* T h e H o n o r a b le Jo s e p h M

. H o o d , Se n io r U n it e d St a te s D is tr ic t Ju d g e f o r the Ea stern District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 08a0616n.06 Filed: Oc tober 15, 2008 NO. 07-4033 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

TA B AT HAMU L L I

NS, )

) Plaintif f-Appellant, ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED ) STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE v . ) S O U T H E R N D IS T R IC T O F O H IO ) U.S. BAN K and ) O P I N I O N KENN ET H KESSL ER, ) ) De fe nd an ts- Ap pe lle es. )

Before: M OORE an d COOK, Circ uit Jud ges; and HOOD, S enior Distric t Judge. * H O O D, S en ior Distric t Judge . Plaintiff-Appellant Ta batha Mullins (“Mullins” or “Plaintiff”) broug ht this action ag ainst Defe ndants-Appe llees U.S. Ba n k an d Kenne th Kessler (collec tively , “De fenda

nts”) alleg ing e mploy

ment discrimination arising from violations of fe dera l law. The district c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of De fenda nts and dismissed Pl aintiff’s

c la ims in t

he ir e nti re ty . Pl a int if

f a rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in con c lud ing that she fa ile d to

make he r pr ima fa c ie c a se fo r pr e g na nc y and ra c e dis c ri min a tio n und e r T itl e VI Iof the Civ il Ri g hts Act of 1 964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. For the rea sons stated below, we AF F IRM the dec ision of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.2

I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND I n November

of 2003, Mullins, an Afric an-A merica n woman, beg an employ

ment as an instore banke r for

Def endant U.S. B ank in Columbus, Ohio. During her e mploy ment with U.S. Bank, Mullins’ supervisor was br anch ma nag er D efe ndant Kenne th Kessler ( “Ke ssler”) . I n ear ly 2 0 0 4, Mu lli ns le arn e d th a t sh e wa s p re g na nt. Ke ssl e r w a s a

wa re that Mu lli ns wa s p re g na nt. Mullins testified i n her deposition that upon lear ning of her pr eg nancy , the circ umstances of her job r e ma in e d

th e s ame an d

n o o n e tr e a te d

h e r d if f e r e n tl y u n ti l a p p r o xim a te ly

A u g u s t 2 0 0 4. Mullins t estified that Ke ssler bec ame e asily frustrated with her an d o v er l y d ismiss ive when she would ask for

direc tion or assistance

. Mullins alleg ed that Ke ssler once threw a key board, striking her a rm and knoc king ove r items from the ba nk ledg e into the Krog er store beca use Mullins failed to pr int a ba lanc e sh e e t on tim e a t th e e nd

of a wo rk da y . M ull ins ’ c o- wo rk e r d isp ute d th is a c c ount. Another co-w orker , Melissa Evans, who is no long er e mploy ed by U.S. Ba nk, testified that Kessler treated M ullins differ ently than he treated the re st of the employ ees. Eva ns testified that she did not “wa

nt to say that [Kessler] was a ra cist, but y ou could tell that he tre ated he r diffe rently than he tre ated the r est of us.” Eva ns speculate d that “[i] t wasn’t bec ause of her a ge, b ec au s e I was y oung e r t ha n he r. Th e re we re pe op le that w e re old e r t ha n h e r. We w e re fe ma le , s o it ’s no t be c a us e
we we re f emale. H e just treate d [Mul lins] differ ently .” On September

15, 2004, prior to the commenc ement of he r workda y , Mullins bega

n to have

c ra mps and sp ott inga sso c iate d w ithhe r n ine te e n- we e k p re g na nc y . She kn e w h e r w or

k d ay wo uld last eleve n hours and that she had vac ation and s i ck l ea v e ava ilable. Afte r she r eporte d to work, Mu lli ns inf

ormed Kes sl e r o f h e r c on dit ion . K e ssl e r s ug g e ste d s he c on su lt w ithoth e r f e ma le employ ees who had g one throug h preg nancie s. The other employ ees a dvised her to c ontact her doctor. Mullins called he r phy sician, who told he r to dr ink w ater for one hour to avoid dehy dration, which the doc tor indicated c ould c ause her cra mping. The doctor instructed Mullins to repor t to the3

emer g ency

room if the cr amping did not subside within one hour. Mu lli ns te sti fi e d that Ke ssl e r ta c itl y re qu ir e d he r to stay a t wor k unti l af te r 5 :30 P.M ., de sp ite being awa

re of her c ondition. Mul lins asserted that she told Kessler that she w as in pain and that she neede d to go to the e merg ency room. She did not tell Kessler that the doctor order ed her to go to the

emer g ency

room. Acc ording to Mulli ns’ deposition testimony , Kessler responde d by

saying that she should take her

30-minute lunch bre ak and told her to ass i s t cu s tomers. He a lso told her that he

n e e d e d h e r t o w o r k t h e n e x td ay. Acc ording to Mulli ns, when Ke ssler found he r lying on the floo r i n t h e b ac k of the off ice later that day , he told her to lea ve and “ to do whateve r it is” she wa s go ing to do. Mullins never expli citly reque sted to use her

sick or vac ation leave , and Kessler did not refuse a re quest by Mullins to seek medic al treatment. I n his deposition, Kessler disputed Mullins ’ ver sion of these fa cts, and maintained that he c onsistently encour ag ed her

to seek medic al attention. Mullins was hospitaliz ed at Mount Carme l East Ho s p i t al fo r four day s due to arr ested premature labor. She was place d on bed rest and be g an using her shor t-term disability

(“STD” ) on September 16, 2004. Mullins’ STD leave was approve d throug h Dec ember 6, 2004. Her STD benef its paid approxim ately

50-60% of

her nor mal pay . On Octobe r 21, 2004, Mullins was

rea dmitted to the hospit al and g ave premature birth to he r daug hter three day s later. The baby died approximately

one hour a fter bir

th. On Novembe r 1, 2004, Ke ssler phoned Mullins to inquire about her condition and whethe r she intended to re turn to work. Acc ording to K essler, dur ing this conve rsation, Mullins st ated that she did not intend to return to work and was resig ning. K essler ma intained that Mullins st ated she intended to move to Tennessee w ith her husband to be c loser to family following the death of her da ug hte r. Pr ior

to S e pte mbe r 15 th, Mu lli ns ha d ma de pla ns to t ra ns fe r t o a Te nn e sse e br anc h o f U .S. Ba nk and Ke ssler wa s awa

re of these plans. Ke ssler he l p ed h er n avigate U .S. Bank’ s transfe r4

pr oc e dure s. She ha d ev e n ch os e n a bank bra nc h in Tenne sse e and tol d co -w or ke rs the y pla nn e d to move there afte r the ba

by was born. Mullins denied stating that she intende d to resig n. Mullins claimed she told Kessler she

wa nte d a tr ans fe r t o a

U. S. B ank

br anc h in Te nn e sse e . M ull ins ma int a ine d s he int e nd e d to c omp le te her maternity

leave and re turn to work at the Columbus branc h in the first wee k of De cembe r. Followingthe phone c all, Kessler draf ted a memorandum documentingthe conve rsation and place d it in Mul lins’ personne l file. In the document, Ke ssler indicate d that Mullins “stated that eff ective toda

y that she would not be re turning to work bec ause the y wer e moving to Tennesse e at the end of the month.” Kessler

contac ted Stephen Phill ips, a U.S. B ank human resour ces e mploy ee. Phill ips instructed Kessler to proce ss Mulli ns’ re signation. I n doing so, K essler se lecte d “job

a ba nd on me nt” a s th e re a so n f or e nd ingthe e mpl oy

me nt. “R esi gn a tio n” wa s n ot a va ila ble a s a
c la ssi fi c a tio n o n the c omp ute r pr og ra m. Ke ssl e r a c kn ow le dg e d th a t se le c tin g “ job a ba nd on me nt”

as the basis for the termination was an err or beca use it ter minated Mullins’ STD benefits prior to the end of he r appr oved mater nity leave . Mullins was not noti fied that he r employ ment had ende d. Approxim ately

one we ek later , Mullins re ceive d a pay stub w ith a zero balanc e, indicating he r S TD be ne fi ts h a d b e e n te rm inate d. She sp ok e wi th P hi ll ip s, who told Mu lli ns that it

wa s h is understandingshe had quit her job. Mullins assure d him that was not her intention. Mullins denied te lli ngKe ssl e r s he int e nd e d to mov e to T e nn e sse e . Phill ips sa id t he re c or ds ind ic a te d s he ha d q uit her job, the r esig nation had bee n proce ssed, and that he lacked authority to resc ind her re signation. He indicated that t he bank, at t hat t ime, would not rehire her. A few day s later, on November 12, 2004, Mullin s’ husband de livered a letter to Ke ssler on her

behalf , expressing he r desire to return to w or k a ft e r h e r m a te rn ity le ave e nd e d. Ke ssl e r fo rw ard e d the le tte r to Phi lli ps , wh o se nt it to U .S. B ank ’s g e ne ra l c ouns e l. After lear ning that Mulli ns did not intend to resig n, U.S. Ba nk rec og nized the discrepa ncy5

reg ardingthe classific ation of her employ ment rele ase. On November 18, 2004, Phill ips attempted to i nf or m Mu lli ns dir e c tly

that sh e c ou ld r e tur

n to wo rk in th e sam e po sit ion

sh e pr e vio us ly

he ld

on c e he r m a te rn ity

leave e nd e d. Mu lli ns did no t pe rs on a lly

re sp on d. On

the same da

y , M ull ins ’

a tto rn e y sent a let ter to P hil lip s o utl ini nghis po sit ion a s to Mu lli ns ’ p ote nti a l c la ims a g a ins t U .S. Ba nk and dire cting Phill ips to have leg al counse l contact him. On Nove mber 29, 2004, a nd in a voicemail messag e to Mullins’ attorney , U.S. B ank ag ain extended an off er to re instate Mullins at the Columbus branch, or a compar able posit ion elsewhe re. Mullins’ attorne y sent a letter

dated that same da y indicating that, afte r talking with Phil lips, Mull ins had dec ided to reloc ate to Te nnessee and could not re sume her pr evious position. The pa rties do not dispute that Mullins rec eived all of the be nefits she wa s due for the entire period of he r STD leave , althoug h the Novembe r pay ments we re n ot rec eived until the end of Janu ary 20 05 . In a c c or da

nc e wi th i ts N ov e mbe r 2 9, 20 04 , c or re sp onden ce, U.S. B ank

fu lly pa id STD benef

its owed as a r esult of Kessler s el ec t ing “ J ob Abandonment” instead of “ Voluntary Termination.” Mullins moved to Tenne ssee in the f irst week of

Dec ember

2004. Mullins fil ed suit in feder al district court on Nove mber 2, 2005. S he filed he r first ame nded complaint on Dec ember 2, 2005 , and sec ond amende d complaint on Dec ember 18, 2006. Def endants moved f

or summary

judgme nt on all of Mul lins’ claims. On J uly 17, 2007, the district court g rante d Def

endants’ motion for summary judgme nt with respe ct to Mullins’ feder al claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mullins’ state law claims. Mullins t hen broug ht this appeal. II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW A di strict court' s g rant of summary judgme nt is reviewe d de novo

. McD onald v. Petree , 409 F.3d 724, 727 (6th Cir. 2005). Summary judgme nt is proper “ if the plea dings, de positions, answers to interrog atories, and admissions on file, tog ether with the aff

idavits, if any , show that there is noT h e Pre g n an cy D i s cr i mi n at i on Act pr ov i s i on s of T i t l e V I I pr oh i bi t s ex - bas ed di s cr i mi n at i on on t h e bas i s of 1 pr eg n an cy . 42 U. S. C. § 2000e( k )

. “ W omen af f ec t ed by pre g n an cy , ch i l dbi r t h , or r el at ed medi ca l c on di t i on s s h al l be t r eat ed t he s ame f

or al l emp l oy ment
- r el at ed pur po s es . . . [ i ncl udi ng bene f i t s ]

. ” Id

. T i t l e V I I ’ s cor e an t i

- di s cr i mi n at i on p ro visi o n stat es “[i ]t sha l l b e u nlaw f ul em p l o ym en t p rac t i ce f o r an em p l o yer . . . t o d i sch arg e a ny i nd i vid ua l , o r o t he rw i se d isc rim ina te a g a ins t an y ind ivid u a l with re sp e c t t o his c o m p e n sa tio n , t e rm s, c o n d iti o n s, o r p riv ileg e s o f em p lo ym e n t . . .” o n the b a sis o f ra c e . I d. § 2 0 0 0 e- 2 (a)( 1 ). 6 g enuine issue a s to any

materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P. 56( c). The moving pa rty bear s the initial burden to show the abse nce of a g enuine issue of mater ial fac t. Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 47 7 U. S. 31 7, 32 3 ( 19 86 ). Th is b ur de n is met by s h o w in g th e c o u rt th a t th e r e is an a b s e n c e o f e v id e n c e o n a mate r ia l f a c t o n w h ic h the nonmoving party has t he ult imate burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325. The burden the n shifts to the nonmoving pa

rty to “come f

orwa rd with some probative evidence t o support its claim.” Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy , 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The Court must construe the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the nonmoving pa rty , in this case, Mullins. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 4 77 U. S. 2 42 , 2 55 (1 98 6) ; Mu lti me dia 20 00 , I nc . v . A tta rd , 374 F.3d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 2004). A mere s ci n t i l l a o f evide nce is insuffic ient; rather , “ther e must be evide nce on

w h i c ht h e j u r

y c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y f i n d f o r ” t h e n o n - m o v i n g p art y. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252. III . AN AL YSI S A. Pl a i n ti f

f ’s Di s cr i mi n a ti o n Cl a i ms Mullins claims t hat U.S. B ank and Kessler violated Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, by

discriminating a g ain s t her on the basis of her preg nancy

and ra ce. The

1 district court found that Mullins failed to mee t her initial burden on both cla ims because she suffe red no adver se employ

ment action. We ag ree with the di s t ri ct co u rt’s re sult, but for the following

rea sons. 1. Plain tif

f’ s Prim a F

ac ie Cas e I n th e a bs e nc e of dir e c t e vid e nc e of dis c ri min a tio n, a s is the c a se he re , a pla int if f i n a Ti tle7

VI Idiscrimination cas e m ay establish discriminatory employ ment prac tices by

circ umstantial evidenc e. The McD onnell Douglas b u r d e n - s h i f t i n g f r a m e w o r k i s u s e d t o an a l y z e T i t l e V II discrimination c ases. McD onnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 4 11 U. S. 7 92 (1 97 3) . T o s tate a pr ima fac ie ca s e for preg nancy

discrimination, a plaintiff “must show (1) she wa s preg nant, (2) she was qualified fo r h er job, (3) sh e wa s su bje c te d to an a dv e rs e e mpl oy me nt d e c isi on , a

nd (4 ) t he re is a nexus betwe en her preg nancy and the adve rse e mploy ment decision.” Asmo v. Keane , Inc. , 471 F.3d 5 8 8 , 5 9 2 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo , 206 F.3d 651 , 6 5 8 (6th Cir. 200 0 ) )

. T o s tate a p r im a f a c ie c a s e f

o r r a c ia l d is c r im in a ti o n , a p la inti f f mu s t s h o w th a t “ ( 1) [she]

was a member of

a prote cted c lass; (2) [she] suffere d an adverse employ ment action; (3) [ she] was qualified for

the position; and (4) [she] was repla ced by someone outside the pr otected c lass or wa s treated diffe rently

than similarly -situat e d , n o n - protec ted employ ees.” W right v. Murray Guard, Inc

. , 4 5 5 F. 3 d 7 0 2 , 7 0 7 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g DiCarlo v. Potter , 358 F.3d 408, 415 ( 6th Cir. 2004)). I t is undisput ed that Mullins was a preg nant African- Americ an woman at all re levant times and that she w as qualified f or the position she held at U.S . Ba nk. The pa

rties diffe r g reatly

on whether the third elemen t o f t h e p ri ma fa cie c ase – a n adver se employ

ment action – occ urre d. Mullins ar g ues that Kessler ’s ref usal to r elea se her from work on September 1 5 t h an d her termination and subseque nt loss of benefits we re a dverse employ ment actions. Mullins’ arg ument that she suffere d an adverse employ ment action whe n she wa s not gr anted sick leave or vacation leave , or release d from work ear ly on September 15th is not supported by the fac ts. From the de position t estimony , it is clear that Mullins never expli citly reque sted to take lea

ve or be r elea sed ear ly from work. Mullins di d not cite, nor did the Court find, any authority sug g esting th a t, u n li k e n o np r e g n an t e mp lo y e e s , ane mp lo y e r mu s t p la c e a

p r e g n an t e mp lo y e e o ns ic k or
vacation leave without a spe cific reque st by the employ ee or g rant a n ear ly rele ase f rom work. See Ty sin ge r v . P oli c e De

p’ t of City of Z an esv ill e , 463 F.3d 569, 575 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (an e mploy er is not8

require d to give pref

ere ntial treatment to pre g nant employ ees)

. Mullins never cle arly expressed the

se v e r i t y o f h e r s y

mp t o m s , un t i l K e s s l e r f

o u n d h e r l yi n g i n t h e b a c k o f t h e o f f i c e . S h e wr on g ly assumed the wor st by

fea ring Kessler

would discharg e her fo r s ee k i n g treatment. See Agnew v. BASF Corp. , 2 8 6 F. 3 d

3 0 7 , 3 1 0 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Garner v. W al-Mart Stores, Inc. , 807 F.2d 15 36 , 15 39 (1 1th

Cir . 1 98 7) (“ e mpl oy e e is o bli g e d ‘ no t to a ssume the wo rs t, a nd no t to jum

p to

c on c lus ion s too fa st’ ” wh e n de te rm ini ngan e mpl oy e r’ s mo tiv a tio ns ). Mu lli ns fa ils to m a ke out a prima fa cie c ase f

or discrimination based upon he r alleg ation that she was not allowe d to leave w ork

e ar l y. We need not dec ide whethe r Mullins’ termination was in fac t an adve rse e mploy ment action. Assuming, arguendo , that Mullins has m et her pr ima fac ie burde n under McD onnell Douglas reg ardingher te rmination, her c laim suffer s a fatal flaw, a s discussed below. 2. Employe r’s Legitimate Nondiscriminator y Re ason & Employe e’s Proof of Pretex t Once a plai n t i ff meets her initial burden, the employ er must provide a “leg itimate, nondiscriminatory

rea son” for

its adv er s e em ploy

ment decision. Asmo , 471 F.3d at 592 (citing Cline , 206 F.3d at 658). I f such a rea son is provided, and to survive a motion for summary judgme nt, the em p l oy ee must then prove “the e mploy er’ s articulate d rea son was a pr etext for intentional discrimination.” Id. An e mpl oy e e c an pro ve pr e te xt by sh ow inge ith e r “ (1 ) t

hat th e pr of

fe re d r e a so ns ha d n o b a sis in fac t; (2) that the prof

fer ed re asons did not actually motivate the ac t ion; or (3) that they wer e insufficient to motivate the ac tion.” Koc sis v . M ult i- Car e Mg

mt

. , 97 F.3d 876, 883 (6th Cir. 1996) (c i t i n g Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co. , 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 ( 6th Cir. 1994)). “[A]s l ong
as an e mploy er has an h onest belief in its proff ere d nondiscriminatory

rea son for discha

rg ing a n
e mpl oy e e , th e e mpl oy e e c ann ot e sta bli shthat th e re a so n w a s p re te xtua l si mpl y be c a us e it i s ultimately

shown to be incorr ect.” Maj ew s ki v. A u t omatic Data Proce ssing, Inc. , 274 F.3d 1106,9

1 1 1 7 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Smith v

. Chrysler Corp. , 155 F.3d 799, 806 ( 6th Cir. 1998)). Whether there is an honest belief

in a proff

ere d rea son is based on t he employ er’ s rea sonable re liance on particula rized fac ts before it at the time of the dec ision. Id. I n the prese nt c ase, a ssuming, arguendo , that Mullins met her prima fac ie burde n reg arding her te rmination, Def

endants have asserted that Kessler ’s subjective be lief that Mullins resig ned her position was a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory rea son for their a ctions. We ag ree . Mullins argues that Ke ssl e r’ s b e lie f w a s e ith e r disho ne st o r m ist a ke n a nd , a s su c h, is p ro of

of pr e te xt. H ow e ve r, thi s
argume nt f

a ils a s a matte r of law be c a

us e Ke ssl e r h on e stl y

be lie ve d M ull ins re sig ne d. At the tim e of the termination action, Kessler documented his conver sation with Mullins i n which he be lieved sh e re sig ne d. Ke ssl e r the n inf or me d human r e so ur c e s o f t he same and

pr oc e sse d h e r r e sig natio n in the U. S. B ank

human re so ur c e s c omp ute r data ba se . K e ssl e r r e a so na

bly re lie d o n p art ic ula

ri zed fa c ts reg ardingMullins known at the time of t he November 1st conver sation to form the hone st belief that sh e was res ign ing . Sp e c if ic a lly , K e ssl e r k

ne w t hat Mu lli ns ha d p re vio us ly pla nn e d to mov e to Tenne sse e to b e c lo s e r

to f ami ly an d th a t s h e h a d

r e c e n tl y lo s t h e r c h il d

. K e s s le r ’ s mistaken interpre tation of Mullins’ actions are not sufficient to establish pre text
. Moreove r, Mullin s ’ te s ti mo ny r e g a r d in g K e s s le r ’ s a ll e g e d

d is criminatory

motive is equivocal at best. In her de position, Mul lins offere d other re asons for any perc eived mistreatment by Kessler , including K essler’ s contempora neous health issues and Mul lins’ mistakes on the job. Mullins’ cow o r k e r s a ls o d e s c r ib e d th e r e lati o n s h ip b e tw e e n th e M u ll in s an d K e s s le r a s a p e r s o n a li ty clash. Thus, Mullins has fail ed t o p rovi de evide nce of prete x t by

showing that Def

endants’ a

rticulated

rea son had no basis in fac t, that it did not actua lly motivate Def

endants, or that it was insufficient motivation for her te rmination. The Court holds that Mullins’ claims of preg nancy and rac e discrimination fail bec ause she did not pr ove that Def

endants’ hone st belief that she r esig ned wa s pretext. The district court did not10

err in gr anting summary

judgme nt in favor of Def

endants beca

use Mullins failed to meet her burden of proof

. B. Consid erat ion of Docum entary Evidence Mullins arg ues that the district cour t erre d in consideringthe re instatement letter U.S. B ank

se nt t o M ull ins ’ c ouns e l be c a us e the le tte r w a s b arr e d b y F e de ra l Ru le of

Ev ide nc e 40 8. B e c a

us e Mu lli ns do e s n ot c la im that U .S. B ank re fu se d to re ins tate he r a

nd we have de c ide d th e me ri ts o f t his

case without reliance on said letter, we decline to de cide this issue. IV . CO NC LU SION F or the re a so ns state d a

bo ve , th e de c isi on

of the dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED

.