Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit

Technology

January 1980

NTIS order #PB80-153323
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 80-600001

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock No. 052-003 -00736-3
Foreword

This assessment of advanced group rapid transit (AGRT) was made in response to

a request of the House Committee on Appropriations to evaluate the need for this

technology and its relationship to national mass transportation goals

In 1975, OTA published a major study, Automated Guideway Transit, An

Assessment of PRT and Other New Systems. This current study of AGRT represents a

partial update of the earlier report.

Increases in traffic congestion, petroleum shortages, and decreasing mobility for

the transit-dependent reflect a growing need for more efficient and effective transportation options. This report examines the need for further advances in automated guideway transit (AGT) technology and evaluates their potential impacts on various stakeholder groups.

Members of the advisory panel and public participation working group contributed a great deal of valuable information and guidance throughout the course of

this assessment. In addition, OTA is grateful for the assistance of numerous Department of Transportation officials representing both the Office of the Secretary and the

Urban Mass Transportation Administration. Several cities were visited to evaluate the

operation of existing AGT systems and to obtain the views of transit operators, planners, system suppliers, and consumers. Additional documents and data obtained from

various domestic and foreign sources are referenced in this report.

ill
Advanced Group Rapid Transit

Project Advisory Panel

Michael A. Powills, Jr., Chairman

Senior Vice President

Bartan-Aschman Associates, Inc.

J. Edward Anderson

Director of Industrial Engineering

University of Minnesota

Robert A. Burco

President

Public Policy Research Associates

Catherine Burke

School of Public Administration

University of Southern California

Lawrence Dallam

Director of Transportation Planning

Twin Cities Metropolitan Council

Julie H. Hoover

Manager of the Planning Division

Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade, and Douglas

George Krambles

Executive Director

Chicago Transit Authority

Robert A. Makofski

Applied Physics Laboratory

The Johns Hopkins University

Public Participation Working Group

Olivia Cammack Alvin Frost Lena Lupica

Mia Choumenkovitch Mark Horowitz Larry Newlin

Del Dobbins William B. Lindsay Gerald C. Sasser
Advanced Group Rapid Transit

Project Staff

Eric H. Willis, Assistant Director

Science, information, and Transportation Division

Robert L. Maxwell, Transportation Program Manager

Joe] Miller, Co-Project Leader

Richard Willow, Co-Project Leader

Contractors

Public Policy Research Associates-Robert Burco

SC Associates-Frank Spielberg

Technology Research and Analysis Corp.—A. M. Yen

Publishing Office

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

Kathie S. Boss Joanne Heming

v
Contents

I.

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VI.

Summary—Issues and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Issue I: The Need For More Advanced Automated Systems

Issue 2: Prototype Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Issue 3: Government/Industry Relationships. . . . . . . . . . .

Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

R&D: The Search for More Competitive Transit Options . . . . .

Automated Guideway Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

History of AGRT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Issues Addressed in the Assessment of AGRT . . . . . . .

Urban Transportation Needs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Goals for Our Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Goals for Urban Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Currently Available Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mixed Traffic Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Exclusive Guideway Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comparison of Mode Classes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Desirable Future Service Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Future Technology Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Implementing Technologies for Service Improvements

Impacts of Advanced Group Rapid

Quality of Service. . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Auto User. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ridership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Special User Groups . . . . . . . . . . .

Safety and Security. . . . . . . . . . . .

Urban Development . . . . . . . . . . .

Energy and Environment. . . . . . . .

Economics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Employment and Productivity . . .

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Government/Industry Relationshipsin

Technology Development . . . . . . . .

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Barriers toInnovation. . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Advanced Group Rapid

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Foreign Competition and Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Long-Range Objectives—An Intermediate Recipient

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

VII. Market Scenarios—Innovation in the Public Sector.

AGRT Implementation Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents—continued

Chapter Page

Downtown People Mover Deployments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......49

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......50

VIII. Options for Automated Guideway Transit Research and Development. . . . ..51

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......51

Program Options for Advanced Technology Development . . . . . . . . .......52

Option I: Emphasize the Upgrading of Existing Technologies . . .......52

Option 2: Emphasize Critical Subsystems Development. . . . . . . .......53

Option 3: Validate Subsystems in a Systems Environment . . . . . .......53

Option 4: Develop and Validate Technology on Prototype Systems. ....53

Number of Prototypes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..54

Magnetic Levitation Technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56

Funding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56

Goods Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....57

Non-Automated Guideway Transit Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....58

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......58

LIST OF TABLES

Tab/eNo. Page

1. Administrative Commitments by Fiscal Year and UMTA Activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

2. AGRT Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....17

3. AGRT Engineering Prototype Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......17

4. Issues Requiring Further Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

5. Typical Features of Advanced AGT Systems. . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

6. R&D Options for Achieving AGT Technologies—Pros and Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

7, Principal Arguments in Favor of Retaining Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..55

8. Estimated Funding Levels for Advanced AGT Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......56

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page

1, U.S. Urban Mass Transit Trends (1940-78) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....11

2. Classes of Automated Guideway Transit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

3. Summary of AGRT Technology Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......16

4. Characteristics of Exclusive Guideway Systems. . . . . . . . . , . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

.,. Vlll
‘ ‘As a matter of fact, one of our tribe conceived

the Idea of the wheel quite some time ago, but we

reasoned that the speed of the outer circumference

would be so much greater than the speed of the Inner

circumference that the whole thing would fly apart.

so we abandoned It ‘‘

‘‘Do you realize. sir, that If your invention should gain popular

acceptance–which I do not for one moment believe it will–we should

have to provide paved roads, throughout the length and breadth of

the country, thousands of pumping stations to supply ready access

to fuel, and innumerable vacant lots In every city In which to park

the vehicles? Take my advice and forget this folly, Henry ‘‘

Chapter I

SUMMARY–ISSUES AND OPTIONS

Current transit options, conceived 50 or more

years ago, are unable to serve efficiently the

dispersed travel patterns in today’s low-density

urban areas. This growing mismatch between

available transit services and trip demands

largely explains why transit serves only 12 percent of the work trips and 2.5 percent of total

urban trips (see table below). Transit’s market

share would need to increase dramatically to

bring about a major reduction in traffic congestion and energy consumption.

Urban transportation problems do not lend

themselves to a single all-encompassing solution. Several near- and long-term options have

been identified, however, which offer the reasonable prospect of making these problems

Major Mode of Transportation to Work for 21 Standard

Metropolitan Statistical Areas: 1975

Number

Mode (thousands) Percent a

Workers using vehicles . . . . . . . . . . 11,650 100

Auto or truck . . . . . .

Drives alone

Carpool

Public transportation .

Bus or streetcar

Subway or elevated

Railroa d

. . . . . . . . . . . 10,040

7,877

2,100

. . . . . . . . . . . 1,432

1,018

177

224

86

68

18

12

9

2

2

Other (motorcycles and bicycles). . . . 179 2

aper cent Of workers using vehicles

NOTE F(gures do not add due 10 rounding

SOURCE Dala from the Travel to Work Supplement 10 (he Annual Houslrrg Survey

more manageable. These options include expanded use of carpools and vanpools, transportation system management techniques, land use

policies, near-term transit product improvements, and new transit technologies offering

service levels more competitive with the automobile.

Automated guideway transit (AGT)—consisting of driverless vehicles operating on their own

guideway—is widely regarded as a promising

new option that cities should have the opportunity to select in addition to buses, subways,

and trolleys. A wide variety of automated transit systems are undergoing development in the

United States, Europe, and Japan. The simplest

form, called shuttle-loop transit (SLT), has operated successfully for several years in shopping

centers, airports, and amusement parks. SLT

systems typically consist of single vehicles or vehicles in trains operating on short segments of

linear or circular guideways with few stations,

little or no vehicle switching, and at least 1-

minute spacing or “headway” between vehicles.

Most installations have been on elevated guideways, but some also operate at ground level or

in tunnels. These types of systems are commonly referred to as horizontal elevators. The

Urban Mass Transportation Administration

(UMTA) has provided some research and development funding for SLT systems over the past

decade and is now supporting planning activities in 10 cities for the installation of SLT systems in the downtown areas. This downtown

people mover (DPM) program was created to

3
4 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

test the viability of existing AGT systems as circulators in city centers.

A second generation of AGT systems called

group rapid transit (GRT) is operating in Morgantown, W.Va., and at the Dallas-Fort Worth,

Tex., airport. Both of these systems received

Federal support. Compared to SLT systems,

GRTs can operate at shorter headways (down to

3 seconds) on more extensive guideway networks and make much more extensive use of

switching. GRT stations can be located on

sidings called offline stations, which permit vehicles to bypass other vehicles that have stopped

to accept or discharge passengers.

The most complex form of guideway transit is

called personal rapid transit (PRT). These systems are characterized by small, one- to six-passenger vehicles, capable of operating at one-half

to 3-second headways and offering nonstop origin-to-destination service on extensive, narrow

guideways. As in the private automobile, PRT

riders would not be required to share their vehicle with strangers. PRT has been under development in France, West Germany, and Japan, but

no system has been deployed in cities.

A federally funded program is currently underway to develop a third generation of automated systems called advanced group rapid

transit (AGRT). The largely arbitrary system

specifications, as defined by UMTA, place

AGRT on the dividing line between GRT and

PRT systems. These specifications call for 40-

mph, 12-passenger, all-seated vehicles operating

with 3-second headways and offline stations.

Three designs were selected including a rubbertired vehicle with propulsion through the

wheels, and two systems propelled by linear induction motors, one supported by an air cushion and the other magnetically levitated, The

technologies under development in the AGRT

program could be applied to all forms of exclusive guideway transit ranging from largevehicle urban rail systems to small-vehicle PRT

systems.

OTA was asked by the Transportation Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to evaluate recently proposed changes in

the scope and cost of the AGRT program. This

assessment addressed three major issues.

Issue 1: The Need For More Advanced Automated Systems

Will AGRT offer significantly lower cost and superior service than other types of urban transit?

There is considerable support at the local

level for continuing work on AGT technologies,

both among transit users and public officials.

Users and nonusers alike are critical of the

amenities, frequency of service, reliability,

crowding, and inconvenience characteristic of

transit services currently available in most

cities. Technological innovations encompassed

in the AGRT program include new electronic

control systems, linear induction motors,

magnetic levitation systems, high-speed switching, and emergency braking for short headway

operations. These advances in technology offer

several potential benefits to transit operators

and users:

● service flexibility comparable to vans or

taxis coupled with the carrying capacity of

a trolley car system or a multilane freeway,

Photo crecflt U S Department of Energy

Old technology—changing needs
Ch. l—Summary ● 5

● lower cost per mile of guideway than for

heavy-rail transit systems thus permitting

the construction of more extensive guideway networks for a fixed capital investment,

. rapid origin-to-destination service with few

or no intermediate stops and no transfers,

and

● substantially increased frequency of nonrush hour service.

Systems incorporating these technologies

could transport people and goods into activity

centers as well as provide circulation within

downtown and suburban activity centers. While

there is widespread agreement that these

changes in service levels would be beneficial,

several potential problems have been identified

that

●

●

c

●

●

●

need to be more fully addressed:

reliability of new technology;

community acceptance of elevated guideway designs;

evacuation of passengers stranded on narrow elevated guideways;

operating problems in ice and snow;

public resistance to riding small, automated

vehicles in the company of strangers; and

verification of 1ifecycle cost estimates.

UMTA has sponsored studies that compare

the capital and operating costs of AGRT with

other transit options. The results show that

there are great variations in cost from system to

system which make generalized cost comparisons virtually meaningless. For example, operations and maintenance (O&M) costs per vehiclemile for the 10 existing AGT systems range from

$0.49 to $6.55. Average O&M costs per passenger-mile for AGT ($0.17) compare very favorably with trolleys ($0.44), buses ($0.49), and

rail rapid transit ($0.58). However, the O&M

costs per passenger-mile for AGT ranges from

$0.09 to $1.01. Consequently, comparisons of

average costs across broad categories of systems

tend to be misleading. There are also wide variations in the capital costs of these systems which

reflect site-specific differences in topography,

guideway design, local labor rates, and system

design requirements. More reliable comparisons

need to be made through analysis of individual

community requirements.

AGT

Light rail

Heavy ra!l

SOURCES Thomas K Dyer Inc Rad flapd Transd Cost Wdy March 1977 N O Lea &

Associates Inc Summary of Capital and Operallng and Maintenance Cost Experl

ence ot Automated Guldeway Transit Systems June 1978

No reliable techniques exist for estimating ridership on such systems because they embody

service characteristics presently unavailable on

public transit. Until some actual operating experience is accumulated, claims about costs per

passenger-mile on AGRT systems cannot be

verified. Surveys show that the service attributes made possible by AGRT technologies are

regarded favorably by the public. However,

survey data is not always a reliable indication of

future behavior. A limited test of these new

service levels will be required to verify the survey findings.
6 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

In summary, we find that:

●

●

AGRT technologies appear capable of providing service levels that the public wants

but cannot get with currently available ●

transit technologies.

Capital and operating cost estimates for

AGRT compare favorably with the costs of

installing and operating heavy-rail systems

on exclusive guideways. However, there

are large variations in capital and operating

costs among the 10 operational automated

Issue 2: Prototype Development

guideway systems. Precise comparisons

with other transit technologies will require

further testing of AGRT systems and realworld experience.

Additional system optimization studies are

needed to determine the preferred vehicle

size, seating capacity, guideway configuration, headway; and line speed of future

AGT systems. The views of transit operators and the public should play a central

role in this analysis.

Do the benefits to be gained from building more than one prototype technology

justify the additional cost?

The original AGRT project plan called for

three manufacturers to submit competing designs, followed by the selection of a single system for prototype development. This plan was

later changed to provide for prototype development of both the air-cushion and the wheeledvehicle systems. In the revised plan, work was

also to continue on magnetic levitation technology, but at a lower level than for the other two

systems. These changes, together with inflation

adjustments, increased the program costs from

$43.5 million to $111 million.

AGT technology is currently at a stage of development analogous to automobile technology

shortly after the turn of the century. In the early

years automobile technology was very diverse

and a single-design concept did not emerge until

after an extended period of testing in the marketplace. AGT is still in the early stages of its

development cycle and it is too soon to predict

which technology will prove superior in most

applications.

In summary, we find that:

●

●

Money invested in alternative AGRT technologies during the early phases of the

R&D program can provide relatively inexpensive insurance against the risk of picking an inferior design.

At this early stage in the development cycle, there is no sound technical basis for discontinuing work or providing any promising technology with significantly less funding. Magnetic levitation is a particularly

promising option because of its low noise

and high reliability potential.

Issue 3: Government/Industry Relationships

What role should Government and industry play in the development of advanced AGT?

Federal programs established to foster the in- Potential transit system suppliers find it introduction of new transit technologies have con- creasingly difficult to justify major corporate insistently underestimated the complex institu- vestments in transit innovation, given a history

tional, economic, and technical barriers to in- of uncertain Federal support, unrealistically

novation. Neither transit operators nor local tight development timetables, complex institupublic officials are anxious to volunteer their tional barriers, and the lack of established stable

communities as laboratories for transit exper- markets. Unlike the automotive industry which

iments unless the Federal Government is pre- caters to millions of customers, or the aircraft

pared to underwrite the financial risks of manufacturers who have established long-term

failure. relationships with scores of airlines worldwide,
Ch. l—Summary ● 7

Federal Government Spending Allocated to

Research and Development–1979

5 9%

5

o

All Federal programs Urban mass transportation

SOURCES OftIce of Management and Budget U S Department of TransDor!allon Urban Mass

T ransporlatlon Admfmstral(on

the fate of would-be transit equipment suppliers

is increasingly bound up with one customer—

the Federal Government. Suppliers regard this

as an inherently unstable and risky arrangement.

The transit procurement process continues to

be administered at the local level. However, the

amount of funding available to each city, the

kinds of equipment that are eligible for purchase, and the procurement procedures themselves are largely determined at the Federal

level. The supplier industry is generally skeptical that the Federal Government will either decontrol the transit procurement process or provide what they regard as sufficient funding to

create a stable market for innovative transit

technologies. Several firms are willing to participate in federally funded R&D programs that require no major corporate investments, but it is

unlikely that production commitments will be

made unless industry is reasonably confident of

a favorable return on investment, even if Government agencies promise support for such a

market.

Transit operators and local public officials are

expressing growing concern that the products of

these federally sponsored R&D programs fail to

satisfy their transportation needs at reasonable

costs. Denver, Cleveland, Houston, and St.

Paul were all selected by the Federal Government as demonstration sites for an AGT system.

All four cities have reportedly withdrawn from

the program even though UMTA had agreed to

pay 80 percent of the system acquisition costs.

While many other cities have expressed an interest in deploying AGT, it remains to be seen

how many will decide to implement their plans.

In West Germany and Japan the development

of advanced AGT technologies has been supported through special agencies established to

promote the development of products that are

competitive in international markets. In this

country, the transit R&D function is managed

by the same agency that regulates and funds

urban transportation systems. Although foreign

countries lack the depth of operating experience

with AGT that has been accumulated in the

United States, they have been more successful in

resisting pressures to rush new technologies into

service before they are thoroughly tested, and

they have followed a more orderly development

process.

The West German Cabintaxi system, with

characteristics very similar to the current AGRT

design goals, is expected to be carrying passengers in a Hamburg demonstration by 1981. The

current development timetable for U.S. AGRT

systems suggest that they will not begin to carry

passengers before 1990 even if development and

deployment hurdles are overcome. If the Cabintaxi demonstration is successful, it would be a

clear signal that technological leadership has

shifted overseas. The trade implications of such

a development will depend on future U.S. Government policy toward advanced transit development and deployment.

In summary, we find that:

●

●

Introduction of innovative transit systems

is constrained not only by the need to more

adequately develop the technology, but by

major institutional and economic barriers

as well.

Recent experience suggests that the promise

of 80-percent Federal funding is no longer

sufficient inducement for cities to accept

transit technologies if there is a question

relative to whether they will meet local

needs at a reasonable cost.
8 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

●

●

Both West Germany and Japan have fostered a cooperative relationship between

Government and industry that has helped

ensure an orderly program of long-range

transit innovation. Further consideration is

needed of alternative institutional arrangements for managing transit R&D in the

United States.

The potential of broad international leadership in the transit technology field is no

longer a credible prospect for U.S. industry. However, component or system leadership in AGT is possible if pursued more

effectively than in the past.

Photo credit DEMAG Fordertechnik

West German AGRT to enter service in 1981—9 years ahead

of U.S. version

Policy Options

Four options for continued research on AGT

options are as follows:

have been identified. These

1.

2.

3.

4.

emphasize short= run product improvements in operating shuttle-loop

and group rapid transit systems;

—

continue long-range development of critical new subsystems capable

of providing major cost and service improvements;

validate new subsystems in a system environment to ensure that they

perform acceptably as part of an integrated package; and

develop prototype systems that incorporate major new technologies

leading to early deployment in cities.

These options could be adopted either singly system could be expected to fall in the range of

or in combination. For example, the first option $2 million to $7 million. The major advantage

emphasizes incremental improvements in shut- of this option is that improvements are available

tie-loop and group rapid transit systems that are to cities in the near-term. But if short-term obalready in operation. Examples of product im- jectives are pursued to the exclusion of longprovements might include higher line speeds, range R&D options, major cost and service level

larger motors, and more reliable door mech- improvements would be indefinitely postponed

anisms. This upgrading of operational systems and the AGRT contractors would discontinue

could be pursued as a short-range R&D objec- work on advanced systems.

tive alongside longer range transit innovations

such as those encompassed in the AGRT pro- Options 2 and 3 would continue development

gram. Depending on the scope of a given prod- of technologies associated with the AGRT prouct improvement program, the cost for each gram but incorporate more flexibility in the
Ch. l—Summary ● 9

selection of system design and performance

specifications. To achieve the advances in service levels specified in the AGRT program each

of the new subsystems needs to be developed in

parallel and tested in a systems environment. It

would be of little value, for example, to increase

a vehicle’s line speed to 40 mph unless it could

be simultaneously demonstrated that the vehicle

can be safely switched at these speeds, that the

emergency braking systems are effective, and

that the control systems are capable of maintaining safe stopping distances. It is not necessary, however to build full production prototypes to verify that the technology meets its

design goals. Deferring development of production prototypes, however, will delay the deployment of these new technologies. Pursuing both

Options 2 and 3 would cost in the range of $60

million to $80 million.

Option 4 would proceed immediately with the

design and development of production prototypes. This was essentially the AGRT program

as requested by UMTA in the FY 1979 budget at

a cost of $111 million. Early in 1979, UMTA

scaled down these plans. While work is to continue on the wheeled vehicle and air suspension

systems together with a lower level effort on

magnetic levitation, a decision to develop prototypes has been deferred. This option involves

the highest cost and technological risk. Its major

strength is that it aims at achieving the AGRT

program goals in less time than it will take

under Options 2 and 3.

In summary, we find that:

●

●

●

Updating existing technologies (Option 1)

should be a continuing objective of shortrange transit R&D programs. But a shortrange program is not a substitute for a

long-range program aimed at achieving significant improvements in performance,

cost , and service levels—beyond those

achievable through incremental improvements in existing transit systems.

Continued work on critical AGRT subsystems and their validation in a systems environment (Options 2 and 3) should help ensure the orderly development of new transit

systems with improved operating characteristics. Emphasis on these two options appears to be most appropriate at this time.

A decision to proceed immediately to develop one or more production prototype

systems (Option 4) presupposes a base of

knowledge about the relative merits of the

technological options and their marketability which does not currently exist, Selecting

specific prototype designs at this time

would appear to be premature.

56-518 - 0 - 80 - 3
Chapter II

INTRODUCTION

I / -. i

-2

-1

0

+1

19io 19’50 1960 1970 1978

SOURCE Amer,can PutXIc Transll Assoctahon

c-0==n

f A

(n

=

v

z

u

In hindsight, decline in the use of public transit is not only understandable but appears to

have been an inevitable consequence of the

changing growth patterns of U.S. cities. Since

World War II, suburban areas have been growing nearly four times faster than central cities.

Jobs and activities have followed people to these

suburbs, decentralizing the functions once largely confined to a single central business district.

Conventional transit—fixed-route bus, trolley, elevated, or subway—was introduced 80 or

more years ago when most of the urban population lived in the high-density central city, where

nearly all employment, shopping, and other activities were carried on. This basic fixed-route

transit, running to and from the central business

district, is becoming less compatible with the

spatial distributions of modern cities with large

multicentered suburbs and diffuse trip patterns.

Transit systems show very marked economies

of scale. As the number of riders per mile decreases, the cost per rider increases—very rapidly. As cities have changed, the automobile has

replaced transit as the basic urban transportation system. Although the decline in the total

transit ridership bottomed out in 1972 and some

growth has occurred since, costs have risen inexorably.

The goal of improved urban transportation is

to make the urban area a better place to live;

transportation attributes per se are important

only as they contribute to this larger goal. The

automobile is not space-efficient. Downtown

areas, high-density suburban developments,

and the principal arterials connecting them are

choked throughout large parts of the day with

automobile traffic. If existing cities are to become more pleasing places in which to work and

live, more space-efficient modes of transportation must be developed both for circulation

11
12 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

within high-density areas and along arterials.

This may require a combination of some restrictions on automobile use at certain times or in

certain areas and sufficiently attractive transportation alternatives to make such restrictions

acceptable to the public.

By the early 1960’s it became apparent that

without immediate Federal intervention, a great

many transit systems would have been unable

to renew their equipment or maintain service

levels. To deal with this rapidly deteriorating

situation, Congress enacted the Urban Mass

Transportation Act of 1964 for the purpose of:

1) improving transit equipment and services,

2) encouraging long-range planning, and 3) providing funds to acquire and preserve services.

Two of the three goals of the 1964 Act have

been largely achieved. Federal funds have enabled local public agencies to provide support to

troubled transit systems, thus preserving at least

a minimum level of service for the captive rider.

In addition, the quality of local transportation

planning has improved significantly as a result

of Federal support. Since 1964 a Federal investment of over $12 billion has gone into the purchase of equipment and extension of services.

Although ridership continued to decline after

1964, it bottomed in 1972 and has shown an increase in each year since then. Ridership today

is roughly equivalent to 1970 levels. Although

the 1973-74 energy crisis is identified as having

caused this reversal, other factors have undoubtedly contributed as well—the better service and equipment coming online as a result of

the Urban Mass Transportation Administration’s (UMTA) programs, subsidized fares, increasing urban congestion, and the decline in urban freeway construction, overall urban area

growth, and central area rejuvenation. Transit’s

share of total urban travel, however, has not

kept pace with the growth in urban population

and person-trips.

Over the past 18 years, Federal funding for

urban mass transportation has totaled $16.7 billion. As shown in table 1, 96 percent of these

funds have been spent in the past 10 years.

Barring a major energy crisis which would

dramatically curtail automobile usage, transit’s

market share is likely to drop further over the

next 20 years. By the year 2000, urban autoTable 1.–Administrative Commitments by Fiscal Year and UMTA Activity (in millions of dollars)

– Unlverslty Interstate ix ‘

-

Commuter NonTechnical Managerial research & and urban free rail urbanized

studies tralnlng trainng systems demon- operaflng formula

grants grants grants grants strations subsidies . grants Total —— —..

Capital

facilities

grants

$ 10 5–

Fiscal

year

1962

1963

1964

196 5

1966

196 7

1968

1969

1970

1971

1972

197 3

1974

1975

1976

TQ

1977

1978

1979

Total

Formula

grants

——

RD&D ——— .

$ 02

193

3 9

8 9

4 7

5 5

6 5

183

163

3 9 5

6 1 4

71 5

6 6 7

4 6 8

4 7 7

177

5 8 9

681

6 4 0

—— —— $ 107

—— 193

3 9

596

1139

1297

132 1

—— 1733

—— 1600

3980 —— 5994

—— 9716

—— 1,0728

—— 1,5162

—— 1,9070

5672

—— 2,3918

3,0139

$750 3,4970 —-

—— —— ——

——

——

——

——

——

——

——

——

—— —— —— ——

——

507

1092

1210

1220

1483

1327

3407

5100

8637

8703

1,1966

1,092.2

2470

1,2500

1,3988

1,2250

‘~~,{8~i

—— —— —— ——

—— —— —— ——

—— —— ——

—— ——

—— ——

$ 31 $01

36 ––

50 ––

80 ––

144 0 4

250 0.5

335 0 4

376 0 3

371 0 5

38 t 0,4

9 6 0 3

432 0 5

550 0 3

550 — 0 5

——

——

——

——

$1.7

3.0

3 0

2 5

2 5

2.3

2.2

0 7

14

2 0

2 0

2 0

——

——

——

——

——

—— ——

—— —— ——

$ 95.6

814

3376

2154

4094

6667

— 7000

——

$ 1516

390.3

521

6216

7424

1,3000

$3,2580

——

——

$03 $ 234

0 7 5 5

—— 806

0 5 750

$6259 $3682 $42 $253 $2,5061 $15 $1845 $750 $16,7374

~O~E FY 19b2 lhro(;qh FY 1977 r~lecl ad-m! mslrallve commtlrnenls FY 1978 and FY 1979-rellecl obllgal(ons

— — .

SOURCE Department of T(dIMpOddllOfl Ufbdll Mdss Trdnsporlahon Admlnlstratlon Jdn 22 1979
mobile vehicle-miles are expected to increase by

over 80 percent, which would mean a more than

twofold increase in traffic congestion and reduced mobility. ’ Meanwhile,

deficits may soon exceed $3

and could continue to c1imb.3

transit operating

billion annually,

Ch. 11—Introduct/on ● 13

.- .- — — —

Clearly, the vast majority of the traveling

public prefers the amenities offered by the automobile, and they are prepared to pay a heavy

premium to retain these features. Continued deployment of bus and rail systems meeting current service standards shows little promise of

being able to persuade significant numbers to

abandon their automobiles in favor of public

transit.

R&D: The Search for More Competitive Transit Options

Section 6 of the Urban

Act of 1964 authorized a

development, and demons

pursue three goals:

1. assist in the reduction

tation needs,

Mass Transportation

program of research,

ration projects to

of urban transpor2. improve mass transit service, and

3. minimize cost.

The proportion of the UMTA budget devoted

to the search for more competitive transit systems and services remains low in relation to the

overall rate of Federal R&D spending. In FY

1979, 5.9 percent of the total Federal budget was

allocated to R&D while only 1.8 percent of the

UMTA budget was earmarked for the development of new and improved transit systems. In

the defense sector, where the development of

competitive products is given a high priority, 10

percent of the budget is set aside for R&D. Between 1975 and 1979, the total UMTA budget

increased 133 percent while funding for R&D

grew only 37 percent.

Currently UMTA devotes roughly two-thirds

of its R&D funds to near-term product improvements and one-third to new systems development. Virtually all of the work on new systems

is focused on the development of automated

guideway transit. Almost no attention has been

paid to one of the three objectives of R&D as

spelled out in the authorizing legislation which

is to explore ways to reduce the need to travel,

such as through the use of telecommunications

or land use policy changes.

Automated Guideway Transit

Automated guideway transit (AGT) is a class

of transportation systems in which unmanned

vehicles are operated on fixed guideways along

a fixed right-of-way. About 20 such systems exist in the United States today, almost all of them

in airports, zoos, or amusement parks. The various AGT classes are described more fully in

OTA’S previous report on AGT’ and are illustrated in figure 2. While the different types of

AGT often are regarded as being distinct systems, they should be regarded as only discrete

points in a multidimensional option space of

system characteristics. UMTA is currently in the

process of deploying demonstration automated

guideway systems in the downtown sector of

several cities to determine their public acceptability in general urban transit service.

Concurrently with the downtown people

mover (DPM) demonstrations, UMTA is funding the development of a new AGT technology known as advanced group rapid transit

(AGRT). The AGRT program, as defined by

UMTA, encompasses several advances in technology including magnetic levitation, highspeed switching, and new command and control

capabilities to permit short-headway operations

‘U, S. Congress, Ott ice (~t Technology Aswssmen t, AI/ f(I))ILitLvf

Guufmwy Trawt, OTA-T-8 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Prlntlng Ottice, lune 1Q75 }.
14 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Figure 2.–Classes of Automated Guideway Transit

Shuttle-Loop Transit

● simplest technology

● vehicle size varies

● little or no switching

 long headway—60

seconds or more

Passenger Shuttle–Tampa International Airport

Group Rapid Transit

● more than six riders

● switching to shorten en route

delays

● Intermediate headway—3 to

60 seconds

Alrtrans– Dallas/Ft, Worth Airport

Personal Rapid Transit

● one to six riders

. no en route delays or transfers

● short headway—less than 3 seconds

Cabintaxl–Hagen, W, Germany

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment, Auromafed Gu/deway Translf, June 1975

in complex networks. The design goals established by UMTA5 specify the following features:

● automated driverless vehicles,

● guaranteed seating,

● full climate-control,

● 5-minute maximum wait time for vehicles,

● no transfers necessa ry on the system ,

‘U.S. Department ot Transportation, Urban Mass Transportation Administration, “Request tor Proposal (RFP) DOT-UT-30014

High performance Personal Rapid Transit (HPPRT) System, ” Feb. .

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

It

limit of two or three intermediate stops,

40-mph top speed,

12-passenger vehicles,

single- or two-car trains,

elevated guideway,

3-second headway,

14,400 seats/hour/lane (theoretical), and

electrical power.

should be noted that these are UMTA’S

20, 1974. design goals and should be subject to modifica-
Ch. 11 IntrodLJctio/7 ● 15

tion to meet the specific needs of particular applications. A city could, as an example, conclude that its needs are best met by an AGRT

system with lower line speeds, longer headways, and smaller vehicles, These kinds of modifications would not involve major changes in

technology. Potential applications for systems

incorporating AGRT capabilities include activity center circulation, radial trunklines, outlying

collection/distribution, and regional networks.

History of AGRT

The AGRT program was conceived in the

wake of TRANSPO ’72, a Department of

Transportation (DOT) sponsored transportation exhibition held at Dunes Airport. Promoted as a showcase for new transportation

technology, four AGT concepts were displayed

under UMTA sponsorship. The AGRT program, as announced in February 1974, was to

consist of two phases—a 7-month preliminary

design phase followed by a 36- to 40-month prototype development phase. The entire project

was scheduled to be completed in 1978.

Three contractors, Boeing, Otis, and Rohr

were selected during the Phase I competition to

prepare preliminary designs. Proposals for

Phase 11 work were submitted in September

1975 following completion of the preliminary

designs. Figure 3 lists the technologies that each

of the contractors proposed to meet the system

specifications.

At this juncture, the program underwent the

first of several major modifications. Responding to recommendations contained in the FY

1976 DOT Appropriations Conference Report,

UMTA restructured the program. Instead of selecting one of the three contractors to proceed

with a test track development, a decision was

made to split Phase II into two parts, thus extending the completion date to the first part of

1981.

All three contractors were invited to continue

design refinements and laboratory testing of key

components during an 18-month Phase 11A.

This work got underway in June 1976. As a part

of Phase IIB, a single design was to be chosen

for full-scale prototype testing at the DOT test

center near Pueblo, Colo. During the fall of

1977, as Phase 11A was nearing completion, a

task force was formed within DOT’s Office of

the Secretary, once again to review the AGRT

program and to chart a course of further activity. The DOT review led to the following recommended program redirection:

●

●

●

●

●

maintain competition by funding both the

Otis air-cushion and Boeing wheeled-vehicle technologies in Phase IIB;

continue technology development on the

Romag magnetic levitation system but at a

lower level than the other two systems;

fund Boeing and Otis to conduct a facility

commonality study with the aim of achieving a common test track at Pueblo;

continue study and development of operating vehicles in trains; and

conduct a departmental review of proposals for construction of the test facility at

Pueblo following the detailed design activity period.

As a result of these recommended changes

and adjustments for inflation, the total cost of

the AGRT program increased from $43.5 million to $110.9 million. Tables 2 and 3 provide a

Table 2.–AGRT Funding (in millions of dollars)

Budget proposal. Submission to Congress– FY 1979 cost

Prime contractors

AGRT development? $800

Trained system design 4 0

Romag development 5 0

Prime contractor tolal 8 9 0

Technical support

Total

Prior expenditures

Phase I planning

Phase I

Prime contractors

Support

Total Phase I

Phase 11A Planning

Phase 11A

Prime contractors

Suppor t

Total Phase 11A

Phase IIB Inltlatlon

Prime contractors

Suppor t

Total Phase IIB

7 9

969– “ —

9

15

4

2 8

Total expenditures (through 3/31 /79) 140

GRAND TOTAL — $110.9

.

a

See table 3 for bre~kdown

.

SOURCE Urban Mass Transportation Adol(n($trdllon
16 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Figure 3.–Summary of AGRT Technology Options

Contractor: Boeing.

Suspension: Wheeled, rubber tires.

Propulsion: d,c. electric motors

Guideway: 8-ft. wide, bottom-supported U channel,

Command & control: Moving block, colllslon avoidance radar,

Switching. High speed, on vehicle,

Contractor: Otis.

Suspension: Alr Ievltatlon,

Propulsion. Linear Induction motors.

Guldeway: 8-ft. wide, bottom-supported channel guldeway

Command & control: Mowng block.

Switching. High speed, on vehicle

Contractor, Boeing (formerly Rohr),

Suspension. Magnetic Iewtatlon,

Propulsion Linear InductIon motors

Guldeway 4-ft. wide, top-supported monorail beam

Command & control: Moving block.

Swdchlng High speed, on vehicle

Pholo credits U S Department 01 Transportation
Ch. 11—introduction ● 17

Table 3.–AGRT Engineering Prototype Development

(cost per contractor in millions of dollars)

Command & Gu!deway

Vehicles control stations Total

Englneenng design $3 $ 6 $4 $13

Fabricatlo n 3 5 4 12

Integratio n — 3 – 3

Tes t — 4 — 4

Totals $6 $18 $8 32

Englneerlng prototype

upgradin g — — — 8

Tota l — — — $40

SOURCE Urban Mass Transportallon Adm[mstrat!on

listing of projected program costs broken down

by category of activity. The program then took

another turn, when in early 1979 UMTA scaled

down the scope of Phase IIB work. Instead of

testing prototypes of the Boeing wheeled-vehicle

and Otis air-cushion system at the DOT test facility near Pueblo, Colo., the test is now to be

carried out at each of the contractor’s plants,

using engineering vehicles. Program costs

through Phase IIB now total approximately $73

mill ion.

Following completion of the Phase 11A contract, Rohr decided to abandon work on urban

transit systems and on February 3, 1978, signed

a licensing agreement with Boeing for rights to

the Romag technology. Numerous Phase IIB

proposals were being submitted by the two remaining contractors in response to changing

UMTA requirements, but contracts were not

signed until June 1979. A lapse of 18 months occurred between the time Phase 11A work was

completed and Phase IIB contracts were signed.

These frequent alterations in the program, coupled with the lack of continuity in funding, have

led the contractors to question the depth of

UMTA commitment to advanced systems development.

Issues Addressed in the Assessment of AGRT

The House Appropriations Committee report

on the FY 1979 Department of Transportation

Appropriations Bill states in part:

. . . as a result of a departmental reevaluation,

the number of (AGRT) systems to be developed

has been increased from one to two or more and

the total estimated cost of the project has increased from $43,.500,000 to approximately

$110,000,000. In view of this substantial cost increase, the committee intends to request an Office of Technology Assessment review of the

project.

In a letter dated July 17, 1978, the Committee

requested that the Technology Assessment

Board authorize an assessment of this project to

“determine the project’s feasibility as well as its

relationship to the overall goals of the Department’s mass transportation program. ” In November 1978, OTA initiated a preliminary issue

analysis pending Board approval to proceed

with technology assessment.

Three principal issues were addressed in this

report:

1.

2.

3.

Will AGRT offer significantly lower cost

and superior service than other types of

urban transit?

Do the benefits to be gained from building

more than one prototype technology

justify the additional costs?

What role should Government and industry play in the development of advanced

AGT?

This study partially updates a major assessment of “Automated Guideway Transit” published by OTA in June 1975. During the course

of the current study, OTA staff members visited

56-518 - 0 - 80 - 4
18 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

the Otis and Boeing test

systems at the Miami,

facilities as well as AGT Both the AGRT contractors and numerous of fiSeattle-Tacoma, Hous- cials in DOT cooperated fully in providing useton, and Dallas-Fort Worth airports and the

Wedway system at Disneyland. Public participation meetings were held in eight cities:

Baltimore, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Miami, and Seattle. Meetings

were also held with transportation planners in

several cities where AGT deployments have

been or are currently under consideration. An

advisory panel and a separate public participation working group have met throughout the

course of this project to assist in the study

design and to comment ori the work in progress.

ful background information.

In succeeding chapters the potential impacts

of AGRT are examined in the light of urban

transportation needs and currently available

transit options. Alternative patterns of Government/ industry relations are explored, with particular attention paid to practices in Europe and

Japan. The concluding chapter outlines several

options for future AGT development, analyzes

the pros and cons of each option, and provides a

range of costs for each approach.
Chapter Ill

URBAN TRANSPORTATION NEEDS

There would be a basic logic in saying that

providing access is the purpose of a city; it aggregates individuals and activities so that mutual access is possible. The specific spatial arrangement of this aggregation depends on the

characterof the transportation available. Acenturyago when urban travel was largely on foot,

effective access depended heavily on proximity.

Homes had to be near work, and stores near

homes. Densities were high, streets were narrow, and travel distances short. This pattern is

preserved and observable in those parts of our

cities that grew up before introduction of trolley

cars and proliferation of the automobile.

The mobility provided by the automobile has

been a major factor permitting the majority of

the U.S. population to achieve personally desired housing and lifestyle goals. It has also

become for most the preferred means of travel.

Yet, it has become increasingly apparent that

there are substantial problems in reliance on the

automobile as the predominant urban travel

mode. These problems include increasing conGoals for

Transportation systems not only provide for

personal mobility, but also influence the longterm spatial evolution of cities. Therefore, these

facilities should be designed to meet social and

economic objectives such as:

gestion, pollution, and energy consumpt ion.

While some of the problems can, in the long

run, be cured or greatly alleviated, there are a t

least two that cannot.

First, the automobile is unavailable to many

urban residents—the poor, elderly, young, and

handicapped. The dispersed development engendered by the automobile makes it difficult to

provide efficient public transit service to meet

the travel needs of these groups.

Second, the car is very inefficient in its use of

space. The transportation capacity needed in the

higher density portions of the city cannot be

provided by automobiles; a more space-efficient

mode of travel is needed.

Transportation does influence the way cities

evolve and function. We would like to be able to

match transportation to the needs of the city. It

becomes, therefore, appropriate to directly consider the alternate, and sometimes conflicting,

goals that cities might choose to adopt.

Our Cities

● housing for all residents offering choices of

price, location, and lifestyle;

● jobs for all residents wishing to work;

● services—social, medical, cultural, recreational, and commercial; and

19
20 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

● a transportation system that permits citizens of urban areas to reach housing, jobs,

medical, cultural, and recreational facilities

with a minimum expenditure of time,

money, and energy resources.

Little progress has been made toward fashioning

strategies for physical development to achieve

these goals.

For most of this century, metropolitan area

growth has tended toward lower density residential development based first on streetcar and

then on automobile transportation. While some

signs of a trend toward reurbanization have

been noted recently, a return to the highly concentrated turn-of-the-century city is not foreseen. Change in urbanization occurs very

slowly. Were a concerted effort toward reurbanization to be undertaken today, significant

and visible change would not appear until the

next century.

A step toward higher densities is often viewed

as desirable by urban planners since concentration permits greater use of transit or walking to

satisfy activity needs. Yet, the same high levels

of concentration that promote transit use also

attract high levels of auto traffic to activity

centers. So long as increased activity density is

limited to only one end of the trip (e.g., the location of jobs or shopping facilities) the auto will

remain the desired and most convenient mode

for most trips. If cities are to be pleasant places

to live and work,

fer from the auto

high-density area

an easy and convenient transto the mode serving inside the

will be absolutely essential.

The economics of urban activities also play a

major role in the shaping of cities. While many

functions can be efficiently conducted in highrise, high-density structures, it is unlikely that

industrial processes will ever again be conducted in multistory inner city buildings. The

economics of transportation, industrial, and

warehousing processes dictate that land-intensive structures be located in low-density areas

where space can be obtained cheaply.

Central business districts may, in some cases,

evolve into high-density centers encompassing a

mixture of activities and dwellings catering to

those who prefer the metropolitan life. Other

dwelling and activity center nodes are likely to

be located throughout the suburban region,

sometimes in conjunction with major retail centers. Residential areas of somewhat higher density may evolve but the mature, low-density,

suburban residential areas will remain and new,

low-density, exurban development may continue to be developed. Many factors will influence these trends including land cost / travel cost

tradeoffs and tax and fiscal /monetary policy.

There is no unanimity of tastes and preferences as to what cities should look 1ike, and not

all cities will evolve the same way. Some urban

areas may choose to revitalize and encourage

high-density growth. Some may choose to

shrink their central business districts and encourage the growth of suburban activity centers, Others may leave development programs

entirely to market forces. Transit R&D programs should expand the options that cities can

select to support locally determined urban

forms.

Goals for Urban Transportation

Although current experience in urban areas

shows that people will tolerate many inconveniences in traveling, the desired system for persona] transport is one that:

●

●

permits the traveler to make trips at convenient times, rather than on the schedule

of a specific vehicle;

provides a comfortable trip—not overly

crowded, seats available, few transfers, little waiting, and a place to store packages;

●

●

●

allows travelers to reach activities within a

reasonable time (e. g., no more than 30 to

40 minutes for work travel);

permits travel at a cost commensurate with

the value of the trip and the quality of service provided; and

is compatible with the structure of the area

being served.

The automobile meets these goals for many

types of travel in urban areas, but it is unsatis-
Ch. Ill—Urban Transportation Needs ● 21

factory in high-density areas and on arterials ●

leading to them. Here, mtore space-efficient

transportation is needed. AGRT systems are

claimed to reduce congestion-related problems

by providing the following features to attract ●

people out of their cars:

extensive coverage —stops within walking

distance of large numbers of central city

residents;

frequent service—service headways sufficiently short so that it is not necessary to

 DEMAG 

Assured seating important to consumer
22 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

— ——

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

consult a schedule in order to avoid long

waits;

service to major activity locations in the

metropolitan area-Central business district

work places, work and retaill activity nodes,

and lower density industrial workplaces;

r-eliable and dependable service;

climate controlled vehicles

assured wating for all users;

perception of safety and security;

direct service between most or all stations

to minimize transfers; and

rivacy.

Features such as climate control and security.

can be provided with conventional systems.

Other features such as no transfers, 24-hour

service, and assured seating are either technologically infeasible or uneconomical using conventional bus or rail hardware,

It is technologically feasible to provide a service with the characteristics stated above. Automation may be a key factor in making smallvehicle large-network systems, offering i mproved service levels, more economically 

feasible.

As service and economic considerations warrant attention, so too does architectural and esthetic acceptabi i t y. In only rare instances have

facilities for automobile transportation been

adequately blended into the urban environment.

The bulky, smelly, noisy, diesel bus, does little

better. Subways remove often obtrusive vehicle

systems from the cityscape, but also deprive the

rider of the enjoyment of light and air and the

excitement of observing city activity. Smallvehicle transit systems, even if elevated, will be

less obtrusive and more amenable to integration

into the city structure. The small, lighter weight

guideways should provide more opportunities

for architectural creativity, and could also be

enclosed within new or existing structures,

much like the Minneapolis skyway system.

The Urban Mass Transportation Administration’s AGRT development program should be

evaluated in comparison with other technological and operational options that could be developed for the future. It is not certain at this time

what solutions will be needed in the future. Just

as the changing character of cities and lifestyles

was often a primary factor in the decline of conventional public transportation, so are future

changes going to be key determinants of future

transportation choices.
———

Chapter IV

TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS

Available

vialed into

Currently Available Options

transportation options can be ditwo classes— those operating in

mixed traffic (i. e., on public roadways) and

those operating on their own exclusive rights-ofway or guideways. A few options, such as

streetcars and dual-mode vehicles, can operate

either in mixed traffic or on exclusive guideways.

Mixed Traffic Modes

There are several distinct categories of passenger transportation now operating on public

streets in mixed traffic:

● automobiles,

● taxis,

● vanpools,

● buses, and

● streetcars (or light-rail vehicles).

Automobiles—Over 90 percent of urban trips

are made with the automobile, which attests to

the fact that its advantages heavily outweigh its

disadvantages. The automobile’s advantages

over other forms of transportation include: I

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

a direct ride from origin to destination,

available for use at all times,

travel in any direction at the whim of the

driver,

no need to stop and pick up other passengers,

privacy and reasonable safeguards against

annoyance of other people,

constant cost for any group size,

a seat for each rider, and

freedom to choose individual taste and

comfort preferences.

The disadvantages of

user include:

● cost of operation

eluding insurance,

the automobile to

and maintenance

the

in-

● high depreciation rate,

● cost of parking,

‘Richard Willow, “Factors Influencing Consumer Choice in Urban Transportation, ” paper presented at the international Synposium ot~ Traffic ad Trans,uortat/o)~ Technologies Hamburg ,

West Germany, June 18-20, 1979.

23
—

24 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

●

●

●

congestion on nonexclusive rights-of-way,

risk of accidents and reliance on driving

skills of others, and

poor dependability under adverse weather

conditions.

The automobile is most frequently cited for

its negative impacts on the community and on

society:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

the internal combustion engine consumes

dwindling petroleum supplies;

emissions contribute substantially to urban

air quality problems;

space is wasted because of unoccupied seats

and because most autos are larger than

their function requires;

garaging costs must be added to costs of

land, homes, and buildings;

major urban core highway improvements

are very costly and bring additional traffic

into downtown streets;

major improvements in roads and parking

facilities require valuable urban land and

add to urban environmental blight;

accidents resulting in injuries and death impose high public costs for police, rescue

squads, hospitals, and rehabilitation facilities;

onstreet parking adds to urban roadway

costs and visual blight; and

the automobile is not a satisfactory mode

for the transportation disadvantaged who

must be provided with public systems to

ensure their mobility and accessibility to

urban services.

Despite its negative features, the automobile has

become the dominant urban mode and it sets the

standard against which other travel options are

measured.

Taxis—Like the private auto, taxis can travel

everywhere in the city and are available at virtually all times of day. They are not immediately available like one’s own car but are much

more convenient than scheduled transit service.

To some, the lack of privacy may seem undesirable. Shared-ride taxis can be significantly more

productive in costs per mile and line capacity

than private automobiles. They can also provide a high level of service to the transportation

disadvantaged, especially if used in conjunction

with a subsidy program. Shared riding may be

somewhat more time consuming because of the

need to serve other riders at the same time.

Vanpools—Vanpools operate at speeds comparable to those of private automobiles or taxis.

In terms of energy and economic efficiency they

are superior to most other surface modes. z

However, vanpools must take more roundabout

routes to pick up and drop off all riders and are

therefore not well-suited to short trips. Vanpool

riders usually have to share a common destination or origin in addition to a shared schedule.

Buses—The greatest benefits of buses on

mixed streets are their low capital costs and high

lane capacities. But the low average speeds and

the limitations imposed by fixed schedules and

fixed routes are disadvantages compared to

more personal transportation forms, Buses can

also be uncomfortable. They lack privacy and

do not offer assured seating. Unlike the automobile, the price of travel increases with group

size.

FIhofo credit U S L3eparfmenf of Traflsportat/ofl

Buses in mixed traffic

Streetcars—Streetcars have larger capacities

than most buses but are less maneuverable.

When a rail vehicle becomes disabled, following

vehicles are delayed, creating a nuisance to the

flow of all traffic. Energy-wise, streetcars may

‘Richard L. Gustatson, H. N. Curd, and T. F. Gt)lob, “Survey

Data: Measurement of User Preferences for a Demand-Respc~nsive

Transportation System, ” General Motors Research Publication

GMR-1057, 1971.
Ch. IV— Transportation Options ● 25

be advantageous where low-cost electricity is

available. Maintenance costs are also higher because of the added burden of track and powerline upkeep.

All transportation options operating in mixed

traffic experience a severe decline in service levels as congestion increases. Exclusive guideway

alternatives, on the other hand, move faster and

more reliably.

Exclusive Guideway Modes

There are six broad categories of systems that

operate on exclusive guideways (or rights-ofway):

●

●

●

●

●

●

busways,

heavy-rail transit (HRT),

light-rail transit (LRT),

shuttle-loop transit (SLT),

group rapid transit (GRT), and

personal rapid transit (PRT).

These six types of systems can be designed, installed, and operated to suit a broad range of

transit requirements. Major system characteristics include vehicle and line capacity, number of

transfers, flexibility of routes, station spacing,

number of stations, degree of automation, and

frequency of service.

The six broad categories of systems distribute

themselves along a common continuum for several of these characteristics (see figure 4). Some

of these characteristics are of maximum value at

the PRT end of the continuum. Others are of

maximum value in the reverse direction. That

HRT ● LRT s

larger

larger

more

less

longer

less

less

schedule d

is, any given characteristic of maximum value

for HRT will be of minimum value for PRT, and

vice versa. Busways should perform similar to

LRT lines.

Systems at the HRT end of the continuum

offer high-capacity line-haul service in highdensity corridors. Large distances can be covered because the average speed is high enough to

make trip times acceptably short. However, station spacings are quite large, and transfers from

line to line maybe required.

l?wto credlf Chicago Trans(t AufhorIfy

Heavy-rail transit vehicle serving Chicago

At the PRT end of the continuum the linehaul capacity is lower, but shorter station spacing and direct origin-to-destination service is

possible. Currently, vehicles at this end of the–

spectrum are incapable of achieving the higher

average speeds of the larger vehicle but such

capabilities could be developed. At the present

time practical maximum trip distances for these

Figure 4.–Characteristics of Exclusive Guideway Systems

Buswav SLT ●

0

GRT ●

smal Ier

smal Ier

less

more

shorter

more

more

n demand

PRT

1

SOURCE Otflce of Technology Assessment

56-51 8 - 0 - 80 - 5
26 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

systems are shorter than for rail systems. Travel

time comparisons between PRT and HRT are

analogous to the fabled race between the tortoise and the hare. Like the hare, HRT achieves

high top speeds but is slowed by many stops

along the way. PRT systems, operating with

offline stations that eliminate intermediate

stops, proceed more slowly but, like the tortoise, they achieve average speeds that are very

close to their line speed. Thus, HRT and PRT

could achieve comparable trip times, despite

large differences in top speed.

All-weather capability is sensitive to vehicle

size, as well as to running surface type (rail v.

road). Rail has an inherent advantage in snow

because of the elevation of the narrow running

surfaces and because the very high contact pressures at the wheel-rail interface crush or liquefy

ice and snow. Special care is generally necessary

only at switches where heaters may be needed to

melt ice and snow accumulations. Power rails

and wires are susceptible to ice build-up, which

must be removed with heaters, chemical solutions, or special scrapers.

Because good adhesion is critical to achieving

safe stopping distances, snow build-up on closeheadway rubber-tired automated systems cannot be tolerated. The current practice for preventing snow accumulation is to heat the guideway surfaces with imbedded electrical heaters or

fluid-carrying pipes. To control ice on power

rails, special scrapers, heated glycol sprays, and

heated power rails are currently used.

To date PRT, GRT, SLT, and HRT have

achieved the highest degree of automation. LRT

is not currently at that level, but there is no inherent reason that LRT on a dedicated right-ofway could not be fully automated. Automation

is independent of vehicle form, as long as the

longitudinal control is properly matched to performance characteristics.

Buses on busways are still totally nonautomated in the United States. With the driver on

the vehicle, there is little incentive to automate

the busway portion of the trip, However, there

is no inherent reason to prevent buses from running manually in mixed traffic and automatically on a guideway. This concept, known as

the dual model bus, has been studied at the

Urban Mass Transportation Administration

(UMTA).

Comparison of Mode Classes

Modes in the mixed-traffic class offer several

advantages:

. utilization of existing roadway system;

● freedom of route selection;

● high level of direct routing (for auto, vanpools, and taxis); and

● easy access for user-owned vehicles.

The exclusive-guideway modes sacrifice some of

these advantages and must absorb the cost of

the guideway. But their inherent advantages

make them very desirable:

 less subject to congestion delays,

 more predictable travel time,

. more easily understood routes,

● better potential for automation, and

● less need for land.

It is interesting to note that streetcars (and

trolley buses) are limited in route selection like

guideway vehicles and also are subject to traffic

delays. Thus, they suffer from the disadvantages of both classes. This strongly suggests that

light-rail vehicles should be provided with their

own right-of-way whenever possible.

Each of these categories has evolved to suit a

market need. The size range of conventional

systems extends from large-capacity HRT systems through buses, with a conspicuous gap, to

auto-like transportation. A need exists to provide transportation service that provides more

of the social, psychological, and convenience

needs satisfied by the auto, but without the

drawbacks of congestion and parking. A part of

the motivation for the development of smallvehicle automated guideway systems derives

from this need.
—

Ch. IV— Transportation Options ● 27

Desirable Future Service Options

The decline in market share for transit over

the past several decades indicates that currently

deployed transit services do not satisfy the mobility needs of most people. Although it is still

not entirely clear which service attributes are

most important to consumers, recent studies

suggest that in addition to cost and trip time

many factors such as assured seating, privacy,

reliability, safety, and availability weigh heavily in the choice of travel mode. -3 4

5 ‘

An important goal of transit R&D is to identify important service attributes and improve

technology so that it can better satisfy travel,

psychological, and social needs at a reasonable

cost. Development and validation of these new

forms of transit service will give transit operators a wider range of options and more flexibility to satisfy locally defined urban transportation needs.

Transit service could become more competitive with the automobile if improvements were

achieved in the following areas:

reduction of wait time and travel time by

providing service with limited transfers and

with few or no intermediate stops,

areawide 24-hour service,

group fares,

high dependability and a minimum of service interruptions,

guaranteed seating and a sense of privacy,

and

guaranteed service through commitment to

a guideway.

Reduction of wait time and travel time.—The

automobile provides service on demand and

I with relatively short travel times. Future transit

options should more closely approximate these

service levels. Trip time on transit can be re-

‘WI11OW, op. Clt

‘Gustatson, c~p.clt.

51<icha ret L. Gustatson and F. P. D. Nav in, “User Preferences for

Dial-A-Bus: A Comparison of Two Cities” (prepared (or presentation at the Third A)I)IL{uI Demand Resp(lwue TrwrIsIt C-otlteretlce.

Ann Arbor, Mich., June 1972).

“Joe] Miller, “Identification and Definition of the Mobility Requirements ot the Handicapped and the Elderly” ( unpublished doctt~r’s dlssertatlon, Northwestern Unlverwty, 1975).

duced by providing a vehicle on demand and origin-to-destination service with few or no intermediate stops. Conventional systems could

provide these service levels but the costs would

be prohibitive.

Areawide 24-hour service.—Because of cost,

transit service does not operate at the same level

at all times of day. Some locations are served in

the peak periods only. At other times of day,

service is much less frequent. As a result, it is

very difficult in many cases to make transfer

connections or even reach a desired destination.

Late-night service, if it does exist, may be perceived as unsafe to use because of the extended

waiting time and because of the walking distance from the system station or stop to the

user’s origin or destination. Guideway systems

are usually limited in extent because of the high

installation costs of conventional designs. Automation enables 24-hour service to be on call

without having large numbers of operators on

duty during slack periods.

Group fares.—For a family or a mediumsized group, round trip fares by conventional

transit could cost significantly more than by

auto, even when parking charges are included.

Transit service charge could be by the vehicle

instead of by the rider. PRT and AGRT operating in the demand-responsive mode could offer

this benefit.

High service dependability .—The reliability

of the system and the ability to recover quickly

from failures are very important service attri:

butes. Because the most reliable of equipment

still fails occasionally, an effective failure recovery strategy is mandatory to contain the effects of failures. Dependability also reduces

maintenance costs.

Guaranteed seating and privacy .—Studies

sponsored by UMTA and others show that users

place a high value on privacy and being assured

of a seat. The desire for adequate personal space

is also related to the need for security. Some individuals may prefer a vehicle in which they are

guaranteed to be alone (PRT); others may prefer

large groups; still others may like a small group.
28 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Photo credjt Japanese M/nistry of /nternattona/ Trade and /ndusfry

Automobile-sized transit vehicles offer

privacy and assured seating

System operational policies ultimately determine whether or not seating and adequate space

are provided. New options will need to be developed that offer privacy, security, and guaranteed seating at a reasonable cost.

Guaranteed service through commitment to a

guideway.—Both developers and consumers are

more likely to make locational decisions based

on a committed fixed guideway transit system

than on bus service which could be here today

and gone tomorrow. Consumer choice of work,

shopping, and housing location can, in turn, influence the density of an urban area, although

these changes will come about slowly.

If a decision is made to deploy a heavy-rail

system (HRT), development will tend to concentrate around the relativel y 

few stations on the

system. If AGT is deployed widely throughout a

metropolitan area, development nodes will tend

to be smaller and more dispersed than for HRT

due to the larger number of stations. But either

form of exclusive guideway transit should encourage higher density development than would

systems that operate in mixed traffic.

Future Technology Options

The research on exclusive guideway transit

systems could lead to many technological improvements common to all AGT, including

AGRT. Improvements include:

●

●

●

●

●

reducing headways (thus increasing lane

capacity) via modernized controls, collision avoidance systems, and improved

braking;

minimizing guideway intrusion and assuring all-weather operation through innovative design;

improving emergency evacuation;

integrating stations into existing commercial buildings to allow easy access, reduce

construction costs, and stimulate business;

increasing system capacity and efficiency

through automatic vehicle coupling and bidirectional capability;

●

●

reducing travel and wait time and providing point-to-point service by means of computerized vehicle management, offline stations, and high-speed switching; and

using levitation principles to lift the vehicle

off the guideway for more efficient propulsion.

Reduction of headways.—Traditional transit

systems use fixed-block controls to maintain vehicle separation. This scheme evolved from the

railroads, where a stretch of track is divided

into sections (blocks) with a minimum of at least

one open block between trains.

Modern technology allows the block to move

with the vehicle. The size of the moving block

varies in relation to vehicle acceleration speed

and braking capability. These moving blocks
Ch. IV— Transportation Options “ 29

can be adjusted automatically to shorten unnecessary vehicle separations and to achieve

higher guideway occupancy without compromising safety.

Such a system appears to offer a level of reliability equal to that of the fixed-block system;

however, the initial application of movingblock controls may raise questions of institutional liability. Improved braking is also necessary at closer headways. An early validation of

this technology is warranted.

Guideway design.—While exclusive guideways allow vehicles to move unhampered by

other traffic, they are perceived by some as an

intrusion into the urban environment. Recently

proposed guideways use lighter materials to reduce their bulky appearance and to offer more

eye-pleasing architectural designs that will

blend better into the surrounding cityscape. In

general, narrow deep-beam guideways should

cost less per unit length. Further study is needed

to determine which guideway designs offer the

most cost-effective operation in ice and snow

conditions.

Emergency evacuation.—New systems must

allow for safe evacuation in cases such as collision, fire, and snowbound vehicles. This problem presents special difficulties in the case of

narrow guideways and suspended vehicles

which prevent the user from escaping on foot.

Station/building integration.—It is expected

that future AGT stations can be integrated into

new or existing buildings. The degree to which

merchants and developers will cooperate in

achieving this integration, however, has not

been established.

Automatic vehicle coupling.—Operations of

fixed guideway systems could be made more efficient if vehicles could be automatically coupled into trains during periods of peak demand

and uncoupled when the demand is light. Joining two or more cars togetherhile in motion

involves a controlled collision similar in principle to the docking procedure in spacecraft.

Reducing trip time.—Other promising technological evolutions in control systems will further enhance and expand the capability of automated guideway systems. The forecasted improvements include higher average speeds (30 to

60 mph), computerized vehicle management for

possible point-to-point service without transfers, and high-speed switching.

Track design for conventional railroads requires that a section of rail several feet long

change positions to direct trains onto alternative

paths. High-speed switches are usually constructed by having a small component move on

the vehicle rather than in the guideway. This

feature allows vehicles to pass through switches

at very close spacing and facilitates the use of

offline stations. These improvements can help

achieve assured seating, ride comfort, and privacy. Comparable improvements are possible

for conventional systems but the cost of this

service has inhibited its introduction.

Levitation.—Some automated guideway system designs now use air or magnetic vehicle levitation in place of wheels for vehicle support.

An advantage of contactless support is less wear

on both the guideway and vehicle components.

Although the guideways for levitated systems

must initially be fabricated as accurately as for

rolling vehicles, it is expected that reduced mechanical wear will lead to savings in guideway

maintenance. Even more significant is the potential total savings in maintenance of solidstate electronics in magnetic levitated systems

versus mechanical parts in wheeled systems.

Levitated systems may also generate less noise

than mechanically suspended systems.

Both air and magnetic levitated vehicles require energy for levitation in addition to the energy required for propulsion. The longitudinal

resistance of levitated vehicles, however, is

lower than that of wheeled vehicles. Development work is needed to improve sensing and

control to maintain the correct amount of levitation.
30 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Implementing Technologies for Service Improvements

Development and introduction of improved

transit systems and services are difficult and

painstaking processes. Unlike some applications

of advanced technology such as the Apollo

space program where a mission of short duration is carried out in a controlled environment,

transit technology must perform its mission for

several years in a complex institutional, physical, and social environment. Facile comparisons

between a successful space program and continuing urban transportation problems have

tended to overlook the complex operating and

institutional environment confronting urban

transit.

In order to become viable transit options, new

transit technologies, such as AGRT, must be

able to demonstrate high reliability in a real environment that is acceptable to operators.

The service and technology options presented

in this chapter, although desirable, may not be

achieved or implemented in a single action.

These advanced technologies could be introduced through a technology evolution process

whereby a staged implementation would be carried out emphasizing the following steps:

● implementing automated guideway technology in short segments to accumulate operating experience, leading to design improvements in subsequent deployments,

● implementing automation to increase productivity,

● introducing system or subsystem technologies where short wait time, travel time, and

other service options may be provided at

reasonable cost by modern control techniques, and

. introducing network technologies for providing a full range of service options desired by users.

Unresolved Issues

●

●

●

●

●

acceptability of integrating stations into

privately owned structures,

maintenance of correct air gap in levitated

systems,

emergency evacuation procedures,

all-weather operation, and

liability questions concerning the use of

moving-block controls.
Chapter V

IMPACTS OF ADVANCED GROUP RAPID TRANSIT TECHNOLOGY

Quality of Service

The advantages of AGRT over other transit

modes are due to:

1. its unique ability to provide station-tostation service with no transfers and few

stops on its own right-of-way, and

2. its high availability at all times of day due

to automation.

It can also provide high-capacity service by

running multicar trains over fixed routes on

fixed schedules.

The Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) has yet to perform important

computer simulations and other studies that

would indicate the congestion impacts caused

by large numbers of people trying to use the system and that would indicate the tradeoffs

among vehicle size, system configuration, trip

patterns, and other design and operating decisions.

The quality of service offered by a transportation mode is measured by such variabIes as

time, cost, comfort, convenience, reliability y,

availability y, and coverage. Assuming that

AGRT would be operated and managed as well

as existing transit systems, its inherent advantages are its potential for station-to-station

service with no transfers and few stops and its

availability at all times of day. While it could

only provide the same amount of coverage as a

bus system at appreciable cost, it would provide

superior service on all other variables (assuming

the security and emergency evacuation questions can be adequately addressed). The guarantee of a seat, the possibility of on-demand service, and the prospect of fewer transfers could

give AGRT a distinct advantage over other

grade-separated modes as well.

The flexibility of AGRT will allow it to respond to changing demand levels. At periods of

low utilization, the service would be “demandresponsive, ” with vehicles being routed to stations as service requests are generated. Such

trips would involve minimal stops and no transfers. During periods of higher demand, the vehicles can be operated in trains on fixed schedules,

over prescribed routes, serving small clusters of

stations. In this latter case, service would be

similar to that of a conventional rail system. *

● In this manner it has been claimed that ACRT could be adaptable to share the transit burden in relievlng a “fuel crisis, ” being

able to offer the same line-haul capacity as heavy-rail systems.

Wh]le existing ~uideways would be adequate within a given coverage area, stations would have tc~ be enlarged and addlt iona] vehicles and attendant Iacillties acqu]red.

31
—

32 Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Phofo credl( OTA s/a// photo

Wide-elevated guideways create visual blight but easier

emergency evacuation

There are other amenities that can be provided to make transit travel comfortable and

convenient. Some of these, such as air-conditioning, barrier-free access, seat comfort, sound

deadening, and simplified fare collection, are

not inherently unique to AGRT. Decisions to

implement AGRT rather than other options

should not be based on these factors.

UMTA material indicates that AGRT has a

capacity of 14,400 persons per lane per hour for

its AGRT systems. ]

In practice it is virtually impossible to achieve these capacities with single

12-passenger vehicles operating individuall y at

3-second headways. Guideways and stations,

like highways, are subject to congestion that

would severely impair service levels, i.e., time,

convenience, comfort, reliability. AGRT vehicles operated in tandem could actually achieve

much higher capacities. Detailed computer simulations to show the various tradeoffs of cost,

travel time, capacity, and other factors are

needed to shed more light on this critical issue.

Unresolved issue:

 the relationship between service levels, passenger trip demands, and other factors.

‘U. S. Ikpartm(’nt (JI Tran\p(~rtatl(~n,

tl(~n Acimlnlstr.~tltJn, l<cqut’st tor

U“T-300 14, tfllgh l’t,rtormdn;c l’~,rw~ndl

Sy\t(>m, “ Feb. 20, 1974.

The Auto User

If provided with sufficient capacity, and if available at all

should be a more attractive alternative to the automobile than

transit modes.

times, AGRT

conventional

The major rationale for AGRT is that it will

help to reduce auto usage and all the attendant

negative impacts the auto has on the urban environment and on national energy policy. In

many areas auto disincentives are being proposed to help deter people from driving, particularly when they drive alone, in congested

city districts, or during peak periods. However,

for these disincentives (such as auto-restricted

zones or increased tolls or parking charges) to

be effective at instigating a shift to a transit

alternative, the transit systems must possess two

important attributes:

1. capacity (to handle the influx) and

2. a level of service close to that of the automobile.

For AGRT to truly be an effective alternative

to the auto, sufficient capacity must be provided

to serve the new riders abandoning their automobiles. In this respect AGRT is no different

than any other transit mode. But where AGRT

can truly be an advantage over automobile

usage is with some of the service attributes discussed above under “Quality of Service. ” AGRT

would certainly be more attractive than buses in

mixed traffic. Because of its ability to provide

more stations at a fixed cost than light- and

heavy-rail guideway systems and to offer nonstop non-transfer service, AGRT should, in

most instances, appear at least as attractive as

conventional fixed guideway systems. Another

very important factor is that AGRT would be

available at all times of day, 7 days a week, a
.

Ch V—impacts of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology ● 33

— — — — . —

feature absent from most transit systems today. terred from continuing to drive, AGRT should

Thus, for those auto users who would wish to be more attractive than conventional modes if

travel by transit or who might otherwise be de- capacity can be provided to meet demand.

Ridership

The service attributes of AGRT should enable it to attract significantly

more riders than ordinary bus service and at least as many riders as other

guideway modes. But additional studies are needed to determine consumer

reactions and the magnitude of ridership impacts.

The service potential for an AGRT system is

similar to an automated shared-ride taxi taking

a rider from origin to destination with only a

small number of stops. In theory, any system

could be operated in this manner. In practice,

only a small-vehicle system can efficiently provide point-to-point (or, in this case, station-tostation) service without having either excess capacity or a large number of stops.

On an overall basis when AGRT is compared

with transit modes operating in mixed traffic, it

will attract higher ridership in the general areas

covered because of its superior speed, comfort,

and reliability. It will also benefit from allowing

most passengers to complete the AGRT portion

of their trip without transferring. *

AGRT has no inherent speed advantage over

conventional rail systems, but could attract

*W’lth h(’~vy rlder~h]p preliminary analy~l~ ha~ Indicated that It

may lx more ett Icaceou\ t (~ opera te AC; RT WI t h a ~er]e> (~t (~verIapplng tlxtd routes on tlxtd t requencle~, In thl~ manner some pasw’nxc~r< m~ y ha V(I to t t-a nsier. l-or on-demand +er~’ ice, I t appears

that all rlder~ would rect’lve a dlrc’c ( rldc

higher ridership due to its better coverage (for a

given construction budget) and reduced transfer

potential. Not enough is known about how consumers would react toward UMTA’s AGRT

concept, versus a well-managed modern rail

system with guaranteed seating. It is likely that

the choice between these two options would be

based on local factors in addition to ridership

forecasts, although AGRT should prove relatively more cost-effective for lower volume

grade-separated installations. As noted in the

previous section, AGRT could be spoiled by its

own success—with higher volumes congesting

the system, lowering service levels, and necessitating additional capital facilities.

Unresolved issues:

● consumer reaction t. advanced automated

systems versus other grade-separated technology and

● the congestion impacts caused by a large

number of people trying to use the system.

Special User Groups

Because of its potential for providing broad geographic coverage and

station-to-station nontransfer service, AGRT can provide significant service

improvements for special user groups.

In every urban area there are large numbers tions is of utmost importance if they are to have

of people whose mobility needs require special a P1ace in the mainstream of American life.

attention in planning and designing public Other groups requiring special attention are

transportation services. For the poor, the cost women and the young.

and availability of public transportation are

critical variables; for the handicapped and el- As a new mode, AGRT vehicles and stations

derly, physical accessibility to vehicles and sta- would be designed to be in compliance with ac-
34 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

cessibility regulations of section 16(b)2 of the

Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 (as

amended)2 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act of 1974.3 However, any other federally assisted new mode or new facilities (fixed or rolling) must also meet these requirements. The inherent characteristics of AGRT do appear to offer some advantages to these special user

groups.

For all user groups, automated guideway systems would be superior to nonautomated transit

modes because of their availability at all times

of day and night. Because of automation, service levels do not have to be sharply lowered in

offpeak hours to save the costs of operators or

attendants. The transit-dependent, particularly

low-income shift workers, would benefit from

this. Women, in particular, would benefit from

the absence of long waits at isolated unprotected

bus stops after dark. The handicapped and elderly would benefit from shorter waits for service, in contrast to long waits and unreliable

service frequently experienced with buses operating on local streets, The absence of transfers

on fixed guideway systems (whether automated

or not) would also make travel easier. (On an

all-bus system many of the handicapped are realistically limited to traveling to destinations ly -

‘Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, Public Law 88-365, 78

Stat. 302, U.S. C. vol. 49, sec. 1601 et seq. (as amended), sec. 16(b)

2.

‘Rehabilitation Act ot 1974.

ing along only those bus routes passing very

close to their residences. )

If AGRT can meet its construction cost goals,

then more extensive coverage can be provided

than with other fixed guideway systems (for

similar construction budgets). If such coverage

was provided in suburban areas, inner city

workers would have better accessibility to

outlying job opportunities than they would

have with conventional fixed-rail systems.

There are two potential disadvantages to

AGRT. First, if AGRT is provided in place of

local bus service there will be fewer access

points to the system. Second, satisfactory solutions for emergency evacuation need to be

found that meet the requirements for the handicapped and elderly, particularly when suspended or narrow guideway systems are being

considered.

Wider doorways to stations and vehicles as

well as escalators and/or elevators for level

changes would be an asset for all transit riders.

But most particularly they would benefit the

handicapped and elderly in comparison to what

conventional alternatives provide. However,

there is little reason to believe that the same accommodations cannot be provided on conventional systems. Thus, decisions to proceed with

AGRT development to aid special user groups

should consider the aspects of geographic coverage and transfers.

Safety and Security

Automation enhances the safety (collision avoidance) of guideway transit systems.

Passenger security is perceived as a problem when the ride must be

shared with strangers, particularly on small vehicles with infrequent stops.

Methods to provide security in unattended vehicles and user response to

such methods, remain as unresolved issues.

Wide= guideway bottom-supported systems offer the most satisfactory

opportunities for emergency evacuation procedures. Narrow guideway systerns are potentially less costly, less obtrusive, and less subject to winter

weather operating problems; but no satisfactory emergency evacuation

strategy has been developed for them.
— . —

Ch, V—impacts of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology ● 35

Automation can enhance safety by eliminating accidents due to human error and equipment

failure. Those AGT systems already in operation have exhibited superior safety performance

since they first began operation in 1971. ~

Security issues arise from uncertainties regarding public acceptance of unattended stations and vehicles. Unattended platforms are

common in many transit systems and all bus

stops are, in fact unattended stations. The more

limited number of waiting points in AGRT

would appear easier to monitor and control.

(Similarly, a heavy-rail system with yet fewer

stations might offer a further advantage. ) Research has shown that crime rates at transit stations parallel those of adjacent neighborhoods. s

Design guidelines are being prepared which

stress adequate lighting and unobstructed visiPhoto credll L TVAC PR&A

Automated systems have proven safe in nonurban settings

‘The N1lTRE C(~rporatl(Jn, L/r/Jti/~ App/IcutI[~~Is ot A(iIIdtIci>cf

Croup RujIILi ~t’L?)151f A) I A/f[~rt~aflt~es AIIuIv515 Study, September

1978, p. 140.

‘Ib]d., p. 144.

bility. Such treatment should reduce station security problems for AGRT and other systems to

a minimum.

There is little experience from which to assess

security in unattended vehicles. Currently deployed systems in Morgantown, W. Va.; in the

Dallas-Fort Worth Airport; and in numerous

other airports, theme parks, and zoos have had

few problems; but none of these systems operate

in a typical urban environment.

Fire presents a very difficult problem for all

transit modes. Vehicles are vulnerable to fire in

the passenger compartments, in undervehicle

equipment, and on nearby property. In-vehicle

fires can be controlled with a more judicious

choice of materials, a solution available to all

modes. However, should fire occur on or under

a vehicle, the location of the vehicle will be

crucial. Vehicles on the surface have the best

chance of being evacuated; passengers can walk

away from fires in tunnels if they are not overcome by smoke. Vehicles supported on wide

guideway elevated structures can utilize the

built-in walkways; however, no generally acceptable solutions are yet available for narrow

guideways and suspended vehicles. Conventionally powered AGRT, with a proliferation of

traction and control units, has a greater probability of failure and delay than larger vehicle

systems. On existing elevated systems it is also

common practice to close sections of guideway

when fire occurs on adjacent property. Most of

the concerns over fire also apply to the need for

emergency evacuation of accident victims.

Unresolved issues:

● methods to provide security in unattended

vehicles (and user response to such systems) and

 emergency evacuation procedures.

Urban Development

Fixed guideway systems that provide not only line=haul service but also

circulation and distribution within activity centers may enhance urban development potentials of the area served.

Urban development tends to occur in areas hance accessibility in station areas and thus suphaving high accessibility. Transit systems en- port development and redevelopment when car-
—

36 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

ried out in conjunction with other positive development policies such as zoning changes and

economic incentives.

AGRT systems, by providing many small stations rather than a few large stations, should encourage medium-density development at many

nodes, as opposed to higher densities at a few

concentrated points. By combining line-haul

and distribution service, AGRT systems should

be able to effectively serve dispersed activity

centers designed for automobile access. This latter attribute suggests that AGRT systems may

prove more effective than existing transit modes

in enabling central-city residents to obtain access to jobs in lower density suburban locations.

Many existing Federal programs influence urban development patterns: housing, highways,

water supply, waste treatment, and economic

development to name a few. The AGRT program goals should be made consistent with a

common set of Federal policy goals.

Unresolved issues:

● the effects of AGRT systems on land use development patterns and

● the relationship of AGRT and its potential

urban applications to the programs and

policies of the Department of Housing and

Urban Development, the Environmental

Protection Agency, and other relevant

agencies.

Energy and Environment

To the degree that the service characteristics of AGRT systems attract

travelers to use transit rather than the private low-occupancy auto, electrically powered systems should make a positive contribution to petroleum con=

servation and maintenance of environmental quality.

For highly concentrated large travel demands,

large-vehicle systems will be more energy-efficient. For periods of low demand, small vehicles

operated as needed, without the requirement to

provide scheduled service, will permit energy

savings by tailoring supply to demand. Selection of an optimum vehicle size would have to

follow an analysis of local 24-hour service

needs.

Noise impacts of guideway systems will depend partially on the technology utilized. Rubber-tired vehicles would probably be similar to

vans or panel trucks in noise impact. Air cushion systems, as in the proposed Otis vehicle, appear to be fairly quiet. Magnetic levitation and

linear motor technology with no moving parts

for propulsion or suspension should be very

quiet.

The visual impacts of elevated guideways are

a very localized and subjective matter. In the

city of Miami, for example, both the rapid rail

and downtown people mover (DPM) systems

will be elevated. This form is apparently acceptable to the public in both residential areas and

scenic areas such as Biscayne Boulevard. Miami

Beach, however, rejected the area’s elevated

rapid rail alternative because of the elevated

profile. In Denver the elevated guideway issue

was also polarizing. From the rider’s point of

view, elevated travel may be more pleasing than

at-grade or underground service.

Electrically powered transit systems can help

reduce air pollution to the extent that persons

can be attracted out of private autos. However,

the overall effect of any benefits will depend on

the environmental characteristics of the power

source.

Snow and ice present particularly perplexing

problems for transit. Elevated guideway systems could cause an environmental nuisance if

snow and ice fall or drip on passers-by. Removing them can entail great costs in energy and

manpower, if a complete shutdown is not forced

altogether. During the harsh winter of 1976-77,

more money was spent on the Morgantown system for natural gas to heat the guideway than

for electricity during the full 12-month period. ’
Ch. V—Impacts of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology ● 3 7

 credit 

Photo 

Suspended vehicles are less bothered by ice and snow. Narrow guideways are less obtrusive,

but emergency evacuation is a problem
38 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

An I-beam (monorail) .design would accumulate Unresolved issues:

less snow than some proposed U-shaped designs ●

that actually trap it. (The latter probably would ●

permit less dripping. ) Keeping the power rails

free from ice, snow, and frost is also an important consideration in assuring service depend- ●

ability.

esthetics of elevated guideways,

an energy-efficient solution to maintaining

operations during ice and snow conditions,

and

optimum vehicle size and speed for energy

efficiency.

Electric-powered transit can help reduce air pollution
.

Ch V—Impacts of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology ● 39

Economics

Advanced AGT systems offer the potential to reduce the cost of public

transit. However, wide variations in estimates of capital and operating costs,

for both automated guideway and existing systems, do not permit definitive

cost comparisons to be made at this time.

Local site conditions and preferences may be more important factors in

system selection than the inherent economic characteristics of AGRT.

Although claims have been made that AGRT

can reduce the costs of urban transit operation,

the data are not available to substantiate these

generalized claims. As recommended in OTA’s

1975 report on AGT, UMTA undertook a program of socioeconomic research in conjunction

with the new systems development program.

Two studies on this topic have been completed,

and

●

●

●

●

The

two more are underway.

The MITRE Corporation, Urban Application of Advanced Group Rapid Transit:

An Alternative Analysis Study, September

1978.

N. D. Lea & Associates, Inc., Summary of

Capital and Operations and Maintenance

Cost Experience of Automated Guideway

Transit Systems, June 1978.

Cambridge Systematic, Inc., “AGT Markets Study” (in progress).

Barton-Aschman Associates, Inc., “Generic

Alternatives Study” (in progress).

MITRE study indicated that AGRT could

improve transit ridership but the findings on

system economics cannot be generalized. The

N. D. Lea study summarized the cost experience

of 10 existing systems, mostly in airports and

theme parks. Generally, these systems are very

limited in mileage and the results of their operating experience are not directly applicable to

AGRT. Cambridge Systematic and BartonAschman are doing further research on AGT

markets with added emphasis on the “image” of

these systems. The first study is investigating

AGT in general; the second is comparing AGRT

with 28 other modes or modal combinations.

One of the major decisions in urban transit is

whether or not to invest in the high costs of ex-

‘U. S Congress, Ottlce ot Technology Assessment Aut(>matwf

GUIJWVJY Trtitwt OTA-T-8 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government I>rlntlng Otflce, February 1975).

elusive rights-of-way and grade separations for

transit vehicles, be they bus, light rail, heavy

rail, or AGT. Such guideways free transit from

the constraints and problems of mixed traffic

operations and provide significantly better

levels of service. However, it is not clear that

certain operating economies made possible by

an exclusive right-of-way will lower operating

costs sufficiently to recover fully the investment

in guideway and stations.

When AGRT is compared to conventional

transportation modes on a lifecycle-cost’ basis

there is too much variability and uncertainty in

the available data to come to any generalized

findings. There are many tradeoffs involved and

wide ranges of parameter values within any

given mode. When the AGRT technology is

available for urban deployments, local site conditions and preferences may be more important

factors in system selection than the inherent

economic characteristics of AGRT.

Because UMTA’s program has centered on a

discrete set of AGRT specifications, data are not

available on other size vehicles or other system

configurations. It may be desirable to conduct

system optimization studies to determine the attributes of a broad range of AGT configurations

for different applications before prototype systems are designed.

A critical element of AGT costs is the design

of the guideway. Narrow deep cross-sections

are most efficient from a structural point of

view and may also be less obtrusive. Suspended

systems, such as Romag, are usually of such a

design, but supported systems can also be designed as efficiently. U-shaped cross-sections are

‘Lllecycle costs Include c~perating and maintenance c~~sts tm

gether with the c(w.t (Jt capital structures and equipment over the

life {~t the facility.
-.

40 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

much less efficient and in addition collect more ●

snow and ice in adverse weather environments.

Unresolved issues:

● the attainability of operating and main- ●

tenance cost goals,

the uncertainty of capital costs for various

configurations and the extent to which

these may be reduced by improved guideway design, and

optimum vehicle and operating procedures

for various applications.

Employment and Productivity

The data are not available to determine the extent to which AGRT might

be more labor-productive than other transit modes. UMTA should investigate

the potential reduction of jobs for unskilled persons brought about by sub=

stituting automated systems for manually operated systems.

Several questions have arisen concerning the

size and mix of labor skills required to operate

and maintain AGT systems:

1.

2.

3.

Will deployment of automated systems

significantly increase or decrease the total

size of the transit labor force?

What skill mix of workers will be required?

Over what time frame would any changes

occur?

There are no clear-cut answers to these questions.

Impact of AGRT on size of labor force

Automated guideway vehicles will operate

without attendants and it is presumed stations

would be unattended. However, automated

guideway systems have a long list of labor categories to fill: mechanics, machinists, electricians, cleaners, maintainers for all major systems (guideway, power distribution, substations), technicians (for fare-collection machinery, elevators, escalators, and communications

equipment), and police, as well as engineers,

planners, and administrative personnel. In its

study of 10 existing systems N. D. Lea stated, d,

. . . labor is generally the largest single

(operations and maintenance) cost component . . . “~

If an advanced automated guideway system

were compared with a modern rail system with

the same size vehicles, requirements for maintenance personnel would appear to be similar.

Although the automated system might require

additional programmers and control room personnel, the large savings in vehicle operators

(and stations) should yield it a large labor advantage. However, if the automated vehicle is

small and a large number of vehicles are necessary (as with the proposed AGRT vehicle) maintenance requirements could be considerably

larger than for a conventional system. When an

automated system is compared with a bus system of comparable size, the labor tradeoff is in

the number of bus operators versus the number

of persons required to maintain vehicles and

guideways. OTA has found no definitive studies

on this issue and finds that further study is necessary.

Labor skill mix

Many of the jobs in a bus operation are regarded as “unskilled’ ’-drivers, cleaners, and

many of the shop functions. Were an automated

system to replace all or a portion of a bus fleet,

it is possible that many of these unskilled jobs

would disappear. While a few more highly

trained technicians would be required for vehicle and system maintenance, the required skill

mix for new systems is not well-understood.

Timing of labor impacts

UMTA’s scenario for automated guideway

systems envisions small deployments in a few

cities beginning with the DPM demonstrations.

“Advanced” technologies would then be implemented starting in the late-1980’s. If current

capital funding policies are followed, these advanced systems would be implemented in “oper-
Ch. V—Impacts of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology ● 41

able segments. ”9 Under such circumstances it is

unlikely that any single urban area could have a

substantial automated guideway network in

operation before the mid-1990’s. At that time

societal attitudes toward the substitution of

automation may have changed. In any case the

rate of implementation would be gradual and

existing Federal law would ensure that no existing employees were displaced. 10 Provisions of

existing labor agreements also need review and

revision where necessary to be consonant with

the nature of AGRT operations.

Although it has been argued that AGRT

would be more labor-productive than other

transit modes, supporting data are not available. However, labor relations and the potential

reduction of unskilled labor positions are important social issues deserving serious consideration by UMTA.

Unresolved issues:

●

●

●

Summary

AGRT possesses several inherent advantages

which give it great potential as an urban transit

mode:

 a less costly guideway that allows coverage

to be increased (beyond that of conventional designs) for each dollar invested,

 a guaranteed seat,

● station-to-station service without the necessit y to transfer, and

● a high level of service at all times of day.

These characteristics can be provided on any

mode. However, i t is the technological advances

of AGRT that make them more economically

feasible. In addition, the lighter less-obtrusive

guideway should make AGRT more esthetically

acceptable to the community.

Although AGRT appears to be a strong candidate in local alternatives analysis, its suitability

will

the size and nature of the labor force required for advanced AGT systems,

the impact of existing labor agreements on

the deployment of regional automated systems, and

social impacts from the potential reduction

in transit jobs for unskilled persons.

largelv be determined bv local site-specific

conditions. The purpose of UMTA’s AGRT program is not to develop a universally best-suited

mode, but to make available to cities a new set

of options, which, with adequate funding, will

be preferred in many applications.

The most serious deficiency of AGRT planning is a satisfactory procedure for evacuating

passengers in a hurry. The best approach is to

design in such a way as to minimize the number

of instances in which evacuation is required.

Failure to resolve this issue will severely limit

the range of opportunities for AGRT deployment. Two other areas need more serious considerations by UMTA: labor issues and the system optimization studies.
.

Chapter VI

GOVERNMENT/INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIPS IN ADVANCED

GROUP RAPID TRANSIT TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT

Results of these investigations show:

● that there are substantial national differences in R&D policies,

● that Government should become involved

in only those specific technologies which

support national policy objectives,

● that there are major policy options between

promoting R&D or supporting Government procurement of innovative technologies, and

. that technology development and technology demonstration ought not to be con-

.

1 U.S. C[>ngress, C)ttlce c~t Tec-hnt>logy Assessment, Go~wrtlme~rt

/JIZT(l/ZTenic}~t 1)1 t/itJ /tItIc>z1[~tJ(lII Pr(~c(’ss OTA-R-73 (Washington,

11. C U.S. G(~vernmcnt I’rlntlng Ottice, August 1978).

‘U.S. Cc~ngres\, OttIce (>} Techn(~l(lgy Assessment, T/~c Rt)/c o/

[){’))lo)~strafl(l)ls J) I Fdcra/ R<. 1) P()/Icy OTA-R-70 (U’ashington,

[>. (_ : U.S. G(}vernment I’r}ntlng OttIce, July 1978).

‘U. S. Department of Commerce, “Domestic Poltcy Review of

Industrial Innovati~~n, ” b$’ork Plan, Sept. 18, 1978, Washington,

D.C.

4AdVISC~ry Subcomrnlttee t]n Ecc~n(>mlc and Trade Pc}llcy ol the

Advlw~ry ~f~mmlttee t~n Indu\tr]al lnnt~vatlon, “Dratt Report on

Ec(~n(~mlc and Trade P(~lIc y, Dec 20, IW8, Washington, D.C. –

An advls~~ry c(lmmlttee c(~nvenecf b}’ and reporting to the Secretary (lt Ct~mmerce.

fused when moving innovation through the

difficult transitions from concept to deployment.

They further indicate a growing concern in the

United States and several other mature industrialized societies that industrial productivity is

declining or stagnating and that incentives for

stimulating innovations which might reverse

this trend are either lacking or not working

properly. Much of the emphasis in some countries, most notably Japan, has been on innovation that would make those nation’s industrial

base more competitive in international markets.

5Advisory Subcomrnlt tee (>n I’r~>curement and Direct Suppc>rt ot

Research and Develc~pment c~t the Aciv]sor-y Comrnlttee on Inciu\-

trial Innovation, “Draft Report on Federal Procurement I’ol]cy, ‘

Dec. 22, 1978, Washington, D.C. —An advisory c(~mmlttee c(~nvened by and reporting to the Secretary ot C“[~mmerce.

“Organization for Economic Cc~operation and Development,

Policies for the Stitt~u/titio/? of lt~dustriul ltI)IozIatIL)tI, V(>lume 1—

Analytical Report; Volume 11- 1—Country Reports CanadaFrance-West Germany -ltaly-Japan-Unl ted States-United Klngciom;

Volume 11-2—Country Reports Australla-Austria-Denmark-F]nland-Ireland-Netherlands-Norway-Spain-Swecie n, Paris, 1Q78.

Available in English or French versions.

43
—. — — .

44 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Photo cred/f Japan M/n/s try of /nternafiona/ Trade and Industry

Japan develops advanced transportation technologies

to penetrate international markets

Among the reasons that the question of Government/ industry relations is important is the

near demise of the U.S. transit vehicle industry*

at a time when “Buy America” is a stated policy

of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) and other Federal agencies. As of

● At least that segment (~t the Industry wl]ling to market veh]cles

which meet the cri terla t{~r Fedcra 1 assistance.

this writing there are no American-owned manufacturers of light- and heavy-rail passenger

cars and only two reluctant domestic manufacturers of full-size transit buses. The factors that

influenced this decline need to be identified to

ensure that advanced group rapid transit

(AGRT) does not suffer a similar fate. The disintegration of U.S. industrial capability in the

transit industry has coincided with an era of

substantially increased Federal involvement in

the planning, funding, and management of transit. Shifting Government procurement policies,

with unrealistic design standards and leadtime,

have accounted in part for the demise of the

transit supplier industry. Future policies on development of AGRT and other advanced technologies in urban transit should be looked at

with these industry impacts in mind.

Each of the remaining three sections of this

chapter considers an important justification for

Government involvement in developing public

transit technologies. The three justifications are:

●

●

●

to reduce barriers to innovation caused by

unique problems of developing technologies for public sector clients,

to deal with issues of foreign competition

and trade, and

to support other long-range national policy

objectives.

Barriers to Innovation

The complex institutional and regulatory process surrounding the procurement of urban transit systems inhibits private suppliers from developing

the innovative technologies necessary to meet today’s transit needs.

The complexity of the public institutional ar- rather than a current problem, often find no porangements and decisionmaking processes that tential client agency present at all to deal with

influence deployment of new technologies in ur- the long-range future.

ban settings is perhaps the biggest barrier to innovation which the private sector faces in developing new technologies. Since established sys- For these reasons private sector firms often

terns, procedures, and expectations are difficult fail to show interest in developing products for

to change, incremental improvements are often such difficult and uncertain markets. One major

preferred to significant departures from tradi- response that Government could take would be

tion. System suppliers are reluctant to develop to guarantee a market for innovative products,

unique innovative systems when competition is rather than to provide R&D grants to get the

required for governmental procurement. And technology developed. Market guarantees are

problem-solving technologies aimed at a future, considered further in chapter VIII.
Ch. VI—Government/lndustry Relationships in Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology Development 45

Another barrier to innovation comes from a

reluctance on the part of major corporations to

become involved in potentially risky ventures.

Unsuccessful attempts to meet rigid performance and reliability requirements serve to discredit the supplier more often than those responsible for creating unrealistic specifications. The

high visibility of transit systems contributes to

an atmosphere of confrontation between suppliers and their public clients, making resolution of

problems more difficult than in private sector

commercial transactions.

The lack of markets for publicly supported

new technology also limits involvement. Boeing

was awarded the Morgan town contract in 1970,

but has yet to garner another automated guideway deployment contract. Otis, the other

AGRT contractor, still has only its single deployment at Duke University, a nonpublic client. Boeing-Vertol, with UMTA assistance, designed and built the standard light-rail vehicle, a

technology which will probably not see service

beyond Boston and San Francisco. Three domestic bus manufacturers (General Motors, AM

General, and Grumman Flexible) have also

claimed that the brief run of recently developed

full-size transit buses will not allow them to

recoup their investment in design and tooling.

All declined to submit bids for the first attempt

at a transbus procurement on May 2, 1979.

While local governments supposedly have

control over technology selection through the

alternatives analysis process, automated guideway systems are rarely given serious consideration. Federal regulations for capital grants restrict system considerations to “operable segments”7 whereas the strongest market for AGRT

appears to be in regional or multicorridor deployments.

If the institutional structure itself is not

enough to constrain the enthusiasm of system

suppliers, then the lack of enthusiasm on the

part of system purchasers may be the telling

blow. Transit operators, conservative by nature, and a cautious public are re!uctant to take

a chance on unproven systems given the adverse

publicity generated by recent Federal demonstrations and deployments of new technologies.

In several cities visited by the OTA staff for this

assessment, the main operator reaction was a

desire for additional buses to relieve current

overcrowded conditions. Pressed with such immediate problems, they show little interest in

solutions that will not be available for another

10 years.

Government involvement is no guarantee of

success in developing new technologies. Aside

from the controversy surrounding several new

U.S. technologies, two important foreign ventures were also unsuccessful. The transurban

technology of Kraus-Maffei sponsored by the

Province of Ontario was abandoned after severe

technical problems developed. Japan’s CVS system, although successfully demonstrated on an

extensive test track, has not yet been deployed.

Moving a complex public technology from laboratory to deployment is a difficult process with

the potential for great financial risk and political

embarrassment.

‘U.S. Dc’partment c~t Transpt~rtati(~n, Urban hlas~ Transp[}rtation Admlnistrati{>n, “Maj(~r Urban Mas\ Tran\p(~rtatl(ln Investments: Statement c~f I’c)l]cy, ‘ Fdcral Rcglsfcr, vol, 41, N(). 185,

Sept. 22, 1976, p. 41513.

Foreign Competition and Trade

The potential of broad international leadership in the transit technology

field is not a credible prospect for U.S. industry. However, the possibility of

component or system leadership in automated guideway transit remains if

pursued more deliberately than in the past.

While the United States is carrying out its terns that may enter the international market

own programs of advancing transit technology perhaps well ahead of U.S. technology. A more

through development of downtown people immediate concern to those interested in quesmover (DPM) and AGRT system development, tions of technological leadership and trade balforeign industries are making progress on sys- ances, however, is the near demise of U.S. pro-
— —

46 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

ductive capacity in more traditional transit technology. Both in the areas of light- and heavyrail car production, U.S. firms have left the field

after losing out to foreign suppliers on the limited procurement activities in this country. The

potential of broad international leadership in

the transit technology field is not a credible

prospect for U.S. industry given both the

makeup of the existing supply industry and the

geographic dispersion of the transit system replacement demand concentrated in European

countries. However, the possibilities of component, product, or system leadership may remain

in certain niches of the transit spectrum if they

are aggressively pursued in a more systematic

manner. Whether or not the rewards of such a

restricted development strategy are worth the

costs is a major question, however, given both

the softness of the U.S. market for such advanced technologies and the foreign competition

under development.

The status of various forms of group rapid

transit and personal rapid transit abroad as of

1975 was well-documented in the previous OTA

assessment, Automated Guideway Transit, 8

The programs which are proceeding abroad that

seem to have relevance to the AGRT program

here in the United States are the Cabintaxi and

H-Bahn systems in West Germany, two Japanese systems under development in the Kobe

and Osaka port districts, and the French Aramis

system. The Cabintaxi system which has had

test track demonstrations in Hagenf West Germany is now being deployed in an outlying suburban portion of Hamburg. The system, under

the sponsorship of the industrial consortium of

Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blohm and DEMAG

and the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology, has performance characteristics very

close to the specifications UMTA has set for

AGRT. The initial development costs are shared

80 percent by the West German Federal Govern-

“U.S. Congress, Office ot Technology Assessment, Automated

Guldeu)ay Tram/t, (XA-T-8 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 197s),

ment and 20 percent by industry, although the

system originated as an industrial initiative. As

it enters the demonstration stage, local government and the Federal transportation ministry

will begin cost-sharing with the system developer.

Japanese systems under development are perhaps more modest technologically than the

West German system, but they are proceeding

with considerable active support by local

governments in Kobe and Osaka.

In France, the Aramis system, under development by Engins MATRA, has gone through several test track demonstrations near Paris, but

has not emerged to a point of major development. The VAL shuttle-loop system is being installed in Line. Studies involving the RATP, or

Paris Metro Authority, have been done for suburban installations linking the regional transportation system, but no final decision on a deployment has been made.

A summary of prospective foreign competition indicates an interesting contrast. Technologically, foreign developers appear to be on a

par with accomplishments in the United States.

A limited number of systems have been deployed in the benign operating environments of

amusement and activity centers, and more advanced technologies have been investigated on

test tracks. However, only the West German

Cabintaxi system appears technologically advanced over anything tested to date in this country. On the other hand, only the U.S. systems

have operating experience akin to what might

be encountered in real urban settings. The

Morgantown and Airtrans systems are the two

most complex and extensive systems in daily

operation anywhere in the world today. Foreign

competitors, therefore, would appear to trail in

that important step of technology and service

demonstration. However, if the Hamburg

Cabintaxi demonstration succeeds, technological leadership could shift overseas.
Ch. VI—Government/lndustry Relationships in Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology Development ● 47

Long-Range Objectives—An Intermediate Recipient

To overcome the absence of interest in Iong-range solutions by public

agencies, an intermediate recipient for technological innovation could be created similar to those developed in West Germany and Japan to stimulate industry over the long term.

AGRT technology and even more advanced

performance system concepts might continue to

be funded and programed by UMTA or they

might find a better institutional home elsewhere

in Government. One of the critical issues raised

in the OTA report on Government involvement

in the innovation process 9 is whether or not

Congress should provide direct support for nonmission-oriented technology. Mission-oriented

technology is that directly relevant to the mission of the agency conducting the research or

technological development. It appears that

UMTA’s involvement with AGRT might be a

direct mission-oriented portion of its urban

transit role. But the foreign experiences leading

to development of advanced forms of transit

technology have almost all been examples of

non-mission-oriented agencies taking the lead.

In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade

and Industry took the lead in encouraging the

development of CVS, not for the express purpose of improving urban transit, but instead for

the promotion of numerous facets of Japan’s

steel, electronics, computer, and other industries seeking new product developments and

new markets. The Ministries of Transportation

and of Construction did not take an active role

in this now dormant program. In West Germany, the lead in supporting the development and

demonstration of the Cabintaxi system is again

in the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology and not the Ministry of Transportation.

Similar cases exist in the United Kingdom,

France, and Canada where the initial efforts

aimed at creating a small-vehicle automated

transit system were championed by special nonmission agencies interested in technological innovation for industry’s sake and incidentally for

transportation mission outputs.

In the United States no such agency exists

with the exception of the Federal laboratories

and the National Science Foundation. However,

as stated in a recent OTA report, the concept

may be advantageous:

This policy [of having only mission-oriented

technology] differs markedly from the practices

and procedures of other technologically advanced nations, notably Japan, in which the

Governments support technological innovation

with no other goal than the general economic

one of helping particular sectors of industry to

grow and to compete in international markets.

Increased attention has recently been focused

within the Government on ways in which, in cooperation with the private sector, it might seek

to stimulate and encourage technological innovation through programs of direct support of

some kind. There are three basic reasons for the

heightened interest in such programs. First, the

United States is facing increasingly stiff competition in technology-based products from other

nations that have programs for the domestic

support of technological innovation for purely

economic purposes.

In addition, the social returns on technological innovation are often greater than any reasonable expected private return, due to the inappropriability of some of the benefits, which make a

Federal sponsorship role appropriate. Lastly,

there are purely social reasons for supporting innovation. An example of these is the general desirability of creating employment. 10

Other such R&D programs exist, albeit with

different missions and host mission-oriented

agencies. They may face the same troubles of

timing, lack of constituencies, and risk-sharing

that AGRT does. Perhaps out of the Presidential

initiatives on industrial innovation or out of the

congressional oversight and review of them,

some multiagency approach to improved Government/industry relations could be developed

that would benefit the long-range prospects for

AGRT and other urban or institutionally complex public technologies.

‘“Ibid.
48 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Summary

AGRT technology should be viewed in the

context of broad national policy with regard to

Government/industry relations and to the demonstration of public technologies in real-world

settings. Much experience has been accumulated

in recent years on both of these subjects, experience that is highly relevant to the questions

of timing, cost, and fundamental approach to

the development, demonstration, and ultimate

deployment of technologically advanced forms

of public transit.

Significant barriers inhibit transit innovation

in American cities:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

the complexity of the local transit decisionmaking process;

insufficient markets, which are too limited

for the competition;

Government-subsidized foreign competition;

risks of technological failure and poor system management;

risk of adverse publicity, cost overrun, and

political embarrassment;

the cautious approach to innovation of

local operators and decisionmakers;

the overriding concern at the local level for

solving immediate problems versus longrun planning;

adverse procurement regulations that discourage innovation; and

frequent changes in Federal regulations that

may not give suppliers large enough production runs to justify their investment in

design and tooling.

The examination of foreign competition in

automated guideway technology reveals that

practical operating experience rather than technological issues should maintain a domestic

preference for American systems over the next

few years. However, this may change as claims

for the West German Cabintaxi become verified

in actual operations.

Rather than have UMTA justify to its constituency of transit operators, urban mayors, and

current users the long-range benefits of developing AGRT or of the related technologies, it may

be more advantageous for an agency such as the

National Science Foundation, or other hightechnology agency, to make the arguments for

financial support and bear the responsibility for

failure or success. A second option would be to

decentralize responsibility for transit R&D.

These and other options deserve further study.
MARKET SCENARIOS–INNOVATION

——

Chapter Vll

IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

AGRT Implementation Scenarios

Introduction of a public technology into the

real world is a complex and poorly understood

process. Innovative urban transit technologies

such as AGRT share much in common with that

class of technologies found most likely to fail in

OTA’s recent study of Federal demonstrations.

These failures result from: 1) technology that is

not operationally reliable and 2) the complexity

of the urban institutional environment.2 These

factors should be thoroughly evaluated before a

decision is made to deploy AGRT systems.

Chapter V contains an assessment of how

well AGRT might function in daily urban transit service. But it is also necessary to sketch out

implementation scenarios that trace the path of

the technology from development through prototypes to demonstration, deployment, and

consumer acceptance. Major transit investments

such as the downtown people mover (DPM)

proposals or possible AGRT installations are

regarded as demonstrations by the Urban Mass

‘Cathc’rln~ Burke, l)~~li)~’uflt)t[ Itl P[(h/It- PCJIIC.V TIIII CL~st~ L)I Pt~r-

+,)tIIJI KL/lIIt/ Tt[J)I+It ( Lexlngt[)n, hl~~s. : D. C. Heath & C(],, 1979).

-U S C{~ngress, Ottlce ~~t Tt’chn(>l~~gy A\w’s\mt>nt, ~l~c l<olc oj

/~(7})/~J/j+ltfjf{~>}/~ })1 ~d(7r~~/ l<<? l) p(>~jcv, OTA-1<-70 (Washingt(>n,

[~ C, U S [;(lvernment I’rlntlng ottlce, ]UIV 1978), pp. 31-41.

Downtown People

OTA’s 1975 report on AGT systems recommended that UMTA undertake an urban demonstration of shuttle-loop transit (SLT) technology. ’ UMTA chose central business districts as

‘U S. C(}ngres\, Ott Ice ~~t Tec hn(~l(~gy A\ws\ment, AI(t(IItILIt[uf

Gl(l(i(’uwu Tr”[?)l$lt OTA-T-8 ( W.~shlngttJn, D. C,: U. S, C(Jvt’rnmen t J>nn tlng 0}1]( t’, February I Q75 ~, p. 7.

Transportation Administration (UMTA), but

are expected by local authorities to be proven

systems capable of reliable daily operation.

Thus, all automated guideway transit (AGT)

deployments over the next few years will be subject to intense international scrutiny of their reliability, cost, and service characteristics. In this

country the institutional complexity of the transit implementation process will ensure that these

paths are not trouble-free.

While large-sized cities already committed to

light- or heavy-rail systems might be in a position to accept new automated guideway technologies only in limited applications as distributor systems, more modest-sized communities without existing rail systems might prefer

modest scale applications that could be expanded incrementally into corridor or regional

systems. This is quite likely to be the reaction of

transit operators, elected officials, and the community-at-large, as well as being pragmatic for

capital spending purposes. This incremental approach of applying proven technology in measured doses is suggested by recent literature on

demonstration programs.3

‘lbId., p. 48.

Mover Deployments

the application site for these demonstrations,

and opened up the eligibility criteria to include

any proven AGT technology, be it SLT, group

rapid transit, or personal rapid transit. * In fact,

49
——— —

50 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

UMTA has called for the first three deployments terest groups. Thus, the implementation process

to use different technologies. To direct primary as well as the actual system operations are

focus on the social and economic impacts, worth observing and monitoring to guide the

UMTA decided that technological risk should AGRT development and implementation probe minimized. gram. As several of the R&D options discussed

While UMTA regards these ventures as demonstrations, the cities themselves are treating

them as deployments. Because the impacts are

real and long-lasting, the local decisionmaking

process reflects the concerns of the various inin the next chapter indicate, AGRT technology

development could continue during this process,

but with a goal toward subsystems development

rather than toward the completion of production prototypes.

Summary

The scenario for implementation of advanced

of gradual technical improvement and deployment

able segments. The DPM program and the foreign

valuable information that will be useful in guiding

way technology development.

AGT technologies is one

of systems in short operdeployments will provide

further automated guide-
Chapter Vlll

OPTIONS FOR AUTOMATED GUIDEWAY TRANSIT

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The Federal Government can bring about advances in AGT technology by supporting efforts

to improve existing technologies or by guaranteeing eventual procurements to motivate technical discoveries.

The approach of market guarantees raises a

range of issues touched on in several of the reports cited in chapter VI. In particular, OTA’s

report on industrial innovation stated:

Most Federal programs intended to affect

technological innovation have historically been

concerned with the supply of new technologies.

Accordingly, they have attempted to increase

this supply by, for example, reducing the cost of

development, undertaking research in publicly

supported laboratories, increasing the rewards

of innovation, etc. This policy emphasis has resulted in part from a widely held, but overly

simple, view of the innovation process which

sees R&D as the overridingly important aspect.

In contrast, recent research emphasizes the complex interconnectedness of various stages in the

innovation process and recognizes that market

demands are often a more important motivator

of innovation than technical discoveries.

Evidence suggests that policies which work

through influences on demand may often be

more effective than those which concentrate on

increasing supply. One way of influencing demand is by Government procurement. Evidence

presented earlier in the report shows that an

assured Government market for new products

can be an effective stimulus co innovation. This

Introduction

conclusion is strongly supported by the foreign

experience.

The downtown people mover (DPM) program sought to provide that assured market,

but the apparent withdrawal of Cleveland, St.

Photo cred~l Of Is E/evafor

Downtown People Movers being planned in

several U.S. cities

51
52 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Paul, and Houston from the program demon- weigh the benefits. The cities must be convinced

strates how difficult it is to guarantee a market. that new technologies will help solve significant

Even when the Urban Mass Transportation Ad- transportation problems at reasonable cost.

ministration (UMTA) offers to pay 80 percent of There is growing doubt at the local level that

the capital cost there is no assurance that cities federally sponsored transit R&D will provide

will cooperate, if they conclude the risks out- workable solutions at an affordable cost.

Program Options for Advanced Technology Development

This section describes four specific supply

side options that would lead to the availability

of advanced automated guideway technologies

in the late 1980’s. The first two options would

focus on laboratory improvements. The latter

two would proceed to test track settings for validation of the existing advanced group rapid

transit (AGRT) technology as an integrated system.

Option 1:

Emphasize the Upgrading of

Existing Technologies

The first objective of this option is to upgrade

existing AGT technologies to the point where

they will be able to provide viable urban transit

service. None of the existing AGT systems have

been subjected to the rigors and high expectations of the urban travel market. They are

operating in much more benign environments—

amusement parks, shopping centers, and airports. To become more viable options for urban

development, they need improvements in reliability, durability, speed, capacity, security,

and cold weather availability. The lack of a

stable market for urban automated guideway

technology precludes existing suppliers from upgrading their own technologies for such a market. At the present time UMTA is supporting a

limited amount of such development with four

system suppliers.

The second objective of this option would be

to put improved systems into service as early as

possible. For example, these technologies, as improved, could be used in the DPM demonstrations, or existing AGT installations could be

retrofitted. This approach will provide more

near-term results than the more advanced technology options that will not be production

Photo credit L TVAC PR&A

Near-term option—upgrade airport systems for use in cities

ready following current schedules before the

late 1980’s at the earliest.

The third objective of this approach, if pursued to the exclusion of other options, is to delay work on advanced technologies until many

of the unresolved issues identified in chapter V

(see table 4) are further analyzed.

Table 4.–issues Requiring Further Analysis*

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Guldeway and station congestion Impacts

Consumer reaction to advanced automated guideway systems

Methods to provide security in unattended vehicles

Emergency evacuation procedures

Effects on land use development patterns

Relationship to other Federal programs and policles

Acceptability of the esthetic Impacts of elevated guldeways

Impacts of snow accumulation and options for solutlon

Optimum vehicle size and speed for energy efficiency

Attainabllity of AGRT operating and maintenance cost goals

Optimum guldeway shape

Optimum vehicle and operating procedures for various appilcatlons

Size and nature of required labor force

Potential reduction In jobs for unskilled persons

Impact of existing labor agreements

‘This IISI IS a summary of the unresolved issues listed at the end 01 each of [he secltons m ch V

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Ch. Vlll—Options for Automated Guideway Transit Research and Development “ 53

Photo credlf O(IS Elevator

AGRT must be able to operate in ice and snow

Option 2:

Emphasize Critical

Subsystems Development

The Federal Government would support activities related to the development of subsystems or components that comprise the new

technologies in AGRT (see table 5). The eventual goal of this form of the program would be

to combine these subsystems into a working system (or family of systems). This program would

then differ from UMTA’s automated guideway

transit technology (AGTT) program which is

working on more general problems such as

safety and security and cold weather reliability.

As with Option 1, the results of this program as

they come online could also be applied to existing new systems. In some cases they could also

be applied to conventional bus and rail as well

as to automated technologies. Decisions on the

final shape(s) of AGRT would be deferred.

A shortcoming of this approach is that a realistic systems environment is needed to verify integrated component operations.

Table 5.–Typical Features of Advanced AGT Systems

● Linear induction motors ● Automatic training

● Air-cushion suspension ● High-speed swltchlng

. Magnetic Ievitatlon c Goods handllng

● Mowng-block controls ● All-weather operation

● Colllslon avoidance radar ● Safety and security systems

c Minimum guldeway cross-section Emergency braking

SOURCE Off Ice 01 Technology Assessment

Option 3:

Validate Subsystems in a

Systems Environment

This option would provide the realistic systems environment necessary to test the interacting relationships of components but defer the

additional costs of full-scale prototype development. A sample test configuration would include a small number of breadboard vehicles, a

modest amount of guideway, and perhaps two

or three switches. The validation program

would be designed: 1 ) to verify that the tested

components perform as expected (command and

control, vehicle operations) and 2) to produce

reliable cost estimates for decisions on further

program direction.

Option 4:

Develop and Validate

Technology on Prototype

Systems

Complete prototype systems would be developed for one, two, or three of the technologies and engineering validation completed

yielding production-ready systems. The prototypes would adhere to the UMTA AGRT specifications, although actual urban deployments

need not adhere in all respects to the same design. As an example, a complete prototype validation would include multiple vehicles and sufficient guideway to test high-speed operation

and switching. This testing would verify such

functions as merging, longitudinal control,

headway maintenance, and collision avoidance.

Those functions that cannot be verified on the

test track would be simulated in the laboratory,

using computer analysis as required. UMTA has

estimated this process as taking about 6 0

months.

The advantages and disadvantages of these

four options are summarized in table 6. These

options are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Option I could be carried out along with any of

the other three. And OTA does not imply that

there are clear-cut distinctions between Options

2, 3, and 4. In fact, there is a natural evolutionary process. The real distinctions among the
54 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

options are in the amount of commitment that budget considerations and the need for further

Congress wishes to make at this time given information.

Table 6.–R&D Options for Achieving AGT Technologies–Pros and Cons

Option Pros Cons

1. Emphasize the upgrading ● Much to offer from existing AGTs, ● Slowest option for achieving deployable advanced technologies.

of existing AGT technology ● Improves marketability of exlstlng AGTs, ● Yields modest AGT technology and service improvements.

(le., DPM) ● Lowest level of technological risk ● Risk of Boeing and Otis leaving program.

● Allows time for other studies, ● Increasing technology gap with foreign systems.

● Defers major technological commitments,

● Benefits many suppliers and technologies.

● Incremental Innovation widely supported,

● Does not outpace market for urban AGTs.

● Least costly in short run.

2. Emphasize critical ● New subsystems immediately deployable, ● Slow option for achieving deployable technologies.

subsystems development c Low technological risk, ● Major subsystems require a systems environment for engineering

● Allows time for other studies. verlflcatlon

● Defers major technological commitments, ● Risk of Boeing and Otis Ieawng program,

● Benefits other suppllers,

● Supports Incremental Innovation.

● Low short-run costs,

● Can also Include Option 1,

3 Validate subsystems in ● Avoids costs of full prototypes. ● Involves a technological commitment,

a systems environment ● Provides a realistlc environment for subsystems ● Forecloses other technologies,

verlflcatlon

● Provides cost estimates.

● Malntalns supplier interest (Boeing and Otis),

● Includes Option 2, can Include Option 1.

4. Develop and validate ● Fastest option to achieve program goals. ● Highest technological risk,

technology on prototype ● Maintains continuity and stability of program, ● Forecloses other technologies,

systems ● Maintains suppller interest (Boeing and Otis), ● Marketabdity unsure,

● Includes OptIons 2 and 3; can Include OptIon 1. ● Highest cost In short run.

● Reduces technology gap with foreign systems

SOURCE OTA staff analysls

Number of Prototypes

Competition would create incentives to encourage economy and austerity in both system design and development and satisfy local requirements for

competitive bidding.

Money spent on the development of alternative systems can be relatively

inexpensive insurance against the possibility of picking an inferior alter=

native.

A subsidiary question related to Options 3

and 4 concerns the number of prototype systems

to be funded at this time should either of these

options be selected. The OTA findings in this

regard are derived from the conceptual stance

outlined in chapter 111 that AGRT is but one

potential configuration within a multidimensional option space. Other developmental programs within UMTA are more broadly based.

The AGTT program, for example, is working

on a number of problems (i. e., safety and

security, cold-weather operation, guideway

configuration) with wide applicability to automated systems, both existing and advanced.

The DPM program, designed to demonstrate

off-the-shelf automated guideway technologies,

is open to a wide variety of offerings including

various size vehicles, monorails, and suspended

technologies.
— —

Ch. Vlll—Options for Automated Guideway Transit Research and Development ● 55

Evaluation of R&D program options should

consider the recommendations of the Commission on Government Procurement and the

guidelines on procurement subsequently issued

by the Office of Management and Budget as

spelled out in Circular A-109. The essence of

this policy is to maintain competition between

similar or differing designs as long as maintenance of such competition is economically feasible. Some of the principal arguments in favor of

concepts, particularly with respect to command

and control, suspension, and propulsion systems. The cost of preserving these options, at

least through the technology verification stage,

is small in comparison with the cost of a single

deployment. The retention of multiple suppliers

is also consistent with Federal and local procurement requirements which favor a competitive

bidding process. Critics of this approach claim

UMTA is paying twice to solve the same misretaining competition are listed in table 7. sion and that ‘other

There is a substantial degree of technological preaches to the urban

diversity offered by the three AGRT system also be considered.

missions or other aptransit dilemma should

Table 7.–Principal Arguments in Favor of Retaining Competition

Arguments In favor

of competition Tradttlonal procurement process Competltwe acquisition process

Provides flexibility for —

There IS no hedge against tallure

dealing with technological

uncertainty

Allows for greater Innovation

Provides for greater control

over costs

Allows for performance as

as well as price

comparisons

Since Government has made the design declslons about the

best approach to meet a need, private sector contractors

compete for the development and production of a ‘ ‘required

system’ and do not offer their own best solutions at thew

lowest costs. Consequently, there IS Ilmlted opportunity for

contractor Innovation and technical competition, contractors

find it easier to promise the customer what he wants, rather

than to Innovate and demonstrate new products

Large firms tend to acquire a technical base based on their

experience with successful products and their customers’

tastes Although smaller firms are likely to have more mltlatwe and to be more Innovative, they are usually discouraged

from competing because the competition begins late In the

process, when the costs are highest

With only a single organized effort underway to meet a need,

system performance and scheduling sllppages have to be

accommodated by additional funding. As a result of this

monopoly sltuatlon, costly and burdensome controls and

regulations must be applled to a greater extent than In competitive procurement to prowde public accountability.

There are no standards to measure the efficiency of a single

undertaking and no competition to ald In choosing the best

system. Source selections have depended less on technical

differences between proposals and more on contractor predicted costs at a time of great technical uncertainty about the

chosen system In relying on these cost predictions for Inltlal

system procurement, Insufficlent weight has been given to

system performance and to the costs that are eventually to

be paid for operating, supporting, and maintaining the system

Money spent on the development of alternative systems can

be relatively inexpensive Insurance against the posslblllty

that a premature choice of one approach may later prove to

be a poor and costly one

Competltlon would reinstate a challenge to Industry to use a

wider span of technologies for system solutions that are of

lower cost and simpler design

Competition would create Incentwes to encourage economy

and austerity In both system design and development

Competitve exploration of technical approaches should produce dlstlngulshably different system performance characteristics Technical differences would then become more

Important crlterla for choosing systems and contractors

than In the past when differences mainly Involved design

detail and an uncertain cost

SOURCE Report of /he CommIssIorI on Government Procurement VOI 2 1972
56 ● Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

Magnetic Levitation Technology

At this early stage in the development cycle there is no sound technical

basis for discontinuing work or providing any promising technology with

significantly less funding. Magnetic levitation is a particularly promising option because of its low noise and high reliability potential.

The suspended Romag technology (see figure ● through the use of 1inear induction motors

3), originally developed by Rohr, and licensed and magnetic levitation, the propulsion

to Boeing in 1978, has several features of par- and suspension systems have no moving

ticular merit: parts and hence, more reliable operating

●

●

it is believed more suitable for winter characteristics.

operations; Although its development is currently receiving

the guideway shape is closer to a structural less funding than the other two AGRT technoloptimum, reducing costs and guideway ob- ogies, Romag exhibits highly desirable charactrusiveness; and teristics as an alternative.

Funding

The program proposed by the Department of

Transportation in early 1978 raised the total

cost of the AGRT development program to $111

million (see table 2) which included the estimated effect of inflation through to an anticipated completion date in early 1984. This plan

would spend $40 million each on the Boeing

(wheeled) and Otis (air cushion) technologies

with $5 million being devoted to Romag. This

level of effort corresponds to Option 4. According to data from UMTA, $14 million of the

$111 million had been spent through April 1979.

Early in 1979 UMTA scaled down these plans,

Contracts recently negotiated with Boeing and

Otis provide approximately $25 million to each

contractor for further work on the wheeledvehicle and air-cushioned systems. Boeing will

also receive $9 million to continue development

of magnetic levitation technology. Cost of the

revised plan including prior expenditures totals

$73 million. A decision to develop production

prototypes has been deferred.

Possible funding levels for Options 1, 2, or 3

(table 8) acknowledge that the optimum development course to advanced AGT systems is not

clear at this time and that technological options

should be kept open as long as possible. Using a

recent grant to upgrade Airtrans as a guide, the

first option could entail costs of up to $5 million

to $7 million per technology. As a guide to costs

Table 8.–Estimated Funding Levels for Advanced AGT Options

Near-term program

OptIon cost (millions)

1 Emphasize upgrad!ng of exlstlng AGT technology $15-30”

2 Emphasize crltlcal subsystems development $20-40”

3 Validate subsystems In a system environment $60-80”

4, Develop and valldate technology on prototype

systems (UMTAFY 1979 proposal) $97

“OTA siafl estimates

SOURCE Olflce of technology Assessment

for Option 2, UMTA proposes to spend $13

million on engineering alone for the Boeing

(wheeled) and Otis (air cushion) technologies,

were complete prototypes to be planned for at

this time (table 3). Additional manufacturers

could be included adding to costs or some synergism introduced among the AGRT technologies

to reduce costs.

Creation of a limited systems environment

(Option 3) would have to include most of the

full-system engineering costs, but only a portion

of the fabrication costs. Savings could thus

amount to up to $8 million to $10 million per

technology. Assuming the two Boeing technologies would use a common command and control system, the requirements for Option 3

would be on the order of $60 million to $80 million.

Table 8 shows $97 million as the cost-to-complete of Option 4, based on the current plan of
Ch V///— Options for Automated Guideway Transit Research and Developmenf . 57

two full prototypes, and about $5 million for for system validation so that additional reRomag. It is possible, however, to reduce the sources could be diverted to accelerate the deamount of prototype guideway and structures velopment of magnetic levitation technology.

Goods Movement

A study should be undertaken to determine the extent to which

automated systems could be used to transport some kinds of goods in urban

areas, thus reducing road congestion and spreading the cost of automated

guideway system construction.

Joint use of transportation facilities to move

both people and goods is a historic practice, permitting the required capital investment to be

spread over a greater number of users. The predominance of trucks for urban goods movement

is a result of the ubiquity of the highway system, the ability of users to operate trucks sized

to their specific needs, and the control of the industry over the timing of shipments.

The possibility that an automated system

could be used for shipment t~f a substantial portion of goods in urban areas deserves consideration. Not all commodities could realistically be

served. The most likely applications would be

for goods moving in large volume to or from

common supply or collection points such as

mail or waste. Retail outlets might be included if

enough of them are close enough to guideways

 credit OTA 

An AGRT system capable of carrying goods as well as people could reduce costs
58 . Impact of Advanced Group Rapid Transit Technology

to provide short inexpensive sidings. In any ur- Unresolved issue:

ban application the type and volume of goodshandling potential will depend on the character- . the potential markets that could use AGT

facilities for goods movement. istics of the local economy and the locations of

the system.

Nonautomated Guideway Transit Options

AGRT is but one option to improve urban

transportation. Its development should not preclude continuing investigations into a number of ●

other promising areas for the future:

●

●

●

transportation systems management for

better utilization of existing passenger vehi- ●

cles and rights-of-way;

dual-mode buses or cars that can operate in ●

mixed traffic under manual control and in

an automated mode on a guideway;

automated roadways to free the motorist of

the responsibilities of vehicle control and to

Summary

provide safer operation free of human error

and erratic behavior;

personal rapid transit, an automated guideway mode (see figure 2) with separate small

vehicles for each traveler or group of persons traveling together;

telecommunications research to find ways

to reduce the need to travel; and

alternative land use policies which, in the

long run, could affect the need to travel, the

length of travel, and the mode of travel by

changing the relative proximities and densities of activity centers.

AGRT is being developed as an additional

technology to help cities meet their needs for

public transportation. As an alternative to

AGRT, Option 1 would upgrade and deploy existing automated guideway technologies for urban use in the near term. The second option

would continue further studies while also beginning work on those subsystems that would ultimately be required for an advanced AGT technology. The third option would add to the second by providing a realistic systems environment in which to test these subsystems in integrated operations. The fourth option, representing essentially the program proposed by

UMTA in 1978 and subsequently revised would

proceed directly with the construction and testing of prototype systems leading to a production-ready technology by the mid-1980’s.

This assessment has identified several critical

information gaps. The selection of one or more

of the first three options would allow more time

for analysis of these issues, which could impact

many of the design decisions for advanced automated guideway systems. There is also a need to

determine further what significant differences

exist among the AGRT technologies. For this

reason and for reasons of system competition it

would seem desirable that development should

continue on all technologies until better information becomes available on which to base

the selection of preferred alternatives.

o