J-S15034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CHEALSE CARSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1014 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 15, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002283-2020

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: AUGUST 1, 2023

Chealse Carson (“Carson”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed following her conviction for, inter alia, aggravated assault.

1

 We 

affirm.

The relevant factual and procedural history of this case is as follows. A 

jury convicted Carson of, among other things, aggravated assault, arising 

from an incident in which she stabbed her brother with a knife. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 9/15/22, unnumbered at *1. Following Carson’s convictions, 

the trial court ordered a pre-sentence investigation and deferred sentencing. 

See N.T., 10/27/21, at 178. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed 

a standard-range sentence of sixteen to thirty-two months of imprisonment 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4).
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for the aggravated assault conviction. See N.T., 2/15/22, at 8.2 Carson filed 

a counseled post-sentence motion, see Post-Sentence Motion, 2/23/22, and, 

following her first attorney’s withdrawal, a pro se post-sentence motion. See 

Motion to Withdraw, 3/31/22; see also Order, 4/1/22 (granting Carson’s first 

attorney’s motion to withdraw); Pro Se Post-Sentence Motion, 6/2/22. The 

trial court denied relief, see Order, 6/17/22, and Carson timely appealed.3 

Both Carson and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4

Carson raises the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

[Carson]?

Carson’s Brief at 1.

Our standard of review for challenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing is well-settled: “[S]entencing is vested in the discretion of the trial 

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2 Carson additionally received one year of concurrent probation and a $100 

fine for related convictions. See N.T., 2/15/22, at 8-9. These sentences are 

not at issue in this appeal.

3 Carson’s notice of appeal is time-stamped July 18, 2022. July 17, 2022 fell 

on a Sunday; accordingly, her July 18, 2022 notice of appeal is timely. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (providing that a notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty 

days after entry of the order from which the appeal is taken); see also 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(2)(a) (requiring a defendant file her notice of appeal 

within thirty days of the entry of the order deciding her post-sentence 

motion); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (excluding weekends from time computations). 

4 The trial court appointed Carson’s present counsel on August 3, 2022, 

following this Court’s July 27, 2022 order directing the trial court to determine 

Carson’s eligibility for court-appointed counsel. See Order, 8/3/22. Carson’s 

second attorney filed her Rule 1925(b) statement. See Rule 1925(b) 

Statement, 8/9/22.
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court, and will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of that discretion[, 

which] involves a sentence which was manifestly unreasonable, or which 

resulted from partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. It is more than just an error 

in judgment.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1211 (Pa. Super. 

2021).

Further, this Court has explained that challenges to the discretionary 

aspects of sentencing are not appealable as of right, but, rather,

an appellant challenging the sentencing court’s discretion must 

invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by (1) filing a timely notice of 

appeal; (2) properly preserving the issue at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify the sentence; (3) complying with 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate section of the brief 

setting forth “a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for 

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a 

sentence[;]” and (4) presenting a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code.

Commonwealth v. Padilla-Vargas, 204 A.3d 971, 975 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation omitted; brackets in original); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). 

Regarding the requirement that an appellant raise a “substantial 

question,” this Court has explained:

A substantial question exists where an appellant sets forth a 

plausible argument that the sentence violates a particular 

provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental 

norms underlying the sentencing process.

Brown, 249 A.3d at 1211 (internal citation omitted). “The determination of 

whether a particular issue raises a substantial question is to be evaluated on 
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a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270, 274 (Pa. 

Super. 2004). 

This Court will not look beyond the Rule 2119(f) statement in 

determining whether an appellant has presented a substantial question, and 

bald assertions of sentencing errors do not suffice. See Commonwealth v. 

Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa. Super. 2018); see also Commonwealth 

v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 123 (Pa. Super. 2017). We are unable to discern 

a substantial question where a Rule 2119(f) statement consists only of 

boilerplate language of sentencing requirements without applying those 

principles to the challenged sentence. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 

A.2d 274, 283 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Radecki, 180 A.3d at 468 (stating 

that “[i]t is settled that this Court does not accept bald assertions of 

sentencing errors”) (internal quotations, citations, and brackets omitted).

Before addressing the merits of Carson’s issues, we must discern 

whether she has preserved her challenge to the discretionary aspects of her 

sentence and properly invoked this Court’s jurisdiction. We note that Carson’s 

Rule 2119(f) statement consists of the following: “The trial court in refusing 

to consider all sections of the Sentencing Code is a substantial question 

requiring discretionary review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).” 

Carson’s Brief at 3. Because Carson’s Rule 2119(f) statement contains only 

boilerplate statutory citations, we conclude she has failed to raise a substantial 

question regarding the discretionary aspects of her sentence. See Gibbs, 981 
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A.2d at 283; see also Radecki, 180 A.3d at 468.

5

 Accordingly, we affirm her 

judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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5 The Commonwealth correctly argues Carson has failed to present a 

substantial question for the same reason. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 10. 

We further note that, even if Carson had raised a substantial question, her

counseled Rule 1925(b) statement mirrors her Rule 2119(f) statement, and 

thus it is so vague that Carson would have waived her issue on this basis. 

See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 8/9/22; Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 

410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (providing that “if a concise statement is too 

vague, th[is C]ourt may find waiver”); Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/22, 

unnumbered at *2 (concluding, “Because [Carson’s] concise statement fails 

to identify the issue she wishes to raise with sufficient specificity, meaningful 

review has been impaired and the issue is waived”); Commonwealth’s Brief at 

10 (arguing for waiver based on a deficient Rule 1925(b) statement).

Lastly, we observe that the issue Carson ostensibly seeks to have 

reviewed is her assertion that the trial court imposed its sentence to punish 

her for taking her case to trial. See Carson’s Brief at 9. However, Carson 

failed to preserve this issue at sentencing or in either of her post-sentence 

motions, and has thereby waived the issue on these grounds as well. See 

generally N.T., 2/15/22, at 8-10 (trial court imposing sentence without 

objection); Post-Sentence Motion, 2/23/22 (moving for a sentence 

modification without specifying any particular basis); Pro Se Post-Sentence 

Motion, 6/2/22 (requesting a sentence modification for several reasons, but 

not asserting that the trial court punished her for exercising her right to a 

trial); Commonwealth’s Brief at 10 (arguing that Carson failed to preserve her 

issue below); Padilla-Vargas, 204 A.3d at 975 (requiring that an appellant 

preserve her challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing at the 

sentencing hearing or in a post-sentence motion).
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/01/2023