UNISPACE '82: A Context for International

Cooperation and Competition

March 1983

NTIS order #PB83-201848
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 83-600520

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
——— ——.—

Preface

Because of concern over the potential adverse effects that UNISPACE ’82 might

have on U.S. interests in outer space, particularly for the U.S. private sector, the House

Committee on Science and Technology and the Joint Economic Committee requested

a post-conference review of UNISPACE ’82. This technical memorandum constitutes

a portion of a major assessment of international cooperation and competition in civilian

space activities that was requested by these same committees.

UNISPACE ’82, the United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful

Uses of Outer Space, demonstrated that the role of the United States in international

space affairs is presently in a stage of transition. The developing world continues to

press for access to technological and physical space resources, while our allies and other

developed countries now compete for the sale of space technologies heretofore only offered by the United States. As this technical memorandum points out, to use the opportunities that conferences such as UNISPACE ’82 present, the United States will have

to be better prepared, including formulating a coherent set of long-term domestic policy

goals for space. OTA hopes that this technical memorandum will facilitate discussion

of ways the Nation can prepare for similar conferences in the future.

A prepublication draft of this technical memorandum was released to the public

by the House Committee on Science and Technology for a hearing by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 22, 1983. Relevant events that occurred in the ensuing month are not reflected in this document.

In undertaking this study, OTA sought the contributions of several agencies and

a wide spectrum of knowledgeable and interested individuals. More than 75 persons

(many of whom are listed in app. K) contributed to this technical memorandum, either

to provide data or to review early drafts. OTA gratefully acknowledges their help. We

are particularly grateful to our workshop participants. Finally, OTA appreciates the

assistance that the Congressional Research Service, the Department of State, the Federal Communications

tion rendered in this

Commission,

project.

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-

. .

i l l
Advisory Panel International Cooperation and Competition in Space

Paul Doty, Chairman

Center for Science and lnternational Affairs

Harvard University

Benjamin Bova

Author

Robert Evans

Vice President

IBM Corp.

Robert Frosch

Vice President

General Motors Research Laboratories

Ivan Getting

Consultant

Mireille Gerard

Administrator, Corporate & Public Programs

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

Benjamin Huberman

Consultants lnternational Group Inc.

Walter McDougall

History Department

University of California, Berkeley

John Mayo

Vice President

Bell Laboratories

John L. McLucas

President

COMSAT World Systems Division

Martin Menter

Brigadier General (Ret. )

Arthur Morrissey

Manager, Strategic Market Assessment

Martin Marietta Aerospace

Fred Raynes

Vice President

Grumman International Inc.

Gary Saxonhouse

Department of Economics

University of Michigan

Jerome Simonoff

Vice President

CitiCorp Industrial Cedit, Inc.

Leonard Sussman

Executive Director

Freedom House

John Townsend

President

Fairchild Space and Electronics Co.

Laurel Wilkening

Director

Lunar and Planetary Laboratory

University of Arizona

Elizabeth Young

President

Public Service Satellite Consortium

NOTE: The advisory panel provided advice and critique, but does not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this techn

memorandum for which OTA assumes full responsibility.

iv
OTA UNISPACE ’82 Project Staff

Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and International Security Division

Peter Sharfman, Program Manager

lnternational Security and Commerce Program

Ray A. Williamson, Project Director

Richard DalBello Thomas H. Karas*

Jane N. Hurd* Gordon Law

Adam Wasserman

contractor s

Burt CowIan Eilene Galloway

Lee Love

Administrative Staff

Jannie Coles Helena Hassell

Dorothy Richroath Jackie Robinson

)TA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

Doreen Foster Donna Young

*OTA Contractor.

v
Workshop on UNISPACE ’82: Participants

This workshop was held at OTA on November 30, 1982. OTA appreciates the help and advice of

these workshop participants. OTA assumes full responsibility for its report, which does not necessarily

represent the views of individual members of this workshop.

Bert Cowlan

International Communications Consultants

Russell Drew

Science and Technology Consultants

Wolfram Drewes

World Bank

Resource Planning Unit

Agriculture and Rural Development Department

Eilene Galloway

Vice President

International Institute of Space Law

Jerry Grey

Publisher

Aeronautics and Astronautics

Martin Menter

Brigadier General (Retired)

Kenneth Pederson (observer)

Director of International Affairs

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Headquarters

Irwin Pikus (Chairman)

National Science Foundation

Charles Schmidt

General Manager and Vice President

RCA Astro Electronics

Ambassador Jean Wilkowski

President

Volunteer International Technical Assistance

vi
Contents

Chapter Page

l. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

The United States at UNISPACE ’82..... 4

Major Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

The Aftermath of UNISPACE ’82 . . . . . . . 8

,The International Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Space Applications Technology and the

International Community. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

U.S. Space Technology and International

Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Space Technology and International

Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

The International Regime for

Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

The Political Context for Outer Space . . . 22

Militarization of Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Origins of the Conference and U.S.

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The 1968 Conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

UNISPACE ’82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

U.S. Preparation for the Conference . . . . . 33

The Issues Negotiated.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Militarization of Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Direct Broadcasting by Satellite . . . . . . . . . 38

Remote Sensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Geostationary Orbit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Transfer of Technology and the Role

of the U.N. in Space Affairs . . . . . . . . . . 44

UNISPACE ’82 in Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

International Space Policy and the U.N. . 49

The Use of Initiatives at UNISPACE ’82. . 52

Foreign Policy and the NASA/State

Department Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . S3

Role of the Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S4

Page

Appendixes

A. The “Militarization” Issue at

UNISPACE ’82 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

B. NASA’s Approach to International

Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

C. Intergovernmental Meeting of Space

Technology Experts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

D. Report on UNISPACE’82, the

United Nations Conference on the

Exploration and Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

E. U.S. Delegation to the Second U.N.

Conference on the Peaceful Uses

of Outer Space... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

F. Attendance at the Conference . . . . . . . . . . 77

G. Text Resulting From the Consultations

of the ’’Friends of the President’’ . . . . . . . . 79

H. Proposal Submitted by Mexico on

Behalf of the Group of 77 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

I. Declaration of the Group of 77 . . . . . . . . 81

J. Formal Agenda of the Conference . . . . . . 83

K. Additional Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

L. Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

List of Tables

Table Page

l. Current Membership of COPUOS . . . . . . . . . 20

2. The Members of the ’’Group of 77,”

Fall 1980. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

List of Figures

Figure Page

1. Patterns of Global Outer Space Activities.. 19

2.U.N. Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

v i i
Chapter 1

Summary
Chapter 1

Summary

OVERVIEW

In August 1982, delegates from 94 countries and

several specialized agencies met in Vienna, Austria

o discuss the state of space technology, its potenial, and the political issues that derive from using

t. Because of their interest in the lessons that

night be drawn from U.S. participation in

JNISPACE ’82, and concern over U.S. leadership

n space, the Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives, and the

oint Economic Committee asked the Office of

technology Assessment (OTA) to prepare this

echnical memorandum on UNISPACE ’82 and

elated issues, It was undertaken as part of a major

ssessment of international cooperation and competition in civilian space activities requested by

hese same committees.

Although UNISPACE ’82 was primarily a techical conference centered around space technolCONTEXT

Over the last quarter century, the United States

as been the leader in developing space technolgy and in exploring outer space. It has played

significant role in establishing the international

gal regime to promote the use of outer space for

peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all counies, irrespective of their economic status and

leir degree of scientific and technical development. Through a program of bilateral and multiteral agreements for science and applications,

the United States has also led in helping other nasns develop their own abilities to reap the benits of using outer space.

During the last decade, however, the diplomatic

and technological context for space activities has

Canged, in part because of the very success of

.S. international programs. Today, the U.S.

~dership role in international markets and ormizations is challenged.l Initially aided by the

ogy, the fact that it was organized by the United

Nations (U. N.) and involved 94 countries meant

that political issues related to space technology

constituted an implicit part of the agenda.

UNISPACE ’82 itself is unlikely to have a significant direct effect on the long-term space goals or

strategies of the United States. Nevertheless, it offered a window through which to view the development of international space policy, the roles

that the United States and its agencies play in this

process, and the potential effect of the process on

U.S. public and private interests. In each of these

related areas, the United States experienced some

successes and some failures; from each it can derive certain important lessons of use to Congress.

United States, the Europeans and the Japanese

now provide stiff commercial competition in specific space technologies. At the same time, some

developing nations have focused on using space

technology as a means to greater economic

growth, and have demanded a greater voice in

its use. Since the United States has had and wishes

to continue its leadership role in space, it is important to understand the lessons of UNISPACE

’82, and how the United States might make better use of international fora to achieve its

diplomatic, commercial, and technical ends. This

technical memorandum is limited to discussing

these matters in the context of UNISPACE ’82.

Policy options for dealing with many of the issues

developed herein will be explored in the forthcoming OTA assessment, international cooperation

and competition in civilian space activities.

Civifian Space Policy and Applkations, (Washington, D. C.: U.S.

ngress, Office of Technology Assessment, June 1982), OTA1-144,

3
4

THE CONFERENCE

Cooperation in space for peaceful purposes was

the major theme of UNISPACE ’82. Because outer

space is by nature and treaty an international

realm, what one country does in outer space is

necessarily of interest, and perhaps a source of

worry, to another.

Although the primary focus of UNISPACE ’82

was on cooperation, competition between nations

for commercial markets and/or political prestige

also played a background role. Some of our

military allies, most notably Japan and those in

Europe, are rapidly building space industries independent of our own. Their emergence as competitors in the exploitation of outer space may

result in their also developing political and

economic agendas on space that differ in important respects from those of the United States.

For several reasons the United States had been

reluctant to participate in UNISPACE ’82, ever

since a conference was first proposed in 197’4;

nevertheless, the United States began to prepare

for the conference. However, a major dispute with

the Soviets over the succession of a U.S. citizen

to Chief of the U.N. Outer Space Affairs Division (OSAD) in the spring of 1981 caused the

United States to cease most of its UNISPACE ’82

activities and threaten to withdraw from the conference. Until this issue was finally resolved on

December 28, 1981, the United States took little

part in preparing for UNISPACE ’82. It slowed

work on its national paper, declined to nominate

a UNISPACE ’82 Deputy Secretary-General, and

allocated no funding for an exhibit or most other

related conference expenditures. After reaching

agreement about the personnel issue and resuming its preparations for the conference in January

1982, the United States had only 7 months to complete its arrangements and to name a delegation.

The primary tangible output of UNISPACE ’82

was a 43¶graph conference report. It was

first submitted in draft by the UNISPACE ’82

secretariat in January 1982 and amended in two

preparatory meetings of the U.N. Committee or

the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) ir

January and March. By the time of the conference

the wording of all but 15 paragraphs, containing

the most controversial issues, had been agreed to

through the consensus procedures of COPUOS

Although they had the option of submitting any

unresolved issue to a vote, the delegates if

UNISPACE ’82 agreed to a consensus procedure

like that followed in COPUOS. During the con

ference, agreement was reached on all 15 disputet

paragraphs. In some respects, however, agree

ment on the text of the conference report was de

ceptive since it merely left the most importan

issues* to be resolved at a later date at COPUO!

or the U.N. General Assembly.

● See section on “Major Issues” below.

THE UNITED STATES AT UNISPACE ’82

The United States had much to gain by participating in UNISPACE ’82. The conference offered

the United States the opportunity to explain its

positions on the use of outer space and influence

those of other countries, as it simultaneously

gained insight into the interests and concerns of

others. However, the preparation and participation at the conference reflected the U.S. approach

to other U.N. conferences. The United States has

been generally reluctant to concede that its interests can be promoted or seriously jeopardized

at such conferences. It approached the UNISPACE

82 warily and attended primarily to “limit th

damage” that UNISPACE ’82 could cause to U.:

interests.

● Conference Preparation. Although for about I

months the United States pursued little form;

preparation for UNISPACE ’82, the Unite

States had developed and established its pos

tions on many of the crucial issues over tl

years. In Janurary 1982, the National Aeronal

tics and Space Administration (NASA) assumt

an unofficial coordinating role until the Sta
5

Department was able to establish a special coordinator’s office. The State Department named

Ambassador Gerald Helman as Special Coordinator for UNISPACE ’82 in mid-March 1982.

NASA Administrator James Beggs was named

Head of the U.S. Delegation in June. The White

House announced the selection of the rest of

the delegation in late July, less than 2 weeks

before UNISPACE ’82.

The United States participated in the January

1982 and March-April 1982 COPUOS preconference meetings where it was able to modify

the UNISPACE ’82 draft report to accommodate U.S. interests. Unfortunately, partly because of the hiatus in conference preparation,

the U.S. delegation was unable to use the full

range of outside advisers (e. g., Members of

Congress, citizens advisory groups, key persons

in the industry, etc. ) to assist in forming U.S.

positions.

In preparing for the conference, each nation

contributed a “Country Paper” describing its

current use of and projected needs for space

technology. Although the U.S. Country Paper

discussed many U.S. achievements, it does not

reflect the full range and scope of the U.S. space

program, including private involvement in

space activities. Nor does it emphasize the full

range and depth of good and useful cooperative

projects that the United States has entered into

with other countries.

Conference Participation. With support from

both allies and friends, the U.S. delegation was

highly effective in preventing most wording inimical to U.S. interests from appearing in the

conference report. It was less effective in using

the conference to further U.S. interests in outer

space.

The United States has had a longstanding

problem of participating effectively at the U.N.

and in its related organizations. U.N. conferences are more often perceived as experiences

to be tolerated rather than opportunities to influence other countries. To use the opportunities inherent in international conferences

more effectively will require a change in U.S.

~ttitude toward them. Specifically, it will require better preparation, especially for private

iector delegates and advisors, and an emphasis

m long-term planning.

●

●

●

U.S. Private Sector. The U.S. private sector has

played and will continue to play a major role

in the development of space technology and

managenlent of space systems. It is therefore

important that the U.S. Government work diligently to take into full account the interests of

the private sector in international meetings such

as UNISPACE ’82. Private sector advisors, with

their valuable technical, organizational, and

negotiating skills, can assist delegations by

working out innovative positions and gathering international support for these positions.

Because the private sector advisors and delegates were selected less than 2 weeks before the

conference, there was little time to brief them

about the many complex issues to be discussed

in Vienna. As a result, some private sector

members of the delegation were not well employed at UNISPACE ’82; they were underused

and given little direction. As the number and

type of private sector space activities increase,

it will be desirable to involve the private sector on a continuing basis in space related diplomacy, and arrange for private sector participation in the early and middle stages of conference

preparation.

The U.S. Exhibit. Initially, the private sector

was reluctant to exhibit at UNISPACE ’82 because firms had not budgeted for it and because

their preparation time was highly constrained.

This reluctance was overcome by Administration urging and assurances that the Government

would support the companies logistically, politically, and materially. In spite of the short

preparation time, the firms put on an excellent

exhibition.

Congressional Involvement. Because of its

responsibilit y for oversight, the Congress has

a longstanding interest in the preparation and

conduct of U.S. delegations at international

conferences and the results they obtain. Both

the House Committee on Science and Technology and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings on U.S. preparation for

UNISPACE ’82. In addition, several members

of the House of Representatives attended parts

of the conference. The hearings revealed that

preconference coordination between the rele-
6

vant congressional committees, NASA, and the

State Department could have been improved.

Many of the concerns expressed by Members

during the hearings regarding the U.S. positions

and preparations for UNISPACE ’82 might

have been allayed had they been kept better

informed.

U.S. Initiatives. In spite of the relatively limited

time available for the task, the United States

prepared several proposals designed to encourage international multilateral cooperation in

space. Although it was the only country to offer such proposals, the lack of preparation time

and the reluctance of the conference secretariat

to help the U.S. delegation, prevented the proposals from gaining wide exposure at UNISPACE

’82.

MAJOR ISSUES

The issues discussed at UNISPACE ’82 were not

unique to this conference. Nor are they unique

to discussions of the potential benefits and drawbacks of employing space technology. In fact,

nearly all of the most important disagreements

have been debated within the specialized agencies

and committees of the U.N. since the beginning

of the space age. Some of them are directly related

to the applications of specific technology or specific systems. Others are more broadly defined

and relate to major international economic and

political concerns.

Economic and Political Concerns

● Economic needs of developing countries. The

discussion at UNISPACE ’82 demonstrated that

the developing countries of the world not only

desire a greater share of the benefits of space

systems and services but are willing and able

to apply considerable pressure on the industrialized countries to institutionalize the means

of transferring space technology and operating

skills. However, the conference made no decisions about the most effective means of accomplishing such transfer. In particular, the idea

of establishing a U.N. Centre for Outer Space,

which had been proposed (and widely supSince the conference the United States has

followed through on one of its proposals by

holding a 2-day Intergovernmental Meeting of

Space Technology Experts in February 1983 (se~

app. C). The meeting, the first of its kind, was

attended by about 100 participants from 4C

countries and international organizations,

about 15 developing countries were repre”

sented. Another proposal, a worldwide study

of global habitability, continues to be discussed

and planned in the United States; a third pro

posal, a satellite communications managemen

seminar, sponsored by Hughes Aircraft uncle

the auspices of the U.S. Telecommunication

Training Institute, is scheduled for later thi

year.

ported by a majority of members during th

preparatory meetings) to serve the training an

information needs of the developing worlc

was, with little discussion, referred back to the

General Assembly. This occurred after the

Soviets applied considerable pressure on some

developing countries to withdraw their supper

Although the United States and most other

Western nations did not oppose the Centre

neither did they wish to add to the operatir

expenses of the U.N. In general, the United

States would prefer to handle most cases

technology transfer through bilateral or limitt

multilateral agreements because these agre

ments make it possible for the United States

match mutual needs more effectively (see ap

B).

Also at stake at UNISPACE ’82 were issued

not on the agenda, related to the so-called N~

International Economic Order (NIEO) and t

New World Information Order (NWIO), po

tions championed by many nations that ha

banded together in a loose coalition called t

“Group of 77 (G-77 ).” Many of these countr

also support the adoption of principles, whi

did appear on the agenda, that guarantee eq

table access to space resources (e.g., the geos

tionary orbit and any material resources su
—..—.——— —

7

as the Moon or other celestial bodies) and protect the sovereign rights of nations through

prior consent regimes. The conference report

reflects part of their position by asserting in

paragraph 11:

The international community, and in particular the developed countries with more advanced technology should intensify their efforts

to promote the wider exploitation of space

technology by developing countries.

I Militarization of Outer Space. This was the most

controversial issue raised at UNISPACE ’82. In

the opening days of the conference, 90 out of

94 delegations, * representing the entire spectrum of international political orientation,

voiced general concern about the increased use

of space for military purposes. Most countries

are deeply worried about the potential damage

of an arms race in space. Although the United

States attempted to limit the debate on the

grounds that the militarization issue should be

discussed in the U.N. Committee on Disarmament, it failed to keep the issue from surfacing

time and again. Events at UNISPACE ’82 demonstrated that the United States has yet to

develop an effective long-term strategy for responding to international concern about the

militarization of outer space.

By contrast, the Soviet Union has positioned

itself well by appearing to be more responsive

to international apprehensions about militarization of space. Unless the United States undertakes to negotiate about limiting weapons in or

for space, it will be in a poor debating position on the issue. “Stonewalling” to avoid discussing militarization, the tactic the United

States used at UNISPACE ’82, may then be its

only practical short-term damage-limiting option.

Private Enterprise in Space. Because the role of

private industry varies among nations, some

confusion and suspicion exists over its future

part in outer space. Although it was never a

subject of debate, the rights and roles of private

firms in outer space were implicit questions in

many issues that surfaced at UNISPACE ’82.

The United States did not mention the issue in its opening state-

‘It .

Many developing countries, along with the

Soviet Union, have attempted to inhibit private

enterprise in space by proposing severely restrictive international regulation. Use of private

direct broadcast satellites (DBS) and 1and remote-sensing satellites will continue to generate

considerable concern among many nations and

lead to continued attempts to subject such

operations to internationally formulated governing principles.

Technology= Specific Issues

The use of satellites for communications and

land remote sensing raise crucial issues about the

flow and control of information within and across

national borders. Although some developing

countries at UNISPACE ’82 argued for international regimes to manage the operation of DBS

and land remote sensing by satellites, they were

unsuccessful. Even so, the United States can expect continued attempts within the U.N. and its

associated agencies to limit the free flow of information. The United States will need long-term as

well as short-term strategies for meeting these

challenges.

Satellite Communications

● Geostationary Orbit (GSO). Three potential

problems exist: future overcrowding of parts

of the orbit, frequency congestion (also related

to orbit overcrowding), and claims of sovereignty by the equatorial nations.

Developing countries raised the issues of possible overcrowding of the orbit and frequency

spectrum, and lobbied hard for a priori allotments based on the principle of the equitable

use of the orbit.

With the exception of that portion of the

GSO over the Western Hemisphere, there appears to be little pressure on 6/4 GHz positions

at the present time. The United States opposes

efforts to allot slots in the orbit or frequencies

prior to an expressed intention for actual use

on the grounds that future technological advances will solve overcrowding problems. The

history of technological advances in satellite

communications supports the U.S. position.

In the 1976 Bogota Declaration, several equatorial countries claimed sovereignty over the
8

GSO, but their claims have been rejected by

most other countries. The support that some

developing countries give the equatorial claims

are inconsistent with their espousal of the principle of global shared use of the GSO. The conference report (par. 281) mentions the equatorial’ claims without supporting them. These

equatorial countries can be expected to continue

to try to use the issue for political leverage in

other international meetings.

● Direct Broadcasting Satellites. The use of DBS

to deliver television programs directly to individual home or village receivers constitutes a

powerful medium for providing news, entertainment, education, health care information,

and other services to isolated areas. On the

other hand, many countries, developing and industrialized alike, recognize the potential DBS

has to impose foreign values on a society.

Some of these countries have expressed strong

interest in regulating its use. Although no decision on this issue was reached at UNISPACE

’82, in November 1982 members of the U.N.

Special Political Committee voted to refer the

matter to the General Assembly. In December

1982, the General Assembly adopted the set of

principles proposed by the Special Political

Committee. Though not legally binding, these

principles reflect the majority international

opinion on DBS. The resolution notes that “access to the technology should be available to

all States without discrimination , . .“ and call

for “consultation and agreement between state

before establishing an international DBS

service. ”

Land Remote Sensing

Since the first use of military remote-sensin

satellites by the United States and the Soviet

Union in the early 1960’s, some nations have ques

tioned the right of a country to acquire image

of another country and the further right to dis

seminate such data to a third party. Durin

UNISPACE ’82, countries belonging to the G-7

reiterated their concern over these issues. The

were successful in retaining wording in the cor

ference report which stated:

The sensed State shall have timely and non-discriminatory access under reasonable conditions

to the primary data obtained by remote

sensing . . .

At the same time, these countries wish the United

States to maintain a continuous data flow fro

the Landsat system, and attempted to u

UNISPACE ’82 to pressure the United States

make such a commitment. It is clear that remet

sensing issues will be of growing concern, as high

ground resolution (30 m or less) satellites a

preach operational status.

THE AFTERMATH OF UNISPACE ’82

Although UNISPACE ’82 had no power to enact laws or regulations, it was a forum for discussion and expression of competing interests. It was

also a meeting in which individuals interacted,

friendships were formed, and critical first impressions and prejudices were established. Past U.S.

achievements in space and international cooperative ventures have created good will that could

be used to lessen the conflict over issues where

the United States differs from other nations, particularly with some members of the G-77. Unfortunately, the absence of long-term domestic policy

goals for space, the difficulties of coordinating

strategies among U.S. agencies, and in the specific

case of UNISPACE ’82, the abbreviated preparation time, have prevented the United States from

taking the maximum diplomatic advantage of

space program and using space technology as

tool of foreign policy. Moreover, the United States

has allowed itself to become isolated on the m

tary and DBS issues, and its tactics regarding {

militarization issue at UNISPACE ’82 may ~

have been overly strident. This is particularly c

tressing, because space technology is one area

which the United States has an exemplary rec(

in “north-south” relations. It is potentially an a

where U.S. /developing country agreements,

rived at through equitable negotiation, could

of substantial scientific and economic advant,

to all parties.
9

Continued opposition to U.S. policies by the

developing nations could also have a direct effect

on U.S. domestic interests. Concern is high over

the issue of prior consent for remote sensing and

DBS. Actions in the U.N. General Assembly or

one of the related organizations could have a

direct effect on the development of a U.S. industry

in either of these fields. Developing country activities at the International Telecommunication

Union also potentially threaten the large and

growing U.S. communications industry. Political

restrictions on the free flow of information affect

not only the communications industry but could

also affect the computer industry.

UNISPACE ’82 was not the cause of any of

these problems; it merely illuminates their existence and the necessity for solutions. By its continued and sometimes unnecessary opposition to

developing country demands the United States has

helped to polarize the international environment.

This polarization works to the net disadvantage

of the United States.

18-780 0 - 83 - 3
Chapter 2

The International Environment
Chapter 2

The International Environment

INTRODUCTION

From August 9 to 21, 1982, 94 nations met in

Vienna r Austria at the U.N. Conference on the

Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

UNISPACE ’82) to discuss the state of space technology and its future use for the countries of the

world, particularly the developing countries.

UNISPACE ’82, the second such conference ever

held, offered the attending delegations an opportunity to see exhibits illustrating the uses of space

echnology, and discuss the potential benefits it

holds for their countries. It also constituted a

orum to raise for general discusson some of the

‘rucial international political, social, and economic questions that the use of space technology

engenders.

For the United States, UNISPACE ’82 offered

an opportunit y to demonstrate its master y o f

space technology, explain its interests, and influence other countries while gaining insight into

their interests and concerns. How did the United

States respond to the challenge presented b y

UNISPACE ’82? What is the importance of the

conference to the future exploitation of outer

space? Will positions taken or stated at this conference affect other international conferences dealPhoto credit International Telecommunication Vn)on

iolar. Powered Earth Station — A key to effective rural communications systems is smal 1, low-cost Earth stat i ons. One sol ut ion

/hic h IS being explored by the U.S. Rural Satellite Program is the use of solar panels to power satellite ground stations,

Pictured here is a prototype system that was demonstrated in Vienna at UN ISPACE ’82

13
14

ing with science and technology? How can the

United States make the best use of the lessons of

UNISPACE ’82 to enhance its commerce with

other countries?

It is within the context of these questions that

the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) prepared this technical memorandum; it was requested by the Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House of Representatives and

the Joint Economic Committee. The memorandum is part of a forthcoming major assessment

of international cooperation and competition in

civilian space activities that was requested by

these same committees.

UNISPACE ’82 illustrated the fact that we now

accept access to, and the use of, space technologies as relatively routine. In the 25 years since the

Soviet Union and the United States began the

space age, several additional countries have

created vital, expanding space programs. Some

150 countries are now direct or indirect users of

commercial space systems. This is a major change

in the context of the use of outer space since the

first conference on the Exploration Peaceful Uses

of Outer Space and was held in 1968. While the

primary focus of UNISPACE ’82 was to consider

the present and future state of space science, space

technology, applications for economic and social

development, and cooperative programs, competition by nations for commercial markets and/or

political prestige played an important role at both

the conference and in the preparations countries

made for it.

The lessons of UNISPACE ’82 are of particular

interest for the United States. As an OTA report

on the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC ‘79)1 stated: “it is highly unlikely that

‘Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World

Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 (Washington, D. C.: U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, January 1982), OTACIT-163, p. 4.

traditional U.S. approaches to these issues (radiofrequency spectrum management in an international forum) will be sufficient to protect U.S.

vital interests in the future. ” This report could

make the same statement.

The issues that surfaced in connection with

UNISPACE ’82 are increasingly evident at other

multinational technological conferences. UNISPACE

’82 corroborated that significant long-term political trends in communication and space technologies are developing which are inconsistent with

presently articulated U.S. interests. The United

States must find the means to participate more

effectively at similar technological conferences.

Not to do so will leave it increasingly isolated

from the rest of the world body politic.

In order to collect the data for this report, OTA

staff attended the March/April meetings of the

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Spac~

(cOpUOS), and the August meeting of UNISPACE

’82 itself. It also interviewed more than 75 expert:

on some facet or other of the issues raised b}

UNISPACE ’82. These included U.S. Governmen

officials, representatives of the aerospace anc

communications industry, members of foreigr

governments, and other private citizens. In ad

dition, 70 people from other countries were pollef

on their views of UNISPACE ’82. Additional in

formation was supplied by contractors and by ,

workshop on UNISPACE ’82 held at OTA, No

vember 30, 1982.

Although planned as a scientific and technicz

conference, UNISPACE ’82 also provided the OF

portunity for nations to examine the politica”

economic, regulatory, and military aspects c

space technology, In order to understand mor

clearly the issues and the conflicts that arose dul

ing the conference, it is useful to examine the ir

ternational environment in which UNISPACE 8~

took place.

SPACE APPLICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND THE

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Since the inception of spaceflight 25 years ago developed and maintained large and varied pr

there have been only two full-scale space powers, grams for civilian and military uses of outer spac

the United States and the Soviet Union. Each has However, during the last decade additional cou
15

tries have started their own space programs and

others have begun to rely more on space-based

services:

France and Japan, have expanding national

programs that include space transportation,

communications, remote sensing, meteorology, and space science systems. Much

French research on space has been conducted

within the European Space Agency (ESA).

Canada, Great Britain, and West Germany,

and other European countries have individual

programs and also contribute to bilateral and

multilateral ventures. Except for Canada,

these are carried out primarily through the

ESA.

India, Brazil, and China, newly industrializing countries, have relatively advanced space

programs that aim to generate a variety of

indigenous space industries and services.

A growing number of countries and regional

associations have, or plan, satellite communications systems; these include Indonesia

(Palapa A&B), India (Insat), the Middle East

(Arabsat), Brazil (Brasilsat), Mexico (Ilhuicahau), Australia (Australsat), and Colombia (Satcol).

Many industrialized and developing countries that use space technologies, primarily

through the International Telecommunications Satellite System (INTELSAT); the

International Maritime Satellite system

(INMARSAT); the Intersputnik network (a

Soviet-based communications satellite system); the U.S. Landsat (for land optical sensing); and the U.S. and other meteorological

satellites.

~pace technology has come to play an increas- —

~gly important role in the domestic and internaonal technology policy decisions of countries.

ethnologically advanced nations have become

~er more dependent on space technology to

itisfy their domestic and international communication and information gathering needs.

~ace technology may contribute to domestic

“osperity and a favorable balance of trade.

Therefore, some less-developed countries view

space technology as one means to accelerate their

development.

Because the development and use of space technology is a long-term, expensive, and often international undertaking, governments have traditionally been the driver behind the evolution and

growth of most space technology. This preeminent government role, combined with the political

sensitivity of technologies that by their nature

transcend national boundaries, has made the use

of space technology the subject of continued international scrutiny. It has, therefore, become increasingly difficult to discuss space technology

without discussing political issues.

The importance which nations attach to space

systems and services challenges the commercial,

diplomatic, and technical skills of the United

States. The United States must define how it will

respond to new international competition in space

services heretofore only offered by the United

States. z

New challenges in international cooperation

also exist. The desire for economic growth and

technological independence has prompted the less

developed nations to apply pressure on the industrialized states to provide space services and hardware on a fully equitable basis and to institutionalize the means of transfer of this technology within the U.N. system. The major questions posed

for the United States are:

●

●

●

How far should it go to accommodate such

demands?

What advantages are there to doing so?

What institutional mechanisms (eg., bilateral

v. multilateral agreements) can best accommodate both the long-term needs of the

United States and those of the less developed

nations?

— —

2CiviZian Space Polk-y and Applications (Washington, DC.: U.S.

Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, June 1982), OTASTI-177.
16

U.S. SPACE TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

As virtually the only supplier of space technology, the United States until recently benefited

from the space programs of other nations because

they constituted an excellent market for U.S.

goods and services. Now, even though the overall

market is increasing, other countries with mature

space programs compete with us in selling satellite

communication systems and services and launching services. They will soon compete in selling

remotely sensed data from space and in manufacturing in space. Foreign competition threatens the

United States with the loss of significant revenue

opportunities as well as with potential loss of

prestige and political influence.3

Satellite Communications.—By far the most

developed and commercialized of all space technologies, satellite communications technology was

developed in the early 1960’s by the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),

the military, and private companies. The creation

of INTELSAT in 1964 made satellite communications available to the world and fostered the

development of the U.S. satellite industry.

(Through COMSAT and other private companies, satellites have come to play a central role

in domestic communications as well. )

The future global demand for satellite communication services appears strong. At home, the

market for voice, data, and video transmission

is growing rapidly, and the advent of directbroadcast satellite (DBS) systems, recently approved by the Federal Communications Commission for domestic service, will contribute to this

growth. Internationally, both developed and developing countries appear eager to make greater

use of satellites for regional and domestic communications, But failure of the United States to

maintain its technological lead could prevent U.S.

industry from capitalizing fully on these opportunities. 4 In 1973, the White House directed

NASA to phase out its advanced satellite communications research program. By 1977, the communications industry, prompted by foreign competition, was urging NASA to resume research in ad31bid.

‘Ibid.

vanced communications techniques. Upon congressional approval, NASA reinstituted a limited

program in 1978.

One reason for pursuing advanced communications research is the future need to use higher

frequencies, such as 30/20 GHz (Ka band), for

commercial purposes. While U.S. firms have

maintained consistently that the technology is too

complex and costly for them to afford, European

and Japanese industries, with subsidies from their

governments, are already developing 30/20 GHz

systems. The virtual certainty that foreign systems

will be used in this decades has occasioned debate

about whether NASA should undertake a large

30/20 GHz technology research and development

(R&D) program, including flight-testing of the

hardware. Proponents of a NASA program point

out that if the technology is not developed in the

United States, U.S. firms will lose an important

market as well as their strong lead in communica

tions technology.

Land Remote Sensing by Satellite.—Since 1972

the United States has had the world’s only globa

civilian remote-sensing system. At present how

ever, it is uncertain whether the United States wil

have a civilian land remote-sensing capabilit:

after Landsat 5 terminates in the late 1980’s. For

eign and domestic users of the Landsat system

have expressed concern about the continuity c

data from Landsat. It is essential to them that the

data flow be continuous and that any price in

creases to be predictable and incremental,

There are political, technical, budgetary, an

institutional problems in Landsat planning. Be

cause Landsat 4 carries new and untried sense]

as well as proven ones, one cannot yet be certain

that it will provide acceptable operational service

The French, Japanese, and the ESA, on the other

hand, plan satellite systems that are express]

designed for commercial operation. Althoug

complete success of these systems is not assuret

these systems will use less expensive and mo

reliable multispectral linear array (MLA) sense

— —

5Aerospace Daily, Feb. 7, 1983, p. 1, Japan launched its comrr

nications satellite CS-2A on Feb. 4, 1983. It carries four 30/20 G]

transponders for commercial use.
17

technology, which the United States does not currently plan to use for civilian systems. * The most

advanced foreign system is the French Systeme

Probetoire Observationale Terrestrial (SPOT),

scheduled for launch in 1984; the French have

already begun to market future SPOT data products through a semiprivate firm, Spotimage.

Space Transportation.—Despite the technological triumph of the space shuttle, need for commercial and Government launch services is likely to exceed the shuttle’s availability. If the United

States has no expendable vehicles ready to launch

commercial satellites at competitive prices, then

the private sector, and perhaps Government agencies as well, will be forced to purchase launch

services from the Europeans.

The emergence of foreign competition against

U.S. launch services is a major change from the

past and a competitive challenge for the future,

Developed by ESA, the Ariane expendable launcher

is being marketed by a French-incorporated company called Arianespace. Several U.S. companies

have already announced plans to launch on Ariane rather than on the shuttle. The Japanese now

launch their own satellites by means of Delta-class

launchers, which they construct under agreements

*Landsat 4 sensors, the multispectral scanner (MSS) and thematic

mapper (TM) are semimechanical and are therefore subject to

mechanical failure and jitter problems. Multispectral linear array

sensors require no mechanical devices.

with the U.S. firms that originally produced the

rockets. The Soviets and the Chinese also launch

their own satellites. The Soviets have offered to

place satellites of certain other countries in orbit.

Thus, although the market for launch services is

growing, foreign launch capability is also growing rapidly.

Materials Processing in Space (MPS).—The

commercial prospects for producing new or refined products in space, such as pharmaceuticals

and metal alloys, are uncertain. To date onIy one

company, McDonnell-Douglas Astronautical Co.,

has committed itself to a long-term commercial

space manufacturing project, The central issues

here are the degree and kind of government incentives available to firms that wish to consider

MPS. ’ Such incentives can include conducting

generic and publicly available R&D on the shuttle or the European-built spacelab, or specific

agreements to share the costs and results of MPS

efforts. At present, NASA has instituted the JointEndeavor Agreement and related arrangements in

an effort to stimulate industry’s interest in MPS.

Several other countries, including Japan and West

Germany, have well-developed materials science

programs that include ground-based research and

eventual plans to use the European-developed

spacelab for government-funded experiments.

6Civilian Space Policy and Applications, op, cit,

U.S. SPACE TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

International cooperation has been a central element of the U.S. civilian space program since its

nception (see app. B), According to the National

Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, space activties should: “be devoted to peaceful purposes for

he benefit of all mankind.” Further, the U.S. will

engage in “cooperation . . . with other nations

and groups of nations, ”

In the past 25 years, the United States has engaged in hundreds of bilateral and multilateral

operative ventures in every area of space technology. U.S. launchers have orbited complete satillites and instrument payloads for dozens of

countries. In 1963, the United States took the lead

in establishing INTELSAT and providing satellite

communications around the world, U.S. meteorological satellites have been used for global

weather coverage since the early 1960’s, and the

Landsat Earth remote-sensing system has been in

operation since 1972 under a policy whereby the

United States has sold imagery to any country for

little more than the price of reproduction. NASA

and the Agency for International Development

have cooperated in giving developing countries

valuable training in the use of Landsat data, as

well as in using satellite communications to deliver

programs to rural areas. The Applications Technology Satellite series of experimental DBS was

used in the mid-1970’s to carry out several impor-
18

tant studies in India and South America. The National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has cooperated with other

countries and with the World Meteorological Organization (wMO) in supplying weather data

from satellites free of charge.

More recently, the United States has engaged

in a major cooperative project with ESA and

Canada to develop the Space Transportation

System (STS). In return for access to the space

shuttle, ESA has produced Spacelab and the

Canadians the Shuttle Remote Manipulator Arm

(an essential component of the shuttle’s ability to

release and retrieve satellites in orbit).

In manned spaceflight, the United States and

the Soviet Union cooperated in several projects

during the 1970’s, culminating in the 1975 ApolloSoyuz Test Project. In one of the most dramatic

symbols of detente, a U.S. Apollo spacecraft

docked in orbit with a Soviet Soyuz.

Not all U.S. cooperative ventures have been entirely successful, though. In the early 1970’s, the

United States made a proposal to the Europeans

for the development of a Space Tug; it was later

withdrawn for economic and political reasons. In

particular, the Air Force did not want the United

States to depend on a foreign consortium for a

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administratloc

Artist’s conception of Spacelab in the cargo bay of the

orbiting space shuttle

major part of STS. Another difficult venture was

the International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM), a

dual-spacecraft scientific project being conducted

jointly with ESA. For budgetary reasons, the

United States withdrew its satellite from the mission in 1981. These setbacks have made some

European countries highly skeptical of the U.S.

ability to stick to long-term commitments. Cooperation with the Soviet Union has been subjecl

to the ups and downs of East-West relations, anc

most cooperative projects have recently been can

celled.

THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR OUTER SPACE

International regulation and coordination of

states’ activities are supposed to protect common

interests and to ensure that special interests are

dealt with in a common framework. Given the

ever larger number of nations that use or produce

space technology, the United States is increasingly

affected by decisions taken in other nations and

in international organizations (see fig. 1).

The United States is a member of the following international organizations which order and

regulate the use of space:

United Nations Committee on the Peaceful uses

of Outer Space.—COPUOS was established in

1959 with an initial membership of 24 countries,

which was expanded to 28 in 1961, 37 in 1973,

and 54 today (see table 1). Within COPUOS, decisions are made by consensus, rather than by ma

jority vote. COPUOS is serviced by the U.N

Outer Space Affairs Division, which is part of th

U.N. Secretariat and has a small permanent staf

(see fig. 2). It has a legal subcommittee and

scientific and technical subcommittee, The leg:

subcommittee is the primary locus for the discu:

sion of legal principles concerning outer space an

development of space treaties. It has formulate

five major treaties, for most of which the Unite

States played a leading drafting and negotiating

role:

● Treaty on Principles Governing the Activiti~

of States in the Exploration and Use of Out~

Space, Including the Moon and Other Cele

tial Bodies (1967).
Figurel .—Patterns of Global Outer Space Activities

U.N. & Specialized Agencies International Telecommunications Nations & National Grouping

I !

* I

U.N.

I

I

I

I

Specialized

Agencies

General Assembly I Secretariat ITU

Global

ntelsat

nmarsat

nterSputnik

1

Regional

Arabsat

(not yet in service)

Nordsat

(not yet in service)

Palapa

m

National Space

Programs

u s . Japan

U.S.S.R. Canad&

France

FRG

Italy

PRC

India

Brazil

U.K.

Regional

Groups

ESA

CEPT

Eutelsat

EBU

Interkosmof

ABU

m

Bilateral

Arrangements

Between

~ations

md National

;pace Agencie$

Private Sector Firms and Consortia

t - - i

Professional Associations

n

IAF

IISL

IAA

ILA

Icsu

COSPAR

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment
20

Table 1 .–Current Membership of COPUOST

Albania

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Benin

Brazil

Bulgeria

Canada

Chad

Chile

China*

Columbia

Czechoslovakia

Ecuador

Egypt

Federal Republic of Germany

France

German Democratic

Republic

Greece

Hungary

India ●

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Italy

Japan ●

Kenya

Lebanon

Mexico

Mongolia

Morocco

Netherlands

Niger

Nigeria

Pakistan

Philippines

Poland

Romania

Sierra Leone

Spain

Sudan

Sweden

Syria

United Kingdom

United Republic of

Cameroon

United States ●

Upper Volta

Uraguay

U.S. S. R. “

Venezuela

Vietnam

Yugoslavia

NOTE: Italics indicate COPUOS membership 1961-73, Asterisk indicates inde.

pendent launch capability,

tGreece and Turkey, Spain and Portugal, alternate membership every 3 years.

SOURCE” Office of Technology Assessment.

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the

Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968).

Convention on International Liability for

Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972).

Convention on Registration of Objects

Launched into Outer Space (1974).

Agreement Governing the Activities of States

on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies

(Moon Treaty) (1979).

With the exception of the 1979 Moon Treaty, the

United States has signed and ratified each of these

international agreements. COPUOS served as the

preparatory committee for the first conference on

the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

in 1968, and UNISPACE ’82; it was the major

forum for debate over the UNISPACE ’82 conference report prior to the conference.

International Telecommunication Union.—A

specialized agency of the U. N., the ITU is an international intergovernmental organization with

157 members that coordinates and regulates international communications. Its primary task is

to allocate frequencies to the various radio services and to register the specific operational

assignments. Inherent in the registration process

for space radio services is the coordination of the

positioning of satellites in the geostationary orbit. The ITU’S allocation of the spectrum to particular types of users (e.g., to space services), is

done by periodic World and Regional Administrative Radio Conferences (WARCS and RARCS).

The last WARC was held in 1979; it was the occasion for considerable conflict between the United

States and other countries over frequency allocations and the appropriate placement of satellites

in the geostationary orbit.7

Other U.N. Agencies

U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Orga”

nization (UNESCO) .-UNESCO is neither a regulatory agency like ITU, nor does it have a broac

‘Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the WorI

Administrative Radio Conference of 1979, op. cit.
21

Figure 2.— U.N. Bodies

(A)

r

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

t

General Assembly

t

Special Political

Committee

+ ,

- — — - -- -.— - Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - --- – – --- – -

A

t

I I

Legal Sub-Committee

I —-———— — ———- —

I

I -1

I

I

I

I

I

I I

I

-— -- -

r

L

7 r ‘

-

1

COSPAR :

I IAF I I ESA I

— — - - - J L - _.J I - - -J

i

Scientific and Technical

Working Group on Sub-Committee

Direct Broadcast Satellites

1 1 1 I

I I

I

I

I

I

r

:

‘

-

1 r ‘I

I ABU I I EBU I

1- -1 - - L--J I

8 Office of Inter-Agency Affairs I

I

I

ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ICAO, I

I

ITU, WMO, IMO & IAEA t

L - — - - - - —— - - - - -- -- — — - — - - -J

I

L

I

Dept. of Political and

Security Council Affairs

Dept. of Economic

and Social Affairs

Committee Services,

Reports and

Research Section

1

Resource and

Transport

Division

1

I

;

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

I

(B)

i

Secretariat

1 1

Inter-Departmental Working Group

I

Centre for Science and

Technology for

Economic Development

Satellite Communicant ions

Office

I 1 I `I t

compl(shed Its ortglnal mandate In 1974 but can be

:alled at any t I me by the parent Comm(ttee

)TE Broken hnes represent observers
22

interest in space matters like COPUOS. However,

as the U.N. agency most concerned with scientific

and cultural issues, including the use of communications for third world development, it necessarily has an interest in space systems as they relate

to these matters. UNESCO is also the focal point

for discussions of the New World Information

Order (see “The Political Context for Outer

Space”) and related issues.

World Meteorological Organization.—WMO

is the chief organization for international coordination in gathering and exchanging weather data.

It also organizes and coordinates global weather

and climate studies such as World Weather Watch

(Ww w ) and the Global Atmospheric Research

Project (GARP). Virtually all of WMO’S work involves the use of satellite information.

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).–

FAO has established a remote-sensing center to

monitor renewable resources, using Landsat imagery to support its field services.

extensive library of Landsat data

laboratory for interpreting aerial

images.

United Nations Development

(UNDP).-UNDP funds a variety of

projects, including training courses

FAO has an

as well as a

and satellite

Programme

development

and regional

centers for broadcasting and resource management. An experimental satellite prototype thinroute communication Earth terminal suited for

low-cost mass production is among its current

programs.

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR OUTER SPACE

The political context for outer space and space

technology has two main components: a longstanding East-West rivalry that goes back to the

beginning of the space age, and a more recent set

of North-South disagreements over proposals for

restructuring relations between developed and

developing countries.

In April 1958, President Eisenhower sent a special message to Congress proposing a civilian

space agency, which would “. . . emphasize the

concern of our Nation that Outer Space be devoted to Peaceful and Scientific purposes. ” After

extensive hearings in which the importance of international cooperation was stressed, the Congress

passed the National Aeronautics and Space (NAS)

Act of 1958. The act opened with the congressional declaration that “. . . it is the policy of the

United States that activities in space should be

devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of

all mankind. ” The act also provided that U.S.

space activites were to be conducted so as to contribute to “cooperation by the United States with

other nations and groups of nations in work done

pursuant to this act and in the application

thereof. ”

When Congress passed the Communications

Satellite (COMSAT) Act of 1962, the United States

declared its intent to provide a global communications satellite system to be established “in conjunction and in cooperation with other countries, ”

paying care to “providing such services to economically less developed countries as well as those

more highly developed. ”

At the U. N., the United States played a key rok

in the formation in 1958 of the Committee on th(

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Several interna.

tional treaties and protocols on the use of spac(

have come out of the committee’s work. Perhap:

the most significant of these, the 1967 Outer Spac~

Treaty, contains language that reflects the sen

timents found in the NAS Act and the COMSAI

Act. Article I of this treaty declares, in part, that

The exploration and use of outer space . . .

shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree

of economic or scientific development, and shall

be the province of all mankind.

In recent times, however, the United States ha

come under intensifying criticism from develop
ing countries for some of its activities in space.

The criticism stems from changes both within the

United States and in the international community. In the United States, emphasis has shifted from

using space for “all mankind” to exploiting its

special properties for the United States in particular. In the international community, the developing world has coalesced into a political bloc

capable of opposing the will of the industrialized

countries.

The space age began amidst an ideological

struggle between the United States and the Soviet

Union in which both parties sought to use this new

technology to exemplify the superiority of their

individual political systems. Each of the superpowers had a strong interest in demonstrating that

the value of their accomplishments would accrue

not only to themselves, but to the whole of mankind. Consequently, the “space dialogue” which

developed during the late 19.50’s and early 1960’s

did not emphasize the value of space industries

to the economic welfare of individual nations, nor

did it emphasize the military value of space. Instead, it was the potential for space to solve large

scale global problems that was most often cited

to the world community.

It was while nations were viewing space with

this “global perspective” that institutions within

the United Nations, such as the Committee on the

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, were formed. The

United States and the Soviet Union encouraged

the nations of the world to aid in planning for the

future exploitation of space. However, the United

States and the Soviet Union no longer control access to space. Although both space technology

and the political context in which space activities

are undertaken have altered substantially since the

nception of the space age, the idea that all naions have the right to participate in formulating

principles to govern the exploration and utilization of space has never altered.

As COPUOS and other U.N. organizations

vere formulating principles to govern space acivities, the United States was building a large and

liverse space industry to support defense and

ivilian needs. Although these two activities

riginated and grew at the same time, their somemes antagonistic ideological bases are difficult

to reconcile: COPUOS and other international

organizations focussed on ideological goals such

as establishing an “international regime for outer

space. ” By contrast, the U.S. private sector centered primarily on developing technologies to

meet specific communication, meteorological, and

resource management needs.

The dominant political division over the use

and acquisition of space technology is between

the industrialized and the developing countries.

In general, the developing countries seek to gain

greater access to and control over the resources

of outer space and the advanced space technologies of the industrialized nations. They do this

primarily by advocating legal and regulatory

regimes for space activities in international

organizations, where developing countries outnumber and can outvote industrialized countries.

The developing countries also promote multilaterally funded and controlled bodies to transfer

know-how and technology to the developing

world. Industrialized countries, on the other hand,

fear turning over too much control to mulitlateral

organizations.

An excellent example of effective use of an international cooperative mechanism is INTELSAT.

Although INTELSAT is a multinational corporation owned by the participating states, it is highly

successful in balancing private and state interests.

COMSAT, the designated participating U.S. entity is a legislatively created private U.S. company; it was the initial manager of INTELSAT.

The INTELSAT organization functions profitably

and provides high quality international communications services. Voting power in INTELSAT

is a function of each member state’s use of the system,8 and the major users are interested in maintaining a profitable, efficient organization. This

voting regime makes it difficult for the numerically superior minority members of INTELSAT to

abuse the function of the organization by raising

larger political and economic issues. *

Third world proposals in space affairs often

draw on broader agendas that have gained wide-

— — — 8

1 NTELSAT Agreement, article V.

*The United States currently has a 25 percent vote.
24

INTELSAT station located in Rabat

spread support from developing countries during

the past decade. These include:

The New International Economic Order

(NIEO).–The idea of NIEO emerged at the U.N.

in 1974, when the General Assembly approved

the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of

States. Championed by the developing nations

(loosely organized into the so-called “Group of

77” (G-77) (see table z), * the Charter was premised on the idea that economic relations between

developed and developing countries were inequitable and should be fundamentally altered. Global

economic restructuring would transfer wealth, expertise, and political power from the “haves” (the

.—

“The Group of 77 (G-77) was not a new organization in 1974.

Created by 77 developing countries in the early 1960’s to coordinate

their position at UNCTAD, G-77 was evolved into the principal negotiating body for developing countries in the North-South dialogue.

As figure 4 shows, virtually every developing country is a member

of G-77. Although G-77 is often confused with the nonaligned movement, the two movements are different. While the membership of

the two groups overlap, G-77 includes countries aligned with East

or Western blocs; and where the nonaligned movement addresses

political, military and economic issues, G-77 focuses its attention

predominantly on economic issues.

industrialized West or “North”) to the “have-nets”

(the less-developed countries or “South”). The

negotiations over the Law of the Sea Treaty exemplified this thrust by the developing world.

At the U.N. and elsewhere the G-77 has largely succeeded in setting the terms of the debate on

North-South relations, putting the North on the

moral defensive and legitimating demands for the

transfer of wealth and power to the South. An

important consequence of the promotion of NIEO

has been the politicization of economic discussions: the developing countries claim a right to

an equal share of the world’s economic and technological pie; the North responds that any assistance is not a matter of right or of compensation

for past injustice. Much of the South’s effort has

gone towards restricting the activities of foreign

private corporations in developing countries: New

Economic Order positions favor state control of

internal economic affairs and direct state-to-state

agreements that give political authorities greater

control over international trade. There is a

marked preference also for comprehensive multilateral transfer programs rather than the more

traditional bilateral aid projects.

Though largely successful in dissociating themselves from the West, the Soviets have on occasion been lumped together with the North; therefore they sometimes (usually as tacitly as possible) side with the West in opposing transfer proposals. China, on the other hand, initially stooc

aloof from the nonaligned movement and the New

Economic Order, but in recent years has associ

ated itself increasingly with the South.

Neither the North nor the South maintain un

animity on all issues. Though the G-77 has been

particularly successful in articulating common pc

sitions and organizing bloc votes, for particula

issues it is often split along political, regional, anl

economic lines. Agreement on general issues does

not always carry over to specific proposals. With

in the West, disagreements are more frequent

with voting en bloc a rarity, The United State

and other countries with a strong preference fc

a relatively unrestricted private sector are occi

sionally at odds with those western countries thi

favor state-oriented programs and are more syn

pathetic with the South.
25

Table 2.—The Members of the “Group of 77,” Fall 1980a

1. Afghanistan

2, Algeria

3. Angola

4. Argentina

5. Bahamas

6. Bahrain

7. Bangladesh

8. Barbados

9. Benin

10, Bhutan

11. Bo/ivia

12. Botswana

13. Brazil

14. Burma

15. Burundi

16. Cape Verde

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

Ce; tra/ African /?epub/ic

Chad

Chile

Colombia

Comoros

Congo

Costa Rica

Cuba

Cyprus

Democratic Kampuchea

Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea

Democratic Yemen

Djibouti

Dominica

Dominican Repubiic

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Equatorial Guinea

Ethiopia

Fiji

Gabon

Gambia

Ghana

Grenada

42. Guatemala

43. Guinea

44. Guinea-Bissau

45. Guyana

46. Haiti

47. Honduras

48. India

49. Indonesia

50. /ran

51. /raq

52. Ivory Coast

53. Jamaica

54. Jordan

55. Kenya

56. Kuwait

57. Lao People Democratic

ffepub/ic

58. Lebanon

59. Lesotho

60. Liberia

61. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

62. Madagascar

63. Malawi

64. Malaysia

65. Maldives

66. Mali

67. Malta

68. Mauritania

69. Mauritius

70. Mexico

71. Morocco

72. Mozambique

73. Nepal

74. Nicaragua

75. Niger

76. Nigeria

77. Oman

78. Pakistan

79. Palestine Liberation

Organization

80. Panama

81. Papua New Guinea

82. Parauuay

83.

84.

85.

86.

87.

88.

89,

90,

91.

92.

93.

94.

95.

96.

97.

98.

99.

100.

101.

102.

103.

104.

105.

106.

107.

108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

113.

114.

115.

116.

117.

118.

119.

120.

121.

122.

Peru

Philippines

Qatar

Republic of Korea

Romania

Rwanda

Saint Lucia

Samoa

Sao Tome and Principe

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Singapore

Solomon Islands

Somalia

Sri Lanka

St. Vincent and the

Grenadines

Sudan

Suriname

Swaziland

Syrian Arab Republic

Thailand

Togo

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia

Uganda

United Arab Emirates

United Republic of

Cameroon

United Repub/ic of I

Tanzania

Upper Volta

Uruguay

Venezuela

Viet Nam~

Yemen

Yugoslavia

Zaire

Zambia

Zimbabwe

a

The Group of 77 now numbers 122 The 77 signatories of the 1964 Jo!nt Declaration of the Seventy-Seven are In Itallcs

‘Before Republlc of V!et-Nam

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

Developing countries have recently begun to

ace greater emphasis on access to technology,

eluding space technology, asserting that without

chnical expertise they will be relegated to peranent economic inferiority. The 1979 U.N. Conrence on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) helped to crystallize these sennents: it pointed to the unequal distribution of

chnology as a primary factor in the dependent

)sition of developing countries and called for a

major effort to transfer technology from North

South.

The New World Information Order (NWIO).–

In many ways similar to the New World Economic Order, the proposals for NWIO stem from

assertions by developing countries that: 1) they

do not have equal access either to relevant information or to the technologies needed to acquire

and disseminate it, and are hence at a disadvantage in economic and political dealings with the

North; 2) news coverage of their countries is both

sparse and slanted, due to the cultural and political biases of Western reporters; and 3) Western

media bring about cultural and economic disrup-
26

tion in developing countries by raising expectations and popularizing alien perceptions.

New World Information Order proposals generally involve increased state control over what

foreign journalists would be allowed to report

and over what its own citizens may learn from

international broadcasts, wire services, and

newspapers. The Soviet Union and other communist countries have enthusiastically supported

NWIO proposals. The United States and most

Western countries have been strongly opposed to

prior restrictions on the flow of information and

have invoked the U.N. General Assembly Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees unrestricted access to information. g

The means of communication are also at issue.

On the one hand, developing countries point to

their lack of communications infrastructure as a

key cause of information inequities. On the other,

they see advanced Western technologies, such as

communications satellites, as posing an even

greater threat to their sovereignty. Hence, while

they demand aid in acquiring communication systems, they propose to regulate and restrict its use.

This approach is most apparent in UNESCO negotiations over a “Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the

Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange. ” Developing countries have also proposed establishing

multinational satellite systems through the U.N.

that would give them greater control over and access to advanced technologies. The most authoritative expression of NWIO proposals, the socalled MacBride report, 10 endorses efforts at ITU

to allocate geostationary slots on a more equitable

basis.

It is important to note that “information” includes not only traditional voice, print, and video

but also computer data and satellite remote-sensing imagery. Regulating the international movement of information, in all its forms, would therefore affect not simply political news coverage but

also access to resource and financial management

data by governments and multinational firms.

—--. -- ———.—

‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. General Assembly

Resolution 217 (11 ) of Dec. 10, 1948, article 19.

IOMany Voices, One 14’orld, UNESCO, 1980.

Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM).–CHM

was first proposed in 1967 by Arvid Pardo of

Malta at the U.N. during discussion of the proposed negotiations on the Law of the Sea. Subsequently, it became an integral part of the draft

Law of the Sea Treaty as well as the draft Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the

Moon and other Celestial Bodies (the so-called

“Moon Treaty”), which was negotiated in the

Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS during the

1970’s.

The CHM concept is generally applied to area:

such as the deep sea-bed, and outer space, that

are not a sovereign part of any one nation. Such

areas have always been understood to be oper

to transit and exploitation by any nation, withoul

being subject to permanent appropriation. How

ever, under the influence of the New World Eco

nomic Order, some developing nations began to

press for active jurisdiction over such areas by

multinational bodies. In the Law of the Sea ne

gotiations, certain countries advocated a Seabe[

Authority with power to define the terms uncle

which private companies could mine ocean min

erals. The Seabed Authority would be mandate

to transfer ocean mining technology and a pox

tion of the revenues from ocean mining to devel

oping countries. In the Moon Treaty, under pel

haps a more limited use of CHM, an undefine

“international regime” was envisioned to regulat

future ventures for exploitating resources on the

Moon and other celestial bodies. The nature of

this international regime and the extent of i

authority were left to subsequent treaty negoti;

tions. In both cases, the proposals were justifi~

on the grounds that the developing countri[

should share in the exploitation of resources th,

belonged to all but were accessible only to a(

vanced industrialized countries.

Though the United States initially supported t]

Common Heritage idea, and is generally credit(

with bringing about the consensus agreement (

its use in the Moon Treaty, it eventually came

oppose both the Law of the Sea and the Mo(

Treaty. Such opposition was the source of co

siderable discontent among the G-77 and certa

developed countries. The effects, if any, of t}

opposition, particularly with respect to the L:

of the Sea Treaty, are not yet known; none W[

visible at UNISPACE ’82.
27

\

/

t=”

/

Photo credits Nationa/ Aeronau(fcs and S~ace Adrn/n/sfraf/on

Di ect receive antenna (lower left) installed i n the village of Kerell i (about 300 miles southeast of Bombay, India) utilized in

conjunction with the Applications Technology Satellite (ATS-6) (top) permitted TV broadcast ng

to villages across India (lower right)
28

Though not explicitly invoked, the Common

Heritage concept has also played an important

role in shaping discussions about the allocation

of other common resources, particularly the

MILITARIZATION OF SPACE*

Another important factor of the UNISPACE ’82

“environment” is the global concern over the issue

of the militarization of Space, The 1967 Outer

Space Treaty prohibits weapons of mass destruction (primarily nuclear weapons) in outer space,

but until recently there has been relatively little

discussion of military space systems. However,

in 1981 key members of the G-77, including Brazil,

Egypt, India, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia, expressed

concern over “the growing dangers of the military

uses of outer space. ”

The sense of danger some states experience has

been aroused by the emergence of weapons designed to attack other satellites (antisatellite or Asats) as well as by the increased use by both the

United States and Soviet Union of space systems

to support terrestrial military activities. (The

Soviet Union possesses a first generation operational A-Sat and the United States has one under

development. Neither system, however, is based

in space. )

From 1977 to 1979, the United States and the

Soviet Union conducted talks on limiting A-sat

deployment; the United States broke these off

following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At

these talks the Soviets professed worry about the

possibility of the U.S. space shuttle being used as

an A-sat system. In August of 1981, the U.S.S.R.

proposed, at the General Assembly, a “Draft

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of

Weapons of Any Kind in Outer Space. ” Article

One of the proposed treaty prohibits stationing

weapons in space (by implication, direct intercept

*See app. A for a more detailed treatment of this issue.

geosynchronous orbit and the electromagnetic

spectrum. This fact was apparent at UNISPACE

’82.

A-sats launched from the ground without going

into orbit would not be prohibited), including on

any “reuseable manned space vehicle, ” i.e., the

shuttle. The Soviet proposal was referred not to

COPUOS but to the Committee on Disarmament.

In the months preceding UNISPACE ’82, a

number of U.S. actions and statements strengthened the perception abroad that the United States

intends to expand its military space activities.

These included:

●

●

●

●

the release on July 4, 1982, of a White House

Fact Sheet on National Space Policy with

strong emphasis on national security programs. The fact sheet announced the formation of a new Senior Interagency Group on

Space, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;

statements by the Secretary of Defense indicating that the United States is actively considering placing defensive weapons systems

in space, along with highly publicized discussions of direct-energy systems in Congress;

establishment of an Air Force Space Command to coordinate military programs; and

the flight of a classified Department of

Defense payload on the fourth space shuttle

mission (landing on July 4, 1982).

The introduction of weapons into space, though

not specifically prohibited by international law,

raises strong emotions. From the inception of the

space age, many have seen space as a “clean slate, ”

an area from which earth-bound political and military rivalries could be excluded. Numerous declarations in U.N. and other fora have extolled the

peaceful uses of outer space.
Chapter 3

Origins of the Conference and

U.S. Objectives
Chapter 3

Origins of the Conference and

U.S. Objectives

THE 1968 CONFERENCE

In 1964, members of the Technical Subcommittee of the Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space (COPUOS) proposed a United Nations

(U. N.) conference on the Exploration and Peaceful

Uses of Outer Space, * Their intent was to inform

and educate developing countries about the significance and usefulness of space systems and to

encourage use of space technology. COPUOS

considered the Subcommittee’s proposal that same

year and set up a working group composed of its

entire membership to examine the desirability of

holding such a conference. In 1966, the General

Assembly endorsed the working group’s proposal. ] The primary objectives of this conference

were to be:

● a n examination of the practical benefits to

be derived from space research and exploration on the basis of technical and scientific

achievements and the extent to which nonspace powers, especially the developing

countries, may enjoy these benefits, par-

* Prior to this, the U .S. S R. had announced that It would pro-

,ose ‘the calllng ot an international conference of scientists under

J N auspices, on the question of exchange of experience in the study

f outer space ‘ General Debate U. N., General Assembly 823 Plenary

/leet Ing, Oct 6, 1959

1“Report of the Working Group ot the Whole, ” UN. Committee

n the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, A AC. 105 30, Jan. 26, 1966.

●

ticularly in terms of education and development; and

an examination of the opportunities available

to nonspace powers for international cooperation in space activities, taking into account

the extent to which the U.N. may play a

role. 2

The first U.N. Conference on the Exploration

and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was held in

Vienna in August 1968. A. H. Abdel-Ghani, then

Chief of the Outer Space Affairs Division, was

appointed Executive Secretary and Kurt Waldhiem, then Chairman of COPUOS, served as

President of the Conference. The conference was

attended by 78 States, nine specialized U.N. agencies and four other international organizations.

Although this conference produced few tangible

results, it generated two proposals that were carried out: one to create a U.N, Space Applications

Program, which provides technical assistance to

developing nations through workshops, seminars,

and training, and a second to establish working

groups in COPUOS to study such questions as

remote sensing, and direct broadcast satellites

(DBS).

2GAOR /23 AI 24, Report of COPUOS A 7285.

UNISPACE ’82

The rapid progress of space exploration and ference was suggested to COPUOS by its Scien-

~chnology that followed the 1968 conference sug- tific and Technical Subcommittee in 1974; 4 i n

ested to some that a second conference was nec- November 1978 the General Assembly agreed to

ssary to exchange information and experience, convene a second U.N. Conference on the Exnd to assess the adequacy of institutional and ploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.5

operative means that were being used to realize

~e benefits of space technology.3 Such a con- 4Report of the Second United Nations Conference on the Explora-

— . — tion and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,

3U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3467 of Dec. 5, 1979. 5U .N. General Assembly Resolution

A ‘CONF.1O1 ’10, p. 107.

33 16 of Nov. 10, 1978.

31
32

. —

Between the proposal in 1974 and the General

Assembly resolution of 1978, the United States

gave no encouragement to those who desired a

second conference on outer space. Its reluctance

stemmed primarily from doubts about the usefulness of such a conference. In the view of the

United States, the 1968 conference had accomplished little; what little it did achieve was not

necessarily in best interests of the United States.

The establishment of an organization such as the

Space Applications Program was contrary to the

U.S. policy to conduct its cooperative technology

programs largely on a bilateral basis (see app. B

for NASA’s rationale). The working groups established by the first conference to study such questions as remote sensing and DBS had been unable

in the intervening decade to resolve the politically

sensitive issues surrounding transborder remote

sensing and broadcasting. Further, since then,

U.N. sponsored conferences had become increasingly politicized; the United States wished to avoid

a confrontation on the basic issues of the New International Economic Order,

Given that the conference would take place, the

decision about who would be Secretary General

caused little difficulty, as Yash Pal of India, a

distinguished physicist and space scientist, was the

first choice of many delegations. Selecting the conference venue was somewhat more difficult.

The U.S.S.R. and India both had offered to act

as host for the conference. It appeared initially

that the conference would be held in Moscow.

This would have been politically desirable for the

Soviets since 1982 marked the 25th anniversary of

the launch of Sputnik. However, such a decision

would have contravened a long-accepted understanding that the conference would not be held

on the territory of either of the space powers. On

the basis of U.S. and other opposition, the Secretary General of the U,N. chose Vienna as a compromise.

The venue established, the United States began

to plan its conference participation. By January

1981, an interagency group, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) and headed by the State Department’s

Bureau of Ocean and International Environment

and Scientific Affairs (OES), had completed a

draft of the U.S. national paper and had contacted

the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics to ensure private sector participation at

the conference. Shortly thereafter, a dispute in the

U.N. Outer Space Affairs Division caused the

United States to halt its preparation for the conference.

The normal procedure for staffing a conference

such as UNISPACE ’82 is that the Chief of the

Outer Space Affairs Division (OSAD) in the U.N.

Secretariat becomes the Executive Secretary of the

conference. During the preparation for

UNISPACE ’82 the position of Chief of OSAD

had become vacant. An American, Marvin Robinson, who had served in OSAD for 19 years and

who had risen to Deputy Chief, was, in the opinion of the United States and others, the most

qualified candidate for the position. In the

organizational structure of the U. N., OSAD

comes under the Department of Political and

Security Council Affairs (see fig. 2), headed by

a Soviet citizen. Recognizing that the duties of the

OSAD Chief would include the function of Executive Secretary of UNISPACE ’82, the Soviets proposed Vladimir Kopal, a Czech space lawyer with

no OSAD experience, for the vacant position.

Despite strong U.S. opposition, the Soviets refused to withdraw their candidate. In response,

the U.S. representative to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS announced that

the United States would have to reassess its commitment to the conference. b

The State Department and the interagency

group working on UNISPACE ’82 activities early

in 1981 halted most conference preparation in

order to stress the seriousness of the U.S. position. Not all concerned U.S. parties agreed with

the wisdom of this course of action. On Septembe~

21, 1981, members of the House Committee or

Science and Technology sent a letter to then Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. * urging “ar

early, positive decision to participate in the sec.

.—— —

*Letter from Richard Fairbanks, Assistant Secretary for Congres

sional Relations, Department of State, to the Hon. Ronnie G. Flip

po, House of Representatives, Oct. 9, 1981,

*The letter was signed by Don Fuqua, Chairman; Larry Winn

Ranking Minority Member; Ronnie G. Flippo, Chairman of the Suk

committee on Space Science and Applications, and Harold C. HoI

Ienbeck, Subcommittee Ranking Minority Member.
33

ond U.N. Conference on Space. 7 The letter noted

that:

Since the commitment to peaceful exploration

and utilization of space represents what we as a

Nation stand for, it would be unfortunate if the

United States did not fully participate.8

In a similar letter sent to James L. Buckley, then

Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science

and Technology, the same members expressed the

fear that in the absence of U.S. participation, the

Soviets might use UNISPACE ’82 to the disadvantage of the United States.9 They referred to the

7Report on UNISPACE ’82, Subcommittee on Space Science and

Applications, Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House

of Representatives, July 14, 1982,

‘Ibid.

‘Ibid.

recent attempts by the Soviets to characterize the

Space Shuttle as a weapon and noted that:

To allow such claims to go unanswered by our

government in a forum such as UNISPACE ’82

would be a mistake. 10

Since January 1981, the State Department had

been trying to achieve a compromise at the U.N.

However, the dispute remained unresolved until

December 19, 1981, when as his last act as Secretary General of the U. N., Kurt Waldheim appointed Robinson as Acting Chief of the Division

to become Chief on the opening day of the conference. Nandasiri Jasentuliana of Sri Lanka was

named Executive Secretary of UNISPACE ’82.

The United States then began to prepare in earnest

for UNISPACE ’82.

‘“Ibid.

U.S. PREPARATION FOR THE CONFERENCE

The Preparatory Meetings

Ostensibly, UNISPACE ’82 was to be a scientific and technical meeting to discuss the practical

uses of space technology, especially in developing countries. The United States had early expressed its hope that controversial political issues

would be kept off the agenda.

The standard U.N. practice in preparing for

conferences of the size and scope of UNISPACE

’82 is to write a draft report before the actual conference so that consensus can be reached on as

many issues as possible. The draft report for

UNISPACE ’82, submitted to COPUOS by the

UNISPACE ’82 Secretariat in January 1982, was

~ 116 page document containing 428 paragraphs.

rhe original version of the draft report strongly

-eflected the personal and national views of its

>rincipal author, Yash Pal of India, and seemed

o the United States to be unduly responsive to

he political agenda of the Group of 77.

The United States took advantage of its opportunities to modify the draft report both at the

;OPUOS UNISPACE ’82 Advisory Committee

neeting in January 1982, and the March-April ’82

DOPUOS meeting. On the surface, the nations

vho participated in these preparatory meetings

accomplished a great deal in agreeing to all but

15 of the 428 paragraphs of the draft report.

Paragraphs for which consensus was not possible, along with suggested alternatives, were included in the final draft in brackets. This apparent

success was somewhat deceptive since some of the

changes in wording tended to “paper over” real

issues for the sake of arriving at consensus. In

most instances, the unresolved issues became the

source of considerable controversy at UNISPACE

’82.

Congressional Interest

The issue of “militarization” of space and questions about the future of the U.S. civilian space

program and the role of the private sector in outer

space created congressional interest in UNISPACE

’82. Of primary importance were the congressional perceptions that:l

 The hiatus in U.S. UNISPACE ’82 seemed to

have prevented the thorough planning preparation necessary for effective conference

participation.

● In the “eleventh hour” the United States was

still insisting that this was a purely technical

llRePort on uN1spAcE ’82, ~P. Ci t
34

●

●

●

●

conference and therefore it would not be prepared to discuss political matters.

Insufficient attempts were being made by the

United States to diffuse the political issues

that had arisen in the preparatory meetings.

The full list of delegates would be decided

too late to prepare the delegates sufficiently

for the relatively complex political issues that

were sure to arise in Vienna.

The attitude of those in charge of conference

preparation was that there was little to gain

by U.S. participation and much to lose.

Sufficient consideration had not been given

to the private sector’s role at UNISPACE ’82;

in particular, preparations for the U.S. exhibit were late in getting underway.

Both the Subcommittee on Space Science and

Applications of the House Committee on Science

and Technology and the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs

Committee held UNISPACE ’82 hearings on July

14, 1982 and August 5, 1982, respectively. At

these hearings James Beggs, Administrator of

NASA, who was serving as Head of the U.S. Delegation with the rank of Ambassador, and Ambassador Gerald Helman, the special coordinator

for UNISPACE ’82, addressed some of the congressional concerns. Members used these hearings

as an opportunity to make suggestions about conference preparations.

In their prepared statement and responses to the

Members’ questions, Beggs and Ambassador Helman expressed guarded optimism. The hearings

disclosed that although the boycott had made conference preparation difficult, the United States

would be prepared to participate fully at

UNISPACE ’82. Beggs stated that the delegation

would be ready to discuss political issues and that

there would be a strong private sector presence

on the delegation and at the U.S. exhibit. In a joint

statement, Beggs and Ambassador Helman declared that the administration viewed the conference as an opportunity for the United States

to reaffirm its commitment to international cooperation and to emphasize our role as the world

leader in space.

It was clear from testimony given by others that

the UNISPACE ’82 preparatory activities had not

been as extensive as those for other international

conferences. Ambassador Jean Wilkowski, coordinator for the U.S. delegation to the 1979 U.N.

Conference on Science, Technology, and Development, testifying at the July 14 hearing, stated

that U.S. preparation for previous international

conferences had benefited considerably from the

close involvement of outside advisors (eg., Congress, citizens advisory groups, key persons in industry, universities, and foundations) and from

thorough analytical studies. This had not been

done as extensively for UNISPACE ’82.

During the July 14, 1982 hearings, several Congressmen expressed misgivings about the fact that,

with only a few weeks left before the conference,

the full delegation had not yet been named. By

the hearings on August 5, less than a week before

the conference was to convene, the delegation had

been named, but the list was not yet available to

the Congress. The delay in naming the nongovernmental delegates, generally attributed to indecision on the part of the Executive, resulted in

there being only one briefing of the delegation

before departing for Vienna. The delegation

when named, was composed of a variety of well

informed and experienced representatives from

numerous government agencies, Congress, and the

private sector. (For the delegation list see app. F)
I I iI
. .

Chapter 4

The Issues Negotiated

Most of the controversial political issues related

to space technology at UNISPACE ’82 have existed since the beginning of the space age and have

changed little since first raised in the United NationsU.N. ) Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space (COPUOS). However, in the intervening

years, the technology has matured and prospered,

and the number of nations having access to or

relying on space technology has increased draMILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE

Although not included in the formal conference

agenda, worries about the introduction of weapons into space (see ch. 2 and app. A) made the

militarization of outer space the most contentious

issue at UNISPACE ’82. Even during the preparatory meeting of COPUOS in March and April,

the paragraphs in the initial draft report dealing

with militarization were the subject of intense

debate. The initial draft report referred to militarization as “a barrier to greater cooperation and

a potential obstacle to deriving the full benefits

of space technology, ” and as an impending “dark

shadow over the peaceful and beneficial uses of

space.’” The United States objected to such wording on three grounds:

1.

2.

3.

that COPUOS and UNISPACE ’82 were not

the proper forum for this issue, which had

already been referred by Committee I of the

U.N. to the Disarmament Committee;

that the discussion—and the term “militarization” —did not distinguish adequately between military support systems such as surveillance, communications, or navigation

satellites, and space weapons; and

that in any case the military uses of space

need not interfere with peaceful uses or with

the use of space systems by developing countries.

“’Draft Report of the Conference, ” Preparatory Committee for

the Second U.N. Conference on the Explorations and Peaceful Uses

of Outer Space, A/ CONF. 101 /PC/L. 20; Mar, 1, 1982,

matically. Accordingly, the political context of

the debate over the exploitation of outer space has

changed. The developing world is now more active in space and demands a greater voice in how

it is used. Although UNISPACE ’82 yielded few

surprises or new approaches to the politics of

outer space, the conference and its report to the

U.N. General Assembly reflect a consensus of

states’ opinion on the exploitation of outer space,

No consensus was reached on these paragraphs

at the March COPUOS meetings.

It was clear from the initial plenary session that

the militarization of outer space would have to

be addressed at the conference. With the exception of the United States and three other countries, all participating nations mentioned this issue

in their introductory statements. Early in the conference, Austria proposed that the four paragraphs dealing with militarization might be resolved by assigning them to a special working

group. The United States and the Soviet Union

both opposed this suggestion. The United States

believed that highlighting the issue of militarization at the beginning of the conference would

make it more difficult to resolve. The U.S. delegation did express its willingness to participate in

an informal working group if all the contested paragraphs were included.

The management of the militarization issue by

the leaders of the U.S. delegation was the source

of some confusion for many delegations. The

United States attended the conference

. . . prepared to accommodate a limited, preferably single, appropriately stated reference to the

problem of weapons systems in space or aggressive uses of outer space contrary to the U.N.

Charter.z

‘Letter from Addison E. Richmond, Jr., Bureau of Oceans and

International Environmental and Scientific Affairs to Dr. Gordon

Law, Office of Technology Assessment, Dec. 21, 1982.

3 7
38

However, the failure of the United States to raise

this issue in its opening speech to the Plenary

created the impression in the minds of some delegates that the United States did not oppose the

“militarization” of space. This impression was intensified when the representative of the United

States, upon having been asked to propose wording on the subject of militarization that was acceptable to the U.S. delegation, stated that the

problem was conceptual in nature and it would

therefore serve no useful purpose for the United

States to put forward proposals on the issue.3

Early in the second week, when it became apparent that consensus would not be reached on

the paragraphs dealing with militarization, the

president of the conference Willibald Pahr (Minister for Foreign Affairs, Austria) assembled a

small ad hoc group of “Friends of the President. ”

This device has been used successfully at previous

U.N. conferences to resolve complicated issues.

The United States agreed to participate actively;

as a result, the Friends of the President drafted

alternate paragraphs to replace the contested ones

(see app. G).

Although the three paragraphs written by the

Friends of the President were adopted without

debate in the final plenary session, the debate over

militarization of outer space was not yet resolved.

Before the formation of the Friends of the President, the Group of 77 (G-77) had circulated a position paper calling for a ban on the “testing, stationing, and deployment of any weapons in

space. ” During that final plenary session, Mexico moved to include this document as well as

another one concerning remote sensing and direct

broadcast satellites (DBS) as annexes to the report

‘U. N. Press Release OS/V/42, Aug. 17, 1982.

(see app. H and I). The United States objected on

the grounds that since the conference report, including the paragraphs drafted by the Friends of

the President, had been agreed to by consensus

it was inappropriate to attach an annex that

lacked the consent of all participants. This debate

was settled by adding a paragraph in the report

that referred to the G-77 document but did not

include it as an annex.

The United States had no easy or obvious

course to follow in dealing with the “militarization” issue at UNISPACE ’82. That the issue was

not on the agenda as called for in the U.N. resolutions establishing the conference was, strictly

speaking, correct. It was also true that lengthy

discussion of the issue would not resolve it, and

could distract the conference from more practical

issues on the agenda. Although the United States

has an interest in combating Soviet assertions that

the space shuttle is a “weapon” while Soviet A-sat

systems are not, it is virtually impossible to make

this case without agreeing that “weapons in

space, ” once properly defined, are bad. The

United States cannot agree that weapons in space

are incompatible with “peaceful uses of space”

while declining to negotiate on the prohibition or

limitation of those weapons. The general U.S. policy, that armaments are a deplorable necessity,

but that we seek appropriate and verifiable agreements to limit or reduce them, could be put to

good use in situations such as the UNISPACE ’82

debate if the United States had a policy on arms

control in space. Unless the United States formulates a position on further arms control measures

for space, resistance to discussing the issue whenever possible may be the only “damage-limiting”

strategy available to the United States (see app.

A).

DIRECT BROADCASTING BY SATELLITE

DBS constitutes both a threat and a promise countries to transmit educational, health, and

to developing countries. It is a threat because it other information services internally without

provides the potential to allow foreign countries building expensive ground-based infrastructures.

and private broadcasters to transmit programs directly to individuals, bypassing nationally con- Many developing countries (strongly supported

trolled distribution systems. The use of DBS also by the Soviets) want international restrictions and

has considerable promise since it would allow regulations placed on the originator of direct
39

Direct broadcast satellite conceptual illustration

broadcast services that spill over national boundaries. The United States opposes any restrictions

on this technology on the grounds that they would

be contrary to the concept of free flow of information as embodied in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the

U.N. General Assembly in 1948. *

The disagreements on DBS are not simply

North-South or even East-West conflicts. Within

the developed West, both Canada and Mexico

have expressed anxieties over the potential adverse

cultural affects of U.S. television programs that

will become available with new U.S. systems. The

legal subcommittee of COPUOS has discussed

—

‘This declaration states “Every[~ne has the right to treedom (~t

t~pln] on and expression. thl~ rl~ht Includes treedom to hold oplnlon~

wit h(ju t In terterence and to wek, rece) \re and impart Informatl(}n

I nd ]dea> throu~h media and re~ard]e>~ ~Jl Ir{ )nt ler~ ‘‘ U h’ (jenera]

4\wmbl\ Re<(~lut](~n 217 ( I 11 I [)ec IO IQ48

DBS and the issue of prior consent for many years

and failed to reach agreement on several draft

resolutions that would establish principles governing the use of this technology. Before UNISPACE

’82, the DBS debate at COPUOS had reached an

impasse.

The final conference report raises the issue of

prior consent to broadcast by stating that DBS

“could affect the sovereign rights of States”4 and

that it is “time for countries to agree on the legal

implications . . . of satellites for international

direct television broadcasting”. ’ A position paper

by the G-77 and submitted by Mexico went a step

further in its discussion of this issue; it states:*

The Group of 77 firmly hold the view that activities in the field of international direct television broadcasting through satellites should only

be conducted in full respect for the sovereignty

of states. In this regard the recognition by the international community of principles embodying:

a) broadcasting state’s responsibility, b) prior consultation and agreement between broadcasting

and receiving states, and c) the radio regulations

of the ITU, inter alia, are of utmost importance.

Given the strong feelings that DBS engenders,

the DBS debate at UNISPACE ’82 was remarkably

restrained. However, this issue was the source of

considerable controversy at the meeting of the

U.N, Special Political Committee Meeting in November 1982. This issue is discussed in detail in

chaper 5.

‘Report on the Second U N. Conference () n the [’eat et U] Llse\ {~t

Outer Space, A CONF. 101 10, August 1Q82, par. 308.

‘Ibid., par. 309 .

● As discussed above, this position paper 1> not part (~t th{’ lin~l

draft report but is mentioned in the report as a separate c (~nterc’n~ e

document.

REMOTE SENSING

Since the first use of military remote-sensing to object to satellite reconnaissance, provided inforsatellites by the United States and Soviet Union mation was not publicized or shared with other

in the early 1960’s, some states have raised ques- than close allies. However, when the U.S. civilian

tions about the right of a country to acquire im- Landsat system began operation in 1972, some

ages of other countries, and the further right to states questioned the propriety of distributing data

disseminate such data to third parties. The United about their mineral and other natural resources

States and the Soviet Union eventually agreed not to third parties. The U.S. policy of broad inter-
40

Photo credit: National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Landsat-D used for exploring the Earth from more

than 400 miles distant

national dissemination gives all parties equal access to information. In addition, through the

Agency for International Development, the

United States has provided developing countries

with assistance in the application of Landsat data

for national purposes.

Today, because many of these countries now

use Landsat data (80 m ground resolution) on a

daily operational basis, and because a new highresolution, commercially oriented system (the

French SPOT) will be flown in 1984, questions

about resolution limits, prior consent, pricing

policies, and data distribution have taken on new

meaning. SPOT is designed to provide ground image resolutions down to 10 m. The experimental

thematic mapper on Landsat 4 provides ground

resolution of 30 m or better. Such systems can

not only yield information regarding natural resources but also data on some military items.

Some countries favor restrictions on the ground

resolution of civilian satellite sensors; others support a legal regime that would require obtaining

the permission (“prior consent”) of sensed countries before acquiring data or selling them publicly, especially if this is done before the data are

available to the sensed country. These countries

argue that nations have sovereignty not only over

their natural resources, but also over information

about these resources.

The United States has repeatedly rejected prior

consent rules and limiting ground resolution on

the premise that any regime which controls resource information is incompatible with the U.N.

doctrine of the free flow of international information. The United States favors the most open

possible regime both for obtaining and disseminating remotely sensed data.

The political difficulties associated with remote

sensing were not raised in the draft conference

report. Instead, the draft report emphasized the

economic implications of remote sensing, and

called attention to: 1) the need for continued access to data from remote-sensing systems and,

2) the importance of efficiently coordinating existing and new systems for use by developing

countries. b Paragraph 172 of the draft report (par.

174 of the final report) had said:

. . . A possible situation in which data is not

available to the sensed State but is available for

commercial and other forms of exploitation by

another country has been a cause of concern to

a number of countries. It is therefore important

to reach agreement on principles governing satellite remote sensing.

In the final report of the conference (par. 174) the

wording was altered to say:

A possible situation in which data are not

available to the sensed State but are available for

commercial and other forms of exploitation by

another country has been a cause for concern to

a number of countries. The sensed State shall have

timely and non-discriminatory access under reasonable conditions to the primary data obtained

by remote sensing from outer space which relate

to its territory. It is therefore important to reach

agreement on principles governing satellite remote

sensing. Accordingly, the current discussions on

this in COPUOS should be completed expeditiously.

This amended paragraph, by recommending

“timely and nondiscriminato~ access [to data]

“’Draft Report of the Conference, ” A/CONF. 101/3, Apr. 20,

1982.
41

Current and Probable Landsat Ground Stations

1800 160 “ 140 “ 1200 1000 80“ 60” 40° 20” 0“ 20“ 40“ 60” 80” 100 “ 1200 1400 160° 18

I 1

I

I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Fairbanks, II I I

I

/ -

@ I

-

w \

Alaska

KI runa,

P = ! d 7 <

I i i

I

Jlllmllll l

NOTE Coverage c!rcles based on Landsat-3 reception (altitude 917 km)

SOURCE’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration

under reasonable conditions, ” cautiously addresses the fears of the developing countries that

prior access to data by industrialized nations will

result in loss of control of their own resources.

Still, it fails to address the matter of prior consent to distribute data by the sensed states. A more

radical approach to the issue of prior consent was

taken in the position paper submitted by Mexico

on behalf of the G-77. *

The Group of 77 firmly holds the view that activities in the field of remote sensing should be

carried out with full respect for the sovereign

rights of states, The Group of 77 believes that

sensed States should have timely and unhindered

access on a priority basis at nominal cost, to all

— —— .—

‘See app, H.

I l l I I I I

80“

60“

400

20“

0°

200

400

60“

80“

data and information obtained over their territories, Dissemination of such data and information derived from it to a third party should not

be done without the prior consent of the sensed

country. The Group of 77 urges UNISPACE ’82

to recommend, through the General Assembly,

to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space and its Legal Sub-Committee to finalize the

work on the elaboration of draft principles concerning remote sensing of the earth from space as

a matter of high priority.

Although both statements accept implicitly the

right of the sensing states to acquire data from

satellites, the crucial issue they touch on is data

dissemination to third parties. The difficulties that

might result from demands for prior consent to

distribute remote sensing data are discussed in

chapter 5.
4 2

GEOSTATIONARY ORBIT

Of all the possible orbits satellites can take

around the Earth, the geostationary orbit (GSO)

is both most useful and most restricted. This orbit

is a narrow band in the equatorial plane of the

Earth 35,800 km above its surface. Because objects in the GSO remain fixed with respect to

points on the Earth’s surface, almost all present

and projected civilian communications satellites

and some meteorological satellites are located there.

In recent years, certain portions of the geostationary arc have become congested electromagnetically. Physical congestion of the GSO also looms as

a possibility; the probability of collisions between

working GSO satellites, whose positions are highly

controlled, and uncontrolled obsolete satellites

grows each year. Use of the GSO has given rise

to two separate disputes.

Allocation of Orbital Slots and

Frequencies

The administrative responsibility for preventing electromagnetic interference in space now rests

with the International and Telecommunications

Union (ITU). The ITU registers and assigns satellite frequencies and orbital position requests on

a first-come first-served basis; any country or

organization that desires to place a satellite in orbit

can do so, provided it does not interfere with

other satellites. This manner of allocation and

assignment is supported by the United States and

other industrialized states, who argue that it permits the most efficient use of orbital and frequency

resources, However, many developing states object that a “first-come first-served” policy may

The Communications Problem

SOURCE National Aeronautics and Space Admlnlstratlon
4 3

result in the GSO and certain frequencies being

“used up” by industrialized countries before developing countries and regions can determine their

own needs. These states argue for “equitable and/

or guaranteed access” to ensure that these limited

resources will be available to them when needed.

Claims of the developing nations to “equitable

access” resulted in Resolution No. Spa 2-1,

adopted by the 1971 WARC (and included in the

Final Acts of WARC-79):

That the registration with the ITU of frequency

assignments for space radio communication services and their use should not provide permanent

priority for any individual country or groups of

countries and should not create an obstacle to the

establishment of space systems by other countries.

This 1971 position was reinforced at the ITU’S

Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference

in 1973 that amended the ITU Convention to include article 33, which reads:

In using frequency bands for space radio services members shall bear in mind that radio frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are

limited natural resources, that they must be used

efficiently and economically so that countries or

groups of countries may have equitable access to

both in conformity with the provisions of the

radio regulations according to their needs and the

technical facilities at their disposal.

The U.S. position is that technical advances can

continue to expand the usable frequency spectrum

and number of GSO slots sufficiently to satisfy

the world’s communication needs. New technology to reduce current orbital spacing and arc configuration will provide for a greater number of

satellites, and recent technological advances in the

use of higher frequencies (14/12 GHz and eventually 30/20 GHz) will meet the frequency requirements of all potential users.

The United States and other Western states op-

~ose a priori allocation of slots or frequencies, and

hey view any comprehensive plan for geostation-

~ry allocation as restrictive and inflexible. They

ear that prior restrictions may also impede tech-

~ical development of communications systems.

In discussions of the UNISPACE ’82 draft re-

)ort, the United States argued for language emphasizin g the potential of new technologies. Some

nations objected on the grounds that while new

technologies could expand the GSO’S potential,

they would also be more expensive, both for the

space and ground segments, than current technology. ’ The United States then supported wording

giving the ITU the responsibility for evolving “criteria for the most equitable and efficient usage of

the GSO and the RF spectrum” to ensure that this

issue would be reconciled in a forum more capable

of discussing its technical merits. * *

In a controversial paragraph (par. 150), the

draft report stated:

. . . it seems desirable that developed countries

shift their satellite communication system to a different frequency band (e. g., 11 /14 GHz), leaving

the 6/4 GHz band basically for use by developing countries. Developed countries should also be

encouraged to shift their high-density and transoceanic traffic to submarine cable or fibre-optic

systems, thereby decreasing the pressure on the

radio frequency spectrum and on the GSO.

Because of the disruptive effect that such a change

would have on domestic and international communications, the United States and other developed countries were prepared to oppose this paragraph vigorously. The paragraph was deleted

from the final conference report with little debate,

suggesting that though the developing world is

concerned with political access to the GSO there

is little agreement as to what, if any, technological solutions may be in their best interest.

Ownership of the GSO

The importance of the GSO, the unsettled status of the longstanding dispute in COPUOS as to

where outer space begins, and the desire of certain developing countries to exert greater leverage

in the international system have led to a contro-

—. ———. ..—

‘In artic]e 281 of the draft report the Unit CL] States ~u~~e~ted the

inclusion of the sentence: “Further, the newer techn(>lt~gie< that lead

to better utilization (e. g., better station-keeping, h]gher fITq Llen~ Ies,

shaped antenna beams, etc, ) should be adopted ] n ~(1 I a r as p(~ssible by all countries and international organizatlonq ‘ This \entence

appears in the final report in this fashion: “It is desirable tor all user~

(~t the ~eostatlonar~, c]rblt to keep in view the advantages of adoptI ng wherever pract ]cable, newer technologies which could ] n prac

tice facilitate more effective u~e <If the geostatlorlary or-bit. ”

* * Paragraph 284 of the draft rep~~rt <~t lanuar> I Q82 had >tated

that \uch cr]terla should be developed with the help (~t ITU; ” thl~

was changed t (1 “wit hin the ITLr,
44

versy over the ownership of the GSO. In 1976,

seven equatorial states, including Colombia, Ecuador, and Indonesia, issued the Bogota Declaration, which claimed sovereignty over the portion

of the geostationary arc above their respective territories in spite of the fact that the 1967 Outer

Space Treaty explicitly rejects sovereign claims

to outer space. The Bogota signatories argued that

the GSO was not in fact part of outer space but

a distinct region determined by the Earth’s gravitational pull. Support for this position by other developing countries has been mixed, partly because

ownership by any one nation contradicts the desire of many developing countries for “equitable

and/or guaranteed access” to the GSO. However,

the equatorial countries obtained the backing of

G-77 for a position paper which declares that “the

present regulatory mechanism for assigning orbit

positions and radio spectrum does not ensure

equitable access to this resource . . .“and that a

new regulatory mechanism is necessary which will

take into account “the particular needs of the developing countries including those of the equatorial countries . . .“* The final conference report

mentions the claims of the equatorial countries

without supporting them. * *

*See app. 1.

● *Paragraph 281 of the final report states:” Despite lack of agreement on defining the precise boundary between air space and outer

space, it is accepted by most nations that GSO is a part of outer

space and, as such, it is available for use by all States, in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. However, the equatorial

countries consider that GSO constitutes a physical phenomenon related to the reality of our planet in that its existence depends exclusively on its relation to gravitational phenomena generated by the

earth, and for this reason it should not be included in the concept

of outer space and its utilization should be regulated under a sui

generis regime. ”

TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE ROLE OF THE U.N.

IN SPACE AFFAIRS

If there was a single underlying theme to

UNISPACE ’82 it was the transfer of space technology from developed to developing nations.

Developing countries see the U.N. as the preferred

agent of deliberation and execution for most activities related to the New International Economic

Order and the New World Information Order. By

contrast, many developed countries, including the

United States, see the U.N. as cumbersome and

politicized, and therefore inappropriate for carrying out many technology transfer programs.

The basic justification for increased access to

space technology and services is that it promotes

development. The final report cites many specific

examples to support this view. It raises the issue

first in paragraph 8 by invoking the example of

the 1979 U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD), whose conclusions are characterized as “in general, applicable to the field of space science and technology. ”7 It then cites specifics from the UNCSTD

report. UNCSTD was a multinational conference

similar to UNISPACE ’82 that dealt with the en7Report on the Second U .N. Conference on the Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space, op. cit., subpar. 8, ref. 2 .

tire range of technical issues. That conference was

noteworthy for its numerous attacks on developed

countries for monopolizing science and technology. The developing countries demanded largescale transfers of technical hardware and knowhow to the developing world.

Among the UNCSTD conclusions quoted approvingly in the final UNISPACE ’82 report are

assertions that eliminating underdevelopment

“presupposes an equitable distribution and creation of scientific and technological capabilities of

the world. The report extends these arguments

in paragraph 11, where it says that:

Space technology can be a powerful tool to accelerate national development: it provides a way

of leap-frogging over obsolete technologies and

getting away from percolation and trickle-down

models of development for which developing

countries do not have the time . . . It is therefore

necessary that all countries be able to have access to space technology.

At the March COPUOS meeting, some devel

oped countries objected both to the assignmen

‘Ibid.
—

4 5

of guilt (and the implied duty to make redress)

for the uneven distribution of space technology

and to the exaggerated claims made for the ability of space technology to foster development.

They suggested wording to the effect that:

Space technology is by no means the complete

solution to a country’s problems neither can there

be any generalized prescriptions for the use of

space technology.

This wording appears in paragraph 12 of the final

report.

During the preparations for UNISPACE ’82,

numerous new and expanded responsibilities for

the U.N. itself were debated. In the original version of the draft report (before the March meetings

of COPUOS), these coalesced into a proposal to

establish a U.N. Centre for Outer Space Affairs,

which would conduct research, provide technical

assistance to developing countries, and disseminate space-related information. The Centre was

to be independent of (and in large part would supplant) activities of the U.N. Outer Space Affairs

Division and to have its own staff and budget,

both substantially larger than under present

arrangements.

This proposal ran into considerable opposition

from several quarters. Within the U.N. bureaucracy, some officials saw the center as encroaching

on activities already performed by a number of

independent U.N. agencies, e.g., the World Meteorological Organization, U.N. Development Programme, and the U.N. Centre for Science and

Technology. Many countries, including the

United States, while not opposing the concept of

the Centre, objected to the added expense. The

Soviet Union, given its dominant position in the

Secretariat of the Committee on Political and

Security Council Affairs which oversees the Outer

Space Affairs Division, opposed any diminution

of the powers of OSAD.

As a consequence, the second draft emphasized

fim-dy coordinating activities with other appropriate U.N. agencies but did not recommend establishing the new Centre. The final report represents

a compromise: it requests the General Assembly

to consider whether it would be best to establish

a center or to expand the present OSAD. In adopting the conference report in December, 1982, the

General Assembly attempted to do both. It established an International Space Information Service

to provide direction to existing data banks and

information sources. 9 This is a much diluted version of the original concept of the center. The

General Assembly also requested the Secretary

General to strengthen OSAD.

‘U.N. Dec. A/SPC 37 L,7; par. 8,
Chapter 5

UNISPACE 582 in Perspective
Chapter 5

UNISPACE ’82 in Perspective

UNISPACE ’82 is unlikely to have a significant

effect, either positive or negative, on the long-term

space goals of the United States. The chief product of UNISPACE ’82, the conference report,

which has since been endorsed by the United Nations (U. N. ) General Assembly, reflects a limited

consensus among the industrialized and developing countries. Because the U.S. approach to

UNISPACE ’82 was neither a stunning success nor

a dismal failure the conference may seem unimportant. * It is useful, however, to view such conferences, and U.S. participation in them, not as

discrete phenomena focused on one set of technological issues, but rather as episodes in a continuing series of discussions involving the structure

of international economics and politics. Attitudes

‘One reviewer ot OTA’S efforts to evaluate UNISPACE ’82 had

thi> to say: “I believe that fUNISPACE ’82 t IS not an important question. It seems to me that Congress hardly needs to be reminded that

earl y involvement, selectlon of a statured and “permanent” leader

and staft, etc. , IS necessary to perform at our best at such convocations. Moreover, I expect, if the facts mere really known, the L~. S.

results were neither a raving success nor a dismal failure. . I seriously doubt that there was any permanent damage from what did

or did not transpire at UN’ I SPACE. Some of the countries’ arguments

are lust not changeable; in other areas it is not all that important

what other countries th Ink and do. Moreover, there will be recurring forums where the U.S. position can be expanded. Some of those

forums will undoubtedly be more important than UNISPACE-

\’lenna ‘ For a different viewpoint, see app. D.

and policies created at a conference such as

UNISPACE ’82 affect the debate on similar issues

in other fora such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) or the U.N. Special Political Committee. The interplay of ideas among

multilateral conferences can have a cumulative effect which could work to the net disadvantage of

the United States. The direct broadcast satellite

(DBS) resolution passed in the U.N. General Assembly in December 1982 (discussed in ch. 4) is

one example of this problem.

In several respects UNISPACE ’82 was typical

of other conferences dealing primarily with developing country issues. In it, the Group of 77

(G-77’) demonstrated their ability to overcome national differences and present a united face to the

“North. ” Some G-77 countries criticized the

United States (primarily for the militarization of

space), denounced Israel (primarily for the invasion of Lebanon) and demanded new legal principles and strengthened international organizations.

Nevertheless, UNISPACE ’82 does offer an opportunity to review the development of international

space policy, the role that the United States and

its various agencies play in this process, and the

potential effect of this process on public and private U.S. interests.

INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLICY AND THE U.N.

The G-77 will continue their strategy of using

global conferences of this sort to encourage

changes in global resource allocation and technology transfer. The acquisition of space technology,

because of the prestige it conveys and its potential

to assist in development, will continue to be a valuable political target for the G-77. The United

States, in order to protect its political and economic relationships with both the “South” and its

OECD partners, as well as to ensure technical coordination of certain critical space systems (e. g.,

frequency allocation at ITU), will have little

choice but to participate in such conferences. They

present an opportunitv not onlv to shape accommodations with developing country demands, but

also to gain specific diplomatic and commercial

advantages vis-a-vis our competitors. I Some of

the typical complications inherent in effective

participation in global conferences emerged at

IJNISPACE ’82.

U.S. international space policy depends directly

on domestic space poIicy.—It would be advantageous if the U.S. delegates could attend global

conferences with a set of clear policies regarding

‘See generally, A Handbook for U, S, Participation in Multilateral

Diplomacy: The U, S. and U.N, Global Conferences; prepared for

the Department of State by The Futures Group (N. Graham, R.

Kauffman, M. Oppenheimer), September 1981.

4 9
50

the entire range of space activities. Such clarity

for all cases is impossible in a pluralist society

where different administrations and different interest groups significantly affect both the allocation of resources for space technology and how

this technology is applied (e.g., by the public or

the private sector).

At several points during the conference preparation and at UNISPACE ’82, issues arose that might

have been resolved to benefit the United States

had the delegation been able to present a clear

statement of U.S. policy. For example, the first

draft of the UNISPACE ’82 report called on the

United States to ensure the continuity of remote

sensing data. Because the future of the Landsat

system was (and continues to be) uncertain, at the

March/April 1982 meeting of COPUOS this

wording was removed at the request of the United

States. Nations that have invested substantially

in the use of Landsat data or the purchase of

ground receiving and processing equipment regard

this absence of promised continuity with deep

concern. What the United States is willing to accept as the “institutionalized confusion” inherent

in a democracy, others regard as yet another sign

of U.S. unwillingness to state its international

priorities clearly and precisely.

Whether or not a commitment to Landsat continuity would have been in the best interests of

the United States is a subject that will be discussed

in the full report.2 In any case, the ability to make

such a commitment might have been used as a

bargaining chip when addressing developing

world demands for a prior consent regime to govern remote sensing. It might have also prevented

nations from looking too eagerly to the French

SPOT system. Conferences such as UNISPACE

’82 offer the United States the opportunity to explain its positions and to inform the world of the

many complications of maintaining a broad multidisciplinary space program in a free society.

G-77 solidarity is both a strength and a weakness for their causes.—The G-77 demonstrated

convincingly at UNISPACE ’82 that unity was

their strongest weapon. From the beginning of the

conference the G-77 met and developed positions

—— —.—-—.

‘Lntemational Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA report, in preparation.

that stressed their agreement on the problems of

the use of space technology rather than on their

disagreements over what was to be done about

such problems. However, as one author has

pointed out, the costs of preserving this unity are

considerable: 3

(Agreement is reached by finding grand issues

over which there is consensus or by adding together each country’s claims and concerns. While

this “least common denominator” approach

allows for agreement—and unity—it often prevents substantive negotiations with the North.

Demagoguery tends to triumph rather than negotiable moderation. The G-77 is inflexible; simply stated, priorities cannot be decided upon, it

is difficult to decide what demand to give up, and

the negotiations can rarely be moved to the “who

gets what and when” stage.

Evidence of the truth of this assertion was in

abundance at UNISPACE ’82. When developing

a position on the use of geosynchronous orbit

(GSO), the G-77 included the demands of the

equatorial nations, even though many G-77’ nations oppose such demands. * Differences of opinion over the need for a U.N. Centre for Outer

Space prevented either strong opposition or support for this proposal from the developing world:

the proposal as it appears in the report is diluted

and ineffective. The idea that the developed countries move their communication services out of

the 6/4 GHz band, a radical proposal thought by

some to have potentially great benefits for G-77

countries, vanished from the report with little

debate. Indeed, most of the recommendations and

proposals for studies that do appear in the conference report would, if instituted, give relatively little assistance to the developing countries.

The apparent unity of the G-77 on some issues

may sometimes make it seem that the best the

United States can hope for is to ‘limit the damage”

to U.S. interests in international conferences. For

example, the United States knew well before

UNISPACE ’82 that G-77 countries were likely to

present a nearly united front on the GSO, on

DBS, and on remote sensing. It was also clear that

these countries would raise the question of “militarization” of space.

3A Handbook for U. S. Participation in Multilateral Diplomacy,

op. cit., p.26.

*Discussed in ch. 2.
51

Because the G-77 consitute a relatively tenuous

coalition, consensus on any given issue may be

superficial and may allow more room for maneuver than is readily apparent. On the “militarization” issue, for example, the United States was

not, as some expected, saddled with unilateral responsibility for the “arms race in space, ” assailed

for developing the space shuttle for use as a “weapen, ” or condemned for all its military space activities. What did irritate many delegations, in and

out of the G-77, was U.S. unwillingness—until

the last possible moment—to acknowledge that

UNISPACE ’82 had any right to discuss the “militarization” issue. In retrospect, it appears that the

United States might have maintained its basic

position that the Committee on Disarmament in

Geneva was the proper place for substantive treatment of the militarization of outer space and at

the same time have acknowledged the importance

of the issue to many UNISPACE ’82 delegations.

G-77 found an easy “rallying point” in what was

widely regarded as U.S. “stonewalling” of the

militarization issue. The initial hostility aroused

on this point was then exploited by those opposed

to the U.S. position on other issues. As a result,

the fragile consensus of G-77 was hardened rather

than fragmented.

How a U.S. delegation responds to the particular pressures and complications of a given global

conference is a matter of tactics and will depend,

to some degree, on the personality and experience

af the delegation leadership. In the light of the

experience with the G-77 on the militarization

issue, the decision, made well before the conference, to attempt to “limit the damage” on it at

UNISPACE ’82 may have been ill-advised.

The future of consensus decision in internationd space affairs is in danger .—This method of decision involves patient and often frustrating negotiations intended to reach results (e. g., a plan of acion, a statement of principles, or specific treaty

anguage) agreeable to all participants. COPUOS

has used consensus successfully to reach agreenent on five international space treaties.4 No rule

if law binds COPUOS to the consensus method;

ather, in 1961 the 28 member nations agreed to

4 See generally; E, Cjalloway, “Consensus Decisionmaking by the

nited Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses ot Outer Space, ”

urnal of Space bw’, spring, 1979.

use consensus, unless agreement was impossible,

in which case decisions would be taken by majority vote.5 More recently, the expansion of

COPUOS to 54 nations and the political stalemate

between the “North” and “South” over the issues

involved in remote sensing, DBS, and GSO, have

strained the consensus process.

At UNISPACE ’82 two issues nearly came to

a vote. The first was the adoption of the rapporteur’s summary of a debate on the Middle East;

the second was the inclusion of two G-77 position papers in the report. * A vote on these issues

was avoided by the last minute plea of the conference president, Willibald Pahr, that the contending parties attempt to reach a compromise.

After informal discussion, they struck a compromise and the consensus procedure was saved

(see ch. 4). The subjects of the disagreements are

perhaps of less importance than the fact that many

nations were prepared to abandon consensus decisionmaking in favor of voting. This fact was confirmed at the Special Political Committee meeting

of November 1982, which was held, among other

reasons, to adopt the 1982 COPUOS report and

the UNISPACE ’82 report in order to transmit

them to the U.N. General Assembly for action.

The Special Political Committee, noting that

COPUOS had been unable to reach an agreement

on a set of principles to govern DBS and responding to a resolution introduced by a number of

developing countries, decided to bring the DBS

issue to a vote. b The resolution passed by a large

majority. Over the protest of the United States,

the U.N. General Assembly adopted a set of nonbinding principles governing the use of direct

broadcast satellites—principles endorsing the right

to “prior consent” of the nations receiving such

broadcasts. * *

—-——.—.

51bld.

*For a summary of the debate on the G-77 position papers, see

ch. 4.

‘A SPC/37~L.5 Rev.1; Nov. 19, 1982. Preparation of an International Convention on Principles Governing the Use by States of

Artifical Earth Satellites for Direct Television Broadcasting (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Kenya, Mexico, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines,

Romania, Uruguay, and Venezuela: revised draft resolution).

**The relevant section reads:

Consultations and agreements between States

A State which intends to establish or authorize the establishment

of an international direct telewsion broadcasting satellite service shall

(continued on p. 52)
52

Since these DBS principles are nonbinding, their

precise wording is less important than the trend

that they foster, viz., a willingness to bring

political pressure to bear on the “North,” even at

the expense of the consensus process. It is now

(cent’d)

without delay notify the proposed receiving State or States of such

intention and shall promptl y enter into consultation with any of

those States which so requests.

An international direct television broadcasting satellite service shall

only be established after the conditions set forth in paragraph 1 above

have been met and on the basis of agreements and/or arrangements

in conformity with the relevant instruments of the International

Telecommunication Union and in accordance with these principles.

With respect to the unavoidable overspill of the radiation of the

satellite signal, the relevant instruments of the International Telecomlikely that majority voting will be used to resolve

other difficult space issues. Consequently, the

United States can expect to face demands, backed

by the threat of a vote, to change its position on

prior consent for remote sensing and equitable access to the GSO.

It is essential that the United States make the

best use of its diplomatic and technical resources.

Conferences such as UNISPACE ’82 offer one

means by which to accomplish this goal. Clearly

articulated positions, well thought-out proposals,

and creative diplomacy can do much to encourage

the idea that, at least in space, other nations would

do best to work with the United States rather than

munication Union

THE USE

shall be exclusively applicable. against it.

OF INITIATIVES AT UNISPACE ’82

In order to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to

international cooperation in space, the U.S. delegation proposed seven mulitlateral projects at

UNISPACE ’82:

●

●

●

●

●

Global Habitability. An international

cooperative research effort to obtain data on

changes of the environment that would affect the habitability of the Earth.

Communication Satellite Technology Seminar. A 2-week seminar for representatives

from developing countries designed to promote the practical application of space communication technology.

Study on Development of International

Emergency Disaster Assistance Communication System. A study to be undertaken by

the Outer Space Affairs Division in consultation with interested international organizations.

Conference on Disaster Monitoring and Early

Warning. A 5-day conference given by the

U.S. Agency for International Development

(AID) on using space technology for early

warning of disasters such as flood, drought

and famine.

Landsat Data Indexes. Compilation of a set

of indexes and related maps designed to encourage the use of Landsat data collected

over the years.

●

●

Policy of Satellite Removal. Recognizes value

of policy of removing, when practical and

feasible, satellites from GSO when their useful lifetimes are complete.

Annual Meeting of Space Technology Experts. An annual 2-day meeting of representatives of government agencies responsible for

space and space-related activities to be held

just before the annual meeting of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS.

Consistent with the leadership that the United

States has always shown in international space

affairs, the United States was the only country

to present specific proposals for international

cooperation at UNISPACE ’82. However, because

of the constrained preparation time and the lack

of funds to implement long-term, expensive projects, it was difficult to reap the maximum politica’

advantage from these proposals.

The proposals were presented by James Beggs,

the head of the U.S. delegation, in his opening

speech, and explicated at special “poster sessions’

held during the conference. Because of the packec

conference schedule and the fact that the room

in which the poster sessions were held was a con

siderable distance from the formal meeting halls

attendance at the poster sessions was meager. Thi

was partly because the U.S. delegation was un
53

able, because of time constraints, to make known

its needs for meeting rooms well in advance of

the conference. However, when the United States

did make its request known, the UNISPACE ’82

secretariat initially refused, and later only reluctantly agreed to assist the delegation.

Given the limitations of the facilities assigned

by the Secretariat, the U.S. delegation might yet

have used the poster sessions more effectively had

the proposals been better integrated into the entire U.S. effort. It might have been politically

desirable for the United States to seek joint sponsors for its proposals or at least to involve other

countries in a debate on their merits during the

course of the conference. This tactic would be less

important for proposals, such as the Landsat Indexes or the Removal of Satellites from Orbit,

which are unilateral in nature and made to demonstrate a cooperative spirit rather than to attract

cooperation on a specific project. However, for

projects such as the Global Habitability Study,

which require international collaboration to be

successful and for which the United States was

not prepared to supply the funds, early and active participation by OECD and developing countries would seem essential.

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE

NASA/STATE DEPARTMENT RELATIONSHIP

UNISPACE ’82 provided an example of how

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the State Department coordinate

their differing activities in the context of a global

conference. Prior to UNISPACE ’82, NASA and

the State Department jointly developed conference

positions and proposals. During the conference,

although the Administrator of NASA was head

of the U.S. delegation, the State Department was

primarily responsible for articulating and defending U.S. positions. NASA, in addition to assisting

the State Department in their efforts, also concerned itself with meeting other nations to plan

for future international cooperative agreements. *

The ability to use space technology to accomplish diplomatic ends is a complex task. International space policy in the United States has

evolved over the years, changing in response to

both technology and the global political environment. The major actors in this process have been

the President, NASA, the Congress, the State Department, the National Security Council, the domestic user community (including government

agencies), and the private sector. Although all of

these actors have contributed significantly, the

—— .-

*After UNISPACE ’82, NASA representatives stated that they conlucted over 30 separate bilateral meetings during the conference.

great bulk of the task of putting international

space policy into practice has fallen to NASA.

In 1958, President Eisenhower recognized that

it would not be in the interest of the United States

if all of NASA’s international arrangements had

to be in the form of treaties subject to the advice

and consent of the Senate. Therefore, when signing the National Aeronautics and Space Act he

cautioned that the act did not preclude “less formal arrangements for cooperation.”7 It is through

these “less formal arrangements” that NASA has

conducted the majority of its international ventures.

The fact that NASA conducts its own international activities does complicate the use of space

technology in the conduct of foreign policy.

NASA’S role as a research and development or-

*Section 205 of the NAS Act states: ‘The (NASA) Administration,

under the foreign policy guidance of the President, may engage in

a program of international cooperation in work done pursuant to

this Act, and in the peaceful application of the results thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. ”

“White House Press Release, July 29, 1958. See also Statements

by Presidents of the United States on International Cooperation in

Space. Chronology: October 1957-August 1971, prepared by Eugene

NI. Emme, Director, NASA Historical Staff; Senate Committee on

Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Senate Document No. Q2-40, Q2d

Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 24, 1Q71, pp. 13-14,
54

ganization compels it to seek partners with which

it can accomplish technological goals (see app. B).

The State Department, the foreign policy organ

of the American Government, pursues international relationships that accomplish political and

diplomatic tasks. Because the State Department

lacks the technical expertise to deal with space

technology it has traditionally deferred to NASA’s

judgment on most international space activities.

Examining the nature of the NASA/State Department relationship in light of its contribution

to the implementation of U.S. foreign policy raises

a number of questions. What degree of control

should the State Department exercise over

ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

Although most space activities have been previously sponsored or controlled by the Government, the U.S. private sector has played a major

role in developing space technology and building

space systems, especially for satellite communications. In addition to supplying the necessary satellite hardware, it pioneered creative management

techniques to ensure efficient global communications. In the mid-1980’s additional services will

be available through direct broadcast satellites

owned and operated by the private sector. Private

corporations are now exploring the possibility of

providing remote sensing, weather, and space

transportation services. By the end of this century the private sector could be the major civilian

actor in space.

In the United States, the government has consistently encouraged the involvement of private

enterprise in its space programs. g In fact, the

United States is nearly unique in the world in its

separation of the Government and private sector.

Because the role of private industry varies within

each of the nations of the world, and because

governments and not private industry enter into

international space agreements, it is important

that the U.S. Government work diligently to protect U.S. private interests in space. This is par-

——. .

“Civilian Space Polic,v and Applications (Washington, D. C,: U.S.

Congress, Office ot Technology Assessment, June 1982), OTASTI-177,

NASA’S international activities? Should access to

NASA expertise and cooperation be used to attract support for U.S. positions on space affairs?

Should the State Department be allowed to use

space technology to bargain for international support on nonspace related issues? Would “politicizing” NASA work to the net advantage or disadvantage of the United States?

Examining these questions in full is beyond the

scope of this report. They will be discussed in

OTA’S, forthcoming assessment, International

Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space

Activities.

ticularly important because the foreign customer:

of space technology are likely to be governments

UNISPACE ’82 demonstrated that although co

ordination between the Government and U.S. in

dustry is difficult, the private sector can be an ex

tremely valuable resource in U.S. participation

at global conferences. U.S. industry contribute

members and advisors to the delegation, and ex

hibits of U.S. space technology.

The participants from the private sector wer

able to assist the delegation by offering indc
55

~:;:. j

Launching of S6S-3, the first commercial satellite to

be placed in orbit during flight of STS-5

*

Photo credits National Aeronauts and Space Admln(strat/on

Space shuttle Columbia (STS-5) blasting off with Astronauts Allen, Lenoir, Overmyer, and Brand
56

pendent assessments of how events at the conference might affect U.S. commercial interests or

domestic politics. Aside from their advisory role,

these participants also engaged in informal discussions that allowed them to gather information

from potential customers.

In addition to the formal conference activities,

UNISPACE ’82 sponsored an exhibit of national

space programs. Uncertainty over whether the

United States would attend UNISPACE ’82 hindered U.S. preparations for the exhibit. Once the

decision was made to attend the conference, Vice

President George Bush met personally with several U.S. aerospace chief executives, urged them

to attend UNISPACE ’82, and assured them of

Federal help. The Government financed the redesign of the exhibit hall in Vienna and provided

transportation of the exhibits to Vienna. This close

cooperation between the Government and the private sector resulted in an impressive and informative U.S. exhibit at UNISPACE ’82.

Delays in the U.S. commitment to attend

UNISPACE ’82 and in naming the delegation

caused some difficulty in making the most effective use of the private sector. Some private sector participants at UNISPACE ’82 reported after

the conference that they felt underused or that

they were given little direction at the conference.

This complaint was not unique to UNISPACE ’82.

A recent report prepared for the Department of

State noted:9

Precisely defining (the role of the private sector members of a delegation) is a problem area

which has frequently plagued U.S. participation

in multilateral diplomacy. Unfortunately, the resulting dissatisfaction among non-governmental

members has tended to negate the potential benefits that were expected to accrue by naming them

to the delegation in the first place. Their utility

as advisors on various issues before the conference

is minimized, and they are unlikely to be interested in playing a facilitating, public relations or

lobbying role during the postconference implementation phase. Much potential good will and

support is often lost.

“A Handbook for 11. S. Participation in Multilateral Diplomacy,

op. cit., pg. 119.

Advertisement from AW&S~ May 1982

Private sector advisors, with their valuable

technical, organizational, and negotiating skills,

can assist delegations at similiar conferences by

working out innovative positions and by gathering international support for these positions. A

more creative use of the private sector might also

assist many delegates from the developing world

to understand the critical role that the U.S. private

sector has played in the growth of technology. This

will be particularly important in future conferences on outer space as the U.S. private sector

begins to move into the ownership and management of remote sensing, DBS, space-manufacturing, and space transportation systems.

The difficulty of integrating the private sector

into the U.S. delegation demonstrates the necessity of spending enough time and effort preparing

private sector participants. For example, one

private sector adviser at UNISPACE ’82 was informed on his arrival in Vienna that he was
57

responsible for interacting with delegates from

several African nations. The adviser received no

directions regarding the purpose of his “interactions” or the issues that might be of special concern to the African delegates.

The role the private sector plays in the development of long-term U.S. space policy is also of

crucial importance. On this subject a 1976 State

Department report stated:’”

Traditionally and factually, U.S. industry and

U.S. Government have operated in a less-thanfully-cooperative manner. An atmosphere of suspicion as to motives on either side makes for arm’s

length relationships. . . . It is eminently appropriate that the Department of State recognize that,

as the central repository for competence in dealing with U.S. relations with the rest of the nations

of the world and with the principal responsibility

for doing so, it must develop a productive relationship with the private sector which will permit and encourage the employment of appropriate

technologies in support of U.S. diplomatic initia-

— . — ] “T K ~lennan, “Technology and Foreign Atfairs, a Report to

Deputy Secretary CJI State Charles \\’. Robinson, ” December 1976,

p.33.

tives. And, indeed, it would be even more useful

if the Department could involve appropriate representatives of the private sector in certain aspects

of its own planning where industrial technology

is to be involved.

An alert and well staffed OES (Bureau of

Oceans and International Environmental and

Scientific Affairs) should be continuously active

in developing an understanding of the interests,

general and specific, of individual industrial companies and of specific segments of industry in

overseas activities. In effect, a loose partnership

of interests—governmental and industrial—

should be fostered. This will require that OES

recruit a small number of professionals with a

strong desire to play a creative role in reestablishing and further extending the preeminence of the

United States in most areas of technology. These

should be persons with broad experience in industry or public policy deliberations.

As the number and type of private sector space

activities increase it may be appropriate to form

an industrial advisory group with expertise in specific space technologies. Such an advisory group

could aid in conference participation, but, more

important, it could be a useful means to conduct

long-term policy formation and analysis.
Appendixes
Appendix A

The “Militarization’Y Issue at UNISPACE ’82

Historical Context

In formal speeches at the UNISPACE ’82 Conference, the Secretary General of the United Nations

(U. N.) and most of the national delegations attending

expressed concern about the “militarization” of outer

space. But precisely what constitutes militarization of

outer space has long been a matter of debate. In January 1957, before the first Sputnik went up, the United

States had proposed at the U.N. that an international

inspection system be set up to assure that:

. . . future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes . . .1

In 1958, the Soviet Union proposed:

A ban on the use of cosmic space for military purposes and an undertaking by the States to launch rockets

into cosmic space only under an agreed international

program.

In voting for the U.N. resolution setting up an ad hoc

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the

United States recognized:

. . . the common aim that outer space should be used

for peaceful purposes only.

The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958

begins with a declaration that:

. . . it is the policy of the United States that activities

in space should be devoted to peaceful proposes for the

benefit of all mankind.

The Soviets in this early period identified “peaceful”

with “nonmilitary.”2 The United States, on the other

hand, interpreted “peaceful” as “nonaggressive. ” Military activities in space would therefore be permissible as long as they did not involve aggression.

Neither of these definitions proved very helpful in

~anning specific activities from space. On the one

land, nearly every overtly civilian space activity can

have military applications: communications, weather

observation, remote imaging, geodetics, and navigaion services can all be used directly or indirectly for

nilitary purposes. Even had it been technically feasi-

)le, to open up national space systems to intense international scrutiny and regulation to assure the absence

)f military application would have been too much for

lither the United States or the Soviet Union to accept.

‘UN. document A C. I 783, Jan. 14, 19.57, General Assembly official recrds, 11th sess,, agenda ttem 22, p. 6.

‘Cf. Robert L Bridge, “International Law and Military Act]wties in outer

pace, ” Akron bw Rewew, vol. 13, No 4, p 658 This interpretation would

ave banned long-range ball]stic m]sslles, which pass through space on their

ay to target The Soviets coupled the]r call for the nonmtl]tanzat]on of space

Ith a demand for the withdrawal of all forces from foreign bases.

On the other hand, once it is admitted that banning

all military activity {rem space is impractical, where

is the line drawn between “aggressive” and “nonaggressive”? Until 1963, the Soviet Union insisted that reconnaissance satellites were illegal violations of national

sovereignty, and ought to be banned. From the U.S.

point of view, reconnaissance satellites helped maintain peace by providing warning of any preparations

for surprise attack; from the Soviet point of view, reconnaissance satellites could make a surprise attack

easier by pinpointing the attacker’s targets. With the

1972 treaty limiting antiballistic missiIe systems, the

Soviet Union and the United States agreed that reconnaissance satellites—one of the “National Technical

Means of Verification’ ’—were legitimate and that, indeed, it would be a violation of the treaty to interfere

with their monitoring of treaty compliance. 3

The United States and the Soviet Union did agree

in 1963 to a U.N. resolution in which they stated their

intentions not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of

“mass destruction. ” This resolution formed the basis

for article IV of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which

formalized the agreement.

The parties to that treaty recognized:

. . . the common interest of all mankind in the progress

of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful

purposes.

But it did not prohibit the use of space for other than

“peaceful” purposes. In fact, it provides only that:

The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by

all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful

purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial

bodies shall be forbidden.

By implication then, the latter activities (except for the

testing of weapons of mass destruction, banned by the

1963 limited nuclear test ban treaty) are not forbidden elsewhere in outer space.

Recent Context

Antisatellite Weapons

Although the United States and the Soviet Union

have agreed to keep weapons of mass destruction out

—. ..—— 3

0n the early Soviet and U S poslt;ons on reconnaissance satellites, cf

Gerald Martin Steinberg, The Leg]tirrration of Reconna~ssance Satellites An

Example of Informal Arms Control Negotiation, doctoral d]ssertatlon, Cornell University, 1981.

61
62

of Earth orbit, they have by no means agreed to keep

weapons out of space. Ballistic missiles, when tested,

pass into and out of space, as they would if actually

armed with nuclear weapons. Between 1967 and 1971,

the Soviet Union tested a weapon which appeared to

some to be inconsistent with the spirit of the Outer

Space Treaty: a fractional orbital bombardment system, or FOBS. Instead of following a ballistic trajectory, the FOBS rockets went into partial orbit, which

would have allowed them to avoid the northern radars

of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning Line. *

In the last two decades both sides have tested weapons intended for use in space. Antiballistic missile

systems would operate in space (ABM’s based in space,

however, would be constrained by the 1972 ABM treaty). In fact, U.S. research and development ABM’s

based at Kwajalein Island in the South Pacific were

tested and had some operational capability as antisatellite weapons. In 1964, the United States declared

operational a nuclear-armed antisatellite rocket based

on Johnston Island, southwest of Hawaii. The system

was dismantled in 1975.

Since 1967, the Soviets have tested an antisatellite

weapon about 20 times (according to the trade press),4

This nonnuclear weapon goes into a partial or full orbit, then approaches the target satellite closely enough

to damage it by exploding into a hail of shrapnel. This

weapon is based on the ground and launched aboard

a large rocket, derived from the old Soviet SS-9 ICBM.

The Department of Defense considers the Soviet antisatellite system to be operational.

For its part, the U.S. Air Force has been developing

an aircraft-based antisatellite weapon that should be

much faster and more flexible than the Soviet system.

The ASAT Talks

In 1978 and 1979, the United States and the Soviet

Union held three sets of talks on the possibility of

limiting antisatellite weapons. A fourth session had

been informally scheduled for February 1980, but, in

the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the

Carter administration declined to meet with the Soviets

again. In his statement of space policy, President

Reagan mentioned that the possibility of arms control

in space would continue to be a matter for “study. ”s

.

● Some 18 missile silos at a Soviet test site were considered by U.S. intelligence as likely launch pads for the FOBS; most of these silos would have

been dismantled had the United States ratified the SALT II Treaty, In any

case, given U.S. early warning satellite capabilities, the FOBS would be of

little value to a Soviet surprise attack, The U.S. military has never considered

a FOBS to be worth developing.

4

See “Soviet ASAT Test Called ‘Carbon Copy’ of One Last Year, ” Aerospace Daily, June 22, 1982, p. 283, and “Soviets Launch Second Satellite intercept in Nine Months, ” Aviation Week& Space Technology, Feb. 9, 1981,

pp. 29-30.

“’The White House Fact Sheet: National Space Policy” (Washington: Office of the White House Press Secretary, July 4, 1982. )

In September of 1982, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency told a Senate Foreign

Relations Committee subcommittee that the issue was

very complex and difficult, and that the administration had been unable as yet to prepare a negotiating

position. 6

Soviet Positioning on “Militarization”

The United States, then, has accepted the onus for

delaying further talks on the control of antisatellite

weapons. In the meanwhile, Soviet propaganda and

diplomacy have been working to enhance the international image of the Soviets on the space “militarization” issue while fostering criticism of the United

States. In 1981, the Soviets began what one analyst

calls “Brezhnev’s Peace Offensive. ”7

The Soviets expressed their willingness to participate

in a summit conference, to negotiate a Nordic region

nuclear free zone, to have a moratorium on new missile deployments in Europe. They have joined the

Western allies in negotiations on long-range nuclear

weapons in Europe. They have resumed strategic arms

limitation talks (renamed START by the Reagan administration) with the United States despite the U.S.

failure to ratify the long-negotiated SALT II Treaty.

In August 1981, the Soviets submitted to the U.N.

a “Draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of

weapons of any kind in outer space. ” In his covering

letter to the Secretary-General of the U. N., Soviet

Foreign Minister Gromyko pointed out that the existing international agreements on space did not preclude

the stationing in space of weapons not covered by tht

definition of weapons of mass destruction. “Consequently, ” he wrote, “the danger of the militarization

of outer space still exists and has recently been increas

ing. ”a

Soviet propaganda has made it clear that the Sovie

Union places the blame for this increasing danger or

the United States. The Soviet position is that the Sovie

space program has always been purely peaceful in nat

ure: since 1958, according to Gromyko, the Sovie

Union:

. . . invariably stated and continues to state that space

should be a sphere of exclusively peaceful co- operation.

A 1981 commentary by a Soviet writer in th

Moscow journal International Affairs is typical c

aTestimony of Eugene V. Rostow before a subcommittee of the Senate Fo

eign Relations Committeer Sept. 20, 1982. U.S. Congress, Senate Commi

tee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, Intern

tional Operations and Environment, Arms Control and the Militarization

Space Hearing, 97th Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 20, 1982 (Washington, D. C.: U.

Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 7-8.

‘See Joseph G. Whelan, “Brezhnev’s Peace Offensive, 1981, ” Congression

Research Service, report No, 82-96S, May 17, 1982.

OU.N, General Assembly, Doc, A136/192, August 1981.
63

Soviet propaganda on the militarization of Space. The

Soviet Union, said the commentary:

. . . is doing everything possible to preclude turning

outer space into another sphere of military confrontation, a threat posed by the U.S. dangerous plans for

an arms buildup in outer space.9

Calling the Soviet proposal for banning weapons from

orbit: “. . . a logical extension of the U. S. S.R. ’S sustained efforts for the total demilitarization of outer

space. ” The Soviet author goes on to give the Soviet

Union primary credit for all the arms control agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the

United States. The article accuses the United States of

attempting to gain control of space in order to win military superiority. “Following this dangerous course,

the American side froze the talks on antisatellite systems it had held with the U.S.S.R. in 1978 -79. ”1°

Citing speculations in the U.S. press, Soviet propagandists describe the space shuttle as not only a reconnaissance platform and a transport for constructing

military space stations, but as a platform for nuclear

weapons and laser weapons:

The Pentagon plans to test the laser “cannon” in outer

space in April 1982, during the fourth flight of the

Shuttle.]’

Because the United States made no official comments

on the nature of the military payload on STS-4 (which

actually took place in June-July 1982), the Soviets were

free to feed any sorts of speculation about it.

The Soviets, going into UNISPACE ’82, had posiioned themselves very well on the “militarization”

ssue. Their own military space program, which is

arger than that of the United States, receives very litle publicity. Even when foreign observers acknowledge that the “militarization” of space is two-sided, it

s usually a U.S. event—like the flights of the shuttle—

vhich is the immediate cause for discussion, For example, upon the landing of STS-4 and President

Reagan’s space policy statement, which appeared to

,ive new emphasis to the military side of space policy,

he moderate Tokyo Shimbun editorialized:

President Reagan’s “national space policy” announcement is a declaration of military expansion in space. We

are strongly concerned about the new U.S. policy which

encourages the U.S.-Soviet arms race in space . . .12

Soviet propagandists have been quick to exploit

envelopments in the United States as indications of the

[.S. “militarization” of space: research on the Prootype Miniature Air Launched System (an antisatellite

reapon), the refusal of the United States to resume

‘V Basmanov, “For a Weapon-Free Space, ” International Affairs

IOSCOW), No 11, 1981, p. 13

IOIbld , P 10 1

I Ilbld. , p 1 0 3

“Quoted in ICA “Morning Digest: Foreign Med]a Reaction, ” International

mmunlcat]on Agency, July 6, 1982, p. 3.

ASAT limitation talks, military participation in the

Space Transportation System, the budgetary trend

away from the civilian space program and toward the

military one, the announcement in June of 1982 that

the Air Force would create a Space Command in order

to better coordinate military space activities, the national security emphasis in President Reagan’s space

policy statement.

Only tacitly do the Soviets admit that they have a

military space program of their own: while decrying

the U.S. program, they warn that they will not permit the United States to win superiority. They caution against “. . . underestimation of the U.S.S.R.

scientific and technological potential, ” which has

made itself felt more than once in postwar times America’s

plans are fraught with a serious danger, since their implementation would sharply escalate the arms race, opening up a new

area in this field. 13

Given the general perception of the United States as

the world’s technological leader—a perception reinforced by the success of the space shuttle—the notion

that it is the United States that is leading the arms race

into space probably falls on fertile ground.

Foreign Perceptions of the Arms Race

The American point of view is that the arms race

is a burden imposed on the United States by the inordinate military preparations of the Soviet Union. It

seems particularly unfair that we should be saddled

with criticism for our military uses of space when the

Soviet Union launches many more military satellites

each year than we do.

From the point of view of many nonallied governments, as well as important segments of the populations of even our allies, however, the fact that the

Soviet Union may be just as big a “sinner” as, or bigger than, the United States does not lessen our responsibility. They view the superpower arms race as a

whole as an illegitimate activity, one which absorbs

resources which might otherwise be contributed to international development and which endangers international security. la Those who see the superpower

arms race as a dangerous process which the protagonists are doing little to halt are likely to see military

developments in space as an integral part of that

process.

The U.S. position is that our military space programs operate benignly because they have been largely

passive gatherers and transmitters of information. We

‘

3 Basmanov, op. cit.

l~Thl~ ~olnt of view on the arms race underlay the report of the “paime

Commission’’—the Independent Commission on Security and Disarmament,

which consisted of well-known figures in mternat]onal affairs. See its Corrrmon Security: A Blueprint for Survwal (New York. Simon & Schuster, 1982)
64

correctly point out that reconnaissance satellites have,

in part, had a stabilizing effect on the strategic nuclear

arms race by:

● helping to prevent drastic overestimates of military build-ups by the other side, and

● helping to verify compliance with arms control

treaties.

But in the final analysis, military satellites are meant

to enhance military power, and those on the sidelines

of the superpower competition certainly realize this.

For them, the “militarization” of space is just another

example of superpower arrogance toward “genuine”

world interests. The U.S. Government does not have

to accept this perception to recognize that it exists and

may need to be dealt with.

U.S. foreign policy in the past 2 years may have fed

the perception that the Government has no real interest

in controlling the arms race. The Reagan administration is widely seen, accurately or not, as having been

forced into negotiations over theater nuclear weapons

in Europe by a determined West European antinuclearweapons movement. It has expressed a fundamental

dissatisfaction with a SALT II treaty negotiated over

7 years by a Republican and a Democratic Administration, although it continues to abide by its provisions.

The suspicion remains that it still hopes, as promised

in its 1980 election platform, to regain a military superiority over the Soviet Union (a theme to which Soviet

propaganda gives considerable play).

UNISPACE ’82

U.S. Position

The U. S. position on the “militarization” issue at

UNISPACE ’82 was that:

Questions of arms control and militarization are not

on the UNISPACE ’82 agenda and it would be disruptive to insist that the conference pay special attention

to it.lb

But the State Department briefing book for the delegation left the U.S. strategy for dealing with the issue

at UNISPACE ’82 unclear. It recognized that despite

U.S. objections, the question would come up:

Nevertheless, we fully expect a number of governments to express to UNISPACE their serious apprehensions. The draft UNISPACE report itself contains a variety of references to the dangers of militarization. The

U.S. delegation, thus, may well have to respond to efforts to make the subject one of special concern to the

conference. 17

But it left unclear what “special concern” might mean,

and to what extent the United States would oppose

discussion or action on the issue.

On the one hand, the delegates were to be prepared

to argue that the U.N. Committee on Disarmament

was the only proper U,N. forum for the issue and that

UNISPACE ’82 could contribute “nothing substantive. ” On the other hand, the delegates were offered

counterarguments on the issue itself that:

● “militarization” was a misleading term because international law permits nonaggressive military

uses of space;

Conference Draft

In 1981, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space reported that several nations had expressed concern over “the growing dangers of the military uses of outer space. ”ls The “Draft Report of the

Conference” (UNISPACE ’82) raised the issue in three

separate places. The “militarization” paragraphs were

placed in brackets in the draft to indicate that they

were not unanimously accepted by the preparatory

committee. Nonetheless, it was clear that the issue

would be raised by many at the conference. *

—————

151981 Report of copl-los, 36th sess,, supplement No. 20 (A/36/20).

● The “militarization” paragraphs were as follows:

Paragraph 13: A major concern, a barrier to greater co-operation and

a potential obstacle to deriving the full benefits of space technology is

the increasing militarization of space. Some military activities—e.g., national technical means of verification (surveillance satellites), navigation

aids, communications for search and rescue, dissemination of meteorological data, etc .—have continued for many years and some have been

used for civilian purposes also. However, the recent introduction and

proposed development of aggressive systems in space have cast a dark

shadow over the peaceful and beneficial uses of space. In order for the

peaceful uses of space to develop in a cooperative, constructive and

unhindered manner, it is necessary to forestall and reverse this unfortunate trend towards the increased militarization of space.

A more provocative version of this paragraph called the militarization o

space a “danger to international peace and security. ”

Paragraph 205: However, there is another major obstacle to drawing

the full benefits form space technology-an obstacle that threatens to

grow larger and to make uncertain the prospect of future beneficial applications, Increasing doubts about the inviolability of peaceful space

activities will mean a set-back to beneficial applications. Many countries have expressed concern at the dramatic increase in the militarization of space. If space technology is to contribute to man’s development

as fully as it can, if nations and peoples are not to be denied the fruits

of its numerous beneficial applications, this negative trend must be reversed.

Paragraph 419: The increasing militarization of space is a matter that

has caused great concern to Member States. While military and disarmament matters are dealt with in other fora of the United Nations, and

issues regarding militarization of space have been referred by the General

Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament, increasing militarization

does directly impinge on peaceful uses of space and on the benefits that

nations can derive from space. To this extent, and by the fact that the

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial

Bodies—which banned nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in outer space—was initiated and formulated in COPUOS, such

matters are within the legitimate concern of COPUOS also. It is therefore

suggested that COPUOS should examine and refer for consideration of

the General Assembly how best it can ensure that outer space is used

for solely peaceful purposes.

1b’’UNISPACE 82 Issue Paper: The ‘Militarization’ of Outer Space, ” in U.

Delegation to the %cond United Nations Conference on th Exploration a.

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Vienna–August +21, 1982: Briefing Boc

sec. 111-C, “Issue Papers. ”

“Ibid,
65

 the space shuttle is not a weapons system and does

not carry weapons into space; *

● U.S. military space systems also provide “vital

human services” and help monitor arms control

agreements; and

● such systems should not be stigmatized because

they function in space.

So the United States was prepared to discuss the

issue up to a point, but the State Department did not

clearly define what that point was. In the end, the conference arrived at compromise wording for the final

“Decisions and Recommendations” which should not

raise particular difficulties for the United States. The

wording simply acknowledges the international concern about “an arms race in space” (the term “militarization” is avoided) and calls on the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament to heed

that concern. * *

Discussion: Dilemmas of the Issue

As costly in international good wiIl as U.S. tactics

on the “militarization” issue at UNISPACE ’82 may

have been, they may have been the best “damagelimiting” approach available. The United States had

no easy or obvious course to follow in dealing with

the question. The argument that the issue was not on

the agenda as called for in the U.N. resolutions establishing the conference was, strictly speaking, correct.

The argument that lengthy discussion of the issue

would not resolve it, but could distract the conference

from more practical issues on the agenda, was also

valid.

There were also some fears that did not materialize

but might have. Would there be a general condemna-

————...———

“The State Department apparently expected attacks along these Ilnes but

these d]d not appear In the country papers or open]ng statements O} the governments that expressed concern about mll]tanzat]on

““The language of the relevant paragraphs IS as follows.

Paragraph 13 The extension of an arms race into outer space is a matter of grave concern to the International community It ]s cfetrlmental

to human]ty as a whole and therefore should be prevented. All natlon~j

]n particular those with ma]or space capabll]tles, are urged to contnbute

act] vel y to the goal of prevent~ng an arms race In outer space and to

refra]n from any action contrary to that aim

Paragraph 14 The maintenance ot peace and secur]ty in outer space is

of great importance for international peace and security The prevention of an arms race and host] lltles In outer space is an essential cond]-

t]on for the promotion and cont]nuatlon of [nternat]onal cooperation

[n the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes In this

regard, the Conference urges all States to adhere to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Actlv]ttes of States In the Exploration and Use of

Outer Space, ]ncludlng the Moon and other Celestlal Bodies and strictly

to observe Its letter and spirit

Paragraph 426: The Conference strongly recommends that the competent organs of the Uruted Nat]ons—m particular the General Assembly

and alsc the Committee on Disarmament —when deallng w]th measures

a]med at a prevention of an arms race ]n outer space—in particular those

mentioned in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly —give appropriate attention and high prlorlty to the grave concern expressed In

paragraphs 13 and 14

tion of all military activities in space, which would be

completely unacceptable to the United States?* Would

the Conference degenerate into a tribunal for the

denunciation of the U.S. military space program,

focussing on alleged uses of the space shuttle as a

weapon? Or would the United States, given recent

publicity about its military space programs, bear the

brunt of the blame for leading an arms race in space?

Finally, if the United States had agreed to compromise on report wording about the military question earlier in the conference, would further compromises, less acceptable to the United States, have

been demanded before the conference was over? In

other words, would forthcoming discussion of the issue

let the camel’s nose into the tent? At the same time,

other considerations might have dictated that the

United States grant the issue at least some legitimacy

for discussion at UNISPACE ’82. First, even though

the militarization of space was not literally on the formal agenda, the relevant “bracketed” paragraphs of

the draft conference report were there and would be

discussed, whatever the wishes of the United States.

Second, delegations of every stripe—Communist

(Chinese as well as Soviet), Third World, neutralist,

and U.S .-allied—expressed concern about the potential for an arms race in space. Most of the formaI

statements did not single out the United States as the

cause of this arms race, but encouraged the two major

space powers to negotiate limiting or reversing the

race. The State Department briefing book did go so

far as to allow the U.S. delegation to admit that the

United States, too, was “concerned that there not be

an arms race in outer space. ” U.S. reluctance to discuss

the issue at this conference, particularly in the face of

willingness to discuss it by all the other 93 countries

there, appeared to many to be an effort to “stifle

debate. ” Moreover, since the United States did finally agree to compromise language on the dangers of an

arms race in space in the final report, its apparent

obstructionism on the issue until the very end alienated

some delegations. Willingness to discuss the issue, on

the other hand, might have won the United States

some credit, at least among its allies, for raising the

level of the debate instead of stifling it.

The Soviets, for their part, positioned themselves

before and during the conference to take maximum advantage of the U.S. refusal to address the “militariza-

● The Algerian delegation raised this spectre when it got the fol]owlng

statement inserted into the conference report’s “Summary of the General

Debate”:

Numerous delegations denounced the wrongful use of space technology, such as swveillance satellites, in cases of militaw conf]lct

The paragraph cited “the aggression committed against Lebanon” and “the

assistance provided to the aggressor” as a case in point. UN , Report of the

Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peacehl Uses of

Outer Space, Vienna, Aug. 9-21, 1982 (A CON F.101 ~ 101, p. 126, par. 525.
66

tion” issue. The sort of Soviet propaganda about the

U.S. military space program cited above has gone

largely unanswered by the United States.* At

UNISPACE ’82 itself, however, the Soviet Union had

no need to direct charges specifically against the United

States. Instead, it could and did merely express its sympathy with the widespread view that steps were needed

to prevent the “militarization” of space, and point to

its own proposal of August 1981 for a treaty to ban

stationing weapons in space as an example of such a

step. No accusation naming the United States was necessary, nor was any defense of the very large Soviet

military space program with its active antisatellite

weapons tests.

Had the United States chosen to debate the “militarization” issue, it might have been able to inform

other nations of the massive Soviet contribution to the

“militarization” of space, perhaps removing some of

the wind from Soviet sails on the issue. Informally,

some delegates tried to do this. Others wished that the

State Department had “unleashed” them to do a more

effective job of pointing out that it had been the

Soviets, not the United States, who had been testing

weapons in space for the last several years.

As tempting as this opportunity to paint the Soviets

with their own brush might have been, however, it

carried a major risk, Except for those countries that

might be categorically opposed to the United States

(and their number might not be as large as we sometimes feel), most of the countries concerned about the

“militarization” issue are not simply interested in apportioning blame. Instead, they want the United States

and the Soviet Union to agree to avert an arms race

in space, no matter who “started it. ” An exchange of

accusations with the Soviet Union over who was doing the most to “militarize” space might score some

debating points for the United States, but at the same

time would reinforce the general impression that there

is indeed a burgeoning arms race in space about which

something ought to be done,

Here, again, the Soviets seem to have seized the

“high ground” on the issue. True, both sides have

agreed that the U.N. Committee on Disarmament

should discuss arms control in space. But the Soviets

point out that it is the United States, not the Soviet

Union, that has discontinued the negotiations on antisatellite weapon limitations. The United States has indicated a lack of willingness to resume those negotiations at any specific future date. It is the Soviet Union,

not the United States, that has proposed (however disingenuously) at the U.N. a treaty to prohibit station-

● For a variety of reasons: secrecy on U.S. program, reluctance to reveal

knowledge and sources about Soviet program, desires not to have the subject openly debated.

ing weapons of any kind in orbit. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union can present itself as addressing the concerns of the international community

about an arms race in space while the United States

belittles those concerns. And further debate about

“militarization” at UNISPACE ’82 would only have

underlined these circumstances.

In other words, if the United States believes that actual negotiation on the question of arms in space is

not in its best interests, its best strategy in the international fora may well be to “stonewall” the issue, to

avoid debate on it as much as possible.

Conclusions

1.

2.

3

4.

5

While the logic of the U.S. position at

UNISPACE ’82 on the question of the “militarization of outer space” may have been sound, the

United States paid a diplomatic price for insisting

on that position so inflexibly. Support for the

United States in future international negotiations

on militarization will probably be harder to get.

Although there was debate on the “militarization” issue despite U.S. wishes, some of the worst

U.S. fears about the consequences of a UNISPACE

’82 discussion of the issue did not materialize.

The issue did not prevent the other work of the

conference from going ahead. The United States

was not generally singled out as the “leader” of

the space arms race. The recommendations of the

conference did not “introduce confusion into the

work of expert negotiating bodies such as the

CD. ” The space shuttle was not condemned as

a weapon.

Soviet propaganda and diplomacy has positioned

the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States very

well on the space “militarization” issue. No matter who takes the “blame” for initiating an arms

race in space (and Soviet propaganda works hard

at saddling the United States with this blame),

the United States bears the onus for refusing tc

negotiate on it (outside the Committee on Disarmament).

Given the fact that the United States has no posi.

tion on further arms control measures for space

obstruction of discussion of the issue whenevel

possible may be the most “damage-limiting” strat

egy the United States can pursue.

Whether the perceived unwillingness of the

United States to deal with this issue will interfer~

with future efforts to win international coopera

tion in space remains to be seen. Some member

of the U.S. delegation to UNISPACE ’82 cam

away with the feeling that the United States dil
6 7

an excellent, if inadvertent, job of uniting the

G-77 (developing nations) against the United

States. This could have negative effects at later

international negotiating fora such as the meetings of the International Telecommunication

Union.

Aftermath

The issue of the “militarization” of outer space will

continue to be a problem for the United States. Other

governments will continue to raise the issue at the U.N.

and elsewhere, either because they see the United

States as vulnerable to criticism, or because they genuinely fear the prospects of the arms race spreading

into space. How other governments perceive the

United States on this issue inevitably affects their attitude on other issues as well. Allies and others concerned about the course of the nuclear arms race may

see the spread of the arms race into space as a part

of the larger arms race problem. Developing countries

may see the “militarization” of space as being of a piece

with the “first-come first-served” approach to the geosynchronous satellite orbit: that is, the high-technology powers dispose of the “common heritage of mankind’ ’—outer space—as they see fit, saying, “Trust us”

to the rest of the world.

More subtly, in most multilateral negotiations there

are informal “trade-offs” among issues, nations offering their support and votes on one question in order

to get votes in return on another. As long as the United

States remains in the international minority in its approach to “militarization of space, ” it will have to

make diplomatic bargains to sustain its position. The

net gains and losses from these bargains remain to be

counted.
Appendix B

NASA's Approach to

International Cooperation*

Since the space program of United States began, the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA) has pursued a vigorous and successful’ program of international cooperation, grounded in the

National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958.** One

possible reason for NASA’s success derives from a key

feature of its cooperative efforts: while NASA has international programs, it does not fund an international

program. There is no “international” line item in the

NASA budget and no money set aside especially for

international programs. Funding for international projects must come out of the budgets of the NASA program offices (essentially science, applications, space

flight, and aeronautics), The Associate Administrators

of the Program Offices and their managers are rated

not on how many international projects they have,

only on how successful they are in achieving their program goals. Thus, for an international approach to a

project to be undertaken it must not only contribute

to achieving the goals of the interested program office, but it must be considered to be among the best

approaches to achieving those goals. The sole modification to this principle occurs when a major U.S. foreign policy objective can be effectively served through

an international space cooperative project; even here,

however, the project must be technically sound.

NASA recognizes that if a “national” and an “international” approach are rated about even technically

and fiscally, the national approach will allow for easier

management and greater resource efficiency. Thus, self

interest and relative efficiency tend to guard against

undertaking marginal international projects.

Another factor contributing to the success of NASA

and its international programs is the requirement that

the agency pursue an extremely high standard of technical excellence. In the space business, it is possible

to build a spacecraft that is 97 percent perfect and still

have a disaster. While most nonspace organizations

would be overjoyed with that degree of success in a

major development effort, it is inappropriate for high

risk, high visibility projects which have frequently

● Prepared by the International Affairs Office, NASA.

‘See President’s 1982 report to Congress on International Activities in Science and Technology (Title V).

● *One of the objectives of the “Space Activities of the United States” is (sec.

102): “Cooperation by the United States with other nations and groups of

nations In work done pursuant to this Act and In the peaceful application

of the results thereof, ”

launched beyond man’s ability to repair easily.2 A

great deal of senior management attention, time and

money is spent making sure that the last 3 to 5 percent of a project is done correctly. The importance of

this for international projects is that NASA managers

want as much insight into them as they have into a

NASA-only project. This dictates a principle of “keep

it simple” in management and technical interfaces. This

means that NASA prefers bilateral relations over projects that might involve three or more countries or organizations.

The concern with technical and scientific excellence

also contributes to NASA’s international programs in

another fundamental way. From the very beginning

the principal area of international space cooperation

has been in the sciences. NASA made a decision early

in its history to involve in its programs not only the

best scientists in the United States, but also those from

throughout the free world. After all, “science” means

“possession and pursuit of knowledge, ” and the way

to attain excellence is to work with the very best scientists. This may seem like a straight-forward approach,

but it has marked a difference over the years between

the science programs of NASA and the European

Space Agency (ESA). Until very recently, ESA restricted direct participation in its own satellite projects

only to European scientists.

In short, the basic character of NASA’s international

programs has stemmed significantly from the character

of the agency itself and was set quite early: international projects would be undertaken only if they contributed to NASA’s own program goals, foreign policy

objectives would be supported, bilateralism would be

the fundamental method of conducting international

projects, and NASA’s science programs would be oper

to participation on a competitive basis by the besi

minds from throughout the free world.

Three additional guidelines used in planning NASA’!

international programs deserve prominent mention

First, each cooperating nation is expected to assum[

full financial responsibility for its own efforts on z

project; i.e., no exchange of funds occurs in either di

rection between NASA and the foreign cooperatin~

agency, This rule serves to reduce considerably the cos

of the projects to NASA and to ensure close project

‘E Hutchlngs, Jr , “The Autonomous Viking, ” Sc)ence, vol. 219, 1983, pr

803-807.

68
69

budget responsibility. Second, whatever the division

in responsibilities between the partners in a joint project, each side must have the capacity to carry out its

own responsibilities. This principle was established to

limit technology transfer to partners. In pursuit of this

objective, NASA seeks to define cooperative projects

so that the interfaces between the contributions are as

well defined and “clean” as possible. Third, the results

of scientific cooperative efforts are to be made openly

available to the international scientific community

within a reasonable period of time through appropriate

channels (depending on the type of project).

Following these prescriptions, NASA has concluded

over 1,000 agreements with over 100 countries in its

25-year lifespan. 3 These agreements are not generalized, umbrella-type arrangements, but rather cover the

specific elements of a discrete undertaking. NASA’s

philosophy is that specificity avoids misunderstandings

and discourages “inventing” projects to satisfy the

spirit of a diffuse agreement. While a number of major

satellite, experiment and facility development projects

are included in these totals, many of the cooperative

projects are for smaller efforts such as remote sensing

investigations (with .53 countries), scientific and technical information exchanges (70; double counting of

countries is involved here), geodynamics projects (43)

and sounding rocket projects (22).

The importance of these “smaller efforts” should not

be overlooked. Many of them have been with developing countries providing them with an opportunity to

learn how to work with remote sensing data or how

to build scientific payloads for sounding rockets or

how to gain access to recent scientific reports in the

open literature. One of the strengths of the bilateral

approach to specific projects is that it facilitates cooperation with developed and developing countries on

different sized projects at different levels of sophistication.

In addition to the scientific, technical, and political

returns to NASA and the U.S. from this cooperation,

over $2 billion in contributions have resulted from

NASA’s international cooperative programs. The

amount grows to more than $3 billion when reimbursable services are included, such as for launching and

providing tracking support for foreign satellites.

Statistical summaries are useful, but they also have

a static quality which may not convey the dynamic

nature of NASA’s international cooperative programs.

in fact, the NASA program is continually adjusted to

-eflect new situations and opportunities. For example,

NASA’S success in international participation became

a political liability in 1980-81 when, in order to ab-

———. . —

‘ A Review ot NASA lnternat]onal Programs, NASA report January

983

sorb its share of the administration’s budget reductions, NASA found it necessary to reduce funding in

one of its major science missions. The problem was

that all three of the major ongoing science projects had

significant international participation: Space Telescope

(with ESA), Galileo/Jupiter orbiter probe (Germany)

and the International Solar Polar Mission (ESA). This

high degree of involvement of international participation in the science program meant that, for the first

time in its history, NASA found it necessary to step

back from an international commitment. NASA decided to terminate development of the U.S. satellite

for the International Solar Polar Mission. The project

was subsequently restructured to include only a single

satellite built by Europe, to be launched by NASA on

the space shuttle. Situations such as this may never

be fully avoidable but they point up the necessity of

carefully reviewing each prospective international

project to assure, insofar as possible, its long-term

merit. This is because the consequences of modifying

or terminating an international project tend to be more

far reaching and damaging to U.S. interests than with

projects that are wholly national in character.

Limited funding also dictates that NASA cannot do

everything there is to do of importance in space. Indeed, the expanding capabilities of other countries

makes this unnecessary. A prime example is the upcoming return of Halley’s Comet. After reviewing its

options, the United States decided not to mount a mission to Halley’s Comet. However, ESA, the Soviet

Union, and Japan all decided to develop encounter

missions. To provide important data and to assure that

U.S. scientists and the world scientific community at

large fully participated in this historic event, NASA

organized of an International Halley Watch (IHW)

program. IHW is an international network of ground

based observatories that will provide significant scientific data but which will also provide ephemeris data

important for assisting the three Halley encounter missions. In addition, the Space Telescope will make Halley observations from Earth orbit, as will three ultraviolet telescopes mounted on board Spacelab mission

0SS-3 in the shuttle’s cargo bay. Finally, NASA is

sending the ISEE-3 spacecraft, which has successfully

completed its primary mission through the Earth’s

magneto tail to make the first ever in-situ cometary

measurements with comet Giacobini-Zinner in September 1985. These data will be useful in their own

right but may also provide valuable insights for the

encounter Halley missions in 1986. By sharing leadership for exploring the heavens with other qualified

space-faring nations, NASA stretches its own resources

and is free to pursue projects which, in the absence

of such sharing and cooperation, might not be initiated.
70

The space shuttle also presents NASA with the

means to enter into new international cooperative opportunities. For example, during a visit to Sao Paulo

on December 2, President Reagan invited a Brazilian

payload specialist to fly aboard the space shuttle. The

President’s remarks were based on the revision in

NASA policy announced October 22, 1982, expanding

opportunities for foreign and domestic sponsors of

payloads on the space shuttle to nominate payload

specialists to fly with them. Training and flight of these

payload specialists will normally be on a reimbursable

basis, although in the case of cooperative missions,

other specific arrangements may be made. Since the

announcement, NASA has discussed the expanded policy with a number of its cooperative partners and reimbursable shuttle customers.

It is therefore quite likely that, beginning in late 1983

with the first flight of a foreign payload specialist on

Spacelab 1 (Ulf Merbold of ESA), a continuing stream

of foreign payload specialists will join U.S. astronauts

on the shuttle.

In the same vein, the possibility of the United States

developing a space station to be serviced by the space

shuttle also opens up potential new opportunities for

international cooperation. Space Station is not at this

time an approved program. However, should such a

project receive future approval, the possibility of international participation in its development and use

is a prospect deserving serious consideration. Potentially interested governments are being kept advised

of developments in the United States and some foreign

studies paralleling U.S. exploratory efforts are underway. These studies are being funded by the foreign

government without commitment on either side with

respect to future cooperation.

In summary, the outlook for mutually beneficial international cooperation in space, both in the short and

long term, is very good. As in the past, most of this

cooperation will be conducted on a bilateral basis.

Where multilateral efforts are manageable and make

sense, however, they also will be vigorously pursued.
Appendix C

Intergovernmental Meeting of

Space Technology Experts

One of the seven proposals for multilateral cooperation that the United States presented at UNISPACE

’82 was an intergovernmental meeting of experts in the

use and management of space technology. Scheduled

to be held just prior to the February meeting of the

Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS,

its aim was to assemble as many representatives as

possible from the world’s space programs in order to

discuss the current state of space technology and to

present the many opportunities that exist for bilateral

or multilateral cooperative ventures in space.

On February 4, 1983, NASA and Columbia University cosponsored the first such meeting, held at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs.

About 100 representatives from 40 countries and international organizations attended. About 15 developing countries were represented at the gathering. Although they had been invited, the Eastern Bloc countries were conspicuously absent, a fact that was lamented by speakers from several countries during the

2 days. Translation (French, Spanish, English) was

provided, and the meeting was transcribed for future

distribution. Copies of most speakers’ papers were

available during the meeting. Most of the time was

scheduled with formal presentations; however, the

organizers encouraged informal meetings and made

several small meeting rooms available for this purpose.

Although it is impossible to evaluate the long-term

effects of the meeting so soon after it was held, the

presentations were generally of high quality and designed to illustrate the potential for cooperation.

Representatives from industrialized countries, developing countries, and the United Nations (U. N. ) presented

:alks. The meeting’s emphasis was on technology;

although political issues were raised and discussed,

technical matters dominated the discussion.

The meeting ran smoothly and was generally successful in giving the United States an opportunity to

-each other countries in an informal multilateral

orum. According to the organizers of this meeting,

uture meetings could continue to focus on technical

matters of interest to the world community; issues with

i high percentage of political content could also be dis-

-ussed as long as this meeting did not usurp the prerogatives of COPUOS. No decision was reached on

he advisability of holding another such meeting.

The agenda, meeting place and timing of this experimental meeting were arranged by NASA and Columbia University. If future meetings are held, the international community must decide who will organize

them, set the agenda and pay for them.

Developing Country Questions

and Needs

During the conference, participants raised the following questions, among others:

1 .

2.

3.

4.

5.

What cooperative opportunities are available and

how can countries obtain timely information

about them?

This question was raised more than any other

at the meeting. Each country follows different

procedures for cooperative projects and announces them by different means. Although the

U.N. attempts to keep abreast of these projects,

it is not always aware of every opportunity.

What instructional programs are available, and

what channels does an individual follow to participate?

Not only do inidividuals and agencies in the

various countries need to know what is available,

they also need to know how to take advantage

of the opportunities. It was suggested that 2-week

workshops are not long enough, except to give

individuals with previous training, instruction in

the latest equipment and techniques.

How can current knowledge be transferred to

potential users in developing countries?

In addition to information on training and cooperative projects, developing countries also need

timely access to data that could be of economic

use (e.g., land remote sensing data or data on

photoplankton distribution in the oceans).

Developing countries need operating funds as

well as initial capital for projects,

In many cases, it is not enough to carry out

a demonstration project because the country may

not have the resources to continue, even if the

new technology is cost effective.

Science programs can be an excellent means to

involve individuals in space technology.

Although basic science projects do not necessarily lead to applications, they help develop the

skills and infrastructure needed for applications

programs.

71
72

6. In developing courses of instruction, who determines the course syllabi?

Some courses are inappropriate for students

from developing countries because they presuppose too much technical knowledge or equipment. Language problems present barriers, especially if the student is expected to learn a foreign

language while studying within his or her own

country. Several participants made the point that

both problems can be overcome if the coursework

and language study are well planned, and include

advice from the participating countries.

7. Perceived need for a service must preceed programs to use it.

This was counted essential for satellite technology to prosper in a given country. Several cases

were reported where the lack of perceived need

within the developing country resulted in a situation where substantial data were accumulated incountry by various programs and not used (e.g.,

remote-sensing data for mapping).

8. Have we been over-optimistic about the potential to transfer technology to developing countries?

Here again, the distinction was made between

demonstration projects and continuing use of the

technology. Several participants expressed doubt

about the speed with which new technology could

be integrated into the social and economic structure of a developing country.
Appendix D

Report on UNISPACE '82

The United Nations Conference on the Exploration and

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

Vienna, Austria, August 9-21, 1982

Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications

Committee on Science and Technology

U.S. House of Representatives

Summary

Ninety-four nations vitally interested in space attended the UNISPACE ’82 Conference. Therefore, the

United States was presented a great opportunity to

demonstrate its progress in space for the benefit of all

mankind.

The United States did not seize this opportunity. The

United States instead adopted a defensive posture and

did not adequately accentuate its past accomplishments nor demonstrate its willingness to aggressively

pursue cooperative international space programs. Although it can be argued that the United States did succeed in protecting its interests in the conference, in

some instances its public positions could be characterized as intransigent.

The single issue attracting most attention at

UNISPACE ’82 was “militarization of space. ” The

United States virtually ignored this issue, for example

in its plenary statement. This omission, following the

President’s July 4 space policy statement emphasizing

military programs, signalled to many delegations that

the United States is now mainly interested in military

applications. Thus, an opportunity to accentuate the

positive— the outstanding U.S. civil space program—

was missed.

The second most discussed issue was allocation of

the geostationary orbit. Less-developed nations expressed concern that because of physical limitations

:he orbit will be “filled” before they can take advan-

:age of it, although the finite lifetime of satellites means

that slots will continue to open if “dead” satellites are

pushed out of the orbit. The United States asserted that

ethnological advances will mitigate these limitations

out did not effectively demonstrate to other delegations how this would occur.

The United States chose to spend only a few months

)reparing for the conference, and named its delegation only days before the conference began. Thus, in

part our defensive posture may have been due simply

to lack of preparation of the delegation,

During preparations for the conference, representatives of the Administration contended that the discussion would be technical and that political issues would

not arise (e. g., this was stated at briefings and hearings). The opposite was true, the conference was highly

political, and not just technical.

Congress could have been brought more effectively into the preparations for the conference. For example, Congress was given the “official” position on certain issues, and was not made privy to how the issues

would be dealt with at the conference.

There was not enough private sector involvement

in the Conference. Representatives of the entrepreneurial private sector should have played a larger

role in UNISPACE because the future of the United

States’ civil space program probably lies largely in that

sector, while in most other nations space is a nearly

exclusive government function. As it was, few private

sector representatives—delegates or exhibitors—were

asked or allowed to participate substantively in the

conference or in preparations for it.

Many delegations from developing nations seemed

virtally interested in benefits space could bring to

them, especially in communications and remote sensing. Several nations stressed the importance of

LANDSAT data continuity.

At the same time, the developing nations were wary

of possible negative impact of space technology on

their nations interests even in communications and

remote sensing. In communications, for example, concern was expressed that direct broadcasts from satellites to individual receivers would introduce unwanted information into their countries. Concern was

also express that the “open skies” policy of the United

States, i.e., nondiscriminatory assess to remote-sensing

73
74

data, would disclose secret information about the plan to take advantage of them. These conferences

sensed country to its adversaries. The United States must be prepared for carefully and wisely, and atmust address these inherently political issues. tended be a well-informed, coordinated delegation in

The United States should recognize that United Na- order to best represent and advance U.S. interests.

tions conferences are a fact of international politics and
Appendix E

U.S. Delegation to the Second U.N.

Conference on the Peaceful Uses

of Outer Space (UNISPACE ‘82)*

Representatives

James M. Beggs

Administrator

National Aeronautic and Space Administration

A/temate representatives

John R. Bolton

Assistant Administrator for Program and Policy

Coordination

Agency for International Development

Anthony J. Calio

Deputy Administrator

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Joe Charyk, President and Chief Executive Officer

Communications Satellite Corporation

Mrs. William P. Clark

Washington, D.C.

Gerald B. Helman

Special Coordinator for UNISPACE

Department of State

Charles Wick

Director

International Communications Agency

Congressional advisers

Rep. Ronnie G. Flippo

U.S. House of Representatives

Rep. William Carney

U.S. House of Representatives

Rep. George E. Brown, Jr.

U.S. House of Representatives

Rep. Daniel K. Akaka

U.S. House of Representatives

Rep. Wayne Grisham

U.S. House of Representatives

Congressional/ staff advisers

Radford Byerly, Jr.

Committee on Science and Technology

U.S. House of Representatives

J. Jeffrey Irons

Committee on Science and Technology

U.S. House of Representatives

Senior Adviser

Hans Mark

Deputy Administrator

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Idvisers

3urt Edelson

Associate Administrator for Space Science and

Applications

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

\nna Fisher, M.D.

Astronaut

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

‘Held at Vienna Austr]a, Aug 9-21, 1982

William Fisher, M.D.

Astronaut

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Riccardo Giacconi

Space Telescope Science Institute

Baltimore, Md.

Henry Hartsfield, CoI., USAF

Astronaut

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

S. Neil Hosenball

General Counsel

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Donald Jansky

Associate Administrator

National Telecommunications and Information

Administrate ion

J. Edward Melanson, Jr., Captain, USN

National Telecommunications and Information

Administration

S. Ahmed Meer

Office of Advanced Technology

Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and

Scientific Affairs

Department of State

Kenneth S. Pedersen

Director

International Affairs Division

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Gilbert Rye, CoI., USAF

National Security Council

David Small

Office of the Legal Adviser

Department of State

John H. Storrie, Brig. Gen., USAF

Headquarters

U.S. Air Force

Norman Terrell

Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Private sector advisers

Robert Anderson

Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer

Rockwell International Corp.

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Roy A. Anderson

Chairman of the Board

Space Systems Division

Lockheed Missiles and Space Co.

Burbank, Calif.

James V. Carroll, Ill

Attorney

Washington, D.C.

Vincent N. Cook

President

Federal Systems Division

International Business Machines

75
76

Robert A. Duffy

President

Charles Stark Draper Laboratories

Cambridge, Mass.

Robin Fairbairn

Attorney

Paso Robles, Calif.

Edward R. Finch, Jr.

Attorney

New York, N.Y.

Joseph G. Gavin, Jr.

President and Chief Executive Officer

Grumman Corp.

Bethpage, N.Y.

John M. Greer

Sacramento, Calif.

Henry E. Hockeimer

President

Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp.

Detroit, Mich.

Charles A. Schmidt

Division Vice-President and General Manager

RCA, Astro-Electronics

Princeton, N.J.
Appendix F

Attendance at the Conference

A. The following States were represented at the Conference:

Albania

Algeria

Angola

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Bangladesh

Belgium

Benin

Bolivia

Brazil

Bulgaria

Belorussian Soviet

Socialist Republic

Canada

Chile

China

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba

Cyprus

Czechoslovakia

Democratic Yemen

Denmark

Ecuador

Egypt

Finland

France

Gabon

German Democratic Republic

Germany, Federal Republic of

Greece

Guatemala

Holy See

Hungary

India

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Ireland

Israel

Italy

Japan

Kenya

Kuwait

Lebanon

Lesotho

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Luxembourg

Malaysia

Mali

Mexico

Mongolia

Morocco

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nigeria

Norway

Pakistan

Panama

Peru

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Qatar

Republic of Korea

Romania

Rwanda

San Marino

Senegal

Somalia

Spain

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Sweden

Switzerland

Syrian Arab Republic

Thailand

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic

Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics

United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Northern Ireland

United Republic of Cameroon

United Republic of Tanzania

United States of America

Upper Volta

Uruguay

Venezuela

Viet Nam

Yugoslavia

Zaire

Zimbabwe

B. The United Nations Council for Namibia was represented at the Conference.

C. The following national liberation movements were represented by observers: African National

Congress (South Africa), Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania.

D. Members of the secretariat of the following United Nations offices were present throughout

or during part of the Conference:

Centre for Disarmament

Centre for Science and Technology for Development

Department of Political and Security Council Affairs

E. The Secretariat of the Economic Commission of Africa was represented at the Conference:

Economic Commission for Africa

F. The following United Nations bodies and programmes were also represented:

United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Environment Programme

United Nations Industrial Development Organization

United Nations Disaster Relief Organization

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT)

G. Representatives of the following specialized agencies and related organizations participated

in the work of the Conference:

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

International Civil Aviation Organization

World Health Organization

World Bank

International Telecommunication Union

World Meteorological Organization

International Atomic Energy Agency

77
78

H. The following intergovernmental organizations were represented by observers:

African Remote Sensing Council

Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation

Arab Communications Satellite Organization

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

Council of Europe

European Communities

European Space Agency

Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission

Interim European Telecommunications Satellite Organizations

International Maritime Satellite Organization

International Organization of Space Communications, “IN TERSPUTNIK”

International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

League of Arab States

Organization of African Unity

Pan African Telecommunication Union

1. A large number of concerned nongovernmental organizations in consultative status with the

Economic and Social Council were represented by observers.
Appendix G

Text Resulting From the

of the “Friends of

Consultations

the President”

Distr.

LIMITED

A/CONF . 101/L. 4

20 August 1982

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

.—.

Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

Vienna, 9-21 August 1982

Text resulting from the consultations of the

“Friends of the President”

1 . The extension of an arms race into Outer Space is a matter of grave

concern to the international community. It is detrimental to humanity as

a whole and therefore should be prevented. All nations, in particular

those with major space capabilities , are urged to contribute actively to

the goal of preventing an arms race in Outer Space ad to refrain from

any action contrary to that aim.

2. The maintenance of peace and security in Outer Space is of great

importance for international peace and security. The prevention of an

arms race and hostilities in Outer Space is an essential condition for the

promotion and continuation of international co-operation in the

exploration and use of Outer Space for peaceful purposes. In this regard

the Conference urges all States to adhere to the Treaty on Principles ‘Governin~

the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of outer Space, Including

the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and strictly to observe its letter and

spirit.

3 . The Conference strongly recommends that the conpetent organs of the

United Nations in particular the General Assembly, and also the Committee

on Disarmament when dealing with measures aimed at a prevention of an arms

race in Outer Space, in particular those mentioned in the relevant resolutions

of the General Assembly, give appropriate attention and high priority to the

grave concern expressed above.

79
Appendix H

Proposal Submitted by Mexico on

Behalf of the Group of 77

. .—

Distr .

LIMITE D

A\ CONF. 101l\L .3

20 August 198 2

ORIGINAL : ENGLISH

Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

Vienna, 9-21 August 198 2

Proposal submitted by Mexico on behalf of the

Group of 77

Statemen t

The Group of 77 firmly holds the view that activities in

the field of remote sensing should be carried out in full respect

for the sovereign rights of states. The Group of 77 believes

that sensed states should have timely and unhindered access

on a priority basis at nominal cost, to all data and information

obtained over their territories . Dissemination of such data

and information derived from it to a third party should not

be done without the prior consent of the sensed country. The

Group of 77 urges UNISPACE 82 to recommend, through the General

Assembly, to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer SPace

and its Legal Sub-Committee to finalize the work on the elaboration

of draft principles concerning remote sensing of the earth from

space as a matter of high priority.

The Group of 77 firmly holds the ‘view that activities in

the field of international direct television broadcasting through

satellites should only be conducted in full respect for the

sovereignty of states. In this regard the recognition by the

international community of principles embodying a) broadcasting

state’s responsibility, b) prior consultation and agreement between

broadcasting and receiving states and c) the radio regulations

of the ITU, inter-alia, are of utmost importance. The Group of 77

welcomes the text of 16 nations’ draft elaborating principles

governing the use by states of artificial earth satellites for

international direct television broadcasting. The Group of 77

regrets that this draft has not yet met with consensus and that

even after ten years of efforts by COPUOS to finalize it have

not been successful . The Group of 77 urges UNISPACE 82 to recommend

that the General Assembly at its 37th Session approve a set of

principles governing the use by states of artificial earth satellites

for international direct television broadcasting in accordance

with the 16 nations’ draft, as aforementioned.

The Group of 77 firmly holds the view that the existing

mechanism of the United Nations body dealing with outer space

affairs should be strengthened. The Group of 77 urges that the

United Nations through its competent organs strongly support

programmed and activities of the developing countries and of

regional, sub-regional and national interests relating to applications of space technology through training, education, technology

transfer and expert technical advice.

80
Appendix I

Declaration of the Group of 77

Distr .

GENERAL

A\CONF .10 l\5

13 August 1982

Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

DECLARATION OF THE GROUP OF 77

Group 77 nations met a few times to discuss some important issues having

interconnexion with the over-all activity of the Conference and having bearing on

the work of all Committees. The following positions have been arrived at:

(1) Group 77 nations are firmly of the view that the issue of militarization

of Space is a matter of great concern. Group 77 nations urge that the

Conference recommends that all Member Nations and, especially, those who

have the capability, be asked to refrain from any activities which lead

to the extension of arms race into Outer Space. Group 77 nations further

reiterate that militarization of Space is detrimental to the entire

humanity and hence extension of arms race to Outer Space, the moon and

other celestial bodies that are the common heritage of mankind, should

not be permitted. The position of the Group 77 nations is that testing,

stationing and deployment of any weapons in Space should be banned. The

Group of 77 considers necessary the adoption of a legal instrument that

definitely bans the emplacement of weapons in outer space and verifiable

controls and guarantees. In view of their special responsibility in this

field, it is recommended that the two major space powers open

negotiations for an early agreement to prevent an arms race in outer

space. Such negotiations should not inhibit or prevent the General

Assembly from giving the necessary directives to the Committee on the

Peaceful uses of outer space and the Committee on Disarmament for the

urgent consideration of this question in conformity with the spirit of

the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the

Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other

Celestial Bodies.

NOTE: As part of the series of special demonstrations connected with

UNISPACE 82, the original text of the present document, upon its receipt in

Vienna, was relayed via satellite to United Nations Headquarters in New York,

where it was translated, typed and subsequently beamed back to Vienna via

satellite link.

82-22177 0315t (E)

‘J.?2-32644

81
82

(2) Group 77 nations are fully convinced that the limited and scarc e

resources of the GSO and allied radio frequency spectrum should be

optimally utilized for the benefit of all countries. Group 77 is of th e

firm view that the present regulatory mechanism for assigning orbit

positions and radi o spectrum does not ensure equitable access to this

resource, and that developing countries are particularly at a

disadvantage. Group 77 is, therefore of the view that a Change to thi s

mechanism is called for . Group 77 notes that WARC-79 of the ITU examined

this problem in detail and decided to convene a Special Conference and

other Regional Conferences “to guarantee in practice for all countries

equitable access ” to the said resource and to agree on appropriate

planning and other approaches to fulfil this objective. Group 77

considers that the principle of guaranteed and equitable access should b e

the essence of any new regulatory mechanism and should take into account

the particular needs of the developing countries including those o f

equatorial countries .

---- -
Appendix J

Formal Agenda of the Conference

1. Opening of the Conference

2. Election of the President

3. Adoption of the rules of procedure

4. Adoption of the agenda

5. Establishment of the main committees and organization

of work

6. Election of officers other than the President

7. Credentials of representatives to the Conference

(a) Appointment of the members of the Credentials

Committee

(b) Evaluation of the major developments in space science, technology and applications, and assessment

of the usefulness of these developments so far

8. General debate (Plenary sessions, mostly presentation of

national papers)

9. State of space science and technology (Committee 1)

(a) Review and projection of the current future state of

science and technology for space research and appli -

cat ions

(b) Evaluation of the major developments in space science, technology and applications and assessment of

the usefulness of these developments so far

O. Applications of space science and technology (Committee 11)

(a) Evaluation of the current and potential applications of

space technology, taking into account present and

foreseeable national and international programmed in

the areas of space research

(b) Examination of the possibilities and mechanisms for

(c)

(d)

enabling all States to benefit from space technology,

bearing in mind their various levels of development,

varying capacities to absorb new technologies and particular needs and priorities

Examination of the choices for utilizing space technology available to countries at various stages of technological growth and of the difficulties they face in this

regard

Examination of the existing infrastructure and scientific and technological development in various countries, especially the developing countries, and of appropriate measures to augment their capabilities to develop space technology and facilitate access to such

technology and to participate and cooperate in space

activities so as to derive maximum benefit from space

technology and its applications.

(e) Examination of developments and system configurations appropriate to the use of space technology for

education

(f) Discussion of compatibility and complementarily between various satellite systems, including those used

for remote sensing, meteorology, communications and

navigation

(9) Consideration of the implications of projected develop-

(h)

ments in the areas of space technology such as earthorbiting solar power stations, space manufacturing,

space transportation and manned space stations; consideration of the implications of the use of the geostationary orbit, the need and possibilities for optimizing that use, as well as of the measures to be taken

to that end

Discussion of the nature of, an ways of protecting, the

near-earth environment including the upper atmosphere and magnetosphere

11. International cooperation and the role of the United Nations (Committee Ill)

(a) Consideration of reports on the nature and extent of

the bilateral and multilateral cooperation in outer

space activities

(b) Consideration of reports on the activities of the United

Nations, including its specialized agencies, and of

other international organizations dealing with the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space

(c) Evaluation of the role of the United Nations, its specialized agencies, other international organizations and

programmed of bilateral and multilateral cooperation

i n order to ensure broad international cooperation on

an equal basis

(d) Evaluation of the role of the United Nations, in the

realization of benefits of space technology for all countries and examination of the need and possibilities for

enhancing this role

12. Adoption of the report of the Conference

83
Appendix K

Additional Contributors

The following individuals contributed to this study in a variety of ways. OTA is grateful for the assistance

they gave:

Richard Barnes Tadahico Inada Ahmed Meer Thomas Rogers

Radford Byerly J. Jefferey Irons James Morrison Richard Shrum

Thomas Bruce Christopher Joyce Arthur Morrissy David Small

Frederick J. Doyle Mark Kieffer Robert Reining Marsha Smith

Robert Duffy Geneviene J. Knezo Addison Richmond David Webb

Floyd Fowler Helen Kupperman Edward Risley

Jonathan F. Gunter Lawrence Martinez Marvin Robinson

Post conference interviews were conducted with the following members of the International Community:

Luis Ramiro Beltran (Columbia) Professor A. M. House (Canada) Segun Olusola (Nigeria)

John Carver (Australia) Tomo Martelano (Yugoslavia) Yash Pal (India)

E. V. Chitnis (India) Alla Massevitch (U. S. S. R.) Sunaryo (Indonesia)

William Coleman (Africa) Salim Mehmud (Pakistan) V. S. Vereskchetin (U. S. S. R.)

Grahame Davey (Fiji International Mahindra Narain (England)

Telecommunications Union)

84
—

Appendix L

Acronyms

ASAT

CD

CHM

COMSAT

COMSAT

Act

COPUOS

CRS

BBS

IOD

!SA

FAO

FCC

G;-77

GSO

AF

CA

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

VMARSAT –

NTELSAT –

ru –

andsat —

DC –

IARISAT –

[LA –

[Ps –

[ss –

ASA –

antisatellite weapon

U.N. Committee on Disarmament

Common Heritage of Mankind

U.S. Satellite Communications

Corp.

Communications Satellite Act of

1962

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses

of Outer Space

Congressional Research Service,

Library of Congress

direct broadcast satellite

Department of Defense

European Space Agency

Food and Agriculture Organization

Federal Communications

Commission

Group of 7 7

geostationary orbit

International Astronautical

Federation

International Communications

Administration

International Maritime Satellite

Organization

International Telecommunications

Satellite Organization

International Telecommunication

Union

U.S. Land-Remote Sensing

Program

lesser developed country

International Maritime Satellite

Organization

multispectral-linear array

materials processing in space

multispectral scanner

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

NAS Act

NGO

NIEO

NWIO

OES

OSAD

O TA

Prep.

Committee

RF

SPOT

TM

U.N.

UNCSTD

UNDP

UNDRO

UNEP

UNESCO

UNGA

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

UNISPACE –

USAID –

WARC –

WMo –

National Aeronautics and Space

Act of 1958

nongovernment organizations

New International Economic Order

New World Information Order

Bureau of Oceans and

International Environmental and

Scientific Affairs

U.N. Outer Space Affairs Division

Office of Technology Assessment

Preparatory Committee formed by

COPUOS to prepare conference

report

radiofrequency

Systeme Probetoire Observationale

Terrestrial (land remote-sensing

system)

thematic mapper

United Nations

U.N. Conference on Science,

Technology, and Development

U.N. Development Program

U.N. Disaster Relief Organization

U.N. Environment Program

U.N. Education Science and

Cultural Organization

United Nations General Assembly

United Nations Conference on the

Exploration and Peaceful Uses of

Outer Space

U.S. Agency for International

Development

World Administrative Radio

Conference

World Meteorological

Organization

o

85