ANZUS IN REVISION

Changing Defense Features of Aust

and New Zealand in the Mid-198

by

FRANK P. DoNNiNi, LT COL, USAF

Military Doctrine Analyst

Airpower Research Institute

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

February 1991
Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department ofDefense school environment i

acad--mic freedom and the advancement ofnational defense-related concepts . The view

this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position 

Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is 

public release .

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Donnini, Frank P.

ANZUS in revision: changing defense features of Australia and New Zealand i

/by Frank P. Donnini .

p. cm.

"February 1991 ."

Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.

1 . ANZUS Council . 2. Australia Military relations-United States . 3. United 

relations-Australia . 4. Australia-Military relations-New Zealand. 5. New Zea

relations-Australia . 6. United States-Military relations-New Zealand . 7. New 

Military relations-United States . I. Title .

UA870.D66 1991

355'.033094-dc 20 

For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents

US Government Printing Office

Washington, DC 20402
Chapter

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 ANZUS-In Good Times and in Bad Times . . . . . . . 

"Showcase" Alliance in a "No-Problem" Region . . . 

United States Alliance Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . 

Other American Military Interests . . . . . . . . . . . 

Navy/Marines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Asymmetry Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Australian Involvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Problems with New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Alliance Background (1951-83 : The First Three Decades

Formation Stage (1951-52) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Interim Stage (1953-75) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Later Stage (1976-83) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Current Conditions (1984 to Present) . . . . . . . . . 

Australian Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New Zealand Turning Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

United States Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Future Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

United States Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New Zealand Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Australian Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Conten s

Disclaimer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ANZUS in Revision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Increasing Regional Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New-Look Defense Features of Australia and New Zeal
Chapter 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3 Australian Defense Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Role of the Australian Defence Force . . . . . . . 

US-Australian Historical Defense Ties . . . . . . . . . 

Wartime Performance of Australian Forces . . . . . . 

Australian Defense before the Dibb Report . . . . . . 

Full-House ANZUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ANZUS Aside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Changes in Defense Emphasis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Defense Setting after 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Revised ANZUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ANZUS Aside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Review ofAustralia's Defence Capabilities (1986) . . 

Government White Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Present and Future Service Capabilities . . . . . . . . 

Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Logistics Support and Defense Industry . . . . . . . . 

Federal Budget Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Australian and New Zealand Defense Relationship . . 

Growing Australian and US Defense Relationship . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4 New Zealand Defense Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

The Historic Role of New Zealand Defence Forces . . 

Pre-Lange Labour Government Setting (1952-84) . . . 

Full-House ANZUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

ANZUS Aside . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Turning Points in Defense Emphasis . . . . . . . . . . 

Lange Labour Government Setting . . . . . . . . . . . 

Within ANZUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Without ANZUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New Direction in Defense Objectives . . . . . . . . 

Government Discussion Paper on Defense . . . . . . . 

Comer Report on Defence and Security:

What New Zealanders Want . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Templeton Study on Defence and Security:

What New Zealand Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Chapter 

Government White Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Service Capabilities (Present and Future) . . . . . . . 

Navy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Defense Feature Shortfalls . . . . . . . . . . . . 

New Zealand Perspectives on Defense Features . . . 

United States Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Summary of Shifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Impact Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Suggestions for Policy-Option Improvements . . . . 

New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Final Comment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendixes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Selected Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Illustrations

Table

1 Aircraft Purchases (1951 to Present) . . . . . . . . . . 
Map 

1 East Asia and the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

2 Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3 South Pacific Exclusive Economic Zones . . . . . . . . . . 

4 New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Appendix

A Regional Country/Island Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

B The ANZUS Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

C Defense Forces of Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

D Major Military Exercises of ANZUS Members1VIid-1982 to Mid-1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

E Defense Forces of New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

F The Government of New Zealand's Position on Ship Visits 

G Significant Event Chronology (1983-87) . . . . . . . . . 
Foreword

The post-World War II collective security networ

foundation for Western allies and friends to deter aggres

communism, and promote the global cause of freedom an

security, and peace. For more than 35 years, one successf

network was the "showcase" ANZUS defense alliance, 

functional relationship between three close allies-Aus

Zealand, and the United States .

ANZUS worked well because it allowed each partner to 

say in matters that concerned all three and other players 

synonymous with fair burden-sharing, mutual confi

cooperation, and alliance unity . In military and intelli

Australia and New Zealand were both self-reliant and de

the United States.

In the mid-1980s, events caused the alliance to revise 

that a return to its former state became doubtful. In addit

and New Zealand wanted their defense forces more se

increasingly focused on their ownregion . As a result, no o

a revised ANZUS and the shifting defense features of Aust

Zealand really meant for themselves, the region, America

security.

Lt Col Frank P . Donnini has helped increase our und

producing a definitive volume on ANZUS in Revisio

Defense Features ofAustralia and New Zealand in the Mi

a seminal work of real value, because he discusses the 

involved with an open-minded, balanced approach that g

to each ANZUS nation.

Colonel Donninni brings a unique perspective to the 

intelligence officer in the early 1980s, he served on exch

Royal Australian Air Force in Canberra, Australia. 

under," he observed and worked with all elements ofthe A

New Zealand military and intelligence organizations . As 
research associate in the mid-1980s, he spent a year at the U

Pittsburgh researching, documenting, and writing this study 

a political-military affairs officer assigned to the Airpow

Institute serving as a military doctrine analyst in the lat

produced the final refined product.

This excellent book will provide readers within each ANZ

a much better understanding of the recent revisions in 

"showcase" alliance and what is likely to happen now, espe

Australian and New Zealand defense establishments . A

people in government, defense, and academia, who are con

such military and security matters, will want to read it .

DENNIS M. DREW, Col

Director, Airpower Resea

Institute
About the Author

Lt Col Frank P. Donnini researched and wrote the bul

while assigned as the 1986-87 Air Force research associ

faculty status at the Graduate School ofPublic and Interna

University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

Colonel Donnini is a 1970 graduate of Union College, 

New York, with a BA in history, a 1977 graduate of 

University with a master's degree in public administr

graduate ofCreighton University with a master's degree i

relations, and a candidate for a doctorate in public admini

the University of Alabama. He received his commission t

Force ROTC program . He has completed Squadron Offic

Command and Staff College, and Air War College .

A career intelligence officer, Colonel Donnini has ser

of intelligence assignments in the continental Unit

overseas . He graduated from Target Intelligence and 

Interpretation Officer courses .

His interest in the Australia, New Zealand, United St

defense alliance, the Australian and New Zealand defen

the Southwest Pacific region began with his 1981-

exchange officer with the Royal Australian Air Forc

Canberra, Australian Capitol Territory, Australia. While 

the commander of the RAAF Target Intelligence Centre

From 1987 to 1990, Colonel Donnini was assigned to 

as a military doctrine analyst in the Airpower Research 

Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Educatio

Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is currently serving as chie

Division, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley 

Acknowledgments

This study began while I was an Air Force research a

at the Graduate School of Public and International Affai

of Pittsburgh. It was a most rewarding experience 

professionally andpersonally . During the 1986-87 academ

a visiting faculty member conducting scholarly research 

and unstructured academic environment. I thank the US 

providing me the opportunity to produce an in-depth inde

of security interest and to interact with the faculty, stud

of an excellent graduate school in a great university .

Many individuals were very helpful and supportive o

efforts. I could never have accomplished this study 

Fortunately during the year I was able to meet and interv

people in senior-level and staff-level diplomatic and def

in Washington, D.C ., and Honolulu, Hawaii. Since their 

opinions were notfor attribution, I must thankthem collec

time and effort. Special appreciation goes to those forei

military professionals at the Australian and New Zealan

Washington.

I am very grateful to several people then associated w

research and writing programs on the Air Staff at the Pe

include Col Timothy Kline, chief of the Doctrine 

Division, and Lt Col Don Drenth, head of the RA pro

predecessor as a research associate at the University o

must also give special thanks to Dr 1 . B. Holley, Jr., m

USAFR, Retired, of Duke University for his invaluable i

right way to conduct solid research and for his advice 

orientation and the midtour seminars. Whenever I began 

I referred to his notes on research and that always helpe

me out . In the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, 

at Air University, I am indebted to Col Dennis M. Dr

Maclsaac, Lt Col, USAF, Retired ; and Dr Lawrence E. G

the Airpower Research Institute-and Dr Richard Bai

Xi
University Press for their constructive advice, editorial com

strong support .

On the academic side, many people deserve my sincere a

These include Dr Henry S. Albinski and Prof Robert A. B

Australian-New Zealand Studies Center, Pennsylv

University; Dr Dora Alves of the National Defense Un

Washington; and Dr Thomas-Durell Young, an independ

also based in Washington. Dora and Tom were especially 

providing me advice, materials, and support throughout 

research year. At the Graduate School of Public and I

Affairs, Dean Lawrence J . Korb and Dr Donald M. Goldste

USAF, Retired, were always there for support and friends

also go to Joseph Cafaro for his great patience and skill in pr

initial word-processing support.

Last but by no means least, I want to extend real grat

family for their complete support and encouragement on wh

a very interesting-and sometimes trying-year away f

Force and then became several years of finishing up what I 

I have not said this often enough, but to my wife Zell and s

and Joshua, I thank you for everything now and in the futu

P. DONNINI, Lt 

Military Doctrine Analyst

Airpower Research Institu
Introduction

Beginning in 1951 the defense features of Australia, N

and the United States (ANZUS}-operating together 

helped to produce a situation that brought security and s

vast South and Southwest Pacific regions. This alliance 

foundation for Western security in the region. Man

considered the trilateral and asymmetrical defense alli

allies a "showcase ." Its success was such that the 

encompassing more than 10 percent of the earth's surfa

called "Lake ANZUS."

However, events and occurrences from the mid-1980s 

created significant adjustments and serious disturbances i

arrangement. For example, much-publicized antinucl

including New Zealand's ban on nuclear-powered 

weapons-carrying ships from port visits, and increases in 

internal destabilizing factors are threatening stability in t

and exclusively Western region. At the same time, Austr

Zealand are undergoing major changes in their convent

features as they strive for greater defense self-reliance 

independence from the third partner in the alliance, the U

If done as intended, the changing Australian and New Zea

features will enhance and improve the strong and capable d

structures ofthe allies and provide real contributions to reg

and stability. Yet major problems are present that call int

only the basic existence of ANZUS itself but also the 

defense capabilities and objectives of the countries conce

The cumulative impact of New Zealand posture and shi

reaction and concern, Australian changes and involvement

and economic nuances have resulted in unprecedented reg

among the three countries. To date there has been l

elsewhere. Nevertheless, disturbances to established way

caused considerable discussion and debate on what has ta

what its meaning is for future regional stability . This resea

Xiii
ANZUSIN REVISION

explores and answers a basic question : What effects do the 

in Australian and NewZealand defense features and securit

have on those countries, the United States, and the region i

ANZUS era?

The nature of ANZUS is revising both as an alliance for 

a framework for security cooperation. For 35 years the 

ANZUS partnership was a major reason for the region

orientation and stability . Now the alliance is suddenly qu

from what it was just a few years ago, and its future is unk

Zealand is no longer an active partner; Australia is force

expensive middleman role; and the United States is frustra

a weakening of its global security network characterized 

deterrence and cooperative allies .

The defense forces of Australia and New Zealan

experiencing major shifts . Some of the changes are due to 

in the revised ANZUS framework. In Australia and New Ze

more changes result from major defense policy changes 

achieve two long-established but little-acted-upon goal

defense self-reliance and more independence from a 

protector, formerly Great Britain and since World War 11

States . Past dependence meant Australia and New Zealand 

adjust their own defense requirements to support those of 

forces . The result sometimes was service overseas that wa

and costly-in both resources and, more importantly, live

recent example was involvement with the United States in 

War as part of the commitment to "forward defense ."

The study mainly provides analysis and commentary of 

and planned shifts in Australian and New Zealand defense f

settings are used for each country. The first setting, the olde

the years before 1986 in Australia and before 1984 in N

Within this setting are two subsections . One is a full-house 

the commonly provided defense contributions from each 

other subsection is the individual Australian and New Zeal

contributions, ANZUS aside .

The second setting involves two time periods sta

mid-1980s . For Australia it begins in 1986, a year highli

Labor government-directed force structure study, 

X1 V
Australia's Defence Capabilities, produced by Paul Dibb 

was followed in 1987 by the government white paper 

policy, The Defence ofAustralia 1987 . The transitional y

Zealand was 1984, when David Lange's Labour governm

elected to power. Subsequent to the election was an inte

debate cycle finalized by the 1987 government publicatio

paper on defense policy, Defence ofNew Zealand -Revie

Policy 1987.

The second setting also has two subsections . The first co

or revised ANZUS and the commonly provided defense c

in spite of the absence of New Zealand. The other subsecti

individual Australian and New Zealand contributions 

features, ANZUS aside. The second setting in each cha

more detail than the first, since it discusses present and f

service capabilities, defense problems, and other aspects of 

defense relationships.

While recognizing the many security and related ben

from the close relationship with the United States, a gro

of concerned Australians and New Zealanders now wan

defense policies more toward their areas of direct strategi

and interest-the South and Southwest Pacific regions. Th

their outcomes, the ongoing and projected changes in Au

New Zealand conventional defense features become more 

regards to Western security. In the revised ANZUS er

interests and objectives in the region also are affected by s

Several means are available for the former close allies 

growing negative aspects of collective security in the regio

together again in an operative and positive defense 

Suggested changes in defense and policy options invo

ANZUS nations, with the United States having the 

Evidence indicates that the United States must be more 

supportive to the region, the American and Australian bil

relationship must become stronger, Australian defense 

improve as the country attempts to assert its role as a reg

power, and New Zealand's defense capabilities will de

unless improvements occur soon.
ANZUS IN REVISION

To place changing Australian and New Zealand defense 

proper context, a discussion of the ANZUS alliance itself i

A broad-based comment on its present status in an evolvi

growing importance and problems is presented . Following t

substantive look at the alliance, tracing its development 

ranging impact for the three allies and the Lake ANZUS r
Chapter 1

ANZUS in Revision

Defense strategy for the East Asia-Pacific region is based on forwa

US forces, robust alliances, and self-sufficient friends.

-Caspar Weinberger, US Secretary of De

Few can deny that the Australia, New Zealand, and the 

(ANZUS) trilateral alliance, ifnot in disarray, was at least q

in the mid-1980s from the "showcase" it once was . The fo

cost-effective, and asymmetrical Western defense allianc

state of revision : two bilateral agreements have replace

successful arrangement. One agreement has the Unite

Australia working closely together in a variety of se

matters under the cloak of a "revised ANZUS," whic

Australia's single most important bilateral relationshi

agreement has brought about an increase in Australian and 

defense cooperation. Regardless of the outcome of the st

once venerable alliance, a return to its former busi

approach and close cooperative relationship is doubtful . T

occurred and has been said in the last few years to e

turnaround . Perhaps these latest problems are only mani

deep and continuing weaknesses within ANZUS that 

brought to a head. Some observers believe that the 

nonbinding ANZUS Treaty reflects Western thinking of 

ago and has outlived or outgrown its original usefulness 

1980s, the ANZUS defense alliance was clearly in tro

possible crossroads of its existence. The changing defens

security objectives for the region must be seen against thi

American post-World War II policy toward the reg

characterized as one of benign neglect. American policy
ANZUS IN REVISION

intended to slight their allies in the South and Southwest P

maintaining the ANZUS partnership was a key US ob

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger described the lo

partnership with Australia and New Zealand (the current 

with New Zealand, notwithstanding) as one of the fiv

American defense policy in East Asia and the Pacific . 2 

reality dictated that other events and relationships in the 

Asia-Pacific region (accompanying map) and extending in

East Asia and the Pacific

Source : US State Department map files, May 1984. Courtesy of Pro

Australian-New Zealand Studies Center, The Pennsylvania State U
AN'

Ocean area were often more important and of greater co

advancement of US objectives and interests.

Besides, ANZUS traditionally provided a stable enviro

South and Southwest Pacific regions that allowed the Uni

concentrate on other areas in East Asia and the Pacific. I

the alliance experienced a crisis and a number of sec

emerged, the United States slowly began to realize that m

must be paid to the region and therefore renewed its empha

help maintain its Western dominance, the United States 

regional stability must consistently be a governing aspec

political, and economic policies . Yet the United Sta

accustomed to strong and productive collective security a

believed that it "cannot, and should not, go it alone ." W

forms, the revised ANZUS structure has experienced powe

that could jeopardize security in aregion long considered 

few problems. The notion of the Southwest Pacific as an 

and serenity is no longer the norm . 4

Increasing Regional Problems

The region has changed to the extent it is no longer, in 

New Zealand Foreign Affairs Secretary Merwyn Norri

"tranquil backwater, secure in its isolation from un

potentially hostile influences from abroad ." 5 The area is 

have more instability . Although outright military invasio

New Zealand, or any other island-states and territories 

other credible possibilities for problem creation exist .

Among external destabilizers to regional stability, the 

has assumed a greater role. Having formally announced i

involved in the Pacific Basin affairs and in competition w

the Soviet Union has demonstrated its plans by expandin

power of its military forces in East Asia and the Pacific . 

example close at hand to the Southwest Pacific region ca

the increase of defensive and offensive assets the Soviet

at the Cam Ranh Bay naval facility and Da Nang air base i

Republic of Vietnam. When military options have not pr
ANZUS IN REVISION

means to achieve objectives, the Soviets have tried ec

political inroads to accomplish the same. Fishing rights 

with economically vulnerable island-nations (first with 

now with Vanuatu) and political support for nuclear free 

have become useful starting points . Regardless of the fut

of its actions, the Soviet Union has welcomed the weake

ANZUS alliance. Many believe the "Lake ANZUS" perc

primary reason that influence in such a large region was d

Soviets for so long.

A wide range of opinions exist concerning Soviet in

capabilities in the region. Extreme views have the Soviets 

and cause all kinds of problems in the future. Former Aust

Minister Malcolm Fraser said that Soviet presence would 

a fish processing facility, then some refueling facilities; [ne

require repair facilities [and], in turn, an airfield. Then i

military] base." 7 A US Navy admiral, testifying in a US c

hearing on East Asia and the Pacific, felt strongly that Sovie

plans are to gain a military foothold in a strategically impo

and to improve surveillance of the US missile test range a

in the adjacent Marshall Islands group. $ Although their opi

farfetched---especially since the Soviets carry minima

Australia, New Zealand, and the rest of the region-Sov

and efforts could possibly grow ifthe Soviets perceive a le

ANZUS alliance or some similar-type arrangement. As on

State Department official remarked, "Even if they are not 

in mind what the Soviet Union is about." 9

Another destabilizing external factor involves potent

with Indonesia, Australia's heavily populated neighbor 

north . Because of its heritage of confrontation politics 

policies of "national resilience," Australia and New Zeal

Indonesia as the most difficult member ofthe Association 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) with which to conduct relations . 

straddling both the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean-So

regions, Australia has special concerns. For some onlooke

could conceivably be the source of rgional instability o

avenue through which it could come . 1
AN

Internal problems are increasing . Widespread antinu

and a demand for a South Pacific nuclear free zone-al

SPNFZmay continue and likely will grow stronger . 

much of the animosity and strong feelings are due to F

continuing nuclear weapons testing in French Polyn

Southeast Pacific), some strong feelings also are direct

other nuclear powers, most especially the United Sta

nuclear navy . Additionally, unsettling economic a

difficulties affect the fragile South Pacific island-sta

decolonization problems, such as those in New Caledon

some of France's last territorial holdings in the region. 

and military coups are no longer unheard of, as evidence

events (with their racial overtones) in the island-nation of 

model state of regional stability. It was the first coup eve

Pacific.

11

New-Look Defense Features of

Australia and New Zealand

Significant to the entire region are the changing convent

features of Australia and New Zealand . For years both 

about and tried to achieve national security objectiv

self-reliance and more independence. While being bot

and receiving members of ANZUS might have seemed 

governments representing all major political parties wi

and New Zealand felt such opposing concepts were wo

attempted to balance them . Until recently real self

independence in defense matters were limited. As future 

national defense efforts and directions, the defense whit

significant documents.

12

As the middle-size partner in ANZUS, Australia is a 

security link overlapping the Southwest Pacific, Southe

Indian Ocean regions . It has increased its primary role 

changes and future direction of regional security 

70,000-member Australian Defence Force (ADF) is 

professional military force, which has earned a deserved 
ANZUS IN REVISION

dependability and effectiveness, especially in wartime. If 

genuine trilateral alliance ceases to exist, Australia plan

stronger and more effective bilateral defense relations

United States . The country also wants to be more self-rel

its acknowledged dependence on and linkage with 

States-particularly in the important areas of capi

acquisitions, logistics support, and intelligence informatio

Several major events in the mid-1980s shaped the chan

features of Australia. One of the most notable was the 19

Australia's Defence Capabilities : Report to the Minister 

written by Paul Dibb for the Labor government of Prime 

Hawke and Defence Minister Kim Beazley. The review 

be adetailed, encompassing, and controversial examination 

ADF structure. Following this report in 1987 was the co

Labor government white paper, The Defence ofAustralia 

laid out long-range defense policy by incorporating key 

Dibb report and later American concerns and desires f

security

The Australian people believe that their best warranty 

for Australia to defend itself and have an area secur

connected to world security . Thus Australia in its white p

that self-reliance must achieve four fundamental objectiv

policy :

" maintain and develop a capacity for independent 

Australia and its interests,

" promote strategic stability and security in the reg

" strengthen the ability to meet the mutual obligati

with its chief allies : the United States and New Zealand, 

" enhance the ability, as a member of the Western 

of nations, to contribute to strategic stability at the global 

As far as political and military leaders are concerned, th

Australian effort has potential and appears to be moving 

the right direction. A number of key factors, acting 

combination, could seriously affect Australia's ability to p
ANZ

considerable program of defense improvements and e

These factors include budget limitations, service capabilit

support, and retention of skilled personnel . The issue t

whether the new defense features-that Australia 

achieve-are the best means to satisfy these important ob

New Zealand (by far the smallest partner in ANZUS 

Western security influence in the South Pacific region, its 

strategic concern) is undergoing its own review of defens

improvements. Under the dominant leadership of Prime Mi

Lange, the New Zealand Labour government has changed 

the way that country approaches its security and defens

government's expressed concentration is on self-reliance 

South Pacific regional conventional focus .

The country's past contributions to collective security 

stability inside and outside ANZUS were proportional and 

the small country had minimal direct value in US strategic 

it was a close ally and a contributing member of the show

However, recent postures and policies have challeng

foreign policy in unprecedented ways .A changing politi

influenced by sustained antinuclear attitudes and initia

Zealand and the region-and economic constraints are r

shifting the country's defense assets away from the revi

formal and informal arrangements .

A comprehensive debate cycle on national defense was 

two years with the Labour government's publication in 1

paper on defense policy . Unlike its Australian counterp

Zealand white paper is very politicized in content and ton

objective of the defense policy is to preserve New Zeala

and interests . This approach is sensible and acceptable, 

goes on to state:

For the first time, we have adopted in formal policy terns the co

New Zealand armed forces will have a capability to operate i

although more probably in concert with Australia to counter low 

gencies in our region of direct strategic concern.
ANZUS IN REVISION

Problems begin here . Despite the rhetoric and int

12,000-member New Zealand Defence Forces appear to 

declining in capability and effectiveness . Consequen

continuing and abrupt defense changes will alter in unkno

defense feature look of New Zealand for a long time to co

Notes

1 . Henry S. Albinski, "Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s," C

85, no. 510 (April 1986): 154; idem, "Australia and the United State

the Relationship," Australian Journal of Politics and History 29, no 

Owen Harries, "Crisis in the Pacific," Commentary, June 1985,47,50; 

"Crisis in the Other Alliance: ANZUS in the 1980s," World Policy J

(Summer 1986) :459,468 .

2. Thomas-Durell Young, "United States Security Interests and Obj

presented at a security conference on Strategic Imperatives and West

in the Pacific, Sydney, Australia, 9-12 February 1986), 47; Caspar W

"The Five Pillars ofOur Defense Policy in East Asia and the Pacific," 

23 (April 1984): 3. In addition to the partnership with Australia and Ne

other four pillars are: the importance of the US security relationship 

commitment to stability on the Korean peninsula, the efforts to build 

relationship with China, and the support for the political and econ

ASEAN. (The ASEAN countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore

Philippines, and Brunei.)

3 . William J. Crowe, "No 17-The US Cannot, and Should Not, 

Pacific Defence Reporter 12, no. 2 (August 1985): 11 . The theme 

repeatedly stressed then as commander in chief of the US Pacific Com

as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that Western allies have 

and responsibilities.

4 . Richard D. Fisher, "Responding to New Zealand's Challen

Security in the South Pacific," Backgrounder, no. 48 (24 July 198

Armitage as reported in Denis Warner, "No 2-'New Zealand Can'

Ways,"' Pacific Defence Reporter 11, no. 10 (April 1985): 14. Armita

were similar to Weinberger's remarks one year earlier in "Five Pillars 

Policy in East Asia and the Pacific"; statement of Karl D . Jackson, 

secretary of defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, in House Commi

Affairs, United StatesPolicy toward NewZealand andAustralia and t

of ANZUS : Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacif

Cong., 2d sess., 25 September 1986, 2.

5 . Merwyn Norrish as reported in Ian Templeton, "Welli

Post-ANZUS Pacific Security," The Bulletin 108, no. 5519 (20 May 
ANZ

6. Quoted in Jill Smollowe, "Pacific Overtures: Moscow's Moves 

Worry Washington," Time 128, no. 20 (17 November 1986) :58-59 ; Cr

in B. Andrews, "Admiral Points to Soviet Fish Pact," Washing

September 1986, 4-D; Jack V. Roome, "Soviet Military Expansion 

Pacific Defence Reporter 13, no. 2 (August 1986): 13-14.

7. Quoted in Clyde Haberman, "Challenge in the Pacific," New 

September 1986, 104.

8. Peter Samuel, "Soviets Buying Access to Strategic South Pacifi

Tells Congress," Defense News, 29 September 1986, 13 ; Dora Alves, 

the NewPacific," Defense & Foreign Affairs 15, no. 6 (June 1987): 41 

9. Quoted in Denis Warner, "Soviet Union NotJust a Country, But a 

Defence Reporter 12, no. 10 (April 1986): 10.

10. William T. Tow, "ANZUS and American Security," Survival 

267; Dora Alves, The ANZUS Partners, Georgetown University S

Series 6, no. 8 (Washington, D.C. : Center for Strategic and Intern

1984), 48.

11 . Alves, The ANZUS Partners, 15 ; Dora Alves, Anti-nuclear A

Zealand andAustralia (Washington, D.C. : National Defense Univers

20, 26-29; "Fiji Coup to Block Indian Power," Pittsburgh Press, 17 

12. Defence ofNew Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987 (W

Zealand: V. R. Ward, Government Printer, February 1987); The Defe

1987 (Canberra, Australia: Australian Government Publishing Servic

13. The Defence ofAustralia 1987, vii, ix .

14. Albinski, "Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s," 154.

15 . Defence ofNew Zealand, 5-6, 38 .

Chapter 2

ANZUS-In Good Times and in Bad Ti

Heart ofthe matter [is that] alliances can only succeed when founde

interest. . . . It is not in New Zealand's interest to form part of a nucl

-David Lange, Labour Prime Minister of 

We [United States] might be pissed off with New Zealand, but 

real friend.

-Marian Chambers, a senior official attached to US House of Rep

Foreign Affai

Until recently ANZUS (that special defense arrangem

Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) was 

showcase alliance. The characterization was especiall

ANZUS was compared with the most visible and mo

security alliance of the United States : the North At

Organization (NATO) . Although ANZUS did not have 

like that of NATO and was far short of meeting the origi

wish for a Pacific version of the North Atlantic allianc

perceived by many to have been effective and efficient

ANZUS was a collective security pact in which the Unite

"it would act to meet the common danger in accord

constitutional processes ." 1

"Showcase" Alliance in a "No-Problem" Reg

The American security guarantee for Australia and New 

often a subject of debate "down under ." The lack of an

direct military threat to either of the two antipodean co
ANZUS IN REVISION

caused the discussion . Related also was the unknown US mi

response if such an adversarial threat were ever to develop

Apart from the security guarantee, Australia and Ne

benefited from ANZUS in a number of ways:

" privileged access to American intelligence s

information ;

" purchase of US military technology and equipmen

which was state of the art or close to it, on very favorable 

" opportunity to exercise and train on a regular basis wi

armed forces ;

" participation in a variety of conferences and forums 

" cooperation on defense science matters;

" sharing of operational doctrine and tactics ; and

" personnel exchanges .

The Australian and New Zealand recipients valued these 

realized that many were irreplaceable . None of the ben

significant costs to the United States, which in turn also be

this special two-way and sometimes three-way flowing arr

fact, for years ANZUS was cost-effective for all countries 

United States Alliance Perspectives

The United States saw ANZUS as a tribute to the collec

and vigor of the Western system of interlocking defen

Officials believed these alliances, when working tog

instrumental in deterring aggression and preventing the 

large-scale conflict. Many of them also felt that allia

mutually reinforcing links among national interests 

features ofthese Western-oriented nations . Thus, ANZUS 

United States not only a regional area in which its armed 

exercise and operate but also an opportunity to devote else

required, some ofthese same limited resources, since Austra
ANZUS--GOOD 

Zealand effectively stabilized the region with their 

resources.

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pa

Wolfowitz said that successful ANZUS alliance manageme

on meeting five critical challenges . First, as an alliance of 

ANZUS had a need for foreign policy coherence. Susta

support for policies was essential. Second, an ongoing 

existed for alliance partners to have extensive contacts a

government and society . This requirement was most evid

consultation at the foreign ministry levels and in c

cooperation on the military side . A key element of c

cooperation had military forces working together, especi

navies because of the maritime nature of the region. Thi

consistency and continuity were necessary . Fourth, e

member had to accept both the mutual burdens and benefit

These included joint (US and Australian) defense facilitie

port and airfield access in Australia and New Zealand, st

and interoperability efforts, and exchanges and consultati

US perspective, tangible evidence of treaty commitment 

the maintenance of an American presence in the re

demonstration of an ability to operate effectively with tr

The final challenge was to recognize that ANZUS, impor

was, was still only one part of a much larger and 

relationship among the three countries .

Other American Military Interests

For Americans, the ANZUS cooperative defense al

other positive aspects that supported a wide range of mil

and objectives not specifically covered by the ANZUS Tre

at current arrangements involving each of the US mil

provides tangible evidence .
ANZUS IN REVISION

Navy/Marines

Australia is frequently visited and generally well liked 

and Marine Corps personnel . In 1986, for example, 57 

visited the country, mostly in Western Australia. The p

Freemantle and Perth were so popular among the America

whom had just spent several months at sea-that they wer

the favorite rest and relaxation areas for US sailors 

overseas. The American objective each year is to achieve 

four-to-five dozen US ship visits and a series of combi

exercises and training . If this goal is achieved, the United 

can continue playing a stabilizing role far beyond th

s

region.

Air Force

The US Air Force has a variety of connections and in

region . Although not as extensive as the Navy's, t

significant. Air Force ties with Australia traditionally have 

Senior leadership of both air forces have met on a 

throughout the years . There was a 20-year period of annua

between the US Air Force chief of staff and the chief of a

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) called "airman-to-a

These discussions ended in the early 1980s . Although vary

bilateral meetings, visits, and discussions continue, the

some suggestions to renew the top-level formal arrangeme

Air Force military transport aircraft have been regularl

Australia with the primary purpose of supplying and su

US-Australian joint defense facilities . There is usually 

Military Airlift Command (MAC) aircraft in the country 

time .

Air-related exercises between the two air forces and o

also helped US interests. The largest air exercise is the 

series . Begun on a bilateral basis in 1984, these tactica

exercises have grown in scope and detail . When possibl

also sends its aircraft and personnel to US-sponsored C

14
AN"LUS--GOOD 

exercises iri the Philippines and Red Flag exercises in th

United States . Most participants on both sides find th

worthwhile and enhancing .

The USAF Strategic Air Command (SAC) not only pa

such exercises as Pitch Black but also has its own spe

programs in Australia. The programs are called Busy Bo

Glad Customer . Busy Boomerang, SAC's first program, s

1980. The idea is for SAC's B-52 heavy bomber aircraft to 

routes over northern Queensland, Australia, but not 

Australian territory. Most of these aircraft fly from a

Andersen AFB, Guam . Busy Boomerang consists of s

training routes andprovides the only good places for Air F

to practice terrain avoidance in the SouthPacific region. Gl

the second SAC program, started in early 1981 in 

Australian government gave permission for SAC to fly B

and supporting KC-135 aerial tankers from RAAF Bas

overwater navigation and maritime surveillance . These 

US Pacific Command support missions into the Indian 

Boomerang Delta, the third SAC program, has been in op

since 1982 . A cell of B-52s flies from Andersen AF

mainland and lands at Darwin. SinceNovember 1986 these 

been able to fly missions in which they depart, fly, and 

Darwin. The Australian government ostensibly approv

program because it was cost-effective for the United St

(and SAC) position was to be appreciative of these sp

arrangements .

Another USAF area of interest concerns the Austra

Assistance Program, which is provided on a cash basis th

military sales (FMS). Among the many countries in th

Command area, Australia ranked first in total FMS pu

fiscal years 1950 to 1986, with more than $US 6.2 billion 

alone Australia had 134 active Air Force-managed FMS 

at more than $700 million in US currency .

Present USAF/Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) 

about as good as they can be under the circumstances . Al

aircraft and aircrews are no longer involved in training a

1 5
ANZUS IN REVISION

with the RNZAF, more than 160 Air Force aircraft trans

New Zealand in 1986 (on their way to and from either 

Antarctica) . Some 16 to 20 RNZAF aircraft transited thr

AFB, Hawaii, during the same time period . However, addi

and landing restrictions are now in place. Effective April 

aircraft were allowed access to US military airfields only 

circumstances, usually involving safety or security matter

Army

The US Anny has its own approach in meeting obje

region. The land component wants and has involveme

levels with the Australian Regular Army (ARA). They e

together. While the last military exercise the US Army had 

Zealand Army was Triad 85, relations between army mem

three ANZUS countries continued at a reduced level . $ Th

vehicle for achieving this continued contact is the Expand

Program (ERP), run by Headquarters US Army Western C

US Army component of the US Pacific Command (USP

Established in 1978, the Expanded Relations Program 

to implement USPACOM's peacetime strategy, com

multinational strategy, enhance understanding and inter

the various military forces, improve selected nations' 

capabilities, and provide US Army Western Command 

specialized training . The program consists of recip

personnel exchanges, on-the-job training, combined comm

field training exercises, and a series of conferences and 

recent years Headquarters Western Command has conduct

through the ERP, military-to-military activities with 33 co

theater.

The centerpiece of the Expanded Relations Program w

Armies Management Seminar (PAMS) . Conducted on 

basis, the PAMS had a straightforward purpose-to "pro

for the discussion of common military management p

professional environment, to stimulate ideas, and to pr

understanding ." 9 The growth of PAMS was impressiv

1 6
AN"LUS--C~OOD 

tatives from nine armies attended the first session in Honol

The 1986 session in Thailand had 196 representatives fro

Included in this gathering were senior officers from the N

Army. As representatives of a friendly but not allied c

actively interacted with members of the US Army. So PAM

auspices of the ERP, affords at least a chance for US and 

military professionals to keep in contact during the pres

strained political relations . I°

The Asymmetry Factor

From the beginning of the formal alliance and it

relationships in the early 1950s, the United States w

participant in the asymmetrical relationship of seemin

partners . Critical for the United States was the other tw

acceptance of the role ANZUS had in preserving peace 

according to approved Western standards. This role ha

regional context but also a critical linkage with the calcula

peace, which depended on a stable nuclear deterrent . Su

freedom required national decisiveness and will to surv

American viewpoint, these fundamentals were all necess

modern Western security alliance and all partners needed t

accept, and adhere to them ."

The asymmetry factor was in reality a major part of 

relationship . Australia, with an urbanized population of 

was a middle power in the world, comparable in many way

New Zealand, with only 3 .3 million citizens, was a sm

country with many of the characteristics of Denmark

neighbors were responsible for stability in their region 

(Appendix A lists the size and strength of their forces.) U

to share with Australia and New Zealand certain powers a

that were in excess of what those nations' smaller size 

warranted. Both countries in turn were able to have 

influence in dealing with the United States on a variety of s

and other concerns . Active membership in ANZUS was a 
ANZUS IN REVISION

for this favorable state offoreign affairs between the friend

~

Pacific nations and their North American ally. IAustralian Involvement

For Australia asymmetry in the former relationship di

problems of perceived imbalance and irregularity of natio

will. Australian officialdom occasionally had a tendency 

the special relationship between Australia and the Unit

even greater than it really was. ANZUS helped perpetuate 

To be sure, the United States needed Australia to host the 

and provide port access to visiting US ships and their full 

of sailors and marines.

However, as Australia has gradually sought greater sel

has become more concerned with its own defense needs

value of Australia to the United States has varied . In 

political, economic, and societal factors caused these shif

or more than military ones.

13 In the early 1970s strained 

reflected frustration and dissatisfaction over involvem

United States in the protracted Vietnam War. In the mid

start of the Liberal government of Prime Minister Mal

relations were generally good . In the late 1970s the rela

slightly downward again, causing one of America's for

on the region to comment on how the "ANZUS inheritan

a fairly obvious yet significant negative: the relative inco

of ANZUS for the United States." 14

The truth was that Americans generally lacked kn

understanding of Australia's history, makeup, goals, and 

recent years, however, an unofficial "special relationshi

for the land and the people "down under," which many Am

had for a long time, helped to strengthen Austral

relationships . 1 s

From a definite low point in the early 1970s, the United 

most part has made official efforts to improve its rel

Australia. For example, as the former US ambassador 

senior career diplomat ever appointed to Australia, Marsha

1 8
ANZUS--GOOD A

ahighly publicized speech on Australian-American relatio

Society of New York in 1975 . In the speech he attempte

some of the ill feelings that had existed between Australian 

Minister Gough Whitlam and US President Richard Nixo

Perhaps the most important factor in our new relationship is Austr

tence on doing its "own thing" in world affairs and our full accep

fact.

Over the past two years (1973-75), we have made it clear again a

we do not look for a lock-step relationship . Such a rigid relationshi

snap in the winds of controversy . Today our relationship is flexib

mutuality and true equality.

16

Much of Green's thinking appeared to be present again i

and practices of the Reagan administration concerning A

security in the region.

Admitting that ANZUS did provide definite security ad

Australia and New Zealand, some Australian scholars 

important negative qualifications on the relationship . First

seriously distorted Australian defense planning. Many de

recent defense posture and force structure stemmed direc

requirements of ANZUS collective security . Questions r

defense forces' need for expensive high-technology w

required interoperability with US forces and systems. Wh

to highly sophisticated sources that provide raw a

intelligence was really important to the defense of Australi

area of discussion .

17 The Australian government attempt

these and other points during a period of extensive revie

in the 1980s .

When viewed as a showcase alliance in a no-problem re

negative and qualifying comments like those above), ANZ

useful to the involved countries . From an Australian 

ANZUS was an alliance between a medium power and 

which blended Australian politics and security into 

arrangement with those of the United States . From an un

Zealand perspective, compared to all realistic alternati

brought the most security for the country at the least Cost

1 9
ANZUS IN REVISION

For more than 30 years, important senior-level offici

annual ANZUS Council meetings as executive consultativ

settings that rotated among the three national capitals, t

covered a wide range of defense and foreign policy issues

meeting usually constituted the most important fixed item o

diplomatic calendar for both the Australian and New Zea

ministers . 19 The three governments, acting through t

ministers and in turn their defense ministers, wanted 

Southwest Pacific region "Lake ANZUS." By pursuing th

ANZUS partners felt they were playing integral and legit

the global Western security network. Respective governmen

representatives at the annual high-level meetings continu

the notion of deterrence in the alliance . The capabilities o

States for nuclear deterrence and the relative capabilities 

States, Australia, and New Zealand for collective c

deterrence adequately provided the military compon

successful and seemingly durable ANZUS alliance .

Problems with New Zealand

Owing to the alliance's importance to regional and glo

the United States took a long time to negotiate with New 

recent antinuclear issues that threatened the allian

Wolfowitz, during the public and behind-the-scenes nego

started in 1984, the United States made a number of point

The United States was proalliance and not pronucle

The US government was fully aware of the lon

nonnuclear policy of the New Zealand Labour Party, both 

of government.

The United States knew that there was little nuclea

the South Pacific region. Washington believed that all thr

countries had a common interest in keeping strong and 

Western defense capabilities, primarily naval, in the regi

The United States had only one navy, and it was nu

20
The United States followed a policy of neither co

deny concerning questions of nuclear weapons on its 

aircraft .

New Zealand's "example" did not lead to mutual ar

but the opposite . By its actions New Zealand was cur

operational role-in effect, its cooperation and burden s

the alliance .

The American reaction to New Zealand's antinuclear 

naval ship-banning policy was swift and decisive . As 

reaction and ship ban policy continued, ANZUS w

inoperative as a tripartite alliance . To demonstrate this to 

and the rest of the watching Western world, the United S

and 1986 introduced several serious "punitive" mea

superpower cut off New Zealand's access to high-grade 

canceled all military exercises involving joint participation 

and New Zealand forces (highly valued by the small but 

New Zealand military), postponed indefinitely the ann

Council meeting, and finally, "closed" the long-standing 

"open door" policy between officials at various levels 

governments. Within a short span of a few months in th

the ANZUS alliance had reached a crossroads of its us

existence .

20 Although not canceling ANZUS per se, th

created a stronger bilateral security relationship with A

ended its security relationship with New Zealand . The Uni

longer considered New Zealand to be the close ally it once 

a friend.

Alliance Background

(1951-83 : The First Three Decades)

AN'LUS--6o0D 

To understand properly the present problems in ANZU

also know about the beginnings and evolution of the a

began as a simple collective security arrangement grew in

and wide-ranging one .

21
ANZUS IN REVISION

Until World War H, Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) 

close alignment with the United States; instead they 

integrated parts of the British imperial system . The 1941

advances suddenly revealed to Allied leaders the vi

importance of Australia and New Zealand to Pacific s

circumstances of US entry into the war initially focused th

many Americans on Australian-New Zealand, and 

Australian, security . In 1942 Australia was the only base 

an effective Allied Pacific counteroffensive could be mou

Japan . The British were no longer the major influence, th

were on the scene, and Australia and New Zealand were 

own important military contributions to the war effort . By 

focus of an ANZ secure base faded, and US attention shift

to the clearing of the Central Pacific strategic s

communication . Still, the total war experience changed 

prewar stereotypes Australia and New Zealand had of the U

Before, the United States was distant, somewhat unfami

secondary importance . Great Britain was king. Howe

mid-to-late 1940s, like it or not, the United States wa

powerful bulwark upon which future ANZ security depen

The Australian basis of foreign policy was thus arguab

a protector," at least until recent times . William F. Mandl

of the period, suggests that Australian history "is not s

depending on a great and powerful friend, first Brita

America, but of almost excruciating loyalty to its policies .

Spender, the conservative Australian minister for external 

1949 to 1951 (and ambassador to the United States from 1

raised in the late 1940s the question of a viable Pacific 

Fear ofthe United States setting up a "beneficent" peace wi

rearmed Japan caused Sir Percy to pursue with the A

assertive negotiating process on Pacific security. The US 

principals involved were Secretaries of State Dean Aches

Foster Dulles of the Truman and Eisenhower admi

respectively, and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asi

who later was secretary of state in the Kennedy a
ANZUS-GOOD 

administrations . None were overly enthusiastic in form

security alliance .

23

New Zealand's foreign policy in the postwar years was d

Australia's . More closely aligned with Great Britain, New 

at a loss to fill the void left by the mother country'

withdrawal from the Pacific. Realities during and after the 

a growing realization that Britain could no longer protect 

security interests . This awareness led New Zealand for th

its history to seek a closer relationship with the United Stat

one option apparently open" was taken with uneasine

quently, the beginning of the ANZUS alliance had an un

players . The new partners consisted of an unenthu

begrudging superpower, the United States ; an ov--

accommodating middle power, Australia; and an uneasy 

small power, New Zealand.

Formation Stage (1951-52)

ANZUS became an official treaty in the early 1950s . (

B, The ANZUS Treaty.) Its formation stage covered the 

1951 to 1952. The alliance took effect when signed into e

September 1951 in San Francisco by Sir Percy C . Spender 

C. A. Berendsen for New Zealand, and Dean Acheson an

Dulles for the United States. Sir Percy finally got his wish . 

now existed for a Western defensive pact in his regio

interest.25

By the time of its signing, the United States did in fac

security agreement with former allies more than it had dur

negotiations . One compelling reason for this change of of

was the growing American commitment to the idea th

communism should be contained and resisted. The ou

Korean War in June 1950 confirmed in the minds ofmany 

Communist expansion was again on the move. By c

Australian air and naval units were in the North Pacific ar

South Korea was invaded. The United States, first in the fi

Nations agent in resisting these hostile advances, requested 

23
ANZUS IN REVISION

Australian military support. Australia's readiness to assis

States helped smooth the way to the ANZUS Treaty signin

episode of ANZUS formation, Communist containment, 

peace treaty, and the Korean War onset considerably re

nature ofthe Australian-Americanrelationship at the time. 

more or less found itself supporting the two larger allies .

2

Another agreement formed then by the ANZUS part

Radford-Collies agreement (named for Adm Arthur Ra

commander in chief, Pacific Command, and VAdm Sir J

the Australian chief of naval staff). It provided for th

Australian, and New Zealand naval forces to share respo

protecting shipping and sea lines of communication in the 

important South Pacific/Eastern Indian Ocean areas . Since 

the agreement has allowed the holding of joint operational 

improve their maritime protection, sea control, and a

warfare (ASW) capabilities . Since any future conflict 

duration involving the ANZUS countries would inclu

shipping, Radford-Collies has continued to have relevance 

shipping protection in the region . Valid concerns include : m

vulnerabilities, US Navy finite resources, vast maritime ex

economies' dependence on international seabome trade, 

precedents of antishipping operations in the region durin

wars . When combined, the concerns assume greater sig

strengthen the need for Radford-Collins . 21

Interim Stage (1953-75)

The interim stage, lasting more than 20 years from 1953 

the alliance grow into a solid and reasonably successful 

By the end of the interim stage, however, major shifts o

approach were present.

At first increasing interdependence and reliance upo

States became important factors in Australian and NewZea

policies . The global collective security practices o£ the 

demanded an objective of "forward defense" when possibl

this end for itself and its allies, the United States expected 

24
ANZUS---GOOD 

New Zealand to contribute their fair share of support.' $ 

continuing their program of providing forces for overseas 

with a great ally . Since Australia and New Zealand no lon

any protection from Britain, they had to rely upon assista

United States . Although the scale of their overse

contributions remained small, the political value that Austr

Zealand gave to America was considerably greater. This 

most evident during their involvement in the Vietnam War 

and the early 1970s.

The establishment of joint US-Australian defense facil

territory symbolized to many what ANZUS really was a

United States believed its two ANZUS partners had ideal 

selected overseas defense establishments . Australia wa

appealing because of its strategic geographic location, remo

stable political climate . By 1955 government officials sig

ment for the first permanent joint installation in Austra

seismic station whose purpose included gathering inf

explosions, locating earthquakes, and undertaking resea

physics .

This early arrangement led to a series of discussions and

resulting in the establishment of many joint US-Austra

facilities . The three largest and most important wer

Nurrungar, and North West Cape . To varying degrees the b

important aspects of American security and internati

operations . The best-known facility was the Joint De

Research Facility at Pine Gap, about 10 miles outside of A

in the center of Australia. Pine Gap had two functions, co

with satellites and development of strategic space tec

facility staff numbered about 450, evenly divided betwee

and Australians .29

The Australian Labor government approved in 1988 an

agreement for operation . Prime Minister Bob Hawke, rep

right wing of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), tol

Washington that he accepted the risks of facilities like Pin

of "global strategic considerations." 3° Even former Pr

Gough Whitlam, aligned with the moderate wing ofthe AL

25
ANZUS IN REVISION

with official US policies, had cooperated . Though announ

that he would make known to the public the functions of 

said after visits and briefings that Pine Gap was too vital a

to reveal all of its operations . The Australian people were 

upset then or later with these positions . A 1981 poll on th

the joint facilities showed 60 percent supported and onl

opposed their presence.

The second important US-Australian facility was the J

Space Communications Station located at Nurrungar near 

South Australia. Nurrungar was a principal fixed groun

American military satellite communication in t

Hemisphere . Recently questions have arisen on w

operational satellite relay systems and mobile ground ter

lessen the "strategic necessity" argument for Nurrungar. T

had the United States wishing to keep the facility 

redundancy .

The third important facility was the Harold E . 

Communications Station located at North West Ca

Australia . It provided secure communications for ships at 

Facilities like Pine Gap and Nurrungar, for reasons o

location, could only be placed in Australia . (See accomp

North West Cape, however, could have its missio

elsewhere.

31 These facilities have fluctuated in value and c

the years. The point to remember is that America believed 

facilities remained important and Australia felt that hosti

significant part of its contribution to ANZUS and to the 

nuclear war .

32

No joint US-New Zealand defense facilities existed o

territory . Two American installations were in place . The 

US Navy base near Christchurch at Harewood, South Isl

the facility provided primary allied support for Operation 

to Antarctica . The second installation was an American 

observatory in the Black Birch range, also on the South Isl

these facilities were not so critical as the joint facilities in 

United States still valued them . It was thus a matter of c

for political reasons, Secretary of the US Navy John L

26
intern--w xvndmta m a ~ aem~n.umu .e ne~ndar.

ran~onu caD~t+l

Inf .mal acmW.sIraLV¢ c+OWL

Australia

ANZUS-GOO

Source : Australia Background Notes (Washington, D.C. : Department of State, B

Affairs, August 1986), 2.
ANZUS IN REVISION

unofficially about moving his service's fairly extensive 

Christchurch to Hobart, Tasmania, situated off the south

of mainland Australia .

ANZUS development encompassed a great deal mo

security matters. It covered a wide range of program

intelligence-maritime surveillance support, logistics 

support, trilateral conferences, consultations, defense coo

more . Although these programs were often erroneously 

part of ANZUS, they officially were not because other d

agreements governed them . However, the ANZUS Trea

suitable facilitating mechanism to make the varied proce

smoothly and efficiently .33

While the interim years saw the establishment of m

features, they also marked the beginnings of opposition t

in Australia and New Zealand. The Vietnam War c

discontent and protests. Almost three years before ANZ c

were committed to Vietnam in 1965, supposedly at the 

United States, there was a small Australian military p

comprised of volunteer regular ground forces but no dra

the Australian government reintroduced conscription by u

system that made nonvolunteers eligible to serve ov

conscripts started to go to Vietnam in 1966, the issues of 

death" came to overshadow almost all other factors in the 

on Australia's role and involvement in Vietnam .

34

Synonymous with this was the brief "lock-step" relat

then Prime Minister Harold E. Holt exercised with Pres

B . Johnson. Holt was the man who proclaimed that Aust

the way with LBJ" concerning Vietnam . It was a rare ins

Australia mounted a peacetime military effort commensu

population and economic resources . The attitude was s

reached a turning point with Johnson's dramatic 1968 p

in Vietnam and withdrawal from the presidential el

moment marked a real crisis not just in, but of, the Austral

alliance .

35

Antinuclear attitudes were also beginning to surface du

In conjunction with growing opposition in the late 1

28
ANZUS--GOOD 

involvement with the United States in Vietnam, questions 

as to the value of the alliance and the complicated iss

weapons. In the early 1970s the New Zealand Labour P

especially under the leadership of Norman Kirk and 

Rowling (later New Zealand's ambassador to the Un

advocated a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific . Dur

period, the Australian Labor Party, led by Gough Whitl

significant views that clashed with Washington's pe

strategic interests . Organized protests became more co

years surrounding the pullout of ANZ military forces fro

1972 and during the concurrent terms of the two labor 

While still supportive of ANZUS, the public was upset wi

direction of events. These antinuclear attitudes were 

shelved by the mid-1970s elections of conservative 

pledged to defense support and close alliance ties with the 

Yet many negative sentiments did not disappear but onl

the background.

36

Twomore shocks disrupted the ANZperception of Amer

and alliance support . First was President Nixon's 1969 a

in Guam stressing that from then on the United States 

expected to come to everyone's defense and that basically 

needed to defend itself. From an Australian point of vie

that "forward defense" was no longer viable and that its 

of securing the region by means of great power commitme

If the United States, like Great Britain before, was leavi

Australia had to develop a greater degree of self-relian

policy . To counter these concerns American officials st

Nixon Doctrine was grossly distorted when applied thus t

NATO. It applied primarily to friends and allies in Asia a

way for American extrication from Vietnam. While Austr

Zealand were listening to this argument, the second sho

was the fall of Saigon in 1975 and the subsequent end 

presence in Southeast Asia.
ANZUS IN REVISION

Later Stage (1976-83)

The later alliance stage covered 1976 to 1983 . C

governments came into power in the mid-1970s : Malc

Liberal Party in Australia and Robert Muldoon's National 

Zealand. In white papers on defense (Australia in 19

Zealand in 1978 and 1983), both governments pushed for g

for self-reliant defense forces . Yet, in Australia espe

attempts to devise new, credible, and self-reliant policies 

respects back to the need for continued close military, t

intelligence ties with the United States .

Increasing inflationary and other economic proble

impose restrictions upon the relatively modest defense spe

Australia and New Zealand . Although initially enthus

substantial increases for defense, the Fraser government 

devoting more than 2 .5 percent of the gross domes

(GDPthe national income) to it . New Zealand's very mo

establishment used only about 1 .8 percent of its GDP for de

adjusted to the country's population and resources, this w

world's lowest figures .

By the mid-1980s two opposing viewpoints concern

alliance management began to emerge . The American 

fairly consistent and advocated no drastically new a

collective security . It stressed burden-sharing responsibil

successful defense alliance. Each active partner need

expected and reasonable contributions . For the alliance t

and worthwhile, a spirit of cooperation that involved milit

and economic aspects had to prevail.

38

Antipodean positions differed from American ones at 

support or defense by the United States was no longer a 

some, provisions in the ANZUS Treaty were not binding 

especially in the South Pacific, was a no-threat envi

ANZUS nuclear umbrella reportedly caused some in

Australia and New Zealand-particularly the joint defens

Australia-to become targets on a Soviet nuclear hit list . Pu

emphasized that nuclear arms control commitments had 

alliance commitments . As a result both Australia and 

30
recognized an increasing need for more self-reliance i

greater regional considerations for security stability.

The ANZUS alliance reached a point of disarray in t

While such a low point was never the expressed goal of na

on any side, some observers have called for changes 

emphasis . Since much of the disagreement now 

fundamental issues, the current crisis could not be view

temporary .

Australian Support

Current Conditions (1984 to Present)

AN'LUS--GOOD 

Significant political changes came with the election o

governments in Australia in 1983 and in New Zealand i

believed that the Australian Labor Party, headed by the ch

Hawke, would take the lead in changing Australian rela

United States concerning ANZUS and many other bilater

Yet Hawke and his government surprised most observers 

to improve upon the already strong ties with the United St

obvious example of this approach was the comprehensive 

entire ANZUS arrangement the ALP conducted imme

entering office . The new government concluded t

supported Australian security in current and prospec

circumstances. Hawke clearly stated that, "we will mainta

commitment to the ANZUS Treaty . . . . The ANZUS al

only be adhered to by my Government, but it will be s

the sense of frank discussions with the US about whethe

may be improved." 4°

New Zealand Turning Point

If the ALP's position on ANZUS gave the United 

degree of comfort, the NewZealand Labour Party's stanc

3 1
ANZUS IN REVISION

year certainly did not. The 1984 election of 43-year-old 

as New Zealand's youngest prime minister represented a t

although not a new one, in New Zealand's approach to 

defense policies . Lange inherited a well-supported NZLP 

policy that contained two essential elements . The first

contradictory, denied entry to New Zealand ports of fore

(primarily American, but also others, including the Britis

nuclear powered, nuclear armed, or, in light of the 

neither-confirm-nor-deny stance, nuclear capable . Yet, at t

the policy wanted New Zealand to remain an active membe

and continue to participate in joint military exercises with 

member countries. The second element called for a nucl

free environment established throughout the South Paci

region-the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, or SPNFZ. A

Zealand officials were concerned, ANZUS was a c

defensive alliance . Ambassador Rowling, the former NZL

initially helped propose these positions, wrote, "New Zeal

formed part of a nuclear strategy . We have not asked nor 

to be defended by nuclear weapons . From our perspective, 

always been a conventional defence relationship .",41

Port access quickly became a nonnegotiable issue for b

culminated in the banning of the USS Buchanan in Febru

state their government's position, American officials, alo

from Australia and the outgoing New Zealand c

government, released a communique shortly after Lang

saying it was essential that allied warships continue to h

New Zealand facilities just as they had in the past. During 

period from 1980 to 1984, almost 40 US naval vessels, 

which were nuclear powered, had called on New Zealand 

New Zealand's leaders countered by stating they 

implication that their only contribution to ANZUS was pro

facilities for US Navy ships . Supporting their point was 

only four American ships visited in 1981 and two in 1982, 

the United States said such port visits were vital . From the 

perspective, that was a "pretty thin relationship ." 42 The i

port access began to dominate and cloud all other discuss

32
ANLUS-43o0D 

Two points stood out regarding the dispute. First, 

difficulties underscored the need for greater American 

allies' domestic political trends before an impasse point 

Second, the United States (and other Western nations) o

fact that New Zealand had been making important co

South Pacific stability and development for decades 

closeness to Polynesia was unmatched .

3

If Prime Minister Lange did not totally believe in the N

before his election, he quickly became a convert and stro

his small country's determined stance to speak out on nuc

and the escalating arms race between the superpowers . Fo

the election, the international news media and the pu

inordinate amount of attention to the young leader and 

nuclear weapons "sanity ." He was even nominated for th

Prize. Although he did not win the peace prize, Lange wa

present his case to the world.

Regardless of future New Zealand security policies, L

the following imperatives he planned to push for. He wa

" to provide for the conventional defense of New Zea

important obligation) ;

" to contribute toward South Pacific security in all it

" to promote economic interests of New Zealand ;

" to pay regard to defense arrangements of its close

important partner, Australia; and

" to take into account the attitude of the United States 

Zealand when thinking about the security relationship .

The New Zealand prime minister highlighted 

fundamental points in the dispute . In their rejection of 

New Zealanders were not anti-American, only antinucle

offended by comments that they were not pulling their 

alliance. As far as New Zealand was concerned, they kne

proper burden sharing. New Zealand did not offer itself 

for others to follow . Its strategic circumstances were 

government excluded nuclear weapons and power becaus

33
ANZUS IN REVISION

there was not in the country's interests. While the Unite

ANZUS in the context of its global East-West strateg

deterrence, New Zealand viewed its own role and commo

be that of a regional conventional deterrent promoting 

security . If the United States continued to insist upon ha

weapons in the region, then maybe that was too high a p

Zealand to pay. The final main point Lange and others wa

with the United States was that by punishing and disengagi

New Zealand on defense issues, the superpower was go

loyal ally and a true friend.

United States Response

The US response was predictably one of measured fru

Zealand's actions were a "matter of grave concern, whic

core of our mutual obligation of allies ." 45 The United S

that neutralist or isolationist thinking was beginning to 

realms of allied foreign policy . Evidence that this was ha

the Lange government's nonnegotiable no-nuclear-we

asserted in "tones of moral righteousness ." 46 Paul Wolfo

best explained the Department of State's position an

actions at a 1985 symposium on Pacific security.

For an ally to insist on that kind of disclosure [NC^ND] as a condi

access is just not responsible . . . .

With words, New Zealand assures us it remains committed to AN

its deeds, New Zealand has effectively curtailed its operationa

alliance. . . . A military alliance has little meaning without military 

. . . New Zealand can't have it both ways.

47

Regardless ofthe number of vessels that actually visited

according to American officials, put the US Navy at a 

disadvantage and weakened its ability to help the ANZUS 

Navy saw negative effects spreading throughout the va

maritime areas . Adm Ronald Hays, commander in chi

Pacific Command, spoke of "the US having lost New Ze

34
formally passed [antinuclear ship ban] legislation ." The 

was being forced to take "appropriate measures" to s

action was not acceptable conduct by an ally . To indicate t

of the banning issue, the United States ended in 1986 a tw

of negotiations and considerable effort with New Zealan

company . . . as friends." 48

Several side effects resulted from the ANZUS controv

the perception that the United States was being an inflexib

trying to impose its will on the smaller members of a Wes

arrangement . Another was the volatile issue of ec

restrictions . This was most readily apparent when rais

agenda item at the bilateral American-Australian security 

in San Francisco in August 1986. The cause for con

unexpected severity of the Australian backlash against 

government due to its offer to subsidize export wheat 

United States to the Soviet Union. Although the Australia

resisted pressures to link "unfair" US trade practices and 

facilities, the Australian public did not. For the firs

Australian citizens interlocked the separate issues and q

value of the American-Australian defense alliance 

Australians found it ironic that while loyalty to the Unite

ANZUS antinuclear dispute was reportedly causing their 

a potential $A 700-900 million in export earnings, A

Zealand trade increased marginally during the same per

unusual Australian political combination of the 

conservative rural farmers and the radical leftist urban a

groups was very critical of American trade policies for 

though the furor over trade issues and alliance linkage su

indicative of still unresolved problems, which might h

Prime Minister Hawke's comment that in many respect

become by the mid-1980s a "treaty in name only." 49

Future Status

ANZUS--GOOD 

The future of ANZUS as a trilateral defense allianc

Fundamental questions that still require answers are many 

35
ANZUS IN REVISION

situation be salvaged and the damage limited? Where does 

go from here? How strong will the bilateral defense relatio

exist between Australia and the United States and betw

and New Zealand? Can and should Australia assume a mi

bridging role? Will ANZUS ever return to the way it w

Western security arrangement for the region impaired 

disturbances? Few easy answers exist for these and other 

satisfactory answers had been available, negotiations wou

successful and grievances on all sides would have been r

discussion of the 35-year-old showcase alliance being in 

major crossroads of its existence would not be ongoing. 

to think about the ANZUS alliance status in the years ahea

some of the major factors that will influence events and p

United States Position

The official US position on alliance goals and responsibi

and uncompromising. Secretary of State George P . Shu

stated that the purpose of defense alliances will continue 

aggression and preserve peace by making it clear that alli

unite to oppose aggressors . The real deterrent will contin

working together to ensure that capabilities exist to f

conflicts . The supporting part of the deterrent will be that 

aggressor will know it . According to Shultz, ANZUS as 

not finished . It remains fully operational between the Uni

Australia today. With some adjustments by, New Zealan

States will welcome the former partner's full participatio

again. While it does not expect New Zealand to endor

nuclear policy, the United States expects New Zealand 

share in maintaining stability and deterrence in the re

Americans this includes unqualified access of their 

Zealand ports . The issue is not one of numbers 

demonstrative effect of New Zealand acceptance and p

important for a fully functioning ANZUS . When New Ze

and actions change accordingly, the United States wi

security arrangements with New Zealand to include jo

36
New Zealand Posture

ANZUS-GOOD 

intelligence information sharing, logistics supply, and sup

the allies, America included, will then need greater regi

roles .

s°

New Zealand, at least as long as the Lange Labour gov

in control, remained unwilling to negotiate its positio

weapons . It did not accept the American view of what 

obligations should be under ANZUS. Its policies were for 

only, and the country's stance was antinuclear and not an

The small country did not think that its policies justified t

United States was taking against it . According to Bryce 

former New Zealand permanent representative to the Un

and then high commissioner in London, there were sever

to remember about his country's policies . New Zealand, 

remote, did not set its policy as an example to any other co

no other member of the Western alliance was following N

actions. Its case was unique and not relevant to othe

reactions worried other small countries and had possibly m

effects on the alliance than New Zealand's own actions . 

was taking steps to compensate for the US suspensio

cooperation. What remained unknown was the long-term a

Zealand's own small armed forces to contribute to the s

region outside of an ANZUS structure s'

Australian Perspective

Australia's perspective was more positive . It felt its bila

with the United States had increased and thus had improv

and status not only with America but also with the other c

region. The Australian public, despite some trade issue d

still overwhelmingly supported ANZUS. In 1985, 73 p

that Australia needed a defense alliance with the United 

Zealand were no longer in ANZUS, an even greater total 

3 7
ANZUS IN REVISION

favored a separate mutual defense alliance with the U

Security cooperation remained close, and it was difficu

situation changing significantly in the near future . Whenal

considered, Australia would attempt to fulfill its regi

obligations under ANZUS. An unknown factor was a 

potent antinuclear element in its own country . As yet th

not appear to be as strong as similar ones in New Zealand a

in the areas covered by the proposed South Pacific Nucle

Summary

The basic ANZUS alliance and the many security 

arrangements that resulted from it directly or indirectly ha

many shifts during the treaty's existence. Although 

thought to be a showcase alliance in a low-threat part ofthe 

events have shown it to be in trouble. Part of the proble

imbalance caused by the special asymmetrical relation

three similar but different partners . Perhaps the nati

objectives and political aspirations of each were in fact far 

to mean ANZUS could no longer continue as it had in the 

between the United States and New Zealand over the nuc

issue reflected some long-standing beliefs that reached a 

the mid- I980s. Australia, which stood to benefit in some 

dispute, also found itself caught in the middle and was 

overall developments .

To be effective any defense alliance must be at least a t

If a member does not pull a fair load, then that member 

hindrance than help. In this case, new arrangements 

conceivable, if not essential . The viability, indeed the su

ANZUS as an alliance is not inevitable. National self-inte

never replace common interest and a spirit of co

fundamental components of an alliance like ANZUS . 52

Along with the former solid alliance being at a crossro

its usefulness, if not its existence, other recent and proj

under way in the Southwest Pacific promise to reshape the 

collective security is provided to the vast region . Both 

3 8
New Zealand are rethinking the roles, missions, and stru

conventional defense forces. One result has been a marke

the way these forces relate to their long-time partner, the 

to include the military, government, and industrial sector

smaller countries has a stated goal to be more independent

and realistic with its defense features, whether within 

revised ANZUS framework. The altering defense feature

and New Zealand require detailed examination to de

origins, directions headed, and meansplanned to see them 

first ANZUS partner to be reviewed is Australia-a 

security link to the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and the 

Notes

1 . Quoted in Dora Alves, TheANZUS Partners, Georgetown Unive

Issue Series 6, no. 8 (Washington, D .C. : Center for Strategic and Inter

1984), appendix 1, 61 ; P. Lewis Young, "ANZUS : Politics of an 

Defence Journal, December 1982, 67 .

2. Alves, 22; OwenHarries, "Crisis in the Pacific," Commentary, J

3. Paul D. Wolfowitz, "The ANZUS Alliance," Current Policy, no

1985) :1 .

4. Paul D. Wolfowitz, "The ANZUS Relationship : Alliance Manage

Policy, no. 592 (24 June 1984) : 4-5 .

5 . Confidential discussions with Headquarters US Pacific 

Headquarters US Pacific Fleet military officials at Camp Smith a

Naval Station, Hawaii, March 1987 ; US Department of State, te

Secretary's Statements at San Francisco, 152332Z August 1986, 1 .

6. "USAF-RAAF Airman-to-Airman Talks," (U), Headquarters 

Deputy ChiefofStaff, Plans, issue paper, 16 October 1986,1-2. Infor

is unclassified.

7. Confidential discussions with Headquarters US Pacific Air For

and Headquarters Strategic Air Command military officials at Hicka

March 1987; "Australian Security Assistance Program," Headqu

Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, background paper, Hickam AFB, Hawa

1987,1 .

8. Confidential discussions with Headquarters US Western Co

officials at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, March 1987 .

9 . "WESTCOM Expanded Relations Program," Headquarte

Command, information paper, Fort Shafter, Hawaii, 19 February 19

10 . Ibid.

3 9

ANZUS---GOOD 
ANZUS IN REVISION

11 . Wolfowitz, "The ANZUS Relationship," 3 .

12. Robert A. Brand, "Defence Down Under: An American View," 

Reporter 11, no. 12 (June 1985): 12.

13. Fedor A. Mediansky, "United States Interests in Australia,"Aust

30, no. 1 (April 1976): 153-54 .

14. Henry S. Albinski, "American Perspectives on the ANZ

Australian Outlook 32, no. 2 (August 1978): 13 1 .

15. Henry S. Albinski, ANZUS: The United States and Pacific Sec

Md.-. University Press ofAmerica, 1987),11 ; JosephM. Siracusa, "Fur

on United States Interests in Australia," Australian Outlook 30, no 

1976) : 475, 479.

16. Siracusa, 476.

17. Fedor A. Mediansky, "Australia's Security and the Ameri

Australian Outlook, April 1983, 24.

18. P. Lewis Young, 67; Ramesh Thakur, "New Zealand and 

Milestone to Millstone?" Asian Defence Journal, December 1984, 1

19 . Harries, 49.

20 . Ibid. ; Wolfowitz, "The ANZUS Alliance," 1-3 ; Dora Alve

Attitudes in New Zealand and Australia (Washington, D .C. : Na

University Press, 1985), 61; Secretary's Statements at San Francisco, 

21 . J . G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, Austra

University Press, 1965), 4; Glen St. John B arclay, "The Future ofAustr

Relations,"Australian Outlook 30, no. 3 (December 1976) :466,470; R

"Australia, New Zealand, and ANZUS," Atlantic Community Quar

(Winter 1984-85) : 346-47; idem, "Defense Down Under," 11 .

22. William F. Mandle, Going It Alone: Australia's National 

Twentieth Century (Melbourne, Australia : The Penguin Press, 1977), 

23. Sir Percy C. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS 

Columbo Plan (New York: New York University Press, 1969), 13, 6

24 . Albinski, "American Perspectives," 131-32 ; David Lange, "Ne

Paths," New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review 35, no. 2 (April-June 1

25 . The ANZUS Treaty Alliance, a list of signatories at San Franci

1951, 6; quoted in Alves, The ANZUS Partners, appendix, 60-63 .

26. Mandle, 134-35 ; Thomas-Durell Young, "United States Secur

Objectives" (paper presented at a seminar on Strategic Imperativ

Responses in the South and Southwest Pacific, Sydney, Australia, 

1986), 46.

27. Thomas-Durell Young, "Don't Abandon Radford-Collins," 

Reporter 13, no. 3 (September 1986): 16.

28 . Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, UnitedStatesMilitar

1987 (Washington, D.C. : Department of Defense, Summer 1986), 4-

29 . Harry G. Gelber, "Australia, the United States and the Strategi

Comments on the Joint Facilities," Australian Outlook 36, no. 2 (Au

40
ANZUS--43WD 

30. Thomas Keneally, Outback (London: Rand McNally Publis

141; Derek McDougall, "The Hawke Government's Policies tow

Round Table, no. 310 (April 1989) : 169.

31 . Gelber,13; Thomas W. Shubert, "rhe United States and the So

Policy Options for a Changing Region" (master's thesis, Naval Postg

March 1986), 35-36. Many Australian strategists, academics, and 

commented on the value and need for the joint facilities . See P. Le

Denis Warner, "The Importance of Being ANZUS,"Pacific Defence 

3 (September 1984): 21 ; Frank Robertson, "Pine Gap Raises Its Out

Defence Reporter 12, no. 10 (April 1986): 14; Mediansky, "United S

Australia," 142, 153; John Stackhouse, "A Glimpse at a Growing 

Bulletin 108, no. 5507 (25 February 1986): 52 ; Keneally, 141; Andr

Bases in Australia: The Controversy Grows," Asian Defence Jour

1984, 50-53.

32. Gerald L. Purcell, "The Value and Future of the ANZUS Allia

the Australian Naval institute 11, no. 1 (February 1985): 14; Anthon

Security in Australian Perspective," Asian Defence Journal, Octob

Fedor A. Mediansky, "ANZUS in Crisis," Australian Quarterly 5

(Autumn-Winter 1985) : 15 .

33. Thomas-Durell Young, "An Analysis of and Commentary o

New Zealand, and United States Defence Relationship, 1951-19

University of Geneva, 1987), 245-55, appendix E; Peter Samuel, 

Anti-Nuclear View Driving U.S . Naval Operations to Australia," 

Tribune, 11 March 1987, 5.

34. Henry S . Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in Australia

Vietnam and Conscription (Durham, N.C. : Duke University Press, 19

141 .

35 . Hugh Collins, "Australia and the United States : Assessing t

Australian Outlook 32, no. 2 (August 1978): 156 .

36. Lange, "New Interests, New Paths," 11 ; Albinski, "America

135.

37. Gelber, 14; John C. Dorrance, "ANZUS: Misperceptions, 

Reality," Australian Quarterly 57, no. 3 (Spring 1985): 218-19.

38. Dorrance, 222,229; Gelber,14-15; Albinski, "AmericanPerspe

Tony Street, "Alliances, Threats and the World around Us: No 1-W

Aligned," Pacific Defence Reporter 9, no. 8 (February 1983): 10.

39. Mediansky, "ANZUS in Crisis," 7-9, 17 ; Lange, "New Intere

11-12; Keneally, 141 .

40. Bergin, 81 ; Brand, "Australia, New Zealand, and ANZUS," 3

41 . John H. Beaglehole, "No 1-NewZealand: The Endof an Era,

Reporter 11, no. 10 (April 1985): 8 ; Shubert, 31 ; Peter Samuel and P

Troubled Waters of ANZUS," Strategic Review 14, no . 1 (Winter 1

42. Allan C. Brownfeld, "Fragility of Alliance Illustrated in 

Washington Times, 12 September 1984, 3C-4C; Beaglehole, 8 ; 

41
ANZUS IN REVISION

"ANZUS Stand Explained," New Zealand Foreign Affairs Revi

(January-March 1985):48.

43. Dora Alves, "Strategic Imperatives to Strengthen the Fabric 

Pacific" (paper presented at a seminar on Strategic Imperatives 

Responses in the Pacific, Sydney, Australia, 9-12 February 1986), 76

44. David Lange, "Relations with the United States," NewZealand 

Review 35, no. 3 (July-September 1985): 31-32; idem, "Nuclear 

Debate," New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review 35, no. 1 (January-Ma

idem, "New Interests, New Paths," 13; idem, "New Zealand's Se

Foreign Affairs 63, no. 5 (Summer 1985) : 1015 .

45. Beaglehole, 10.

46. Samuel and Serong, 44-45 .

47. Quoted in Denis Warner, "No 2-'New Zealand Can't Have I

Pacific Defence Reporter 11, no. 10 (April 1985) : 12; Alves, Anti-nu

in New Zealand andAustralia, 61 .

48 . Brand, "Australia, New Zealand, and ANZUS," 357; Ronald J

Shadow Is Apparent in Pacific Security Setting," San Diego Union, 1

6C; "U.S .-New Zealand Disagreement on Port Access for U.S . Ship

ofState Bulletin 86, no. 2114 (September 1986): 87 ; Albinski, ANZ

States andPacific Security, 49-50.

49. Statement of James R. Lilley, US deputy assistant secretary o

Asia and Pacific Affairs, in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Unit

toward NewZealand andAustralia and the Current State ofANZUS: H

the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d sess

1986, 8-9; Fedor A. Mediansky, "Washington Startled by a Roarin

Under," TheBulletin 108, no. 5544 (11 November 1986) : 118; Oakla

Pacific Shakes Fist at the U.S.," Toronto Globe & Mail, 25 Oct

Beaglehole, 11 .

50. George P. Shultz, "On Alliance Responsibility," Department 

85, no. 2012 (September 1985): 33 ; Caspar W. Weinberger, "We W

New Zealand's Return Anytime," Pacific Islands Monthly 56, no

1985) : 20.

51 . Bryce Harland, "A Continuing Partnership," New Zealand 

Review35, no. 2 (April-June 1985):27-28 ; Brian L. Kavanagh, TheCh

Alliance in the South Pacific (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Pre

52. Ross Babbage, "The Prospects for Security Cooperation be

Allies till the Turn ofthe Century" (paper presented at the National Def

Conference on the Pacific Basin Security : Impact of Political and 

toward Year 2000, Honolulu, Hawaii, 27 February 1987), 14-15

Alliance?" Air Force Times, 9 February 1987, 28 .
Chapter 3

Australian Defense Features

Australia regards its relationship with the United States as of 

importance. . . . We will be together forever.

-Bob Hawke, Prime Ministe

We [plan to] shape [limited defence capabilities] primarily to def

and Australian interests in very large areas which are our immed

environment .

-F. Rawdon Dalrymple, Australian Ambassador to the 

The images of the Australian fighting man at war ha

those ofrugged individualism, fierce courage, unswervin

"mates," and staunch self-reliance . These representation

a large part of the myth and the national self-image that A

others, including Americans, have when thinking abou

forces of the land "down under." The truth is that Aust

generally have proved themselves well . Fighting under t

then with the United States, they have shown throug

worthiness as valued comrades in arms .

In peacetime the Australian military forces have not 

as many accolades from foreigners or even from their ow

In the mid-1980s Minister of Defence Kim Beazley 

Australian Defence Force (ADF) as "capable, well-

equipped, and well-led ." I At the same time defense crit

the ADF to have "little bits of lots" of capabilities . 2 To he

issue, Beazley commissioned a one-year in-depth study 

by Paul Dibb, a recognized authority on Australian poli

matters.

43
ANZUS IN REVISION

The resulting report, Review of Australia's Defence C

Report to the Ministerfor Defence (the Dibb report), publis

was hailed as the most significant review of Austral

capabilities, force structure, and related aspects since the Se

War. This report formed the basis for the 1987 government 

on defense policy, considered by many to be a landmark doc

the Dibb report and the white paper were important parts of 

a country on the brink of a major restructuring of defens

military force structure. Australia was trying to address its s

while remaining committed to policies and practices suppo

interests and self-reliance. Were these diverse objectives 

This chapter examines the multitude of issues involv

changing Australian defense features. It considers Austral

defense posture, then examines how it came about . For a c

framework, it looks at two general settings: before and af

year of the Dibb report. Other areas are then discussed pr

section on the growing bilateral Australian and Ameri

relationship .

The Role of the Australian Defence Force

Australia, a Western country with fairly diverse ec

political structures, considers itself as a regional middle p

the Western global alliance system. With a mostly Caucasia

of 16.4 million, more than 70,500 people serve on ac

volunteer members of the ADF. The reserve military i

26,000, mostly in the army, and the civilian force working 

the Department of Defence exceeds 40,000. 4 Consequent

almost 137,000 (less than 1 percent of the population) 

directly associated with some aspect of the peacetime defen

ADF strives to support a pro-Western and pro-ANZUS g

policy that revolves around a high-technology, conventio

force. Although the Australian public until recently h

particularly involved in public debate on defense issues

supportive of both an effective and a capable ADF and 

44
AUSTRALIAN DEF

arrangement . In 1984 The Bulletin magazine's speci

Australians disclosed that :

74 percent favored increased defense spendin

62 percent favored compulsory military tr

young men

(39 percent for young women) ;

57 percent believed some countries threaten

security ; and

68 percent believed its defense treaties with its 

United States, were of great value to Australia. s

Yet manpower figures and public samplings did not 

questions needed for debate on the ADF and defense polic

effort for informed debate was required to determine whet

had the appropriate mix of a reasonably self-reliant defe

and a certain degree of dependence on overseas support 

United States) to meet its defense objectives . The Dibb 

follow-on government white paper, The Defence of Au

were steps in the right direction for addressing the changi

defense features . Comments on earlier features of 

necessary to put a discussion of an ANZUS chronolog

context.

US-Australian Historical Defense Ties

In the past the United States has been a factor in Austr

thinking as a means to help protect the country and 

According to some observers, the idea began in the l

century, and it was expressed in the White Australia pol

function of the newly federated country's fear of an in

formidable Japan . For this reason, Australia's Prime Mi

Deakin in 1908 engineered a visit to Australia by 

Theodore Roosevelt's Great White Fleet . Deakin also tri
ANZUS IN REVISION

see enunciated an American (and British) "Monroe Do

Pacific."

The Australian fear of the original Japanese threat do

political thinking for almost 40 years. The widesprea

America saved Australia from the Japanese (and the Ge

South Pacific) during the darkest days of World War I

important source for much of the lasting pro-US s

high-level popular support for ANZUS. The idea of a sp

Doctrine has not gone away. Current Minister of Defenc

spoken of an assertion of Australian regional leadership, w

backing, reflected in a modem Monroe Doctrine in the 

Beazley's comments were indicative of the general atti

necessary and continuing strong defense ties with Americ

Wartime Performance of Australian Forc

Despite close association with the American military du

the ADF (and incidentally the New Zealand Def

accomplished and contributed enough to stand out on t

combined exploits of Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) 

wars were well known. The military had a proven reputa

standard of performance in battle. Their tradition ba

maintaining top-quality volunteer forces capable of rapid 

regional contingencies and on serving as the professional 

larger defense forces in times of wider need .

Considering its population base and other requiremen

of the ADF in both global wars were significant . In the Fir

Australia was not threatened by any adversary. Neve

country of then only five million citizens rose to the occ

approximately 330,000 volunteers overseas, primarily to 

to and fight for British military leaders under the auspic

Empire effort. An incredible total of 60,000 servicemen, 

of every five, died during the war. Australia, in its "comi

more men killed in combat in that conflict than did th

United States .
AUSTRALIAN DEF

World War II witnessed an equally impressive eff

associated with the British in North Africa and then l

Americans in the Pacific . At the start of the war in Sep

Australia had in all three services about 10,000 regular

reservists . By the end of 1941 the total was 230,000 . Roy

Air Force (RAAF) strength alone reached 160,000 person

aircraft, and the RAAF became temporarily the world's 

air force. The ADF peaked at almost two-thirds of a milli

by mid-1943 and fell off to 575,000 by war's end in Sep

(Australia sent 550,000 overseas and lost more than 34,0

8,000 in Japanese POWcamps .) 8 This total six-year experi

almost everyone in a nation of about seven million peopl

Australian Defense before the Dibb Repor

From World War II up to the mid-1970s, Australian d

features were generally quite dependent on the United Sta

the latter time period did any form of defense self-reli

emerge and incorporate itself into a special arrangeme

dependency with the United States . In addition, until the 

1970s, no Australian government had made defense t

"substantial intellectual analysis." 9 A discussion now f

Australian defense features associated first within the AN

and then with the alliance aside .

Full-House ANZUS

The term most identified with Australian defense str

full-house ANZUS was that of forward defense . The co

ADF was not a new one but was applicable prior to heavy 

to the United States before and after the ANZUS a

functioning in the early 1950s . Support for forward def

went to the British and gradually shifted over to the Americ

defense began with the dispatch of the Australian Regula

Division to Malaysia in mid-1941 and did not end u

47
ANZUS IN REVISION

Australian combat forces withdrew from Vietnam in earl

argued that a residual forward defense presence (i .e ., use o

Air Base in Malaysia and similar small-scale arrangemen

of obligation (i .e ., Five Power Defence Arrangemen

remained in the area. However, most agreed that forward 

old sense was unworkable after the last British and US 

withdrew from mainland Southeast Asia in 1975 . Apart 

War It there was some discussion that Australian con

forward defense and reactions to crises threatening its sec

were not appropriate. A few commentators likened them 

and "defense on cheap ." Io

If the above critical or demeaning comments we

indisputable was the traditional Australian insistence abo

ally with great and powerful friends . Australian ideas a

needs and requirements were slow to change. Factors 

location, history, politics, allegiances, and perceive

combined to make Australia, at least until recently, willin

role of a junior partner. Although Australians, accordi

ambassador to the United States, "are not . . . and never wi

to adopt a supine and uncritical posture towards their majo

have been known to bend and oblige . Australia realiz

complex and difficult problems in adequately defen

continent and interests, which covered an area equi

continental United States but with less than 7 percent 

human resources and 4 percent of its wealth.

Despite the difficulties inherent in defending such a 

ADF organization in the past gave low priority to home de

the years before 1986, the primary objective was or

overseas deployment as part of an integrated allied force. 

recently began slowly adjusting to the policy of first prepa

the Australian mainland (three million square mi

surrounding maritime environment (another three million 

At the same time, the ADF wanted to be capable of c

ANZUS and its share of the Western security network .

1

The first instance of ADF units performing forward 

under ANZUS was in the Korean War. Although U

48
AUSTRALIAN DEF

collective security actions were used to solicit all

cooperation against the aggressors, the sending of re

Australian forces to fight alongside American ones was 

factor in the United States agreeing to create ANZUS

immediate readiness to assist the American forces in Kore

that they were the first actually to get into combat 

impressions .

13

Australia also participated in forward defense in the V

As Australian Ambassador to the United States F. Rawdo

pointed out to an American audience in Washington, D.

and New Zealand were the only Western allies of the US 

the Vietnam campaign." 14 At its height of commitment, t

military presence in Southeast Asia reached 8,000, 

considerable number of servicemen at that time . The costs 

and financial expenditure were high. But an even greater 

deep division the Vietnam War involvement brought 

society . Similar in many ways to dissent and protest agai

the United States and elsewhere, the Australian connectio

element. For many Australians "the Vietnam debacle effe

forward defense." 1s

Australians had not really questioned Sir Robe

announcement in 1965 of an ADF commitment to the a

Vietnam . Nor had they disputed Prime Minister Harold H

promise in 1966 to President Lyndon B. Johnson that 

admiring friend, a staunch friend, that will be all the way 

However, after Holt's drowning in late 1967, that partic

understanding between the two governments ended.

By 1968 the questions began with a basic one as 

satisfactorily answered: Did the Australian government s

Vietnam because of a request from Saigon or because 

pressure to be a reliable ally and support forward defense 

Treaty obligations? 17 Some Australian observers were c

role and considered it one more example of their experie

United States in the war with Japan and in the conflicts 

Vietnam . For support, they pointed to several problems in 

record on consultation and cooperation with respecti

49
ANZUS IN REVISION

governments . While US officials might have responded 

the above comments, the views were indicative of past im

disturbances in the bilateral relationship .

1

8

Major dependence on US government and private Amer

industries for support and equipment has been and will c

a basic tenet of Australian defense features. Although p

Australian defense self-reliance admitted this was not syn

Australian self-sufficiency, there was no contradiction 

policy . The ANZUS alliance and its related arrangements w

as substantially improving Australia's technical ca

equipment acquisition processes . The mechanism to p

terrupted supply and other logistics support for the substa

weapon systems, high-technology equipment, and o

material of US origin was a memorandum of understa

between the United States and Australia. The latest MOU 

of appendages on logistics support was dated April 19

each year and preceded by a similar MOU in 1982 a

arrangement in 1965, the MOU set out effective policies a

for logistics support arrangements in peacetime and dur

emergency . The MOU was the workable cornerstone 

support between the two countries. It helped ensure Aust

as a first-class ally, at least as far as logistics and proc

concerned .

19

Table 1 lists ADF aircraft purchased from the Unit

illustrates the dominance of American-sourced defense e

material in ADF overseas defense expenditure . Primary 

capital equipment have been air, then naval, and lastly gr

of the ADF. The starting point was 1951, when Australi

the United States its first large defense order in the post

era. That time also marked both the beginning of the decl

equipment acquisition from Great Britain, Australia

supplier, and the formation of the ANZUS defense allia
AUSTRALIAN DEF

Table 1

Aircraft Purchases (1951 to Present)

Sources. Tom Muir, "The US-ANZUS Partner and Major Defence Supplier," P

Reporter 12, no. 10 (April 1986): 12 ; Headquarters US Pacific Air Fo

Policies Directorate, "Australian Security Assistance Program," (U), 

1987, 1 . (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified .

5 1

Total US Producer Name Type Remark

113 North Sabre fighter redesig

American (constr

license

12 Lockheed P2V-5 maritime

Neptune surveillance

36 Lockheed C-130 transport still in 

Hercules

30 Lockheed P-3 Orion maritime still in 

surveillance

20 McDonnell- A-4G fighters Royal 

Douglas Skyhawk Navy s

remain

New Z

31 Grumman S-2E coastal still in 

Tracker surveillance

200 + Bell, Boeing, helicopters many 

Sikorsky,

Vertal

28 General F-111C strike aircraft still in

Dynamics servic

config

75 McDonnell- F/A-18 fighter/ most t

Douglas Hornet air defense assemb

Austra
ANZUS IN REVISION

Most analysts agreed that the 1963 decision to purchas

strike aircraft at the design stage signaled a significa

Australian policy and a commitment to bring the ADFint

association with the United States . The "Americanization

has become all but complete .

20 The bulk of the maj

purchases falls within the government-to-government fo

sales (FMS) program. For Australian purposes esp

arrangement is extensive and important .2l

Naval equipment purchases, while not as standardi

systems as the aircraft, are still significant in quality and 

Royal Australian Navy (RAN) formerly used the HMAS 

World War II British Illustrious-class aircraft carrier, a

However, the carrier capability along with its Ameri

fixed-wing elements of the Fleet Air Arm ended with the 

"retirement" in 1983 . 22 The current process started in th

when the RAN purchased three US-built Adams-class g

destroyers . In the 1970s Australia decided to buy fou

guided missiles frigates from the United States and then 

for two more such ships, now designated Adelaide-class, 

Australia. When we combine the number of ships purchas

up more than one-half of the RAN's present surface com

The RAAF depends more on US support than the RAN, 

the latter still counts on the United States for quality and 

The Australian Regular Army (ARA), by its nature, 

big weaponsplatforms like its sister services . Even so, so

equipment, such as armored personnel carriers and 

howitzer artillery, are of American origin. 23 (See ap

equipment details on ADF service branches .)

From the above discussion it is clear that the close rel

the United States and dependence upon this country fo

equipment and logistics support make it hard for Austra

self-reliant in defense matters . Unless carefully co

US-sourced equipment, although good for standardizat

operability, could channelize defense capabilities. It al

Australian defense industry involvement and product

These are the reasons Australian leaders in recen

52
AUSTRALIAN DEF

emphasized an Australian ability to modify and adapt 

equipment to meet their own security requirements. For a 

Australia this would still never mean complete self-s

defense effort. But it could mean, over time, a lessening o

on foreign sources-such as the United States-for weapo

spare parts, ammunition, and so on. 2a

Within a full-house ANZUS, Australia and the ADF con

important roles in several other areas . The fact that Aust

three joint defense facilities (because of its strategic l

continent) was probably a noneconomic factor of o

importance to the United States. Although some arg

arrangement was outside ANZUS, Americans in position 

generally considered it "within the spirit" of Article II of 

Treaty (appendix B). The facility hosting and some of the o

military, technical, and scientific agreements between the 

remained important indicators of close defense cooperati

More narrowly, Australian security posture necessitat

with the US intelligence community and access to its rele

finished intelligence and surveillance information . The 

flow is a two-way street in which the United States also 

Austral ian-sourced intelligence materials . The 

unequivocally stated that the contribution being made by 

the United States to each other's core interests (as in critical 

was a "vital element of symmetry in the security relation

There were two other examples during this period of m

commitment to the American alliance through ANZUS. 

consistent provision ofport and air facilities, which suppor

US nuclear and conventional military forces . The 

government still has a clear policy to welcome such visi

alliance responsibility and substantial benefits for its o

Second was the Radford-Collins agreement of 1951, wh

justification for combined naval operations .2'

A final worthwhile element for the ADF in an operative 

the particular value associated with regular bilateral, 

participative combined military exercises conducted 

participation. (For example, appendix D lists the variet

5 3
ANZUS IN REVISION

exercises ANZUS members had from mid-1982 to mid

extensive and comprehensive exercises as the biennial Ka

in Australia and the Rimpac series off Hawaii have helpe

operational skills, evaluate techniques, improve comp

compare performances . According to Kim Beazley combi

with the United States also have familiarized American for

military capabilities and the operational environment of t

instance, each year up to 60,000 US sailors and marine

conjunction with port visits) actively participate with 

colleagues in exercise operations on and off the Western Au

Improved effectiveness of all forces resulted. Australian 

know that ifthe United States does not play in such combi

the opportunity does not readily exist for the ADF, especia

and RAN, to find suitable replacements for such capable 

ANZUS Aside

The focus on Australian defense features is more a

limited in a setting with ANZUS aside . For years these 

reflected a strategic objective policy that was itself unc

developed in the ANZUS Treaty to provide a type of secu

guarantee . Yet a major point for many to ponder was th

ANZUS Treaty has never come close to being "tested." 

To adjust the reliance and uncertainty, the Australian 

white paper on defense policy in 1976-the year 

fell--created the impression that Australia was tryin

self-reliant and capable of independent operations . Ye

policies did not provide the necessary detailed direction 

required financial resource allocation to make this poli

reality. Two divergent goals characterized Australian na

objectives at that time. First, the prime intention of th

support and assist the United States' strategic deterrent a

umbrella. Second, ADF needed to have the capabilities 

ensuring stability, independence, and strength of its regio

(2) assist and help protect newly independent South Pacif

(3) continue to play appropriate roles in collective s

54
AUSTRALIAN DE

ANZUS, the FPDA (Great Britain, Australia, New Zeala

and Singapore), and other agreements .

Although these were not new concepts, the question re

they achievable? Critics of these defense policies felt t

strategic considerations were not the determining factors . 

decisive, however, was the political andbureaucratic cont

funds. A prime example to prove this was the "fortre

mentality shownby the Australian Labor Party (ALP) oppo

the early 1980s debate on funding an aircraft carrier repla

HMAS Melbourne. Proponents for anew carrier viewed t

and relevant concept of RANassets to protect vital sea tr

promote regional cooperation. The opponents prevailed, 

saw a lessening of its already limited force projection ca

The ADF had its own military assistance program 

dealing with regional cooperation was called the Defenc

Programme (DCP). In recent years, it accounted for about 

per year, or less than 1 percent of Australia's total defen

that amount more than 40 percent went to providing near

Guinea with military assistance . Whether the DCP was a

depended more on the type of aid than the amount .

Generally, Australian aid in the absence of any single d

(e.g ., assistance to PapuaNewGuinea) was directed at tw

it provided training facilities in Australia for regiona

attend. For example, in 1984 more than 1,000 military p

regional countries attended such training courses. Involv

area were numerous combined exercises and exchange

Defence Cooperation Programme allowed ADF servin

conduct such civil aid missions as mapping, medical a

disaster relief. Thebulk of DCP efforts directed towand th

consisted of such civil aid support.

An extension of Australian military contribution in sup

forces, under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreem

resulted in the still-in-effect Five Power Defence Arra

aspect of FPDA that stood out was the RAAF's con

Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia. It was the largest m

lishment used by the RAAF outside Australia. The 

55
ANZUSIN REVISION

Defence System (IADS) was another aspect of the FPDA 

two regional members-Malaysia and Singapore . 

Australia's contribution of a relatively sophisticated air d

network capable of aircraft detection as far out as the 

Thailand and Indonesia. Although complaints recently hav

Australia that the FPDAhas not been effective and the cost

are increasing, the arrangement still gives the ADF an op

deploy and exercise outside the immediate area of Aust

provides-practically, politically, and symbolically-th

permanent Western military "forward base" presence on t

Asian mainland.

32

The ADF has been involved in other overseas oper

prominent were two long-term operations in Southea

Malaysian insurgency from the late 1940s to 1960 and th

"confrontation" period from 1963 to 1965 . Both campaig

British efforts and occurred prior to ADFparticipation wi

forces in the Vietnam conflict . A more peaceful A

performed overseas was the recently ended operation 

Peninsula as members for almost four years in the Multina

of Observers (MFO). This particular arrangement had a he

composed of RAAF and Royal New Zealand Air For

personnel and helicopters (110/8 and 35/3, respectively). 

tinuing example of equipment interoperability, common 

doctrine, and quasi-alliance benefits . 3

The cornerstone of Australian-New Zealand defense coo

relations was considered by many to be the ANZACpact (i

of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, the co

that served with distinction in World War I), the first 

agreement entered into between the two Commonwealt

Negotiated during World War II and in effect since 194

purpose was twofold : to maintain and strengthen relation

two countries and to provide a means to exchange 

information on matters of common concern, especially as t

to the Southwest and South Pacific areas . From a strictly 

of view, paragraph 35 of the treaty provided for defense co

means of consultation, common doctrine, equipment and 

56
AUSTRALIAN DEF

interchanges, and logistics support coordination . Over the 

defense and logistics cooperation developed to a point wh

account that, although their defense needs were not quite t

were sufficiently parallel to permit a high degree o

Accordingly, in the spirit of strengthening both countr

capabilities, a memorandum of understanding was signe

develop a common industrial support base .

34

When all these various factors came into play within 

ANZUS, it was evident that the proper development of th

national defense infrastructure for operational deployme

of Australia and its several interests was not an easy matt

also had a classic view that saw itself as always assisting l

to achieve their goals, being a middle power facilitator, a

leadership to smaller countries that did not trust larg

Whether such a view of Australia's role in international 

relations was accurate or not, it carried over into discussi

policy, alliance relationships, and proper use and structur

in peacetime and during war. This discussion first started 

the late 1960s to mid-1970s and was associated with sever

turning points which affected ADF defense emphasis .

Changes in Defense Emphasis

Having considered an active defense alliance with the 

and participation in America's wars to be the fundamen

Australian military planning, the Australian government 

by several significant events starting in the late 1960s . 

1969 Nixon Doctrine. Australian attitudes on security dep

already changing by 1968 primarily due to disillusionmen

in Southeast Asia . Enunciation of the Nixon Doct

embellishment by subsequent American administrati

appropriately understood or not, sent tremors through t

political and military ranks . While not giving Austra

planners clear-cut alternatives, the doctrine at least add

reorienting defense strategy toward one of increased sel

with continued support for American deterrence and AN

5 7
ANZUSIN REVISION

The Australian Labor Party government of Prime Mi

Whitlam in the early 1970s caused Washington to becom

of Australia as a middle power of growing influence 

Whitlam had problems in dealing with the Nixon adminis

though he realized that his country's relations with the 

were all-important. The Whitlam government's cancella

for several major defense capital equipment items, such 

for the RAN, which were to have formed the nuc

independent naval task forces, eventually restricted A

operation.

37 Attitudes and perceptions of powerful leftist 

the Labor party were also forming, and they brought a

distancing from, at least a readjustment of the close defen

the United States. From roughly this time on, serious att

a more self-reliant defense posture began to be made 

Central to this posture was the belief that such fu

requirements as low-level military contingencies were i

responsibilities and must have main priority in Austr

policy and planning .

The next shocks came to Australia (and others) with the 

South Vietnam, to Communist forces in 1975 and the c

reduction of American combat and support forces station

Asia . For Australia, which for years had organized its A

with a larger allied force, the confusion was great. 

combined helped force Australians to contemplate chan

albeit slowly and hesitantly, through a major restructure

In a partial reflection of this changed defense orienta

has taken measures especially in recent times to reduc

already limited involvement overseas . The MFO operati

has ended. There have been slow reductions of fo

permanent assignments at Butterworth Air Base and t

attachments in Singapore. The Dibb report stated that t

Defence Arrangement, including Australian presence a

represented the concerns of a previous era. While still us

for practical cooperation, these overseas arrangements 

political as well as military considerations .

39 Despite Di
AUSTRALIAN DE

Australia planned to continue deployments (but at redu

Butterworth and to military exercises with friends and all

Another turning point on defense emphasis started wit

of the Labor government to federal office in 1983 . This 

aware of a growing level of public comment on issues o

security and armed with thoughts of creating sound 

defense policy and forces, undertook several important st

the fact that a linkage existed between support for an activ

the United States and a positive policy on arms control, 

government's initial step was to review ANZUS comple

and almost in parallel, it stepped up diplomatic efforts o

issues. Third, Labor party leaders decided to review the 

objective of improving the military's capacity for self

concentration on the region of direct security concern to 

This latter step was not easily accomplished and, in fac

way. Yet it was a step in the right direction . Momentum f

such a thorough review had been building to a decision po

1980s. The trend in defense thinking slowly shifted to 

procuring ADF weapon systems and fixing priori

equipments, many of which were to have multipurpose ro

focus more appropriately on Australia's own defense ne

determining circumstances for much of Australian w

acquisition, use, and planning were governed by the abili

in distant theaters . That was no longer going to be the d

What was gradually emerging from the civilian branch o

Department as a guiding theme for ADF emphasis was 

requirement for versatility, mobility, and endurance 

Australia and its several primary interests .

The means to achieve these objectives found partial at

approach of Paul Dibb's report on defense capabiliti

Defence Minister Kim Beazley's guidance, direction, 

Beazley and Prime Minister Bob Hawke (both of whom 

scholars in their postgraduate days) occupied powerful p

right division of the Australian Labor Party and reflected 

rightist view of ANZUS and defense: pro-American, 

vative, and pragmatic . A native of Western Australia, 

59
ANZUS IN REVISION

relatively young (less than 40 years old) and ambitious 

Parliament ; some political observers thought he would ev

to the top of his country's political structure . He has g

prominence by using his academic training in international 

defense policy to make the minister of defence portfolio 

highly visible and important in the Labor government . In 

asked Dibb to "examine the content, priorities, and rationa

forward planning and to advise which capabilities are ap

Australia's present and future defence requirements.

4I T

the 1986 Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities

government incidentally stressed was not a statement of o

but an independent analysis of defense policy issues .

42 R

marked the final turning point in defense emphasis prior t

of the 1987 white paper on defense policy .

The Defense Setting after 1986

The Australian defense features associated with A

post-1986 setting-after the Dibb report was published-a

different from those present in the years just prior to the 

The larger change is in the approach to defense beyond t

the ANZUS Treaty .

Revised ANZUS

ANZUS, or more appropriately the revised ANZUS bil

relationship between Australia and the United States, conti

most segments of ADF either directly or indirectly . Altho

has changed significantly the nature of its strategic pers

defense priorities, ANZUS remains important to Austral

in the global Western alliance network and, perhaps more 

its practical benefits for Australian independent defense.

These benefits cover a wide range of important 

Australia, an ANZUS framework means that it keeps 

relationship with a strong and close ally and will work tow

60
basic obligations within that relationship . The joint defense 

to remain fully functioning, and Australia feels the faciliti

to the avoidance of global conflict . More germane to 

following issues:

combined exercises and training ;

high-technology transfer;

force interoperability ;

material acquisition and support ;

equipment and weapon systems standardization ;

common operational doctrine ;

logistics support arrangements ; and

intelligence and surveillance resources .

AUSTRALIAN DEF

Australia also will continue to purchase substantial defe

supplies from the United States . Over the next decade, it p

$A 15-20 billion in America . The extensive bilateral ag

arrangements, coupled with an ongoing series of useful an

meetings and sessions at several levels, aided much in 

interaction and improved defense relations . These are 

aspects of a healthy bilateral relationship .

The United States is willing to continue these coopera

endeavors, because it realizes that a capable conven

contributes not only to regional security but also to US sec

and global deterrence . In return, the costs for Australia (

financial aspects) are not high. In light of the proble

Zealand, this relationship is expected to grow even stron

significant in the Pacific region.

ANZUS Aside

ANZUS aside, the ADF is trying to use the strategic l

by the Pacific War portion of World War II and other ev

its self-reliant capabilities to suit the Australian strategic 

It expects to go well beyond specific area defense and be 

6 1
ANZUS IN REVISION

aid, cooperation, training, and a host of other defense-relat

current defense policy, according to Beazley, is to pursue 

relationship between strategy and force structure within t

of limited financial means. Australia's first priority mu

self-reliance .

,45

One area of intended expansion is in military assista

These programs reflect a governmental objective to inc

substantially in the South Pacific region. The governm

improve its long-standing defense cooperation with Papua 

The RAAF is increasing the number of long-range ma

(LRMP) aircraft deployments to the South Pacific from f

year. Whenplanning the RANfleet program, the navy wa

to have its ships make regular visits to independent co

region. Perhaps the most opportunistic area for defense 

upgrading the small island countries' abilities to manag

their important exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and 

shown on the accompanying map. Australia has offered t

countries in developing the Pacific patrol boat, specifical

meet their 200 nautical mile EEZ surveillance needs. Ato

at an estimated cost of $A 61 .7 million are on order. This 

is far larger than any previous Australian defense coope

in the South Pacific region or in Southeast Asia.

Internally Australiaplans to adjust to ashift of defense r

the traditional populated regions of its south and east t

inhabited north andnorthwest areas of the continent. It ha

that the ADF needs to defend many vulnerable ins

resources in these latter more remote areas . Yet the defe

infrastructure is minimal.

Australia is also trying to improve its defense and lo

structure . Minister Beazley has made limited headway 

some new ground rules for the defense industry. Fir

changes is that defense spending, either at home or overs

relevance to the nation's strategic priorities . Second i

industry should become commercial in its approach an

various projects . Although Beazley's efforts are not revo
AUSTRALIAN DEF

South Pacific Exclusive Economic Zo

Source: Robert lgara, "Economic Cooperation in the South Pacific," i

and the Pacific, ed. Roderick Alley (Boulder, Colo. : Westvie

201 .
ANZUS IN REVISION

signaled the likelihood, for the first time in a generation, o

and consistent government policy for the defense industry 

To a lesser degree than before, the ADF will continue t

to participate in the Five Power Defence Arrangement and t

Air Defence System on the Malay Peninsula . It will incre

defense effort in the Southeast Asia region that foc

development of associations and military relationships bas

concerns . The ADF military assistance program, by means 

and training, appears to be more promising than strict adh

dated and more formal FPDA. 49

Finally, ANZUS aside, the Australian-New Zealand bila

relationship will keep on being one of "substance," 

Beazley . Substantive issues include:

an extensive program of combined exercises ;

high-level consultations ;

cooperative defense procurement ;

logistics and supply cooperation;

staff and training exchanges ; and

defense science and communications cooperation .

Even though the Australian Labor government recogniz

relationship with New Zealand is strong and importa

appears to regard the alliance relationship with the Uni

being even more important for security purposes . I

December 1986 speech given in New Zealand, Austra

Minister Bill Hayden said that Australia disagrees complet

Zealand's nuclear ship ban policy, and he flatly rejected t

being the replacement for the former US role in a defense u

with New Zealand. Australia is incurring additional and 

expense due to the need to duplicate military exercis

arrangements with its ally across the Tasman Sea. In this 

it remains to be seen over the long term how much 

contribute to and work with the New Zealand Defence Fo
AUSTRALIAN DEF

Review ofAustralia's Defence Capabilities (1

Paul Dibb's independent Review ofAustralia'sDefence 

Report to the Minister for Defence focused on the capabil

structure requirements of the ADF. Dibb admitted th

contained little new in the way of redirection themes. In

first time, it brought together the major themes in Austr

policy that had been under way for the past decade and a ha

"forward defense" ended and calls for "defense self-rel

The report created an interesting and informed public deba

issues that was both refreshing and necessary for a de

Australia's I In short, Dibb's study brought about a m

Australia's approach to defense .

The basic thrust of the report was to move Australian d

in the direction of a more self-reliant posture. Dibb's appro

down the area of judgment relied on two principles . 

required an understanding of Australia's unique 

circumstances since the ADF needed to plan on defendin

and national interests on its own. The second principle ca

preciseness in defining the threats Australia faced, with in

warning time figured in. The defense strategy that was ne

tasks was one of "denial," which in turn would become as

"layered defence." According to Dibb, this would ensure 

would have substantial difficulty in crossing the sea and a

Australia. The doctrine of "layered defence" and the exte

time (up to 10 years) for development of a regional ass

substance became two of the main sources of co

misinterpretation about the report.

Another significant aspect concerned definition of the 

operation for the ADF. An important and recurring theme 

to concentrate force-structure priorities in the area of d

interest to Australia. This was where Australia should 

independent military power. The area represented about 

the earth's surface . It stretched more than 4,000 nautica

west from New Zealand and the Southwest Pacific islands 

Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean. It was more than 3,000 

north to south from the archipelagoes of Indonesia and N

65
AN"LUS IN REVISION

the Southern Ocean bordering Antarctica . The report also 

sphere of primary strategic interest generally encompassi

Asia and the South Pacific . Dibb felt that this area 

Australian national security but did not pose any direct mi

Therefore, ADF structure and priorities should not be ori

this greater area. Likewise, being part of ANZUS was impo

a requirement for allied Australia to become invo

contingency planning for global war.

While there was considerable emphasis on defense 

policy, the Dibb report was first and foremost a fo

document . Minister Beazley directed Dibb to determine w

and its support structure needed for capabilities and req

Australia planned for entry into the next century . Dibb 

report as presented provided a central theme of Austral

defensible continent. With some adjusting of ADF s

priorities, the military would be able to carry out well this 

in the 1990s and beyond . Beazley, as expected, was very 

the report since it closely mirrored his thoughts and ambi

the defense minister's major objectives was to convince Au

they could defend themselves and establish the necessary f

and organization to make self-reliance a reality . Dibb had 

percent annual real growth in defense spending. In that reg

was of little help to Beazley, who now had the more dif

starting the slow but consistent long-term process of 

development within the strained financial resources of A

Review was an important step in laying the groundwo

developments, such as the white paper on defense policy, 

Dibb brought out several interesting aspects of Austr

features that were critical if Australia wanted to have 

effective self-reliance and best use of limited resources. 

with the recently altered ADF senior command structu

change much more central power and authority were give

of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Headquarters Austra

Force, similar to the US chairman of the Joint Chi

organization . The functional command structure was show

ment. The individual service chiefs were shifting from f

66
AUSTRALIAN DEF

being sole commanders of their components to being more 

three operational commands centered on the Headquarter

Defence Force. The CDF was using direct responsibility 

aspects to those functional commanders handling maritime 

defense, and land defense . The RAN, RAAF, and ARA 

separate services, but they ideally were working more clo

than in the recent past. Although individual services were 

lose their separate planning functions, each service reali

functions would eventually rest with a central and pivotal 

body . Joint planning and operations were expect

improvement over the current arrangements .5z

Other parts of the Dibb report dealt with the very i

often-neglected areas of defense industry and logistics 

"tail of the dragon." Concerning defense industry, Dibb 

relative inefficiency of most government defense f

encouraged future defense industry growth in the privat

established three capability guidelines for the Austra

industry . They included the need to:

repair, maintain, and modify most defense force 

especially those associated with low-level contingencies 

Australia would face) ;

produce high-usage spare and ammunition items, if 

in cost; and

design and produce in those areas ofunique national 

or where domestic capacities were clearly compet

international basis .

53

Even though government policy, the requirement for 

defense industry policy as spelled out in Dibb's commen

receive increased attention. This seemed especially worthw

current ADF defense expenditure within Austral

represented only one-half of 1 percent of the gross nat

(GNP) . Most knowledgeable commentators agreed th

defense requirements would still need considerable suppo

from overseas, mainly from the United States . Absolute se

67
ANZUS IN REVISION

was neither realistic, justified, nor sought under presen

circumstances.

Dibb's coverage of logistics support requirement

Excluding manpower costs, logistics support activities 

accounted for more than one-quarter of defense outlays e

extensive inventory totaled more than 1 .6 million line ite

several billion Australian dollars, and was managed b

30,000 military and civilian personnel . Additionally, A

support involved more than 15 million transactions annual

an important part of defense requirements that had t

sustainable, and economical . One of Dibb's recommenda

shift more defense resources to the northern and northwes

of Australia . But implementing that recommendation wou

the logistics problem since the infrastructure in that part of 

was poor and the majority of support and supply bases 

thousands of miles away. 4

Many prominent and influential Australians praised th

because it provided for the first time a positive and identi

the ADF. One of its more enthusiastic supporters was Air 

Sir Neville McNamara, who had recently retired as CDF. T

the report was a "serious and well-reasoned attempt to 

all major considerations relating to development of a 

ADF although there is nothing glaringly new in the report 

to say,

Drawing together of Australia's interests, strategic circumstance

priorities should greatly assist in promoting greater understandi

appropriate measure ofdefence capability. Definition of area of 

interest and sphere of primary strategic interest, together with 

meaningful strategy, layered defence concept and recommendatio

capabilities should provide a most useful working basis for devel

Government White Paper and more positive guidelines for bene

planners.

55

Although the air chief marshal was generous in prais

his predecessor as CDF, Adm Sir Anthony Synnot, was n

the report was well researched and credible, Sir Antho

with the strategy of denial. He saw it as being too defensiv

68
AUSTRALIAN DEFE

only to what an enemy might do first . His alternative was 

deterrence, which rested on the existence of a believab

unacceptable counteraction . It implied offensive capabiliti

be seen at all times to be able to hit apotential enemywhere 

to hurt most severely. Sir Anthony still found truth i

"Offence is the best form of defence ." 56 AirVice Marshal T

a Royal Air Force representative to a mid-1986 Australia

on air power, said the same in a slightly different way.

It is a truism of war that a good defence can avert defeat, but se

impose a political solution upon an enemy or, more simply, secure 

Others were even more critical of the report . Peter He

immediate past permanent head of the Australian De

Foreign Affairs, perceived isolationist trends. He feared t

to attain the overdue and totally commendable degree of i

and self-reliance in defense, Australia might find itself dise

the close and necessary ties now enjoyed with the Wester

general and the United States in particular. Henderson w

attention paid to military power projection capability into 

prime strategic interest and more effective "integration wit

is US) forces .",58

Another critic was Michael O'Connor, executive dir

Australia Defence Association, who found Dibb guilty of "

appreciation," and making "facts" fit a set of preconcepti

that there was a complete rejection of the idea that Aust

make contributions to the defense of allies and friends

thought strongly that Dibb proposed a classical fortr

Despite Kim Beazley's protests to the contrary, in O'Co

this approach was wrong since "no such fortress has ever 

a siege .

59

A criticism of strategic naval aspects came from A. W. 

an Australian who has written often on naval matters 

country . It was clear to Grazebrook that the Dibb report, p

the Strategic Basis as guidance, substantially underes

importance of overseas trade to Australia's economy and 

for a capable navy to defend that trade. Since Australia di

69
ANZUS IN REVISION

some 30 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) with 

disruption of maritime trade would become significan

term .

60

As a final example of Australians being upset with th

Peter Samuel, a Washington-based journalist, pr

pessimistic comments. Writing in Strategic Review, 

Australia's meaningful and active participation in We

planning and operations ending if recommendations in t

taken . Consequently, there would be a drastic redefinit

of Australia's defense alliance obligations . To counter 

urged the United States to "reject Dibb [before] it be

Australia's conventional wisdom about defense ." 61

What were the official and unofficial American reacti

report? Perhaps the most concern about the report's impl

from the US Navy . It appeared to be no accident that Adm 

then commander of the large US Pacific Fleet, was the 

official to criticize the report publicly.

62

Former government officials were also willing to spe

US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacif

later US ambassador to Indonesia John Holdridge said 

mistaken strategy for the Australians to zero in on defe

Australia from low-level to midlevel forays by north

"Who is going to attack from island-nations in the nort

also worried about increasing Soviet pressures and thre

influence generally in the Pacific. He questioned Austral

to contribute to an "all for one, one for all" concep

security.

63

Richard Armitage, US assistant secretary of defense fo

security affairs, issued a more moderate official public 

statement prepared for broadcast to Australia, he said t

"appears to be a serious attempt `to fit' defense polic

strategy into a `rational mix ."' As he diplomatically pu

was an attempt to harmonize the very difficult problems 

defense policy, force strategy, and the final objectives .

The most significant American response was seen at th

between Defence Minister Beazley and US Secretary ofD

70
Weinberger during the August 1986 bilateral America

meeting in San Francisco . Subsequent to the meeting, B ea

Australian officials stressed that the Dibb report essentia

force-structure document and not official Australian poli

an important influence, but not the only influence, on 

government white paper on defense policy . Australia wo

consideration a number of factors, to include Dibb's rec

and US concerns as the government formulated its positio

65

paper.

Government White Paper

AUSTRALIAN DE

Australia's long-awaited defense white paper, Th

Australia 1987, was released in March. As expected, it 

main thrust of the 1986 Dibb report, yet still satisfied t

conservative commentators, and the Australian military, 

objectionable certain aspects of the Dibb report. Despite 

on protecting sea lines of communication, the policy p

down suggestions arising from Dibb that a "fortress A

opting out of regional responsibilities and out of the Wes

community . To show that some of the earlier American 

now at rest, Adm Ronald J . Hays, United States comma

Pacific Command, wrote in an advance release that

Australia is developing a comprehensive strategy forstructuring, 

training its defense forces. Australian strategic studies, force moder

reorganization stressing joint operations will imrove Austra

capability and therefore promote regional stability . 6

What was in the white paper to make Admiral Hays t

The tone of it was set early in the preface. Defence Min

started out strongly by stating that the Australian pe

Australia to provide for its own security . Defense self-re

still had to be achieved within a framework of alliance

associations . It was a multiple-way arrangement in whi

of alliance and associations made such self-reliance atta
ANZUS IN REVISION

a self-reliant Australia gave them support since it would be 

meet Australian responsibilities within its own strategic r

According to Beazley, the concept of self-reliance bein

the course for a decade of development achieved th

objectives of Australia's national and international defens

objectives were to (1) develop and maintain a capacity for 

defense; (2) promote regional strategic security and 

strengthen the ability to meet mutual obligations shared wi

allies, the United States and New Zealand; and (4) improv

ability as an active member ofthe West to contribute to stra

at the global level . These were not new fundamental obj

1976 defense white paper identified self-reliance and its o

primary requirement . Yet that white paper failed to giv

substantive direction to the concept. Beazley's Defence 

1987 intended to correct those deficiencies by setting cl

by providing the comprehensive overall approach to Austr

that would result in responsible defense planning .

The white paper then defined Australia's present and f

interests as follows:

" defense of Australian territory and people from m

threat;

" protection of Australian interests in surrounding ma

offshore islands, and close-by ocean areas and vital chok

" avoidance of global war;

" maintenance of a strong defense relationship wit

States;

" furtherance of a favorable strategic situation in So

and Southwest Pacific;

" promotion of a sense of strategic community betw

and other countries in areas of direct military interests; a

" maintenance of Antarctic Treaty provisions .

These interests fell naturally in line with the basic d

objectives .
AUSTRALIAN DEFE

As outlined in the white paper, the primary tasks of the 

carry out the first two interests above : defense of Au

protection of its interests in the area of direct military co

nation . Accordingly, Australia planned to make a number 

Chief among them were proposed efforts to strength

defenses, create a two-ocean navy, get a credible mine coun

capability, and develop an integrated air defense capability

Australia wanted to continue to cooperate closely with 

new-look ADF would have improvements in range, 

mobility, and independent logistics support.

To budget for all these requirements, Australia was goi

more than 33 percent of the defense budget over the lon

largest capital investment in the country's peacetime 

intended allocation amounted to more than $A 

(approximately $US 17 billion at 1986 exchange rates) sp

years. What remained uncertain was how Australia coul

all these objectives within a budget allocation of 2 .6 to 

GDP, which corresponded to slightly less than 10 

governmental outlays.

67 As Karl Jackson, the US dep

secretary of defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, poi

congressional hearing, the present government of Australi

showing a strong commitment to defense and alliance wi

States . Since one of its keystones of security was a stro

Australia's future defense posture would require steady a

budget allocations, based on a strong economic structure, t

Although his program is ongoing, only time will tell 

ambitious ADF improvement and develosment program 

schedule and within resource constraints.

The overall thrusts of the white paper were to meet the g

requirements for basic competence and preparation i

national defense and to provide for Australia's own secur

defense activities and influence . The country's policymak

that the planned development ofthe ADF, as discussed in t

paper, was in step with Australia's security needs . P

development, ifproperly carried out (e.g., funded), woul

first and foremost the priority task of defending the 

73
ANZUS IN REVISION

important secondary tasks of ensuring that an enemy 

difficult to use force against Australia and allowing fo

make realistic contributions to regional security and all

also would be achieved .

69 As Thomas-Durell Youn

American observer of ANZ defense matters, pointed out

1987 Australian defense review must be assessed favor

viewpoint of Western interests . . . . in positive terms .

Present and Future Service Capabilities

For discussing the present and future ADF service 

logical starting point is the new concept of a central 

control organization embodied in the Chief of the Defe

Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), and Headquart

Defence Force. More authority and control formerly 

individual air force, navy, and army services . Si

redesignation, the top military officer no longer is Chief 

Force Staff (CDFS) but heads a newly created Headquart

Defence Force . The CDF now commands the ADF, wi

support being provided by Headquarters ADF, which 

conjunction with the service offices, undertakes opera

planning for the CDF. Under these arrangements single 

of staff retain their command responsibilities and 

combat-ready force elements to joint force commanders 

The ADF now emphasizes the areas ofjoint operation

In 1986 the government created the appointive office o

same year the ADF appointed air, maritime, and land forc

and started to develop supporting operational headquarter

The joint force commanders report directly to the C

responsibility for the conduct of designated joint ADF 

operations . As an example of the new arrangements

beginning to set up a separate joint-force command, he

Darwin, Northern Territory, to support increased AD

basing in remote northern and northwestern Australia.

71

Institutions already in place and others in vari

development have facilitated increased ADFjoint planni

74
support, instruction, and training . To improve in the jo

ADF has for instance the joint theater command struct

Darwin is aproposed test bed), the Joint Intelligence Orga

the Joint Warfare Establishment .In the instruction and t

the ADF maintains the Joint Services Staff College fo

officers (of which there is usually an American field gr

each six-month course), and the recently opened Austra

Force Academy. The ADF Academy, on the grounds 

Military College Duntroon in Canberra, trains officer c

each of the military services.

Air Force

AUSTRALIAN DEF

The easiest way to look at the service components is to 

air force, because it is the military branch most satisfied wi

andplanned ADFdevelopment. With 22,800 airmen on a

RAAF is capable, improving, and arguably the most effe

in the region. Under the white paper statement of polic

would mainly be concerned with activities involving air 

warfare .

By far the most significant recent event affecting the R

introduction of the F/A-18 Hornet multirole tactical fight

the inventory. Labeled by Gordon Scholes, Beazley's p

defence minister, as the "largest single defence project 

in Australia," the F/A-18 program has dominated ADF

planning for several years .

73 The reason is that Austra

in-country, at a rate of 18 aircraft per year, a total of 

advanced high-technology fighters, designed and produc

based McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. The arrangem

Australia, under its Australian industry participation (AI

form an integral part of the Hornet aircraft modification 

The program has gone well. The state-of-the-art, hi

Hornetsreplaced the French-designed and Australian-bui

all-weather interceptors, first introduced into the RAAF 

years ago. The Hornets are now operational, with three s

at RAAF Base Williamstown in New South Wales with s

75
ANZUS IN REVISION

aircrews, and support on temporary duty at Butterworth 

Malaysia, and one at the new RAAF Base Tindal in t

Territory) .

Two other RAAF aircraft programs are also important. F

are the only legitimate long-range aircraft the RAAF has f

interdiction, since the F/A-18 is used primarily for 

Australia's 23 F-111s are being refurbished, at minimum co

operating costs and maintain the aircraft in service . The 

feels that more F/A-18s, configured as dual seaters for a

purchased later to replace F-111 s lost through attrition. C

that F-Ills, and not F/A-18s, need to undergo expensiv

because they, along with the RAN's submarine force, are 

ADF elements with primary strike and interdiction m

capabilities . A second major aircraft program is th

capabilities improvement, by acquiring modem electr

measures, of the 20 US-produced P-3C Orion long-ran

patrol aircraft .

Despite the healthy picture of capital equipment gains, R

still feel they have some real shortcomings affecting t

portion of the ADF. To perform its role as afirst-line defens

requires several additional enhancements . According to ret

Air Staff David Evans, the most serious problems are the l

multipliers" like nflight aerial refueling and airborne early 

control aircraft, inadequate contingency stocks of muniti

continuing severe shortage of trained pilots and aircrews . 

added the need for new tactical airfields in the north. To 

of the problems, the Australian government plans to mo

Boeing 707 aircraft for inflight refueling and is buildin

northern air bases, as highlighted by the new RAAF 

Base-the designated home for one of the new F/A-18 sq

progress is slow and expensive. One of the most serious 

uncorrected is the permanent departure of skilled manpow

from the RAAF. 74
Navy

AUSTRALIAN DE

The Royal Australian Navy is also undergoing change

to the 1983 decommissioning ofAustralia's only aircraft c

Melbourne, and the demise of the fixed-wing element of 

the RAN was down to an active strength of 15,700 perso

of maritime security the white paper proposed several R

It would divide the navy into two fleets, one deployed in t

the other in the Indian Ocean. To support the eastern-b

RAN possibly planned to relocate certain fleet facilities 

to Jervis Bay, farther south on the coast. For the Indian O

forces homeported in the west, the RAN would expand 

at Stirling, south of Perth, Western Australia.

The RAN intends to improve its limited mine co

(MCM) force, as long neglected in Australia as in We

elsewhere . In Australia's case, it has the option to pro

Australian-designed Bay-class catamaran inshore 

assuming that its first of class trials proves operationally s

expressed need for more MCM capabilities is a step 

direction .

In the area of surface combatants, the present govern

expand the existing major surface combatant 

destroyers-three guided missile destroyers (DDG), four 

frigates (FFG), and five destroyer escorts (DE)-to an ope

of 16 to 17 major surface combatants. Planning calls for 

able to respond to three broad levels of capability . The D

high-capability surface combatants comprise the top leve

of vessel, the light patrol frigate (also known as the 

combatant), would provide the second level of capabil

class of eight frigates would represent the large

ship-building program ever in Australia and would replac

currently in RAN. Patrol boats suitable for coastal ope

maintain the third level. Assuming that all the planned 

for the surface combatants occur, the allied fears sparke

report of lack of commitment for ADF maritime eleme

eased.
ANZUS IN REVISION

To be a meaningful and effective deterrent, a fully imple

time strategy for Australia needs mobility and afloat suppor

interoperability with other ADF components, allies, 

friends; and offensive and defensive capabilities . An ex

surface force able to deploy on a regular and consistent basi

maritime areas is essential for this strategy .

The RAN also plans to replace its submarine f

Oberon-class, diesel-powered submarines with a newer c

submarines in the 1990s. The submarines were selec

Swedish-designed Kochums A Type 471 external hulls a

built and fitted out in Australia. They would homeport on 

The new submarine construction project will be costly (m

3.3 billion) and complicated . Yet there are many Austral

the submarine project as a logical extension of an Australi

to master increasingly complex programs and as the type 

be encouraged in Australian industry . In addition, it woul

greater ADF independence and self-reliance.

75 As the 

director, RAdm Oscar Hughes, analyzed it, the submarin

taking Australian industry "three or four rungs up the ladde

said that

Australia has never before attempted a project of this magnitude a

make it all work, we are looking for four to five fold increase in th

companies achieving acceptable levels of quality assurance and 

already embarked upon a national quality control familiarization 

industry.

Unlike the F/A-18 program, which consisted of modif

assembly of already designedparts, the submarine progra

60 to 70 percent of the content, including the design wor

out in Australia.

The RAN is not without problems. One of these concer

antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities . With the ret

RAN's sole aircraft carver, the navy lost the ability to s

Sea King helicopters, which supplied medium-range ASW 

The RAAF now has the responsibility to provide fixed-wi

to the fleet at sea. Included within this arrangement is th

RAAF P-3C Orions to conduct ASW operations . Yet the 

7 8
AUSTRALIAN DEFE

force is grossly undermanned. The RAAF's 20 Onions are e

only to support the fleet but to fly maritime surveil

Australia's 11,000 nautical mile coastline and out into its ma

of strategic interest. The ASW problem needs attention an

soon.

While there remains a blue ocean capability for fleet 

despite the Melbourne's departure, it is different from wha

be . The Australian government appears to be indicating a 

of strategic interests from Southeast Asia to the South Pacif

is seen in the RANport visits in 1987 in which 27 port calls w

for the general South and Southwest Pacific region and 

specific Southeast Asian ports . Concurrently there was 

complete pullback of RAN ships providing support to US 

forces in the northwest Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf area

said such deployments were using 11 percent of its 

commitment . Those deployments to the far Indian Ocean a

The policy instead is to show a greater presence in the 

Indian Ocean. When the US Navy is in that area, the RA

conduct combined exercises with it at sea. Yet even t

presence plan is doubtful. For example, the RAN announc

send a six-ship task force to the South China Sea in 1986

FPDA exercise and then to a follow-on exercise with the U

month later, the Australians canceled all plans due to la

Some observers saw this as a sign of things to come.

Finally, like the RAAF, the RAN has a continuing 

retaining skilled personnel after training. There is alrea

shortage of personnel to effectively man the Oberon-clas

squadron with its six boats . Combined with the overall RA

authorized personnel, the sea-going service has a seri

problem . One wonders, given the present circumstances, h

expects to man a fleet that will expand significantly in the 

Army

According to the white paper, the Australian Regular A

more emphasis on highly mobile forces capable of rapid 

79
ANZUS IN REVISION

This shift appears to bode well for soldiers serving in t

helicopter support and somewhat less so for those in arm

Despite a reduction of almost 700 men, the army ha

manpower component, with an active force of more than 

reserve complement of around 25,000 of various level

proficiency . The white paper contained several changes o

the ground force. The government's policy is that, in r

wide range of credible contingencies, the army struct

highly mobile forces capable of rapid deployment any

Australia and its territories . This force structure requi

organizational changes from the current army one bas

Division (mostly regular), two reserve divisions (2d 

Training and Logistics Commands.

The mainstay for army rapid deployment in low-intens

will continue to be the 3,000-man-strong Operational 

Force (ODF), based in Townsville, northern Queensla

formed itself from the army's 3d Brigade, 1 st (Infantry) 

unit is really the only organization in the land force ready 

combat with just a few weeks' warning. Organized wi

ratio of combat soldiers to support (including l

communications, and so on), the ODF receives pri

allocations .

An area that is getting increased attention is the imp

support. The consolidation of all ADFhelicopters into the 

addressed the issue of direct combat support. This 

included both battlefield and utility helicopters, some 

time were to be transferred with personnel from the RAA

lift capability, the army intends to acquire at least 36, and 

American-built Blackhawk helicopters . They would sup

UH-1H helicopters (also American-built) already in AD

Part of the army's problem is to ensure it has an adequat

for quick, sufficient expansion when a military threat bec

The army wants to improve the state of its reserve forces t

To increase reserve participation, some of the armored a

formations are being shifted to the reserves . Critics of t

the importance of such formations in any major land 

8 0
AUSTRALIAN DEFE

defense of Australia, and thus the need for state-of-the-art 

be maintained in a core (e.g ., regular) ground force . This i

further resolution .

Finally, it is necessary to stress another problem 

Australian ground forces which is possibly the most serio

problem is the same as that bothering the RAAF and R

skilled manpower . Some refer to it as a "crisis of confide

say the problem is discontent caused by low pay and poo

family conditions . Figures from the first half of 1986 illus

number of qualified officers resigning from the ADF. In th

of 1986 the resignation rate jumped by 46 percent from t

and in the second quarter 47 percent. More than 1,000 off

active service in an 18-month period. At a time when 

undergoing major restructuring for the future, a high loss r

professionals-due to low morale, poor pay, and so on-be

more serious. Not just in Australia's but in any countr

defense force, the foundation rests on having good, q

dedicated career personnel .

79

Logistics Support and Defense Industry

An adequate defense logistics support structure and a cap

industry are unglamorous but important factors that Au

accept and deal with if defense self-reliance is to be achieve

government realized this and used the 1986 Dibb report 

white paper to highlight such special challenging area

defense of Australia .

Some commentators on the present logistics support 

been free with their criticisms . Maj Gen J. D. Stevenson

Australian army's logistics operations in the early 1980s

adequate logistics support for even a modest force wi

operational commitment can be provided without bringi

the ADF to a standstill . This "worst case" even allow

develop an operational capability . Stevenson believes t

faces the following logistics problems in meeting modest r
ANZUS IN REVISION

"

remoteness of possible operation areas from the 

areas in southeast Australia;

" limited civil-logistics infrastructure in the operatio

" inadequate transportation infrastructure in or alo

the possible operational areas ;

" inadequate major repair facilities and limited availa

parts and component replacements; and

" inadequate operational logistics organization . $°

Despite this unpromising outlook, all is not lost. Gover

and others are at least trying to address some of thes

long-standing challenges . One example is the recently pub

articles in a book titled, A Vulnerable Country? Civil Re

Defence of Australia . The editors were Dr Desmond Ball 

Langtry of the Australian National University's Strategi

Studies Center in Canberra, Australian Capitol Territory . P

Hawke provided a foreword . The book rightly notes that 

of Australia poses enormous defense planning and logi

that are compounded by limited and concentrated resou

help alleviate these problems is to have a national ra

Especially important for defense of northern A

medium-level military threat is completion of the 1,

Springs-Darwin rail link . It would directly benefit nationa

and defense, including the new F/A-18 facility at Tin

Nevertheless, the rail network limitation is just one of 

logistics problems. Australia must keep on trying to solve 

and expensive (estimated $A 1 billion for the rail link a

support challenges .

81

The continued vitality of the defense relationship w

States is the most important element of the external rea

Australian defense logistics support and industry . The U

the major source, and in many instances the only sourc

the ADF's advanced defense equipment and tec

memorandum of understanding on logistics support r

1985 contributed substantially to Australian def

capabilities . It formed a fundamental part of the s

82
AUSTRALIAN DEFE

relationship that promoted favorable terms and improveme

countries. An example of benefits derived from such an 

was the successful Nulka project, which was a major c

equipment effort between the two countries. Nulka was a 

established between Australian defense science and 

organizations and the US Navy to design and produce 

missile defense system .

The defense industry itself has room for improvem

government's side the science and technology capab

Department of Defence is concentrated in the Defence 

Technology Organization (DSTO) . With a total staff of 4

has more than 16 principal locations scattered throughout A

it contributes to the development and implementation o

defense policy by the direct application of science and 

DSTO provides assistance to the ADF, Department of De

defense agencies, and even private industry .

DSTO's current and future programs include man

specifically designed to increase Australia's self-reliance 

One of the most interesting and expensive DSTO pr

indigenous development of an over-the-horizon (OTH) 

known as Jindalee, an aboriginal word meaning bare bone

begun as a proposal from the Australian Weapon

Establishment in 1969 and approved in 1974 with the fi

allocation of funds, Jindalee now consists of one large rada

Alice Springs providing broad area air surveillance . E

Jindalee network, if feasible and affordable, of up to thre

be a basic element of a national air defense and control sy

planning is for one or two to be sited in north or northeast 

one in the west or southwest . Whatever its final outco

promises to enhance Australia's air defense alert and e

capabilities .

Private defense industry plays an important role in 

government requirement for defense self-reliance . Pau

correct in dismissing complete self-reliance since 

requirements for complex systems and weapons (e .g., ta

aircraft and air-to-air, air-to-ground, and ground-to-air mis

8 3
ANZUS IN REVISION

a need for overseas suppliers . To make this workable s

overseas sources are building branch offices in Australia. 

the American Raytheon Corporation established an air-t

facility near Sydney that began operations in 1987 . Ye

defense industry could still get a significant share of the int

In 1985-86 the ADF spent more than $A2.8 billion on activ

relevant to defense industry . Ofthat amount, almost one-ha

billion, was spent in Australia. The potential is there for in

figure over time .

One means to improve internal involvement is the Austra

participation program . The AIP is an integral part of 

modification and assembly project for the RAAF. The 

structure provides Australian industry the capability t

military resources to enable self-reliance in engineering, 

and spares provision. The AIP and an effective defense off

are important for a viable defense industry, especially w

with US corporations involved in long-term projects lik

Hornet acquisition program .

83

While there is promise-some already demonstrated a

being talked about-in the important areas of logistics 

defense industry, much more needs to be done. One are

attention and action is to build and retain a skilled manpo

in-country . Government and private policies, backed 

investments and flexibility, are also necessities fo

improvement. The present government apparently under

basics and is attempting to correct some deficiencies and a

balanced approach.

Federal Budget Requirements

The provision of adequate resources for the defense o

essential . However, defense spending cannot be determin

from Australia's other national priorities and economic c

The 1986-87 federal budget cut real growth in defense e

1 percent, with funds increasing by $A743 million to a tot

billion (about $US 4 .9 billion). This represented 9 .

84
AUSTRALIAN DEF

government outlays and 2.9 percent of GDP. It was in kee

government's plan to spend approximately 3 percent GD

defense .

Defense outlays have gone up and down in past years 

peaked at well over 4 percent of GDP during Austr

involvement in the Vietnam War. Since then the outlay h

2.6 to 2.9 percent. As related to government expenditure

outlay rose from a low of about 8.4 percent in the mid-1970

the endofAustralia's "forward defense" participation in So

to about9.5 percent in the early 1980s and to 9.9 percent n

steadily and evenly, these figures appear correct for A

features in peacetime. The fact that Australia is spendin

about 319 US dollars per capita is just a fair measure of 

process that was behind the defense expenditure propo

federal budget .

In the 1986 financial year, the defense expenditure bre

follows:

" capital equipment, 28 percent ;

" capital facilities, 5 percent;

" personnel, 40 percent; and

" operating costs, 27 percent.

As far as major capital equipment expenditure goes, t

for the F/A-18 aircraft and FFG-class frigates will w

program completions . Yet expenditures should remain 

since other major capital equipment projects will then b

new submarines, mine countermeasure vessels, light p

more helicopters, and OTH radars. One expenditure mu

highest-that for personnel. Despite such outlays 

associated with low pay and benefits persist . They in t

single biggest problem for the ADF: the continued l

manpower from the three military services, the reserve, a

defense work force . Any lessening of this allocation could 

serious results for the Australian Department of Defence
ANZUS IN REVISION

Australian and New Zealand Defense Relation

Australia and New Zealand share a defense relationsh

degree of importance to the security ofboth countries . Conc

a common history, proximity, and shared strategic in

Zealand has an important role to play in the South Pacific. I

it has been more substantial than or at least equal to 

Australian and New Zealand defense forces need to 

maintain their ability to operate together. Where practical

and on its own terms, Australia plans to continue defense 

with New Zealand and improve operational capability .

In the unresolved dispute between New Zealand and the 

over visits by ships, understanding the present problems i

Australia officially is not a party to the disputes and is 

saying that New Zealand's political policy on nuclear ba

Australia will continue working with New Zealand on defe

issues of mutuality in a revised ANZUS period. Yet the

much the ADF can do for and with the New Zealand Def

A return to the ANZUS security situation that existed befor

is desirable but doubtful . Accordingly, the defense relation

the antipodean neighbors will neither suffer greatly 

significantly in the present political and economic enviro

Growing Australian and US Defense Relation

To the surprise of almost no one, the 1987 white paper c

positively for a strong bilateral defense relationship wit

States . Australia accepted its roles as part of the Western c

nations, as an active member in the ANZUS defense alli

provider for its own defense self-reliance. This matu

approach coming from such a close ally was one which the 

readily welcomed. Australia purposely tried in its wh

accommodate some of the American concerns evident wi

Dibb report . Both countries acknowledged the consider

enjoyed by each in a special security relationship .
AUSTRALIAN DEF

The ANZUS Treaty and its related agreements, such 

defense facilities, all remain in effect. Australia is more t

work with the United States on a variety of defense 

demonstration of its commitment to deterrence and self-

close cooperation. Australia's alliance with the United 

should remain a genuinely equal partnership. Their s

defense relationship is expected to continue and most like

more .

ss

Summary

The Australian Defence Force has earned a reputat

capable and dependable, especially during wartime c

peacetime performances have fluctuated. These shifts have 

both inside and outside the prevailing ANZUS security str

due to an expressed need to be more self-reliant in defens

to a revised policy of more regional security orientatio

former one of forward defense- Australia has in recent ye

to change its defense features .

Several major events have shaped these adjustments. On

significant was the notable Review ofAustralia's Defence 

(the Dibb report of 1986), which basically examined 

structure. Following this was the comprehensive gove

paper, The Defence ofAustralia 1987, which laid out defe

incorporating not only key points of the Review but a

concerns and desires for collective security. The end 

Australian position which sought and was likely to a

stronger and closer bilateral defense relationship with its 

United States, regardless of what form the future ANZUS 

Unknown, however, were factors affecting Australian abi

for its considerable program of defense improvements 

ments . Among the most serious problem areas were servi

capabilities, federal funding, logistics support, relatio

Zealand, and probably most important, departure of sk

personnel .
ANZUS IN REVISION

The overall Australian effort has potential and is gener

in the right direction as far as Australian-and American-p

military leaders are concerned. However, much more dist

changes that the former third partner in ANZUS-New 

going through. Alliance problems concerning defense 

issues are serious and have gone beyond the divisive nuc

issue. The next chapter looks at New Zealand, the main Wes

influence in the South Pacific region, in the context of its ma

defense features .

Notes

1 . Gerald Varni, "ICA Exclusive Interview-The Honorable 

Australia's Minister of Defence," International Combat Arms 5, no. 

82.

2. Ibid. ; J. L. Millhouse, "Australia's Security beyond the Y

Importance of Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation," Journal of t

Services Institute, November 1984, 33 .

3 . P. Lewis Young, "International Defense Profile: Australian D

International CombatArms 5, no. 2 (March 1987): 68.

4. Ross Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence (St. Lucia, Austr

of Queensland Press, 1980), 217.

5 . The Bulletin survey was discussed by T. M. Hawkins, "Public 

Defence in Australia," Journal of the Royal United Services Instit

13-15.

6. T. B. Millar, "Australia and the United States," in Australia's Ext

in the 1980s: The Interaction ofEconomic, Political, and Strategic F

Dibb (Canberra, Australia: Croom Helm, 1983), 155; idem, "T

Australia," Daedalus 114, no. 1 (Winter 1985): 260; Fedor A. Medi

Perception in the Southwest Pacific Region: An Australian Pers

presented at the National Defense University Conference on Pacific 

Impact of Political and Social Change toward Year 2000, Honolu

February 1987), 15 ; Andrew Mack, "Crisis in the Other Alliance : 

1980s," World Policy Journal 3, no. 3 (Summer 1986) : 449.

7 . Robert A. Brand, "Australia, New Zealand, and ANZUS," Atla

Quarterly 22, no . 4 (Winter 1984-1985): 350.

8 . Millar, "Defence ofAustralia," 260-61 ; Dalrymple, 583; N. F. As

Gentlemen, Please," Pacific Defence Reporter 12, no. 12 (June 1

Gwynn-Jones, "The Royal Australian Air Force," Air Force Maga

(August 1985): 67, 70.
AUSTRALIAN DEF

9. Harry G. Gelber, "Australian Strategic Perspectives" (paper p

National Defense University Symposium on Trams-Pacific Security Is

Hawaii, 29 May 1980, 12.

10. Millar, "Defence of Australia," 265, 267, 270; Mack, 4

Dalrymple, "On Being a Superpower's Ally: The Case of Austral

Foreign Affairs Record 57, no. 7 (July 1987): 585; P. Lewis Young, 

11 . Dalrymple, 585.

12. Millar, "Defence of Australia," 265, 267, 270; Mack, 452; Dal

13. J. G. Starke, The ANZUS Treaty Alliance (Melbourne, Austra

University Press, 1965), 33 ; Joseph M. Siracusa and Glen St. John Barc

the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-51 : From V-J Dayto ANZU

History 5, no. 1 (1981) : 48, 50.

14. Dalrymple, 584.

15 . Ibid. ; Millar, "Defence ofAustralia," 271 ; Andrew Mack, "Aust

Revolution," Journal ofDefense & Diplomacy 4, no. 9 (September 1

16. Dalrymple, 584; Millar, "Defence of Australia," 271 ; Mac

Defense Revolution," 5 .

17. Dennis L. Caddy, "The American Role in Australian Inv

Vietnam War," Australian Journal of Politics and History 28, no

344-45 .

18. Fedor A. Mediansky, "The United States and Australia: Some 

Reflection," Australian Outlook 31, no. 1 (April 1977): 122.

19. Alan Burnett, "The Discontinuous Triangle," n. p., 1978, 31 ; 

Triangle: Defence and Security," n. p.,1978, 35. TomMuir, "The US-

and MajorDefence Supplier," Pacific Defence Reporter 12, no. 10 (

20. Muir, 12; Burnett, "ANZUS Triangle," 32 .

21 . "Australian Security Assistance Program" (U) (Headquarters 

Forces: Plans and Policies Directorate, background paper, 26 Feb

(Secret) Information extracted is unclassified .

22. Thomas-Durell Young, "Down Under White Papers," US 

Proceedings 114, no. 3 (April 1987): 140.

23 . Burnett, "ANZUS Triangle," 33 .

24 . Paul Dibb, "Issues in Australian Defence," Australian Out

(December 1983) : 163 .

25 . Burnett, "ANZUS Triangle," 24; Andrew Clark, "Hawke Gets 

American Farmers Come First," The Bulletin 108, no. 5516 (29 Apri

26. Fedor A. Mediansky, "Australia's Security Outlook and 

Alliance," Asian Defence Journal, October 1986, 56-57.

27. Michael O'Connor, "Fundamental Weaknesses in Australia's D

Pacific Defence Reporter 12, nos. 6/"7 (December 1985-January 19

80 .

28. Varni, 80; Robert A. Brand, "Defence Down Under: An A

Pacific Defence Reporter 11, no . 12 (June 1985): 14; B. White, "Th
ANZUS IN REVISION

across the Tasman," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, No

63 .

29. White, 62.

30. Thomas-Durell Young, 137 ; John Davidson, "Security 

Communication in the Pacific and Indian Oceans" (paper presented 

Defense University Symposiumon Pacific Security, Washington, D.C.

144; Michael O'Connor, "Australia's Retreat into Isolationism," 

Journal, December 1982, 76.

31. O'Connor, 77; idem, "Australia's Regional Defence Coope

DefenceJournal, August 1985, 93, 96; Ray Sunderland, "What Is Austr

Strategy?" Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Novem

"Statement by the Minister for Defence: The Hon. Kim C. Beazley, M

Initiatives in the South Pacific," 20 February 1987, 2; S. Thana, "Austr

Perspectives : AReview on the Way," Asian Defence Journal, April 

32. Thana, 56, 58.

33 . Burnett, "The ANZUS Triangle," 8-9; Brand, "Defense Down 

34. White, 62; Thana, 61 .

35 . Dibb, 103; David Fulghum, "Foreign Officers Study Dynamics 

Air Force Times, 8 December 1986, 49.

36. Clive Williams, "Better to Deter Than to Defend," Pacific De

12, no. 12 (June 1986): 18 ; Henry S. Albinski, The Australian-Ame

Relationship : A Regional and International Perspective (St. Luc

University of Queensland Press, 1981), 7.

37. Joseph M. Siracusa, "Australian-American Relations, 1980

Perspective," Orbis 24, no. 2 (Summer 1980): 276; David Barnett, 

Symbolism : The Dilemma for Radical Hawke," The Bulletin 108, no. 

1986) : 30 .

38. P. Lewis Young, 68-69.

39. Paul Dibb, Review ofAustralia's Defence Capabilities : Report 

for Defence (Canberra, Australia: Australia Government Publishing 

48 . Hereafter referred to as Review.

40. Burnett, "The Discontinuous Triangle," 28.

41 . Dibb, Review, v.

42. Dibb, "Issues in Australian Defence," 163-64; Mack, "Austr

Revolution," 5 ; idem, "Crisis in the Other Alliance," 459; Varni, 82 

"No 1-Most Testing Period Ahead," Pacific Defence Reporter 

(December 1986-January 1987) : 200.

43 . Ross Babbage, "The Future of the Australian-New Zea

Relationship" (paper presented at a seminar on New Zealand Defence P

ofPolicy Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 9 De

4; Dibb, Review, 46.

44. US Department of State, telegram, subject: Revised Transcri

Francisco Press Conference, 230606Z August 1986, 3, 7 ; Dibb, Revie

45. Varni, 80; "Defence Initiatives in the South Pacific," 2.

90
AUSTRALIAN DEF

46. "Defence Initiatives in the South Pacific," 2, 5-7.

47. Andrew Robertson, "Wars Not Won by Defence Alone," 

Reporter 13, no. 3 (September 1986): 14; P. Lewis Young, 79.

48. "Defence and Industry : ANew Deal," The Bulletin 108, no. 552

72.

49. Dibb, Review, 48.

50 . Varni, 80; American Embassy, Canberra, telegram, subject: F

Hayden's Arrival Statement in Wellington, 100320ZDecember 1986,

Information Service, American Embassy, Wellington, telegram, 

Reaction, 110351Z December 1986, 1 .

51 . Babbage, 6; Mack, "Australia's Defense Revolution," 5.

52. Dibb, Review, v, 3-5, 176; John Edwards, "Secret Report : We

with Fast, Hit-hard Forces," The Bulletin 108, no. 5513 (8 April 19

Stackhouse, "Defence 86--Going It Alone," The Bulletin 108, no. 55

59, 61-62, 65 ; idem, "Defence Brass Prepare for Infighting," The B

5513 (8 April 1986) : 26-27; idem, "The Dibb Repellent," The Bullet

(17 June 1986):26; The Defence ofAustralia 1987 (Canberra: Austral

Publishing Service, 1987), 60.

53. Dibb, Review, 101, 107-9, 112; Ross Babbage, "Implications 

for Defence Industry," Pacific Defence Reporter 13, no. 3 (Septem

D. Stevenson, "No 2-Logistic Support Demands More Attention," 

Reporter 13, no. 4 (October 1986) : 35, 48.

54. Ibid.

55. Sir Neville McNamara, "No 1-A Serious Guide to Future D

Defence Reporter 13, no. 4 (October 1986): 32-34.

56. Sir Anthony Synnot, "No 1-Basic Strategy Is Wrong," 

Reporter 13, no . 2 (August 1986): 17-18.

57 . Robertson, 15.

58 . Peter Henderson, "Isolationist Trends in Dibb Report," 

Reporter 13, no. 3 (September 1986): 8-9.

59. Ibid. ; Michael O'Connor, "Australia's Defence Policy : Maki

the Conclusion," Asian Defence Journal, June 1986, 10, 14; idem

Mentality: The CounterView,"TheBulletin 108, no. 5526 (8 July 198

"Fundamental Weaknesses in Australia's Defence Policy," 214.

60. A. W. Grazebrook, "No 2-Errors of Major Significance," 

Reporter 13, no. 2 (August 1986): 19.

61 . Peter Samuel, "The Dibb Report and Australia's Defense Vag

Review 14, no. 4 (Fall 1986): 47, 53.

62. Fedor A. Mediansky, "Washington Startled by Roaring Mous

The Bulletin 108, no. 5544 (11 November 1986): 119.

63 . Howard Handleman, "Whither Australia? U.S. Has Major Re

Dibb Report," Pacific Defence Reporter 13, no. 2 (August 1986): 4

64. Ibid.
ANZUS IN REVISION

65 . Peter Samuel, "Weinberger Criticizes Report Recommendi

Defense Policy Changes," Defense News, 10 November 1986, 28.

66. "Defence White Paper," Pacific Defence Reporter 13, no. 1

19-20 .

67. The Defence of Australia 1987, vii-x, 2, 19-22; "Defence Whi

Hamilton, 200.

68 . Statement of Karl D. Jackson, deputy assistant secretary of d

Asia and Pacific Affairs, in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Unit

towardNew ZealandandAustralia and the Current State ofANZUS: H

the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d sess 

1986,5-6.

69. The Defence ofAustralia 1987, 112; "Defence White Paper," 2

70. Thomas-Durell Young, 141 .

71 . The Defence ofAustralia 1987, 59-61 ; "Defence White Paper,

72. While on an exchange officer tour with the RAAF, the author a

a two-week field grade officer course at the Australian Joint Warfare 

RAAF Base Williamstown, New South Wales . He was the first US A

enrolled in that type of course, an orientation program for joint 

conventional war fighting.

73. T. D. Bridge, "Australian Defence underHawke,"ArmyQuarter

Journal, April 1984, 150.

74. Ibid. ; Gwynn-Jones, 67-68; Special Correspondent, "No 3 : RA

Defence Forces," Pacific Defence Reporter 10, nos. 6n (Decembe

1984) :257 ; F. W. Bawes, "F/A-18 a Major Plus, But Little Progress in 

Pacific Defence Reporter 12, nos. 6/7 (December 1985-January 198

Defence ofAustralia 1987, 51-52, 64; "Defence White Paper," 22; 

"The Growing Watchful Eye on Our North," The Bulletin 108, no

1987): 56.

75. The Defence ofAustralia 1987, 62-63; "Defence White Paper,

76 . TomMuir, "Submarines and Self-Reliance," The Bulletin 108, 

1986): 76.

77 . Ibid.

78 . A. W. Grazebrook, "No 2: The Navy No Longer a Credible 

DefenceReporter 10, nos. 6/7 (December 1983-January 1984):25 1 ; id

The Decline Continues," Pacific Defence Reporter 12, nos. 6/7 (D

January 1986) : 219, 222; Dora Alves, "A Meaningful Maritim

Australia," Pacific Defence Reporter 13, no. 3 (September 19

Stackhouse, "New Subs Survive Attack," The Bulletin 109, no. 5560 (

57-58 ; Henry Keys, "Why Australia Build Is Worth the Extra 

Submarine Project," Pacific Defence Reporter 13, no. 3 (September 

Gnggs, "Australia: New Security Perspectives and Policies," Intern

Review 19, no. 5 (May 1986) : 580; Thomas-Durell Young, 

"'Self-Reliance' and Force Development in the RAN," US 

Proceedings 112, no. 3 (March 1986): 161 ; Confidential Austral

92
AUSTRALIAN DEF

source, interview with author, March 1987; discussion with one US m

March 1987.

79 . The Defence ofAustralia 1987, 53, 57, 90-98; idem, "Defence 

22, 59; P. Lewis Young, 69; Thomas-Durell Young, "Australia's De

and Programs," International Defense Review 19, no. 5 (May 19

Edwards, "How We Can Defend Ourselves," The Bulletin 108, no. 551

54; Brand, "Australia, New Zealand, and ANZUS," 350; Stackho

86-Going It Alone," 65; J. D. Stevenson, "Army-Skilled, Dedicat

Adequate Means," Pacific Defence Reporter 12, nos. 6/7 (Decembe

1986): 216-18; idem, "A High-Quality Army, But No Means to Do t

Defence Reporter 10, nos. 6/7 (December 1983-January 1984): 

Barnett, "Officers March from a Dilapidated Force," The Bulletin 1

October 1986):26; confidential Australian government source, interv

January 1987. (Most criticism of the shift came from the Australian 

career soldiers associated with the armored and mechanized branche

80 . J . D. Stevenson, "The Logistic Problem: It Must Be Faced," 

Reporter 10, no . 8 (February 1983): 22-23; Hamilton, 200.

81 . Ibid.

82. The Defence ofAustralia 1987,35-36, 65, 69-72, 85; P. Lewis 

Jindalee : Australia's OTH Backscatter Radar," Asian Defence Jou

1985, 59-62; Chris Sherwell, "Jindalee Takes Australian Defen

Financial Times, 10 February 1987, 4.

83. The Defence ofAustralia 1987, 89; P. Lewis Young, "Intern

Profile," 73; "Defence and Industry : ANew Deal," 72; Special Corr

3 : RAAF Happiest of Defence Forces," 257 ; Tom Muir, "Vi

Achievements in Defence Offsets Program," Pacific Defence Repo

(April 1986) :4, 10; Brand, "Australia, New Zealand, and ANZUS," 

84. Hamilton, 200; The Defence ofAustralia 1987, 99-100, 103-5

Future of Australian-New Zealand Defence Relationship," 15 

"Marching in the Right Direction," TheAustralian, 7 January 1987, 

85 . The Defence ofAustralia 1987, 3-6 ; "Defence White Paper," 

Chapter 4

New Zealand Defense Features

For New Zealand then, the aim in the future will be to have fle

professional [defence] forces capable of operating in our own [S

region . . . we do not propose to militarize the Pacific.

-Frank O'Flynn, New Zealand Labour Minister of De

Our [New Zealand] armed forces are . . . small . . . but they can hol

up in any company in the world . . . effective . . . professional . . 

keep them that way; we must.

-D. Fwan Jamieson, Air Marshal, Royal New Zeala

ex-chief defence for

Military isolation imposed on New Zealand by United States i

Wellington's anti-nuclear stance has hurt defence forces and woul

affect them .

-New Zealand defence ministry written 

parliamentary com

For years, many Americans were not very informe

Zealand. Those who did know something about the South 

often had only a vague idea of what the country was lik

New Zealanders were friendly, spoke English, and were 

Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZ

alliance, which provided collective security in the Sout

region. Some even knew that the New Zealand military ma

referred to in a nonderogatory manner by his Western all

as a"Kiwi,"just as he considered his Australian counterpar

and his American one a "Yank." Although the New Zea

95
ANZUS IN REVISION

contributions to ANZUSandto Western security might hav

they were proportionate. New Zealand gave its fair share 

received benefits from the arrangement .

But in the past 15 years, New Zealand has been goi

transition in most of the fundamental aspects of its national 

well-being . It has created what Dr Dalton West, a Canadi

Zealander now living in Washington, D.C ., has called 

security dilemma." I Simply stated, the dilemma meant th

success New Zealand had in deterring potential aggressor

difficulty it had in defining the need to do so. In the pursu

security, the paradox became evident . The more New Ze

it, the more elusive it appeared . As Dr West viewed 

obligations New Zealand was willing to accept in its pursu

security today, the more commitments the country assume

The dilemma caused New Zealand to undergo man

changes in its defense features and conditions . This chapte

changes in two settings. First is the one that takes into 

Zealand defense contributions inside and outside an AN

prior to the David Lange Labour government election in 

is the period after that election, from 1984 to the pr

considers New Zealand's defense conditions outside A

Australia's middle role comes into focus here . Next come

the extensive two-year cycle of defense debate-beginn

interim defense review in 1985 and ending with the govern

paper on defense policy in 1987-followed by the current 

New Zealand Defence Forces' (NZDF) capabilities a

Finally, American perspectives on recent NewZealand def

and conditions are given.

The Historic Role of

New Zealand Defence Forces

New Zealand is a small subregional power and leader 

Pacific community . It is insulated and isolated by oceans, 

of the world's first social welfare states . While the prese

of 3 .3 million is predominantly white, the racial composit

96
NEW ZEALANDDEF

changing . Indigenous Maoris of Polynesian origin compri

percent of the population. The growing influx of thousan

islanders-Samoans, Tongans, Fijians, and others-is 

significant that by the year 2000 every third or fourth Ne

will likely have a Polynesian ancestor.

Agriculture is the backbone of New Zealand's ec

international trade is an important part of it . With upwards 

sheep, New Zealand is the world's largest exporter of wool 

direct or support nature of the agriculture-based economy, 

is very urbanized. More than 80 percent of its people li

major metropolitan areas, the largest by far being the grea

area at the tip of the North Island. 3 (See accompanying 

Zealand .)

NZDF, with its several elements, totals more than 25

and civilian personnel. Of this aggregate, 12,600 compri

duty force . The military reserves include 2,900 regula

territorials . The civilian portion consists of almost 3,200 

employees connected with the Department of Defence. 

forces' present size, composition, and capabilities 

medium-technology conventional force in the South Pac

(See appendix E .)

To really comprehend the traditions and history of the 

to the country's 1951 entry into ANZUS and even afterwa

understand New Zealand's strong ties with Great Britain

white New Zealanders were of British origin. Only a gener

country still served as "England's farm ." More so than 

Australia, many in New Zealand fondly called Engl

whether they had ever been there or not . Consequently, for 

committed itself to a supportive approach to collective sec

distinctively British in nature. New Zealanders demon

unswerving support in wartime by not thinking about thei

and strategic situation but only of service to the mother c

Wartime experiences in the twentieth century i

allegiance . In the First World War tiny New Zealand call

military members for overseas and home service. Almost 

volunteers . Ofthe total, 100,000 went overseas to Europe. 

97
ANZUS IN REVISION

` NEW ZEALAND

1 :8,000,000

172'

Ka .IG

176 ° E

SOUTHPACIFIC

OCEAN

marul

aron REFEREN

wjnCF+1es . . . . . . ._ 

5UNEDIN 1 OthwCities and

rclnne to$bn§arough3 . . . . . . 

SIRYtve Cenm . . . . . 

NetionM State

Mighwel s . . . . . . . . 

Rahrays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

50 0 10

New Zealand

Source: S. H. Franklin, "The Social Structure and Population," in New

Pacific, ed. Roderick Alley (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 

98
NEWZEALANDDEF

World War almost 194,000 men and 10,000 women s

military between 1939 and 1945 . The male equivalent wa

of the population of men aged between 18 and 45 years. O

served overseas . In the 1950-53 Korean War, a total of 

personnel, all volunteers, served in the Commonwealth 

Korea. Another 1,300 sailors were continuously afloa

waters. Even during the Vietnam conflict from 1964 to 197

3,800 NZDF personnel had active service in Vietnam . A

military involvement was ostensibly in response to Ameri

it still was representative of the past proven performances 

in overseas conflicts, mostly in support of British interest

Following the gradual lessening of British influence 

after World WarII and the withdrawal in the late 1960s of 

stationed east of Suez, New Zealand (like Australia) 

supporting defense role . No longer was the role directed 

Britain. Defense relations with the United States too

importance. For years the defense efforts were suffici

Zealanders to know that they were one of the few genu

democracies totally committed to the Western alliance. As 

Sir D. Ewan Jamieson, former chief of the NZDF, poin

have no history of neutralism ." 7 Others might have disag

air marshal's comments being applied to present and fu

security policies of the Lange Labour government. Few 

however, that New Zealand defense efforts in the past we

supportive of British defense needs and objectives .

Pre-Lange Labour Government Setting (1952

Like the Australian Defence Force 1,500 nautical mile

ofthe NZDFefforts in the early and middle years ofthe AN

was geared to satisfying the objectives of forward d

Zealand's defense strategy, like Australia's, proceeded f

assumption that its military operations would be conduc

an allied effort under the leadership of a major power. In 

1960s, forward defense was a concept that made sense. Ac
ANZUS IN REVISION

NZDF provided a supporting role within ANZUS that clos

the dictates of preparing to fight away from its own territo

This approach led to a commitment for NZDF either to 

overseas or to be ready to go if the situation required 

congressional hearings on the American-New Zeala

American government officials emphasized how the tw

fought side by side in four major wars. New Zealand leaders 

that the overseas involvements were generally due not t

States but to British Empire-Commonwealth commitmen

remained that there was American-New Zealand defense 

during times of conflict before and during the ANZUS yea

A number of specific areas were indicative of the c

involvement New Zealand had in a full-house ANZU

beginnings in the early 1950s, the ANZUS Treaty grew 

a defense relationship much broader than that provided 

itself . On a functional basis for New Zealand, ANZU

intelligence-sharing, combined military exercises, train

seminars, staging facilities for military aircraft, and por

ships. These aspects were similar to those of Austra

proportionately reduced level . The end result was an eas

that characterized the military-to-military relation

partners . As Karl Jackson, the US deputy assistant 

defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, noted, it was a 

integrated trilateral relationship ." 10 ANZUS for years r

cornerstone of New Zealand foreign policy with a securi

that was inherent not with the "promise of the ANZUS 

with the premise of the alliance ." lI

The close intelligence relationship between the Unite

New Zealand (and also Australia) was one of the 

fundamentals of a full-house ANZUS. In fact, the small but 

New Zealand intelligence community was and still is for 

one of the country's strongest supporters of the United 

intelligence flow went in both directions . The United State

to send large amounts offirst-rate intelligence information 

to its ally in the South Pacific . The amounts were signif

senior military leaders responded in 1986 to a parliame

100
NEW ZEALANDDEF

committee that the 80 percent drop in US-provided intel

the 1984 Lange Labour election, severely hampered t

ability to give up-to-date military information. In return 

American flow, New Zealand provided very useful int

assessments on South Pacific regional issues not available 

the United States . Both sides benefited from the involved 

arrangement.

13

Another important aspect of strong bilateral and tril

cooperation in the ANZUS framework was interoperab

ability of the NZDF to operate within and alongside allie

Interoperability enabled the modest NZDFto maintain hig

and operational efficiency than otherwise possible . The N

to gain access to and be a part of military doctrine formulat

nications, standardization of procedures, logistics, trai

cooperation, exercises, and the like. These all constit

manifestations growing out of the ANZUS alliance relat

was at times more important than the treaty itself. The 

military was able to develop and maintain its professiona

by working closely with larger partners . The defence forc

aware and appreciative of this special situation. l

a

Perhaps the greatest peacetime area in which the NZD

positively was in their small but important support 

Radford-Collins agreement . As Thomas-Durell Young ha

pointed out, Radford-Collins is still relevant in maintai

maritime control and protecting shipping interests in th

agreement, probably more than any other, had a fundamen

the NZDF structure, since it required NewZealand to main

level of forces in peacetime to carry out its maritime ob

responsibilities .

15

Since New Zealand's regional defense environment 

maritime, the country devoted resources during this perio

interoperable capability to maintain effective mari

primarily in New Zealand waters and in the South Pacif

were seen in the naval and air branches of the NZDF. Th

Zealand Navy (RNZN) acquired from Great Britain 

frigates to satisfy this objective, and the Royal New Zeal
ANZUS IN REVISION

(RNZAF) flew American-built A-4 Skyhawks and P-

provide maritime strike and surveillance capabilities, re

These approaches were in line with later remarks by an N

military leader on the important role small countries as w

ones had in keeping a security balance. There was an obvi

role for New Zealand in the South Pacific region.

New Zealand had some workable arrangements for defe

support and supply. It had both a memorandum of un

(MOU) on logistics support with the US Department 

(renewed in 1982 but not in 1987) and mutual developmen

and defense industrial infrastructures with Australia. 

important allied arrangements which would enable New 

obtain needed equipment and supplies, especially duri

sustained operations.

17

Of particular value was the MOU with the United Stat

example of a defense cooperation program established in t

broader alliance activities . In the MOU the US Departmen

wanted to ensure uninterrupted supply to New Zealand 

American weapon systems and other logistics support . In 

Zealand agreed to provide assistance such as maintenance 

transiting American military ships, aircraft, and related equ

type of MOU was one of only a few offered by the United S

allies. Its ending in 1987 meant that New Zealand woul

receive the special preference reserved for allies in buy

systems andparts . The NZDF would still be able to buy the 

from American manufacturers and through the foreign m

system but without preference. Although this arran

workable, it made such acquisition more difficult for 

Especially affected was the air force, which wa

"Americanized" among the services in terms of equipment 

To emphasize the extent of this dependence, approximatel

of all RNZAF purchases in 1981 were from US sources. 

demise affected the more British-equipped navy less and 

equipped and supplied mostly by Australian and local so

of all ."
Full-House ANZUS

NEW ZEALAND DEF

New Zealand's contribution to a full-house ANZUS 

forms . From an official perspective, its most obvio

contribution to the alliance was in allowing allied warshi

access to New Zealand's port facilities . On a larger strateg

dimension, Adm Ronald J. Hays, US commander in c

Command, stated that New Zealand for years played a rol

contributing in the policy formulation of the Western secu

and the ANZUS alliance . Some people observed that the n

Navy vessels which visited New Zealand (at a rate of seve

year in the early 1980s) was small . Others, especially in N

argued that the smallest partner's contributions to ANZU

than just hosting ships . 19

New Zealand's perspective on the benefits derived fro

in ANZUS had a different tilt from the US one. By having 

cooperation with the United States in ANZUS asymmetri

New Zealand was able to realize two important advan

"special" ally it had a degree of access to a global sup

allowed more influence on certain security issues. New 

was able to "play the American card" to maintain that count

of action in security and foreign policy matters with Austr

Additionally New Zealand's participation in ANZUS 

small country to put less money into its own defense eff

complement a national objective of greater defense force 

and interdependence in facing Pacific security problems. 

Air Marshal Jamieson appropriately noted, New Zealan

themselves if they thought their nation was capable 

self-reliance in defense. The nation's security, whether 

ANZUS, was still bound up with global security an

community of nations with whom it had trade and interac

Lastly, before discussing a setting of New Zealand def

outside ANZUS in the pre-Lange government years, it is 

place into proper context the country's two professional 

that contributed the most and received the greatest numbe

from a full-house ANZUS: the military and intelligence 

Subsequent New Zealand Labour government policies an

103
ANZUS IN REVISION

ANZUS punished principally these communities and 

22 others .

ANZUS Aside

New Zealand's defense features with ANZUS aside f

1950s to the early 1980s had three main aspects: a conti

connection, several assistance programs in the South Pacif

close cooperation with Australia. All three were over

defense policies which revealed limited independent 

excessive reliance on a larger ally, and few clear-cut objec

of support to ANZUS.

Although Great Britain's presence was considerably dim

of the directed thrust of New Zealand (and Australian) se

in the 1950s and 1960s still went toward supporting that p

task, related to the slow process of decolonization and the e

of a viable independent government, was the defeat of 

insurgents on the Malay Peninsula . Another task was the 

of the "confrontation" of Malaysia by Indonesia . Both New 

Australia had significant defense force commitments . Fo

the height of confrontation, New Zealand had 3,000 serv

all services, committed to the support of Malaysia.

One lasting low-key reminder of the former British pre

Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA). Irreverently 

"five horsepower arrangement" by an Australian high c

FPDA gave the most advantages to Malaysia and Singapo

them to build their own defense capabilities while stre

economies needed for effective security maintenance.

23

The New Zealand Anny, partly in response to the req

continued stationing of an ANZUK (Australia, New 

United Kingdom) force in Singapore and Malaysia, kept 

Singapore at considerable cost to New Zealand. British for

by 1974 and most of the Australian ground contingent 

Called the New Zealand Force Southeast Asia (NZFORSE

Zealand unit was the lst Battalion, Royal New Zeal

Regiment . Numbering more than 700 troops it perfo

104
NEW ZEALAND DE

functions, including being a positive demonstration of ex

to a once unsettled area. Singapore and Malaysia found 

in a shadow linkage to the United States by way of New 

Australian military presence in the region. This wa

important in the first years after the mid-1970s withdrawa

ground combat forces from Southeast Asia. As far as New 

concerned, despite the expense, NZFORSEA service 

small army's volunteer recruiting and eased the probl

modating the battalion personnel (and their dependents) 

New Zealand .

There have been few other long-term overseas involv

NZDF in peacetime. The most obvious recent example 

Zealand contingent to the multinational force ofobservers 

Sinai . As mentioned in the previous chapter, New Zeal

its helicopters and personnel with a larger Australian air 

Middle East peacekeeping operation that lasted more tha

New Zealand maintained a fairly active series of mut

defense programs directed at both selected South Pacif

members of the Association of Southeast Asian Natio

These programs consisted of bilateral agreements with 

Singapore (under the FPDA), Indonesia, Thailand, th

Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Tonga. Recently there has 

shift in emphasis to the South Pacific area of more d

concern to New Zealand. Types of activities there incl

of training facilities, personnel exchanges, and joint e

Zealand used defense force assets to provide natural disa

assistance to those countries throughout the region in ti

A very significant feature of NZDF outside ANZ

trans-Tasman Sea relationship with the Australian D

(ADF) . There were differences in orientation, such 

closeness to the Asian mainland, Indonesia, and the In

contrast to New Zealand's more pronounced orientati

South Pacific . Nevertheless, much of New Zealand's 

predicated on an integrated response with Australia t

threat.

26 As Prime Minister David Lange carefully wr

article,

105
ANZUS IN REVISION

If Australian forces were engaged in combat in defence of Austral

it is almost unthinkable that New Zealand defence forces woul

whether or not New Zealand interests were directly involved.

27

This was an important point emphasizing how the Aus

Zealand connection, at least defense-wise, was strong dur

stress . Even though each country had its own orientation a

be independent and self-reliant in a qualified sense, the bo

their armed forces, forged in wartime, had an important 

political decisions concerning security in peacetime .

The 1944 Australia-New Zealand agreement, also called 

pact, was still used in the mid-1980s by some to justify 

defense relationship outside of ANZUS. Political mana

formalized in the 1970s by the establishment of such ann

as the Australia-New Zealand Consultative Committee 

Cooperation (ANZCCDC) and the Australia-New Zeal

Policy Group . The ANZAC relationship built up lo

arrangements between the two close allies for training

exchanges, technical cooperation, logistics support, and 

sharing. 2g Overall, the bilateral defense relationship was u

especially to New Zealand. Yet the security problems 

United States and New Zealand that began in the 1970s an

to a "crisis" point in the mid-1980s also strained and cr

between Australia and New Zealand.

Turning Points in Defense Emphasis

Several turning points changed the traditional ap

Zealanders took on defense issues. One was the antinuclea

has become so prevalent in New Zealand society toda

foundations for the antinuclear movement go back to 

turning point really began in the early 1970s during the 

government of Norman Kirk and Sir Wallace Rowling . T

issue then dealt with attempts to make the entire South Pac

weapons free zone . The New Zealand Labour Pa

mainstream's principal target for the antinuclear push was 

106
NEW ZEALANDDEF

to its active program of nuclear weapons testing in Fren

and not the United States with its nuclear-powered and nuc

navy. But left-wing fringes of the NZLP long had been 

aspects of the nuclear issue. Consequently, these more ext

groups extended their protests to include New Zealand wit

military alliances with any nuclear power-which meant 

the United States .

When David Lange's fourth Labour government ente

1984, his "conservative" handling of the national economy 

concessions to leftist NZLP elements were necessary if he 

support . So Lange gave them much of the foreign policy 

That is one reason the subsequent port ban on nuclear shi

political reasons "nonnegotiable ." 29

Prime Minister Lange was quick to point out that the nuc

policy was antinuclear only and not anti-ANZUS or an

New Zealand has always been committed to the ANZUS 

as Ambassador Rowling stated to a US congressional sub

1985, the NZLP interpreted the alliance to be a convent

partnership, not a nuclear one . Thus, the party saw no 

United States to send nuclear-propelled or nuclear-arme

aircraft to New Zealand.3° Lange did not believe a positi

attitude equated to negative feelings against the United 

words, "Anti-Americanism is not popular in New Zealand 

doesn't catch on.",31

Close connections with the South Pacific Nuclea

(SPNFZ) treaty further strengthened antinuclear feel

Zealand . Both Australia and New Zealand saw SPNFZ as 

necessary . The fact that the United States did not sign 

meant to many New Zealanders that America was suppo

nuclear policy and that the Soviet Union (which agree

parts) was the major global power pursuing regional pea

SPNFZ issue soon transcended politics and became very 

perhaps oversensationalized . 32

While antinuclear sentiment is now reflected among all 

political parties, many observers believe that it was 

Minister Robert Muldoon of the National Party who politi

107
ANZUS IN REVISION

in the late 1970s . Muldoon's government hosted 

nuclear-powered ship visits . Media attention on the 

disturbances during the visits created a situation which Mul

satisfactorily explained nor justified . His actions and com

boosted the momentum of growing antinuclear attitudes 

NZLP conference, leaders set a policy which directed t

Labour Government, in accordance with its desire to promo

continue to oppose visits by nuclear-powered and nucl

carrymgcraft." 33 At the same time NZLP continued to pa

calling for withdrawal from ANZUS. These were the ty

political issues on which David Lange sought middle-grou

when he became the NZLP leader in February 1983 . O

Lange found that the majority of his people remained co

antinuclear stance .

Another turning point for the NZDF was the need 

self-reliant and to have an independent capability to sa

needs in the South Pacific region. Vietnam War invo

subsequent disillusionment were critical early catalysts in 

New Zealanders away from the role of a "faithful and unt

to a greater power.

Lange himself was one of the early protesters against th

1964 the young law student made his first public sp

involvement in Vietnam . His political activism then must 

the attention of American authorities . Upon completing h

and preparing to embark for several years oflegal work in 

Lange was refused an American visa when he requested t

the United States . 3

s

The post-Vietnam War period saw a continuation of N

defense efforts to be more self-reliant . In Decemb

conservative government of Muldoon published Defen

white paper that proposed restructuring the NZDF 

self-reliant and planned for a wider role in the South Paci

in the Defence Review, the official defense policy objecti

preserve security and integrity of New Zealand 

nautical-mile exclusive economic zone;
" promote security and stable development in Sout

providing, on request, practical assistance in defense 

countries of the region;

" be able to respond militarily to low-level emerge

South Pacific ;

" maintain and strengthen defense relationships w

partners;

" develop further defense cooperation with Australia

" demonstrate commitment to maintain peace and 

Southeast Asia.

109

NEW ZEALAND DEF

Additionally the DefenceReview identified a South Pacific 

for the army by creating a ready reaction force as well as 

an ongoing force structure capable of expansion in case of 

highlighted a need for another maritime surveillance aircr

The DefenceReview was a forward-looking document b

association with partners in a functioning ANZUS allia

before the government changed and a new shift in de

emerged, the 1983 white paper had a fundamental probl

self-reliance required a greater budget allocation for defe

was not evident in the early 1980s .

The final major turning point concerned these econo

stances. For years, effective deterrence provided by colle

allowed progressive New Zealand governments, regardle

capitalize on external ties and keep defense expenditures t

Only in fiscal year 1981-82 did defense expenditures exc

of the gross national product (GNP)--and that was for 

since FY 1970. By comparison Australia spent almost 3 pe

United States almost 8 percent of their respective GNPs 

Successive New Zealand governments, faced with domes

problems, deferred numerous defense equipment purchas

devaluation by 22 percent of the New Zealand do

international currencies created a further problem, especial

than 80 percent of NZDF equipment came from overseas 

The economic situation has become more serious, i

general agreement that the NZDF's primary emphasis 
ANZUS IN REVISION

defense . Past governments were willing to purchase a

capital equipment in this area. Unfortunately, primary asset

those belonging to the navy, are fast approaching the obsole

and require replacement. Yet such items are expensive, an

NZDF budget for capital expenditures is limited to on

percent, divided among all three service components.

39

The country's budget problems neither started nor en

NZDF. The New Zealand foreign debt is more than US $11 

of the world's largest for a nation that size. Although unem

1970 was almost zero, it had grown to nearly 6 per

mid-1980s . Annual inflation rates have varied in recen

hovered around 6 percent at the time of Lange's election 

current split with the United States is costing the New Zea

budget an estimated extra $NZ 50 million per year. Yet N

still planned to budget a scarce $1 billion on defense in FY 

caused one former NZDFchief to lament, "We can do no le

to maintain any real combat capability of our own." 4° 

where the peacetime defense allocations fit into an alr

national budget. These problems are not new; they have b

or pushed aside by former governments. The Lange gove

priority was a major economic restructuring of New Zeala

market-based economy to help correct its financial woes . 

long-term increased allocations for defense self-re

antinuclear atmosphere are supposed to fit in is anyone's 

Lange Labour Government Setting

The election of the fourth Labour government head

Lange in July 1984 marked a visible change in New Zeal

defense policy and relationship in ANZUS. The rapid asc

onto the national scene represented a shift in New Zeala

and foreign relations. Perhaps the meaning of this cha

shown in the statements issued by Lange and US Secre

George P. Shultz, who coincidentally was in Wellington, N

to attend the annual ANZUS Council meeting taking plac

time as that country's federal election.
NEWZEALANDDEF

The new Prime Minister-designate Lange met privately w

a 40-minute discussion. After that meeting Lange announ

Zealand's ties with the United States were "a very basic p

heritage" andcited his nation's "hugedependency" on the Ame

for its trade. Yet at the same time he stated an often-repeated 

is simply inconceivable to me" that the military strategy ofthe 

and its allies "would be frustrated" by banning US Navy wa

New Zealand ports. Lange furthered the cause of antinuclear 

by proclaiming that it was a "very significant concern within 

that we ought not be seen to be buying into a nuclear defen

. . . People in this country are saying in increasing numbers t

to be defended by nuclear weapons.

,42

For his part Shultz made a concerted effort to remain ca

and reasonable with Lange. It was then still possible 

Lange's pronouncements reflected more the euphoria 

victory than deep-seated and unswerving convict

emphasized the importance of port calls to the Western 

asked rhetorically, "What kind of alliance is it if military 

able to be in concert with one another?" 43

The above statements set in motion a series of o

highlighted by quiet, eleventh-hour, behind-the-scenes neg

attempted to break the growing deadlock between the clo

issue came to a head in February 1985 with the bannin

Buchanan from New Zealand. The American reaction w

teristically strong and swift against New Zealand. To 

Zealand's antinuclear stance starting a trend which ot

might follow, the United States suspended its secur

extended to New Zealand under ANZUS. As Secretary Sh

"We part as friends but we part company as far as t

concerned." 44

Lange and his following in New Zealand outwar

unperturbed and proceeded to press for antinuclear polici

independence. Lange started the political process to crea

legislation in New Zealand. He advanced this wit

introduction in February 1987 of a bill in Parliament to b

weapons from New Zealand, saying it would be a "real me
ANZUS IN REVISION

control ." Only then would there be a "willingness to rep

defence with conventional defence and . . . hope of an end 

race ." 45 Political opponents in New Zealand said the nuc

as presented was the "formal opting-out legislation from 

alliance" and the "end of ANZUS in New Zealand." Never

bill's passage in the summer of 1987 and Labour Party

government in the federal elections in September 1987 cu

46 process .

The New Zealand Ministry of Defence maintained 

position in wanting independence and effective forces, w

out of a revised ANZUS alliance . Defence Minister Fra

talked of New Zealand's intentions to provide means th

NZDF to carry out a regional role in association wit

(Australia primarily) but with a gradually increasing de

reliance . O'Flynn admitted that a small professional arm

New Zealand's had to maintain effective interaction 

partners . Only in this way would there be confidence in its 

capabilities . While this apparently became more difficult 

of New Zealand's strained relations with the United 

differences with Australia, the minister was publicly opti

beginning that New Zealand could meet the "formidable c

all ." 47 Soon after the 1984 NZLP election, he defined 

interests behind New Zealand's foreign and security polic

a secure and prosperous South Pacific region free 

possible from confrontation ;

sound and growing bilateral relations with Austra

United States, and Japan;

important interests with ASEAN and the Europea

Economic Community (EEC) ;

a continued East-West balance of power to ensur

and peaceful worldwide trading and political environme

a demilitarized Antarctic continent and region no

to political or economic dispute .

48
Within ANZUS

NEW ZEALAND DEFE

Considering these political aspects, what is the status of N

defense features within ANZUS in a Lange government? 

there is very little to discuss about present New Zeal

contributions to the alliance. It is more appropriate to men

no longer occurring. Most of the prior bilateral defense a

between the United States and New Zealand are now susp

are no more combined training and exercises, intel

surveillance support, logistics and supply support, personne

or defense conferences and consultations .

While no one knows for sure what the long-term effec

the NZDF, several developments are predictable. With

defense connection, New Zealand's military forces, in spite 

contacts with the Australian Defence Force, will become p

removed from developments in modern military do

procedures. To be sure, such a modem approach has 

application to the South Pacific security environment. Ye

to remain professional and current, requires some exposur

Western defense thinking and policies to adapt them to the 

needs. New Zealand's senior military leaders were alrea

1986 there had been a significant loss by having acce

American tactical doctrine, particularly in maritime and a

warfare systems .

9

In the area of logistics and supply support, the e

nonrenewal of the memorandum of understanding was unc

there will be little effect since New Zealand in the past 

most of its military purchases. However, although NewZea

such supplies from American sources, the procedure of do

be more difficult and the costs higher since the country w

be treated in arms sales as an ally but rather as a "friendly g

Several US congressmen wanted to punish New Zealand 

this area. Bill Broomfield (R-Michigan) introduced a bi

officially strip New Zealand of any preferential treatment 

arms sales and security assistance . Had it passed, the 

amendment would have ended for a long time any chanc

defense cooperation between the two countries.

s o
ANZUS IN REVISION

The virtual elimination of official association with the 

has led to an "unofficial" reaction that affects most critic

Zealand defense community . The US position in es

high-level New Zealand access to American officials in 

Since the former ally once enjoyed such special arrangeme

much harder to function without them . This factor and the o

difficult problems for the NZDF. As US Deputy Assistant 

Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Karl Jackson tes

such access to US military and political circles means h

New Zealand in terms of defense force structure, mo

sustainability, and worthwhile training . If the New Zealand 

decides to provide for an adequate, self-reliant convention

has to require the New Zealand people to assume more 

contributions to replace those assets previously provided 

States through the ANZUS alliance relationship .

One approach New Zealand is trying in an effort to ea

the defense arrangement with the United States is to 

interaction with Australia on a bilateral basis . This be

feature of New Zealand's defense contributions outside of

the 1984 election period. Undeterred by finding itself i

Australia continues to set priorities for its own defense fe

include a definite determination to strengthen bilateral r

the United States, as reflected in the recent series ofministe

(i .e., July 1985 in Canberra, August 1986 in San Francisc

in Sydney, July 1988 in Washington, and November 198

between the two which replaced the temporarily defu

Council sessions . Australia still acknowledges its l

relationship with NewZealand. It is willing, within reason, 

better defense cooperation and operational compatibility 

as central defense planning, expanded bilateral exercises

collection, and shared security interests. But as Austra

Minister Bill Hayden told Lange in December 1986, Aust

defense substitute for the United States and will do only wh

regarding an increased Australian-New Zealand defense r
Without ANZUS

NEW ZEALANDDEF

ANZUS aside, New Zealand has a strong regional rela

the islands of the South Pacific. The Labour government 

the importance of New Zealand's key role in furthe

interests in the area. According to Graham Ansell, the 

high commissioner for Australia, his government und

"Pacific way" of the islands. New Zealand wants to gear 

assistance and defense cooperation programs in a South Pa

to give the appearance that it already has an impressive u

of and is more influential than the United States and eve

times.

New Zealand leaders also have attempted to convin

citizens and others that New Zealand's national interests a

in the focus shift from a provision of forces to larger alli

far away to a more self-reliant capability directed towa

Pacific region . They point to several ongoing and propo

ments to support such a line of thinking. New Zealand 

extensive links through its military assistance program

equivalent to civil aid-with Fiji, Papua New Guinea, To

Samoa, and the Solomon Islands (more than $NZ 6

1986-87). New Zealand has a special defense concern 

Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. As part of this involvement, 

in cooperation with Australia provides maritime survei

region . It also holds its own joint military exercises th

Samoa in 1985 and the Cook Islands in 1986, with 

personnel) to demonstrate in Prime Minister Lange's 

Zealand's firm commitment to regional security." 54

Further evidence ofthe regional shift was found in Lange

1986 announcement that most of the NZFORSEA troop

Singapore under the FPDA umbrella would return ho

Singapore supposedly was "comfortable" with New Zeala

to transfer its token military force after a 30-year prese

result would be a beefed up military capability focused not 

on Southeast Asia but mainly on the South Pacific-N

stated region of primary strategic concern.
ANZUS IN REVISION

These changes in national defense policy and strategy 

in an atmosphere devoid of internal resistance. Lange re

seriously into account the experience of his seni

professionals . When he announced that a panel of indepen

would be appointed to undertake a defense review (i.e 

Committee of Enquiry-to be discussed later), he t

suggestions to include any of the 17 former defense chie

primarily due to some of the retired officers issuing a publ

on defense which called on the Labour government to 

antinuclear stance. Lange's reaction was to refer to this col

of retired professionals as "geriatric generals." Defen

O'Flynn did little better in winning friends among the NZD

When he publicly called some officers "disloyal" for tryin

the government's defense policy, he created a political em

that almost turned into a crisis. The opposition called 

minister to fire his minister of defence. Even though Lange 

incident and the prior one revealed considerable tension 

within the ranks and in the public service in New Zealand 

Two major implications arise from a review of the re

and shifts in New Zealand's defense policy outside ANZ

concerns the very real negative impact on the NZDF 

downgrading of its military relationship with the United 

small but well-trained and professional force can easily i

into larger allied formations ; it cannot hope to achieve h

proficiency by exercising and training alone. The 

immediately the loss caused by the American cancellatio

exercises and exchanges . For example, in 1985 the N

programmed exercises either canceled or restructured, 

approximately 6,000 man-days of training being taken awa

New Zealand Navy was probably hurt the most, as it saw 

days reduced to 34 due to the ending of joint exercises 

United States . One former NZDF chief said that lack 

exercises and exchanges with larger allied services would 

five years (by about 1990) a marked decrease in the exist

of the NZDF.
NEWZEALAND DEF

The second implication concerns the government's atte

the impact of US action by increasing defense expenditur

self-reliance in security matters . To give a clear signal 

government announced a proposed increase in defense al

$NZ 761 million in 1984-85 to $NZ 900 million in fiscal 

almost $NZ 1 billion (about 550 million in US dollars) 

These increases appeared impressive, especially since the 

government traditionally devoted less than 2 percent o

defense .

While the long-term results were unknown, many def

believe that New Zealand's attempts to increase defense 

self-reliance will have little real effect on its security postu

likely course of events could make the worst fears co

ANZUS aside the NZDF will lose its recent level of p

modern medium-intensity warfare and its interoperabili

Western defense forces . s

New Direction in Defense Objectives

The New Zealand Labour government persists in its eff

a new direction in defense objectives . In a display of d

Lange directed a complete cycle of defense review and 

the best defense policy and force structure required for 

and regional security. At the beginning of the cycle in 

Defence Interim Review and the government discussi

Defence Question : A Discussion Paper Issued as Backgro

Submissions on Future New Zealand Strategic and Secu

Following were several significant inquiries and studies

them was an examination of the defense situation by th

Defence Committee of Enquiry (the Comer committe

concluded with the release of a government white paper 

As the Dibb report and the subsequent defense white p

most important discussions on defense policies for A

World WarII, this two-year defense review cycle was lik

Zealand.
ANZUS IN REVISION

Government Discussion Paper on Defense

The government's comprehensive review of defense p

with the May 1985 DefenceInterim Review. This prelimina

was followed in December 1985 by publication of the 

discussion paper, The Defence Question. The latter was pr

background to the subsequent public submissions on 

Zealand strategic and security policies.

The concept of The Defence Question was unique. The 

rightly felt that since defense and security were everyone'

was important in a democracy for these issues to be brou

open. Consultation with the people was of fundamental 

Therefore, the intent was for this discussion paper, as a firs

the cycle process, to stimulate coherent debate on defense 

issues. The paper was not a statement of government p

attempt to set the scene for public consultation. If proper

would be a preparation for the new government's whi

defense in 1987, designed to end the review cycle and offic

the 1983 white paper. The whole purpose of the 1985 report 

the correct follow-on questions that the public inquiry and 

white paper would then seek to answer.

The discussion paper's aims were:

" to provide a framework for thinking about defense 

reference point for those wishing to make submissions t

committee;

" to outline and invite comments on the available opti

" to attempt an analysis of the more central provisions 

" to set out the broad thrust of the government's o

thinking with the goal of generating focused comment.

Before the discussion paper raised some fundamental q

Labour government made sure that its key elements of de

were known. The first element was that the policy had to c

best to provide for the defense of New Zealand. Next, Ne

security was linked by its South Pacific focus to stability i
NEW ZEALANDDEFE

This in turn had linkage to wider regional and even 

siderations when relevant . Third, the government inten

greater self-reliance founded on the principle of self-help. F

Zealand had to be free of nuclear weapons and not a parti

nuclear strategy (e .g ., ANZUS as a nuclear alliance) for its 

Labour government's nonnuclear policy thus became a b

point in defining the country's defense posture in the futur

The paper concluded by highlighting the following key 

defense issues for public discussion :

" kinds of defense policies appropriate to New 

(nonnuclear) stance and geographical position ;

" military capabilities required to uphold national inte

" degree able to stand alone in pursuit of more independ

" importance of defense cooperation, especially with A

South Pacific partners ;

" role of NZDF in contributing to regional stability 

through resource protection, civic action, and disaster reli

" appropriate commitment level to continuing in

maintaining effective NZDF. 58

Corner Report on Defence and Security:

What New Zealanders Want

The independent Defence Committee of Enquiry, chai

Corner, was established by the New Zealand Labour go

early 1986 to facilitate debate on defense and security issu

second stage of the cyclical process of public consu

committee's terms of reference were:

" to receive and hear public submissions on the disc

The Defence Question, on the future defense policy of Ne

" to question groups and individuals making submiss

" to commission polling to provide objective dat

attitudes to defense and security; and
ANZUS IN REVISION

to prepare for Lange and his government a report, ba

hearings and poll data, which would be considered in prep

white paper on defense policy. 59

Over a six-month period more than 4,100 New Zealand

submissions and the National Research Bureau 

comprehensive public opinion poll. The results underwent 

discussion by the four distinguished key members o

Committee of Enquiry :

Frank Corner, chairman, foreign affairs secretar

ambassador to the United States (1967-72), permanent r

to the United Nations (1962-67);

Maj Gen Brian M. Poananga, New Zealand Ar

General Staff (1978-81), high commissioner of Papua 

(1974-76);

Ms Diane Hunt, director of the Policy Res

Commission for the Future (1978-79) ; and

Dr Kevin Clements, senior lecturer in sociology at t

of Canterbury, director of the Quaker UN office in Gene

nongovemment representative with the New Zealand del

Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva 

It was Lange's intention to choose these four people for t

based not only on their knowledge and expertise but also 

range of backgrounds and differing viewpoints . By so do

the com6mo ittee's conclusions would reflect a valid 

opinion.

The Comer committee's results, published in July of 1

satisfactory as far as Lange was concerned . Using the 

opinion poll, and other sources of information, Corner's 

the country deeply divided on defense. More than 72 p

community desired to be in an alliance with larger coun

percent, most ofthem the same concerned citizens, wanted 

requirements arranged in a way that ensured New Zealan

free . According to the opinion polls, "the single most pref
NEW ZEALANDDEF

option overall was for New Zealand to be allied to the Uni

Australia but separate from any nuclear aspects." Fort

wanted it . Viewing this option as not achievable, 

government's unconditional antinuclear stance, the co

enhancement of the bilateral ANZUS relationship with Au

most promising option left open . Its bottom line was t

government was wrong in having a defense and security i

instead of precede, major policy changes (i .e., antinucle

ANZUS withdrawal) .

In a series of letters between Lange and Comer, bo

unwilling to compromise. In an 18 August 1986 final let

minister thanked Corner and his committee for their work 

criticizing some essential points, especially those on 

American-New Zealand negotiations from 1984 to the

words, "The comments on negotiating mistakes ar

misleading, and far outside the Committee's terms of ref

Templeton Study on Defence and Security

What New Zealand Needs

Partly due to the ambiguities andproblems associated w

report, Malcolm Templeton, director of the Institute of 

at Victoria University in Wellington and a former deput

foreign affairs, produced in October 1986 an independe

Defence and Security : What New Zealand Needs. Its term

required (1) an independent commentary on the political 

background for a review of New Zealand's defense 

capability; (2) a clarification of the country's role in the 

and (3) use as a possible starting point for a full examin

Zealand's strategic and defense requirements during t

century . Templeton emphasized that his study was not 

by the Labour government or any private organizati

Institute of Policy Studies received financial support o

basis from a number ofnational government departments, 

ministries of foreign affairs and defense, Templeton's s
ANZUS IN REVISION

received some sup ort from these areas, but it was "ind

outside direction." 2

Templeton summed up his study by stating New Zealand 

to promote its national security by :

" cultivating a growing sense of common security ;

" developing mutually supportive defense and foreign 

" intensifying its participation in the search for effect

of disarmament, with special emphasis on nuclear arms .

Additionally, a closer defense relationship with Australia w

to New Zealand's advantage, provided that the latter wa

doing its fair share. The sooner a greater bilateral defense w

became part of New Zealand's policy the better, as far a

was concerned. Lange was more receptive to the conclu

independent study and unofficially incorporated it as a thir

defense cycle .

63

Government White Paper

The white paper completed the government's review 

policy and was set aside in Parliament in February 198

incorporated in the white paper, the government stated th

prime reasons for its defense review . The first was the nee

defense arrangements which took into account the Labour g

nonnegotiable policy of nuclear weapon exclusion from N

and the resulting important consequences for the bilateral 

with the United States under ANZUS. The second was th

requirement to adjust resources to meet defense needs.

In the white paper the central objective of the New Zea

policy was to preserve its security and that of the island-sta

it was responsible . The policy also focused on the need 

South Pacific orientation for the NZDF. The main question 

What is required to defend New Zealand and its regional 
NEWZEALAND DEFE

Six fundamental issues were raised in response to the ma

The white paper contained separate sections addressed to 

following issues:

" Against what threats must New Zealand be defende

" What should New Zealand's security relationship 

neighbors?

" What wider security obligations and interests does 

have?

" What domestic environment factors affect its abilit

defense needs?

" What are the defense objectives on the basis of 

environment and resource limitations? and

" What military capabilities are required to meet t

objectives?

Underlying the answers to these six key questions were t

guiding New Zealand's defense strategy . First, the co

exercise greater self-reliance, and, when possible, mainta

to meet or deter with its own resources credible threats to 

interests. The second principle was complementary to t

Zealand recognized its part in an international commun

circumstances warrant, New Zealand would work wi

collective security . The focus would still be both on A

especially on the South Pacific, New Zealand's area of "di

concern ."

The Lange government felt the white paper and the prec

cycle represented the most fundamental change in New Zea

policies since World War II . Although previous white 

stressed the need for greater emphasis on New Zealand's 

in the South Pacific, few decisions on force structure were 

practical effect to this shift. According to the government

time, New Zealand was adopting in formal policy terms t

an NZDF capability to operate independently and sel

countering low-level threats in its region of direct strateg

clarified that by saying the country more probably wou

123
ANZUS IN REVISION

concert with Australia. New Zealand officials, at least in 

were confident with its defense policies, backed up by the r

allocations, would "place the defence of New Zealand an

on a secure basis for the future ." 64

While Lange and his followers hailed the white paper 

what New Zealand and the NZDF needed, others had c

worry was that New Zealand wanted to remain committe

global security and planned to help by maintaining peace a

collective security in its region. Yet protecting West

interests in a vast region without a superpower's support (i 

security using both nuclear and conventional deterre

awesome task. What made it even harder were the fac

Zealand's isolation, small population, fragile agricultur

limited resources, and protection by a full-time defense fo

people.

Another worry was New Zealand's requirement for a st

defense link with Australia, which reflected greater self-re

full self-sufficiency. Despite the ANZUS rift, New Ze

paramount importance on a nondependent but substan

relationship with Australia. Whether Australia could fulfil

meet its own significant defense requirements was uncerta

certain was Australia's refusal to replace the United Stat

New Zealand's defense and security needs .6s

Perhaps the greatest concern was about the Labour 

strong control over all aspects of New Zealand defense 

Australian white paper of March 1987 contained encoura

Western collective security in the greater Southwest Pa

Australia intended to meet its allied security commitments 

defense needs . Regrettably, the New Zealand white paper d

the same positive feelings . There was no deviati

government's antinuclear policies and ship bans. Unlike 

counterpart, the concentration was generally on defense 

as opposed to the NZDF capabilities and equipment 

Perhaps the explanation for this was the fact that the New Z

paper was a political document. According to informe

Washington, it was the first defense review to be coordina
prime minister's office by a political appointee instead of 

servant . In the past these procedures were left to the ministri

and foreign affairs. While the white paper officially was ca

of New Zealan"eview of Defence Policy 1987, some 

thought of it as "Defence of New Zealand-David Lange'

Defence Policy 1987 ." 66

Until recently the NZDF has performed well despite bei

resources . Yet problems have begun to appear and affec

readiness and the generally proficient capabilities once as

the three services . The forces are in need of upg

modernization to remain capable and self-reliant in the reg

improvements are part of a slow and expensive process . 

is common to all three NZDF services : the need to rep

material with costly, technologically sophisticated, moder

The most serious aspect of this problem deals with 

obsolescence of several capital weapon systems.

Navy

NEW ZEALAND DEF

Service Capabilities (Present and Future)

The Royal New Zealand Navy has the most at stake i

round of defense procurement deliberations . The naval f

2,600 active duty members, and a blue-water offensi

centered on four Leander-class antisubmarine warfare frig

vessels are due to be decommissioned for obsolescence 

same time in the mid-1990s. Due to the long lead times 

replacing such capital assets, decisions need to be immedia

the RNZN is going to have a frigate replacement ready 

proper time. The government's decision to fund a tanker 

of at-sea refueling will help increase the range effecti

existing frigates . If in a few years, however, there are n

refuel, then the tanker acquisition would be wasteful . The 

realizes that a good naval capability is basic to its sta

125
ANZUS IN REVISION

providing security and stability to a maritime South Pacif

unanswered question remains : How will it provide 

financial support to have and maintain such a capability?

Air Force

The Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF), with a s

of 4,200, is a reasonably capable regional air 

"Americanized" in aircraft, it centers in the late-198

Skyhawks (which replaced Canberras in 1970), and 

surveillance P-3 Orions. Many of the aircraft are either 

end in service life or have been modified and upgraded 

as they can be . Well organized, disciplined, and pro

RNZAF is fortunate in having quality personnel who k

ment in peak condition despite the aging problem . 

maintains varying degrees of operational capabilities in 

roles expected in a modern air force : strike, maritime r

transport, training, and helicopter operations . These ach

to the RNZAF's credit since it also has to deal with the p

question of "where is the money coming from?" If the R

blue-water capability or sees it diminished in the future

will have to expand and improve its maritime element

more professionals, more funding, and new or upgraded 

air force that is beginning to lose its recognized capabili

break with the United States, inability to have va

exchanges, and so on-the issues quickly multiply i

impact. Like the RNZN, the RNZAF faces some serious 

Army

Compared with the navy and air force, New Zealand's 

face the same critical problems since it does not have 

major decisions on capital equipment that could affect t

of a small military service . However, the army cannot e
NEWZEALANDDEF

for a reconsideration of its role in New Zealand's rev

strategic concern.

Two events are shaping the direction of the 5,800-man 

First is the impact of the gradual withdrawal of the 700-

from Singapore to New Zealand, completed in the late 1

is the creation in late 1984 of an infantry battalion-size

maintained at a high-readiness state to counter any low-int

emerging within the South Pacific region. Called the Re

Force (RRF), it is similar to the Australian Army's 

Deployment Force (ODE). The RRF has been given p

Army's portion of the defense budget for both its eq

manpower requirements . In fact the Army's manpow

recently increased by 300 men to bring the RRF battalio

regular strength of 1,200 . 69

Defense Feature Shortfalls

Despite the government's plans to make the NZDF mo

and capable in the region, the future does not look good 

proud and professional military forces. Many believe th

the NZDF is downward. In a revised ANZUS era, part of 

the unclear roles of the forces where they are on the outsi

instead of the other way around. The limiting factors that 

started to affect capabilities include demoralization of pe

of realistic exercising, economic and funding restricti

public esteem . While the danger apparently is over i

Zealand's economic rationalists wanted to do away compl

defense forces, many individuals remain who want to le

and power of the NZDF in the perceived "no-threat" 

Unless the situation is closely monitored and controlled

that the NZDF faces a situation of eventual "atro

justified.

Among the existing and potential defense shortfalls di

are three that appear likely to assume greater importance 

first concerns the perennial issue ofkeeping skilled perso

duty . Absolutely essential for the NZDF, small as it is, is 

127
ANZUS IN REVISION

functioning core of true professional military officers and 

The defense budget allocates more than one-half of its 

percent in 1982) to personnel. Yet pay and benefits are 

issues. The government publicly must give high priority 

the serious outflow of valuable professionals from the se

creating adesirable atmosphere in which young, enthusiast

New Zealanders will want to consider making a career in 

the present time the perceptions within and without the mi

conducive to straightening out the serious personnel prob

The second shortfall deals with capital equipment 

replacements . Decisions are needed to plan and prepa

weapon system changes, especially in the navy and a

government should increase its 15 percent defense allo

area . However, that seems unlikely due to the curr

economic, and moral climate in New Zealand.

71

The third has to do with New Zealand's efforts to inc

cooperation with Australia. Australia can do only so muc

Zealand, especially since its defense relationship with the 

is considered primary while that with New Zealand is sec

the best of circumstances . Nevertheless, by virtue of the 

relationship, it is Australia, and not New Zealand, that 

position to dictate many of the terms of such future defe

Such a situation does not appear to be in New Zealand's 

since that nation supposedly wants adegree of independen

in defense matters .

New Zealand Perspectives on Defense Featu

Prime Minister Lange apparently harbored few illus

probable impact on the superpowers . He said, "Small nat

Zealand) are like rabbits blinded by the headlights of two 

as they inexorably go and hit each other. We have no 

them ." 73 Even if he believed that, Lange and his Labour 

were sure they would be able to influence events in thei

and the South Pacific region. Concerning the defense rel

the United States, he was pushing for a credible defense 

128
context of effective military relationships with the convent

ofother powers to promote global common security . If the 

acceded to that arrangement, New Zealand would ac

Failing that, New Zealand felt there was scope and pr

relationships it maintained with the armed forces of o

particularly Australia. (See appendix F.)

Although the collective voices of the active military e

were downplayed and muffled, there were still others in 

who continued to provide a much-needed alternative pe

defense issues that rose above the political overtones . They 

a number of legitimate concerns. The former ANZUS 

despite its problems, gave dimension and depth to many mu

interactions between the military of the three nations 

beyond that provided by the cooperative bilateral or 

arrangements. The trilateral structure allowed New Zeala

defense issues and overcame isolationist tendencies . In 

situation since the ANZUS demise, these problems were s

New Zealand defense. A way to address them was to incr

of defense expenditure to a consistent 2.5 percent gr

product for greater self-reliance. Additionally, many agre

Malcolm Templeton, that a substantial effort was prompt

bring American-New Zealand defense relations back t

approaching their previous normality and closeness . They 

best place to begin was in behind-the-scenes, gov

government exchanges and negotiations .

75

United States Perspectives

NEWZEALAND DEF

The official US government position on the break with 

and the downgrading of the ANZUS alliance was well k

time of New Zealand's banning of a US Navy ship from 

February 1985, the US Assistant Secretary of State for the 

Pacific Paul D. Wolfowitz summarized the American vie

Our regional alliances are important in preventing small conflic

starting; and since it is from small conflicts that the greatest dange

129
ANZUS IN REVISION

arise, these alliances are important for preserving nuclear peace. . . 

New Zealand assures us that it remains committed to ANZUS. But 

New Zealand has effectively curtailed its operational role in th

military alliance has littleGmeaning without military co-operation, 

can't have it both ways.

Several years later the American perspective hadnot cha

even firmer. The United States reluctantly suspended 

obligations to New Zealand and reaffirmed its convictio

for allied ships and aircraft was essential to the effecti

ANZUS alliance in particular and to global security in 

Americans would not tolerate deviation from this wel

defense policy. New Zealand's current port access polic

from individual and collective capacity to resist arme

constituted amaterial breach of its obligations to the Unite

Article II of the ANZUS Treaty.

The United States was upset with this downgrading 

especially considering New Zealand's former traditio

vigorous cooperation with the United States and o

democracies. The Americans also realized that the toug

facing the NZDF in force structure, training, sustai

modernization were made even more difficult by the ong

While Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated, "We wo

New Zealand's return . . . anytime,",77 the fact rema

differences between the United States and New Zealand 

being resolved. The differences were even more pron

contrasted with other official American positions, as 

Weinberger's often quoted comment, "The way you kee

to be strong enough throughmutual action to deter war." 

US military members regretted especially the problems th

going through, but could do little to assist .

79

Summary

Although by far the smallest of the three ANZUS p

Zealand has certainly had a substantial impact on allianc

affairs in recent years . Few could argue that past 

130
NEWZEALANDDEF

contributions for collective security and regional stabil

outside ANZUS were not proportionate and useful. Th

seriously its responsibilities for burden-sharing, first und

and then the Americans .

A changing political climate, influenced by su

encompassing antinuclear attitudes evident in New Zeal

parts of the entire region, has greatly changed the way 

approaches its security and defense needs . Driven by a com

Minister David Lange and encouraged by growing popula

country appears to have shifted its focus forever aw

earlier-and perhaps also from the revised-ANZUS 

informal frameworks . As firm proof of the new emph

reliance and regional conventional focus, Lange organize

two-year defense debate cycle. The public review was 

the government's publication of a white paper on defen

was politicized in content and overtone . The ca

effectiveness of the once professional New Zealand De

seem to be steadily declining, despite the governme

comments and the military's efforts to control and correc

The next chapter covers several areas, to include genera

of the current state of affairs, assessments of what the fut

recommendations for some defense and policy op

involving all three of the ANZUS countries .

Notes

1 . Dalton A. West, "New Zealand Security Perspective" (pape

seminar on Strategic Imperatives and Western Responses in the 

Australia, 9-12 February 1986), 188, 190. 2. Ibid.

3. Robert P. Jordan, "New Zealand: The Last Utopia," National 

no. 5 (May 1987): 656-61 . 4. "Defense Forces of New Zealand," Military Balance: 1987-1

Garden City Press, 1987), 167-68 .

5. Frank O'Flynn, "Formidable Challenges for All," New Zealan

Review 35, no. 2 (April-June 1985): 18; Jordan, 661 .

6. "Section 11-Defence," New Zealand Official Yearbook-1

New Zealand: V. R . Ward, Government Printer, 1985), 328 .
ANZUS IN REVISION

7 . Sir D. Ewan Jamieson, "Defence Dilemmas of Small Countrie

Age," Pacific Defence Reporter 13, no. 5 (November 1986): 40

"ANZUS Triangle: Defence and Security," n. p., 1978.

8 . Malcolm Templeton, Defence and Security: What New 

(Wellington, New Zealand: Institute ofPolicy Studies, Victoria Univer

9. Statement of Stephen J. Solarz, chairman of House Subcomm

and Pacific Affairs, in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Unit

toward New Zealand and Australia and the Current State of AN

before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 99th Con

September 1986, 3 .

10. Statement of Karl D. Jackson, deputy assistant secretary of 

Asia and Pacific Affairs, in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Uni

toward New ZealandandAustralia andthe CurrentState ofANZUS: 

the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d sess 

1986,2.

11 . Ramesh Thakur, "New Zealand: In Search ofa Defence Policy,

Journal, July 1985, 54.

12. Philip Riley, draft research paper on New Zealand-American d

for National WarCollege, January 1987, 19.

13. Thakur, 58; Kevin P. Clements, "New Zealand Defence Polic

the Future" (paper presented at a seminar on New Zealand Defence 

ofPolicy Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 9 D

7 ; Thomas-Durell Young, "Problems in Future New Zealand Defenc

December 1986, 3; Ian Templeton, "Lange Moving to Make Austra

Arms," The Bulletin 108, no. 5541 (21 October 1986): 110.

14. Thakur, 58 ; Young, 6.

15. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Dilemmas," US 

Proceedings 111, no. 8 (August 1985): 54; idem, "Don't Abandon Ra

Pacific Defence Reporter 13, no. 3 (September 1986): 16.

16. Robert A. Brand, "Australia, New Zealand, and ANZUS,"Atlan

Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Winter 1984-1985): 354; Jamieson, 41 .

17. "Current Defence Policies : Background," Background Briefs 

Defence (Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Defence, July 1984)

18. Ramesh Thakur, "A Nuclear Weapon-Free South Pacific : A 

Perspective," PacificAffairs 58, no. 2(Summer 1985) : 225; William M

Zealand to Lose DoDMilitary Purchasing Help," Air Force Times, 9 

P. Lewis Young, "The RNZAF: ToughGoingAhead,"Asian Defence 

1985,76; Brand, 354; Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Air Powe

and Force Determinants," Air University Review 37, no. 3 (March-Ap

19. "U.S .-New Zealand Disagreement on Port Access for U.S. Shi

ofState Bulletin 86, no. 2114 (September 1986): 1 ; Ronald J. Hays, 

Is Apparent in Pacific Security Setting," San Diego Union, 10 August 

C. Brownfeld, "Fragility of Alliance Illustrated in NewZealand," Was

12 September 1984, 3C.

13 2
NEW ZEALAND DE

20. Thomas-Durell Young, "Problems in Future New Zealand Def

21 . Sir D. Ewan Jamieson, "New Zealand Defence Policy : 

Viewpoint" (paper presented at a seminar on New Zealand Defence 

of Policy Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 9D

3; "Current Defence Policies," 2.

22. Riley, 19.

23. Bumett, "ANZUS Triangle : Defence and Security," 10; John H

Zealand Foreign Policy," in New Zealand and the Pacific, ed. 

(Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1984), 91 ; P. D. Hastings, "Aust

Defence Co-operation in the 1980s," in Australian Defence Policyfo

Robert O'Neill and D. M. Homer (St. Lucia, Australia: Universit

Press, 1982),130-31 .

24. Henderson, 92; "New Zealand Force, South East Asia," Backg

Minister ofDefence (Wellington : New Zealand Ministry of Defenc

Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Defense Arrangements : An 

Ahead," International Defense Review 19, no. 5 (May 1986):593; O'F

A. Brand, "Defense Down Under: An American View," Pacific Defe

no. 12 (June 1985): 13 .

25. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Defense Arrangemen

26. Henderson, 85-86.

27. Bumett, 38.

28. Ibid., 38-39; O'Flynn, 19 .

29. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Dilemmas," 55; Gwy

Zealand's Pesky Nix on Nukes," Washington Times, 1 November 1

30. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Defense Policy unde

War College Review 39, no. 3 (May-June 1986): 22-23 .

31 . Stuart Inder, "The Unsqueaky Facing up to Charles Atlas," 

no. 5560 (10 March 1987): 35.

32. Richard D. Fisher, "Why the U.S . Must Oppose the South Pac

Zone," Backgrounder, no. 55, Heritage Foundation, 23 December 1

"A Nuclear Weapon-Free South Pacific," 232.

33 . Riley, 4-5 ; Vernon Wright, David Lange Prime Minister (

Zealand: Unwin Paperbacks, 1984), 128-31 .

34. Wright, 128-31 ; John H. Beaglehole, "Labor's Dangerou

Pacific Defence Reporter 12, nos . 6[7 (December 1985-January 198

35. Wright, 49-50; Andrew Clark, "Lange Symbolism Exac

Schism," The Bulletin 108, no. 5521 (3 June 1986): 1 . (Lange liked 

university student he gave an antiwar speech on American Independ

later he wanted to use the 6 August anniversary date of the US nuc

Hiroshima to introduce legislation to ban port visits in NewZealand 

ships . This action caused some US officials to refer to New Zea

"nonaligned" and "third world.")
ANZUS IN REVISION

36. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Defense Arrangements

"New Zealand's Dilemmas," 54; "Section 11-Defence," New Ze

Yearbook-1985, 320; Beaglehole, 16.

37. Ibid.

38. Paul Dibb, Review ofAustralia's Defence Capabilities : Report 

for Defence (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Postu

(Washington, D.C. : Department of Defense, Summer 1986), 14.

39. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Defense Arrangements

"New Zealand's Dilemmas," 51-52 .

40. Ross Babbage, "The Prospects for Security Cooperation bet

Allies till the Turn ofthe Century" (paperpresented at the National Defe

Conference on Pacific Basin Security : Impact of Political and Social 

Year 2000, Honolulu, Hawaii, 27 February 1987), 12.

41 . Ibid. ; "Defense Forces of New Zealand," 167-68 ; Brownfeld, 

Jamieson, 41 .

42. "New Zealand's New Leader Reiterates Labor Party's Antinu

Washington Post, 20 July 1984, 28 .

43 . Ibid.

44. "U.S . Terminates ANZUS Treaty with New Zealand," Atlant

News, Summer 1986, 2; Thakur, "New Zealand in Search of a Defen

author's notes on keynote speech by Ronald J. Hays at the National Defe

Conference on Pacific Basin Security in Honolulu, Hawaii, 28 Februa

45. "New Zealand Parliament Asked to Ban Nuclear Arms," Wash

13 February 1987, 9.

46. Ibid.

47. O'Flynn, 18-19.

48. Ibid.

49. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Defence Policy under L

idem, "New Zealand's Dilemmas," 55 ; Ian Templeton, 110.

50. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Defence Policy unde

Matthews, 36.

51 . Riley, 19; Jackson, 3 .

52 . Jackson, 5 ; Beaglehole, 14-15; United States Information Serv

Embassy, Wellington, New Zealand, telegram, subject : Media Reac

December 1986, 1 .

53 . Graham Ansell, "ANZUS Stand Explained," New Zealand F

Review 35, no. 1 (January-March 1985):49; Beaglehole, 14 .

54. Babbage, 18; Ian Templeton, "Wellington Ponders Post-

Security," The Bulletin 108, no. 5519 (20 May 1986) : 105 ; "Openi

Background Briefs for Minister ofDefence (Wellington: New Zeala

Defence, July 1984), 2; Dora Alves, "Sea Change in the New Pacif

Foreign Affairs 15, no. 6 (June 1987): 41 .

134
NEW ZEALANDDEFE

55. Michael Richardson, "Labor under Pressure to Change on ANZ

Defence Reporter 13, no. 9 (March 1987): 36; "Troop Withdrawal,

Times, 19 January 1987, 3(20).

56. Beaglehole, 16; Ian Templeton, "Minister at War with Generals 

Toe," The Bulletin 107, no. 5505 (11 February 1986): 82; idem, "Lan

Make Australia a Brother in Arms," 110. Frank O'Flynn, a Queen's 

military service background in the RNZAF in World War II, had a

enough political life as the Labour minister of defense . He resigne

portfolio in mid-1987 and was replaced by Bob Tizard, a Labou

Parliament, who had no previous military background.

57. John H. Beaglehole, "New Zealand Wants to Eat Its Cake And 

Pacific Defence Reporter 11, no. 3 (September 1984): 22; idem, "Labo

New Course," 14-15 ; Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Defense 

Labour," 26-27; "New Zealand Military Says Standards Slip since U.S 

York City Tribune, 2 October 1986, 3 .

58 . TheDefence Question : ADiscussion PaperIssued as Backgroun

Submission on FutureNew Zealand Strategic andSecurity Policies (We

Zealand: V. R. Ward, Government Printer, December 1985),1-4,21 .

59. Defence Committee of Enquiry, Defence and Security : What N

Want (Wellington, New Zealand : V. R. Ward, Government Printer, 31 

60. The Defence Question, 2.

61 . National Research Bureau, Public Opinion Poll on Defence and

NewZealanders Want, annexto the report ofthe Defence Committee of

Comer Report (Wellington, New Zealand: V. R. Ward, Governmen

1986), 89; Defence and Security : What New Zealanders Want, 73-74, 

4.

62. Malcolm Templeton, Defence andSecurity : What NewZealand 

57,60.

63 . Ibid. ; Ian Templeton, "Lange Moving to Make Australia a Bro

110; Sir George Laking, "Assault on Economic Dependence,"NewZea

Review, December 1986, 7-8.

64. Defence ofNew Zealand: Review of Defence Policy 1987 (We

Zealand: V. R. Ward, Government Printer, 1987), 8, 38 .

65. Defence and Security : What NewZealanders Want, 89; Defenc

WhatNewZealandNeeds, 73-74; David Barber, "New Zealand Takes A

with New Defense Policy," Christian Science Monitor, 30 March 198

66. Thomas-Durell Young, "Down Under White Paper," US N

Proceedings 14, no. 3 (March 1988) : 141-43 .

67. Brand, "Australia, New Zealand, and ANZUS," 353-54; T

Young, "New Zealand Defence Arrangements," 593 ; Beagleho

Dangerous New Course," 15-16; idem, "New Zealand's Defence

Debate," Pacific Defence Reporter 10, nos . 617 (December 1983-Janu

68. Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Air Power Requiremen

Lewis Young, "RNZAF: Tough Going Ahead," 77-78, 81 .

135
ANZUS IN REVISION

69 . Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand Defence Arrangeme

Beaglehole, "New Zealand's Defence," 81 ; "Troop Withdrawal," Wa

19 January 1987, 3(20).

70. Confidential government source in Hawaii, March 1987 

"ANZUS Triangle: Defence and Security," 54; Brian L. Kavanagh

Western Alliance in the South Pacific (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air 

1987), 38 .

71. Beaglehole, "New Zealand's Defence," 79,82; idem, "Labor's 

Course," 15-16.

72. Thomas-Durell Young, "Problems in Future New Zealand 

6-10.

73 . Quoted in "Big Man from a Small Place," The Bulletin 108, no

1986):58.

74. Clements, 9; Lange statement on "The Government of New Ze

on Ship Visits," 13 April 1985 . (See appendix F of this study.)

75. "ANZUS," Background Briefs for Minister of Defence (

Zealand Ministry of Defence, July 1984), 7 ; Malcolm Templeto

Perspective" (paper presented at a seminar on New Zealand Defence 

of Policy Studies, Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand, 9 

10; Jamieson, "New Zealand Defence Policy : A Professional Viewp

76. Paul D. Wolfowitz, quoted in Dora Alves, Anti-nuclear A

Zealand andAustralia (Washington, D .C. : National Defense Univers

61 .

77. Caspar W. Weinberger, "We Would Welcome New Z

Anytime," Pacific Islands Monthly 56, no. 2 (December 1985): 18-

78. Ibid.

79. Statement of James R. Lilley, US deputy assistant secretary 

Asia andPacific Affairs, in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Un

towardNew Zealand andAustralia and the Current State ofANZUS

the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d ses

1986, 6-15; statement of Karl D. Jackson, US deputy secretary of 

Asia and Pacific Affairs, in House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Un

toward New Zealand and Australia and the Current State ofANZUS

the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d ses

1986, 30-33 .
Chapter 5

Conclusion

The US security guarantee can be restored as soon as New Zeala

adequate corrective measures to restore normal port and air acces

alliance cooperation .

-James R. Lilley, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 

and P

The alliance between Australia and the US is an evolving one . . . 

forward to [a] robust alliance based on mutual advantage, mutua

an increasing familiarity with each other.

-F. Rawdon Dalrymple, Australian Ambassador to the 

We are determined that New Zealand will accept its responsibi

security of the South Pacific . . . acting not only in New Zealan

US' and broader democratic interests. . . . Certainly, in any f

defence cooperation, New Zealand will be a more independent, se

valuable partner.

-David Lange, New Zealand P

This study has considered and discussed many questi

dealing with changing defense and security conditions in 

Southwest Pacific regions. Although its main purpos

provide recommendations for governmental decision

changes, it has presented enough facts and supporting 

allow for considerable observations and assessments . 

suggest for the three countries concerned some areas 

improvement in actions and policies . All of these relate i

137
ANZUS IN REVISION

explaining and answering the original research question p

introductory section: What effects do the recent shifts in Aus

New Zealand defense features and security conditions ha

countries, the United States, and the region in the revised A

Summary of Shifts

The defense features and security conditions ofthe ANZU

alliance and each of the partners have changed. Reflecting t

political leadership's view of the basic Western connection

Reagan said several years ago, "Our ties [with Australi

Zealand] are a precious tradition, reflecting our many co

shared values." I Today, the ANZUS organization continue

a modified framework for such "ties" and allied coopera

particular region of the world, current differences with Ne

Labour government notwithstanding . Yet the current dif

some of the main reasons the regional problems are 

addition, there remains the constant worry felt by many Aus

New Zealanders as to what extent US defense forces 

committed to protect regional security. Despite Americ

statements to the contrary, many believe that a general 

concern still exists in the United States for issues relating to 

Whether justified or not, this perception-when ad

significantly altered defense features and security condit

increasing range of security-destabilizing factors-indic

secure region undergoing important shifts .

The United States is determined and committed to have 

Pacific and to be a great Pacific power. When it comes 

military resources to the East Asia-Pacific region, the U

supports a defense strategy based on forward-deploye

forces, robust alliances, and self-sufficient nations with s

and objectives . Because ofthe common interest among the U

and its East Asia-Pacific allies and friends in promotin

stability in the region, close defense cooperation and collec

arrangements are essential . However, like it or not, Ameri

assets are stretched thin . This point is particularly rele

13 8
nuclear US Navy, since the vast region is so maritime in na

why a full-house ANZUS, or something similar to it a

partners assuming a fair and proportionate share of the def

is so important and necessary for the South and Southw

regions.

Since many past defense practices no longer apply i

combined region, an obvious need for some sort of 

readjustment exists . The earlier willingness on the part of th

to let Australia and New Zealand provide most of the milit

in the region now appears unworkable and impractical .

As US Navy Adm William J. Crowe has said so ofte

cannot, and should not, go it alone in the Asia and Pacif

Virtually no defense cooperation is now present betwee

States and New Zealand. The result is increased bilateral 

between the United States and Australia to make up for th

third ally's participation and to demonstrate continued 

collective security, albeit with a different perspective. Yet 

how much more extensive the US-Australian cooperative e

should be . The question here becomes three-pronged for A

US objectives really complementary and achievable in wan

a greater interest in the region, pursue closer cooperative d

with Australia, and encourage Australia to take greater r

for regional security? Whether ANZUS will continue to fu

operative alliance structure in these matters is still unknow

Impact Assessments

Australia is the principal country on which will fall 

defense responsibility for keeping the region stable. 

government in Canberra, and presumably any future o

willing to accept that leadership role. This position is 

Australian policy to have a middle-power role in its regio

concern, which in turn allows it to make a positive con

Western global security . Australia is realistic in its p

relatively small but close ally of the superpower United 

evolving security alliance relationship with America, Austr

139
ANZUSIN REVISION

continue having an independent partner's say and i

important US concern is whether Australia's changing 

defense features can satisfy Australian, American, and 

objectives in the region.

The Australian government's white paper, The Defenc

1987, is the current document that indicates future 

Australian defense policy . For the Americans it is an 

satisfactory analysis and statement of Australian defens

requirements, and objectives in a Western security conte

paper does much to ease US worries which were evi

"strategy of denial" concept advocated in Paul Dibb's 1

Australia's Defence Capabilities. While incorporating 

the Dibb report, the whitepaper still adjusts its emphasis t

a resolve to contribute to the general Westem security po

A serious factor that remains incalculable and thus u

well Australia will manage its intended self-reliance impr

country plans to require large amounts of constant nation

economic structure beset by financial problems and 

demands. Additionally, there must be a political will, 

public support, to see these many developments realize

States has an important interest in helping Australia have 

defense features to be the dominant Western force in t

America is limited by its resources, defense prioriti

obligations. Therefore, what Australia accomplishes n

future requires both a strong and flexible relationship w

States and, perhaps, a greater degree of self-improvemen

worth the expense and effort, fulfillment of this objectiv

not be easy .

This security ambition will require Australia to contrib

and balanced basis even more than it is now doing fo

security matters . In spite of problems such as lack of ade

and military personnel departures, extensive optimis

remain for the changing Australian defense features. T

Defence Force (ADF) has the ability to improve on wh

credible, capable, and professional military force . 

Australian defense policy is forwardlooking and will ma

140
a significant force in an overlapping region. Greater self

concurrent close alliance with the United States are essenti

this policy .

Unfortunately, a similar positive outlook is not appli

defense feature changes underway or likely to occur in N

Unlike its Australian counterpart, the 1987 New Zealand 

focuses generally on the single issue of defense policy 

address in depth the equally important issues of military cap

equipment requirements of the New Zealand Defence For

The New Zealand white paper is a very political s

reflects the influence of Prime Minister David Lange and 

more forceful antinuclear policy members in and arou

Labour government . To its credit, the white pape

concentrates on the need for a greater and more effective 

orientation for the NZDF. Such reasoning is sensible as 

wants to achieve a degree of defense self-reliance, the So

its area of direct strategic concern, and its contributio

necessary for Western security in that region. However, 

overtones and antinuclear sentiments of the governme

appear likely to override its stated objective to have an

changed but capable small power, medium technology, 

defense posture and force .

The New Zealand Labour government remains firm in 

ANZUS is not a nuclear alliance but a conventional on

antinuclear policies are not anti-American in any way . C

the resulting dispute, impasse, and "bashing" by the Unit

considered excessive by the standards of many New Zea

others in the Pacific region). According to Lange, once th

ofhowhard New Zealand worked for a settlement with the 

on the issues under contention, many will be less critical 

ally's actions. He also points out that it was the United S

New Zealand, that called a halt to efforts to reach a

accommodation.

Regardless of who did what in recent diplomatic discus

result appears harmful not only for the once proud NZD

another security-related national asset: the New Zealan
ANZUS IN REVISION

community. Both are hurting in regards to resources, 

equipment, capabilities, and perhaps most import

professionals . When security forces are relatively small, l

the loss of good, qualified personnel is really felt . There 

or room to absorb some of the departures .

The NZDF is beginning to suffer, and the trend ind

decline is on the way. Despite the effort to increase defens

with Australia, political and economic constraints limit 

approach. Senior leaders in the NZDF, the ADF, and th

are worried that any real drop in New Zealand defense c

effectiveness could soon start to have serious and las

impact. The downhill slide could become either perma

difficult (and expensive) to correct.

Suggestions for Policy-Option Improvemen

When weighing the possibilities for future regional 

security enhancement, one must think about what is or is 

in the South and Southwest Pacific . Fortunately for the 

and especially the US Navy, the "Kiwi disease" of anti

and actions has not yet effectively spread to other a

antinuclear issue is far from over. New Zealand has fin

legislation into law. The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 

on the political agenda of many regional countries, i

Zealand and Australia. Although Australia officially disag

New Zealand on its nuclear ship ban policy and agrees w

States, this loyal ally could also one day assume a 

antinuclear stance . For many Australians from a numb

backgrounds, the root causes of nuclear discontent remai

The once venerable ANZUS alliance has been substanti

There continues to be strong US-Australian and 

Australian-New Zealand bilateral defense relations, but 

Zealand defense cooperation link and the trilateral relatio

If some sort of alliance accommodation occurs in the futur

becomes an operative full-house alliance again, it surel

carbon copy of the effective arrangement that existed be

142
Policy changes that could turn around negative aspec

security in the region are still possible . Demonstrable 

improvements take several forms . One form requires the 

partners, represented by their political and diplomati

reconvene their former trilateral negotiating arrangemen

more to adjust policy and change the existing ANZUS Tr

great amount of valuable time has already passed 

get-together, it does not make sense for the Americans 

hope of working with new political decisionmakers in 

New Zealand, since labor governments in both countr

power for several more years . Thus, the American lead

undertake some sort of positive initiative as soon as poss

How would the existing treaty be changed? The best 

to consolidate treaty provisions to eliminate doubt 

contractual arrangement among the members. The goal w

to get rid of or at least acceptably compromise contentio

issue would be the vagueness of the American securit

come to the aid of the others and vice versa. More tangib

needed of solid intent, realistic capability, and bindi

assistance as they affect all three countries.

Another irritant is port access. While the US Navy is e

in advocating its policy of neither confirming nor deny

nuclear-capable ships, surely some flexibility is possible 

New Zealand was a rarity for US foreign relations in tha

close, and trusted ally-until just a few years ago . Since 

American naval port calls to New Zealand were not that 

and were usually out of the way, the solution appears to l

rather than confrontation during peacetime . Only du

increased tensions or actual hostilities involving all t

would the United States plan ship visits . New Zeal

obligated under such circumstances to accept the ships 

with appropriate treaty provisions . As long as peacetim

still available in more strategically located Australia

position seems suitable .

The joint defense facilities in Australia need to remain 

in place . The United States should continue operatin

143
ANZUS IN REVISION

acceptable and open basis with the host Australians . At a

facilities should not become bargaining chips in political 

differences.

New Zealand

To be effective, any defense arrangement, whether co

nuclear, must be a two-way street . If a member is not shari

fairly and shows no signs ofchanging its ways, then that m

leave that particular defense grouping, which would mean 

should depart the wide-ranging alliance of ANZUS.

Yet New Zealand, by far the smallest and most narrow

the three partners and now on the outside, still has a rol

the inside . Past performances offer proof and current reg

disturbances provide justification. New Zealand appears 

into a corner from which it cannot or will not emerge . 

political leaders insist on having the final say on the

country's defense and intelligence forces are going t

expected end result, if the present course of events cont

advantageous to no one.

To correct this, New Zealand can improve its defense c

satisfy its security requirements in several ways . First

politicians--especially the prime and defense ministers-

and heed the advice oftheir senior military and defense of

balanced and more appropriate long-range defense 

objectives will follow .

Second, a realistic approach to regional security i

Fundamental to this is an acceptance and understanding t

States is neither the source of nor savior for all secur

However, working closely with or alongside the Am

Western-oriented collective arrangement is better than b

or neutral.

Third, the country should not expect too much from Au

the present conditions . Their bilateral defense relatio

promise in a capacity as complementary support but not 

144
for previous arrangements, like those found mostly within 

ANZUS.

Fourth, a suitable gesture of value and a desire for unpr

relations are needed . The most visible way, with the bi

would be a repeal of the recently passed antinuclear legis

the basic components of governmental antinuclear polic

away-and the Americans need to realize and accept them 

are-the symbolic removal of the law should do much 

Australian and American receptiveness to compromise .

Finally, if New Zealand does repeal the antinuclear l

quickly yet quietly adopt a low profile, try to keep the de

capabilities from falling further, and wait for the other AN

to act.

Australia

Australia has a pivotal role in these policy-option im

That role is consistent with Australian wishes to have m

influence in their areas of strategic concern and p

importance in the greater Western security network .

Two arrangements are possible . If an operative full-h

returns in some revitalized form, Australia should have 

central position. Going along with the added benefits wi

responsibilities and obligations . On the other hand, if 

alliance ceases to exist, Australia should have a lead i

stronger bilateral defense relations between America-A

Australia-New Zealand. The middle power will then nee

effectively as a defense-related bridge between the two 

revised security arrangements.

In addition Australia should continue its unique de

objective of greater self-reliance combined with supp

United States . Proper and sustained political and economi

critical for success in these areas . Australian leaders 

responsibilities, professional military members want t

general public must be willing to support these and re

Though Australia will not be able to have all it wants, do 

145
ANZUS IN REVISION

needs, and accomplish them all on time, the defense future 

bright. What remains essential is Australia's ability to ke

objectives and policies steady and on track.

United States

While New Zealand still can have a productive secu

Australia needs to increase its value as a pivotal force, the 

has probably the primary role in seeing that these po

improvements occur. Such progress will take several for

Fast, the United States and Australia need to strive fo

defense cooperation and security-related diplomatic coor

process, already well under way, has to go on whether i

ANZUS structure . The United States, while benefiting s

cross flow, must plan to continue providing the majority o

and intelligence support that went into the former ANZUS 

Second, at the same time the United States must be wil

its expressed wishes and let Australia take a leading secur

region. Since actions speak louder than words, Amer

prepared to make some allowances and move the extr

certain issues . The United States might have to support or a

more effectively, on a basis of equality with Australia, sel

and nonsecurity issues-such as the South Pacific nucl

wheat sales, and arms control-that are very important to 

the region. Failure to do these things and to give adequate 

force America to bring its own security and defense f

region in the absence of a viable security partner . This ext

is not acceptable, desirable, or achievable in either 

long-term for the United States .

Third, the superpower must be willing to allow its othe

partners, be it Australia alone or together again with Ne

have independent voices and to disagree when necessary 

American political leaders cannot always expect 

way-especially in a combined region not their 

strategically important-and have others, whether all

blindly follow. Accordingly, America has to be sincerely w

146
a bit, become more flexible, and get closer to Australia no

to New Zealand eventually . The ultimate objective must b

countries to seek equal and fair partnership again 

asymmetrical state of defense cooperation.

Fourth, America should have a more consistent and ac

in the region. This greater and more visible role does not 

along military lines . As the most powerful Western play

States must design an appropriate long-range defense p

with its own foreign, economic, and political objectives a

those of its friends and allies in the region. The United St

sensitive to the legitimate aspirations and requiremen

including the small and vulnerable island-nations of the 

community. Efforts to provide more support for regi

institutions, to increase economic assistance, and to take 

French nuclear testing issue should be priorities for Amer

in the region.

Fifth, the United States should examine the possibili

discussion with New Zealand on a variety of 

security-related issues. Any further penalties or punis

Zealand by the United States would be excessive a

discouraged . The defense forces and the intelligence com

small nation are already suffering . Given time and some br

New Zealand's politicians might eventually try to wor

ments acceptable to all sides . The improved defense 

relations should outweigh the perceived losses from comp

avoid again the spectacle of the world watching the supe

the smaller country, these future probes should be done 

manner and with patience. Australia would be an ideal m

Final Comment

The South and Southwest Pacific regions are still intac

oriented . Past experience has shown Australia and New 

exceptionally valued security partners for the United Stat

close allies were loyal, supportive, and friendly, especia

common bonds were forged by fighting together during 

147
ANZUS IN REVISION

Even though Australia needs to assume a true regional le

the United States ultimately retains the power and resou

about real change, and it needs to take timely and meaning

keep the relationship from further deterioration .

At relatively slight political and economic costs, the 

can still provide the critical impetus in working out accept

arrangements . The most important requirements for the U

Australia, and eventually New Zealand will be full 

cooperation on an equitable burden-sharing basis and w

degrees of defense self-reliance and independence. 

partners have worked well together in the past. Hope exists 

ANZUS, or some other Western-style defense relation

available to guarantee that genuine South and South

regional security extends well into the future .

Notes

1 . President Ronald Reagan, quoted in Paul D . Wolfowitz, 

Relationship : Alliance Management," Current Policy, no. 592 (Was

Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 24 June 1984), 5 .

2. Brian L. Kavanagh, The Changing Western Alliance in th

(Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air University Press, 1987), 27, 49, 55 .

3 . William J . Crowe, "No 17-The US Cannot, and Should Not

Pacific Defence Reporter 12, no. 2 (August 1985) : 11-12.

4. Report of the Defence Committee ofEnquiry, Defence and Secu

Zealanders Want (Wellington, New Zealand: V. R. Ward, Govern

July 1986), addendum III, 4.

5 . Kavanagh, 45-47, 54-55 .
Epilogue

It has been almost 40 years since ANZUS was created a

five years since the "showcase" alliance began to unrave

Glists significant events from 1983 to 1987 .) By 1990, the 

undergone major revisions and most likely would never 

former arrangement. Based on that reality, all parties conc

focus on how the revised alliance structure and the rel

changes for Australia, New Zealand, and the United Stat

and continue to contribute to the important security requir

region and, in turn, to Western collective security .

Security must be understood to be just one of several ba

that influence the way each country, by itself or with oth

foreign anddomestic policies . In fact, it is the complicated 

interaction of politics, economics, trade, and security th

entire process . While one element might dominate at an

they all exert constant pressures, constraints, and impulse

Defense in peacetime, especially for Australia and N

occupies the "back bumers" of government policies. Wh

mines the proper ways to achieve regional stability must p

reality of where defense fits into the overall scheme of th

Another influencing factor is the changing threat envir

external and internal. Providing adequate defense resourc

threats to regional stability is a primary justification for mi

No one can deny that the changes in the world scene that 

late 1980s are momentous and even frightening, sin

outcomes are so unknown and unpredictable.

Such uncertainty makes life for Western defense 

strategists difficult as they try to maintain existing militar

and improve in those areas most relevant for the proj

Although the stability of the South and Southwest Pacific 

not appear threatened by any majorpower (e .g., the Soviet 

is not the time to relax . The unknowns about possible ex

149
ANZUS IN REVISION

in the future dictate that effective military forces must be 

in being today .

Internal threats and disturbances also are present in a 

envied for its peace and stability. With the diminishing 

ANZUS" concept, there is a wide variety of destabilizing 

real and possible. Ethnic and racial unrest has appeared in s

such as Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Indonesia . Antinuc

have become a way of life for many . Economic imbalance

hope cause potential vulnerabilities that could upset the "

of doing things and resolving differences .

In this regional atmosphere of change and turmoil, defen

impact stability and security, which will affect both th

long-term interests of the Western countries . The que

relevant : What present and future effects will the rec

Australian and New Zealand defense features and securi

have on those countries, the United States, and the region 

ANZUS era? There is no crystal ball that will reveal 

regional security; but we can make several observatio

direction in which Australian and New Zealand defens

policies appear to be heading.

As the middle power that seeks to have a greater region

modified intermediary function, Australia feels both 

negative impacts associated with the ongoing changes . On 

side, it is trying to implement and sustain the forward-loo

policies spelled out in the 1987 defense white paper. Thro

and proper equipping, the Australian Defence Force (AD

better prepared than ever before in peacetime to deploy ele

notice and then operate them effectively-whether as s

joint, or combined forces-in limited combat conditions .

The expanded Australian-American defense arrang

stronger and more necessary due to the demise of the trila

arrangement, is in good shape . There is a genuine 

relationship that exhibits both flexibility and growth . A v

of the two allies fighting side by side was seen in the 19

exercise held in northern Australia. In its largest warfigh

ever conducted in peacetime, Australia had more than 23

150
members (almost one-third of the active force) participati

Americans. 1 This type of combined operations pro

understanding and unity among military professionals 

continue.

A step in the right direction concerning equipping is

long-delayed decision to proceed with the Australian and 

frigate-building program (10 West German-designed sh

option for two more) . Australia will coproduce eight frig

Zealand two in a binational program . Major construction w

in Australia and extensive subcontracting in New Z

program will help modernize both countries' navies and 

for defense industries. Additionally, a construction pro

Swedish-designed submarines (with an option for an addi

replace the ones now in the Australian navy will sta

continued development of the Australian-design

over-the-horizon radar network for surveillance of Austral

approaches shows great promise. 2

Despite these positive indicators, negative aspec

apparently sound Australian defense program and bui

consistently and well by long-serving Minister of D

Beazley-perhaps too ambitious and thus stretched 

unachievable in certain areas. 3 Two issues stand out.

First, Australia has major budgetary and resource const

is the distinct possibility that the government, still led by pr

Minister Bob Hawke but faced with pressing fiscal p

economic shortfalls, will underfund its current and f

programs . As a result, the ADF will develop a greater 

some limited operational roles, but at the continued expe

a self-reliant and independent force able to conduct sust

operations . 4

Second, and more serious, is the high loss rate amon

service members who leave the ADF, especially prev

midlevel officers, senior noncommissioned officers, an

(i .e., those most skilled and experienced). Manpower 

developed into a clear crisis. In the last four years of the 

than one-half of the ADF left the military. As Australia i
ANZUS IN REVISION

in a high-technology deterrent force, the ADFis not retain

needed to operate and maintain it . s

The New Zealand Defence Forces (NZDF) have their o

While the new frigate build/acquisition is a positive aspect

noted that the prolonged debate concerning the expense 

New Zealand's fleet of aging frigates is one reason the dec

took so long . As it now stands, by the time New Zealand's 

new ships in the late 1990s, its existing fleet will be obsol

Like the ADF, the NZDF is experiencing an excessiv

rate of valuable personnel . Because of the NZDF's sm

problem is felt more profoundly when good people depar

earlier than planned .

In addition, three important consequences have resu

estrangement of NZDF from those of the United States . 

consequences are related. There has been a definite loss 

subsidized US military equipment, and so New Zealand ha

to place greater reliance on Australia for its military e

military exercise needs. The third consequence has spun 

political debate surrounding defense issues and could a

influence in and out of government. Political leftist grou

greatly encouraged to pursue their policies further by red

spending and introducing more isolationist tendencies.

The problems must be seen in the context of the 

economics that occupy center stage in New Zealand life 

politics, Prime Minister David Lange stepped down as l

His controversial five-year rule was marked by avigorous 

inherited from former Labour party platforms) of antinu

and quarrels with Western nuclear powers, primarily the 

He was adamant in his beliefs to the end. During a final 

minister to the United States in early 1989-when he le

University but was not invited to Washington-he was ca

Onwhether NewZealand in its relationship with the Unite

try to edge back to "business as usual," he stated, "To en

is no misunderstanding I think it best to say clearly that a

US and New Zealand the security alliance is a dead lette
Lange's replacement, Geoffrey Palmer, represents the 

Labour party, but it is still doubtful that there will be any r

of the antinuclear policies and addressing of the differences 

two former allies . Antinuclear sentiment runs throughou

Labour party, the political opposition, and theg New Zea

despite their expressed pro-American feelings .

In the area ofeconomics, New Zealand-asocial welfare 

Western developed nations-is in the midst of a majorrestr

takes precedence over most other issues, including defens

Labour government assumed office in the mid-1980s, New 

a small, vulnerable national economy that was ove

overregulated, and living far beyond its means. In s

considerable domestic and overseas debt (which siphoned 

in every $10 of the gross national product), the country ha

almost no growth. Lange and Minister of Finance Rog

introduced some major long-term economic reforms whic

should help New Zealand recover and be more competi

meantime, there will be only limited funds available for 

defense forces.

The United States remains the final player in this revi

game. Its main participants in the Reagan administrat

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of 

P. Shultz, are gone . The George Bush administration is 

operating in a new era.

Paul M. Cleveland, the US ambassador to New Zeala

main period of change and troubles (1986-89), noted i

speech that now was a good time to correct past problems 

to be at the end of an old and the beginning of a new i

relations era, and the times call for extensive public d

alternative international goals and policies," he said. C

return of New Zealand to full membership in the Western 

Cleveland said that "further repairs will be necessary in 

area. The operative questions are largely for [New Zealand

He concluded on a somewhat positive note, "Because we 

on this globe, share a strategic interest in the region, and h
ANZUS IN REVISION

common, and because we care, we will be watching with 

you proceed.

"10

This discussion returns to the suggested recommendati

substantive and symbolic improvements contained in th

chapter. Nothing has changed. Consequently, the United 

pivotal role in ensuring that collective security in some f

the South and Southwest Pacific regions . Both Austra

Zealand need to pursue their own programs of gre

self-reliance and increased independence . Yet, for these p

effective and practical, certain degrees of cooperat

interaction, and dependence must occur between those tw

the United States .

While the ANZUS security alliance as it was will not 

some other Western security arrangement should be in p

the time for each country's political and military leaders 

modern foundation for lasting regional stability. Giv

conditions, it not only can but must be done, and the soon

Notes

1 . Kate Pound, "Aussies, Americans Test Air Tactics in Kangar

Stars and Stripes, 24 August 1989, 8 .

2. "Industry Update," Journal ofDefense & Diplomacy 7, no. 12 (D

5 ; Thomas-Durell Young, "Problems in Australia's `Defense 

Contemporary Southeast Asia 11, no. 3 (December 1989): 23 8.

3 . P. Lewis Young, "Australian Defense Minister Emphasizes Se

Cooperative Programs," Armed Forces Journal International, Novem

4. Thomas-Durell Young, 239; Michael McKinley, "Divergence i

Zealand Security Relations," in Security, Strategy, and Policy Respons

Rim, eds. Lawrence E. Grinter and Young Whan Kihl (Boulder, Colo. 

Publishers, 1989), 229.

5 . McKinley, 229; J. D. Stevenson, "Is the Defence Force Effe

Defence Reporter 15, nos. 6/7 (December 1988-January 1989): 223 .

6. P. Lewis Young, "Estrangement from US Cuts New Zea

Options," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1989, 52.

7. David Lange, "Calling a Dead Letter a Dead Letter," New Zeala

Review, July-August 1989, 26.

8. "U.S . Hopes Nuclear Policy Will Exit with Lange," Washington 

1989,7 .

154
9. Henry S. Albinski, "Australia and New Zealand in the 1980s," Cu

April 1986,151 ; Jonathan Boston, "The Fourth Labour Government in 

The Economics and Politics of Liberalization," Australian Quarterl

(Spring and Summer 1987): 366-76 ; idem, "Tough Recovery-New 

Economist, 11 July 1987, 69-70.

10. Paul M. Cleveland, "U .S .-New Zealand Relations : S

Observations," Department ofState Bulletin 89, no. 2147 (June 1989) 

APPENDIXES

Appendix A

Regional Country/Island Profiles

Source : Thomas W. Shubert, "The United States and the Southwest 

Options for a Changing Region" (master's thesis, Naval Postg

1986), 23 ; "The Military Balance, 1985/86," Air Force Maga

1986, 94, 101, 111 .

159

COUNTRY/ POLITICAL f POPULATION DEF

ISLAND STATUS 

AMERICAN SAMOA US TERRITORY j 36,000 I NONE

AUSTRALIA INDEPENDENT 16,200,000 (1) 70,0

(1901) (2) 31,0

COOK ISLANDS SELF-GOVERNING I 18,000 NONE

STATE IN FREE (DEFEN

ASSOCIATION WITH NEW Z

NEW ZEALAND

FIJI INDEPENDENT 680,000 (A) 2.7

(1970) (B) 30

FRENCH FRENCH 160,000 I NONE

POLYNESIA TERRITORY (DEFEN

FRANC

KIRIBATI INDEPENDENT 62,000 NONE

(FORMERLY (1979)

GILBERT ISLANDS)

NEW CALEDONIA FRENCH 145,000 + NONE

TERRITORY (DEFE

FRANC

NEW ZEALAND INDEPENDENT 3,300,000 (A) 12,

(1907) (B) 9,

(1) 3,

(2) 6,

NIUE SELF-GOVERNING 3,000 NONE

STATE IN FREE (DEFE

ASSOCIATION WITH NEW 

NEW ZEALAND

PAPUA NEWGUINEA INDEPENDENT 3,400,000 3 .200

(1975) (SOME 

DEFE

TIONS 

AUSTR

SOLOMON ISLANDS INDEPENDENT 250,000 NONE

(1978)

TOKELAU NEW ZEALAND 1,500 NONE

TERRITORY (DEFE

NEW 

TONGA INDEPENDENT 100,000 SEVER

(1920)

WESTERNSAMOA INDEPENDENT 150,000 NONE

(1962)

VANUATU INDEPENDENT 130,000 NONE

(FORMERLY (1980)

NEW HEBRIDES)

Appendix B

The ANZUS Treaty

TREATY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF

NEWZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, AND THE UNITED STA

AMERICA CONCERNING SECURITY

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purpose and principles of the C

United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peo

Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric ofpeace in the P

Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursu

its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has arme

administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the comi

of Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and ab

assist in the preservation ofpeace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members o

Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as w

the Pacific Area,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unit

potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them s

the Pacific Area, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective de

preservation of peace and security pending the development 

comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the Uni

to settle any international disputes in which they may be involve

means in such a manner that international peace and security andj
ANZUS IN REVISION

endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the 

of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Unit

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective ofthis Trea

separately andjointly by means ofcontinuous and effective self-he

aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capa

armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion o

the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any 

is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific A

the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and d

would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its 

processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result th

immediately reported to the Security Council of the United N

measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken 

necessary to restore and maintain international peace and securit

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of 

deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory 

Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pa

armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific .
Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as af

way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter 

Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the ma

international peace and security.

Article VII

The parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of 

Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the im

of this Treaty . The Council should be so organized as to be able t

time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensive syste

security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Na

effective means to maintain international peace and security, 

established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultativ

with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or oth

in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this 

contribute to the security of that Area.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordan

respective constitutional processes . The instruments of ratific

deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia

notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty s

force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been depo

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely . Any Party ma

a member of the Council established by Article VII one year af

been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the 

of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice .
ANZUS IN REVISION

Article X1

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in th

the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will b

by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signa

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the und

Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of Septemb

For Australia: PERCY C

For New Zealand: C.A. B

For the United States of America: DEAN 

JOHN FOST

ALEXAND

JOHN J. S

Source: Dora Alves, Anti-nuclear Attitudes in NewZealand and Australia (Was

National Defense University, 1985), 67-71 .
$A = Australian dollars

Population: 16,428,000

18-30 31-45

Men: 1,735,000 1,775,00

Women: 1,677,000 1,723,00

TOTAL ARMED FORCES :

Active: 70,500.

Terms ofService : voluntary.

Reserves: 26,112 .

Appendix C

Defense Forces of Australia

ARMY: 32,000.

1 field force command: 7 military districts .

1 infantry division w/3 brigades (1 mechanized, 2 infantry) each 2 ba

1 armored regiment (3 squadrons).

1 reconnaissance regiment.

1 armored personnel carrier (APC) regiment.

3 artillery regiments (1 medium, 2 field); 1 locating battery.

1 air defense (AD) regiment; 1 light AD battery.

1 field engineer, 1 construction, 1 field survey regiments.

2 signals regiments; 6 independent squadrons .

1 Special Air Service (SAS) regiment (3 squadrons) .

3 transport regiments (1 air support).

165

GDP 1984/5 : $A 209.54bn ($US 

1985/6 : $A 231 .98bn ($US 

growth 1984/5 : 4.4% 1985/6 : 3 

Inflation 1985/6: 8 .5% 1986: 9

Debt 1985 : $US 54.3bn 1986: 

Def budget 1985/6: $A 6.67bn ($US 4.67bn)

1986/7: $A 7.42bn ($US 4.80bn)

$US 1 = $A (1984/5): 1 .2896 (1985/6):1 .4288

(1986/7) : 1 .5461
AN"LUS IN REVISION

7 supply battalions .

1 independent infantry company.

Army Aviation:

1 rgmt (2 recce, 1 command support, 1 utility sqdns) .

5 independent squadrons (plus 9 reserve).

1 aviation school + base workshop battalion.

Logistics command HQ:

11 transport units, 6 supply, 4 workshop battalions ; 9 supply, 7 

companies.

Training command.

RESERVES include: 2 division HQs, 1 Field Force Group HQ; 4 bri

recce regiments, 3 independent squadrons; 16 infantry battalions, 5 

companies; 5 artillery regiments (4 field, 1 medium), 3 indep

batteries, 2 locating batteries; 5 engineer regiments (3 field, 2 cons

signals, 9 transport squadrons; 1 cdo regiment, 2 cdo companies; 3 

units.

Equipment:

Tanks: 103 Leopard lA3 .

AFV: MICV : 63 M-113 with 76mm gun (48 with Scorpion, 15 w

turrets) .

APC: 725 M-113 (including variants). Artillery : Howitzer: 105mm: 258 ; 155mm: 36 M-198.

Mortar: 81mm: 280.

ATK: RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm: 70 M-40.

ATGW: 10 Milan.

AD: SAM. Redeye, 20 Rapier, 18 RBS-70.

Aviation: Aircraft. 14 1 PC-6 Turbo-Porter, 13 GAF N-22B Mission

Helicopter : 47 Bell 206B-1 Kiowa.

Marine : 16 LCM, 87 LARC-5 amphibious craft.

(On order: 105 105mm light guns, 42 RBS-70 SAM launche

helicopters) .

NAVY: 15,700 (including Fleet Air Arm).

Fleet Command, Support Command, 6 Naval Area commands.

Bases: Sydney (HQ), Melbourne, Jervis Bay, Brisbane, Cair

Freemantle.

Submarines: 6 Oxley (modernized Oberon class) .

Destroyers : 3 Perth (US Adams) ASW(being modernized) with 1 Sta

2 Ikara ASW.

Frigates: 9:

166
4 Adelaide (FFG-7) with 1 Harpoon SSM, 1 Standard SAM, 2 A

helicopters ;

5 River with 1 x 4 Seacat SAM/SSM, 1 Ikara ASW.

Patrol craft, large: 20: 15 PCF-420 Freemantle, 5 Attack (5 Reserve t

Minehunters: 2:

1 modernized British Ton coastal ;

1 Bay-class inshore catamaran .

Amphibious: LCT: 6 (1 Reserve training, 3 in reserve).

Support: LSH: 1 (heavy amphibious transport ship) .

1 Fleet flagship/destroyer tender with 1 Wessex/Sea King helico

1 ex-ocean ferry (training/logistics support).

1 replenishment tanker.

3 Marine Science Force survey ships .

FLEET AIR ARM: (1,200);

no combat aircraft, 7 armed helicopters .

ASW: 1 helicopter squadron with 7 Sea King Mk 50 .

UtilitylSAR : 2 squadrons :

1 helicopter squadron with 10 Wessex 31 B;

1 composite squadron with 6 Bell (3 UH-1B, 3 206B),

6 AS-350B Ecureuil (Squirrel) helicopters, 2 HS-748

Electronic Warfare training aircraft .

(On order: 2 FFG-7 frigates, 1 Bay-class MCM catamaran; 16 Sikor

ASWhelicopters).

AIR FORCE: 22,800:

some 148 combat aircraft, no armed helicopters .

FGA/recce: 2 squadrons with 14 F-111C, 4 F-111A, 4 RF-111C.

Interceptor/FGA : 3 squadrons with 60 Mirage IIIO, 12 Mirage HID 

Maritime Reece: 2 squadrons with 20 P-3C Orion.

OCU: 1 squadron with some 21 F/A-18, 13 MB-326H.

Forward air control: 1 flight with 4 CA-25 Winjeel .

Transport: 6 squadrons :

2 with 24 C-130E/H Hercules;

1 with 4 Boeing 707-338C (to be tanker aircraft) ;

2 with 20 CC-08 (DHC-4 Caribou);

1 VIP with 4 BAe (2 BAC-111, 2 HS-748), 3 Falcon 20.

Helicopter: Transport : 1 medium helicopter squadron with 8 CH-47 

in reserve) .

Utility: 3 helicopter squadrons with 30 UH-1B/H Iroquois.

(All helicopters, except CH-47, to be transferred to Army 1987-97

Training: 81 MB-326H (life-extended), 8 HS-748T2, 48 CT-4/4

aircraft, 18 AS-350 Ecureuil helicopters .

AAM: Sparrow AIM-7M, Sidewinder AIM-9L, -9M, Matra 530,-55

167
ANZUS IN REVISION

ASM: AGM-84 Harpoon.

Air Defence: Jindalee OTH-B radar: 1 on trials, 4 planned.

(On order: some 54 F/A-18 FGA/interceptor/training, 67 PC-9 trainin

S-70 helicopters) .

Forces Abroad:

Malaysia/Singapore : 1 infantry company, 1 squadron with Mirage HIO

with CC-08 aircraft .

Papua New Guinea: 135 personnel and, 1 training unit, 1 engineer u

advisors.

Indian Ocean: 2 destroyers 1 amphibious (Headquarters Perth).

Advisers in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Solom

Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, and Western Samoa.

PARA-MILITARY:

Bureau ofCustoms; 10 GAF N-22B Searchmaster maritime recce air

craft.

Source: Military Balance : 1987-1988 (New York: Garden City Press, 1987), 152-53 
Appendix D

Major Milita~ry Exercises of ANZUS Memb

Mid-1982 to Mid-1983

169

APPROXIMATE I EXERCISE 

DATE I NAME TYPE COUNTRIES CO

JULY (A) FREEDOM MARITIME 3 US, AUS NAVY

1982 PENNANT AMPHIBIOUS

(B) PACIFIC LAND US, AUS ARM

RESERVE WARFARE

(C) PITCH AIR AUS ALL 

BLACK DEFENSE JOIN

(D) DIAMOND AMPHIBIOUS AUS NAVY

DOLLAR JOIN

OCTOBER (A) THERMAL SPECIAL US, AUS SPEC

1982 GALE WARFARE S OTH

COUNTER- AGEN

TERRORIST

(B) BOMB AIR US, AUS AIR 

COMP WARFARE

(C) RED AIR US, AUS AIR 

FLAG WARFARE

I (D) FIVE AIR AUS, NZ, AIR 

POWER DEFENCE UK, MALAY- NAVY

(TADS) SIA, SINGAPORE (FPDA)

NOVEMBER (A) SAND- MARITIME US, AUS, AIR

1982 GROPER NZ

(B) - COMMAND & US, AUS, ARM

SIGNALS NZ

(C) FIN- ASW AUS, NZ, AIR 

CASTLE UK,

TROPHY CANADA

JANUARY (A) TASMAN LAND AUS,NZ ARM

1983 RESERVE WARFARE

(B) PACIFIC LAND US, AUS ARM

RESERVE WARFARE

MARCH (A) SEA ASW US, AUS, AIR 

1983 EAGLE NZ

(B) FIVE AIR FPDA AIR 

POWER DEFENSE

IADS

(C) TASMAN LAND AUS, NZ ARM

' RESERVE WARFARE

I

APRIL (A) FPDA COMMAND AUS, NZ, ARM

1983 POST I UK, MALAYSIA,

SINGAPORE

(B) COPY AIR US, AUS. AIR 

THUNDER SUPERIORITY PHILLIPINES
ANZUS IN REVISION

Appendix D (continued)

Sources: Defence Department, Defence Report 1982-83 (Canberr

Government Publishing Service, 1983), 13-16; Dora Alves, 

Partners, Georgetown University Significant Issue Ser

(Washington, D.C. : Center for Strategic and International St

77-80.

170

APPROXIMATE ' EXERCISE S

DATE NAME TYPE COUNTRIES COM

(C) ROLL MARITIME US, AUS, NAVY

CALL NZ, UK,

CANADA

MAY (A) WANTOK LAND AUS,PNG ARMY

1983 WARRIOR WARFARE

(B) NEW MARITIME AUS, NAVY

HORIZON INDONESIA

(C) PACIFIC LAND US, AUS ARMY

BOND WARFARE

(D) REINDEER LAND AUS, UK ARMY

WARFARE

(E) 13ULLSEYE AIRLIFT CANADA, UK AIR F

(F) PITCH AIR AUS I ALL S

BLACK DEFENSE JOINT

JUNE (A) VOLANT AIRLIFT US, AUS AIR F

1993 RODEO

(B) STARFISH MARITIME FPDA AIR F

(C) COBRA LAND AUS, ARMY

KING WARFARE THAILAND

(D) NORTH LAND AUS, UK ARMY

STAR/ WARFARE

SOUTHERN

CROSS

(E) TROPIC LAND WARFARE US, AUS ARMY

LIGHTNING 5 COMMAND

POST

OCTOBER (A) KANGAROO COMBINED US, AUS, ALL S

1983 ARMS NZ

CONTIN (A) EXERCISE MARITIME US, AUS NAVY, 

UOUS SERIES- 6

ANZUS RELATED AMPHIBIOUS

TOINCLUDE

US 7TH FLEET

' (B) EXERCISE LAND AUS, ARMY

SERIES WARFARE MALAYSIA

' (C) TAMEX ASW US, AUS, AIR F

(5X) NZ

" (D) WILLOH AIR AUS, NZ AIR F

WARFARE
Appendix E

Defense Forces of New Zealand

$NZ = New Zealand dollars

Population : 3,317,000

18-30 31-45

Men: 379,000 339,000

Women: 368,000 340,000

TOTAL ARMEDFORCES:

Active: 12,600.

Terms ofservice: voluntary, supplemented by Territorial Army se

basic, 20 days per year.

Reserves : 9,352. Regular 2,915 : Army 1,370, Navy 755, Air 79

6,437 : Army 5,728, Navy 489, Air 220.

ARMY: 5,800.

2 infantry battalions .

1 artillery battery .

1 light armored squadron.

1 SAS squadron.

Reserves : Territorial Army: 6 infantry battalions, 4 field, 1 me

batteries, 1 recce, 1 APC, 1 ATK sgdns .

GDP 1984/85 : $NZ 40.40bn ($US 

1985/86: $NZ 44.09bn ($US 

growth 1985/86: 0.8% 1986

Inflation 1985: 6.3% 1986 

Debt 1985 : $US 14.7bn 1986 

Def budget 1985/86: $NZ 911 .58m (US$ 

1986/87: $NZ 1 .06bn (US$ 

FMA 1984 : $US 1 .2m 1985 

$US 1 = $NZ (1984/85) : 1 .8914 (198

(1986/87) : 1 .8884
ANZUS IN REVISION

Equipment:

Tanks: light : 26 Scorpion.

APC : 72 M-113.

Artillery : 57 : Guns : 105mm: 8 Hamel; 140mm: 10 5.5-in . Howitzer

(including pack).

Mortar: 81mm : 74.

ATK: RL: LAW. RCL: 84mm: Carl Gustav; 106mm: 18 M-40.

(On order. 16 Hamel 105mm guns).

NAVY: 2,600.

Base: Auckland.

Frigates : 4 Leander with l Wasp helicopter:

3 have 1 x 4 Seacat SAM;

1 has 2 x 4 Seacat, 1 Ikara ASW.

Patrol craft, large: 4 Lake ; inshore : 4 Kiwi (Reserves).

Survey vessels : 3 .

Miscellaneous : 1 oceanographic vessel.

Helicopter: 7 Westland Wasp (see Air Force).

(On order. 1 12,300-ton tanker (1987), Seacat SAM).

AIR FORCE: 4,200.

43 combat aircraft, 7 armed helicopters .

Operations Group:

FGA: 2 squadrons with 17 A-4K, 5 TA-4K Skyhawk.

MR: 1 squadron with 6 P-3K Orion.

COIN: 1 with 15 BAC-167 Strikemaster.

ASW helicopters : 7 Wasp (Navy-assigned) .

Transport : 3 squadrons :

aircraft : 1 with 5 C-130H Hercules, 1 with 7 HS-748 Andover

727-1000;

helicopters : 1 with 6 Sioux (Bell 47),12 Bell UH-1D/H.

Communications : 1 flight with 3 Cessna 421 C.

Support Group:

Training: 1 wing with 4 Airtourer, 15 CT-4 Airtrainer, 3 F-27 

aircraft; 3 Sioux helicopters .
Forces Abroad:

Singapore : 1 infantry battalion with logistics support, 1 support helic

UH-1); to be withdrawn.

Egypt (Sinai WO): 35 ; 2 UH-1 helicopters ; now withdrawn.

Source : Military Balance: 1987-1988 (New York: Garden City Press, 1987), 167-68 

Appendix F

The Government of New Zealand's

Position on Ship Visits

New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange's statemen

the 13 April 1985 edition of the New Zealand Listener ma

the Labour Party's view of the position of the United Sta

Zealand regarding ship visits .

In the face of the New Zealand Government's det

to persist in its intention to exclude nuclear weapons, th

a request for a port visit by a vessel which appeared to c

New Zealand's policy. The difficulty for the Ne

Government was that the Americans could not allow 

to be seen to be complying with New Zealand's p

American defence posture requires the presentation oft

at any time capable of defensive action with nuclear 

whether or not any given vessel is at any given time nucl

Whatever vessel came to New Zealand, that vessel co

terms of that posture, be allowed to be identified as una

nuclear weapons. It was for that reason that the US had 

made plain its reservations about any proposal to l

exclude nuclear weapons from New Zealand waters

action was incompatible with the American wish to 

untrammelled movement of its nuclear capacity.

American reluctance to send a vessel to New Zea

would not only be unarmed with nuclearweapons but wh

be seen to be unarmed with nuclear weapons force

Zealand Government's hand . To accept a vessel whi

subject of American assertions as to its nuclear readi

effectively defeat the New Zealand policy, whether 

given vessel was nuclear armed . The only tenable posi

175
ANZUS IN REVISION

the New Zealand Government was to accept a vessel wh

establish from its own resources was not nuclear 

examination was made which could establish no mor

broad probability that a particular vessel was not nucl

The possibility that nuclear weapons were present co

conclusively eliminated, and for that reason the Ne

Government declined the application for a port visit .

The disappointment which was felt by both sides a

in the proceedings was understandable . The US reactio

It has severely curtailed its defence and intelligence co

with New Zealand. While the ANZUS alliance remain

in place, considerable questions have been raised 

structure and future direction of the New Zealand m

intelligence effort, not to mention the conduct of our in

relations .

The political problems posed by the American 

acute. The National party, which has pledged to r

Zealand to "full and active membership of the ANZUS 

cannot do so without at the least being seen as admitt

weapons to New Zealand. Such an action would sa

elements of opinion in New Zealand but it could not 

kind of consensus about the ANZUS alliance . T

Government must accommodate the deep-seated 

insecurity which have been awakened by the attenuati

Of the defence relationship with the US:

The possibility of consensus about New Zealand

arrangements lies in the development of a credible defe

in the context of effective military relationships 

conventional forces of other powers . There is sco

development within the framework of the ANZUS all

US will accede to it ; failing that, there is scope in the r

New Zealand maintains with the armed forces of ot

Australia not least .

176
It is clear that the building of a consensus 

Zealand's defence and security interests will not 

achieved. The element ofpartisanship will not be easily 

and will continue to obscure our common interest. I

interest that a careful and serious examination and as

New Zealand policy in defence and international relat

be made .

Source : Dora Alves, Anti-nuclear Attitudes in NewZealand and Australia (Wa

D.C . : National Defense University Press, 1985), 79-81 .

Appendix G

Significant Event Chronology (1983-8

179

Mar 1983 - Australian Labor Party (ALP), with Prime Minis

won sweeping victory in Australian federal ele

Liberal/National coalition of Prime Minister 

ended

late 1983 - Australian government conducted complete re

and expressed strong continuing support .

Dec 1983 - New Zealand white paper on defense presen

1978 review) .

Jul 1984 - New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP), with Prime 

Lange, won federal election in New Zealand. Re

National Party rule of Prime Minister Sir Rober

Annual ANZUS Council meeting in Wellingto

took place immediately after results of feder

Secretary ofState George P. Shultz met with new

Minister Lange and stressed importance a

ANZUS alliance.

Aug 1984 - South Pacific Forum unanimously endorsedAust

for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone.

Oct 1984 - Background briefing papers for New Zealand 

for Defence Frank O'Flynn made available for 

Nov 1984 - Republican Ronald Reagan won national r

president in landslide victory .

Jan 1985 - US government requested permission for 

powered destroyer USS Buchanan to visit Ne

Zealand Labour government unable to reach de

Feb 1985 - New Zealand government officially refused 

visit . ANZUS began unraveling process .
ANZUS IN REVISION

Australian Prime Minister Hawke visited Wa

pressure forced him to repudiate Australi

agreement to assist with US testing of MX miss

Australian Minister for Defence Kim Beazle

academic Paul Dibb to undertake a one-

Australia's defense capabilities .

Apr 1985 - Memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 

between the United States andAustralia reaffir

1980 and 1965 arrangements) .

May 1985 - New Zealand released its Defence Interim Rev

Jul 1985 - Bilateral ANZUS Council meeting with Austral

States (New Zealand absent) held in Canberra.

Sep 1985 - New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Geoffr

unsuccessful "door opening" visit to United St

Dec 1985 - New Zealand Labour government publish

Question: A Discussion Paper Issued as Ba

Public Submission on Future New Zealan

Security Policies.

Prime Minister Lange introduced into Parl

Zealand nuclear free zone, disarmament, and a

June 1986 - Secretary of State Shultz and Prime Ministe

foreign ministers meeting in Manila and parte

no longer allies ."

Dibb's Review of Australia's Defence Capabi

Australian Parliament .

Aug 1986 - In place of annual ANZUS Council meeting, 

and Australia held bilateral talks in San Franc

States, following upon its ending of nea

cooperation with New Zealand in 1985, susp

under ANZUS to assist New Zealand in event 
New Zealand government published its o

Committee of Enquiry report, Defence and Secu

Zealanders Want.

New Zealand defense forces on their own c

military maneuvers and operations on the Coo

South Pacific .

Oct 1986 - New Zealand's unofficial Templeton study, o

Security : What New Zealand Needs, released.

Dec 1986 - New Zealand announced that most ofits oversea

in Singapore will return home by 1989.

Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden told 

Lange in Wellington that Australia would not be 

the United States on defense matters and 

Australian-New Zealand defense cooperatio

limits .

Feb 1987 - New Zealand published Defence of New Zeal

Defence Policy 1987. It superseded the 1983 w

was the culmination of a two-year government 

defense review which began with the May 1985 

Review.

US Department ofState announced that the long

on logistics support between the United States a

(as preceded by 1982 and 1985 arrangements

renewed.

Mar 1987 - Australia published its government white paper 

Australia 1987. It superseded the 1976 wh

incorporated many of the main points from the 

the concerns expressed by the US government.

Jun 1987 - Bilateral ministerial meeting between the Un

Australia held in Sydney. This was the thir

meeting which replaced the former annual A

meeting (with New Zealand in attendance).

New Zealand Parliament finally passed the Nuc

Bill.
ANZUS IN REVISION

The ALP, with Prime Minister Bob Hawke, w

Australia .

The NZLP, with Prime Minister David Lange, w

New Zealand.

Source: Much of this information was extracted from Dora Alves, Anti-nuclear 

New Zealand andAustralia (Washington, D.C. : National Defense Univ
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Synnot, Sir Anthony. "No 1-Basic Strategy Is Wrong." Pacific De

13, no. 2 (August 1986): 17-18.

Templeton, Ian. "Lange Moving to Make Australia a Brother in Arm

108, no. 5541 (21 October 1986): 110.
. "Minister at War with Generals Shoots PM's Toe." The B

5505 (11 February 1986) : 82 .

. "Wellington Ponders Post-ANZUS Pacific Security." The B

5519 (20 May 1986): 104-5.

"Tough RecoveryNew Zealand." The Economist 304, no. 7506 

69-70.

Varni, Gerald. "ICA Exclusive Interview-The Honorable Kim Beaz

Minister of Defense." International CombatArms 5, no. 2 (March 

Warner, Denis. "No 2-'New Zealand Can't Have It Both Ways."' 

Reporter 11, no. 10 (April 1985): 12-15.

. "The Importance of Being ANZUS." Pacific Defence Rep

(September 1984): 19-21 .

. "Soviet Union Not Just a Country, But a Cause." Pacific De

12, no. 10 (April 1986): 8-10.

Weinberger, Caspar W. "We Would Welcome New Zealand's Re

Pacific Islands Monthly 56, no. 12 (December 1985): 18-21 .

. "The Five Pillars of Our Defense Policy in East Asia a

Defense 84, no. 23 (April 1984): 2-7.

Williams, Clive. "Better to Deter than to Defend." Pacific Defence R

12 (June 1986):17-20.

Young, P. Lewis. "International Defense Profile : Australian De

International CombatArms 5, no. 2 (March 1987): 67-79.

Young, Thomas-Durell. "Australia's Defense Priorities and Programs

Defense Review 19, no. 5 (May 1986): 583-88.

. "Don't Abandon Radford-Collins ." Pacific Defence Rep

(September 1986) : 16.

. "New Zealand's Defense Arrangements: An Uncertain 

International Defense Review 19, no. 5 (May 1986): 591-94.

. "Problems in Future New Zealand Defence Policy ." n. p., 

Newspapers

Andrews, B. "Admiral Points to Soviet Fish Pact." Washington Times

1986, 4D.

Barber, David. "New Zealand Takes Ambitious Tack with New D

Christian Science Monitor, 30 March 1987.

Brownfeld, Allan C. "Fragility of Alliance Illustrated in New Zealan

Times, 12 September 1984,3C-4C.

Dyer, Gwynne. "New Zealand's Pesky Nix on Nukes." Washi

November 1984,3C.

"Fiji Coup to Block Indian Power." Pittsburgh Press, 17 May 1987, 

193
ANZUS IN REVISION

Fulghum, David. "Foreign Officers Study Dynamics of Alliances." Ai

8 December 1986, 49.

Haberman, Clyde. "Challenge in the Pacific." New York Times, 7 Se

26-113 .

Hays, Ronald J. "Soviet Shadow Is Apparent in Pacific Security Setti

Union, 10 August 1986, 6C-IOC.

Matthews, William. "New Zealandto Lose DoDMilitary Purchasing H

Times, 9 March 1987, 36.

"New Zealand Military Says Standards Slip since U.S . Break." New Yor

2 October 1986, 3 .

"New Zealand's New Leader Reiterates Labor Party's Antinuc

Washington Post, 20 July 1984, 28.

"New Zealand Parliament Asked to Ban Nuclear Arms." Washing

February 1987, 9.

Pound, Kate. "Aussies, Americans Test Air Tactics in Kangaroo '89

and Stripes, 24 August 1989, 8.

Ross, Oakland. "South Pacific Shakes Fist at the U.S." Toronto Gl

October 1986,3D.

Samuel, Peter. "New Zealand Anti-Nuclear View Driving U.S. Nava

Australia." New York City Tribune, 11 March 1987, 5 .

. "Soviets Buying Access to Strategic South Pacific Islan

Congress." Defense News, 29 September 1986, 13.

. "Weinberger Criticizes Report Recommending Australian 

Changes." Defense News, 10 November 1986, 28.

Sherwell, Chris. "Jindalee Takes Australian Defence by Storm." Fina

February 1987, 4.

"Troop Withdrawal." Washington Times, 19 January 1987, 3(20).

"U.S. Hopes Nuclear Policy Will Exit with Lange." Washington T

1989,7 .

"Whither the Alliance?" Air Force Times, 9 February 1987, 28.

Young, Peter. "Marching in the Right Direction." The Australian, 7 J
Index

Index

197

Acheson, Dean: 22, 23 revised structur

ADF. See Australian Defence 86, 112, 127, 

Force 148, 149, 150

Alice Springs: 25, 82, 83 showcase allian

ALP. See Australian Labor Party 19, 38, 138, 

Ansell, Graham : 115 ANZUS Treaty: 1, 2

Anti-American feelings/policies : 31, 49, 53, 54, 60, 

ANZ (Australia and New 38, 103, 147

Zealand) : 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 46, Australian-American 

74 See US-Australian 

ANZAC (Australia and New Australian Defence 

Zealand Army Corps): 56,106 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 

ANZCCDC (Australia-New 60, 73, 87, 99, 140

Zealand Consultative capabilities: 5, 

Committee on Defence 65, 68, 123, 

Cooperation): 106 capital systems, 

ANZUK(Australia, New Zealand, 50, 58, 59, 61

and United Kingdom) : 104 defense industr

ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, 67, 81, 82, 83

and United States) alliance force structure : 

beginnings : 17, 21, 23, 50, 65, 66, 71, 87

100,149 intelligence : 61

Council: 20, 21, 110, 114 logistics suppor

problems: 31, 33, 35, 38, 57, 61, 62, 67

1241 129 82,84

33, 37, 107, 141

Antinuclear attitudes: 5, 7, 20, 21,

130,143

Armitage, Richard: 

28, 29, 33, 35, 37, 38, 95, 106, ASEAN (Assoc

107, 108, 110, 111, 116, 121, Southeast Asian 

124, 131, 141, 142, 145, 150, 105,112

152,153 Asymmetrical relati
ANZUS IN REVISION

operations: 65, 74

organization : 48, 49, 52, 53,

55, 58, 60, 66, 74, 81

Australia-New Zealand

Consultative Committee on

Defence. See ANZCCDC

Australia-New Zealand Defence

Policy Group: 106

Australia, New Zealand, and

United States. See ANZUS

Australian-New Zealand

relations. See New ZealandAustralian relations

Australian industry participation

(AIP): 75, 84

Australian Labor Party (ALP): 25,

29, 31, 55, 58, 59

Australian Regular Army (ARA):

16, 47, 52, 67, 79

Ball, Desmond: 82

Beazley, Kim: 6, 43, 46, 54, 59,

62, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 75,

151

Berendsen, C. A. : 23

Bilateral defense agreements: 1, 6,

14, 21, 31, 35, 36, 37,44, 50, 53,

60, 61, 71, 86, 87, 101, 105,

112, 113, 114, 122, 129, 139,

142, 144, 145

Broomfield, Bill: 113

Buchanan, USS : 32, 111

Budget issues : 7, 84-85, 87,

109-10, 117, 127, 128, 151

Bush, George: 153

Busy Boomerang/Busy Boomerang

Delta: 15

198

Butterworth Air Base: 

76

Cam Ranh Bay, Vietna

Canberra: 64, 75, 82, 1

Christchurch: 26, 28

Clements, Kevin: 120

Cleveland, Paul M. : 15

Cocos Islands: 65

Collective security an

alliance: 7, 11, 19, 2

49, 54, 87, 95, 97, 

124, 131, 138, 139, 

Collins, John: 24

Commonwealth: 56, 99

Corner Committee of 

116, 117, 118, 119, 

Corner, Frank: 120, 12

Corner Report: 121

Crowe, William J. : 139

Dalrymple, F . Rawdo

137

Da Nang Air Base, Vie

Deakin, Alfred: 45

Defence and Security : 

Zealand Needs: 121-

Defence and Security : 

Zealanders Want: 1

Defence Cooperation P

(DCP): 55

Defence Interim Revie

Defence ofAustralia 1

71, 72, 81, 87, 140

Defence of New Zeala

ofDefence Policy 19
Defence Question, The: 117, 118,

119

Defence Review: 108, 109

Defence Science and Technology

Organization (DSTO): 83

Dibb, Paul: 6, 43, 45, 47, 53, 58,

59, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71,

77, 81, 83, 86, 87, 117, 140

Direct military interests

(Australia): 65, 68, 72, 73

Direct strategic concerns (New

Zealand) : 105, 123, 141

Douglas, Roger: 153

Dulles, John Foster: 22, 23

East Asia-Pacific : 2, 3, 4, 70, 73,

100, 114, 1371 138

Evans, David: 76

Exclusive economic zones (EEZ):

62, 63, 108

Exercises : 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 24,

32, 36, 53, 55, 56, 61,64, 74,79,

100, 101, 105, 113, 114, 115,

116, 126, 127, 150

Expanded Relations Program

(ERP): 16, 17

Fiji: 5, 105, 115, 150

First World War. See World War I

Five Power Defence Arrangement

(FPDA) : 48, 55, 56, 58, 64, 79,

104, 105, 115

Foreign military sales (FMS): 15,

529 102

Forward defense: 24, 29, 47, 48,

49, 65, 87, 99

France: 5, 106, 107, 147

199

Fraser, Malcolm : 4, 

Glad Customer: 15

Grazebrook, A. W. : 

Great Britain/Britis

29, 32, 43, 46, 47, 

97, 99, 101, 102, 

Green, Marshall: 18, 

Gross domestic prod

Australia: 70, 7

New Zealand: 3

Gross national produ

Australia: 67

New Zealand: 1

Guam : 15, 29

Harland, Bryce : 37

Hawke, Bob: 25, 31

82,151

Hayden, Bill: 64, 11

Hays, Ronald: 34, 1

Henderson, Peter: 68

Holdridge, John: 70

Holt, Harold E . : 26, 

Hughes, Oscar: 78

Hunt, Diane: 120

Independence (defen

Australia: 5, 54

72, 73, 78, 1

148, 151, 15

New Zealand: 

108, 111, 112

128, 137, 148

Indonesia: 4, 56, 65, 

confrontation p

56,104
ANZUS IN REVISION

Indian Ocean: 2-3, 4, 5, 15, 24, 65,

77, 79, 105

Integrated Air Defence System

(IADS) : 55-56,64

Intelligence: 6, 12, 19, 21, 28, 30,

37, 53, 61, 65, 75, 100, 106,

113, 114, 141, 144, 146, 147

Jackson, Karl : 73, 100, 114

Jamieson, D. Ewan: 95, 99, 103

Japan/Japanese : 22, 24, 45, 46, 47,

49,112

Jindalee: 83, 151

Johnson, Lyndon B. : 22, 28, 49

Joint facilities : 13, 14, 18, 25, 26,

30, 35, 53, 61, 87, 143

Kennedy, John F. : 22

Kiribati: 4

Kirk, Norman: 29, 106

Korea/Korean War: 23, 48, 49, 99

Kwajalein: 4

Labor government (Australia): 6,

19, 25, 31, 59, 60,64, 81, 143

Labour government (New

Zealand) : 7, 31, 37, 95, 96, 99,

101, 103, 106, 107, 108, 110,

115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121,

122, 124, 128, 138, 141, 143,

152

Lake ANZUS: 4, 20, 150

Lange, David: 7, 11, 32, 33, 34,

99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 108,

110, 111, 113, 114, 1159 116,

117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124,

128, 131, 137, 141, 152, 153

200

Langtry, J. O. : 82

Lehman, John: 26

Liberal government 

18

Liberal Party (Australi

Lilley, James R. : 137

Lyons, James: 70

Malaysia/Malay Peni

48, 55, 56,64, 76, 1

Mandle, William F. : 2

Mason, Tony : 69

McNamara, Neville: 6

Melbourne, HMAS: 52

Memorandum of und

(MOU)

Australia and New 

57

Australia and US

New Zealand and 

113

Menzies, Robert: 49

Military Airlift C

(MAC): 14

Monroe Doctrine ofthe 

Muldoon, Robert: 30, 

Multinational Force of 

(MFO) : 56, 58, 105

National Party (New Ze

107

NATO (North Atlan

Organization) : 11, 2

Neither confirm 

(NCND): 21, 32, 34

New Caledonia: 5

New Guinea: 65
New Zealand-American relations .

See US-New Zealand relations

New Zealand Army: 16, 17, 99,

104, 120, 126

New Zealand-Australian

relations : 1, 5-7, 31, 33, 36, 56,

64, 86, 104, 105, 106, 114, 115,

119, 122, 124, 128-29, 142,

143, 144, 145

New Zealand Defence Forces

(NZDF): 46,64, 86, 97, 99,100,

101, 102, 105, 109, 113, 114,

116, 119, 122, 124, 141, 152

capabilities: 96, 112, 124,

127,131,141,142

capital systems, acquisition:

110, 124, 125, 128, 141,

142

defense industry : 102, 142

force structure: 101, 130

intelligence : 100, 106, 113,

1141 141

logistics support: 101, 102

operations : 101

New Zealand Force Southeast

Asia (NZFORSEA): 104, 105,

115

New Zealand Labour Party

(NZLP) : 29, 31-32, 33, 108,

112, 116, 153

Nixon Doctrine: 29, 57

Nixon, Richard: 19, 29, 58

Nonnuclear issues and ANZUS

alliance: 20, 119

Norrish, Merwyn: 3

North Atlantic Treaty

Organization. See NATO

20 1

North West Cape: 25

Nuclear issues a

alliance: 4, 64, 86, 

120, 122, 142, 143

Nulka: 83

Nurrungar: 25, 26

O'Connor, Michael: 

O'Flynn, Frank: 95, 

Operational Deploy

(ODF) : 80,127

Pacific Armies M

Seminar (PAMS) : 

Pacific way : 115, 15

Palmer, Geoffrey : 15

Papua New Guinea: 

115, 120, 150

Pine Gap: 25, 26

Pitch Black: 14, 15

Poananga, Brian M. : 

Polynesia: 5, 33, 107

Primary strategi

concern, regional 

115

Pro-American: 59,1

Radford, Arthur: 24

Radford-Collins ag

53,101

Ready reaction force 

127

Reagan, Ronald: 19, 

Regional security/sta

131, 138, 142, 14

150,154
ANZUSIN REVISION

Review of Australia's Defence

Capabilities: 6, 44, 60, 65, 66,

87,140

Roosevelt, Theodore : 45

Rowling, Wallace: 29, 32, 106,

107

Royal Australian Air Force

(RAAF): 14, 47, 52, 54, 55, 56,

62, 67, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81, 84

Royal Australian Navy (RAN):

52, 54, 55, 58, 62, 67, 76, 77, 78,

79, 81, 151

Royal New Zealand Air Force

(RNZAF): 15-16, 56, 95,

101-02,126

Royal New Zealand Navy

(RNZN) : 101, 116, 125, 126

Rusk, Dean: 22

Saigon, Vietnam: 29, 49, 54, 58

Samuel, Peter: 70

Scholes, Gordon: 75

Second World War. See World

War II

Self-reliance in defense: 5, 6, 7,

18, 29, 30, 31, 43,44, 45, 47, 50,

52, 54, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 66, 69,

71, 72, 78, 83, 86, 87,103, 106,

108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115,

117, 119, 123, 124, 127, 128,

131, 137, 140, 141, 145, 148,

151 9 154

Shultz, George P. : 36, 110, 111,

153

Singapore: 55, 56, 58, 104, 105,

115,127

202

Southeast Asia: 4, 5, 

57, 58, 62,64, 66, 

109,115

Southeast Pacific : 5

South Pacific: 2, 3, 4, 

29, 30, 32, 33, 46, 54

627 63, 66, 79, 86, 88

100, 101, 104, 105

109, 112, 113, 115

122, 123, 124, 126

139, 141, 142, 147

154

South Pacific Nuclear 

(SPNFZ): 5, 29, 3

107, 108, 142,146

Southwest Pacific: 2, 

38, 56, 65, 72, 79, 9

142, 147, 148, 149, 

Soviet Union: 3, 4, 35

Spender, Percy : 22, 23

Stevenson, J. D. : 81

Strategic Air Comman

Synnot, Anthony: 68, 

Templeton, Malcolm

129

Trilateral relations : 1

53,100,101,129,1

United Nations : 23, 37

US-Australian relatio

18, 24, 35, 36, 37,44

64, 72, 82, 86, 87

137, 139, 140, 142

150

US Congress: 73, 100
US military Weinberger, Caspa

Air Force : 14, 15 153

Army : 16,17 Wellington: 110, 1

Marine Corps: 14 West, Dalton: 96

Navy: 5, 14, 20, 32, 34, 70, White paper

(USPACOM): 15, 16, 24, 34, Whitlam, Gough: 

103 Wolfowitz, Paul: 1

World War I : 46, 9

Vanuatu : 4 World War II: 44, 

Vietnam War: 18, 25, 28, 48, 49, 61, 99, 117, 123

56, 85, 99, 108

Washington: 20, 25, 29, 49, 58, 70,

96, 114, 124, 152

Young, Thomas-Du

83, 103, 107, 111, 129, Australian: 5, 

139, 142, 143 54, 60, 66, 

US-New Zealand relations : 15, 75, 77, 79, 

23, 33, 35, 99, 100, 103, 87, 117, 12

111, 116, 121, 122, 128, New Zealand: 

129, 139, 142, 144, 152 109, 117, 1

US Pacific Command 123,124,12