2Printed on paper that contain

at least 20% recycled fiber
Planning for

Disaster 

Debris

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Office of Solid Waste
About This Guide

This guide highlights the need for communities to plan for the

cleanup of debris after a major natural disaster. Based on lessons

learned from communities that have experienced such disasters, this

guide contains information to help communities prepare for and

recover more quickly from the increased solid waste generated by a

natural disaster.

Acknowledgments

The following individuals shared their knowledge and experiences of 

recovery from natural disasters and provided input to this guide:

Joan Edwards, Ellyn Hae, and Kelly Ingalls

City of Los Angeles, California

David Paulson

Erie County, Ohio

Chris Doyle and Larry Latham

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Dale Berton, William Himes, and Wayne Rifer

Kauai County, Hawaii

Steve Etcher and Charles Friedrichs

Lincoln County, Missouri

Cary Saul 

Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Deborah Higer

Metro-Dade County, Florida

Robert Grubbs

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

ii
iii

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Natural Disasters Can Generate a Substantial 

Volume of Debris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Hurricane debris..............................................................................................2

Earthquake debris............................................................................................3

Tornado debris.................................................................................................3

Flood debris .....................................................................................................4

Fire debris ........................................................................................................4

Federal Resources Available To Help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

Congress and the President ............................................................................5

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ........................................5

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)........................................................5

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ..............................................6

State and Local Resources Available To Help . . . . . . .6

State governments ..........................................................................................7

Other government assistance.........................................................................7

What a Community Can Do To Speed Recovery 

and Reduce Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Lessons Learned: 

Plan for Managing Disaster Debris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Make a long-term debris management plan..................................................8

Consider mutual aid arrangements................................................................8

Implement recycling programs ......................................................................8

Update the community’s solid waste management plan .............................8

Develop a communication strategy...............................................................9

Prepare for increased outreach and enforcement staffing needs ..................9

Obtain equipment and supplies .....................................................................9

Select collection and storage sites .................................................................9
iv

Determine management options and goals.................................................10

Segregate hazardous waste ...........................................................................10

Prepare contracts...........................................................................................10

Plan for FEMA and state reimbursement ....................................................10

Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Los Angeles, California—The Northridge Earthquake...............................11

Lincoln County, Missouri—The Midwest Floods.......................................14

Metro-Dade County, Florida—Hurricane Andrew......................................16

Mecklenburg County, North Carolina—Hurricane Hugo..........................18

Kauai, Hawaii—Hurricane Iniki ..................................................................20

For More Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ......................................22

EPA regional offices ......................................................................................22

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Hotline ......................23

RCRA Information Center ...........................................................................23

Magazine articles ..........................................................................................23
Every year natural disasters, such as fires,

floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and 

tornadoes, challenge American communities. These natural disasters have generated

large amounts of debris, causing considerable

disposal challenges for local public officials. If

you answer yes to any of the following questions, your community could benefit from the

advice and information presented in this guide.

h Is your community at risk of significant

damage from a natural disaster?

h Does your emergency plan ignore disaster

debris cleanup or rely on open burning or

unengineered burial of the debris?

h Has your community updated its solid

waste management1 plans with recycling

policies that are not included in your emergency response plan?

h Does your emergency plan need updating to

reflect recent changes in the community’s

solid waste management practices and facilities (e.g., landfill closures, new recycling

programs, or regionalization of services)?

In the past, debris from disasters was simply

buried or burned in the community. As demonstrated by recent disasters, burying or burning

debris as a means of waste management may

not be acceptable. Citizens do not want to

inhale the smoke from open burning. Municipalities do not want to risk contamination of

drinking water and soil from uncontrolled 

burial of debris. Under normal circumstances,

much municipal solid waste is recycled. The

remainder is disposed of in sanitary landfills or

in sophisticated combustors, both of which are

equipped with devices to control pollutants.

Often, however, these standard waste disposal

options are not sufficient to handle the overwhelming amount of debris left after a disaster.

Further adding to the disposal dilemma is the

fact that many municipalities are reluctant to

overburden or deplete their existing disposal

capacity with disaster debris.

Any community likely to be faced with

significant debris from a natural disaster

should develop a debris management plan. To

facilitate coordination, this plan could be a

specific task under the community’s general

emergency plan. This guide, based on experiences of other communities, suggests some

helpful planning considerations. It describes

steps a community can take to prepare for

dealing with the waste created by natural disasters and to speed recovery after such disasters. It also describes ways communities can

reduce the burden on their municipal solid

waste management systems in the event of a

natural disaster.

This guide does not provide all the tools a

planner will need to write a debris management plan, however. The development of a disaster debris management plan usually requires

input from neighboring communities, state

officials, local contractors, and a variety of

local agencies. This guide is intended to help a

planner begin the development process.

1

Introduction

1 In this guide, the term “solid waste management” refers to all phases of nonhazardous solid waste removal and handling,

including collection, transportation, sorting, processing, recycling, reduction, combustion, and landfilling.

Hurricane Andrew
2

Natural disasters strike with varying

degrees of severity and pose both

short- and long-term challenges to

public service providers. The most severe 

natural disasters generate debris in quantities

that can overwhelm existing solid waste management facilities or force communities to use

disposal options that otherwise would not be

acceptable. The table below gives examples of

how much debris was generated in a few

recent natural disasters.

Debris removal is a major component of

every disaster recovery operation. Much of the

debris generated from natural disasters is not

hazardous. Soil, building material, and green

waste, such as trees and shrubs, make up 

most of the volume of disaster debris. Most 

of this waste can be recycled into useful commodities. Debris from hurricanes, earthquakes,

tornadoes, floods, and fires falls into a few

major categories, as shown in the table on the

facing page.

Hurricane debris

Hurricanes generate high-velocity winds,

cause oceans to surge well above high tide 

levels, and create waves in inland waters.

Hurricanes leave behind debris made up of 

construction materials, damaged buildings, 

sediments, green waste, and personal property.

Hurricane debris obstructs roads and disables

electrical power and communication systems

over wide areas.

Most of the damage and resulting debris is

in the area where the hurricane first hits land;

Natural

Disasters Can

Generate a

Substantial

Volume of

Debris

2

2 In this guide, the term “green waste” refers to all types of organic yard and landscaping waste, including shrubs, leaves,

grass, and tree materials. “Wood waste” refers to tree limbs that have been ground into mulch.
3

however, the destruction also can extend many

miles inland. For example, in 1989, Hurricane

Hugo made landfall at Charleston, South

Carolina, and continued inland, causing great

damage as it cut across the state and into

North Carolina. The hurricane generated

400,000 tons of green waste in Mecklenburg

County, North Carolina, 200 miles from

Charleston. This amount of green waste would

have taken up two years of landfill capacity,

while only two and a half years of capacity was

available in the local landfill. The county considered burning the green waste, but rejected

the idea to protect the county’s air quality.

Instead, all the debris was ground up into

mulch and given away to local citizens and

businesses for use.

Earthquake debris

Earthquakes generate shock waves and displace the ground along fault lines. These seismic forces can bring down buildings and

bridges in a localized area and damage buildings and other structures in a far wider area.

Secondary damage from fires, explosions, and

localized flooding from broken water pipes can

increase the amount of debris. Earthquake

debris includes building materials, personal

property, and sediment from landslides.

Los Angeles is still collecting and managing debris from the Northridge earthquake that

hit the city in January 1994. The amount of

debris reached 3 million tons at the end of July

1995. Three months into the debris removal

process, city officials decided to attempt to

recycle as much of the debris as possible to

conserve the remaining landfill capacity. Most

of the waste was construction and demolition

(C&D) debris, which could be processed by

local recycling businesses. City officials

worked with the Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA) and local businesses to expand existing recycling capacity

and approve permits, thereby enhancing the

ability of these businesses to meet the city’s

waste management needs. The city developed

contracts with existing businesses, provided

them with clean source-separated materials,

and piloted a project to recycle mixed debris.

After one year, the city had created more than

10,000 tons of new, privately operated daily

processing capacity for mixed and sourceseparated debris.

Tornado debris

Damage from tornadoes is caused by highvelocity rotating winds. The severity of the

damage depends on the size of the tornado funnel and the length of time the funnel touches

the ground. Damage is generally confined to a

narrow path extending up to half a mile wide

and from a hundred yards to several miles long.

Tornado debris includes damaged and destroyed

structures, green waste, and personal property.

The city of Sandusky, Ohio, did not have 

a plan for managing disaster debris when a 
4

tornado hit in July 1992. Cleanup took about 

two and a half months and involved approximately 600 tons of waste, most of which was

green waste. City officials found that the two

greatest obstacles to managing the debris were

communicating instructions to residents and

sorting the green waste to maximize chipping

and mulching efficiency.

Flood debris

Debris from floods is caused by structural

inundation and high-velocity water flow. As

soon as flood waters recede, people begin to

dispose of flood-damaged household items.

Mud, sediment, sandbags, and other reinforcing

materials also add to the volume of debris

needing management, as do materials from

demolished and dismantled houses.

After the Midwest flood in the summer of

1993, officials in Lincoln County, Missouri,

handled the flood debris through dropoff centers as well as county collection. The debris

included appliances, wood, shingles, insulation, tires, materials containing asbestos, and

household hazardous waste. To comply with

state solid waste regulations and county recycling goals, county staff and contractors segregated the debris by waste type. Scrap dealers

picked up the appliances, and individuals salvaged the wood. Tires were cut in half for disposal in approved landfills or ground for

roadside use. After the flood, the state of

Missouri temporarily set aside its recycling

policy, which prohibited landfilling of compostable materials, so that communities could

landfill leaves and yard waste. A hazardous

waste contractor collected and disposed of

household hazardous waste.

Fire debris

While fires leave less debris than other

types of disasters, they still generate much

waste. For example, demolished houses contribute noncombustible debris. Burned out 

cars and other metal objects, as well as ash 

and charred wood waste, also must be managed. In addition, large-scale loss of plants serving as ground cover can lead to mud slides,

adding debris to the waste stream.

In Malibu, California, one of the communities hit hardest in 1993 by coastal fires,

268 houses were destroyed; most of them

burned to their foundations. Malibu removed

fallen trees as well as dead trees that might

have fallen on roads or homes, and chipped 

the trees for mulch. The city left other dead

trees standing to help prevent erosion. The 

city gave property owners six weeks to 

remove their own debris, then began removing

remaining household debris. In clearing the fire

debris from about 175 properties, the city 

collected the same amount of solid waste normally collected in an entire year. The city

recycled some concrete and asphalt and lifted

daily landfill limits to accommodate the rest of

the debris.

The Midwest Floods
5

I

f the President declares a community a 

natural disaster area, considerable federal

assistance is available from FEMA. In 

addition to FEMA, the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can provide federal

assistance. Most natural disasters, however, do

not qualify for full federal assistance.

Congress and the

President

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and

Emergency Assistance Act sets forth federal

disaster relief responsibilities and procedures.

Among many other activities, the Stafford Act

authorizes debris removal in “the public interest . . . from publicly and privately owned

lands and water.” The President makes the

final decision to declare an area a natural disaster and therefore eligible for federal assistance.

Federal Emergency

Management Agency

(FEMA) 

The Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to

respond to disasters and emergencies in order to

help save lives and protect public health, safety,

and property. FEMA operates under specific regulations, which are spelled out in Section

206.224 of Title 44 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR). The Stafford Act and the

CFR use the term debris removal in a broad

sense to encompass the entire process of removing, handling, recycling, and disposing of debris.

The CFR declares debris removal to be “in the

public interest,” not only to protect “life, public

health, and safety” but also to “ensure economic recovery of the affected community.”

Thus, the authorizing statements in the Stafford

Act and CFR are broad and inclusive.

For communities to qualify for FEMA

assistance, the effort needed to recover from

the disaster must be of such magnitude as to

be beyond the capabilities of the state or local

government. A local government must make a

declaration of natural disaster to the state

emergency management agency, and the state’s

governor must request through FEMA that the

President declare the affected area a disaster.

Once the President concurs, the local government becomes eligible for reimbursement of

some portion of its debris management expenses and other disaster recovery costs. FEMA also

opens a Regional Operations Center and a

Disaster Field Office in the affected area to coordinate efforts with local and state authorities.

Once the declaration is made by the

President, FEMA negotiates the disaster relief

efforts with the state emergency management

agency. The state agency represents the local

communities during this discussion. FEMA

staff advise local government officials regarding the activities eligible for reimbursement

specific to that community; FEMA also sets

reasonable cost standards for these activities.

Under the Stafford Act, FEMA is authorized to

pay for activities to handle debris posing an

immediate threat to the public, generally

including debris removal, transportation, volume reduction at staging areas, and ultimate

disposal. FEMA requires careful recordkeeping

regarding expenditures for communities to

obtain reimbursement. FEMA may fund recycling of disaster debris if the local government

has in place prior to the natural disaster a 

policy emphasizing recycling, or if the local

government can demonstrate that recycling is

a cost-effective debris management option.

FEMA does not respond alone to natural 

disasters. Other federal agencies also have 

substantial roles. In particular, two agencies

are involved in hazardous and nonhazardous

waste management.

U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers (USACE)

The Department of Defense is responsible

for emergency support related to public works

and engineering, and has designated USACE as

its operating agent. USACE provides technical

advice and evaluations, engineering services,

Federal

Resources 

Available To

Help
6

construction management and inspection,

emergency contracting, emergency repair of

wastewater and solid waste facilities, and realestate support.

USACE assistance is arranged through

FEMA. In the Miami area after Hurricane

Andrew in 1992, USACE removed debris in the

hardest hit areas by contracting with six large

general contractors.

U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA)

EPA is the primary agency responsible for

emergency support related to hazardous materials. EPA responds to releases of hazardous

materials and provides technical assistance for

environmental monitoring needs. EPA regional

offices also can provide technical assistance on

municipal solid waste issues.

State and local governments are communities’ first source of assistance in thewake of a natural disaster and in planning for disaster debris management. Such

assistance is available to communities impacted by disasters, regardless of whether they

receive a federal disaster declaration.

State and

Local

Resources

Available

To Help

The Midwest Floods
7

State governments

The state emergency management agency

and state waste management agency have specific roles to play in cleaning up disaster debris.

The state emergency management agency

serves as the local government’s liaison to

FEMA and can provide information for emergency planning. This state agency also can help

represent the local government’s interests to

FEMA during a disaster and cleanup. The state

waste management agency’s role can be to make

special accommodations for the unusual waste

management needs resulting from a natural disaster. For example, this agency could temporarily lift permit requirements for solid waste

facilities. In addition, specialized assistance is

often available from other state agencies.

Other government 

assistance

Both state and local governments may

enter into mutual aid agreements with other

state and local governments prior to any disaster. Such an agreement could provide for either

binding commitments or nonbinding intentions of support by state and local governments to assist one another in the event of a

disaster. Through these agreements, communities can loan equipment and personnel with

specific expertise or experience.

The Southern Regional Emergency

Management Assistance Compact is an example

of a mutual aid agreement originally signed by

17 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

The resolution supporting this pact now has

been offered to all states and includes model

legislation for state legislatures. The compact

also contains broad language and a legal framework addressing authority, liability, licensing,

reimbursement, injury or death benefits, and

use of the National Guard. For more information on the Southern Regional Emergency

Management Assistance Compact, contact:

The Southern Governors’ Association

The Hall of the States

444 North Capitol Street, NW.

Washington, DC 20001

202 624-5897

Preparing a disaster debris management

plan in advance can pay off in the event

of a natural disaster. Planning can help

a community identify its debris collection,

recycling, and disposal options. Although the

recovery process will take a long time, perhaps

even years, careful planning will prevent costly

mistakes, speed recovery, and avoid creation of

more waste. A plan also can save money by

identifying cost-effective debris management

options and sources of help, increasing control

over debris management in your community,

and improving administrative efficiency.

What a

Community Can

Do To Speed

Recovery and

Reduce Costs

The Midwest Floods
The following suggestions for disaster

debris planning are based on insights

from community officials who recently

have experienced a major natural disaster.

Make a long-term debris

management plan

Every community consulted suggested

increasing existing emergency planning to

include long-term debris management. Because

natural disasters can generate tremendous quantities of debris, communities should plan for the

worst case. Any plan should include a detailed

strategy for debris collection, temporary storage

and staging areas, recycling, disposal, hazardous

waste identification and handling, administration, and dissemination of information to the

public. Distribute the plan and work with personnel from each agency to ensure that the plan

can be implemented quickly and smoothly.

Review the plan at least once a year, and revise

it as needed. For example, outdated forms, such

as time sheets and materials tracking forms,

may need to be replaced.

Consider mutual aid

arrangements

Mutual aid arrangements allow communities to quickly access specialized personnel or

equipment on a short-term basis. Usually the

host community pays the expenses for the personnel as well as any maintenance or repair

costs for equipment. These agreements can be

developed for a local geographic area or can

extend to communities in other states. The

agreements can be formal or informal.

Implement recycling 

programs

Implementing a plan for recycling disaster

debris is much easier if a community already

has a recycling program in place. Permitting,

enforcement, collection, processing, and marketing issues already will have been largely

resolved. After a disaster, the community will

be faced with expanding current recycling practices rather than designing and implementing

new practices. It is much easier to expand

existing capacities and markets than to start

these endeavors in the wake of a disaster.

Update the community’s

solid waste management

plan

It is important that a community’s solid

waste management plan reflect current practices and policies, especially those that apply 

in disaster situations. The plan is an official

document that often is filed with the state, and

when regional solid waste services or facilities

are involved, a copy often is provided to neighboring communities as well. It also can be 

beneficial to share the plan with private contractors and other community agencies (e.g., fire

and police) that in the event of a disaster would

be involved with solid waste management 

services. Should a disaster occur, supporting

8

Lessons

Learned: 

Plan for

Managing

Disaster Debris

The Northridge Earthquake
9

agencies would find the plan useful because it

describes established practices and policies, as

well as the types, locations, and capacities of

existing solid waste recycling and disposal facilities. Reflecting current practices and policies,

the plan also would serve as a resource document in negotiating technical and financial

assistance with FEMA and other agencies.

Develop a communication

strategy

Prepare a communication strategy ahead of

time. Government officials will need to tell the

community when, where, and how trash collection will resume, as well as provide special

instructions for reporting and sorting disaster

debris. Many communities have prepared radio

announcements and flyers as part of the emergency plan. Depending on the type and severity

of the natural disaster, however, a community

might lose electricity, telephone service, radio

broadcasting capability, or newspaper service.

Therefore, communities should prepare for

more than one method of communication.

Discuss with local media companies the use of

free advertising time and space to communicate

instructions in the event of a disaster.

Prepare for increased 

outreach and enforcement

staffing needs

In the aftermath of a natural disaster,

waste management staff must handle an

increased number of telephone calls and

requests concerning waste removal.

Communities need more staff to train and

monitor debris collection contractors, enforce

disposal restrictions, and help solve implementation problems. Identify sources of temporary

labor and, if your community is culturally

diverse, consider the use of a multilingual 

telephone bank.

Obtain equipment and 

supplies

Identify in advance the types of equipment

and supplies that your crews will need to implement the plan. Plan for quick procurement of

these items through mutual aid agreements or

standing contracts, or consider stockpiling this

equipment. If stockpiling is too expensive for

one community alone, perhaps the state could

stockpile the equipment.

Types of equipment that a community

might need include chain saws, portable generators, cellular phones, flashlights, batteries,

vehicle repair equipment (flat tires occur more

often because of glass and metal debris in

roads), and extra work clothing. A local government that routinely stores drinking water (e.g.,

for its solid waste collection crews) might want

to make sure that water supplies are wellstocked during the hurricane or flood season.

Select collection and 

storage sites

The most common suggestion from communities that have experienced natural disasters is to pre-select debris staging sites that will

be used for temporary storage and processing of

debris. Convenient local sites allow collection

crews to reduce travel time when transferring

debris to processing or disposal facilities and

result in faster street clearing. Site operators

can sort debris for recycling or disposal, as well

as answer questions from the public. These

sites can be used to store green waste before

transferring it to another facility, or they can be

used to chip and mulch green waste on site.

Communities also can use these sites to distribute free mulch or wood to the public.

Select the sites based on planned activities,

such as staging, collection, storage, sorting,

recycling, landfilling, and burning of debris.

Pre-selection of sites speeds the implementation of the debris management plan. Also consider access to heavy equipment, lack of impact

on environmentally sensitive areas, and convenience to collection routes. Investigate possible

impacts on adjacent housing, since the sites

could produce noise at levels deemed unacceptable by residents or attract rodents that may

carry disease. Evaluate and document the condition of these sites prior to use. The government agencies involved will be responsible for

returning these sites to their original condition.

Be sure to establish agreement on the schedule

for return of the property to the owners and the

degree of rehabilitation to the property.

If residents will be asked to bring disaster

debris to collection sites, your community

should include these locations in its disaster

communication strategy, so that information is
10

immediately available to the public in the

event of a disaster. Schedules and staffing plans

for these sites should take into account that

the busiest times for residents dropping off

home-related debris are likely to be evenings

and weekends.

Determine management

options and goals

Any disaster debris management plan should

include a disposal strategy. Communities need

to set priorities for recycling wastes and determine the desired disposal options for the remaining waste.

Segregate hazardous

waste

Be prepared to segregate hazardous from

nonhazardous disaster debris; otherwise your

community might be forced to dispose of the

combined waste as hazardous waste. Monitor

collected business waste to be certain it does

not meet the definition of hazardous waste.

Waste handlers must understand these requirements as well as have a plan for controlling

and diverting the hazardous waste from the

debris stream.

Prepare contracts

Determine what equipment and staff

resources your community needs in the event

of a disaster. Any assistance that will not be

provided by state and other local governments

must be obtained through contracts. If contracted work seems likely at the state or community level, consider bidding an emergency

contract, as is commonly done for snow

removal. The request for proposals (RFP) may

include service for debris collection, storage,

sorting, processing, marketing, and disposal.

Investigate FEMA reimbursement policies and

ensure that the terms described in the RFP are

likely to meet FEMA and state requirements in

the event that your community qualifies for

federal or state reimbursement.

Plan for FEMA and state

reimbursement

Consider staffing needs to meet the recordkeeping requirements for FEMA reimbursement of disaster debris management costs.

Some states reimburse some costs even if the

disaster does not qualify for federal reimbursement funds. Discuss recordkeeping requirements with your state emergency planning

agency. Your community, particularly if it is

small, might benefit from identifying in

advance people who have experience in obtaining reimbursement.

The Midwest Floods
11

The city of Los Angeles relied heavily on

recycling to manage debris from its

January 1994 earthquake. In response to

the earthquake, city staff negotiated with

FEMA to designate recycling as the preferred

method of debris management. The city developed contracts with existing businesses to

recycle clean source-separated materials and

worked with more than nine businesses to

develop processing capacity for mixed debris.

By midsummer, the city was able to recycle

about 50 percent of the earthquake debris collected each week. By July 1995, the city was

recycling over 86 percent of the debris collected, totaling over 11⁄2 million tons.

Collection and recycling

The city of Los Angeles did not have a plan

for debris management prior to the earthquake

but quickly developed debris management procedures after the disaster. The day after the

earthquake struck, the city instituted a curbside debris collection program, which did not

include recycling. C&D debris under normal

conditions makes up 10 to 15 percent of the

Los Angeles waste stream. Prior to the 1994

earthquake, one local company processed 150

tons of C&D waste per day. After the earthquake, the city picked up as much as 10,000

tons of C&D waste per day. City officials

updated an existing list of licensed, insured

debris removal contractors and asked them 

to attend an orientation and to sign hastily

drafted contracts for debris removal.

At first, contracts for debris removal were

only two pages long and contracted for one

week of work. These early contracts allowed

the city to begin removing debris quickly, yet

did not include recycling or other requirements

such as subcontracting parameters. Contracts

ultimately grew to 22 pages. The city assigned

each contractor a grid of streets to clear. City

inspectors (pulled from other assignments)

monitored contractors and kept records to

determine whether debris in each area was collected within seven days of being set out.

When contractors expended their total contract

amounts, city officials placed them at the bottom of the list of approved contractors and

called them again when their turns came.

After two months of negotiation, FEMA

allowed the city to include recycling as a

debris removal method. This decision was

based primarily on the city’s local policy supporting recycling and a recycling pilot that 

documented a potential 82 percent recycling

rate. Contractors began separate collections of

wood, metal, dirt, concrete and asphalt, and red

clay brick. The city required the contractors to

send any debris that could not be separated to

facilities that recycled at least 80 percent of the

mixed debris.

Most of the materials collected were recyclable. Recyclers crushed concrete and asphalt

(mixed with up to 15 percent dirt) and sold it

for use as sub-base in roads. They reused dirt as

landfill cover and soil amendment. They

ground and screened wood, selling fine pieces 

Los Angeles, California

The Northridge Earthquake

Case Studies

Of course, every community hopes it never has to use its disaster debris management plan, but when a disaster does hit, prepared communities can recover

more quickly than other communities. Below are disaster debris case studies

from an earthquake, a flood, and three hurricanes. These case studies include examples

of situations in which planning paid off, as well as circumstances in which the lack of

planning slowed recovery.
12

by the cubic yard for landscaping and coarse

pieces for cogeneration fuel or compost.

Recycling facilities either ground up brick for

use on baseball infields or chipped it for use in

landscaping. Scrap metal dealers recycled

metal waste.

By December 1995, four facilities were

capable of recycling mixed debris. Two of them

used an automated process that screened out

fine debris and sent the remainder along a conveyor belt where workers removed and separated wood, brick, metal, and trash by hand. A

vibrating screen removed any dirt left in the

remaining stream. At the end of the process,

only clean concrete and asphalt were left.

City officials also ensured that debris

would be recycled by providing training and

incentives to haulers. For example, city officials required haulers to develop a recycling

plan that included scouting for recyclables

and dedicating trucks to a given type of

waste, so that debris separated at the curb did

not become mixed in the truck. The city also

created a contract performance incentive that

placed source-separated recycling higher than

mixed recycling. With these efforts, the city

expanded its C&D recycling capacity by a

minimum of 10,300 tons per day. Immediately

after the earthquake, all debris was disposed of

in three landfills. Just over a year later, the

city had added 18 recycling facilities and one

landfill. This expansion helped to meet a longterm goal to increase recycling of routine

C&D waste.

By the end of the program, the city had

recycled almost 56 percent of all materials collected since the day of the earthquake for less

than the cost of disposal. The city demonstrated that when sufficient recycling facility

capacity exists, a recycling rate of over 86 percent can be achieved. This total would have

been much higher, in fact, had the city implemented recycling in the beginning of the

recovery effort. To prepare for the possibility

of future disasters, Los Angeles has issued an

RFP for a contingency contract for various

waste management activities, including the

use of sites in the event of a natural disaster.

The Northridge Earthquake
13

Communication

Soon after the earthquake, officials placed

news stories and advertisements to inform the

public that they could leave debris for pickup

on the street in a pile as wide as a parked car.

At first, the city allowed residents to leave

mixed debris at the curb. Later, city officials

asked residents to separate the following materials: concrete and asphalt (these could be

mixed), dirt, red clay brick, wood, and all other

material. Residents had been accustomed to

the relaxed requirements that allowed them 

to set out mixed debris, however, so crews of

specially hired city workers distributed

doorhangers requesting residents to separate

their debris. Where residents still did not separate debris into its recyclable components,

work crews preceded the debris haulers and

separated the debris. When residents placed

yard trimmings or other non-earthquakerelated debris on the curb, workers left

doorhangers explaining why these materials

had not been picked up and giving directions

on how to dispose of the materials. In the first

eight months after the earthquake, debris

haulers collected 122,000 truck loads of debris.

The city relied on both residents and city

staff to determine which locations needed

debris pickups. A telephone bank, staffed by

English-, Spanish-, and Korean-speaking operators, fielded requests for pickups from residents.

Staff entered the address of each caller into a

geographic information system database and

regularly produced maps showing areas needing

pickups. At the same time, city inspectors

supervising the debris management work

reported streets where debris had accumulated.

Outside assistance

Los Angeles was largely self-sufficient in

managing its earthquake debris. If the quantity

of debris had been greater, the city would have

asked for assistance from USACE (through

FEMA), the state of California, and other

states. Other agencies provided some assistance. The California Office of Emergency

Services provided a liaison to FEMA and

issued emergency regulations expanding permit hours for solid waste facilities.

FEMA funded the debris recycling program, including paying recycling facility tipping fees, as well as the costs associated with

hiring data entry staff and contracting with a

consultant to manage recycling efforts. For the

period of May 14, 1995, through July 15, 1995,

the average tipping fee to use the recycling

facilities was $21.55 per ton versus $24.92 per

ton for disposal facilities, resulting in an average savings of $3.37 per ton. In addition, 

recycling saved the city transportation costs

since recycling facilities were closer to the

devastated areas and many had shorter lines.

California’s Integrated Waste Management

Board helped Los Angeles obtain this funding

by writing a letter to FEMA stating that recycling was state policy. Los Angeles, like every

community in California, has been required to

submit a plan for source reduction, recycling,

and composting under the state’s Integrated

Waste Management and Litter Reduction Act.

FEMA determined that since Los Angeles had

a recycling policy prior to the earthquake, the

city did not need to demonstrate that recycling would save money in order to obtain

FEMA funding.

The Northridge Earthquake
14

The Midwest floods in the summer of

1993 inundated 75 towns and more than

20 million acres of land in nine states.

The flood damaged or destroyed an estimated

50,000 homes and ruined household belongings

in thousands of other homes that were flooded.

One rural county that borders the Mississippi

River, Lincoln County, Missouri, developed a

successful debris management program with a

significant recycling component.

Collection and recycling

Lincoln County initiated separate debris

cleanup programs for three types of debris:

h Mud and sand deposited on roads

Crews cleared mud and sand from roads

and moved it into roadside drainage 

ditches. Later the ditches were cleared 

of the dirt and sand to restore drainage.

Crews delivered the dirt to farmers, who

used it for topsoil.

h Household debris

Soon after the flood waters began receding,

county officials placed containers for

household flood debris at one site in each

of the county’s four towns along the river.

The county contracted with a private

waste management firm to haul approximately 700 containers of debris, ranging in

capacity from 40 to 90 tons, to a landfill.

Initially, staff operated the collection sites

10 hours per day. Officials soon increased

operating time to 24 hours per day because

residents dropped off more debris at night

than during the day. County residents

brought household flood debris to the collection sites and left it on the ground. The

county used a hi-lift, a tractor with a bucket

on the front, to lift heavy items into large

containers. Site staff were responsible for

sorting materials for recycling, as well as

separating out hazardous waste. The waste

management contractor provided guidance

on the types of hazardous waste sorters

were likely to encounter. Staff separated

about 25 percent of the debris, including

appliances, wood, shingles, insulation,

tires, materials containing asbestos, and

household hazardous waste. Scrap dealers

picked up the appliances; individuals salvaged wood. Missouri’s recycling policy

prohibiting landfilling of compostable

materials (leaves and yard waste) was 

temporarily lifted after the flood.

Substantial household hazardous waste

accumulated at the collection sites. If

sorters were unsure whether particular

materials were hazardous (e.g., shingles

and insulation), they set them aside as special debris. The waste hauler then determined whether these materials should be

taken to a hazardous or nonhazardous

waste landfill. The hauler placed leaking

hazardous waste containers into sealed

containers. No hazardous materials leaked

onto the ground, so no soil remediation

was needed at the collection sites.

h Building demolition debris

Approximately 300 houses in Lincoln

County sustained damage amounting to

more than 50 percent of the value of the

house. Most of these homeowners chose to

sell their properties to the county in a buyout and demolition program. FEMA and the

state Community Development Block

Grant program, which is connected with a

Department of Housing and Urban

Development program, funded the program.

Once the county purchased the houses

slated for demolition, county crews worked

to remove and separate salvageable or nonburnable items from the homes. Crews

removed vinyl siding, windows, asphalt

shingles, insulation, cabinets, appliances,

furniture, electrical cables, piping, rafters,

studs, and decks. The demolition contractor then had the option to sell or give away

as much of these materials as possible

before disposing of what remained. The

Lincoln County, Missouri

The Midwest Floods
contractor then could easily demolish the

shell of each house, which consisted

almost entirely of wood.

An air curtain burner combusted the demolition debris and unsalvaged items from the

houses. Other debris was landfilled.

Communication

A mass mailing of over 1,000 letters was

sent to residents in the Lincoln County floodplain. Information also was distributed through

a local newspaper. The county’s communication strategy differed for each of the three

types of debris generated.

Through phone calls and advertisements in

local newspapers, the county found farmers

interested in taking the soil debris piled by the

roadside. County crews removing soil from

ditches delivered some of the soil to their farms.

The county publicized the household debris

collection program through public meetings,

newspapers, and radio, but ultimately word of

mouth was the most effective communication

mechanism. Signs on the road identified each 

collection site. The county informed residents 30

days prior to the closing of the collection sites.

A series of public meetings was held

throughout the county to inform residents of

the home buyout program. County staff responsible for assessing flood damage to houses met

daily for breakfast from 6 to 7 a.m. at a centrally

located restaurant in the flood area and welcomed homeowners to meet with them and

learn about the buyout program. The county

also notified residents of the program with

posters at the same restaurant and at a resort

community at the northern end of the flood

area. As of July 1995, Lincoln County had completed over 250 buyouts, had demolished and

recycled over 200 homes, and was expecting to

purchase and remove an additional 150 homes

from the flood plain.

Outside assistance

The Boonslick Regional Planning

Commission, a local government group,

recruited staff for the collection sites and the

pre-demolition salvage crews. U.S. Department

of Labor funds paid for these services through

the Jobs Training Partnership Act program.

15

The Midwest Floods
16

Hurricane Andrew, which struck the

Florida coast on August 24, 1992, left

an estimated 6 million tons of debris

in Metro-Dade County (Greater Miami). This

included downed trees and debris from 150,000

houses that were severely damaged or completely destroyed. Because of the extent of the

destruction, Miami received help in collecting

hurricane debris from USACE through FEMA.

Since the hurricane, to streamline the

administration of hauling contracts in the event

of future disasters, Metro-Dade County has

issued an RFP for a contingency contract for

various waste management activities. The RFP

calls for two types of bids: one bid for a disposal

site plus waste hauling services and one bid for

a disposal site without waste hauling services.

Collection and recycling

Metro-Dade County instituted a hurricane

plan prior to the disaster and followed the plan’s

emergency debris collection guidelines. In

accordance with the plan, the county initially

focused on both collection of garbage, because

garbage can pose the greatest health risk, and

clearing of the county’s highways.

In the three weeks after the hurricane, the

amount of garbage set out by residents was

double the pre-disaster amount as people in

houses without electricity cleaned out spoiled

food from refrigerators and freezers. County

garbage collection crews worked seven days a

week, 18 hours per day to collect garbage and

clear debris from the streets.

A small number of county solid waste management employees initially could not report to

work because they needed to make emergency

repairs to their homes, obtain food for their families, or provide care to children or elderly dependents. In these cases, other county employees

offered assistance, thereby reducing the amount

of time county employees were unable to perform their waste management duties.

Initially, the hurricane debris consisted

mostly of downed trees. As citizens began their

cleanup efforts, more household debris was collected (e.g., rain-damaged furniture). And as

repairs began, the debris contained more C&D

wastes (e.g., drywall and roofing tiles).

The county asked residents to bring wood

and yard waste, appliances, and metal to any of

the county’s 18 existing trash and recycling

dropoff centers. Wood and yard waste was

chipped for mulch. Scrap dealers took appliances and metal. County officials asked residents to place other hurricane debris at the

curb and to separate nonburnable waste from

burnable waste.

Soon the trash and recycling centers were

overwhelmed with debris. The county then

opened neighborhood staging areas in parks

and similar locations where residents could

bring their wood waste. Approximately

500,000 tons of wood waste from the hurricane

were mulched and distributed to agricultural

areas, parks, and residential sites.

The county and USACE hired debris

haulers to move debris from the curbs to staging areas. At each of the staging areas, personnel separated and inspected incoming loads and

removed any hazardous waste. In the northern

part of the county, the county government

established 16 zones and assigned county

resources to four zones, contracting out the

work in the remaining 12 zones to qualified

local contractors. The county divided up the

number of contracts equally to firms owned by

Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics.

USACE contracted debris removal work in 13

zones to six out-of-state contractors. MetroDade County contracted with a private firm to

haul debris from all of the staging areas to the

private firm’s landfills.

The Florida Department of Environmental

Regulation allowed debris to be burned under an

emergency 30-day order. USACE used air-curtain

burners that met all federal and state requirements. Some other local burn sites, however,

did not use state-of-the-art technology. Burning

at these sites led to many public complaints and

Metro-Dade County, Florida

Hurricane Andrew
17

protests by environmental activists. As a result,

county commissioners shut down all burning

three weeks after it began. The major problem

that arose during burning operations was commingled debris that did not burn efficiently. At

USACE burn sites, the resultant ash was tested

to determine if it was hazardous and disposed of

accordingly. After debris collection and staging

areas were cleared of all debris, the county conducted soil and water testing for hazardous

waste contamination.

Communication

Metro-Dade County used different communications strategies for each stage of the debris

management effort. In the days following the

hurricane, city officials gave about 10 television and radio interviews each day, in which

they asked residents to carry their garbage to

the nearest cleared street. Later, the county

used television, radio, and direct mail advertisements. Newspaper advertisements were not

an option since the hurricane had temporarily

halted publication of Miami’s daily newspaper.

Because most access into the hurricane zone

was by highway, the county also distributed

flyers at highway toll plazas. Through all of

these communication vehicles, the county told

residents and building contractors how to set

out debris, the status of debris collection in

each zone, and the sanctions against illegal

dumping. The county also added new telephone lines and work stations and hired and

trained new staff to handle thousands of calls

each month about debris. Every call complaining about debris piles or illegal dumping was

recorded, routed to the appropriate agency for

action, and mapped on a geographic information system to help identify problem areas.

Outside assistance

Metro-Dade County received extensive

assistance from USACE in managing its hurricane debris. Within three days, two general

contractors had been awarded debris removal

contracts for $3 million and had begun

removal efforts. USACE took responsibility for

the harder hit southern half of the county,

while the county crews concentrated on the

northern half. USACE debris removal work

went on for over two years and totaled over

$375 million.

Hurricane Andrew
18

I

n September 1989, Hurricane Hugo created

a solid waste crisis for Charlotte, North

Carolina. In Mecklenburg County, North

Carolina, alone, the equivalent of 10 years’

worth of green waste was generated in just

over three hours.

Collection and recycling

The Charlotte/Mecklenburg Emergency

Management Office was well prepared to handle the variety of medical, housing, and communication needs presented by this disaster.

Mecklenburg County did not, however, have a

plan to deal with the enormous quantity of

debris generated by the storm. When Hugo hit,

the county was down to its last municipal solid

waste landfill, which had only 21⁄2 years of capacity remaining. The county did not want to use

up its remaining landfill capacity. Because of

existing air pollution problems, burning was

not a viable option either. County officials

determined the best option would be to collect

and shred the green waste—by far the largest

category of waste—and distribute the resulting

product for use as mulch and boiler fuel.

The city of Charlotte and six other municipalities in Mecklenburg County were responsible for collecting the hurricane debris. Working

together, these communities spread collection

and storage locations throughout the county.

Eleven public properties were designated as

green-waste dropoff sites, including former,

present, and future landfill sites and a parcel of

land at the Charlotte airport. Private citizens

also volunteered land for collection sites.

More than 175,000 vehicle loads dumped a

total of 400,000 tons of green waste at the collection sites over a 10-month period. Officials

feared that such a large quantity of green waste

would be accompanied by a high level of nonorganic contaminants. The contaminant level

was very low, however, due primarily to three

factors:

h During the three weeks immediately following the storm, the county landfill

accepted all storm-related, non-green-waste

debris free of charge. This debris totaled

6,300 tons and consisted primarily of C&D

waste.

h All entrances to green-waste sites were

staffed during operating hours, and staff

strictly enforced the prohibition of other

types of waste.

h The city of Charlotte resumed weekly

curbside trash collection two days after the

storm, providing convenient disposal of

other types of waste for all residents.

While awaiting shredding, wood was piled

10 to 15 feet high over 100 acres of land. One

problem with storing this much wood was the

fire hazard.

Green-waste mulch also was piled 10 feet

high. When piled that high for more than a

Mecklenburg County, North Carolina

Hurricane Hugo

Hurricane Hugo
19

month, this mulch tends to heat up and can

spontaneously combust. One mulch fire at a

storage site took a week to extinguish.

The county initially hired a local contractor to shred the green waste into mulch using

high-speed shredding equipment. One month

after the hurricane, with four shredding systems working 12 hours per day, seven days a

week, the county decided to contract for more

grinders. Shredding was finally completed in

February 1991 (16 months after the storm) at a

cost of $7 million.

Communication

As the green-waste mulch was created, the

county had yet another challenge on its hands:

what to do with 400,000 tons of shredded

green waste.

In October 1989, the county launched its

“Take-a-Ton” mulch give-away program. The

media was very supportive in getting the word

out. The Charlotte newspaper published maps

of the give-away locations, and radio and television stations ran announcements.

Initially, the product was too coarse to be

used as mulch. But once the county reduced

the shredder’s screen size and provided loaders

on site, citizens took home the mulch as fast

as it could be produced. County officials also

granted permits to contractors to haul away as

much mulch as they could to sell to their customers. One company hauled away thousands

of cubic yards to sell as boiler fuel to local

paper mills.

Outside assistance

State and federal sources, including FEMA,

provided funding to Mecklenburg County.

FEMA required the county to maintain data on

all incoming debris and equipment operations.

Five full-time staff kept detailed records of the

county’s recovery expenses. At the site, county

personnel recorded information on each vehicle, including delivery date, time, truck type,

and user. The county hired temporary staff to

record similar information for contracted grinding operations. As a result of its diligent recordkeeping efforts, the county was reimbursed

fully (75 percent from FEMA, 25 percent from

the state of North Carolina) for its debris management costs, totaling over $7 million. The

accounting also has proved helpful in planning

for future natural disasters in the region.

Hurricane Hugo
20

Hurricane Iniki struck the Hawaiian

island of Kauai in September 1992.

The storm generated more than 5 million cubic yards of debris—seven years’ worth 

of Kauai’s normal refuse—for a landfill with less

than four years of remaining capacity. Kauai

needed the four years to plan and design a new

landfill, and shipping the debris off the island

for disposal was not economically feasible.

Island officials therefore chose to develop an

efficient collection and recycling plan that saved

both money and the dwindling landfill space.

Collection and recycling

Within days of the storm, island officials,

with the cooperation of local landowners,

established five temporary hurricane debris

receiving sites. Officials trained temporary site

operators to separate recoverable materials on

site, but encountered many problems during

the early stages of the cleanup effort. Hauling

contracts had been written quickly and did not

include incentives to keep materials free of

contaminants. Consequently, some reusable

materials became unusable. Haulers mixed

clean loads of green waste with other trash and

combined hazardous materials with recyclable

debris. Stores and household refrigerators generated tons of food waste, which was mixed

with recyclable materials. In the absence of

instruction to do otherwise, residents began

creating spontaneous dumps and at some sites

burned or buried debris. In addition, the initial

collection contractors were construction crews

with little or no experience in handling and

recovering solid waste.

Because Kauai is an island, officials could

not easily spread the burden by transporting

hurricane debris to unaffected communities.

Without an adequate management plan, the

collection sites were overwhelmed until

December, when officials implemented a

debris management plan and contracted with

professional solid waste personnel to manage

the sites and the collection process.

The island’s solid waste management plan

focused on recycling. From the beginning, local

and state officials made a firm commitment to

divert the massive amounts of debris from

Kauai’s landfill. A response team that included

local, state, and federal government staff, contractors, and the county’s solid waste consultants developed the plan. Team members

agreed that materials recovery was the most

environmentally sound and economical

method of managing the hurricane debris.

The plan aimed to divert debris in a costeffective manner by separating materials at the

point of generation. It also proposed methods

to maintain separation through the collection,

transportation, storage, and processing stages.

The plan required residents to separate materials into five piles at the curb: green waste;

metals and appliances; wood debris; aggregate

materials, including toilets, tile roofing, and

concrete; and mixed debris. The plan also

banned the burning of debris and instituted

curbside collection across the island to accommodate those unable to haul the debris themselves. The plan ensured that processed debris

was usable and met market specifications.

Officials decided to hold off grinding any materials until a processing and end-use plan was

developed. While this delay increased stockpiles of materials, it was essential to costeffective diversion.

All of the metals, appliances, tires, and

aggregate materials were reused. The aggregate

was used to make revetment walls to shore up

county shore-front property. A local company

processed more than half of the 100,000 tons of

green waste created by the storm into compost, thereby saving the county millions of dollars and precious landfill space. As a result of

delays, the recycling plans for the remainder of

the green waste and mixed debris fell through,

and the waste was buried or landfilled.

Although the plan took three months to

prepare, it resulted in much higher debris

diversion rates, minimized environmental

impacts, reduced waste management costs, 

Kauai, Hawaii

Hurricane Iniki
21

minimized threats to health and safety, and

significantly shortened the duration of the

cleanup effort. In addition, the plan instituted

specific controls at collection sites across the

island to monitor incoming debris, contain

odors, and minimize water runoff.

Communication

One of the first orders of business after the

storm was to inform residents about what to

do with hurricane debris scattered across their

property. With all communication systems

down for several weeks, however, it was nearly

impossible to reach all island residents to

instruct them on how to separate materials.

Kauai had only a fledgling recycling program,

and source separation was not a household

practice. As the communication systems

recovered, island officials posted signs, ran articles in the newspaper, and broadcast radio

announcements to inform citizens of upcoming collection efforts. After several weeks of

intense outreach, the public caught on and

began separating materials before pickup or

dropoff. Discrete piles of green waste, metals,

wood, and mixed debris soon lined the streets

of Kauai. During this process, island officials

realized that mobilization for recovery would

have occurred more rapidly and effectively if

they had planned ahead. By developing a clearly

defined organizational structure and public

information materials in advance, officials

could have saved time and money and streamlined cleanup efforts in the chaotic aftermath

of the storm.

Outside assistance

Most of the funding for the cleanup efforts

came from a FEMA grant. Shortly after the

storm, more than 2,000 military and National

Guard personnel arrived to help in the cleanup

effort, and the aid of 27 private contractors was

secured. Together with county and state road

crews, military units and contractors systematically swept the entire island to collect sourceseparated debris placed curbside by residents.

With FEMA’s assistance, officials are preparing

for future disasters by establishing a permanent collection and storage site with proper

environmental controls.

Hurricane Iniki
22

The following references and contacts

can help your community plan for disaster debris cleanup.

Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA)

For more information about FEMA requirements, contact:

Infrastructure Support Division, Room 714

Response and Recovery Directorate

Federal Emergency Management Agency

500 C Street, SW.

Washington, DC 20472

Phone: 202 646-4240

EPA regional offices

EPA’s local offices can help provide information on solid waste management and regulations. Contact the EPA office in your region:

Region 1

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: HER-CAN6

90 Canal Street

Boston, MA 02203

Phone: 617 573-9670

Fax: 617 573-9662

Region 2

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: 2AWM

290 Broadway

New York, NY 10007-1866

Phone: 212 637-4099

Fax: 212 637-4437

Region 3

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: 3HW53

841 Chestnut Building

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Phone: 215 597-9636

Fax: 215 580-2013

Region 4

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: 4WD-OSW

345 Courtland Street, NE.

Atlanta, GA 30365

Phone: 404 347-2091 ext. 6425

Fax: 404 347-0076

Region 5

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: HRP-8J

77 West Jackson Boulevard

Chicago, IL 60604-3590

Phone: 312 886-0976

Fax: 312 353-4788

Region 6

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: 6H-H

1445 Ross Avenue

Dallas, TX 75202-2733

Phone: 214 665-6656

Fax: 214 665-6762 

For More 

Information

The Northridge Earthquake
23

Region 7

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: STPG

726 Minnesota Avenue

Kansas City, KS 66101

Phone: 913 551-7666

Fax: 913 551-7947

Region 8

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: 8HWM-WM

999 18th Street, Suite 500

Denver, CO 80202-2466

Phone: 303 293-1667

Fax: 303 293-1488

Region 9

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: H-W-3

75 Hawthorne Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

Phone: 415 744-2106

Fax: 415 744-1044

Region 10

U.S. EPA

Mail Code: HW107

1200 Sixth Avenue

Seattle, WA 98101

Phone: 206 553-2857

Fax: 206 553-8509

Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (RCRA) Hotline

For general information on solid waste

management and regulations, contact the

RCRA Hotline Monday through Friday, 9 a.m.

to 6 p.m. EST, at:

h 800 424-9346.

h 800 553-7672—TDD (for hearing

impaired).

h 703 412-9810—in the Washington, DC,

metropolitan area.

h 703 412-3323—TDD (for hearing

impaired in the Washington, DC, 

metropolitan area).

RCRA Information Center

To order EPA publications on solid waste

management and regulations, write to:

RCRA Information Center (5305W)

U.S. EPA

401 M Street, SW.

Washington, DC 20460

Publications disaster debris planners might

find useful include:

Criteria for Solid Waste Disposal

Facilities: A Guide for Owners/Operators

(530/SW-91-089)

Environmental Fact Sheet: Yard Waste

Composting (530/SW-91-009)

Household Hazardous Waste Management:

A Manual for One-Day Community

Collection Programs (530-R-92-026)

Joining Forces on Solid Waste

Management: Regionalization Is Working

in Rural and Small Communities (530-K93-001)

Recycling Works! State and Local Success

Stories (530/SW-89-014)

Safer Disposal for Solid Waste: The Federal

Regulation for Landfills (530/SW-91-092)

Summary of Markets for Compost

(530/SW-90-0736)

Magazine articles

Below are a few articles that served as

resources in writing this guide and might be of

use to disaster debris planners:

Brickner, R. 1994. How To Manage Disaster

Debris. C&D Debris Recycling. April, p. 8.

Friesen, G., J. Harder, and W. Rifer. 1994.

Closing the Loop After the Storm.

Resource Recycling. October, p. 37.

Sheehan, K., and C. Thoresen. 1993. Des

Moines, Iowa: A River Ran Through It,

and Over It. Waste Age. November, p. 39.

Steuteville, R. 1992. Recycling After the

Storm. BioCycle. October, p. 30.