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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. THOMAS WALCZYK

(AC 36354)

DiPentima, C. J., and Prescott and Dupont, Js.

Argued November 17, 2014—officially released February 24, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, geographical area number twelve, C.

Taylor, J.)

Bethany L. Phillips, for the appellant (defendant).

Maria del Pilar Gonzalez, deputy assistant state’s

attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy,

state’s attorney, and Jaclyn Preville, deputy assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The defendant, Thomas Walczyk,1

appeals from the judgment of conviction,rendered after

a jury trial, of evading responsibility in violation of

General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 14-224 (b)2

following

his involvement in a motor vehicle accident. On appeal,

the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence produced at trial with respect to two elements

of § 14-224 (b): (1) damage to the school bus; and (2)

whether the defendant fulfilled his statutory obligation

to stop, render assistance, and give his name, address,

operator’s license number and registration number to

either the school bus driver or the police. We disagree

and, accordingly, affirm the judgment.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. On September 5, 2012, a school bus driver was

transporting schoolchildren home on a school bus and

was approaching a stop sign located on Howard Street

in East Hartford, when he noticed a vehicle parked on

the right hand side of the street approximately ten to

twenty feet from the stop sign. He then drove to the

left side of that parked vehicle in order to safely

approach the stop sign. While the school bus was still

positioned on the incorrect side of the street, the defendant drove his vehicle, a station wagon, toward the

school bus and, upon observing the school bus in his

way, yelled at the bus driver to move the bus. When

the bus driver did not move the school bus, the defendant drove his vehicle between the bus and the parked

car. In doing so, the defendant hit the side of the school

bus and its front bumper with his vehicle. The school

bus sustained damage to the right side of its front

bumper. After the accident, the defendant exited his

vehicle, picked up a piece of molding that had fallen

off his vehicle due to the collision with the school bus,

and yelled various obscenities at the bus driverto which

the bus driver did not respond. The bus driver did not

feel it was safe to respond to the defendant because

he had schoolchildren on the bus and he felt that he

needed to protect them. Subsequently, the defendant

backed up his vehicle and drove off without giving

the bus driver his name, address, license number or

registration number. The defendant did not initiate any

contact with the police following the accident.

Following the accident, the bus driver radioed to

his dispatcher to explain what had happened and the

dispatcher contacted the East Hartford Police Department. When the police arrived on the scene, the bus

driver gave Officer Frank Thomas the defendant’s

license plate number. On the basis of that information,

Thomas telephoned the defendant that evening and the

defendant identified himself as the person operating

the vehicle involved in the accident. The defendant met

Thomas at the police station a few days later and provided Thomas with his insurance paperwork. Subse-
quently, the defendant was charged with evading

responsibility pursuant to § 14-224 (b).

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of

evading responsibility pursuant to § 14-224 (b), and was

sentenced by the court to one year of incarceration,

execution suspended, followed by three years of probation, and fined six hundred dollars. Thereafter, he filed

this appeal and a motion to stay ‘‘the entire order of

probation’’ pending the outcome of this appeal, which

motion was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the

defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence

for the jury to conclude that he violated § 14-224 (b).

Specifically, the defendant argues that the evidence was

not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

whether there was any damage to the school bus, and

whether he stopped, rendered assistance to the bus

driver, and gave the bus driver his name, address, operator’s license number or registration number.

‘‘The standard of review employed in a sufficiency

of the evidence claim is well settled. [W]e apply a two

part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light

most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we

determine whether upon the facts so construed and

the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury]

reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative

force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . This court cannot substitute its own

judgment for that of the jury if there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Elsey, 81 Conn. App. 738, 743–

44, 841 A.2d 714, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 901, 852 A.2d

733 (2004). ‘‘On appeal, we do not ask whether there

is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support

a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead,

whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence

that supports the [jury’s] verdict of guilty.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, 280 Conn.

779, 809, 911 A.2d 1099 (2007).

General Statutes (Rev. to 2011) § 14-224 (b) requires

that ‘‘[e]ach person operating a motor vehicle who is

knowingly involved in an accident which causes . . .

damage to property shall at once stop and render such

assistance as may be needed and shall give his name,

address and operator’s license number and registration

number . . . to the owner of the . . . damaged property, or to any officer or witness to the . . . damage

to property, and if such operator of the motor vehicle

causing the . . . damage to any property is unable to

give his name, address and operator’s license number

and registration number to the . . . owner of the property . . . damaged, or to any witness or officer, for

any reason or cause, such operator shall immediately

report such . . . damage to property to a police officer

. . . a state police officer or an inspector of motor

vehicles or at the nearest police precinct or station,
and shall state in such report the location and circumstances of the accident causing the . . . damage to

property and his name, address, operator’s license number and registration number.’’ (Emphasis added.)

On the basis of the differing accounts of damage to

the school bus, the jury could have concluded that the

bus had sustained some damage, however slight, and

that the defendant should have given the bus driver

the information required by the statute. Although the

defendant testified that he did stop and attempt to talk

to the driver, he did not, perhaps due to his own

demeanor, provide the information required by § 14-

224 (b) to either the bus driver or to the police immediately after the accident. The operator of a motor vehicle

involved in an accident that causes damage to another

vehicle, however slight, is required by the statute in

question to provide the information listed in the statute.

After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to sustaining the verdict, we conclude that the jury

reasonably could have concluded that the defendant

violated § 14-224 (b). Accordingly, we sustain the conviction.

The judgment is affirmed.

1 The defendant represented himself at trial, but is represented by counsel

on appeal to this court.

2 Effective October 1, 2014, § 14-224 was amended by No. 14-130, § 25, of

the 2014 Public Acts. Hereinafter, all references to § 14-224 in this opinion

are to the 2011 revision of the statute.