This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for **

decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

GT/Research

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSEPH L. SIGNORELLI,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

FRANK HUGHES, Graham County

Sheriff; et al.,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 08-16946

D.C. No. 4:06-cv-00083-RCC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 11, 2010** 

Before: BEEZER, TROTT, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.

Joseph L. Signorelli, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the

district court’s summary judgment on his claim that county jail officers violated his

FILED

JAN 25 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
GT/Research 2 08-16946

rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and also

appeals from the order denying of his motions for appointment of counsel. We

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo summary

judgment. Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th

Cir. 2001). We review for an abuse of discretion denial of a motion for

appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,

1017 (9th Cir. 1991). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Signorelli

failed to identify any evidence in the record that established that he was disabled as

defined by the ADA. See Carmen, 237 F.3d at 1028-31 (affirming summary

judgment even though there was evidence in the record that may have created a

triable issue, but where that evidence was not explicitly referenced in the

opposition to the motion); Weinreich v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 114

F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that to state a claim of disability

discrimination under Title II, the plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that he is an

individual with a disability).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Signorelli’s

motions for appointment of counsel in light of a determination that Signorelli was

able to articulate his claims and failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
GT/Research 3 08-16946

merits. See Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017(“The court may appoint counsel under

section 1915[ ] only under exceptional circumstances. A finding of exceptional

circumstances requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success . . . and the

ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se . . . .”) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

We do not consider issues that Signorelli raised for the first time in his reply

brief. See Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It is well

established in this circuit that the general rule is that appellants cannot raise a new

issue for the first time in their reply briefs.”) (quotation marks, brackets, and

citations omitted); see also California Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Randolph, 507 F.3d

1172, 1188 n.20 (9th Cir. 2007).

Signorelli’s remaining contentions are not persuasive.

AFFIRMED.