RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2017 TO BE PUBLISHED 

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2016-SC-000411-D(}

KENTUCKY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE COMMISSION


### V. ON REVIEW FROM COURT OFAPPEALS CASE NO. 2014-CA-001023 JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT NO. 14-CI-000854
NORMAN WILSON AND UNIVERSAL LINEN, LLC

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE VENTERS REVERSING APPELLANT

APPELLEES

The Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC) appeals from a decision ofthe Court ofAppeals which concluded that Appellee Norman Wilson had substantially complied with the verification requirement ofKRS 341.450(1) when he filed a complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court seeking judicial review ofan adverse decision ofKUIC. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed Wilson's complaint based upon the decision ofthis Court in 

### Taylor v. Kentucky UnemploymentInsurance Commission, 382 S.W.3d 826 (Ky. 2012). The Court ofAppeals reversed the circuit court, citing the substantial compliance doctrine implicitin 

### Shamrock Coal Co. 

### v. Taylor, 697 S.W.2d 952(Ky. App. 1985). We granted discretionaryreview to examine the continuing viability of

### Shamrockin light ofour decision in 

### Taylor.I
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND After losing hisjob, Wilson applied for unemployment compensation. When he received an unfavorable ruling from the Kl1IC, he exercised his statutoxyright of judicialreview byfiling a complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 341.450(1). As relevant to ourreview, KRS 341.450(1) provides that a party aggrieved by a final decision ofthe KUIC may obtain judicialreview ofthat decision "by filing a complaint against the commission in the [circuit court ofthe appropriate county]
.... The 

### complaint
. .. shall be verified by the

### plaintiff orhis attorney." (Emphasis added.) Wilson's attorney signed the complaint and Wilson signed an attached "verification" page which stated: "I, Norman Wilson, have read in its entirety the foregoing plea[ding], and to the best ofmyknowledge the information contained therein is truthful and accurate." Neither Wilson's signature, nor the signature ofhis attorney, was notarized or otherwise subscribed under oath before an officer authorized to administer oaths.

1This case squarelypresents the question that evaded reviewin Spears v. Goodwine, 490 S.W:3d 347,352 (Ky. 2016). Spears came to this Court as an appeal of a writ ofprohibition grantedby the Court ofAppeals. Theunderlying casepresented the question ofwhether substantial compliance would intervene to save an unverified complaint forjudicialreview ofa decision ofa public retirement fund board. We resolved the issuepurelyupon conventional writ analysis and didnot address the underlyingissue ofsubstantial compliance. ·

2Citing 

### Taylor, the circuit court concluded that Wilson's complaint lacked the verification expresslyrequired by KRS 341.450(1). Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the action, reasoning that the unverified complaint failed to vest that courtwith the authority to adjudicate the case. On appeal, however, the Court ofAppeals found 

### Shamrockto be a more fitting precedent. 

### Shamrock holds that a complaint which exhibits •a clear attempt at verification" is sufficiently compliant with KRS 341.450(1) to authorizejudicial review. 697 S.W.2d at 953. Thus, the Court ofAppeals reversed the trial court's decision and reinstated Wilson's claim.
II. ANALYSIS In 

### Taylor, we reaffirmed the "firmly rooted concept oflaw in this state that the courts have nojurisdiction over an appeal from an administrative agency action unless every statutoryprecondition is satisfied." 382 S.W.3d at 831.2 As a general rule, "[t]here is no appeal to the courts from an action ofan administrative agency as a matter ofright. When grace to appeal is granted by statute, a strict compliance with its terms is required." 

### Board of Adjustments of City of Richmond v. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1978) (citations omitted). Statutorypreconditions for vesting courts with the authority to engage in judicialreview cannot be satisfied by substantial compliance. 

### See City 

### of

2 We acknowledge that the use oftheword "jurisdiction" in this contextis confusing. We clarified in 

### Spears that "[t]he deficiency [ofan unverified complaint seekingjudicialreview ofan administrative order] has no effect on the.circuit court's subjectmatterjurisdiction. 490 S.W.3d at 352. However, such deficiency leaves the "court withoutjurisdiction ofthe particular case." Id. (citation omitted).

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### Devondale v. Stallings, 795 S.W.2d 954,957 (Ky. 1990) ("It is only [when defects are nonjurisdictional in nature] that a discussion ofsubstantial compliance
... is appropriate."). Consequently, at least with respect to the jurisdictional requirements for invokingjudicialreview ofan administrative agency ruling, we have no substantial compliance exception to a statute which grants the right to appeal. 

### See Kentucky UnemploymentInsurance Commission
v. Carter, 689 S.W.2d 360, 361-362 (Ky. 1985). We also noted in 

### Taylor a significantline ofcases holding that the verification requirement ofKRS 341:450(1) requires strict compliance, and that the attorney's signature alone on the petition could not be regarded as satisfyingthe statutory requirement for verification. We believe 

### [Monyhan, 3 

### Pickhart,4 Fisher,s and Carter,6relied upon by 

### Fishe,j accurately state the rule in the case before us, and thus we hold that a properly verified complaint is required to invoke circuit courtjurisdiction under KRS 341.450(1), and, further, that a CR 11 signature bythe claimant's attorney is insufficient to comply with the verification requirements ofthe statute. 382 S.W.3d at 830. The Court ofAppeals' decision in 

### Shamrock is plainly at odds with the principle ofstrict compliance. 

### Shamrock, perhaps artfully, evades the foregoing

3 Monyhan v. Kentucky UnemploymentInsurance Commission, 709 S.W.2d 837 (Ky. App. 1986).
4 Pickhart v. U.S. Post Office, 664 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. App. 1983).
s Fi.sher v. Kentucky.UnemploymentInsurance Commission, 880 S.W.2d.891 (Ky. App. 1994).
6 Kentucky UnemploymentInsurance·commission v. Carter, 689 S.W.2d 360 (Ky. 1985). 4principles by avoiding the term "substantial compliance." Instead, it holds that the defective complaint was in "sufficient compliance" with KRS 341.450(1) because it exhibited "a clear attempt atverification." 697 S.W.2d at 953. 

### Shamrock states that the pleadingin question contained "no more than a technical defect" and reaches the curious conclusion that the complaint was "verified, though not under oath." Id. By definition, "verification" occurs 

### onlywhen the signatory is "under oath." A statement not made under oath cannot be a "verified statement." As
we said in 

### Taylor, citing 

### Black'sLawDictionary and 3 Am. Jur. 2d

### Affidavits § 8, "verification" means "aformal declaration made in the presence ofan authorized officer, such as a notary public, bywhich one swears to the truth of the statements in the document." 382 S.W.3d at 834. For whatever reason, the legislature determined that a complaintfiled to obtainjudicial review ofa KUIC decision "shall

### be verified by the plaintiffor his attorney." (Emphasis added.) A fundamental rule ofstatutory construction commands that "effect must be given, 

### ifpossibleo;, to every word, clause, and sentence ofa statute." 

### Hampton v. Commonwealth, 78 S.W.2d 748,750 (Ky. 1934) (citations omitted). Thejudiciaryis constrained to "giv[e] th.e words their plain and ordinary meaning," and to "[deduce] the intent ofthe Legislature
... from the language itused, when it is plain and unambiguous." 

### Pearce v. University of Louisville, 448 S.W.3d 746, 749 (Ky. 2014) (citations omitted). We cannot disregard the words ofthe statute simply because we think the

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### resulting application is harsh or we think the statute would be better without them.In context with the rest ofthe statute, the meaning of"verified" is plain and unambiguous; we must give effect to that word. Evezy pleadingfiled in the courts mustbe "signed" bythe party's attorney, orbythe partyhimselfifhe has no attorney. CR 11. To construe the verification requirement ofKRS 341.450(1) as being satisfied by the unsworn signature ofa party or his attorney is tantamountto simply reading the word "verified" out ofthe statute. 

### Shamrock's conclusion that a signed butunsworn petition was "a clear attempt at verification" and thus in "sufficient compliance" with KRS 341.450(1) is untenable. In 

### Taylor, we noted thatunlike the claimantin 

### Shamrock, the claimant in 

### Taylorhad made "no effort at verification at all" and did not even attain the
measure of"sufficient compliance" tolerated by the court in 

### Shamrock. "If 

### Shamrock Coal is ourguide for substantial compliance, Taylor falls short of that mark." 382 S.W:3d at 833. By side-stepping the question of 

### Shamrock's continuingviability, we left the door open for its application by the Court of Appeals in this case. Consequently, the Court ofAppeals concluded that the
unsworn signature on the verification page ofWilson's complaint qualified as the kind of"clear attempt atverification" tolerated under 

### Shamrock's concept of "sufficient compliance." 

### Taylordistinguished, but did not overrule, 

### Shamrock. We correct that omission now. 

### Shamrockwas wrongly decided and is hereby ovt;rruled. A complaint subscribed with an unsworn signature lacking 6attestation before a notary or another officer authorized to administer oaths is merely a signed pleading sufficient for CR 11; but, it is not a verified complaint
as required by KRS 341.450(1). Turning backnow to the particularfacts ofthe case before us, the only question remaining is whetherWilson's signed, but unsworn, declaration ofthe truthfulness ofthe complaint complies with KRS 341.450(l)'s verification requirement. 

### Taylorresolved that a complaint 

### certified by the attorney does not meet the statutoryqualification ofbeing "verified." We distinguished "certification" and "verification" in 

### Taylor. "Verification" is "a formal declaration made in the presence ofan authorized officer, such as a notary public, by which one swears to the truth ofthe statements in the document' but "[c]ertification ii;; one's personal affirmation ofbeliefin the truthfulness ofwhat is stated in the document." 382 S.W.3d at 834. The critical distinction between certification and verification is the latter's required formality ofbeingunder oath and attestation by a third party, the notary or other official. Wilson contends that he complied with the requirements ofKRS 341.450 because his pleading is styled as a "Verified Complaint," it is signed byhis attorney, who is an officer ofthe court, and unlike the complainant in

### ,Taylor, included a declaration ,that, to the best ofhis



## . . knowledge, the information in the complaint-is truthful. He reminds us that his signature (though unsworn) was his formal declaration made in the presence ofhis attorney, an officer ofthe court. We do not question the veracity ofWilson or his attorney. 7The Rules ofCivil Procedure promulgated by this Court do not generally require that a pleadingbe verified; we are accustomed to merely a certification ofthe pleading. Butwe have long acknowledged that since there is no basic right ofappeal to the courts from an action ofan administrative agency, the GeneralAssembly mayprescribe the preconditions under which such an appeal must be perfected. Flood, 581 S.W.2d 1. Consequently, given the absence ofan authorized officer's statement attesting thatWilson, or his attorney, swore under oath to the allegations ofthe complaint, we cannot regard it as "verified" within the meaning ofKRS 341.450(1).

. III, CONCLUSION Having overruled Shamrock and determined that the complaint filed herein fails to satisfy the verification requirement ofKRS 341.450(1), we
reverse the opinion ofthe Court ofAppeals and reinstate thejudgment ofthe Jefferson Circuit Court. All sitting. Minton, C.J.; Hughes, Keller, and VanMeter, JJ., concur.

·Wright, J., dissents by separate opinion in which Cunningham, J.,join WRIGHT, J., DISSENTING: I respectfully- dissent, as I believe Wilson's substantial compliance with the requirements was sufficient to satisfy the statutory mandates. Specifically, Wilson signed an attached verification page stating that he "read in its entirety the foregoing plea[ding], and to the best of [his] knowledge the information contained therein is truthful and accurate." All thatwas absent was the signature ofa notary. This oversight could have been

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### easily rectified and the merits could have then been properly addressed with no prejudice to the opposingparty. In Taylor v. Kentucky UnemploymentIns. Comm'n, 382 S.W.3d 826, 833 (Ky. 2012), there was·"no effort ofverification at all." Therefore, this Court distinguished Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. v. Taylor, 697 S.W.2d 952 (Ky. App. 1985) wherein the Court ofAppeals had held "a clear attempt at verification is sufficient." I would not overturn Sha.mi;-ock and would, instead, reaffirm its holding. Though his signature was not notarized, Wilson made a clear attempt atverification which substantially complied with the statutoryrequirements. This is a classic case ofform over substance and it does not serve the administration ofjustice. Keeping in mind that we are a Court ofJustice, it is better for us to resolve the issue on its merits rather than tossing it out because the motion was not verified. Therefore, I would affirm the Court of Appeals and send the matter back to the Jefferson Circuit Court, which should then address the merits ofWilson's claim. Otherwise, the result is simply unjust. The legal arena should not be a large-scale game of"gotcha" where people win or lose based on technicalities. Cunningham, J.,joins.

9COUNSELFORAPPELLANT: MariaT. Russell Patrick Byron Shirley
. Education and Workforce DevelopmentCabinet Office ofLegal and Legislative Services COUNSEL FORAPPELLEE NORMAN WILSON: Fernando Valdizan Alex White 617 BaxterAvenue Louisville, KY 40204 COUNSEL FORAPPELLEE UNIVERSAL LINEN, LLC: Gavin Weinrich Smith Greenberg & Perkins, PLLC

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