alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.6



CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002



The undersigned, as the Chief Executive
Officer of DHX Media Ltd., certifies that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, the annual report on Form 40-F for the fiscal
year ended June 30, 2017, which accompanies this certification, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d),
as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information contained in the annual report on Form 40-F
for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2017 fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of DHX Media Ltd. at the dates and for the periods indicated. The foregoing certification is made pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. § 1350) and shall not be relied upon for any other purpose. The undersigned expressly
disclaims any obligation to update the foregoing certification except as required by law.



Date: September 27, 2017



|/s/ Dana Sean Landry          | 
|----------------------------- | 
|Dana Sean Landry              | 
|Chief Executive Officer       | 
|(principal executive officer) |
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In re Jack W. Sessums, Jr.

Appellate case number: 01-19-00106-CV

Trial court case number: PR-0079203

Trial court: Probate Court of Galveston County

On February 13, 2019, relator, Jack W. Sessums, Jr., filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus and emergency motion to stay, requesting that we stay a hearing scheduled for 

February 20, 2019. We grant relator’s emergency motion to stay the February 20, 2019 

hearing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10(b). This stay is effective until the case in this Court is 

finally decided or the Court otherwise orders the stay lifted. Any party may file a motion 

for reconsideration of the stay. See id. 52.10(c).

Further, the Court requests that the real party in interest respond to the petition for 

writ of mandamus. It is ordered that the response of any interested party, if any, shall be 

due no later than 20 days from the date of this order.

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Sherry Radack

  Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: __February 15, 2019___
#### William H. Waldby v. Genevieve Callendar.

TJie provision in the tax law of 1858, which attempts to confer upon Circuit Court Commissioners the power to adjudicate upon tax titles, is unconstitutional and void.

*Submitted on brief July 6th.*

*Decided July 9th.*

Certiorari to the Circuit Court Commissioner for Allegan county.

On April 23d, 1859, Genevieve Callendar presented to said Circuit Court Commissioner a petition, under §101 of the tax law of 1858, to have certain tax titles held by one Merchant, upon ¿and claimed by her, set aside and annulled. Plaintiff in error, who held a mortgage given by Merchant, was made a party respondent to said petition, and proceedings having been had before the Commissioner in conformity with the section mentioned, the Commissioner rendered judgment that the prayer of the petition be granted, and the tax deeds annulled.

*T. M.*Cooley, for plaintiff in error: .

The Legislature can not, under the Constitution, confer upon Circuit Court Commissioners the power which this act attempts to give.

That the power is judicial is too clear to need argument, or the citation of authorities. The decision of- the Commissioner is called a *judgment*by the act (§101): it determines the title : it is a substitute for the action of ejectment (§90): it is final unless appealed from: the commissioner does not report to the Circuit or any other court: and the Circuit Court gets no jurisdiction of the proceedings except by *a/ppeal.*The power is not only a judicial power, but a judicial power of the highest importance, determining finally controversies with respect to property, to any amount or value.

It is a power not exercised with respect to any suit *in court.*

It is not possessed by Circuit Judges_jat chambers, and does not relate to chamber duties.

*431It was not possessed by commissioners at the adoption of the Constitution.

The act therefore does not come within any of the decisions of this court with reference to the power of commissioners, and there can really be no question of its invalidity.

There was no appearance for defendant in error.

Martin Cii. J.:

By §101 of act No. 32 of the session of 1858, *(S. JO. pp.*186, 189) the Legislature attempted to confer upon Circuit Court Commissioners judicial powers equal to the combined powers of courts of law and of equity. By §16 of Art. 6 of the Constitution, the Legislature could only invest these officers with powers not exceeding those of a Circuit Judge at chambers; and this attempt to clothe them with these superior powers, is in. direct conflict with this constitutional provision.

The judgment of the Circuit Court Commissioner is reversed, with costs.

The other Justices concurred.
11 TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND

, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Larry Harold Forward

, * From the 238th District

Court of Midland County,

Trial Court No. CR37755

.

Vs. No. 11

- 11

- 00060

- CR * March 28, 2013

The State of Texas, * O pinion by Wright, C.J.

(Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Willson , J. )

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is no error in

the judgment below. Therefore, in accorda nce with this court ’ s opinion, the judgment of the

trial court is in all things affirmed.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Thomas K. DeSalvo, Appellant.

[635 NYS2d 562]

—Judgment unanimously affirmed. Counsel’s application to withdraw granted *{see, People v Crawford,*71 AD2d 38). Memorandum: Defendant’s sentence must be consecutive *{see,*Penal Law § 70.25 [2-a]). (Appeal from Judgment of Genesee County Court, Morton, J.—Attempted Burglary, 3rd Degree.) Present—Law-ton, J. P., Wesley, Balio, Davis and Boehm, JJ.
#### Elizabeth D. Vail, *Plaintiff, v.*Thomas H. Kensett and others, *Defendants.*In the Matter of the Application of James C. Eadie, *a Referee in Partition, Relator, v.*Elizabeth D. Vail, *Purchaser, etc., Respondent.*

— Judgment upon submitted case as follows: That *673the children of the sons who held the life estate are necessary parties to the partition action, and that the referee’s title on the case is not good; judgment for purchaser. Opinion by Barnard, P. J.
#### STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, CROSS-RESPONDENT, v. WILLIAM B. PURYEAR, DEFENDANT, CROSS-PETITIONER.

See same case below: 94 *N. J. Super.*125.

*Mr. Thomas E. Burkin, Jr.*and *Mr. William J. Gearty*for the cross-petitioner.

*Mr. Brendan T. Byrne*and *Mr. Barry H. Evenchick*for the cross-respondent.

May 2, 1967.

Denied.
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Baker, Willis and Annunziata 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

UNITED AIRLINES 

v. Record No. 0510-95-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER 

SHIRLEY KOMACK FEBRUARY 6, 1996 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 M. Lynn McHale (Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer & 

Boccarosse, on brief), for appellant. 

 Peter M. Sweeny (Peter M. Sweeny & Associates, 

P.C., on brief), for appellee. 

 In this appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation 

Commission (commission), United Airlines (employer) contends that 

carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) is not a disease and, therefore, the 

commission erred when it found that it is a compensable disease. 

 In the alternative, employer argues that the CTS suffered by 

Shirley Komack (claimant) was not caused by her employment. 

 As the parties are familiar with the record, it is not 

necessary that we recite facts other than those necessary to show 

the reason for this opinion. On the issue of whether CTS is a 

disease, Dr. Raymond F. Lower reported that if "disease" is 

defined as "any deviation from or interruption of the normal 

structure or function of any part, organ, or system (or 

combination thereof) of the body that is manifested by a 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
- 2 - 

characteristic set of symptoms and signs whose etiology, 

pathology, and prognosis may be known or unknown," SloaneDorland Ann. Medical-Legal Dictionary 209 (1987), then claimant's 

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome is a disease. See Perdue Farms, 

Inc. v. McCutchan, 21 Va. App. 65, 68, 461 S.E.2d 431, 433 

(1995); Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438 

S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993) (quoting Sloane-Dorland Ann Medical-Legal 

Dictionary 209 (1987)). Based upon those decisions, we hold that 

claimant's CTS is an occupational disease that if proved to be 

job-related may make claimant eligible for workers' compensation 

benefits. 

 Having first found, as required by Merrillat Industries, 

Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429, 432, 436 S.E.2d 600, 601 (1993), that 

the evidence supports that CTS is a disease, we turn to the 

causation issue alternatively raised by employer. Dr. Lower was 

given a job description of the type work claimant performed for 

employer as a food service employee, and the doctor reported 

that, not being aware of any non-related activities "which 

substantially exposed [claimant] to the risk of carpal tunnel 

syndrome," he was of the opinion that claimant's CTS was "more 

likely than not caused, in whole or in part, by the conditions of 

her employment as a Food Service Employee." Although other 

medical authorities did not agree with Dr. Lower's opinion, we 

hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the commission's 

decision. 
- 3 - 

 Accordingly, we affirm the finding that claimant is entitled 

to the benefits provided by the Workers' Compensation Act. 

 Affirmed.
Case No. 6,813.

#### In re HUBBARD.

[1 Lowell, 190; 1 1 N. B. R. 679.]

District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Dec., 1867.

Baxkkui’Tcy — Pkoof op Deut — Mistake — Leave to WlTUllUAV.

1. A creditor who has proved his debt in bankruptcy may be permitted to withdraw his proof if it was made under a mistake of fact or law.

[Cited in Re Parkes, Case No. 10,754; Re Baxter, 12 Fed. 75.]

[Cited in Re Burgess, 83 Me. 343, 22 Atl. 222; Nichols v. Smith, 143 Mass. 462, 9 N. E. 810.] .

2. Leave to withdraw will usually be granted where the withdrawal will restore all parties to the position they were in before the proof was made; but not if intervening rights will be affected.

[Cited in Re Phillips, Case No. 11,098.]

In bankruptcy. [In the matter of Edward Hubbard, Jr.] In this case certain creditors proved their debts at the first meeting, on the twenty-fifth of November, and on the-twenty-first of December they filed a petition before the register to be allowed to withdraw their proofs of debt from the files, for the reason- that, since proof had been made, they had discovered that a certain person named was a dormant partner , with the bankrupt, and was solvent; that they could not by due diligence have discovered this fact earlier; and alleging that they had. discontinued all suits against the bankrupt himself. The register certified to the judge the question whether the petition ought to be granted.

LOWELL, District Judge.

Where proof, has been made under a mistake of fact, or even of law, it may be corrected, almost as a matter of course, if neither the bankrupt nor other creditors who have proved will be injured. And even where the rights of others will be affected, if the only effect is to restore all parties to the position they were in before the debt was proved, it would be proper to allow the withdrawal if there had been a mistake, and no want of diligence. In the only case in which I have refused such a petition, the creditor, by proving his debt, had relieved an attachment by trustee process, and the garnishee had in good faith paid over the funds to the assignee. Although I did not believe that any court would hold the lien to be revived by the creditor’s withdrawing his proof, yet it was not right to permit such a question to be even mooted.

Under our practice an order of this kind may be passed by the register, if after due notice, no opposition is made; otherwise by the court. The decisions on the question are Morse v. Lowell, 7 Mete. [Mass.] 152: *776Ex parte Harwood [Case No. 6,185]; Bemis v. Smith, 10 Metc. [Mass.] 194; Safford y. Slade, 11 Cush. 29; Beverly Bank v. Wilkinson, 2 Gray, 519. Leave to withdraw proof granted.
Exhibit 23.1

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

The Board of Directors

Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc.

Naples, Florida

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (No. 333-145455, 333-115930, and 333-40806) on Form S-8 of Beasley Broadcast
Group, Inc. of our report dated March 11, 2008, with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc., and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which report appears in
this Annual Report on Form 10-K of Beasley Broadcast Group, Inc. for the year ended December 31, 2007.



|                                
|--------------------------------
|                                
|/s/ Crowe Chizek and Company LLC
|                                

March 11, 2008

Fort Lauderdale, Florida
#### THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondents, *v.*CHARLES H. WEED, Appellant.

*Bvidence*— advice, *that a paper signed by a husband and wife in legal effect constitutes a divorce, is no defense to am. indictment for bigamy.*

Upon the trial of the defendant for bigamy it was shown that prior to the second marriage he and his wife had signed articles, under seal, in Connecticut, providing that if either party should apply for a divorce, the other party would not oppose the application and would not appear against the petitioning party. He was then asked by his counsel whether the justice of the peace in Connecticut, who witnessed the paper, did not tell him that it was in legal effect a divorce.

*Held,*that the court properly refused to allow the question to be put

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Sessions of Westchester county, convicting the defendant of bigamy.

*629
      *Francis*Larkin, for the appellant.

*Nelson H.*Baker, district-attorney, for the people.

Barnard, P. J.:

The prisoner was indicted for bigamy. The offense was clearly proven. The prisoner married one Louisa Bryson, in Westchester county in this State, in 1875, and he again married one Carrie Megol in May, 1881, in Westchester county. Louisa Bryson was at the date of the second marriage and is yet living. It was proven upon the trial that, before the second marriage, the prisoner and his wife signed articles under seal, in Connecticut, that if either party should apply for a divorce the other would not oppose the application and would not appear against the petitioning party. A question was put by the prisoner’s counsel to him whether the justice of the peace in Connecticut, who witnessed the paper, did not tell him that the paper was in legal effect a divorce. The same question was put to another witness to the paper. These questions were overruled and an exception taken to the decision. This presents the only question in the case. We think it was not an erroneous ruling. The general rule is that all are presumed to know the law, and that ignorance of, the law excuses no one from crime. The particular crime alleged was fully made out. The two marriages were understandingly entered into by the prisoner, with full knowledge of the facts which, by statute, establishes the offense. The prisoner, when he married the second time, knew that his first wife was still living. Neither the deputy sheriff who drew the paper nor the justice who read it over could destroy the effect of an intentional violation of a statute, by advice that such violation could be lawfully done.

The conviction should therefore be affirmed.

Dtkman and Pratt, JJ., concurred.

Conviction affirmed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

CYNTHIA O’CONNER

, 1

Petitioner Below

Appellant,

v.

DARRYL J. ROBINSON

,

Respondent Below

Appellee. §

§ No. 42, 2015

§

§

§ Court Below

— Family Court

§ of the State of Delaware,

§ in and for New Castle Co unty

§ File No. C N 09

- 04138

§ Petition No s

. 1 4

- 29245 and

§ and 14

- 28432

§

Submitted: August 28, 201 5

Decided: October 2 7 , 201 5

Amended: October 29, 2015

Before ST RINE

, Chief Justice ; HOLLAND

, and S E ITZ

, Justices.

O R D E R

This 2 7 th day of October 2015 , upon co nsideration of the appellant’s

opening brief

2 and the record below, we find it evident that the judgment of

the Family Court should be affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons

assigned in the Family Court’s well

- reasoned decision dated January 13,

2015 affirming the Commissioner’s denial of the appellant’s petition for a

protection from abuse (“PFA”) order and grant of the appellee’s PFA

petition.

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties under Supreme Court Rule

7(d).

2 The appellee did not file an answering brief.2

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the

Family Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr.

Chief Justice
EXHIBIT 35.1














SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT OF TOYOTA MOTOR CREDIT CORPORATION (“THE SERVICER”)








I, Wei Shi, certify that:





(a)   A review of the Servicer’s activities and of its performance under the applicable Sale and Servicing Agreement during the year ended December 31, 2012 has been made under my supervision.




(b)   To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Sale and Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the aforementioned period.








March 21, 2013








By:  /S/ WEI SHI





Wei Shi


Vice President - Treasury, Finance & Analytics


Toyota Motor Credit Corporation, as Servicer of the


Toyota Auto Receivables 2010-A Owner Trust


- 22 -
**Exhibit      32.2**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

**AS      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

|   | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                                |                                                                |                                 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
|                                                                | DIAMOND                POWERSPORTS, INC.(Registrant)                |
|                                                           |                                                           |                            |
| Date: February                17, 2005     | By:                                                       | /s/ Lisa                Elliott |
|                                                                | Pierre                ElliottChief                Financial Officer |
#### Max Heurtematte *v.*Francis Yarris.

— Motion for reargument denied.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with this Report on Form 10-Q of Summit Financial Services Group, Inc. (the Company), for the quarter ended
June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Marshall T. Leeds, Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President of the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, do hereby certify, to my knowledge that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                                                            
|------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Marshall T. Leeds                                       
|Marshall T. Leeds                                           
|Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer
and President
|Dated: August 16, 2010
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.43
                                                                   -------------

                                REVOLVING NOTE

$13,500,000                                                     December 8, 2000


     For value received, the undersigned, RF MONOLITHICS, INC., a Delaware
corporation (the "Borrower"), hereby promises to pay on the Termination Date
under the Credit Agreement (defined below), to the order of WELLS FARGO BUSINESS
CREDIT, INC., a Minnesota corporation (the "Lender"), at its main office in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, or at any other place designated at any time by the
holder hereof, in lawful money of the United States of America and in
immediately available funds, the principal sum of $13,500,000.00 or, if less,
the aggregate unpaid principal amount of all Revolving Advances made by the
Lender to the Borrower under the Credit Agreement (defined below) together with
interest on the principal amount hereunder remaining unpaid from time to time,
computed on the basis of the actual number of days elapsed and a 360-day year,
from the date hereof until this Note is fully paid at the rate from time to time
in effect under the Credit and Security Agreement of even date herewith (as the
same may hereafter be amended, supplemented or restated from time to time, the
"Credit Agreement") by and between the Lender and the Borrower. The principal
hereof and interest accruing thereon shall be due and payable as provided in the
Credit Agreement. This Note may be prepaid only in accordance with the Credit
Agreement.

     This Note is issued pursuant, and is subject, to the Credit Agreement,
which provides, among other things, for acceleration hereof. This Note is the
Revolving Note referred to in the Credit Agreement. This Note is secured, among
other things, pursuant to the Credit Agreement and the Security Documents as
therein defined, and may now or hereafter be secured by one or more other
security agreements, mortgages, deeds of trust, assignments or other instruments
or agreements.

     The Borrower hereby agrees to pay all costs of collection, including
attorneys' fees and legal expenses in the event this Note is not paid when due,
whether or not legal proceedings are commenced.

     Presentment or other demand for payment, notice of acceleration, notice of
intent to accelerate, notice of dishonor and protest and all other notices of
any kind are expressly waived.

                              RF MONOLITHICS, INC.

                              By  /s/ David M. Kirk
                                  --------------------------------
                                      David M. Kirk, President