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Filed 2/28/13 P. v. Archuleta CA4/2 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION TWO 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

RUBEN ARCHULETA, 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 E054427 

 (Super.Ct.No. FWV1002489) 

 OPINION 

 APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Sachs, 

Judge. Affirmed. 

 Jennifer L. Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Lilia E. 

Garcia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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I 

INTRODUCTION1

Defendant Ruben Archuleta participated in selling heroin to two undercover police 

officers in September and October 2010. A jury convicted him of two counts of violating 

Health and Safety Code section 11352, subdivision (a). The trial court found true five 

prior strike allegations and three prior prison term allegations. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 

667.5, subd. (b), and 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) 

Pursuant to the Three Strikes law, the trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years 

to life on count 1. On the other count and allegations, the court sentenced defendant to 

consecutive terms totaling four years four months. 

On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by not granting 

defendant’s Romero2 motion and by refusing to order disclosure of juror information. 

Defendant concedes his argument about presentence custody credit was decided in 

People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314 and People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896 

although he continues to raise the issue to preserve it for federal review. We reject 

defendant’s other contentions and affirm the judgment. 

 1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise. 

2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). 
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II 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

On September 8, 2010, Ontario Police Officers Maynor Arana and Jorge Galvez, 

working undercover, bought drugs from Alfred Mandujano who offered to sell them 

heroin and provided them with a telephone number. 

A. Count 1

On September 17, 2010, Arana called Mandujano and said he wanted $20 worth of 

“negra,” slang for heroin. Mandujano said to meet him at 613 North Holmes in Ontario. 

Arana and Galvez dressed in plain clothes and drove an unmarked police car to the 

address Mandujano had given them. Mandujano was waiting outside when they arrived. 

Arana walked up to Mandujano and said he wanted $20 worth of heroin. Mandujano said 

he did not have any heroin with him but he would call a friend to deliver some to the 

house. Mandujano made a phone call and said his friend would be there shortly. Five to 

10 minutes later, defendant arrived on a bicycle. 

Arana gave Mandujano $20, which he handed to defendant, who gave Mandujano 

two balloons and left on his bike. The officers took the balloons back to the police 

department. Lab analysis determined the substances recovered weighed 0.07 grams and 

0.13 grams and contained heroin. 
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B. Count 2 

On October 8, 2010, Arana called Mandujano again and asked for $80 worth of 

heroin. Mandujano told Arana to drive to his house and he would call a friend to have 

him deliver the drugs. Arana and Galvez drove to the house and Galvez got out of the car 

with Arana. Mandujano was standing in the side yard and Arana asked for $80 worth of 

heroin. Mandujano said he was going to make a call and have his friend bring it to the 

house. Defendant arrived on a bicycle. Mandujano handed defendant the money and 

defendant put his hand in his mouth and spit out eight balloons, giving them to Arana. 

There were seven orange balloons and one red balloon. Arana gave Mandujano the red 

balloon at his request. 

Galvaz and Arana took seven balloons back to the police station. The brown 

substance inside two of the balloons weighed 0.12 grams and 0.10 grams and contained 

heroin. 

Thirty to forty-five minutes after the transaction, Officer Darryl Lauritzen arrested 

defendant about a half a mile from 613 North Holmes. Defendant had $80 in cash. The 

serial numbers on the money matched the $80 Arana used in the narcotics transaction. 

Lauritzen checked the box on the booking form indicating defendant appeared extremely 

intoxicated. 

III 

ROMERO MOTION 

Defendant had five strike priors, four from a case in 1982 and a fifth from a 1990 

case. In the current case, defendant was convicted of selling heroin worth $100 to 
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undercover police officers, a nonviolent, non-serious offense. After refusing to strike the 

prior convictions, the court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life plus a consecutive 

term of four years four months. 

Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion because defendant falls 

outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law and the court should have stricken four of 

defendant’s strikes and sentenced him as a second strike offender. Defendant argues the 

current convictions were not serious or violent, were clearly a result of his lifetime 

addiction to drugs, and occurred when defendant was no longer on parole. Defendant 

also asserts his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the 

circumstances of this case.3

A. Standard of Review 

The Three Strikes law requires a court to “consider whether, in light of the nature 

and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony 

convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the 

defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence 

should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious 

and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) In addition to 

the factors enumerated in Williams, discretion is limited by a requirement that a dismissal 

be in the furtherance of justice. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) The interests of 

 3 As discussed in the parties’ supplemental briefing, defendant’s two convictions 

for attempted murder mean he may not be eligible for resentencing under Proposition 36, 

or the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, section 1170.126. 
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justice require consideration of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the interests 

of society. The reasons for a dismissal must be such as would motivate a reasonable 

judge. (Romero, at pp. 530-531.) 

An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a Romero motion for an 

abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.) The abuse of 

discretion standard is “deferential,” but “not empty.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 

162.) It asks whether the ruling in question “‘falls outside the bounds of reason’” under 

the applicable law and the relevant facts. (Ibid.; People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 

503.) When the balance of the evidence favors the defendant, “‘a trial court not only may 

but should exercise the powers granted to him by the Legislature and grant a dismissal in 

the interests of justice.’” (Carmony, at p. 375.) Only where the relevant factors 

manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no reasonable minds could differ 

does the failure to strike constitutes an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 378.) 

B. Defendant’s History 

Defendant has rotated in and out of prison for 30 years. In 1982, defendant 

pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery and two counts of attempted murder for a total 

sentence of 10 years. Defendant was paroled in November 1988. Two years later, in 

October 1990, he pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and admitted that he 

personally inflicted great bodily injury and was sent to prison for three years and paroled 

in June 1992. In March 1995, defendant’s parole was revoked and he was returned to 

prison to finish his term until he was discharged in November 1995. In May 1998, 

defendant pleaded guilty to section 273.5 and was sentenced to eight years in prison and 
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paroled in May 2004. Defendant violated parole three times but was discharged from 

parole in July 2009. He committed the current offenses in September and October 2010. 

C. The Romero Motion 

Defense counsel moved to dismiss defendant’s strike priors pursuant to section 

1385 and Romero. Defense counsel argued that defendant fell outside the spirit of the 

Three Strikes law because of the minor nature of the current offenses; the fact that the 

four 1982 convictions arose out of a single case when he was 19 or 20 years old; his 

relatively mature age of 47, making him less likely to return to violence; his lifetime 

struggle with drugs; and the alternative of a lengthy sentence which would also punish 

defendant for his prior offenses and his current offenses. Defendant was also a caretaker 

for his diabetic and disabled mother, grocery shopping, paying bills, and obtaining her 

medication. Defendant had played baseball in his youth, attended community college, 

and worked at a trucking company. Defendant was enrolled in a substance abuse 

program from October 2009 through March 2010, shortly before the underlying crime. 

The prosecutor countered that defendant should be sentenced as a third strike 

offender because of his criminal history and recidivism. According to the prosecution, 

“[M]any of Defendant’s crimes are those of moral turpitude, he has shown a history of 

being a violent criminal who is a danger to society. This is precisely the type of recidivist 

criminal the Three-Strike laws is [sic] meant to punish.” 

The court noted defendant’s evidence indicating that he had sought treatment for 

his drug abuse between October 2009 and February 2010. The court also reviewed 

defendant’s prior convictions. In denying defendant’s Romero motion, the court 
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observed that “in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felony and prior 

felony convictions and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, that 

the defendant may not be deemed outside the scheme or spirit, in whole or in part.” The 

court granted defendant’s request to strike defendant’s priors as to count 2 only but did 

not strike any of the priors related to count 1. In its decision, the court noted that the 

underlying crime was not serious or violent. The court noted that the only victim of the 

case was the State of California. While recognizing that defendant would not be eligible 

for parole until age 72, the court expressed concern that defendant had been imprisoned 

for 22 of the past 28 years. On count 1, the court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life. 

On count 2, defendant was sentenced to a consecutive term of four years four months for 

the three prison term priors found true. 

D. Analysis 

Defendant relies on several cases to argue the trial court abused its discretion. In 

Williams, the California Supreme found an abuse of discretion in dismissing strike priors 

because the defendant’s current conviction was his fourth recent driving under the 

influence conviction and he had numerous prior convictions of crimes which involved 

actual violence. (People v. Williams, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 164.) 

In contrast to Williams, the California Supreme Court in Garcia, found the trial 

court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the defendant’s prior serious felony 

strikes in the interest of justice because the defendant’s prior convictions all arose from a 

single period of aberrant behavior, he cooperated with police, his crimes were related to 

drug addiction, and his criminal history did not include any actual violence. 
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Cumulatively, these circumstances indicated the defendant could be deemed outside the 

spirit of the Three Strikes law, at least “in part.” (People v. Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at 

p. 503.) 

In People v. Bishop (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1245, the Court of Appeal found that 

when a present crime is minor and the past offenses are remote “it presents the trial court 

with an opportunity to evaluate factors such as how long the state maintains an interest in 

keeping the defendant as a public charge and after what period of incarceration he is no 

longer likely to offend again.” (Id. at pp. 1250-1251.) 

Finally, in People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, the trial court cited the 

defendant’s advanced age and the fact that the violent felony conduct was out of 

character for the defendant as reasons for striking the strike. (Id. at p. 334.) The Court of 

Appeal found that the trial court had abused its discretion for a defendant with a threeyear-old prior violent conviction and the defendant appropriately came within the Three 

Strikes regime, causing his sentence to be doubled as a second strike. (Id. at pp. 341, 

343, 347.) 

In this case, we acknowledge that the sale of $100 worth of heroin to undercover 

officers is a nonviolent, non-serious, victimless crime and, with his current sentence of 29 

years to life, defendant may be at least 70 years old before he is eligible for parole. Even 

if the trial court had granted defendant’s Romero motion and sentenced him as a second 

striker, he would still be facing a potential sentence of more than 15 years. Additionally, 

the record shows a history of heroin addiction and that defendant was likely selling 

heroin to support himself and his mother. 
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Nevertheless we cannot conclude the relevant factors manifestly support striking 

defendant’s strike priors and sentencing him as a second strike offender. (People v. 

Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) The remoteness of defendant’s 1982 offenses is 

offset by defendant leading a continuous life of crime for almost 30 years. (People v. 

Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813.) Because defendant is a career criminal, his 

age should not constitute a mitigating factor. Nor is defendant’s sentence of 29 years to 

life a violation of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment or the 

Fourteenth Amendment. (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11; Lockyear v. Andrade

(2003) 538 U.S. 63.) 

Based on defendant’s recidivism and likely future conduct, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s Romero motion as to count 1 The trial court’s 

decision was not so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable judge could agree with it. 

(Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530; People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) 

IV 

DISCLOSURE OF JUROR INFORMATION 

 Defendant contends that because potential juror misconduct or witness tampering 

occurred, additional investigation was necessary and the trial court’s refusal to find that 

defendant established good cause for disclosure of juror information violated his rights to 

a fair trial and impartial jury under the federal and state Constitutions. 

A. Relevant Background 

After the verdict, the jury foreperson revealed that, during the trial, she saw the 

investigating officer, Detective Jimenez, seated next to the prosecutor at counsel table, 
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coaching the testifying witness, Corporal Arana by mouthing the word “no.” Defense 

counsel sought the foreperson’s information to get more details as to what the juror had 

observed. The court requested a transcript of Arana’s testimony for review. 

The court reviewed the defense motion to unseal the information (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 237), the prosecution’s opposition, and the transcript of Arana’s testimony, highlighting 

each question to which Arana responded “no.” Defense counsel argued that, because the 

case against defendant was based on the credibility of the various Ontario police officers 

involved in the controlled buy, the veracity of the witnesses was the cornerstone of the 

case against defendant. Defense counsel argued further that juror misconduct had 

occurred when the foreperson failed to come forward to report the conduct between the 

police officers during Arana’s testimony. If the foreperson had told the court about her 

observations, defense counsel could have made a motion for a mistrial and the issue 

could have been addressed when all the parties were still available. The prosecutor 

argued there was no juror misconduct as the foreperson was under no obligation to 

disclose what she had observed. 

The court commented that the jurors had been instructed to interpret any behavior 

by a witness and factor it into their analysis of credibility. (CALCRIM Nos. 105 and 

226.) The court asked whether it was accurate that the foreperson had indicated she saw 

the communication, considered it, and it did not change her mind. The prosecutor 

confirmed that was her recollection of the juror’s statements and defense counsel could 

not remember. The court also observed that defense counsel had argued in closing that 

the testifying officers were not credible. Thus, in finding defendant guilty, the jury must 
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have found the officers to be credible and the jury had been polled without expressing 

any reservations. The court found that release of the juror information was not warranted 

and further inquiry amounted to a “fishing expedition” which did not outweigh the strong 

public interest in juror privacy. The court reviewed the transcript of Arana’s testimony 

and determined that every time he answered “no” it was not to a question that would have 

had any significant effect on the outcome of the case. The court also denied defendant’s 

subsequent motion for new trial. 

B. Application of Applicable Law 

To investigate the fairness and impartiality of a jury, after a verdict, disclosure of 

juror information is governed by sections 206 and 237 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 

Subdivision (g) of Code of Civil Procedure section 206 permits a defendant or his 

attorney to petition the court for access to juror information “for the purpose of 

developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose.” (People v. Granish

(1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1125.) 

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 237, subdivision (a)(1), the names of 

jurors are to be made available to the public, unless the court determines that a 

“compelling interest” requires the information be kept confidential. (People v Jefflo

(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1320.) Pursuant to subdivision (b) of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 237, a hearing on a request for juror information, such as addresses and 

telephone numbers, shall be held pursuant to the procedures set forth in subdivisions (c) 

and (d) of section 237 if the requesting party makes a prima facie showing of good cause 

for disclosure and the record does not establish a “compelling interest” against disclosure. 
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(Jefflo, at p. 1320; People v. Granish, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1125.) A defendant in 

a criminal case is entitled to jurors’ addresses and telephone numbers “if the defendant 

sets forth a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct 

occurred, that diligent efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and 

that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with adequate information to 

rule on a motion for new trial.” (People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541, 551-552.) 

If the court does not order a hearing, the court is required to state, in a minute 

order, its reasons for not ordering a hearing and to make express findings either of the 

lack of a prima facie showing of good cause or the existence of a compelling reason 

against disclosure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 237, subd. (b).) These statutory provisions 

require the court to balance the jurors’ interest in privacy against the “‘strong public 

interest in the ascertainment of the truth in judicial proceedings.’” (People v. Rhodes, 

supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at p. 549; People v. Jefflo, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1321, fn. 8; 

People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 990; People v. Granish, supra, 41 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1126, People v. Rhodes, supra, 212 Cal.App.3d at pp. 549-550.) Denial 

of a petition filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 237 is reviewed under the 

abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 317.) 

Defendant contends he deserved to have a hearing to establish what exactly the 

foreperson saw and how she incorporated her observations into the jury’s deliberations. 

In failing to find good cause and holding a hearing to investigate, thereby denying 

defendant’s request for the juror information on the prejudicial impact of a claim of juror 

misconduct that was not yet ripe, the court abused its discretion. 
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Here, however, the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied the 

defense motion to disclose the jurors’ information because the trial court made an express 

finding of the lack of a prima facie showing of good cause. The trial court determined 

that the foreman did not share her observations with the other jurors and there was no 

indication whatsoever that it affected her decision or the verdict. Furthermore, additional 

investigation would have constituted a “fishing expedition” invading juror privacy. 

Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 

defense motion for disclosure. 

V 

DISPOSITION 

 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defense motion for 

disclosure of juror information or in denying defendant’s Romero motion. We affirm the 

judgment. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS 

CODRINGTON 

 J. 

We concur: 

HOLLENHORST 

 Acting P. J. 

McKINSTER 

 J.