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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARC HIMMELSTEIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 12-1475 (JEB)

COMCAST OF THE 

DISTRICT, L.L.C., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

As the Court explained in an earlier Opinion, a $220 dispute over an unreturned cable 

modem has mushroomed into a federal lawsuit involving complex issues of tort, federal debtcollection laws, and preemption. See Himmelstein v. Comcast of the District, LLC, 

(Himmelstein I), --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2012 WL 6103219 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 2012). To quickly 

recap, Plaintiff Marc Himmelstein’s failure to return a modem when terminating his cable 

service ultimately led to a negative credit report and $26,000 in additional financing costs when 

he refinanced his home. He thus sued both Comcast and Credit Protection Association, L.P., a 

collection agency. Having granted in part and denied in part Comcast’s first Motion to Dismiss 

in Himmelstein I, the Court now reaches the same result with respect to CPA’s Motion to 

Dismiss: Count IV, Plaintiff’s Fair Credit Reporting Act claim, survives, but Count III’s 

assertion of negligence is preempted by the FCRA and does not.

I. Background

According to the Amended Complaint, which must be presumed true at this stage,

Himmelstein was a long-time customer of Comcast, from whom he received residential cable 
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and high-speed internet service. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 9-10 & Exh. A (Comcast Agreement for 

Residential Services). When Himmelstein elected to terminate his contract around June 2010, a

Comcast technician came to his residence to remove the equipment, picking up the cable box, 

but inadvertently leaving behind a modem. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 12-21. In August 2010 he was 

informed for the first time he owed Comcast approximately $220 for cable-modem equipment 

that had not been returned. See id., ¶ 21. “Shortly thereafter, Himmelstein received a demand 

letter from a collection agency [CPA] seeking to recover, on Comcast’s behalf, the alleged 

$220.00 outstanding balance.” Id., ¶ 23. He then contacted Comcast again regarding the status 

of the account and was told that the charge would be removed and corrected when he returned 

the missing modem. See id. Himmelstein located the missing modem and returned it 

immediately to Comcast. See id., ¶ 24. 

Himmelstein never received his refund check, however, and CPA continued to pursue 

collection of the $220 balance. See id., ¶¶ 26-29. The collection agency, moreover, reported the 

debt to the national credit-reporting agencies in December 2010. See id., ¶ 28. When 

Himmelstein contacted CPA to dispute the debt, it acknowledged the error, ceased collection on 

the account, and contacted Comcast to report the account for deletion – but never contacted the 

national credit bureaus regarding the mistake. See id., ¶¶ 29-30. At around the same time, 

Himmelstein himself notified the national credit bureaus that he was disputing the debt. See id., 

¶ 31. 

The following spring, Himmelstein sought to refinance his mortgage with Citibank. See

id., ¶ 30. His credit report continued to reflect the Comcast debt, despite his repeated efforts to 

redress the error with both Comcast and CPA. See id. Because of this outstanding debt, 

Citibank required Himmelstein to pay an additional $26,000 (1% of the value of the mortgage)
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for the same loan. See id., ¶ 32

In 2012, he filed this action, alleging several common-law counts against Comcast, as 

well as a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and a common-law negligence claim against 

CPA. In late 2012, the Court granted Comcast’s Motion to Dismiss in part and narrowed the 

case against the both defendants. Plaintiff’s FCRA (Count IV) and negligence (Count III) claims

survived the Motion, and Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26), and CPA has now 

moved to dismiss the two counts against it.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint that 

“fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the 

Court must “treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true and must grant plaintiff the benefit 

of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 

216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court need not accept as true, however, “a legal 

conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in 

the complaint. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to 

withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, [if] accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation omitted). Though a 

plaintiff may survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely,” the 

facts alleged in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
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III. Analysis

In moving to dismiss, CPA contends both that Plaintiff’s FCRA claim is facially deficient 

and that his negligence claim is preempted. The Court will discuss the two counts separately.

A. FCRA Claim

In Count IV of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that CPA violated the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., by 

reporting a false debt to the national credit bureaus; failing to 

conduct a proper investigation into Himmelstein’s dispute; failing 

to correct the false debt reported to the national credit bureaus 

despite acknowledgment that the information previously provided 

was inaccurate; failing to report to the national credit bureaus that 

Himmelstein disputed the accuracy and validity of the alleged 

debt; and failing to modify, delete or permanently block the 

inaccurate information.

See Am. Compl., ¶ 67. Himmelstein contends that these actions violated § 1681s-2(b), which 

imposes certain requirements on furnishers of credit information like CPA. See id., ¶ 66. 

Moving to dismiss, CPA argues that Himmelstein has failed to properly allege facts that would 

trigger any legal duty running from CPA to Plaintiff under that section. See Mot. at 3, 7-8. The 

Court disagrees. While Plaintiff’s pleadings could be more complete regarding the full sequence 

of events, the facts as currently alleged and “all inferences that can be derived” from them, 

Sparrow, 216 F.3d at 1113 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), are sufficient to 

provide CPA with “fair notice of the claim and the ground on which it rests.” Kingman Park 

Civic Ass’n v. Williams, 348 F.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

The Court will first address the FCRA and the duties it imposes on furnishers, then move 

on to an analysis of the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations.

1. Duties of Furnishers
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The FCRA was enacted “to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency 

in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 

47, 52 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “As an important means to this end, the Act sought to 

make ‘consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities [in assembling and 

evaluating consumers’ credit, and disseminating information about consumers’ credit] with 

fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.’” Gorman v. Wolpoff & 

Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4)). In 

addition to imposing duties on consumer reporting agencies (CRAs), “Section 1681s-2 [of the 

Act] sets forth ‘[r]esponsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies.’” 

Id. at 1154. While the statute does not explicitly define “furnishers” of credit information, 

“‘[t]he most common . . . furnishers of information are credit card issuers, auto dealers, 

department and grocery stores, lenders, utilities, insurers, collection agencies, and government 

agencies.’” Chiang v. Verizon New England, Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 35 n.7 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting 

H.R. Rep. 108-263, at 24 (2003)). Neither party here disputes that CPA is a “furnisher” of 

information for FCRA purposes.

The FCRA imposes two sets of duties on furnishers, one under § 1681s-2(a) and one 

under §1681s-2(b). The first “prohibits any person from furnishing information to a CRA that 

the person knows is inaccurate,” and “any person who ‘regularly and in the ordinary course of 

business furnishes information to one or more [CRAs]’ must correct and update the information 

provided so that it is ‘complete and accurate.’” Saunders v. Branch Banking and Trust Co. of 

Va., 526 F.3d 142, 148 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)). As to the second, “a 

furnisher incurs [additional duties] under § 1681s-2(b) if a consumer disputes the accuracy of 

information that the furnisher reports.” Id. “If a consumer notifies a CRA that he disputes the 
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accuracy of an item in his file, [the] FCRA requires the CRA to notify the furnisher of the 

dispute.” Id. (citing § 1681i(a)(2)). Once notified, a furnisher must:

(a) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed 

information;

(b) review all relevant information provided by the [CRA] 

pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title;

(c) report the results of the investigation to the [CRA]; [and]

(d) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete 

or inaccurate, report those results to all other consumer 

reporting agencies to which the person furnished the 

information and that compile and maintain files on 

consumers on a nationwide basis . . . .

§ 1681s-2(b)(1). 

Although “no private right of action under § 1681s-2(a)(3)” exists, Gorman, 584 F.3d at 

1162, “‘[t]he majority of courts that have considered the issue’ have concluded that there is a 

private cause of action under § 1681s-2(b). . . . However, . . . courts have ‘uniformly’ concluded 

that § 2(b) ‘provides a private cause of action only if the furnisher received notice from a 

consumer reporting agency, as opposed to the plaintiff alone, that the credit information was 

disputed.’” Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D. Mass. 2004) (citations omitted); see 

also, e.g., SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 652 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] 

private citizen wishing to bring an action against a furnisher must first file a dispute with the 

consumer reporting agency, which then must notify the furnisher of information that a dispute 

exists. Only after this notification can the furnisher face any liability to a private individual.”); 

Chiang, 595 F.3d at 35 (“Although a consumer may dispute credit information directly to a 

furnisher . . . the consumer has no private right of action if the furnisher does not reasonably 

investigate the consumer’s claim after direct notification.”); Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. 

Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It can be inferred from the structure of the statute 
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that Congress did not want furnishers of credit information exposed to suit by any and every 

consumer dissatisfied with the credit information furnished. . . . But Congress did provide a 

filtering mechanism in § 1681s-2(b) by making the disputatious consumer notify a CRA and 

setting up the CRA to receive notice of the investigation by the furnisher.”); Narog v. Certegy 

Check Servs., Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“A person may only sue a 

furnisher of information in court under [the] FCRA . . . if the person first disputes the derogatory 

mark with the Credit Reporting Agency . . . .”) (emphasis in original).

There is no doubt, therefore, that CPA must have received notice of the dispute from the 

CRA, not just from Plaintiff, in order for Himmelstein to recover under § 1681s-2(b).

2. Sufficiency of Allegations

The question here is whether Plaintiff must specifically plead that the CRA notified CPA

of the disputed credit information. Defendant urges the Court to adopt a hard line. CPA argues 

that although Himmelstein pleads that he notified the national credit bureaus of the disputed 

debt, see Am. Compl., ¶ 31, and that he “immediately disputed the debt” when first contacted by 

Defendant, see id., ¶ 29, because he did not explicitly “allege, as [he] must, that the bureaus 

forwarded the dispute to CPA,” Mot. at 8, Plaintiff does not state a claim under § 1681s-2(b). 

Plaintiff responds that Defendant’s view of the matter is too cabined. See Opp. at 8-9.

While federal courts have been uniform in holding that a private right of action under the 

FCRA only exists where the furnisher is notified of the dispute by a CRA, they have taken a 

variety of approaches to the degree of precision with which a plaintiff must plead that said 

notification actually took place in order to state a claim under § 1681s-2(b). Compare, e.g., 

Carlson v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 517, 519-20 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that while 

it is “clear from § 1681s-2(b)(1) that Plaintiff must indeed prove that . . . notification [from the 
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CRA to the furnisher] occurred to succed on his claims[,] . . . Plaintiff is not required to plead all 

elements of a prima facie case to avoid 12(b)(6) dismissal. All that is required is fair notice of 

the claim and the ground on which it rests.”) (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 

(2002)), with Dornhecker v. Ameritech Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 918, 928-29 (N.D. Ill. 2000) 

(dismissing without prejudice to amend where plaintiff alleged he personally notified furnisher 

of dispute, but did not allege furnisher was notified by the CRA), and Ryder v. Washington Mut.

Bank, FA, 371 F. Supp. 2d 152, 154 (D. Conn. 2005) (dismissing for failure to state a claim 

where plaintiff alleged only that he had contacted the furnisher, but did not allege that disputed 

claim was properly investigated upon notification by a CRA). The Court believes Himmelstein 

has the better of this argument.

 To begin, it is worth noting that CPA cites no authority – nor has the Court identified 

any – for the proposition that where the plaintiff has alleged notification of both the national 

credit bureaus and the furnisher, but does not explicitly allege that the CRAs notified the 

furnisher, he always fails to state a claim. On the contrary, those cases where courts have 

dismissed for failure to plead notification by the CRA to the furnisher are readily distinguishable, 

as each involved a plaintiff who failed to plead any contact whatsoever with a CRA. See, e.g., 

Elmore v. North Fork Bankcorporation, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)

(dismissing for failure to state a claim where “plaintiff did not complain to the credit reporting 

agency . . . [but instead] . . . saw that the negative information came from the [furnisher] 

defendant, and went directly to the [furnisher] defendant”); Phrasavang v. Deutsche Bank, 656 F. 

Supp. 2d 196, 203 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing for failure to state a claim where “plaintiff fails to 

allege that he notified any consumer reporting agency of the ‘wrongfully, improperly, and 

illegally reported negative information’ that he claims the [furnisher] defendants provided”); 
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Gibbs, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (“In the instant case, Gibbs has not alleged that he contacted any 

credit reporting agency or that the agency, in turn, got in touch with any of the [furnisher]

defendants. Under such circumstances, a complaint brought under § 2(b) should be dismissed.”).

Where a plaintiff pleads notice to the CRA, to also require an allegation that the CRA 

notified the furnisher seems overly formalistic. As other courts have noted, the “FCRA is not 

merely a complex statutory scheme, but one that has been said to contain almost 

incomprehensibly complex provisions and esoteric structures,” Narog, 759 F. Supp. 2d at 1195

(internal quotations omitted), such that “a layperson . . . could not possibly have been expected 

to comply” with its procedural requirements. Burrell v. DFS Servs., LLC, 753 F. Supp. 2d 438, 

440 (D.N.J. 2010). Plaintiff, nonetheless, not only appears to have “attempted to address the 

[problem] in a manner that most similarly-situated consumers would consider reasonable,” id., 

but has also successfully complied with the requirements of the statute by notifying the national 

credit bureaus of the dispute. 

In arguing that the case should be dismissed because Plaintiff alleged that he directly 

notified CPA, Defendant is asking the Court to ignore the above allegation that he also contacted 

the national credit bureaus. This latter assertion is the critical one. Under § 1681s-2(b), a 

furnisher’s duties to investigate disputes and correct erroneous information are triggered “[a]fter 

receiving notice pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title.” Id. (emphasis added). Section 

1681i(a)(2), moreover, requires that a CRA that receives notice from a consumer of a disputed 

debt “shall provide notification of the dispute to any [furnisher] . . . [including] all relevant 

information regarding the dispute” within “the 5-business-day period beginning” when the CRA 

receives such notice. As a result, the only allegation missing from Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint is that the national credit bureaus fulfilled their legal responsibility to notify CPA. 
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The Supreme Court, however, has held: “The law . . . [, however,] presumes that every man, in 

his private and official character, does his duty, until the contrary is proved; [and] it will presume 

that all things are rightly done, unless the circumstances of the case overturn this presumption. . . 

.” Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 25 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1827); see also Cincinnati, N. O. & T. 

P. Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U.S. 319, 327 (1916) (“It cannot be assumed, merely because the 

contrary has not been established by proof, that an interstate carrier is conducting its affairs in 

violation of law. Such a carrier must comply with strict requirements of the Federal statutes or 

become subject to heavy penalties, and . . . in respect of transactions in the ordinary course of 

business, . . . it is entitled to the presumption of right conduct.”). 

The Court can see no reason why, given that Plaintiff is entitled to “all inferences that can 

be derived” from the Complaint, he is not entitled to this long-held, fundamental presumption. 

While Defendant may certainly introduce evidence at summary judgment that shows such notice 

did not actually occur, at this stage the Court is bound to grant Plaintiff the presumption that the 

credit bureaus complied with the FCRA and in fact notified CPA of the disputed debt. This is 

particularly appropriate where Plaintiff could not independently know of such notification. See

Davis v. Trans Union LLC, 526 F. Supp. 2d 577, 585 (W.D.N.C. 2007) (“The Defendant, 

however, has not provided any authority, nor has the Court found any, to support the argument 

that a complaint is facially deficient under the FCRA if it fails to allege that a furnisher of credit 

information was contacted within five days of a credit reporting agency’s receiving notice of a 

consumer’s dispute. Without the benefit of discovery at the pleading stage of litigation, the 

Plaintiff would presumably lack the [requisite] knowledge of whether Defendant received notice 

within five days, and adopting such a burdensome requirement would be contrary to the goals of 

notice pleadings.”). At summary judgment, however, Plaintiff must prove that such notice 
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actually occurred. See, e.g., Markovskaya v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 

340, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting summary judgment for defendant where “[t]here [was] no 

evidence . . . that any such agency contacted [the furnisher defendant] directly with respect to 

Plaintiff’s account. Indeed, the evidence provided by [defendant was] completely to the 

contrary”); Davis v. Md. Bank, No. 00-04191, 2002 WL 32713429, at *16 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 

2002) (noting that CRA’s statutory obligation to inform furnisher of consumer complaint is 

insufficient to trigger presumption of notice at the summary-judgment stage); Aklagi v. 

Nationscredit Financial, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1193 & n.5 (D. Kan. 2002) (granting summary 

judgment to furnisher defendant because only admissible evidence was testimony on behalf of 

furnisher defendant that it had not received notice through the proper channel). 

While our Circuit has not weighed in on this dispute, the Court is in good company with 

other federal district courts in taking this approach and denying a motion to dismiss where there 

is no express allegation of notice from the CRA to the furnisher. See, e.g., DiMezza v. First 

USA Bank, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (D.N.M. 2000); Watson v. Trans Union Credit 

Bureau, No. 04-205, 2005 WL 995687, at *5 (D. Me. April 28, 2005) (permitting inference “that

the credit reporting agency was complying with the clear and rather simple mandate of the law”

and refusing to dismiss action “for want of a straw allegation [of communication between the 

CRA and the furnisher]”).

In fact, other federal district courts have gone even further, holding that an FCRA 

“[p]laintiff is not required to plead all elements of a prima facie case to avoid 12(b)(6) 

dismissal.” Carlson, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 520. For example, in Vasquez-Garcia v. Trans Union de 

Puerto Rico, 222 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.P.R. 2002), the plaintiff alleged that he had notified the 

CRA, but did not specifically plead that the CRA had complied with § 1681i(a)(2) and provided 
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notice of the dispute to the furnisher. Id. at 158. In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, 

the Court observed that when “information [regarding the CRA’s communications with the 

furnisher] is provided to plaintiff in discovery, it will become clear whether plaintiff will be able 

to adequately prove his claim . . . . At this stage, it . . . is not necessary, nor possible, for the 

court to decide . . . whether plaintiff will be able to establish sufficient proof for his claim.” Id.

at 158-59 (noting that while “plaintiff’s amended complaint does not constitute a paragon of a 

well pleaded complaint, . . . the Court has an obligation to read the pleadings liberally, [and] . . . 

finds that the amended pleadings contain assertions which, if found eventually to be true, 

sufficiently state a claim”). Because Plaintiff has alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face” – that is, he has pleaded facts that 

“allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged” – the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion as to Count IV and allow Plaintiff to proceed 

to discovery. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

B. Negligence Claim

Having determined that Plaintiff has pled a cause of action under the FCRA, the Court 

now turns to his negligence claim (Count III). CPA argues that this count must be dismissed as 

preempted by the FCRA, and the Court agrees.

“Federal law may preempt state law in three instances: (1) where Congress expressly 

indicates that the law is meant to preempt state law [i.e., express preemption]; 2) where federal 

law and state law conflict [i.e., conflict preemption]; and 3) where federal law occupies the entire 

legislative domain of an issue [i.e., field preemption].” Davenport v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 378 F.3d 

839, 842 (8th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted); see also Glade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. 

Assoc., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (describing three types of federal preemption). Of the three 
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forms of preemption, only the first is relevant here because the FCRA contains explicit 

preemptive language. In determining the scope of that preemptive language, the Court bears in 

mind that “[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 

U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 

1. FCRA Preemption Provisions

In this case, there are two statutory provisions to consider. The original 1970 enactment 

of the FCRA declined to generally preempt most companion state laws, but § 1681h(e) did 

expressly preempt a limited number of state common-law claims. It stated in relevant part: 

“[N]o consumer may bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of 

privacy, or negligence with respect to reporting of information against[, inter alia,] any . . . 

person who furnishes information to a [CRA] . . . except as to false information furnished with 

malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (emphasis added). In 

other words, certain common-law claims against furnishers of information were preempted 

unless a plaintiff met the heightened standard of malice or willfulness.

In 1996, however, Congress amended the FCRA to impose new duties upon furnishers 

such as CPA. See Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 

Stat. 3009 (1996). The 1996 amendment included a new preemption provision – Section 

1681t(b)(1)(F). The general preemption provision of § 1681t(b)(1)(F) was broader than the old § 

1681h(e): “No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State . . . with 

respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . [inter alia] section 1681s-2 of this title, . . . 

relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to [CRAs] . . . .” Id. Plaintiff, 

furthermore, does not contest that his negligence claim stems from conduct that § 1681s-2 
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regulates. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 53-57 (outlining CPA’s statutory duties under FCRA § 1681s-2 

and alleging that CPA was negligent for “breach[ing] each of these duties”).

While the earlier 1970 provision – which still remains in the FCRA – only preempts a 

narrow class of state common-law claims, the newer clause more broadly preempts “the laws of 

any State.” In addition, the malice/willfulness requirement does not exist in the new statute. 

Because the 1996 preemption section seems to swallow the 1970 one with respect to claims 

against furnishers, reconciling the two is no easy matter. See, e.g., Haynes v. Navy Fed. Credit 

Union, 825 F. Supp. 2d 285, 298 n.14 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Over the years, ‘courts have struggled to 

reconcile an apparent conflict between the two preemption provisions.’”) (citing Mark H. Tyson, 

State Law Furnisher Liability Claims and the FCRA – the State of Confusion, 63 Consumer Fin. 

L. Q. Rep. 19 (2009)). 

To decide the Motion, the Court must ultimately decide which provision applies. Since 

Plaintiff has pled willfulness, see Am. Compl., ¶ 69 (“CPA acted willfully and/or negligently in 

failing to comply with its duties under the [FCRA].”) (emphasis added), if the 1970 section 

governs, no preemption occurs; on the other hand, under the 1996 section, Plaintiff’s claim 

would be preempted.

2. FCRA Preemption Approaches

Although the D.C. Circuit has not yet had to resolve how the two FCRA preemption 

provisions apply to furnishers of information, other courts have employed at least three 

approaches in endeavoring to do so. Those approaches are commonly referred to as (1) the 

“temporal approach,” (2) the “statutory approach,” and (3) the “total approach.” Plaintiff urges 

the Court to adopt the statutory approach, and CPA argues for the Seventh Circuit’s version of 
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the total approach. See Mot. at 5-7; Rep. at 1-3; Opp. at 4-5. Although CPA’s argument 

ultimately carries the day, the Court believes it instructive to address all three approaches in turn.

a. Temporal Approach

Under the “temporal approach,” courts have reconciled the two statutory provisions by 

holding that the newer one only preempts state claims arising after a furnisher of information 

receives notice of a dispute, whereas the original provision only applies to claims prior to that 

notice. See, e.g. Vazquez-Garcia, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 161 (settling upon temporal approach to 

“avoid any construction that nullifies one section [of the FCRA] or causes it to be superfluous”); 

Aklagi, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1194-1196; Bank One, N.A. v. Colley, 294 F. Supp. 2d 864, 869 

(M.D. La. 2003). Some courts have criticized this approach – rightly, it would appear – as 

perversely affording “a furnisher of information more protection from exposure to liability for 

acts committed after receiving notice of dispute than for acts committed before such notice.” 

Johnson v. Citimortgage, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (citation omitted); 

see also Manno v. Am. Gen. Fin. Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 418, 429 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (same); 

Barnhill v. Bank of Am., N.A., 378 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702 (D.S.C. 2005). The FCRA, moreover, 

contains no clear textual language to support such a construction, and neither the parties nor any 

Circuit has endorsed it. The Court, therefore, also declines to adopt the temporal approach.

b. Statutory Approach

The statutory approach – argued for by Plaintiff – proposes a slightly more attractive 

construction. That theory holds that Congress intended the new FCRA provision’s preemption 

of “the laws of any state” to preempt only state statutes, but not state common law. See, e.g., 

Manno, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 429 (“[T]he statutory approach is the one most consistent with a close 

analysis of the statutory text and with the congressional intent underlying [the newer preemption 
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provision].”); Barnhill, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (implementing statutory approach and relying in 

part on “the canon requiring the specific statute to prevail over the general statute”); Johnson, 

351 F. Supp. 2d at 1376 (same). Were the Court to adopt the statutory approach, neither the 

1970 provision nor the 1996 one would preempt Plaintiff’s negligence count because his is a 

common-law claim and he has alleged willfulness. 

The Seventh Circuit in Purcell v. Bank of Am., 659 F. 3d 622 (7th Cir. 2011), however, 

underscored a notable defect with the statutory approach’s construction of the FCRA’s 

preemption provisions. There, the district court had held that Congress intended the word “laws” 

in the newer provision to preempt state statutes only, while “leaving claims based on state 

common law free to proceed.” Id. at 623. Overruling that interpretation, the Seventh Circuit 

stressed the uncanny similarity of the statutory approach’s interpretation of “laws” to the one 

long rejected by the Erie Doctrine. It explained: 

[T]he district court’s conclusion that the word “laws” in a federal 

statute refers to state statutes but not state common law produces a 

sense of déjà vu. This is how Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 16 (1842),

understood the word “laws” in the Rules of Decision Act . . . . But 

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruled Swift and 

held that a reference to state “laws” comprises all sources of legal 

rules, including judicial opinions. It is hard to see why the 

judiciary should again tread Swift’s path. Many modern decisions 

about preemption follow Erie and hold that a federal statute 

preempts state common law to the same extent as it preempts state 

statutory law.

Id. at 623-24. The Seventh Circuit, additionally, responded to many courts’ reliance upon the 

specific-over-general canon of statutory construction in their adoption of the statutory approach, 

explaining, 

[I]t can be hard to determine which [preemption provision] is more 

specific . . . . [E]ach statute is more specific in one respect and 

more general in another. The specific-over-general canon . . . does 
17

not offer a good reason to depart from the norm that courts do not 

read old statutes to defeat the operation of newer ones.

Id. at 626.

Congress, moreover, could have specifically signaled with explicit language that the new 

preemption provision only referred to state statutory law if that had been its intent, but it declined 

to do so. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that the use of the introductory phrase “no 

requirement or prohibition” in the preemption provision of another federal statute – the precise 

language employed by § 1681(b)(1)(f) – telegraphed Congress’s intent to preempt all laws, not 

just statutory law. See Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (statute’s use 

of phrase “‘[n]o requirement or prohibition’ . . . sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction 

between positive enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass 

obligations that take the form of common-law rules”). While the statutory approach holds more 

appeal than the temporal one, it likewise possesses defects that render the Court wary of adopting 

it.

c. Total Approach

Under the total approach – argued for by CPA – courts have held that the new preemption 

provision preempts all related state-law causes of action against furnishers, even willful 

violations of state common law. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 155 F. 

Supp. 2d 356, 362 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that new preemption provision “clearly eliminated 

all state causes of action against furnishers of information, not just ones that stem from statutes 

that relate specifically to credit reporting”); Hasvold v. First USA Bank, N.A., 194 F. Supp. 2d 

1228, 1234 (D. Wyo. 2002) (same). At least one opinion in this District appears to endorse the 

approach. See Adams v. Martinsville Dupont Credit Union, 573 F. Supp. 2d 103, 118 (D.D.C. 
18

2008) (defamation claim against furnisher preempted by FCRA even though complaint alleged 

“malice and/or willful intent to injure”). 

Courts that have rejected the total approach often stress that it judicially “repeals” the 

earlier preemption provision in spite of Congress’s decision to retain it in the FCRA. See

Manno, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (“Repeals by implication are not favored. In the absence of a

clear and manifest legislative intent to repeal, statutes that appear to conflict must be read, if 

possible, to give effect to each.”) (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981)); Johnson, 

351 F. Supp. 2d at 1374 (“[T]o imply Congress’s intent to repeal a previously existing provision 

in the statute without a clear statement in the amendment to that effect is an unwieldy act of 

legislation that this court ought not and will not undertake.”).

The Seventh Circuit in Purcell, however, addressed the “repeal by implication” critique. 

There, the Seventh Circuit rejected “any inconsistency between the two statutes.” 659 F.3d at 

625. Rather, it reasoned,

Section 1681h(e) preempts some state claims that could arise out 

of reports to credit agencies; § 1681t(b)(1)(F) preempts more of 

these claims. Section 1681h(e) does not create a right to recover 

for willfully false reports; it just says that a particular paragraph 

does not preempt claims of that stripe . . . . The extra federal 

remedy in § 1681s-2 was accompanied by extra preemption in § 

1681(b)(1)(F), in order to implement the new plan under which 

reporting to credit agencies would be supervised by state and 

federal administrative agencies rather than judges. Reading the 

earlier statute . . . to defeat the later-enacted system . . . would 

contradict fundamental norms of statutory interpretation.

Our point is not that § 1681t(b)(1)(F) repeals § 1681h(e) by 

implication. It is that the statutes are compatible: the first-enacted 

statute preempts some state regulation of reports to credit agencies, 

and the second-enacted statute preempts more . . . . This 

understanding does not vitiate the final words of § 1681h(e), 

because there are exceptions to § 1681t(b)(1)(F). When it drops 

out, § 1681h(e) remains. But even if our understanding creates 
19

some surplusage, courts must do what is essential if the more 

recent enactment is to operate as designed.

Id. (emphasis in original). The Second Circuit, moreover, subsequently adopted that reasoning. 

See Macpherson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 665 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 

operative language in [the earlier] § 1681h(e) provides only that the provision does not preempt a 

certain narrow class of state law claims; it does not prevent the later-enacted § 1681t(b)(1)(F) 

from accomplishing a more broadly-sweeping preemption.”) (citing Purcell, 659 F. 3d at 625). 

This Court ultimately finds the reasoning set forth in Purcell and Macpherson persuasive. 

While the Court acknowledges that a handful of district judges in other circuits still appear to 

apply the statutory approach, none of those opinions directly renounces – or even mentions – the 

recent decisions of the Seventh and Second Circuits. Those two decisions are, furthermore, 

almost the only Circuit decisions to engage in a detailed analysis of the issue, they are the most 

recent ones, and their discussion convinces the Court.

In resisting this outcome, Plaintiff cites cases that interpret statutes other than the FCRA, 

including multiple cases from the D.C. Court of Appeals. See Opp. at 5. As correctly noted by 

CPA, “When interpreting a federal statute, federal courts apply the federal standards of 

construction, not those applied by state courts.” Rep. at 2; see also Miss. Band of Choctaw 

Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989) (“[T]he meaning of a federal statute is necessarily a 

federal question . . . [that] remains subject to [The Supreme] Court’s supervision . . . .”); Charvat 

v. GVN Mich., Inc., 561 F.3d 623, 630 n.6 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The issue before us is the 

interpretation of a federal statute. We therefore are not bound by decisions of the state courts . . . 

interpreting the federal [statute].”); Stein v. Paradigm Mirasol, LLC, 586 F.3d 849, 854 (11th 

Cir. 2009) (interpretation of federal statute “is a matter of federal law” subject to “principles of 

statutory interpretation from federal decisions”). The one D.C. Circuit case cited by Plaintiff, 
20

Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), moreover, is inapposite since it concerns 

a federal workers’ compensation statute. Plaintiff’s non-FCRA cases, consequently, do not 

persuade the Court to deviate from the Seventh Circuit’s sound approach to interpreting the 

FCRA’s preemption provisions. 

Because Plaintiff’s negligence claim against CPA is premised solely upon conduct that § 

1681s-2 directly regulates, and the FCRA expressly preempts state causes of action arising from 

that conduct, the Court will dismiss Count III.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will issue a contemporaneous Order this day denying 

CPA’s Motion to Dismiss as to Count IV and granting the Motion as to Count III. 

 /s/ James E. Boasberg 

 JAMES E. BOASBERG

 United States District Judge

Date: March 20, 2013