F PB98-917006

 NTSB/SIR-98/03

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20594

HIGHWAY SPECIAL INVESTIGATION 

REPORT

TRANSIT BUS SAFETY OVERSIGHT

7086
Abstract: After the National Transportation Safety Board conducted several accident

investigations involving transit buses (Normandy, Missouri; Cosmopolis, Washington; New

York, New York; and Nashville, Tennessee) and held a public hearing on transit bus safety in

March 1998, it found that substantial safety deficiencies and little Federal or State government

safety oversight existed within the transit bus industry. During the public hearing, participants

discussed transit agency self-regulation, the extent of Federal and State safety oversight, accident

data, pupil transportation, and driver selection and qualification.

The findings from the public hearing and from the four accident investigations formed the

basis for this special investigation report. The safety issues discussed in this report are the

Federal and State safety oversight of transit bus operations, adequacy of transit bus accident data

to identify potential safety issues, and safety program guidelines for transit operators.

As a result of its investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board issued

recommendations to the U.S. Department of Transportation, American Public Transit

Association, Community Transportation Association of America, and American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to

promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established

in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to

investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety

recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of

government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and

decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety

recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at http://www.ntsb.gov/. Other

information about available publications may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries Section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20594

(202) 314-6551

(800) 877-6799

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from:

National Technical Information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(703) 605-6000
Highway Special Investigation Report

Transit Bus Safety Oversight

NTSB/SIR-98/03

PB98-917006 National Transportation Safety Board

Notation 7086 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W.

Adopted: November 17, 1998 Washington, D.C. 20594

iii

Contents

Introduction....................................................................................................................... 1

Special Investigation ......................................................................................................... 3

Overview ............................................................................................................................. 3

Normandy, Missouri .................................................................................................... 3

Cosmopolis, Washington ............................................................................................. 3

New York City, New York .......................................................................................... 4

Nashville, Tennessee.................................................................................................... 5

Federal Oversight of Transit Bus Operations...................................................................... 6

Federal Highway Administration................................................................................. 6

Federal Transit Administration .................................................................................... 6

Transit Bus Accident Data ................................................................................................ 10

Federal Transit Administration .................................................................................. 10

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ...................................................... 11

Federal Highway Administration............................................................................... 12

Transit Bus Industry................................................................................................... 12

State Oversight of Transit Bus Operations........................................................................ 13

Other Safety Programs ...................................................................................................... 14

Conclusions...................................................................................................................... 16

Recommendations ........................................................................................................... 17

1

Introduction

Recently, the National Transportation Safety Board has investigated transit bus1

accidents in Normandy, Missouri; Cosmopolis, Washington; New York, New York; and

Nashville, Tennessee.2

 The Normandy, New York, and Nashville accidents exposed

various operational deficiencies such as unqualified drivers, drivers with hazardous

medical conditions, inadequate maintenance practices, and the operation of buses with

mechanical defects. The Cosmopolis accident revealed that certain laws and school

transportation safety operational practices are not applicable to transit operations.3

 Had

these deficiencies been found during other types of bus operations,4

 which fall under

Federal and State government safety regulations, sanctions could have been imposed,

such as assessing fines, taking the buses out of service, or suspending the company

operations. However, no such Federal regulations are in place for transit buses. Of the

four accident locations, only New York conducts some type of oversight of transit bus

operations.

As a result of the Normandy, Missouri, accident in which four pedestrians were

killed and three injured, the Safety Board held a public hearing on March 3 and 4, 1998,

to determine the extent of transit bus safety oversight. During the public hearing,

witnesses representing State and Federal government agencies testified, as well as

representatives from several transit agencies, member service organizations, and State

associations. The participants in the hearing discussed transit agency self-regulation, the

extent of Federal and State safety oversight, accident data, pupil transportation, and driver

selection and qualification.

The findings from the public hearing and from the accident investigations form

the basis for this special investigation report, which addresses the following safety issues:

• Federal and State safety oversight of transit bus operations,

 

1

Defined as a vehicle that operates primarily in local scheduled route service at lower speeds and

frequently loads and unloads passengers. These buses are manufactured with space and accommodations,

such as support bars or straps to use as hand-holds, for standing passengers. Transit bus operations are

generally publicly funded.

2

Highway Accident Summary Report – Transit Bus Collision with Pedestrians, Normandy, Missouri,

June 11, 1997 (NTSB/HAR-98/01/SUM); Highway Accident/Incident Summary Report – Collision with a

Pedestrian by a Utility Truck near Cosmopolis, Washington, November 26, 1996 (NTSB/HAR97/01/SUM); and National Transportation Safety Board Accident Investigations – Transit Bus Collision

with Pedestrian in New York City, New York, October 2, 1997 (HWY98FH019) and Transit Bus Collision

with Multiple Vehicles in Nashville, Tennessee, August 31, 1998 (HWY98FH042).

3

Laws that require traffic to stop for school buses that are loading or discharging students are not in

effect for transit buses. A transit bus is neither painted yellow, equipped with stop arms or bars, nor required

to have its driver ensure that children are safely out of the roadway after exiting the bus.

4

Interstate motor coach or charter buses.
Introduction 2

• adequacy of transit bus accident data to identify potential safety issues, and

• safety program guidelines for transit operators.

As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board makes safety recommendations to

the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), the American Public Transit Association

(APTA),5 the Community Transportation Association of America (CTAA),6 and the

American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO).7

 

5

A nonprofit organization that serves members of transit systems, rail systems, manufacturers,

universities, and State departments of transportation. APTA has over 1,100 members, 400 of which are

transit agencies that serve over 90 percent of the people who use public transportation in the United States

and Canada. These transit agencies make approximately 13.5 million passenger trips per day on the bus

system alone.

6

A national organization that represents rural transit agencies.

7

An advocate organization of multimodal and intermodal transportation that serves State departments

of transportation, the DOT, and Congress to ensure safe transportation, mobility, and economic prosperity.
3

Special Investigation

Overview

After the Safety Board conducted several accident investigations involving transit

buses and held a public hearing on transit bus safety in March 1998, it found that

substantial safety deficiencies and little Federal or State government safety oversight exist

within the transit bus industry. The Safety Board understands that the Federal

Government is spending $6.34 billion to subsidize the operation of transit agencies;8 yet,

its safety oversight of transit bus operations is essentially nonexistent. The public expects

that transit bus operations, whether publicly owned or subsidized, are safe. The following

accidents illustrate some of the deficiencies that contributed to the unsafe conditions at

these transit agencies. The report will then discuss Federal oversight, accident data, State

oversight, and, finally, industry safety programs.

Normandy, Missouri

In June 1997, a transit bus operated by a driver trainee encroached on the platform

at a park-and-ride facility in Normandy and struck seven pedestrians, killing four and

injuring three. The investigation of this accident highlighted the lack of effective safety

oversight in the transit bus industry. The Normandy accident investigation revealed

several operational deficiencies on the part of the transit bus agency, which included the

operating of buses by unqualified drivers, incomplete driver files, excessive driver hoursof-service, and inadequate maintenance practices that resulted in the routine operation of

buses with mechanical defects.

Cosmopolis, Washington

In November 1996, a Federal Transit Administration (FTA)-funded transit bus

was being used in Cosmopolis primarily for the transportation of school children. A 10-

year-old child had departed the northbound transit bus and was struck and killed by a

southbound utility truck. This type of student transportation operation is permitted using

FTA-funded equipment; although under Federal regulations, the bus cannot bear

resemblance to the typical yellow school bus. Because transit buses are without

distinguishable markings and safety equipment, such as the flashing lights and stop arm

signals of school buses, the truckdriver was not required to stop for a transit bus during

the loading and off-loading of students. This type of operation, while similar to that of a

regular school bus, cannot provide comparable safety standards for protection of the

 

8

Of this amount, over $2.5 billion is provided for transit bus operations.
Special Investigation 4

transported children. Considering that millions of school age children are transported by

transit buses each day, the Safety Board is concerned about the absence of safety

oversight, either by the State or the Federal governments, in this growing segment of

transit bus operations.

The Cosmopolis accident resulted in the issuance of Safety Recommendations

H-97-26 and -27 to the DOT and Safety Recommendations H-97-28 through -30,

respectively, to the National Association of State Directors of Pupil Transportation

Services, APTA, and the CTAA. In these recommendations, the Safety Board urged that

the organizations, working together, collect accident data involving school children riding

on transit buses and determine the most appropriate means to ensure that school children

riding on transit buses in tripper service9 are afforded an equivalent level of operational

safety as school children riding on school buses. Safety Recommendations H-97-26, -27,

and -30 are classified “Open-Acceptable Response,” based on these organizations’

acknowledgement that they are planning, pending availability of funds, to conduct a study

on the identification and collection of data involving school children riding transit buses.

Even though the Safety Board has not received direct responses to Safety

Recommendations H-97-28 and -29, the agencies receiving these recommendations were

included in the response to Safety Recommendation H-97-30. In November 1998, the

Safety Board sent follow-up letters to these organizations to elicit information on their

participation in the study.

New York City, New York

In October 1997, a New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) bus went out of

control in downtown New York City after the busdriver suffered a seizure. After

sideswiping another bus, the accident bus collided with four passenger cars, three

pedestrians, a bicyclist, and multiple street fixtures before coming to rest against a

building. The collisions resulted in one fatality, five injuries, and extensive property

damage to the bus and the struck vehicles and objects. The 55-year-old busdriver died 2

weeks later from complications related to his preaccident medical condition.

The Safety Board found that the busdriver, while driving a bus under the influence

of alcohol and drugs, had been involved in two injury-causing accidents10 in the 15 years

preceding the October 1997 accident. The busdriver had a history of alcoholism that

contributed to the development of other medical complications, including seizures.

Incidents at work related to the driver’s alcoholism led to repeated medical examinations,

performed through the NYCTA Medical Services Division, at which rehabilitation

sessions were recommended but never attended by the driver. The NYCTA Medical

Services Division had knowledge that this driver’s medical history placed him at

 

9

Tripper service is defined as regularly scheduled mass transit transportation service, which is open to

the public, and is designed or modified to accommodate the needs of school students and personnel, using

various fare collections or subsidy systems.

10Both of these instances occurred before the FTA implemented its drug and alcohol program.
Special Investigation 5

increased risk while driving, but the NYCTA did not recommend the medical

disqualification of the driver. The Safety Board review of his medical records, maintained

by the NYCTA, showed that the NYCTA probably should have indicated that this driver

should not be medically certified to drive a bus, based on the State of New York Special

Requirements for Bus Drivers (Commissioner’s Regulations Part 6).11 Although the

policies and procedures to conduct medical examinations were followed, no analysis of

the results of the medical procedures was conducted by the NYCTA. This case

emphasizes the need for action to be taken when safety hazards are identified through

existing policies and procedures.

Nashville, Tennessee

On August 31, 1998, a Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) transit bus in

Nashville drove through two consecutive intersections with red signals in the downtown

district. At the second signal, the bus hit a car, which had pulled into the intersection,

then veered across the roadway and ran over a second car, killing two of the occupants.

The busdriver was off his designated route and reportedly speeding at the time of the

accident; however, he was not behind schedule. The busdriver had been reprimanded and

suspended on at least two previous occasions before this accident for failing to follow the

designated route. The busdriver had been diagnosed with hypertension and diabetes; these

conditions were being treated through medication and diet. The Nashville MTA medical

review officer had been apprised of these treatment efforts.

The bus was inspected, and the brakes were found to be out of adjustment. A

maintenance inspection had been conducted 4 days before the accident, and the brakes

were not readjusted at that time. In addition, a hole was found in the main air line for the

brake system, which reduced the brake air pressure12 and, thus, the brake efficiency.

During the pretrip inspection, the busdriver should have observed this low air condition.

(In reviewing the Nashville MTA maintenance operations, another bus that had been in a

previous accident was found to have a cracked frame, and yet, it was still in service.)

Although the company had reprimanded the driver involved in the August 31

accident and was aware of his medical condition, it allowed him to drive a bus, which had

an inadequate brake system, and, thereby, caused a situation to exist that resulted in an

accident.

 

11Physical qualifications for drivers to be considered in biennial examinations. (a) A person shall not

drive a bus unless he or she is physically qualified to do so. (b) A person is physically qualified to drive a

bus if he or she: (5) Has no established history or clinical diagnosis of a respiratory dysfunction likely to

interfere with the ability to control or drive a bus safely; (8) Has no established history or clinical diagnosis

of epilepsy or any other condition which is likely to cause loss of consciousness or any loss of ability to

control a bus; (9) Has no mental, nervous, organic, or functional disease of psychiatric disorder likely to

interfere with the ability to drive a bus safely; (13) Has no current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism.

12The pressure gauge on the dash read 105 psi; normal pressure is 120 psi.
Special Investigation 6

Federal Oversight of Transit Bus Operations

The above four accidents, which occurred in different parts of the country,

highlight significant safety problems in the transit bus industry. The Safety Board is

concerned that the Federal Government provides significant funding for public transit

operations without ensuring adequate safety oversight.

Federal Highway Administration

Before 1984, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) had the authority to

conduct safety oversight of transit bus operations. In 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the

Motor Carrier Safety Act that specifically exempted passenger carrier operations that

were part of Federal, State, or quasi-public operations. In May 1988, the FHWA issued a

rulemaking, to the same effect as the 1984 act, including the same exemptions in the

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations13 (FMCSR). The FHWA currently has no

authority to perform any safety reviews or inspections of transit bus operations.

Federal Transit Administration

The FTA advised that its mission is “to provide leadership, technical assistance,

and financial resources for safe, technologically advanced public transportation, which

enhances all citizens’ mobility and accessibility, improves America’s communities and

natural environment, and strengthens the national economy.”

The FTA Office of Safety and Security’s strategic goal is to “promote the public

health and safety by working toward the elimination of transit-related deaths, injuries,

property damage and the improvement of personal security and property protection.” It

has a staff of eight employees and an annual budget of approximately $5.5 million, of

which $3 million is used for the oversight programs.14 Approximately $2.5 million is

used for national planning and research, including training and technical assistance on

recommended safety standards, comprising seismic and fire safety, alternative fuels

system safety plans, accident investigation, and standardization of safety equipment on

buses.

The Federal Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century authorized the FTA to

distribute in FY98 and FY99, respectively, approximately $4.64 and $6.34 billion in

Federal funding to transit operations. In 1998, approximately 40 percent of all funding

was provided to the 5,25015 transit bus operations; another 40 percent was provided to rail

 

13Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 390.3(f)(2) exempts, with the exception of the

recordkeeping requirements of Part 390.15, transportation performed by the Federal Government, a State or

any political subdivision of a State, or an agency, established under a compact between States that has been

approved by the U.S. Congress.

14 Drug and Alcohol Testing Program and Rail Rapid Transit State Safety Oversight Program.

15This includes 550 urban transit operators, 1,100 rural transit operators, and 3,600 specialized services

for the elderly and persons with disabilities.
Special Investigation 7

rapid transit operations; and 20 percent was provided to new transit systems. According

to the FTA, a similar percentage will probably be funded in 1999. This funding will be

principally divided between formula grants and discretionary programs.16 In 1998, about

$2.5 billion was disbursed through the formula grants to transit systems, communities,

and cities. An additional $2 billion was allotted for discretionary programs, which include

fixed guide rails, bus modernization, new bus purchases, and the startup of new transit

systems. The FTA also distributed $91 million to communities for urban and transit

planning.

Safety Assessment Methods—FTA officials stated that they have three

methods to assess the safety of the transit bus agencies that receive Federal funding.

However, none of these methods provides a comprehensive assessment of transit bus

safety throughout the country or a remedy for any of the problems that may exist.

One method is the sharing of safety information among transit agencies, which

enables the agencies to perform self-assessments of their operational safety. This

information is composed of data that are reported annually to the FTA by each transit

agency receiving Federal funds. Unfortunately, some of the data may be 2 years old

before it is available and may not be accurate or sufficient for transit bus agencies to

thoroughly compare the safety of their operations with those of other agencies (see

“Transit Bus Accident Data” section).

Another method containing a safety component is a program of triennial reviews,

which are employed to measure the responsible use of Federal funds. The reviews are

legislated by Congress because of a concern that the FTA was not adequately monitoring

the use of Federal funds. The FTA hires contractors to perform the triennial reviews of all

(about 550 urban) transit agencies directly receiving Federal funds. (The other transit

agencies receive Federal funding administered through the States.) The Office of

Oversight within the Office of Program Management oversees the contractors. The Office

of Safety and Security does not participate in the triennial review process.

In conducting the reviews, contractors go to each transit agency and ask questions

to ascertain whether the transit agency is performing certain required functions. Subject

questions include whether the agency is in compliance with the American Disabilities

Act, the Buy America law, the Service Equity laws, and the Disadvantaged Business

Enterprise regulations; and few questions concern transportation safety programs. The

1999 Triennial Handbook used by the contractors contains the following safety-related

questions:

• Does the grantee have a written system safety program plan? How is it

implemented and managed?

 

16Formula grants are based on a combination of population, population density, bus revenue miles, bus

passenger miles, and operating costs. Discretionary funds are set aside annually by the U.S. Congress.
Special Investigation 8

• What key safety issues has the grantee identified for this year and how are they

being addressed?

• Does the system safety program plan include an emergency management plan?

Does the grantee conduct periodic drills?

• What type of safety training does the grantee provide and to whom?

• Does the grantee have a safety awards program? Is there an active safety

committee? To whom does the safety officer report?

The safety section of the handbook also notes that:

While FTA has no specific requirements for transit safety, FTA can

conduct safety investigations when conditions of any facility, equipment,

or manner of operation appear to create a serious hazard of death or injury.

FTA is concerned about the safety of both transit passengers and transit

workers and encourages grantees to develop a written system safety

program plan. These questions are intended to provide an overall

understanding of how safety is incorporated into the organization, what

kind of emphasis is placed on safety training, what the general safety

record of the grantee is, and what areas of emphasis the grantee has with

regard to safety. Guidance on the development of a written bus transit

system safety program plan is available in an APTA publication entitled,

Manual for the Development of Bus Transit System Safety Program Plans,

1998.

The contractor makes no assessment of the effectiveness of the safety programs at

the transit agency. Transit funding is not dependent on the results of the responses to the

safety questions posed during the triennial review.

Under 49 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 5329, “Investigation of Safety

Hazards,” should a serious hazard be reported to the FTA, DOT funds may be withheld

from a transit agency. In the last 30 years, the FTA has conducted only three

investigations under this statute. Two investigations were prompted by congressional

requests; the third was prompted by union complaints. One investigation in New York

resulted in the disbursement of an additional $17 million of Federal funds to correct 56

identified conditions of concern.17 The other two investigations resulted in the

requirement for the transit agency to change the unsafe conditions within a specified

period of time. No funding has ever been withheld from transit agencies under this

statute.

 

17In the transit bus operations, these included the lack of a system safety plan, comprehensive control

of busdrivers, and technical resources; inadequate data; and poor corporate culture and management.
Special Investigation 9

Safety Hazard Identification—The FTA has two programs to identify safety

problems that may exist within transit agencies. The drug and alcohol testing program is

applicable to all transit agencies directly receiving Federal funds, and the State Safety

Oversight Program is only applicable to those agencies conducting rail rapid transit

operations.

The FTA began its drug and alcohol testing program of safety sensitive

transportation employees in 1997 and has since audited 35 transit systems. Each of these

program areas is treated separately. Since the inception of the alcohol program, the FTA

has reduced the testing requirement from 25 to 10 percent because the data collected

during the audits indicated a small number of positive results. Testing for drugs remains

at 50 percent. If a transit bus agency does not comply, under 49 U.S.C. Section 5331,

“Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act,” the FTA is authorized to withhold

Federal funds. However, as of September 15, 1998, no funds have been withheld.

As a result of a Safety Board safety study and an accident investigation of rail

rapid transit vehicles,18 the Board has made safety recommendations to the FTA for rail

rapid transit operations regarding safety oversight.19 The FTA has begun to implement

these recommendations to improve the safety of rail rapid transit operations. Through the

State Safety Oversight Program for rail rapid transit,20 Congress has authorized the FTA

to withhold up to 5 percent of the urbanized area formula funds for the entire State if the

State does not initiate a safety oversight program for rail rapid transit operations.

However, according to FTA testimony during the March 1998 public hearing, no

sanctions are applied if a rail rapid transit system’s safety plan proves deficient. On two

occasions, the FTA has used its authority to withhold funds for the lack of State oversight

of rail rapid transit systems.21 Because the FTA has only recently required the States to

perform rail rapid transit oversight duties, the FTA believes that it has no basis for the

merits of extending that role to other modes of transit operations. The success of the State

Safety Oversight Program for rail rapid transit is being audited this fiscal year.

 

18National Transportation Safety Board Safety Study – Oversight of Rail Rapid Transit Safety, July 23,

1991 (NTSB/SS-91/02) and Railroad Accident Report – Collision and Derailment of Maryland Rail

Commuter (MARC) Train 286 and National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) Train 29 near

Silver Spring, Maryland, February 16, 1996 (NTSB/RAR-97/02).

19Safety Recommendations R-91-33 through -35, respectively, to the Urban Mass Transportation

Administration ([UMTA], now the FTA) and R-97-22 to the FTA: “Document and evaluate the

effectiveness of existing State oversight activities of rail rapid transit safety and develop guidelines for use

by State and local governments that address the critical elements of an effective oversight program;”

“Monitor safety oversight programs implemented by the State and local governments to determine that the

elements of an effective program are in place, that adequate financial resources are available, and that the

mechanism through which the oversight is being accomplished is appropriate given the nature of the

particular transit system;” “Use funding authority to ensure independent and effective safety oversight for

UMTA-funded projects and UMTA-assisted systems;” and “Revise the grant application process to require

a comprehensive failure modes and effects analysis, including a human factors analysis, be provided for all

federally funded transit projects that are directly related to the transport of passengers.” The status of these

recommendations is “Closed-Acceptable Action” for Safety Recommendations R-91-33 through -35 and

“Open-Acceptable Response” for Safety Recommendation R-97-22.

20Title 49 CFR Part 659.7 – “Withholding of Funds for Non-compliance.”

21Michigan and Georgia currently do not have a safety oversight program for rail rapid transit.
Special Investigation 10

According to the FTA, its primary role is to provide capital for operational

assistance to transit programs. The Safety Board is concerned that funding is occurring

without any reasonable checks to ensure that Federal funds are being used in the public’s

best interest and that the public’s safety on transit buses is not being compromised. The

FTA considers its primary responsibility to be the disbursement of Federal funds and, as

such, engages in a cooperative partnership with the transit industry. The FTA stated at the

public hearing that it has traditionally looked either to State regulation, if it exists, or to

self-regulation by the transit industry to safeguard the public’s use of these transportation

systems.

Although the FTA has the methods described above to ensure safety, none are

focused specifically on safe operations within transit bus agencies. For the FTA to have

an effective safety oversight program, it would need to ensure that 1) safety plans are

required and implemented, 2) the Office of Safety and Security is included in the triennial

review process to ensure that safety plans are complete and in use for all fund-recipient

operations, and 3) all safety deficiencies are corrected within transit bus agencies. The

Safety Board concludes that the FTA is currently unable to identify situations that may

lead to unsafe conditions on buses for the traveling public or to resolve any unsafe

conditions because of a lack of effective safety oversight and enforcement. The Safety

Board, therefore, believes that the DOT should develop and implement an oversight

program to assess and ensure the safety of transit bus operations that receive Federal

funding.

Transit Bus Accident Data

Federal Transit Administration

Before 1990, the FTA did not collect data on transit bus operations; only data on

rail rapid transit were collected. Currently, however, all public transit agencies receiving

direct Federal assistance under the FTA’s formula program must report accident data to

retain eligibility for Federal funds. The FTA accident data only contain the number of

fatalities, injuries, and incidents in the given year,22 and, therefore, this accident data can

only be used to establish numeric trends in the occurrences of fatalities that result from

noncollisions and from collisions with vehicles, objects, and people. The FTA requires

the reporting of transit bus incidents that meet the following criteria:

• any event involving property damage exceeding $1,000;

• any incident requiring medical treatment of a passenger or an employee, either

on site or in a hospital; or

• any fatality resulting from the event occurring within 30 days.

 

22The FTA plans to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to expand the data fields collected.
Special Investigation 11

The FTA obtains summary accounts from the transit operators, who report data

for their previous fiscal year, which vary across transit agencies. The FTA, however,

reports the data by calendar year. By the time the FTA collects and collates the data for a

report, it is almost 2 years old.

Because of the different reporting timetables allowed by the FTA, accident data

from transit agencies are routinely being discounted from the FTA statistical database.

The extent of these errors was emphasized when an FTA witness testified, “We have a

number of instances where they’re [transit agencies] so late in reporting for a given year

that we cannot incorporate it in a given year’s document, in which case we don’t report it

at all so we don’t skew anything.” Further, the FTA has determined that, for unknown

reasons, data are routinely reported incorrectly, as the witness continued, “We probably

have about eight instances a year where our validation checks suggest that perhaps they

[transit agencies] were entering the data incorrectly for one reason or another.” The FTA

does not exercise any penalties, such as the withholding of funds, for incorrect or

improper accident reporting submitted by transit agencies.

National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) Fatality Analysis

Reporting System (FARS) only collects accident data that involve fatalities. In the FARS

database, an accident must involve a motor vehicle traveling on a roadway open to the

public and result in the death of a person, either an occupant of a vehicle or a

nonmotorist, within 30 days of the accident. FARS is based on police reports, medical

examiner and death records, and other reports, which are related by calendar year. Each

accident maintained in FARS has more than 100 coded data elements that characterize

the accident, the vehicles, and the people involved in fatal accidents.

NHTSA also has the General Estimates System (GES), which contains a random

sampling of police-reported crashes. The GES data are neither limited to fatal accidents,

like FARS, nor inclusive of all accidents.

In 1996, the FARS database reported 126 fatalities in transit bus collisions (5 of

these were passengers on a transit bus; the others were either pedestrians or people in

other vehicles). That same year, the FTA reported 83 fatalities in transit bus accidents (it

is impossible to determine where the fatal injuries occurred based on the FTA data). (See

figure 1.) The FTA has maintained that the number of transit bus fatalities has steadily

decreased; however, the FARS data indicate that the number of fatalities has not

decreased. The differences in the number of fatalities may be explained by the differences

in the databases.
Special Investigation 12

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1987198819891990199119921993199419951996

Year

Number of Fatalities

FTA FARS

Note: The 1990 FTA 

data include fatalities 

from all incidents, not 

just collisions.

Figure 1. FTA and FARS data on fatalities due to transit bus collisions between

1987 and 1996

The FTA fatality data also are not as comprehensive as FARS data and lack a

tracking program for injury severity, contributing factors, vehicle actions, driver actions,

or other safety-related factors. Still, the FTA data provide more accurate injury counts for

accidents than do the FARS data. FARS does not present all injury data, only that injury

data for people involved in a fatal accident.

Federal Highway Administration

The FHWA collects bus accident data from State and local enforcement agencies.

However, FHWA representatives testified during the hearing that approximately one-third

of this data is not reported to the database by State or local enforcement personnel and

that the data do not distinguish between transit and other types of buses.

Transit Bus Industry

Bi-State Development Agency (St. Louis, Missouri) and New Jersey Transit

(NJT) representatives testified during the public hearing that they retain their own

statistics regarding collisions and other related safety matters, in addition to those

submitted to the FTA. These data are analyzed and maintained for in-house use by their

respective safety departments to evaluate agency operations. The representatives testified

that the reports generated by these data include more detailed accident information than

do those reports required by the FTA.
Special Investigation 13

As discussed above, the reporting and collection system that the FTA is using

lends itself to discrepancies in the FTA final reports. The FTA data also are of limited

value, can be used only to identify numeric trends of transit bus accidents, and are not

useable to identify the underlying causes of or contributing factors to these trends.

Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that the accident data presented by the FTA,

NHTSA, and the FHWA do not accurately portray the transit bus industry’s safety record

due to the data limitations of each and, in the case of the FTA, the lack of timeliness. In

addition, the Safety Board concludes that the lack of accurate and sufficient data within

the transit bus industry prevents a thorough assessment of transit bus safety.

Consequently, the Safety Board believes that the DOT should collect accurate, timely,

and sufficient data so that thorough assessments can be made relating to transit bus safety.

Furthermore, the Safety Board believes that as part of the oversight program, the DOT

should evaluate the collected data to identify the underlying causes of transit bus

accidents that could lead to the identification of safety deficiencies at transit agencies.

State Oversight of Transit Bus Operations

Representatives from Missouri and Texas, two States that do not provide safety

oversight of transit bus operations, and California and New York, two States that actively

provide safety oversight of transit bus operations, testified during the March 1998 public

hearing. In addition, a representative from the NJT testified about the New Jersey

regulations.

Missouri and Texas both regulate charter bus operations and, through FTA

mandates, rail rapid transit operations.23 These States’ legislatures, however, have not

provided the authority to regulate the safety of transit bus operations.

The California Motor Carrier Safety Operations Program has the safety oversight

for all bus operations within the State, including those operated by transit agencies. In

New York, the New York Public Transportation Safety Board oversees any transit agency

receiving State operating assistance24 and, additionally, makes recommendations on

safety issues.

The New Jersey Department of Transportation regulates both hours-of-service and

vehicle inspections. The NJT is required to inspect and maintain its buses to meet the

FMCSRs.

 

23Under 49 CFR Part 659, the mandate covers safety oversight of rail rapid transit operations as a

condition of a State receiving Federal funding only for the rail-related portion of bimodal transit agencies

and does not apply to any rail operations subject to the regulatory control of the Federal Railroad

Administration.

24In 1997, the New York Department of Transportation provided approximately $1.4 billion in

operating assistance to about 125 transit agencies.
Special Investigation 14

The FTA does not interact with any of the States’ agencies that perform safety

oversight functions; therefore, the FTA would be unaware of any existing safety problem.

In addition, the FTA has no direct association with rural transit operators and provides

funds through the States for disbursement to these agencies.

Other Safety Programs

Although safety programs at the Federal level are essentially nonexistent and the

State programs vary, APTA has developed two programs to provide for safe operations at

its member transit agencies. However, these programs are not available to all transit

agencies (only to APTA membership, which is less than 10 percent of all transit agencies)

and have a fee associated with them.

APTA has drafted the Bus Safety Management Program (BSMP), a system safety

program that will be applicable to transit bus operations, as well as the Manual for the

Development of Bus Transit System Safety Program Plans. The BSMP is similar to the

APTA rail rapid transit system safety program, on which the FTA State Safety Oversight

of Rail Fixed Guideway Systems Program was modeled. (The MTA in Harris County,

Texas, was evaluating the BSMP at the time of the public hearing.) The BSMP will help

transit agencies set up a safety program in conformance with the Manual for the

Development of Bus Transit System Safety Program Plans. APTA will then examine each

system safety program on a triennial basis and evaluate whether the transit agency has:

• a system safety program plan that is in conformance with the APTA Manual

for the Development of Bus Transit System Safety Program Plans.

• its system safety program plan fully implemented.

• conducted an internal safety audit program to identify, track, and resolve

safety program deficiencies.

Although a transit bus agency will be required to pay a fee, between $9,000 and

$15,200 (based on size), to initiate the program, APTA anticipates almost full

participation in the BSMP by its transit agency members. However, compliance with the

safety oversight of operations will still be the responsibility of the individual transit

agency, even with the implementation of the BSMP.

In 1993, APTA conducted a survey of the hiring practices of various transit

agencies because of concerns within the transit industry about the ratio of accident and

employee-retention rates of newly hired drivers compared with experienced drivers. Over

100 agencies responded to the survey, resulting in the APTA conclusion that the thenexisting recruiting and hiring practices were extremely diverse. In December 1994, APTA

published the final report Bus Operator Selection System25 (BOSS), which details a

 

25APTA contracted Landy Jacobs, Inc., a human resource consulting firm based in State College,
Special Investigation 15

selection system that could be adopted by a transit agency and allow the recruitment of

drivers who would be more likely to maintain a stable attendance and employment record.

In addition to employment stability, according to APTA, this system would also reduce

the accident rates typically experienced with new operators, as has been encountered by

those transit agencies that evaluated the system.

Since its inception, BOSS has been implemented at 31 agencies, including the

NYCTA, and numerous agencies are in the process of implementing this selection

system. According to APTA testimony at the public hearing, program start-up requires a

major commitment on the part of the transit agency to internally probe its processes and

to involve its human resource and operations people in preparing for implementation.

Additionally, the BOSS program has a cost factor associated with it for the ongoing

support of the consultant who developed it. APTA believes that because of these factors,

the BOSS program will probably require time to be universally accepted and applied but

eventually all APTA transit agency members will use the program.

At the public hearing, the CTAA voiced its concern that the BOSS program

primarily addresses the problems facing the APTA membership. The CTAA emphasized

that New York City alone hires about 1,200 bus operators annually and the rural transit

network nationwide totals only between 6,000 and 7,000 bus operators. The number

difference in hiring demands results in different training and recruitment needs for

smaller rural transit systems. The typical CTAA member employs a total of six

busdrivers, whose employment involves low turnover and wages.26 The CTAA also

testified that because its members operate in rural areas, the labor market is limited and

many of the operators believe that they are almost forced to hire the available drivers and

then attempt to train them to be qualified safe bus operators.

While APTA has taken steps to ensure that uniform safety and qualifications will

be applied to its member transit bus agencies, this only represents 10 percent of all transit

agencies. Consequently, the Safety Board concludes that a model comprehensive safety

program is not available for all transit bus agencies, only urban transit agencies that are

members of APTA. Therefore, the Safety Board believes the DOT, APTA, the CTAA,

and AASHTO, in cooperation, should develop a model comprehensive safety program(s)

that is provided to all transit agencies.

 

Pennsylvania, to develop this project.

26Approximately 10 percent of the CTAA’s membership only pay their busdrivers minimum wage.
16

Conclusions

1. The Federal Transit Administration is currently unable to identify situations that may

lead to unsafe conditions on buses for the traveling public or to resolve any unsafe

conditions because of a lack of effective safety oversight and enforcement.

2. The accident data presented by the Federal Transit Administration, the National

Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and the Federal Highway Administration do

not accurately portray the transit bus industry’s safety record due to the data

limitations of each and, in the case of the Federal Transit Administration, the lack of

timeliness. The Federal Transit Administration data also are of limited value, can be

used only to identify numeric trends of transit bus accidents, and are not useable to

identify the underlying causes of or contributing factors to these trends.

3. The lack of accurate and sufficient data within the transit bus industry prevents a

thorough assessment of transit bus safety.

4. A model comprehensive safety program is not available for all transit bus agencies,

only urban transit agencies that are members of the American Public Transit

Association.
17

Recommendations

As a result of its special investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board

makes the following safety recommendations:

to the U.S. Department of Transportation:

Develop and implement an oversight program to assess and ensure the

safety of transit bus operations that receive Federal funding. (H-98-43)

Collect accurate, timely, and sufficient data so that thorough assessments

can be made relating to transit bus safety. (H-98-44)

Evaluate the collected data, as part of the oversight program, to identify

the underlying causes of transit bus accidents that could lead to the

identification of safety deficiencies at transit agencies. (H-98-45)

Develop, in cooperation with the American Public Transit Association, the

Community Transportation Association of America, and the American

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, a model

comprehensive safety program(s) and provide it to all transit agencies.

(H-98-46)

to the American Public Transit Association:

Develop, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, the

Community Transportation Association of America, and the American

Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, a model

comprehensive safety program(s). (H-98-47)

to the Community Transportation Association of America:

Develop, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, the

American Public Transit Association, and the American Association of

State Highway and Transportation Officials, a model comprehensive

safety program(s). (H-98-48)

to the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials:

Develop, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, the

American Public Transit Association, and the Community Transportation

Association of America, a model comprehensive safety program(s).

(H-98-49)
18

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

GEORGE W. BLACK, JR.

Member

November 17, 1998