NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT

YANCY SCOTT RICHARDS, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case Nos. 2D15-4586 ) 2D16-2162 KRISTA L. WEBER, f/k/a KRISTA L. ) RICHARDS, ) CONSOLIDATED Appellee. ) ) Opinion filed May 24, 2017.

A ppeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Robert A. Bauman, Judge. Karol Williams, of Karol K. Williams, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant. Mark A. Neumaier, Tampa, for Appellee.

BADALAMENTI, Judge. Yancy Scott Richards (Former H usband) appeals multiple aspects of the temporary alimony award, the durational alimony award, the fina l judgment of dissolution, and the partial award of attorney's fees and costs to his ex-wife, Krista L. Weber (Former Wife). We affirm as to all issues raised by Form er Husband without- 2 - comment, save for one—the trial court's order that Former Husba nd pay 70% of Former Wife's attorney's fees and costs. Section 61.16(1), Florida Statutes (2015), requires that the co urt consider "the relative financial resources of the parties" in fashioning an award for attorney's fees, suit money, and costs in a dissolution case. Our supreme court has explained that in evaluating whether an award of fees is appropriate, courts a re to "look to each spouse's need for suit money ver sus each spouse's respective ab ility to pay." Rosen v. Rosen, 696 So. 2d 697, 699 (Fla. 1997). As such, this court ha s explained that "the trial court cannot award fees based solely on disparity of income." Arena v. Arena, 103 So. 3d 1044, 1046 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (first citing Balko v. Balko, 957 So. 2d 15, 16 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); then citing Bohner v. Bohner, 997 So. 2d 454, 457 (F la. 4th DCA 2008)). Here, the trial court found that "[c]onsistently throughout the parties' eight (8) year marriage," Former Hus band earned approximately 70% of the parties' combined gross annual income. The trial court then ordered tha t Former Husband pay 70% of Former Wife's attorney's fees and costs as follows: "Bas ed upon the parties' disparate incomes the Responden t/Former Husband has the financi al ability to

contribute towards the Petiti oner/Former Wife's attorney fees a nd costs."

The trial court abused its discre tion by ordering Former Husban d to pay 70% of Former Wife's attorney's fees and costs because, on the record before us, the trial court based its award solely on the relative incomes of t he parties and did not indicate that it considered anything besides the parties' dispa rate incomes. See Balko, 957 So. 2d at 16 (citing Stoler v. Stoler, 679 So. 2d 837, 838 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).- 3 - Although the trial court may have considered the parties' relat ive financial resources beyond their disparate income, such considerations ar e not apparent on the record before us. Thus, we reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs.

We remand to the trial court for reconsideration of its award o f attorney's fees and costs taking into consideration the overall relative financial resour ces of the parties and to make findings of fact that will allow for review of its decisio n. See id. If necessary, the court may take additional evidence on this issue. See id. We affirm the trial court's award of durational alimony and final judgment of dissolution i n all respects. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with instructions.

WALLACE and KHOUZA M, JJ., Concur.