which is said to be the equivalent as regards blast, of 

the atomic bomb, will destroy an aircraft one to two miles away. 

The efficient design of warheads for air to air missiles and ground 

to air missiles is dependent on accurate information on the 

destructive effects of both ordinary and atomic explosives when 

used either for blast or for hurling fragments. 

5.7 The destruction of ships offers many new problems in terminal 

ballistics. The penetration of the armor of battleships and other 

men-of-war is essentially the same problem as penetration of the 

armor tanks. A scientific curiosity of the first decades of this 

century, the so-called Monroe effect, has been applied in this last 

war to the development of hollow or shaped charges which have 

remarkable powers of penetration. Ships are more easily destroyed 

by underwater explosions. 

5.8 “Terminal Ballistics and Destructive Effects,” by Dr. N. M. 

Newmark (Part III of Explosives and Terminal Ballistics) describes 

the present state of knowledge of destructive effects of explosives. 

This report also contributes suggestions for completing our 

information on the subject. It is believed that such a program 

should be carried out because (1) in a transition period such 

information is certainly needed, and (2) the final picture 

concerning the relation between the atomic and the conventional 

explosive is yet uncertain. 
350 

to be generally accepted: 

a. The most effective high explosive bomb for attack of light 

industrial buildings is a GP bomb fused to burst between the roof 

and the floor. Greater damage is produced to the building and to its 

contents with this fusing than with instantaneous fusings, or with 

cratering bombs. 

b. Against heavy industrial buildings and heavy machinery, 

large cratering bombs or penetrating bombs are required to 

produce severe damage. 

c. Against relatively combustible construction, either residential 

or industrial, incendiary bombs were several times as effective, 

weight for weight, as any other type of bomb, except possibly air 

burst of very large blast bombs. 

d. Small bombs, blast bombs, and incendiary bombs had 

virtually no effect on submarine pens and heavy fortifications. 

Penetrating bombs or large general purpose bombs are required. 

e. Against brick wall-bearing construction and against light 

wood-frame construction, blast bombs are most effective, and air 

burst at the proper height produces more damage than ground burst 

or cratering bombs. 

5.10 Improvements needed in present conventional weapons 

depend on the availability in quantity and size of atomic bombs. 

Since it must be assumed, in the immediate future at least, that 

only a relatively small quantity of present-type atomic bombs will 

be available, conventional bombs must be capable of being used 

effectively against all possible types of targets. 

5.11 The following requirements seem to be most urgently needed: 

a. Bombs designed specifically for the attack of massive 

underground installations including shaped-charge bombs, rocketassisted bombs, and follow-through bombs. Possibly the required 

improvement in penetration performance can be obtained by 

developing bomb cases of increased strength. 
351 

targets vulnerable to blast. 

c. Development of fragmentation bombs with more adequately 

controlled fragmentation. 

d. Development of fuses with more accurate control of timing, 

to permit bombs to burst after penetrating the roof of a building 

and before striking the floor or penetrating the earth beneath. (See 

SAG report, Explosives Terminal and Ballistics.) 

Function Independently of Weather and Darkness 

6.1 The goal of the Air Forces is an all-weather air force, i.e., 

complete independence of weather, both for flying and carrying 

out offensive and defensive missions. Flying independently of 

weather includes take-off, landing, and traffic operations without 

visibility, navigation without contact and minimum influence of 

the weather situation and wind on the flight path and flying time. 

The main requirement for carrying out offensive missions in any 

weather is the replacement of visual bombing and visual fire 

control by radar methods. The same methods and equipment which 

are needed to carry out flight bombing and combat operations in 

cloudy weather serve the same purposes on dark nights. 

Blind Landing 

6.2 There are two aspects to the problem of blind landing, the 

actual blind landing or blind approach of a single aircraft, and the 

problem of traffic control in the neighborhood of a landing area, 

which is in many ways more difficult than traffic control along 

cross-country airways. The first problem mentioned has been 

attacked from two different directions, represented by the glidepath-localizer system, and the more recent GCA (groundcontrolled-approach) system. In the glide-path- localizer system a 

direction of approach, and a glide path, are defined in space by 

fixed radio beams. Through a suitable receiver and indicator the 

pilot is apprised automatically of his position relative to this path. 

In the GCA system the position of the aircraft is determined by a 

precision radar set on the ground and instructions are given to the 

pilot over any available communication channel. Each system has 
352 

and it requires no special equipment in the aircraft: however, its 

traffic handling capacity is now rather restricted and it does require 

fairly elaborate ground equipment and a highly trained crew. We 

cannot regard either method as a universal solution of the problem. 

There may be in fact several future systems, or combinations of 

systems for different types of airports, ranging from permanent 

commercial air bases to temporary landing strips at advanced 

military bases. What is needed, in addition to technical 

improvements, is extensive experience and a comprehensive 

program of trials aimed at an integrated combination of all useful 

aids. 

Traffic Control 

6.3 Traffic control near an airfield is peculiarly difficult because of 

the congestion which exists at such a focal point and the necessity 

of orderly approach to the landing path. Microwave search radar, 

on the ground, is a powerful aid and is an essential adjunct of the 

GCA system. It does not, however, solve all the critical problems, 

which include communication and identification. It ought to be 

possible for a ground controller not only to know the position and 

altitude of any aircraft in the vicinity, but to talk directly to any 

selected one. This requires a multiplicity of channels, and a degree 

of flexibility and reliability not approached by any existing 

communication equipment. However, the voice communication 

techniques available at microwave frequencies are very promising 

and should be exploited. Incidentally the heavy investment in 

existing types of equipment is exerting a retarding influence on this 

development, which we consider extremely important for the 

future Air Forces. 

6.4 Going even further, one can envisage means by which some of 

the information available on the ground could be relayed to each 

pilot in the vicinity, almost completely breaking down the barriers 

of overcast and darkness. 
353 

that is, controlling the aircraft in a condition of reasonably steady 

flight on a given course, and second, determining as frequently as 

necessary the position of the aircraft in ground coordinates. We 

have to consider also obstacle detection or collision prevention. 

6.6 Automatic pilots have been in use since about 1933. In the 

present form one or more gyroscopes are used to detect rotations of 

the aircraft; the resulting relative motion is translated into a signal 

which is amplified and operates the controls. Means are provided 

to make various adjustments of sensitivity and to prevent selfoscillation. The automatic pilot must be adjusted to the particular 

type of aircraft and the best adjustment often depends on the 

roughness of the air. Automatic pilots for pilotless aircraft must be 

designed to operate without the necessity of manual adjustments in 

the air. 

6.7 Instrument flying in all weather conditions requires a solution 

of the icing problem which is still a great obstacle to continuous 

operation of pilotless as well as piloted aircraft. 

6.8 An aircraft flying blind can keep track of its position by the 

sort of aided dead reckoning provided by the ground-positionindicator for some time after a fix in ground coordinates has been 

obtained. Even with further improvements in instrumentation there 

will remain the inherent limitation due to lack of precise 

knowledge of the wind. Airborne radar of reasonably high 

resolution permits, over land at least, contact flying or direct radar 

pilotage, which may be used on occasion as the sole means of 

navigation or may more usually serve to establish frequent fixes 

for an automatic dead-reckoning instrument. Not all aircraft will be 

able to afford the space for this facility, and, since the radar picture 

must be interpreted by a human observer, pilotless aircraft would 

be required to relay such a picture back to the controlling base. 

6.9 A very important means of blind navigation is provided by the 

long range hyperbolic system, Loran, which has come into wide 

use. A detailed discussion of the future possibilities of this and 

related systems is included in the report of the consultants on radar. 

(See the SAG report, Radar and Communication.) We should call 
354 

on the problem of guiding pilotless aircraft far beyond the horizon. 

Obstacle Detection 

6.10 Military operations require the simultaneous operation of 

large numbers of aircraft under blind conditions. The problem 

arises of avoiding collision. Any airborne radar with 360o view is 

capable of performing this function within the limitations imposed 

by its minimum range and resolving power. The minimum range is 

fundamentally limited by the pulse length; it is about 125 feet for a 

1-microsecond pulse. Hence, while the airborne radar search set 

suffices to warn of the approach of other aircraft, it cannot be used 

to guide formation flying in blind conditions in the tight 

formations employed in clear weather. However, there seems to be 

no good reason for close formations in bad weather. 

6.11 It would be possible to devise systems smaller and less 

elaborate than a complete search radar to perform solely the 

function of warning of obstacles. Whether these would be 

worthwhile in themselves depends on the type of formation flying, 

and the type of aircraft, which develop in the future. 

Weather 

6.12 Long range flights in general will be carried out at altitudes 

“over the weather” thus avoiding most disturbances caused by the 

weather situation. For this purpose it is generally sufficient to fly at 

40,000 feet altitude at moderate latitude and at 50,000 feet altitude 

in the equatorial zone. Altitude flying involves certain equipment, 

especially supercharged engines and supercharged cabins. 

Problems occurring at high altitudes in gas turbine and jet engine 

operation have to be solved. Furthermore, problems of 

aeromedicine related to high altitude flying have to be pursued. 

(Cf. 7.11 to 7.15) The influence of wind will be automatically 

minimized by the high speed of future aircraft. 

6.13 The age of the “All-Weather Air Force” is drawing nearer. 

However, it will never be possible to ignore the forces of weather. 

The key to all-weather flying lies in knowing what the weather will 

be, understanding its dangers, and circumventing them. 
355 

careful selection of flight paths. Use of equipment, choice of 

procedures, and determination of flight paths must be based on the 

weather forecast. The weather forecast is vital also to ground force 

operations. Fire control necessitates corrections for atmospheric 

conditions, chemical warfare cannot be conducted with precision 

when a weather forecast is lacking, soil trafficability is a function 

of the weather, and tactics and planning demand an evaluation of 

what future weather will be. No military operation is wholly freed 

from the weather; many are bound closely to it. 

6.14 Wartime researches led to marked advances in upper aid 

analysis, weather forecasting, weather observation, and the 

application of weather information to military problems. 

Particularly noteworthy progress was made in upper air researches. 

Unprecedented quantities of upper air observations from all over 

the world provided the fundamental data. Researches led to the 

formulation of new methods of upper air analysis and to the 

extension and development of fundamental theories concerning the 

dynamics and structure of the upper air. Major advances were also 

made in long-range forecasting. Several long-range forecasting 

methods were developed and submitted to rigorous trial, using 

specially devised mathematical techniques to test their validity. 

The best methods were then utilized to prepare weather advice for 

pending military operations. The development of new scientific 

devices, for example, radar, made possible the development of new 

and improved instruments which extended the range and accuracy 

of meteorological measurements. In turn, the effective use of radar 

required additional meteorological studies. 

6.15 Future research must be directed towards improving weather 

forecasting, obtaining vital knowledge concerning the upper 

atmosphere and ionosphere, and achieving all-weather flight. The 

theories and data obtained during the war must be carefully 

checked and sifted to develop new forecast tools. The advent of 

new weapons, such as the atomic bomb, guided missiles, robot 

planes, and very high ceiling aircraft makes it necessary to obtain 

observational data for the upper atmosphere and ionosphere and to 

develop theories that will make forecasting practicable for these 
356 

terrestrial magnetism, ionization, and special radiation effects 

become important in the high atmosphere. In the achievement of 

all-weather flight, the weather obstacles to be overcome in flight 

must be described and measured in detail if equipment and 

procedures to overcome the weather are to be successfully devised. 

The atmosphere is of ever-increasing importance as the medium 

through which the instruments of war are launched. Meteorology, 

the science of the atmosphere, is of ever-increasing importance to 

the military. To keep abreast of modern military developments, 

research in meteorology must be vigorously pursued. 

6.16 The conditioning of weather over large territories has not 

been seriously considered in the past, however, the progress of 

meteorological science and the possibility of introducing in the air 

large amounts of energy by nuclear methods, might bring this aim 

into the realm of possibility. For example, the amount of energy 

required for forced local release of atmospheric instability in the 

case of convective storms and for the dissipation of fog should be 

within the limits of available energy from atomic sources. The 

general problem consists essentially of three parts: (1) exact 

knowledge of the weather parameters in the domain in which we 

want to produce changes, including both instantaneous values and 

their tendency of variation; (2) methods of computing the future 

weather, as dependent on the presence or absence of available 

control measures; and (3) means of applying the controls, such as 

adding energy in certain regions, modifying the reflection 

coefficient of certain areas, etc. It seems possible, with the aid of 

electronic computers, to produce a model of a certain region of the 

earth’s surface and the existing weather situation, which can be 

used not only for fast weather prediction, but also for direct rapid 

experimentation, on a mode scale, with various control methods. 

(See the SAG report, Weather, by I. P. Krick.) 

Defeat Enemy Interference 

7.1 The fight for air superiority includes the annihilation of all the 

means the enemy has to take the air and the neutralization of his 

ground defenses. Hence, strategic bombing and the fight for air 
357 

effectiveness of bombing missions. However, the possibility has to 

be envisaged that concentrated battles of air power against air 

power will be fought for control of the air, as battles were fought 

for superiority on land and on sea. Then, of course, superior 

experience, superior skill, and superior equipment will decide the 

outcome. 

Armament vs. Speed 

7.2 It is possible to develop large battleships of the air which 

would depend for protection on powerful, defensive armament 

including target-seeking missiles. It must be kept in mind, 

however, that they will be opposed by fighter airplanes with 

superior speed and maneuverability, of both the piloted and 

remotely-controlled variety. This suggests that a more effective 

method of defense against such attacks will be obtained by 

increasing the speed, the ceiling, and the maneuverability of the 

bomber to avoid the inevitable decrease in performance inherent in 

reliance on complex and necessarily heavy defensive armament. 

The problems are somewhat similar to those encountered in the 

past in building up sea power, and the future strategists of the air 

will have to decide on the relative merits of the different schools of 

thought which will probably develop. 

7.3 As far as the technical problems are concerned, speed, 

maneuverability, rate of climb, and altitude, appear as the main 

requirements. Improvements in speed and rate of climb are 

determined by improvements in aerodynamics, propulsion, and 

lightweight construction. One particular difficulty with jetpropelled airplanes occurs when fast climbing from the ground is 

required. Although the rate of climb is excellent, the total time of 

reaching a certain altitude is handicapped by the fact that the best 

speed of climbing is relatively high, near the maximum speed. 

Consequently, considerable time is needed for acceleration of the 

plane near the ground. Probably means of assisted take-off will be 

needed to reduce the time of acceleration. 

7.4 Present jet-propelled, fast airplanes lack, in some respects, the 

maneuverability of earlier fighter airplanes. This is a natural 
358 

capable of pursuing successfully the fastest and most 

maneuverable enemy bombers. This requires the maintenance of 

lift to as large angles of attack as possible without stalling, 

particularly at high Mach numbers, and the use of as low wing 

loadings as are consistent with the requirements of high speed and 

range. In piloted aircraft this problem also involves the black out 

limit of the pilot, which must be maintained as high as possible by 

use of pressure suits and other aero-medical techniques, and 

probably by use of the prone position in very fast interceptors. 

High Altitude 

7.5 To secure air superiority it is necessary to reach equal or higher 

altitudes than the enemy. Rocket-driven airplanes are especially 

suitable for extreme altitudes, because their propulsion is 

independent of atmospheric air, although their flight duration is 

inherently limited. Hence, it will be necessary to use every possible 

means to adapt other types of jet propulsion to high altitudes. 

Improvements in combustion and improvements in compressor 

design are the main requirements, especially the elimination of 

difficulties which are encountered in compressor efficiency when 

supersonic flow occurs in the machine. 

Human Limitations and Capabilities 

7.6 The human element, both on the ground and in flight, is of 

paramount importance in global operations directed toward 

attaining air supremacy. The study of this element is the concern of 

aviation medicine which includes: (1) the initial selection of 

personnel on the basis of those human qualities which make for 

efficient combat airmen with emphasis on vision, hearing, reaction 

time, neuropsychiatric normality, cardio-respiratory efficiency, 

physical prowess and psychologic adaptability; (2) the training of 

aircrews in the technique which will enable them to perform 

efficiently, independently of weather and darkness, under the 

unusual stresses produced by high speed, high altitude, great 

maneuverability, rapid changes in barometric pressure with 

changing altitude, and instrument right and contact with the 
359 

under all environmental conditions; and (5) a detailed 

consideration of human requirements and limitations in the design 

of aircraft, so that the airman-aircraft complex will be made into an 

efficient fighting element. 

7.7 Inasmuch as human tolerance does not change, the steadily 

progressive increase in speed, ceiling, and potential 

maneuverability of aircraft has resulted in a progressively smaller 

margin between psycho-physiological requirements and human 

tolerance. Once supersonic speed is exceeded this margin will be 

of paramount importance in the operation of the aircraft. Hence, it 

is essential to determine under all conditions of flight the human 

tolerance as given by nature and the limits which can be attained as 

the result of selection, training, and the use of special protective 

devices, such as a G-suit, in order to utilize fully new aircraft in 

combat operations. Of necessity, the performance of present and 

future aircraft will be based in part on human limitations and 

capabilities. 

7.8 An additional human factor is that once an aircraft is damaged 

and must be abandoned, the aeronautical engineer’s problem is 

over but the problem of survival of the crew, wherever they may 

happen to be in the world, is just beginning. 

7.9 High-speed flight and maneuverability result in certain hazards 

and stresses on the flyer. At the comparatively slow speed of 600 

mph, 880 ft are traversed every second. Between the time the pilot 

receives an impulse to act and action by the pilot 0.2 sec elapses 

for simple reactions and he has traveled 176 ft without anything 

happening. For discriminative reactions the reaction time may be 

0.4 sec or more. These times require that the controls be 

immediately at hand and that the flyer be alert. If the situation 

requires a change in the course of the airplane, aiming and firing a 

gun or carrying out other mechanical tasks, the total time lag 

increases (reaction time and mechanical lag). To keep this 

reactionless period at a minimum requires that pilots be selected 

who have the shortest possible reaction time. When two aircraft are 

approaching head on at a speed of 2000 mph there will be an 
360 

passing. Obviously radar aids are essential. Danger of collision 

will be a real possibility. 

7.10 When flying at very high speed, quick turns with resultant 

high acceleration of short duration may be a method of eluding 

guided missiles. Therefore, studies to determine the effects of 

comparatively high acceleration of from 1 to 5 sec duration on 

flying personnel is of vital importance. Also, the effects of 

exposure to negative acceleration immediately after exposure to 

positive acceleration and vice versa should be carefully 

investigated. The effect on acceleration tolerance of such factors as 

anoxia, cold, heat, febrile and post-febrile state and intake of food 

and fluids is virtually unknown. All acceleration suits should be 

incorporated into the flying suit. Determination of the maximum 

acceleration that can be tolerated when the pilot is in the prone 

position (approximately 10-12 g from the chest to the back) and 

still allow manipulation of the controls will allow the aeronautical 

engineer to design such aircraft to withstand higher acceleration 

than ever designed before. However, the tolerance of a man in the 

prone position to acceleration from the head to feet on take-off and 

feet to head on landing is known to be quite low. 

7.11 Flight at high altitudes requires the use of oxygen by the crew. 

The oxygen equipment, now used by the Army Air Forces, gives 

flyers complete protection against anoxia up to altitudes of 37,000 

ft. For continued flying efficiency above 37,000 ft, some form of 

added pressure must be used to protect the flyer. Pressure 

breathing (6in. water pressure) can increase the ceiling 2,000-3,000 

ft. Pressure breathing used in connection with counterpressure 

pneumatic clothing can give protection for a few minutes as high 

as 80,000 ft. Pressure suits and pressure cabins, however, give the 

only complete protection at extreme altitude. 

7.12 Aeroembolism (or bends) is a serious human limitation in 

high altitude flights and becomes increasingly significant above 

30,000 ft. For one hour’s exposure 35,000 ft, one person in ten 

would be incapacitated; one in four at 40,000 ft. Very few 

individuals can stay more than 20 min above 40,000 ft without 
361 

aeroembolism. On the other hand, exercises at altitude increases 

the danger of its onset. 

7.13 Of the mechanical effects of altitude, the most serious is the 

rapid expansion of body gases, especially above 30,000 ft, which, 

if they exist, can cause painful abdominal discomfort. Extreme 

rates of decompression are well tolerated but compression rates 

above 1 psi/min are increasingly difficult to withstand except for 

specially trained and selected personnel. 

7.14 All aircraft designed for extreme high-altitude flights (ten 

miles and up) must be equipped with pressure cabins and ideally 

should be maintained at an absolute pressure of 4.4 psi or over. 

Pressure suits have been built that satisfy this requirement but have 

proved to be extremely cumbersome and awkward. 

7.15 Experiments on human subjects have shown that the human 

body can tolerate a relative expansion of internal gases of 2.3 

during any explosive decompression of a pressure cabin or a 

pressure suit. Above 50,000 ft, however, it is virtually impossible 

to protect a pilot by proper choice of cabin pressure condition from 

both the dangers of anoxia and expanding internal gases. Loss of 

cabin pressure at any altitude above 50,000 ft will place the pilot in 

sufficient danger to require emergency protection from some form 

of pneumatic clothing, a practical version of which has yet to be 

developed. 

7.16 Emergency escape from an aircraft, while traveling at 

extremely high speeds (transonic and supersonic), and at high 

altitudes (10-50 miles) will require many special considerations. A 

parachute must be developed that will relieve the very high 

expected opening shock and will be free of oscillation. For this 

purpose, the Germans developed the ribbon parachute. Emergency 

oxygen must be carried, probably in the parachute, and for bailouts 

above 50,000 ft, some protection must be provided against severe 

anoxia and aeroembolism. Methods must be provided to eject the 

flyer free of his damaged ship. Ejection seats as an escape method 

are only practical for subsonic speeds. Full-face oxygen masks will 

protect the face from wind blast and cold. The concept of an 
362 

cockpit, a stabilizing parachute is required as the speed drops 

through the transonic range. Larger parachutes free of severe 

opening shocks will be required to reduce descent to a safe value 

for striking the ground. Alternately, the cockpit could be unsealed 

automatically below 50,000 ft and allow a conventional parachute 

descent. Automatic opening devices should be used throughout the 

sequence of events. 

7.17 The high skin temperature of supersonic aircraft will require 

special protection for the pilot against heat prostration. Air-cooled 

flying clothing will be a requirement. Proper choice of insulation 

on the cabin will be a factor. As the speed of the aircraft drops to 

subsonic levels, protection against the cold for the pilot must be 

considered. 

7.18 Since some rocket-propelled aircraft may use liquid oxygen as 

one of the fuel components, this liquid could be used as a source of 

cabin pressurization, as a source of oxygen for the pilot, and as a 

method of cooling an air ventilated duct for protection against 

excessive cabin heat. For rocket propulsion, using toxic liquids or 

atomic energy sources, protection must be given the pilot against 

noxious gases or radiation. 

Countermeasures 

7.19 High speed, maneuverability, and high altitude are the means 

of escaping interference from ground defenses. However, we must 

attribute to the enemy the same highly developed weapons of 

defense which we try to develop. Hence, it appears imperative to 

have in our airplanes means for detection and deflection of targetseeking devices aimed at them. This is one of the many problems 

which concern countermeasures against new remote-controlled or 

homing devices. 

7.20 A technically competent enemy will try to thwart our 

operations by countermeasures directed at our own electronic 

devices for the collection of information and the transmission of 

intelligence and control. The vulnerability of a target-finding radar 

to jamming is no less important than the vulnerability to fighter 
363 

counter-weapon in the fields of radio and radar. At certain times 

we enjoyed the advantage of a new technique, temporarily 

unknown to the enemy, and hence, of a period when a new device 

(for example, microwave ASV radar) could be used with impunity. 

It would not be wise to count on many such advantages in the 

future, and it is, therefore, important to assess the vulnerability of 

new devices at an early stage of their development. In the reports 

of the individual consultants on radar, communications, infrared, 

and guided missiles, the specific problems of countermeasures are 

taken up. It is worthwhile to present here certain broad conclusions 

which emerge from these studies: 

a. The fact that an electronic device can, in principle, be 

jammed (and most of them can) does not necessarily mean that it 

will be jammed so as to impair seriously its military value. The 

problem of jamming, realistically considered, is not merely one of 

ingenuity, of which we must assume that the enemy has an 

unlimited supply, but of electric power and energy and well-known 

physical laws. It may be made uneconomical for the enemy to 

interfere with some device of ours, even though he regards it as a 

serious threat. 

b. The developments in radar and related fields which promise 

the most in freedom from enemy interference are the use of a 

diversity of frequency channels, rapid tuning from one channel to 

another, higher power, and where consistent with other 

requirements, more directive beams of radiation. The opening up 

of the microwave region of the spectrum has, on the whole, made 

the task of the would-be jammer much more formidable. 

c. Radio links used for remote guiding and control, or for 

transfer of intelligence from and to unmanned aircraft, will 

probably make more and more use of the “combination-lock” type 

of security, exemplified by electronic pulse coding and decoding in 

contrast to the “concealed-button” type of security, which involves 

the dangerous assumption that the enemy cannot readily discover 

what we are doing. 
364 

develop. We must keep active and alert in this field, if only to be 

able to anticipate the countermeasures to which our devices may 

fall victim. 

e. In general, electronic warfare puts a premium on ingenuity, 

speed, adaptability, and alertness. Against the countermeasures of 

a determined and technically advanced enemy our only permanent 

military assets are well-informed, resourceful, scientific personnel, 

and a flexible production organization. 

Perfect Communication from Ground to Air 

and From Air to Air 

8.1 The preceding discussion has assumed accurate and reliable 

communication between the airplanes involved, and between the 

airplanes and their base. Present aviation communication, while 

fairly satisfactory, still lacks a good deal in reliability and ability to 

make contact. However, if the present rate of development 

continues, the requirements of the projected Air Forces can be met 

in a relatively few years. 

8.2 At present the communication problem is divided into two 

parts: 

a. Liaison communication for the long-range transfer of 

information between individual airplanes or flights of airplanes and 

their base, distances from a few hundred miles to several thousand 

miles. 

b. Command communication between the members of a group 

or formation of planes. 

8.3 Future aviation communication will undoubtedly retain these 

two subdivisions, and will probably include a third, namely shortrange communication between air bases and airplanes, for the 

purpose of guiding offensive operations, traffic direction, and 

landing control. This may include visual presentation by television 

and instrument indication, as well as voice communication. 

8.4 The liaison system must operate on frequencies between one 

and ten megacycles. This is because radiations at higher 
365 

require antenna lengths which cannot be accommodated, even in 

the largest bombers. In order to obtain communication at a distance 

in the frequency range available for liaison work, it is necessary to 

depend upon ionospheric reflection, and to obtain reliability it is 

essential to select from among eight or ten bands in this region. 

Because of these limitations, liaison communication is limited to 

between five and ten speech channels. This means communication 

must be very highly organized in order to economize the needed 

channels. 

8.5 The use of teletype systems and special voice coding can 

greatly reduce the frequency bandwidth required for a 

communication channel. By adopting these means, a great many 

more channels become available. This may become an important 

part of liaison. 

8.6 Long-distance communication of the liaison type may be 

supplemented by a high-frequency relay system. This will make 

available a large number of channels, which can be used for 

liaison. However, the longer wavelength direct liaison channels 

must be retained in the event the relay chain is broken. 

8.7 Command communication allows a much greater latitude in the 

selection of the frequency at which it can operate, since only lineof-sight is required. In practice it will be carried on at as high a 

frequency as possible, in order to make available a maximum of 

communication channels, limited only by the state of technical 

development, antenna considerations, and the molecular absorption 

of the air. 

8.8 At present, command systems operate at frequencies around a 

hundred megacycles. In the immediate future the frequency should 

be increased by a factor of at least ten, and perhaps much more. 

There will be available a large number of communication channels 

at these upper frequencies, so that each airplane in the group or 

formation can be assigned individual channels, in addition to 

general and emergency channels shared by the whole group. 
366 

jamming, interference, and interception, by using special forms of 

modulation, multiple channels, or other refinements. 

8.10 With the large number of channels to be employed in this type 

of operation, it is imperative that the individual units be integrated 

into a closely knit practical system. This can be done following 

practices similar to those employed in ordinary telephone systems. 

Each airplane in the formation would be assigned a frequency or 

pair of frequencies on which he would communicate with anyone 

calling him. In order to call another airplane, the calling transmitter 

and receiver would be tuned to the frequency of the station being 

called, simply by manipulating a numbered dial similar to a 

telephone dial. While certain problems connected with frequency 

stability remain, steps have already been taken toward their 

solution in the use of a single stabilized oscillator to control the 

frequency of both transmitter and receiver, various feedback 

systems, and similar measures. In such a network it would be 

essential that certain master channels be kept open at all times for 

the reception of general commands and emergency instruction. 

Since these channels must be available whether or not a station is 

calling another airplane, this arrangement may require some 

duplication of equipment. This will not be seriously objectionable, 

because short-range, high-frequency radio equipment can be made 

relatively small. 

8.11 Certain command operations may be aided by highly 

directional transmission. Communication of this type can be 

carried out very efficiently in the microwave portions of the radio 

spectrum. Laboratory models of receivers and transmitters are at 

present in existence, and the technical availability of this 

equipment is assured. 

8.12 The extremely high-frequency portion of the radio spectrum, 

that is 60,000 megacycles or more, has certain properties which 

may be of value for short-range command systems. Here the 

molecular absorption of the atmosphere begins to be important. 

This means that the signal is attenuated very rapidly with distance. 

Thus, it would be possible to carry on communication between 
367 

before such equipment becomes available for practical aviation 

application, it must go through a long period of research and 

development. 

8.13 For single-seat fighters and other aircraft where one man must 

perform a great many operations, as well as act as radio operator, it 

may be necessary to supplement voice communication with an 

indicating system, with a semipermanent record of the message. 

Developmental equipment of this type has already been produced 

in the form of the British “Beechnut” and American “Volflag.” 

These units not only give an annunciator presentation of the 

message, to be read by the pilot, but also give an automatic 

answer-back when the equipment correctly records the signal. This 

type of equipment can be made highly selective and jam-proof. 

8.14 Facsimile may also serve as an adjunct to voice 

communication. It allows the transmission of large amounts of 

information over a relatively narrow channel. Furthermore, this 

information is in the form of a permanent record. The information 

which can be transmitted may be in the form of maps, pictures, or 

charts, in addition to written words, which in itself can be of 

considerable value. Because the bandwidth required is somewhat 

greater than is needed for speech transmission, it probably will not 

be used as liaison equipment, but will be operated at command 

frequencies and on radio relay chains. 

8.15 In order to carry out successfully large-scale aerial operations 

under all weather conditions, it is necessary to provide very 

complete contact between the air base and airplanes leaving or 

approaching the base. When large numbers of airplanes are 

involved, voice communication will not be adequate, but must be 

supplemented by some form of visual aid. A modification of the 

“Teleran” system can provide the required contact. With this 

system, the location and altitude of all airplanes in the 

neighborhood of the base are determined by radar equipment at the 

ground station. This information is electronically plotted on maps 

of the terrain, dividing the space above the air base into a 

predetermined number of levels. A picture of the map and the 
368 

knows the whereabouts of every other airplane at his altitude, and 

the danger of collision is greatly reduced. The transmitted map 

carries with it appropriate meteorological information and any 

instructions that may be necessary. Blind landing and take-off aids 

are also provided for airplanes at the lowest level. 

8.16 This system gives the ground station complete control of the 

airplanes in the vicinity and makes possible the concentration of 

large numbers of aircraft with relatively little danger. It also makes 

it possible for the air station to direct the grouping of large airplane 

formations and perform other functions necessary in carrying out 

air activities on a large scale. 

8.17 The three classes of communication described will provide for 

the interchange of information required for integrated air activity 

on a large scale. In its present state of development, the radio art is 

in a position to supply most of the technical means for liaison, 

command, and air-base control. However, radio research should be 

encouraged in order to improve present means and develop new 

equipment giving better performance. (See the report, Aircraft 

Radio Communication Equipment, Part III of the SAG report, 

Radar and Communications.) 

Defend Home Territory 

Detection and Warning 

9.1 The first problem of defense is detection and warning. The 

successful defense of England was attributed largely to longwavelength, early warning radar, installed at the time of the 

Munich agreement. This equipment could detect aircraft at a range 

of 150 miles at normal cruising altitudes, although its resolution 

was so low that it could not separate as distinct indications two 

aircraft 10 or 15 miles apart. Aircraft at low altitudes could not be 

detected. Had the Germans known the limitations of the 

equipment, they could have defeated its use. 

9.2 These early types of equipment, operating on wavelengths of 

ten and three meters, were succeeded by microwave equipment of 

much greater resolution. The range of all types is essentially 
369 

above the optical horizon with a resolution and position accuracy 

of the order of 150 feet, under normal atmospheric conditions. It is 

possible to eliminate from the indicator all targets which are not 

moving. Hence, the area covered will be determined by the height 

of the set and the screening by surrounding hills. The height can be 

increased by using airborne sets, but the size of the available 

aircraft limits such equipment to lower weight and power, which in 

turn limits the range to about 200 miles. 

9.3 Identification of the detected aircraft as friendly or hostile is a 

major problem. Identification beacons have been found to be only 

a partial solution. Reliance has to be placed in large measure on 

knowledge of the flight plan and of the progress of the flights of all 

friendly aircraft, identifying unfriendly aircraft by a process of 

elimination. Advances in communication techniques will probably 

supply additional aid in identification. 

9.4 Unsolved problems in detection and warning are the ability of 

aircraft to fly low, so that they remain below the optical horizon 

until very close, and the problem of detecting missiles like V-2, 

coming in from the stratosphere at steep angles outside the angles 

covered by present radar warning sets. The first may be solved by 

the use of airborne search radar sensitive only to moving targets. 

The second requires only additional engineering development to 

improve the high-altitude coverage. 

9.5 The provision of warning alone, without methods of defeating 

the attack, is useless. The warning network must be integrated with 

the control of fighter and missile squadrons. 

Countermeasures Against Missiles 

9.6 The second great problem of defense of home territory is 

countermeasures against missiles. We shall not here discuss 

passive measures, such as dispersion of industry, underground 

location of key targets, etc., but only the active measures against 

the missile in flight. So far as known at present, the possible active 

measures against atomic bombs do not differ from those against 

missiles carrying ordinary explosives. Such measures will be 
370 

blast or fragmentation from warheads of defensive missiles. 

9.7 Any missile using remote radio control, electronic homing 

devices, or proximity fuses, can in theory be jammed. In practice it 

is necessary to know something of the method of operation and to 

adapt jamming equipment to the particular enemy device. The 

information may be obtained either by intelligence methods, by 

continuous search of the electro-magnetic spectrum, or by 

examination of captured equipment. There is no blanket over-all 

method of jamming which would defeat any and all types of 

electronic apparatus. This method of defense requires extremely 

close cooperation between intelligence officers, special 

reconnaissance patrols, and electronics specialists engaged in 

development of jamming equipment. 

9.8 Missiles using homing devices may be deceived by decoy 

targets. Thus a missile using heat radiation could be decayed by 

artificial targets. This device is of limited application, since 

techniques of target selection are known, and the enemy must be 

assumed to possess them. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to 

locate a decoy target within the field of view if a missile were 

directed toward the real target and yet far enough away to be 

outside the radius of destruction of an atomic bomb. 

9.9 Many persons have suggested the possibility of producing 

premature explosion or otherwise incapacitating missiles by means 

of some form of ray. If the missile carries a proximity fuse, it may 

indeed be possible to operate it by a suitable electronic jammer and 

thus explode the bomb, whether it consists of atomic or ordinary 

explosive. In the absence of a proximity fuse or of a system for 

remote electronic control of detonation, science offers no prospect 

of detonation at a distance. The interaction of electromagnetic 

radiation with matter has been thoroughly investigated from long 

radio waves through microwaves, infrared, visible light, 

ultraviolet, X rays, gamma rays, to cosmic rays. Our ability to 

concentrate radiant energy at a distant point is limited by a 

fundamental property of wave motion in an unbounded medium, 

i.e., the tendency of the waves to spread. Even if twice the total 
371 

just reach the sparking voltage in air. Furthermore, shielding is 

relatively easy, because of the high inductivity of metals. The very 

shortest rays cannot be focused, and the energy decreases as the 

inverse square of the distance. Thus, present scientific knowledge 

offers no hope for, but on the contrary distinct evidence against, 

the possibility of detonating bombs at a distance. 

9.10 No serious attempt has yet been made to hit a projectile or 

missile moving with, say, twice the velocity of sound. However, by 

adapting the target-seeking principle to winged rocket projectiles, 

it should be possible to accomplish this aim, provided location and 

warning occur sufficiently in advance. Another principle would be 

that of a barrage of aerial mines; however, it does not appear 

possible to increase the density of the barrage to such an extent that 

the missile would not slip through. Certainly both methods should 

be studied. 

9.11 Against aircraft, manned or unmanned, moving with sonic or 

slightly higher velocity, target-seeking automatic interceptors seem 

to give most promise. The German project Wasserfall, the British 

CAP project, and some of our own undertakings move in this 

direction. Ramjet propulsion seems to be the most efficient way to 

reach the necessary speed and flight duration. 

9.12 Manned interceptors will be developed, as well as automatic 

devices. For this purpose both rocket and jet propulsion drive 

should be considered. For extreme altitudes, the rocket may be the 

only method of propulsion which promises success. Because of 

human limitations, manned interceptors probably cannot be used 

against extremely high-speed unmanned missiles. 

Offense is Best Defense 

9.13 One possibility in the future may be the rocket barrage with 

atomic warhead. This could be used against aircraft or missiles 

traveling at high altitude. If the range of the effect of the atomic 

explosion is exactly known (estimated as about two miles for the 

present atomic bomb) and atomic explosion is possible in devices 

of reduced size, damage on our own territory can be avoided. 
372 

9.14 While it is profitable to develop as effective means as possible 

for both active and passive defense against enemy action, it must 

be remembered that a purely defensive attitude is defeatist. A 

nation which relies solely on defense for its security is inviting 

disaster. England might well have become untenable if only 

defensive measures had been relief [sic] on to stop the V-2 attacks. 

These attacks were only stopped after use of the launching sites 

had been denied the enemy. Japan’s defeat was assured when she 

failed to deny us access to air bases from which we could attack 

the homeland itself. The best defense is adequate preparation for a 

strong offense. 
373 

Problems of Organization with 

Recommendations 

Fundamental Principles for Organization of Research 

10.1 The spectacular innovations in technological warfare which 

appeared with ever increasing momentum in World War II have 

made us extremely conscious of the necessity for continuous 

scientific research to insure maintenance of our national security. 

The legislative and executive branches of the government, 

industry, and science are now intensively engaged in finding the 

best form of organization and the most efficient scheme for uniting 

all efforts to create the best facilities and utilize all the available 

scientific talents. Many of the fundamental questions of 

organization will be decided after the legislative work has been 

done. However, it is of the utmost importance that the Air Forces 

lay down the leading principles of their own policy and establish 

the foundation of organized research in their own realm. 

10.2 The basic principles of the responsibilities of the Air Forces in 

the scientific domain may be formulated as follows: 

a. The Air Forces have the fundamental responsibility for 

insuring that the nation is prepared to wage effective air warfare. 

This responsibility cannot be delegated to any other government 

agency or scientific body. 

b. The Air Forces must be able to call on all talents and 

facilities existing in the nation and sponsor further development of 

facilities and creative work of scientists and industry. 

c. The Air Forces must have the means of recruiting and 

training personnel who will have full understanding of the 

scientific facts necessary to procure and use equipment which is 

more advanced than that used by any other nation. 

d. The Air Forces must be authorized to expand existing AAF 

research facilities and create new ones to do their own research and 
374 

10.3 During World War II, the Air Forces enjoyed the fruits of 

research work being done by several scientific bodies organized or 

called upon for the duration of the war. Moreover, the whole 

scientific manpower of the nation was available to the services, 

and a great portion of it to the Army Air Forces. How to secure the 

cooperation of science and industry during peacetime is a very 

difficult problem. 

10.4 Unfortunately it is not possible to establish the necessary link 

between science and industry on one side and the Air Forces on the 

other, by establishing contact and agreement at the top level only. 

It would be simple to establish an office of organized science and 

agree to allot scientific problems to such an office and military 

problems to the Air Forces. However, scientific results cannot be 

used efficiently by soldiers who have no understanding of them, 

and scientists cannot produce results useful for warfare without an 

understanding of the operations. The following sections present 

certain recommendations which may have some value for the 

solution of the problem. 

Cooperation Between Science and the Air Forces 

11.1 It is generally recognized that an adequate national program 

for extending the frontiers of knowledge in various fields of basic 

science is a necessary adjunct to the maintenance of military 

security of the nation. Every scientific development eventually 

finds its way into the field of military applications. However, basic 

research requires time. Wars are fought with weapons based on 

fundamentals discovered during the preceding years of peace. 

Discovery of fundamental results is dependent on an atmosphere of 

freedom from immediate specific goals and time tables. 

11.2 For these reasons government authorities, military or civilian, 

should foster, but not dictate, basic research. The successful 

conduct of such research requires freedom and continuity of effort 

and cannot be accomplished by intermittent contacts for small 

tasks. Research staffs cannot be assembled and dispersed at short 

intervals. In addition, parallel competitive attacks on research 
375 

centralized dictatorial control of projects, funds, and facilities. 

11.3 The Air Forces do not desire to do basic scientific research in 

their own organizations; however, they wish to encourage and 

sponsor such research as they deem necessary for the defense of 

the nation. 

11.4 At the present time there is a tendency to concentrate the 

direction of scientific research activities in one controlling 

organization and make this organization responsible for the 

production of scientific results needed by the services, for the 

development of new weapons and equipment. Such centralization 

can be detrimental to American science, if it means exclusion of 

independent individuals and small groups of research men whose 

contributions are vital to the maintenance of an abundant scientific 

life within a nation. 

11.5 Generally it may be said that the conception and initial 

development of new ideas often come from men and groups which 

are widely dispersed and not directly connected with central 

organizations and planned research. Jet propulsion and atomic 

energy are good examples of this thesis. In both fields individual 

initiative, not dictated by any preconceived plan, played an 

important part, both in this country and abroad. If free enterprise 

and initiative are necessary for maintaining a sound economy 

within a nation, certainly they are even more necessary in scientific 

life. 

11.6 It is imperative from this point of view that the Air Forces 

continue and expand their present direct relations, spiritual and 

contractual, with various universities, research laboratories, and 

individual scientists. None of the central organizations existing 

now and to be established should be the only source of information 

and the sole intermediary agency between science and the Air 

Forces. The Air Forces should have the freedom to call on 

institutions and individuals whose assistance they deem to be of 

the greatest benefit for their program. 
376 

a permanent interest of scientific workers in problems of the Air 

Forces. The handling of research on applications of nuclear physics 

by some military authorities gives an interesting example of how 

scientific people can be antagonized by too much command. 

11.8 The physical attributes of scientific life are libraries, 

laboratories, publications, society meetings. The main impediment 

to high-grade cooperative scientific activity in the past has been the 

conflicting philosophy of scientists and soldiers in handling 

scientific matters. An unavoidable difficulty is introduced, of 

course, by the security restrictions necessitated by the character of 

military research. However, it is believed that this problem can be 

successfully solved. 

11.9 The first requirement for successful scientific collaboration is 

an efficient method of making the material contained in the 

archives of the Air Forces and other military bodies accessible to 

those scientific workers who are cleared for classified information 

and whose cooperation is desired. The lack of such an organized 

library service has in the past been one of the great impediments to 

scientific work. The Air Documents Division, established recently 

at Wright Field, may be the nucleus for the development of an 

efficient library and information service. 

11.10 Concerning the laboratory work, it is recommended that 

Army Air Force personnel be assigned to civilian laboratories, in 

order to acquire an intimate knowledge of scientific research to 

permit them to evaluate correctly scientific facts and effectively 

direct and supervise research in the Air Forces laboratories. 

However, the personnel assigned to civilian laboratories should not 

be there as supervising or liaison officers, but merely to learn. On 

the other hand, it is recommended that the Air Forces develop a 

scientific reserve corps familiar with current military problems, as 

a pool for active service in wartime. Younger scientists, who were 

working on projects in various civilian organizations during the 

war, would constitute admirably fit candidates for this reserve 

corps. 
377 

in peacetime. The wide variety of research and development 

problems facing the Air Forces definitely requires that the Air 

Forces be able to call upon specialists from time to time and for 

limited periods, in order to obtain the best advice and 

comprehensive reports on selected topics of current interest. 

11.12 During the war several laboratories, established by the 

services and the NDRC, in close connection with universities and 

directed by scientists belonging to the universities, made important 

contributions. This favorable result suggests the establishment of 

cooperative laboratories, in which the administrative and financial 

responsibility and management would remain with the 

government, and the scientific direction would be undertaken by 

faculty members. This method would solve the security problem 

and yet have the advantages of the geographical and spiritual 

connection with a place of scientific learning. 

11.13 In the field of publications and meetings, it is recommended 

that the interest of scientists in military problems be cultivated by 

sponsoring a society for military sciences, whose membership and 

publications would be restricted in conformity with security 

regulations. Air Forces personnel should be given membership in 

this society and permission to discuss and publish the results of 

their endeavors in the classified publications of the society. 

11.14 The following recommendations are therefore made: 

a. Direct research contracts between the Air Forces and 

scientific institutions. 

b. Library of classified material, to be made available to 

scientists who have been cleared. 

c. Exchange of personnel between the Air Forces and civilian 

laboratories. 

d. Authorization for temporary employment of scientific 

consultants. 

e. Cooperative laboratories in close connection with 

universities. 
378 

Cooperation Between Industry and the Air Forces 

12.1 This report does not deal with problems of procurement. Thus 

the analysis and recommendations are restricted to the problems of 

research and development to be done cooperatively by the Air 

Forces and industry. 

12.2 The main field in which industry and the Air Forces will work 

in close cooperation is applied research and development. It is 

imperative that the Air Forces separate funds and management of 

development contracts from procurement contracts. In the past, 

much time and effort have been wasted by lack of a clear line 

between procurement and development. Development contracts 

should also be based on competition, since the competitive spirit 

probably produces the best solution in the shortest time. However, 

competition in scientific and development work is different in its 

nature from pure commercial competition. 

12.3 The main objective in separating research and development 

from procurement is to make it possible for industry and the talent 

available in the industry to carry on applied research, which is 

absolutely necessary for rapid progress in the articles to be 

produced. Some industrial companies own facilities and funds for 

this purpose, as for example, the large companies producing 

electrical equipment, automobiles, and chemical products. These 

companies practice mass production and have a wide market for 

their products: therefore, they are able to do applied (in some cases 

even basic) research for the purpose of improving their products or 

of reducing the cost of production. In the case of the aircraft 

industry, it is generally recognized that the government must at 

least partially support the costs of applied research, because many 

of the problems refer solely to military applications and the costs 

of development cannot be recovered by the sale of the product. It is 

believed that it is more advantageous for the Air Forces to pay for 

the research needed than to pay higher prices for the products 

which would include the costs of development. 
379 

warfare. Consequently certain parts of the aircraft industry will be 

engaged in developments which have no commercial value and 

will not result in large orders from the government during 

peacetime. It is then necessary that promising developments of this 

type be carried through the pilot-plant stage with the financial 

support of the Air Forces. These pilot plants should be able to 

furnish the quantity necessary for tactical evaluation of the 

equipment. In addition, all preparations must be made for securing 

a rapid expansion of production of both materials (such as special 

fuels and propellants) and devices (like missiles, electronic 

equipment, etc.). 

12.5 Many problems require facilities which are only available to 

the government. In the past NACA, at the request of the armed 

services, carried out most of the tests necessary to improve the 

characteristics of experimental airplane types. It is believed that it 

would be more advantageous for the general progress if the NACA 

were relieved of the duty of testing and improving experimental 

types and could concentrate on forward-looking investigations on 

questions of basic and applied science. The testing and research for 

immediate improvement of experimental types should be taken 

over by the Air Forces and new facilities should be created which 

allow the carrying out of such tests on a large scale. The design of 

new facilities should take into account the probable development 

in the next decades. 

12.6 The air lines will be an important factor in any future warfare, 

since their equipment and experienced personnel constitute a 

valuable reserve for organized transportation between the mainland 

and bases distributed over the world. Hence, a close connection 

between the airlines and the Air Forces is necessary. In the 

operational field, as in the field of airplane and engine 

development, the natural development is that the facilities of the 

Air Forces should be used for perfecting operational methods, such 

as traffic control, landing aids, etc. 

12.7 The following recommendations are therefore made: 
380 

b. Design of Air Forces facilities for applied research and 

development, both in the field of technology and operations, on 

such a scale that they can be made available to the industry 

producing equipment and the companies engaged in air 

transportation, to carry out the research necessary for the 

development desired by the Air Forces. 

c. Promising developments of the nonrevenue-producing type 

should be placed in pilot plant production to such an extent that the 

Air Forces can obtain a sufficient number for tactical evaluation of 

the special equipment and devices to be used in case of war. 

d. Rapid expansion of production facilities for such items 

should be adequately provided for by the development contracts. 

Adequate Facilities in the Air Forces for Research and 

Development 

13.1 Scientific research in the Air Forces embraces not only the 

application of the physical sciences for production of efficient 

equipment, but should refer to all phases of aerial warfare which 

require scientific thought and analysis. For example, it should 

include problems of a physiological and psychological nature, as 

well as the scientific analysis of operations and methods of 

prognosis of the effects of planned operations. 

13.2 In the past, especially in the last prewar years and during the 

war, the Air Forces developed research and testing equipment at 

Wright Field for aircraft, engines, armament and other equipment, 

materials, and also for aeromedicine and physiology. At Eglin 

Field a proving ground was established for equipment to be tested 

under field conditions and for the study of effects of means of 

destruction. These facilities, in the light of future development, 

appear definitely inadequate, even from the purely technical 

viewpoint of producing and testing efficient equipment. 

13.3 There is no doubt that electronic devices will play an 

increasingly important part in all future Air Forces operations. In 

the past, the history of electronic applications has usually been that 
381 

and prolonged redesigning, it finally becomes useable in the air. 

Almost invariably this process of redesign was carried out by 

engineers with no real knowledge of the special problems of 

aircraft. In other words, the aeronautical engineers have had no 

appreciation of the possible value of electronics in solving their 

problems, and the electronic engineers have had no knowledge of 

the difficulties their equipment would experience on aircraft. 

Electronic equipment has been added to planes as an afterthought, 

with consequent difficulties of installation and operation. Even in 

the case of radar, it was not until 1944 that a group of radar 

scientists and aeronautical engineers conferred for the purpose of 

studying the uses of radar and discussing the problems of installing 

radar equipment in planes. 

13.4 Future controlled missiles are completely dependent on 

electronic devices. They must be designed by electronic and 

aeronautical engineers working in close cooperation. Instrument 

flying requires that the electronic equipment be designed by 

persons familiar with aeronautical problems. 

13.5 In the age of moderate speed airplanes with conventional 

engine-propeller drive, it was possible to carry out development 

work on separate components. Supersonic airplanes and pilotless 

aircraft cannot be developed successfully by such methods. 

Questions of aerodynamics, structures, propulsion, and control\are 

closely interconnected. The component parts of a guided missile 

cannot be made to function independently any more than can 

anyone organ of the human body. Based on these considerations, it 

is proposed that the Air Forces create new facilities, under one 

command, entirely separated from procurement and supply, with 

the objective of developing supersonic and pilotless aircraft. 

13.6 The Center for Supersonic and Pilotless Aircraft Development 

(SPAD) should be equipped with adequate wind-tunnel facilities to 

attain speeds up to three times the velocity of sound, with large 

enough test sections to accommodate models of reasonable size, 

including jet propulsion units, and one ultrasonic wind tunnel for 

exploration of the upper frontier of the supersonic speed range. 
382 

be provided. Electronic engineers should be given the necessary 

facilities to study control methods, servo-mechanisms, and homing 

devices in close cooperation with aerodynamicists and propulsion 

experts. The Development Center should also provide facilities for 

investigations of the human aspects of flight at supersonic speed 

and extreme altitudes. The facilities for experimental launching, 

flight research, and flight analysis should be integral parts of the 

Development Center. 

13.7 It is believed that the Air Forces program in the field of 

supersonic and pilotless aircraft urgently needs the establishment 

of such a central organization to lead the activities of the scientific 

institutions and industrial companies to new horizons; and, to make 

facilities available for research and development work, necessary, 

beyond a doubt, for maintaining our supremacy in the air. 

13.8 It is proposed that research and development in the field of 

aircraft operations, communications, and weather service be 

consolidated into a Center for Operational Aircraft Development 

(DAD), with the objective of approaching the ideal of the all 

weather Air Forces, solving the problems of traffic control, fighter 

control, and of warning and location. This Center should be 

equipped with adequate laboratory facilities for applications of 

radar television technique. Experimental bases for testing control 

and communication devices should be integral parts of this Center. 

It should cooperate closely with the airlines and the weather 

service. 

13.9 It is believed that the proving ground at Eglin Field should be 

put in charge of development of bombing devices and procedures, 

and study of bombing survey and analysis methods. 

13.10 It is proposed that a Center for Nuclear Aircraft 

Development (NAD) be initiated, dealing with problems arising in 

connection with atomic bombs and the use of atomic energy for 

aircraft propulsion. 

13.11 The organizations and facilities suggested in this chapter 

cannot be created in one year, but must be developed gradually in 
383 

Forces begin systematically building up development centers with 

competent personnel and adequate testing facilities, they will 

unavoidably lose the lead and initiative in fields which in a few 

years will constitute the domains of their most vital 

responsibilities. 

Summary of Recommendations 

13.12 The following recommendations are therefore made: 

a. Research and development in the field of aerodynamics, 

propulsion, control, and electronics should function as one 

entity. 

b. A Center for Supersonic and Pilotless Aircraft Development 

(SPAD) should be established, with adequate wind-tunnel, 

propulsion, control, and electronic research facilities. 

c. A Center for Operational Aircraft Development (OAD) 

should be established for research and development in the 

operational field, such as all-weather flight problems, 

communications, and fighter control. 

d. A Center for Nuclear Aircraft Development (NAD) should be 

initiated. 

e. Eglin Field should be developed into a research and 

development center for bombing technique, research on blast 

effects, and bombing survey and analysis methods. 

Induction of Scientific Ideas in Staff and Command Work 

Long-Range planning 

14.1 Scientific planning must be years ahead of the actual research 

and development work. Long-range planning should be the 

responsibility of the Commanding General of the Air Forces. I 

believe there is general agreement throughout the nation that in the 

past decades the direct interest of the Commanding General in 

long-range planning has been one of the most important assets of 

the former Air Corps and the present Air Forces. This philosophy 
384 

of qualified officers and eminent civilian scientists, should be 

available to the Commanding General, reporting directly to him on 

important new developments and advising him on the planning of 

scientific research. It is considered that the advice and 

contributions of persons who, although thoroughly familiar with 

the work and the needs of the Air Forces, have their main activity 

outside of the Army, would be of considerable value. This group 

should contain experts with broad experience in the various 

branches of science involved, who would represent a cross section 

of our scientific thought. Their reports to the Commanding General 

would be used to effect continuous revision of the Air Forces 

research and development program. 

Management of Research and Development 

14.2 The problem of the best organization of management and 

development is a very difficult one. It cannot be expected that 

unanimous agreement can be reached on this question. The plan 

for management of research and development is a sore point in all 

large organizations or companies. It mostly undergoes periodic 

changes, which emphasize one or the other side of the question, 

ranging from separate and almost independent research 

laboratories to decentralization of research and development into 

the operating units. In the special case of the Air Forces, two 

solutions have been proposed: (1) the establishment of one Air 

Staff section for research and development; and (2) a supervising 

and directing agency attached to the office of the Chief of Air 

Staff. Both solutions have advantages and disadvantages. 

Obviously it would be extremely difficult to remove the actual 

operation of all research and development facilities from all the 

various existing staff sections and concentrate them in one new 

section. On the other hand, the central supervising and directing 

agency would have a hard task introducing new ideas into the 

operation of a large number of dispersed sections and commands 

engaged in research and development. 

14.3 Independently of the special form of management of research 

and development, the office in charge of direction and supervision 
385 

example, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the 

National Bureau of Standards, the Civil Aeronautics 

Administration, the aircraft industry, the air lines, scientific 

institutions, and individual scientists. These panels should assist in 

formulation of the detailed research program and the choice of the 

agency, institution, or individual best fitted and available to carry 

out the desired research work. 

Scientific Intelligence 

14.4 Scientific intelligence is one of the important requirements for 

the future Air Forces. In the recent past the necessity for an 

organized scientific intelligence service became more and more 

evident as the war proceeded, and it became an urgent necessity as 

Germany collapsed. Fortunately, at that time a great number of 

scientists and technicians could be made available to the Air 

Forces on a voluntary basis. In this way the information gained 

from Germany could be worked up in an appropriate manner. 

However, at the present time, only a few months later, no more 

such personnel is available. The supervision of future German 

scientific work, for example, is still lacking scientific help. 

14.5 Scientific intelligence starts at home. The example of the 

atomic bomb show that scientific discoveries of prominent military 

importance were made by pure scientists who had no connection 

with any military office or establishment; as a matter of fact, they 

were not interested in military applications. Hence, it will be 

necessary for the Intelligence Service to employ scientific 

personnel with broad interest and knowledge, who have the ability 

to recognize the military aspects in the scientific production of our 

theoretical and experimental scientists, university, and industrial 

laboratories. The screening of patents and inventive ideas 

presented to the military agencies, as it has been done in the past, 

will not be sufficient. The Intelligence Service needs permanent 

collaborators who pursue the scientific literature, attend meetings, 

visit scientific establishments, and report their findings and 

suggestions periodically. In peacetime much tact will be necessary 

to accomplish such efficient intelligence service, because of the 
386 

rounding up of their work. 

14.6 Scientific intelligence in foreign countries is, of course, a 

much more difficult matter. One can distinguish between scientific 

intelligence on subjects which are open to discussion and on 

subjects which are classified. I believe that all knowledge of 

scientific life in a foreign country is of great importance since, 

after all, the same scientific personalities who create the peacetime 

science of a country will be called upon to help their country in 

wartime. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the Air 

Forces: (1) have scientific attaches in embassies and legations in 

various countries; (2) send scientifically trained officers, engineers, 

or consultants of the Air Forces to scientific meetings and 

congresses abroad; and (3) send personnel connected with the Air 

Forces for longer periods to study at foreign institutions. 

14.7 The intelligence services concerned with subjects which a 

foreign country does not want us to know, will use the methods 

which were successful in general military intelligence. However, it 

is imperative to have a scientific section in the Intelligence Service 

which will direct the search for and exploit the results of scientific 

data. It is imperative that we have knowledge, in advance, of all 

potential targets which could be of importance in scientific 

warfare, unless a complete exchange of scientific and technical 

data, as proposed recently by Great Britain, extends over the whole 

world. 

Science In Plans and Operations 

14.8 The Air Forces entered into World War II with quite 

inadequate preparation as far as the prognosis and analysis of the 

results of missions were concerned. Analysis groups were 

assembled during the war, and opinions concerning the relative 

importance of targets were widely different. We now have the 

experience of a long war. The work done by organizations such as 

the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey gives material for discussion 

and for planning future applications. Of course, in a future war 

bombs, missiles and atomic energy involve radical changes and 

bombers will be different; however, it cannot be sufficiently 
387 

analytical work itself. It is believed that the staff sections dealing 

with planning and operations should be equipped with adequate 

scientific personnel to be able to continue studies on methods of 

target analysis, operational analysis, and the like. It is necessary to 

have in peacetime a nucleus for scientific groups such as those 

which successfully assisted in the command and staff work in the 

field during the war. In these studies exerts in statistical, technical, 

economic and political science must cooperate. 

Personnel Policy 

14.9 It is believed that many shortcomings of research and 

development in the Air Forces originate from a lack of 

appreciation, at higher levels, of the qualifications necessary for 

successful direction of a laboratory or a proving ground. The 

theory that an intelligent officer is able to direct any organization, 

military, technical, or scientific, is certainly obsolete. An officer in 

charge of a laboratory or proving ground can be really useful only 

if he holds the position for a sufficient time to become thoroughly 

acquainted with the subject matter and personnel. Officers with 

engineering training on engineering duty must not be handicapped, 

as regards promotion, because of long tenure of the same 

assignment or time spent in acquiring advance education. 

14.10 The position and rank of officers responsible for research 

and development must be made commensurate with the importance 

of their work and achievement and must not depend on the size of 

the organizations under their command. 

14.11 The level of civilian personnel engaged in research and 

development work must be raised by authorizing the Air Forces to 

hire or dismiss civilian scientific personnel outside of the Civil 

Service. Also, methods of appointment, compensation, and 

management of civilian scientific personnel under the Civil Service 

must be freed from those restrictions of the Civil Service 

regulations which make the government service unattractive to 

first-rate scientists. In this connection, a separate branch of the 

Civil Service for scientific personnel would be of value. 
388 

a. A permanent Scientific Advisory Group should be available 

to the Commanding General, to advise him on questions of longrange scientific planning. 

b. The office in charge of research and development should 

establish research panels for coordination of Air Forces research 

with that of government agencies and other scientific institutions. 

c. Scientific intelligence at home and abroad should be 

strengthened by including scientific personnel in the Intelligence 

Service, appointing scientific attaches abroad, and frequently 

sending scientifically-trained officers or civilians to meetings and 

for study in foreign countries. 

d. Operational analysis and target studies should be continued in 

peacetime, with adequate scientific personnel. 

e. Officers in charge of laboratories should keep such positions 

long enough to be really useful, without being handicapped in 

promotion by long tenure of such assignments. 

f. Position and rank of officers responsible for research should 

be determined by the importance of their work and not by the size 

of the organizations under their command. 

g. Appointment and compensation of civilian scientific 

personnel should be freed from Civil Service regulations, to enable 

the Air Forces to employ first-class scientists and engineers. 

Scientific and Technological Training 

of Air Forces Personnel 

15.1 The discussion in this section refers only to the scientific and 

technological training of Air Forces officers. The specific training 

of mechanics, radio operators, electronics technicians, and the like, 

is not considered. It is believed that in addition to utilizing civilian 

consultants in various advisory capacities and civilian scientists 

and engineers in the Civil Service, the Air Forces must organize a 

broad training program for officers in various fields of science and 

engineering. New scientific discoveries will continually have a 
389 

these new concepts. This requires, above all, that the Air Forces be 

permeated by officers who have the training which will make them 

capable of evaluating scientific facts with good technical judgment 

and vision. 

Training for Air Staff Work 

15.2 Practically all sections of the Air Staff are confronted with 

problems involving the application of science. Therefore, it is 

desirable that future Air Staff officers have an understanding of the 

capabilities of science and an appreciation of scientific thought. 

Therefore, it is proposed that a certain number of young officers be 

selected and given scientific training for future Air Staff work. 

Two years of special training at scientific institutions should be 

given these officers, in a branch of science chosen by them. The 

aim of this education should be training of the mind and 

acquaintance with scientific results, rather than specialized 

knowledge and routine skill. At intervals of about five years, oneyear refresher courses should be inserted. The scientific training 

would be in addition to military training for staff duties, which is 

given at such places as the Army War College, the Command and 

General Staff School. 

Training for Research and Development 

15.3 A certain number of officers should be given specialized 

scientific technological training in the branches of mathematics, 

physical sciences, and engineering, which are of vital interest for 

development of equipment and operational methods. This training 

should be accomplished at scientific institutions. Its main objective 

should be not so much the education of research men in the proper 

sense, as to give future officers engaged in, or in charge of, 

research and development an intimate knowledge of the 

capabilities and limitations of science and accustom them to 

working in cooperation with scientists and scientific institutions. It 

is very important that in the future scientific training, a broad 

variety of sciences which have applications to Air Forces problems 

be taken into account. A proper balance must be established 
390 

officers can best be recruited through the Air Forces ROTC. 

Exceptionally brilliant students (about 20 percent of the total 

number taken) should be permitted to continue their scholastic 

training until they have an M.S. degree and then be put on active 

duty for about three years. This will give them an opportunity to 

orient themselves in the type of work they are best suited for in the 

Air Forces. After that, they should return to college for a period of 

two years, or long enough to get a Ph.D. degree. This would 

produce a supply of officers with an intimate knowledge of several 

fields of science. This is essential to finding the best compromises 

when military requirements produce conflicting design problems 

involving more than one field of science. The remaining 80 percent 

of those students selected through ROTC would go on active 

service after obtaining a B.S. degree and would return to college, 

after about three years of active service, long enough to obtain an 

M.S. degree. 

15.4 All officers engaged in research and development must be 

given repeat scientific training for a period of one year at intervals 

of about five years. This training can be given at scientific 

institutions, or by assigning the officer to work as an engineer at 

one of the research laboratories working on Air Forces problems. 

15.5 Every effort should be made to retain in the Air Forces those 

research and development officers who have already received 

added scholastic training at government expense during the war. 

Flying training in grade should be provided for those who are not 

pilots at the present time, but who desire flight training and can 

qualify for it. Training a pilot is a much simpler job than training 

an engineer. It does not appear reasonable to concentrate on trying 

to make engineers out of pilots at the Air Forces Engineering 

School, while at the same time refusing to give good engineers a 

chance to become pilots because they have not been members of 

combat aircrews. 

Technical Schools in the Air Forces 

15.6 The main objective of the technical schools in existence or to 

be established in the Air Forces should be training for 
391 

sciences involved, they should concentrate their efforts on the 

transmittal of practical knowledge and skill. Exceptionally brilliant 

graduates of the Air Forces technical schools should be selected for 

further scientific training in civilian schools. 

Summary of Recommendations 

15.7 The following recommendations are therefore made: 

a. A certain number of young officers should be selected and 

given special training at scientific institutions in preparation for 

future scientific Air Staff work. 

b. Technical officers recruited throughout the Air Forces ROTC 

should be given advanced scientific training up to the level 

required for an M.S. degree, in a broad variety of sciences which 

have applications to Air Forces problems. 

c. Additional training should be given 20 percent of the officers 

referred to in the preceding recommendation, to qualify them for a 

Ph.D. degree. 

d. All future Air Staff and technical officers who receive 

scientific training should be given one-year refresher courses at 

intervals of five years. 

e. Every effort should be made to retain in the Air Forces those 

research and development officers who received scholastic training 

at government expense during the war. 

f. Flying training should be opened immediately to those 

officers with scientific training who, regardless of combat 

experience, otherwise qualify. 

g. The AAF Engineering School shall be built up in such a way, 

that fundamentals of the sciences involved in AAF problems shall 

be included in the curriculum. Exceptionally able graduates shall 

be selected for further scientific training in civilian educational 

institutions. 
392 

AAF Army Air Forces, US Army 

ACM air chief marshal 

AEDC Arnold Engineering and Development Center 

AFBMD Air Force Ballistic Missile Division 

AFFTC Air Force Flight Test Center 

AFHRA Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell 

AFB, Alabama 

AFIT Air Force Institute of Technology 

AFR Air Force regulation 

AFSC Air Force Systems Command 

AGARD NATO Advisory Group for Aeronautical 

Research and Development 

AIC Army Industrial College 

Air Corps Army air branch, 1926-1941 

Air Service Army air branch, 1920-1926 

AMC Air Materiel Command 

Aphrodite Project using radio-controlled bombers to crash 

into German targets 

AR Army regulation 

ARDC Air Research and Development Command 

AWPD-1 Air War Plans Division/Plan Number 1 (1941) 

BLC boundary layer control 

Caltech California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, 

California 

CEP circular error probable 

CG commanding general 

CNN Cable News Network 

CO commanding officer 

COA Committee of Operations Analysis 

Convair Consolidated Vultee Aircraft Corporation 

Crossbow German V-1 and V-2 launches against Britain 

ETO European theater of operations 
393 

FDR Franklin Delano Roosevelt 

GALCIT Guggenheim Aeronautics Laboratory, California 

Institute of Technology 

GE General Electric 

GHQ General Headquarters, Air Force (1935) 

GPS Global Positioning System 

HOI Headquarters Office Instruction 

ICAF Industrial College of the Armed Forces 

ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile 

JATO jet assisted takeoff 

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff 

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

Lusty LUftwaffe Secret TechnologY, project to 

investigate German scientific laboratories as they 

were liberated after D day 

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

Mike Shot First US thermonuclear test detonation, 

November 1952 

MPH miles per hour 

NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 

NAS National Academy of Sciences 

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

NASM National Air and Space Museum 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NBS National Bureau of Standards 

NDRC National Defense Research Committee 

NRC National Research Council 

OCAC Office of the Chief of the Air Corps 

OCAS Office of the Chief of the Air Service 

Octagon Second Quebec Conference, September 1944 
394 

OSRD Office of Scientific Research and Development 

Overlord Cross-channel invasion from Britain to Normandy 

Beaches, 6 June 1944 

R&D research and development 

RADLAB Radiation Laboratory, MIT 

RAND Research and Development Corporation 

SAB Scientific Advisory Board, 1946-present 

SADU sea-search attack development unit 

SAG Scientific Advisory Group, 1944-1945 

TFX tactical fighter (experimental) 

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle 

USAF United States Air Force, 1947-present 

USAFA United States Air Force Academy, Colorado 

Springs, Colorado 

USAFE US Air Forces in Europe 

USC University of South Carolina 

USMA US Military Academy, West Point, New York 

USSTAF US Strategic Air Forces in Europe 

WDD Western Development Division 

Weary Willie Project to send automated (pilotless) war-weary 

bombers against Germany 
395 

gpy 

Manuscript Collections 

California Institute of Technology, Institute Archives, Pasadena, 

Calif. 

The Theodore von Kármán Collection. 

Millikan, Robert A. Papers. 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Archives, Pasadena, Calif. 

Various papers covering the early days of the GALCIT 

were used from this archive. Additionally, the photo 

collection was very helpful in the compilation of photo 

essays for this work. 

The Johns Hopkins University, Milton S. Eisenhower Library, 

Baltimore, Md. 

Dryden, Hugh L. Papers, 1898-1965. 

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C. 

Andrews, Gen Frank M. Papers. 

Arnold, Gen Henry Harley. Papers. 

Bush, Dr. Vannevar. Papers. 

Doolittle, Gen James H. Papers. 

Eaker, Lt Gen Ira C. Papers. 

Foulois, Maj Gen Benjamin D. Papers. 

Guggenheim, Harry F. Papers. 

LeMay, Gen Curtis E. Papers. 

Millikan, Robert A. Papers. 

Mitchell, William “Billy.” Papers. 

Spaatz, Gen Carl Andrew. Papers. 

Wright, Orville and Wilbur. Papers. 

Harry S Truman Library, Independence, Mo. 

Truman, Harry S. Papers. 
396 

US Air Force Academy Library, Special Collections, Colorado 

Springs, Colo. 

“HAP” Arnold. The Murray Green Collection. 

Hansell, Maj Gen Haywood S. Papers. 

Kármán, Theodore von. Papers. 

Kuter, Gen Laurence S. Papers. 

Victory, John F. Papers. 

US Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), Maxwell 

AFB, Ala. 

The system used at the AFHRA centers around two 

antiquated research tools, IRIS and the card catalog. 

Collections are named by call number only. Oral history 

interviews are listed separately in this section. A new 

computer system is currently being installed to simplify 

research in this facility. 

US Air Force Materiel Command History Office, Dayton, Ohio. 

Original volumes of Toward New Horizons are located 

here. 

US Air Force Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. 

Arnold, Henry H. Papers. 

Ercoupe Folder. 

The Kettering Bug Folder. 

Approximately 50 folders containing technical 

information on many aircraft designations were consulted 

in preparing this manuscript. 

US Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Washington, D.C. 

Early SAG lies contain many of the organizational 

documents missing in other locations. Additionally, the 

papers of Floyd Sweet, former SAB secretary, are on lie 

there. 

US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa. 
397 

US Military Academy Library, West Point, N.Y. 

A variety of sources were used to piece together Arnold’s 

cadet life. 

Public Records and Documents, Unpublished 

National Air and Space Museum Archives (NASM). 

NASM, Washington, D.C. 

Arnold, Henry H. Folder. 

Bush, Vannevar. Folder. 

Jet Engines, General and 1920-1945. 

Kármán, Theodore von. Folder. 

Lewis, George W. Collection. 

Munk, Max. Folder. 

Prandtl, Ludwig. Folder. 

NASM, Silver Hill, Md. 

Hunsaker, Jerome Clarke. Papers. 

A microfiche copy of the Kármán Papers are located 

here, however, there are substantial amounts of 

personal information, and photos which were not 

copied from the originals at Caltech. 

US National Archives and Records Administration. 

National Archives, Washington, D.C. 

Record Group 18. Records of the Office of the Chief 

of the Air Corps. 

National Archives, College Park, Md. 

Record Group 255. NACA Executive Committee 

Meeting Minutes. 

Record Group 111. H. H. Arnold Photo Collection. 
398 

US Official Histories 

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August 1942. 

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December 1943. 

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May 1945. 

Vol. 4: The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 

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Vol. 5: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to 

August 1945. 

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Vol. 7: Services Around the World. 

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The War Department 

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—. “Science and Air Power.” Air Affairs, December 1946, 

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“U. S. Making Rocket War Plane.” Washington Post, 7 January 

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Eaker, Ira C. 1 October 1979, and 7 December 1979. 

Getting, Ivan. 17 October 1994. 

Green, Murray. 18 November 1993, 9 February 1994, and 20 June 

1994. 

Hansell, Haywood. 4 October 1979, and 9 December 1979. 

Hasert, Chester N. 24 May 1995. 
414 

Roland, Alex. 4 May, 5 August 1994, and 15 February 1996. 

Interviews and Oral Histories 

Interviews by the Author 

Arnold, Mrs. Barbara. 6 April 1995. 

Arnold, Mr. Robert. 14-16 July 1995. 

Charyk, Dr., and Mrs. Joseph. 9 November 1994. 

Flax, Dr. Alexander. 9 November 1994. 

Getting, Dr. Ivan. 9 November 1994. 

Hallion, Dr. Richard P. 28 August 1995. 

Hasert, Mr. Chester. 9 November 1994. 

Schriever, Bernard A. 9 November 1995,12 March 1996. 

Sears, Dr. William Rees. 8 July 1995. 

Stewart, Dr. Homer Joe. 21 July 1995. 

Stever, Dr. H. Guyford. 18 May 1995. 

Yarymovych, Dr. Michael I. 20 July 1995. 

USAF Academy Oral History Interviews 

Doolittle, Lt Gen James H. 21 April 1969, 22 December 1977. 

Eaker, Lt Gen Ira C. 19 October 1978. 

Kármán, Dr. Theodore von. Number 212.27 January 1960. 

Twining, Gen Nathan F. Number 206. 206A. November 1965, 3 

November 1967. 

Victory, John F. Number 210A. October 1962. 

Murray Green Collection Interviews 

Arnold, General of the Air Force, H. H. Interviewed by T. A. 

Boyd. 19 October 1949. 
415 

Bowman, Brig Gen H. W. 23 August 1969. 

Carroll, Maj Gen Franklin. 1 September 1971. 

Chidlaw, Gen Benjamin. 12 December 1969. 

Conant, F. W. CUOHR 

Craigie, Lt Gen Laurence. 19 August 1970. 

Dean, Lt Gen Fred. 20 February 1973. 

Gardner, Grandison. CUOHR. 

Keirn, Maj Gen Donald J., Retired. 25 September 1970. 

Kelsey, Benjamin S. 9 June 1971. 

McHugh, Brig Gen Godfrey. 21 April 1970. 

Milling, Thomas D. n.d. CUOHR. 

Raymond, A. E. n.d. CUOHR. 

Viccellio, Lt Gen Henry, Jr. 13 May 1970. 

Reminiscences of Friends and Family, 

on file at USAF Academy 

Arnold, Mrs. H. H. 

Spaatz, Gen Carl A. 

Air Force Historical Research Agency 

Oral History Interviews 

Cook, Orvil R. K239.0512-740, 836. 

Craigie, Laurence. K239.0512-637, 647, 695, 1397, and 146.33-34. 

Doolittle, James H. K239.0512-1405, 623, 625, 793, 998, 1152, 

and 146.34-39. 

Dryden. Dr. Hugh Latimer. K146.34-41. 

Eaker, Ira C. K239.0512-626, 627, 799, 829, 868, 918, and 

142.052. 

Hunsaker, Jerome C. K146.34-53. 
416 

Lindbergh, Charles A. K146.34-64. 

McHugh, Godfrey T. K239.0512-1458. 

Norstad, Lauris. K239.0512-1116, 1473. 

O’Donnell, Gen Emmett “Rosie.” K239.0512-1476. 

Peabody, Hume. K239.0512-867. 

Putt, Lt Gen Donald L. K239.0512-724. 

Seamans, Robert C. K239.0512-866. 

Symington, Stuart. K239.0512-932, 1039, 1343. 

Twining, Nathan F. K239.0512-635, 636. 

Whittle, Sir Frank. K239.0512-931. 

Miscellaneous Interviews 

Allen, Gen Lew, Jr., USAF, Retired. Interviewed for 5 Decades of 

Progress: Toward New Horizons, by John Primm, videotape, 

USAF Television, 20 September 1994. 

Kármán, Theodore von. Interviewed by Shirley Thomas, tape, 

January 1960. 

Sorenson, Harold. Interview for 50th Anniversary SAB, Pentagon, 

Washington, D.C., 27 September 1994. 

Video Recordings 

Primm, John. 5 Decades of Progress: Toward New Horizons. 

USAF Television, Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 30 min., 

1994. 

—. New World Vistas. USAF Television, 54 min., 15 December 

1995. 

Sears, William Rees. “Oral History Interview, 9 July 1995, 

Tucson, AZ.” USAF Television, 1995. 
417 

“Proceedings of the ‘50th Anniversary of the SAB’ Symposium.” 

10 November 1994, National Academy of Sciences. 6 hours, 

1994.