Assessment of Community Planning for

Mass Transit: Volume 10—Washington,

D.C. Case Study

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-253688
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

CONGRESSIONAL BOARD

Representative Olin E. Teague, Texas, Chairman

Senator Clifford P. Case, New Jersey, Vice Chairman

SENATE HOUSE

Edward M. Kennedy Morris K. Udall

Massachusetts Arizona

Ernest F. Hollings George E. Brown, Jr.

South Carolina California

Hubert H. Humphrey Charles A. Mosher

Mlnnesota Ohio

Richard S. Schweiker Marvin L. Esch

Pennsylvania Michigan

Ted Stevens Marjorie S. Holt

Alaska Maryland

Emilio Q. Daddario, ex officio
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director

Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director

URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority

Walter J. Bierwagen

Amalgamated Transit Union

Robert A. Burco

Oregon DOT

Jeanne J. Fox

Joint Center for

Pulitical Studies

Lawrence A. Goldmuntz

Economics and Science Planning

Dorn McGrath

George Washingion University

Bernard M. Oliver

Hewlett-Packard Corporation

Simon Reich

Gibbs and Hill

Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr.

Princeton University

Frederick P. Salvucci

Massachusetts DOT

Stewart F. Taylor

Sanders and Thomas, inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF

Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager

Mary E. Ames Larry L. Jenney

V. Rodger Digilio Bev Johnson

Thomas E. Hirsch, 111 Teri Miles

CONTRACTORS

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.

. . .

111
PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Washington, D.C.

metropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by the Office of

Technology Assessment to provide an information base for an overall

assessment of community planning for mass transit.

The findings of the overall study are reported in the summary

document, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit, which forms the

first volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request of

the Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of its

Transportation Subcommittee.

The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’s

Transportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by the

OTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owings

and Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for the

study. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible points

of view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.
CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Existing Passenger Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Transportation Planning Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CRITICAL HISTORY OF TRANSIT PLANNING AND

DECISIONMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Decision to Study Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Decision on System Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Decision to Construct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT PLANNING PROCESS . . .

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNING AND DECISION

PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Institutional Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Technical Planning Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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9

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21

2 6

3 5
Summary and Highlights

● Planning for the Metro regional transit

system began 20 years ago. The main

impetus for the first study was public concern

about future congestion and growth.

● During the critical period in the early sixties,

rapid rail was promoted as a way to mitigate

congestion while keeping freeways out of

Washington’s parks and neighborhoods.

Both highway and transit forces viewed

Washington as a test case; confrontations

between these two groups delayed Metro

throughout its planning and construction.

● The technical work throughout the transit

planning process in Washington was

progressive and, in general, fair. Yet, the

political overtones in the early 1960’s debate

cast doubt on the planners’ objectivity.

● Thanks to a remarkable achievement in

regional cooperation, the 98-mile Metro

system is under construction. The District

has petitioned to exchange most of the once

controversial freeways for funds to continue

Metro construction.

● Though public pressure has brought some

changes in the adopted regional system, the

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Authority (WMATA) has had, in general, a

defensive approach to public involvement. As

Metro construction has progressed into

residential areas and people have discovered

that subways can disrupt neighborhoods in

many of the same ways as highways, public

criticism of Metro has increased.

● Coordination of Metro with other regional

land use and transportation planning has

been weak. Metro alignments were selected

to conform to regional comprehensive planning, but station area development planning

began late and continues with neither

WMATA nor the Washington Metropolitan

1

66-889 0 -76- 2
Council of Governments (COG) providing

coordination. COG’s Transportation Planning Board, responsible for coordinating

regional multimodal planning, does not

assert its function effectively.

● Congress was the forum for early Metro

decisions, including the important 1965

decision to build the 25-mile basic system.

The promise of Federal financial support

underlay and influenced Metro decisionmaking from the beginning.

● WMATA’S repeated underestimates of

Metro’s construction cost, in combination

with rising deficits in Metrobus operations,

have created a situation in which local

governments and the Federal Government

alike are wary of making the new financial

commitments needed to complete the

system. The current Metro cost estimate is

$4.5 billion, a $2 billion rise over the original

projection of $2.5 billion.

● WMATA is in an unusually difficult position

with regard to funding because it persists in

assuming that, in the long run, operating

revenues will pay not only for operating costs

but for a portion of the debt charges.

Although this was a common assumption

when it first appeared in Metro planning, it

has been called into question by the everrising operating deficits of Metro’s buses.

This new economic situation has raised the

possibility that local governments could be

liable for the responsibility of paying Metro’s

debts, a situation which makes it politically

difficult to elicit further funds for Metro. The

fragility of a locally based funding structure

for transit is as yet an unresolved issue.
Metropolitan Setting 1

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Washington, D. C., is unique in being a city of

national and international significance as well as a

regional center. Its metropolitan area is 2,400

square miles and includes two States and the

District of Columbia. The Federal Government

owns a sizeable proportion of the land.

Washington, D. C., is the focus of one of the

Nation’s fastest growing metropolitan areas.

Washington ranked twelfth in population among

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA’s)

in 1940 and had moved up to seventh rank by 1970,

expanding as the role of the Federal Government

expanded, but this trend slowed during the 1960’s,

The suburbs in the meantime have continued to

grow, gaining over 60 percent population between

1960 and 1970 (see Figure 2). The fastest growing

sections of the SMSA during the 1960’s were

Prince William, Prince Georges, and Fairfax

counties. The SMSA population density in 1970

was 1,216 persons per square mile, and the District

of Columbia density was 12,231.

Washington has an exceptionally high

proportion of jobs in the center city. In the “Journey

to Work” survey from the 1970 Census, only two of

the top eight cities have a higher proportion of total

SMSA jobs in the central city—Philadelphia and

Chicago. However, although total work trips rose

by 44 percent between 1960 and 1970, by far the

greatest portion of the increase occurred in trips

beginning and ending in the suburban ring. The

relative proportion of trips carried in private

automobiles rose during the decade, while the

proportion of transit trips fell (see Figure 3).

Capitol Building, and picks up again north of the

region at the Beltway. Interstate 295 approaches

Washington from the Beltway south of the city,

stopping after crossing the Anacostia River.

Interstate 66 approaches from the west, terminating at the Beltway. Interstate 270 connects

with the Beltway northwest of the city. Major

parkways lead west along both banks of the

Potomac and south along the Virginia bank.

Washington’s highway system is one of the most

congested in the Nation during peak hours. It has

been targeted for major upgrading and new

construction since the late 1950’s, but most of the

improvements have been stymied by public opposition.

Bus transit service in the region is criticized for

being slow, expensive, and uncomfortable.

Although streetcars have been out of circulation

since 1962, many of the bus routes still follow old

streetcar lines that no longer conform to the

pattern of urban development. After 1950 the

spectre of financial mismanagement lowered public

esteem for the privately operated D.C. bus system,

and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Authority (WMATA) took over operations in 1972.

The riots of 1968 accentuated fear of crime, and

ridership plummeted. Within the past 2 years,

however, patronage has held generally steady.

The area’s regional rapid rail system has been

under construction since 1969, and a 41⁄2-mile

segment is due to open in early 1976, The Metro

system (see Figure 4) currently is scheduled for

completion in 1981, Table 1 shows a summary of

Federal grants to area transit operations, exclusive

of support for Metro.

EXISTING PASSENGER TABLE I.—Federal Assistance to Washington, D. C.,

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM Transit Programs From F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975

The region’s major highways include an inType of Assistance Federal Share Total Costs

terstate loop, Route 495 (the Capital Beltway). The Capital Grants . . . . . . . . . . . $79,958,000 $118,525,000

Capital Loans . . . . . . . . . . . . 57,000,000 58,900,000 recently upgraded Interstate 95 enters the District

from the south, terminating just north of the

Technical Studies . . . . . . . . 6,020,000 10,014,000

TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . 142,978,000 187,439,000

I See figure 1, pp’s 14 and 15. Source Urban Mass Transportation Administration

3
LAND AREA (1970)

(square miles)

Suburban Ring 2,291. 6

District of Columbia 61. 4

Entire SMSA 2,35 3

POPULATION

Suburban District o f

Ring Columbia

1960 1,312,65 4 763,95 6

1970 2,105,23 8 756,51 0

DENSITY

(Population/square mile )

Suburban District o f

Ring Columbia

196 0 5 7 3 12,42 2

POPULATION

Percent Change 1960-1970

60.4 %

-1.0%

Suburban District o f

Ring Columbia

1970 919 12,321

FIGURE 2: WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS

Source : Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (o r

cities) ,

or othe r

with th e

4

usually-with a population of at least 50,OOO, plus adjacent countie s

political division s that are economically and socially integrate d

central area ,
WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION

Center City to Suburban Ring

Beginning and Ending in Center City

suburban Ring to Center City

Beginning and Ending in Suburban Ring

1960 1970

WORK TRIP MODE

1960 1970

Remaining

stayed a t

Employed Residents Using Publi c

Employed Residents Using Autos

workers either walked to work,

home or did not report mode.

Transportation

Suburban Ring

Center City

FIGURE 3: WASHINGTON SMSA TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS 1960-1970

Source : Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners and

the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974 .

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (o r

cities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent countie s

or other political divisions that are economically and socially integrate d

with the central area .

5
FIGURE 4: WASHINGTON, D. C., REGIONAL METRO SYSTEM
TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

INSTITUTIONS

A large number of institutions currently participate in the transportation planning process in

the Washington region due to the area’s jurisdictional peculiarities. Most of them, however, play

only minor roles.

TABLE 2.—Federally Recognized Regional Agencies

Desig -

nation Agency

A-95 Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

(Transportation Planning Board)

MPO Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments

(Transportation Planning Board)

The Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority (WMATA)

WMATA is an interstate compact signed in 1966.

It is empowered to “plan, develop, finance, and

cause to be operated improved transit facilities. ” It

was originally precluded from directly operating

transit services, but in 1972 WMATA was given

authority to take over and operate the four private

bus companies in the region. The six members of

WMATA’s rotating board are appointed, two each

by the D.C. City Council, the Washington Suburban Transit District, and the Northern Virginia

Transportation District.

The Northern Virginia Transportation District

(NVTD) and the Washington Suburban

Transit District (WSTD)

These two suburban transit authorities

(representing Virginia and Maryland suburbs,

respectively) were established in 1964 and 1965 to

provide funding conduits to WMATA. The commission memberships are comprised principally of

elected officials from local jurisdictions.

Metropolitan Washington Council of

Governments (COG) and the

Transportation Planning Board (TPB)

COG, the regional A-95 agency, z was created in

1966. Its staff prepares regional land use, employment, and population forecasts and does areawide

comprehensive planning.

TPB was created in 1965, prior to COG, to be

responsible for “3-C” coordination. s It has since

affiliated with COG and shares some of the COG

staff. The board members come from 17 local

jurisdictions and include representatives from

State and District of Columbia highway

departments.

National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC)

This agency and COG’s predecessor, the

National Capital Regional Planning Council, supervised the first transit needs study in the region.

Both were Federally appointed bodies. Until

recently NCPC was the planning body for the

District of Columbia, but since home rule was

granted its interest has been limited to planning for

Federal land in the region.

Maryland-National Capital Park and

Planning Commission (M-NCPPC)

The M-NCPPC is a State agency. It shares

responsibility for the planning function with the

two counties in the Maryland portion of the

national capital region. The Commission prepared

the general plan for the bicounty region and a

master plan of highways. It has both advisory and

administrative responsibilities for zoning and

subdivision regulations, but the county governing

bodies approve plans and make final decisions on

zoning amendments. The county planners have

undertaken Metro development impact studies.

Northern Virginia Planning District Commission

This is a State agency with advisory powers for

regional planning in the Northern Virginia suburbs

●

2 Circular A-95 of the Office of Management and Budget

requires one agency in each region to be empowered to review

all proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region.

Circular A-9.5 replaced Circular A-82, which was created to

implement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and

Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 3301),

3 Originally the “3-C” regional highway agency, TPB (with

COG) recently was named the area’s Metropolitan Planning

Organization. The Urban Mass Transportation Administration

and the Federal Highway Administration require Governors to

designate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (M PO) in each

area to carry out the “continuing, comprehensive transportation

planning process . . . carried out cooperatively . .“ (the “3-C”

process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 and

the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 19YA.

According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published in

September 1975, MPO’S must prepare or endorse (I) a longrange general transportation plan, including a separate plan for

improvements in management of the existing transportation

system; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called the

transportation improvement program (TIP), to implement

portions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planning

prospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work

programs.

7
of Washington. It is coordinating Metro development planning in the area.

District of Columbia

Until 1968 the District Government was composed of three Federally appointed commissioners

with military backgrounds. In 1968 the administration of District affairs was turned over to an

appointed City Council. The Council has been an

elected body since November 1974.

The District’s main involvement in transportation has occurred through its highway department.

The City Council has a transportation committee.

Its members are councilmen, and it has one staff

assistant. The director of the Office of Transportation Systems Coordination in the Mayor’s office

attends WMATA board meetings as an advisor to

the District’s delegates to the WMATA board.

U.S. Congress and the Federal Government

Congress and the executive branch are principal

participants in transportation planning in the

national capital region. The House and Senate

Appropriations Committees control disbursement

of the Federal and District of Columbia shares of

Metro capital costs. Decisions concerning new

financing plans for Metro must be made with

advice from two executive agencies, the Office of

Management and Budget and the Urban Mass

Transportation Administration.

8
Critical History of Transit Planning

and Decisionmaking

The following history covers the decisionmaking

process for Washington’s Metro rapid rail system

from its beginning in the 1950’s to the present day.

The discussion centers around three key decisions:

(1) studies leading to the decision to study rail

transit in 1960, (2) planning for selection of a

specific system, concluding in 1968, and (3)

evolution of the financial commitment that allowed

construction to begin. The narrative ends with a

status report on the debate over how to pay for

completion of the system.

Although the history focuses on the evolution of

formal decisionmaking, it also briefly explains the

political context of Metro planning. To a great

extent the Metro system grew out of a determined

effort by civic-minded Washingtonians to stop new

freeway construction. The system’s purpose was to

reduce auto trips between suburbs and downtown,

primarily to benefit those parts of Washington that

would have been destroyed to make room for new

highway routes and parking garages. The system

was not designed specifically to help downtown

business or to make commuting from the suburbs

easier. Most downtown business interests supported Metro only as part of a “balanced” transportation system. Inner city interests have influenced

the system design only since it was officially

adopted. Metro planners extended the system to

the suburbs to get maximum patronage, yet

Public oppostion to new urban highways was a major stimulus to Metro rail transit in Washington, D.C.

66-889 0 -76- 3

9
suburban commuters would have been equally or

better served by new highways. Suburban jurisdictions supported Metro in part because they had to

spend relatively little to get it.

DECISION TO STUDY TRANSIT

This section covers the period of transit planning

ending in 1960 when Congress created an agency to

plan a rail system for Washington. A collage

assembled by WMATA shows headlines from

Washington newspapers dating back to a 1909 Post

feature story called “Why Not a Real Subway

System for Washington?” Rapid transit was

alternatively supported and discouraged in various

public plans over the years, but it was not until 1952

that Congress authorized a special study of

transportation needs in the national capital area.

Congressional funding for this Mass Transportation Survey was finally granted in 1955. The

survey’s 1959 Mass Transportation Plan roughly

outlined a network of new freeways with busways

and two basic rapid rail routes, along with

organizational alternatives for carrying on the

planning effort. Congress quickly acted to create a

Federal agency to take the next steps.

Early Studies

Serious discussion about the possible need for

rapid transit appears to have been motivated by the

surge in population, its spread into the suburbs, and

rising automobile ownership in the late 1940’s and

early 1950’s.

A study published in 19444 recommended a 7.1-

mile system of streetcar subways to augment the

surface network but concluded that rapid transit

was not likely to become necessary in a city with

such a low population density. However, the report

suggested the subway tunnels could be modified to

hold rapid rail trains if future conditions mandated.

The real catalyst for rapid transit planning in the

Washington area was the spectre of traffic congestion raised by several reports on regional transportation needs published by the Washington

4 Transportation Survey and Plan for the Central Area of Washington,

D. C., J. E. Greiner Co. and DeLeuw, Cather & Co. in cooperation

with the District of Columbia Department of Highways; the

D.C. Department of Vehicles and Traffic; and the Public Roads

Administration, Federal Public Works Agency, 1944.

Metropolitan Area Transportation Study,5 which

was a cooperative effort of area highway

departments begun in 1948. Partly in response to

this public concern about the implications of

growth, Congress in 1952 created two comprehensive planning bodies to help guide development.

The National Capital Planning Commission

(NCPC) and the National Capital Regional Planning Council (NCRPC) were instructed to prepare

comprehensive plans for the capital city and for the

region that would include plans for the movement

of goods and people. b NCPC concluded later that

year that more detailed information was needed

before an adequate mass transportation plan could

be developed. Congress waited until 1955 to oblige

with a $400,000 grant for the two planning

agencies to conduct a survey of present and future

mass transportation needs.7

The Transportation Plan—National

Capital Region of 1959

NCPC and NCRCP appointed a Joint Steering

Committee to oversee the Mass Transportation

Survey, created an advisory committee of transportation experts, hired a director and a small staff, and

commissioned studies by a number of consultants.

The most influential member of the group was

Harland Bartholomew, chairman of NCPC and a

member of the Joint Steering Committee of the

survey, who was a strong believer in rail transit. He

was also a strong believer in the merits of objective

study, and he expanded the scope of the survey

beyond “mass transportation” needs to include the

appropriate role of the private automobile. The

goals of the survey, as he articulated them, were to

make a “profound effort to ascertain the relative

scope and function of the automobile, the bus, the

streetcar, rapid transit, and other newer concepts

of transportation” and plan accordingly to provide

adequate future transportation in the national

capital region.

The study presented a multimodal orientation. A

general development plan was created; an economic

base study prepared; alternatives selected, tested,

and packaged into a recommended system; and a

financing and organization study conducted,

5 See “A Recommended Highway Improvement Program,”

Washington Area Metropolitan Transportation Study, 1952.

6 Public Law 592 (66 Stat. 781), National Capital Planning Act

of 1952, amending the Act of June 6, 1924 (43 Stat. 463) as

amended.

7 Public Law 84-24 (69 Stat. 33), Second Supplemental

Appropriations Act of 1955.

10
Altogether 10 consultant firms were involved, and

the result was the Transportation Plan—National

Capital Region, transmitted to Congress by the

President on July 10, 1959. 8

The 1959 plan recommended a major highway

building program along with both rail and bus

transit. It called for 248 miles of new freeways, 80

miles of which had not appeared on earlier plans, at

a cost of $1.8 billion. Another $86 million was

earmarked for express bus operations. A 33-mile

rail system, half in subway, was estimated to cost

$476 million.

The proposed plan was the subject of Congressional hearings,9 where it met with generally

favorable comment. However, the discussion

contained elements of all the issues that would be

argued over the coming decade: in particular, the

relative appropriateness and feasibility of highway

transportation versus rapid rail, the role of the

Federal Government versus private enterprise in

transit development, and the need to forge regional

cooperation in transportation planning.

The Joint Committee decided to recommend a

temporary Federal agency to develop plans and

locate proposed routes for a comprehensive

transportation system. The system thus designed

would be owned by an interstate compact. The

compact idea grew out of an effort that was

underway at the time to create an interstate

organization to coordinate transit regulatory

functions. The National Capital Planning Act of

196010 was subsequently passed and the National

Capital Transportation Agency created to take on

the transportation planning tasks.

s A list of the studies included in the Mass Transportation

Survey and the consultants who prepared them is:

General Deueiopmenl P/an (John T. Howard).

Economic Base Study (Council for Economic and

Industry Research, Inc.).

Fu/ur-e Transportation Demand (William Smith &

Associates).

Highway Transportation Engineering (DeLeuw,

Cather & Co.).

Flnanclng and Organization (Lnstitute of Public

Administration).

~ “Transportation Plan for the National

Hearings before the Joint Committee

Metropolitan Problems, 86th Congress,

November 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1959.

10 F’ublic Law 86-669, 86th Congress.

Capital Region,”

on Washington

First Session,

DECISION ON SYSTEM SELECTION

The basic configuration of Washington’s regional

rapid rail system was determined by National

Capital Transportation Agency (NCTA), the

Federal agency created by Congress to undertake

transit planning in 1960. In short, NCTA proposed

a regional transit system whose 25-mile core was

authorized by Congress in 1965. Shortly

afterwards, the jurisdictions of the region succeeded in formalizing an interstate compact organization. This organization, called the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA),

began a technical evaluation process in early 1967

that led to the adoption, in March 1968, of the 98-

mile Regional Metro System.

The National Capital Transportation Agency’s

November 1, 1962, Report to the President

The proposals of the NCTA generated far more

intense controversy than the earlier findings of the

Mass Transportation Survey. The debate was

grounded in the ongoing argument over where and

how many new freeways ought to be built to serve

the District and surrounding areas. The NCTA

report tended to polarize the discussion by coupling

its proposal for an extensive rail network with

recommendations that several key highways,

including the Three Sisters Bridge across the

Potomac, be dropped from area highway plans.

The fact that Congress also was considering

national legislation to aid urban transit during this

period brought overtones of national significance

to the local debate and sharpened the antagonism of

the arguments on both sides.

The NCTA work was principally a staff effort,

although numerous consultants contributed over

the agency’s 5 years of operation. The most critical

portions of the NCTA 1962 report (system

planning, traffic forecasting, and engineering)

were done in-house. Darwin Stolzenbach, a

freeway opponent who had been a senior analyst

with Operations Research, Inc. of Silver Spring,

Md., guided the technical proceedings. Policy

control was exerted by a five-member advisory

board required by the 1960 Act. The chairman and

dominating force of this group was Frederick

Gutheim, a well-known architectural writer. As

Staff Director to Congress’ Joint Committee on

Washington Metropolitan Problems during that

body’s brief existence from 1958 to 1960, Gutheim

had turned out a series of planning reports on the

NCR that were strongly transit-oriented and

11
representative of the then nascent wave of

antifreeway sentiment.

NCTA was instructed to cooperate with all

planning agencies in the region, but it pursued this

cooperation in informal ways. Those agencies that

disagreed with NCTA’s findings generally charged

that there had been little cooperation. In lieu of

producing a plan that conformed to each of the

often conflicting ideas of the various planning

bodies in the region, NCTA focused on the new

regional comprehensive plan published in 1961 by

the NCPC and NCRCP. This Plan for the Year 2000,

popularly known as the “Wedges and Corridors

Plan,” presented new population, employment, and

growth data and, most importantly, changed the

forecast for land use from the sprawl-like configuration that had been assumed for the 1959 plan

to an organized radial network of growth corridors

separated by low-growth and greenbelt “wedges, ”

The data were plugged into a new traffic

forecasting model and the findings used to support

a regional transportation system featuring extensive rapid transit service. A seven-line system 83-

miles long (a 50-mile increase over 1959) was

recommended for a total cost of $796 million, an

increase of $320 million over the 1959 plan. NCTA

called for 74 fewer miles of highway than the 1959

plan. No cost estimate was made, as it was assumed

that this mileage would be financed through the

continuing highway funding mechanisms and

would require no additional legislation. Proposed

express bus operations total about half the transit

mileage recommended in the 1959 report,

The reduction in highway cost was much greater

than the increase in transit cost, so it was stated

that the total cost of the 1962 plan was lower than

that of the 1959 plan. Transit costs were minimized

by having only two lines in city center, forming a

loop around the Mall, by making only one crossing

of the Potomac, and by maximizing use of rail

rights-of-way.

Congress’ Rejection of NCTA Proposals, 1963

The summary NCTA report transmitted to

Congress in 1963 did not include the highway

building restrictions, but the early debate

nevertheless focused on the highway issues.

Highway proponents suspected Stolzenbach’s rail

plan was intended to spearhead a nationwide

campaign to substitute rapid rail for new highways.

Rail advocates in turn accused the highway lobby—

various automotive, trucking, cement, and related

interests-of choosing the Nation’s capital to be

“the focus of their drive toward automobilization of

the country.”11

Stolzenbach’s acquaintances say that he indeed

sought to broaden the implications of the

Washington freeway transit issue. He was politically identified with the prorail cause. Prior to

becoming NCTA Director, Stolzenbach had been

active in the Interfederation Council of the Greater

Washington Area, a regional body concerned with a

broad range of issues and representing 361” civic

organizations. On behalf of the council, Stolzenbach testified that the 1959 plan “placed disproportionate emphasis on private auto transport . . and

failed to consider seriously public policies that

would tend to increase the utility of mass transit

relative to the automobile.”12

Stolzenbach was well connected with antifreeway and prorail spokesmen. These were

members of Washington’s liberal Democratic

community. Among them were Elizabeth Rowe,

chairperson of NCPC and a vocal opponent of the

freeway program; and Paul Sitton of the Department of Commerce, who crafted the Budget

Bureau’s statements of policy support for the

NCTA plan and later helped Department of

Transportation Secretary Alan Boyd reach a

decision to block construction of one of the

highwa y advocates’ pet projects, the Three Sisters

Bridge.

Stolzenbach’s NCTA appointment reportedly

had been lobbied by lawyer Charles Horsky, an

important figure in the Kennedy White House

who, as president of the Washington Housing

Association, had criticized the 1959 Transportation

Plan on the grounds that it gave inadequate

emphasis to rapid transit. 13

11 See comments of Representative William Harsha for the

pro-highway, antirail view and statements by Admiral Neill

Phillips of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City for the

opposite viewpoint, “Transit Program for the Nation’s Capital

Region,” Hearing before Subcommittee No. 6 of the Committee

on the District of Columbia, House of Representatives, 88th

Congress, First Session, July 9, 10, 16, 18, 24, 25, 29, and 31,

1963.

12 November 1959 Hearings before the Joint committee on

Washington Metropolitan Problems, op. cit.

13 November 1959 Hearings before the Joint Transportation

Committee, op. cit.

12
The Kennedy liberals were not the only group

who supported transit in 1963. Downtown

business interests believed a rail system was

essential to shore up their substantial investments

in the “old” Washington central business district

between 15th and 7th Streets. New office construction in the downtown area had tapered off, and at

the time no one foresaw the shift to the K StreetConnecticut Avenue area that has occurred since.

Although the highway issue was prominent in

committee hearings, it was not the sole or even

prime reason for the defeat of the rapid rail

proposals in 1963. Congress was unwilling t o

consider so costly a system without any sign of

financial commitment from local jurisdictions. It

was decided to consider only the District of

Columbia portions of the proposal until the

interstate compact that was in the works was

completed. However, for the time being, even the

less costly 23-mile basic system presented for

consideration was sent back to committee.

Congress’ chief complaint was that the bill

threatened private transit enterprise and omitted

language guaranteeing labor protection. The

operators of the four private bus companies in the

region, led by O. Roy Chalk of D. C. Transit, Inc.,

were vocal critics of the implication in the 1963

legislation that the rail system would eventually be

operated by the public interstate compact, although

the bill made no reference to the matter one way or

the other. The only intensive lobbying on the bill

was done by the bus company owners and the labor

unions, who were concerned that labor would not

be granted protection if the system was publicly

operated.

The defeat of the enabling legislation occurred

only 3 weeks after the Kennedy assassination, and

this event may also have played a part in the bill’s

demise. The President’s death threw protransit

forces into disarray. Most of the protransit

spokesmen also were deeply involved in other

Kennedy programs and, in the aftermath of his

sudden death, were absorbed in protecting these as

well as the transit issue. As a result, the early

momentum in favor of the proposal was diffused.

Interestingly, Kennedy’s death also brought an end

to a compromise he had been engineering on the

location of the controversial Three Sisters Bridge.

Years later, in 1968 that still-unresolved issue

would stand in the way of the construction of the

adopted regional rail system.

Congressional Authorization of the Basic

Metro System, 1965

The plan NCTA brought to Congress, 18 months

after the 1963 defeat, proposed a similar 25-mile

rail system in the District of Columbia extending to

the Pentagon in Arlington. It would cost an

additional $30 million (total $431 million) and

included 2 additional miles (total 25 miles, 13 in

subway). The planning was headed by NCTA’s new

director, Walter McCarter. McCarter was a more

moderate personality than Stolzenbach and was

well respected as a transit expert with 43 years of

experience in Cleveland, Chicago, and Milwaukee.

The 1965 proposal reduced the proportion of

Federal investment in the system (and increased

the relative share of the District). It also stipulated

that the rail facilities could be operated only by

private concerns, and it incorporated labor protection provisions that had been written into the

Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964.

Because the 1965 proposal directly remedied the

shortcomings identified in 1963, because the new

NCTA director was a more effective politician14

because the freeway controversy had been isolated

from the transit planning agency to other forums,

and because the interstate compact and eventual

local financial support for the remainder of the

system was near at hand, the rail measure passed

Congress in 1965 and was enacted into law.

Dissenters were concerned chiefly with what they

alleged to be overcommitment by the Federal

Government to a local system.

Adoption of the Regional Metro System,

March 1968

The Federal expression of commitment to a basic

rail system gave a boost to the effort to create an

interstate compact agency to plan the system’s

regional extensions. On November 6, 1966,

President Johnson signed legislation authorizing

the District to participate in an interstate transit

authority, and by the end of the month Maryland

and Virginia had ratified the compact. The

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(WMATA) officially began to function in October

1967, when NCTA expired and its 30 staff people

transferred to WMATA.

11 McCarter represented NCTA on the NCPC Board and

consistently voted against the majority and in favor of the

package of D.C. freeways that continued to be the focus of

controversy.

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15
Meanwhile, the embryonic WMATA organization had already begun the technical and political

process of planning the regional system. The

WMATA board (two members from each major

jurisdiction in the region) and numerous representatives of the area’s political subdivisions came

together at 3 regional workshops at Airlie House

during the year to discuss technical findings and

give policy direction. A patchwork system evolved

and subsequently was tested for patronage and

modified to become the Proposed Regional System

in December 1967.

The Proposed Regional System comprised 7

radiating lines continuing out from the authorized

basic system. The basic system itself was amended

by Congress in 1967 to add service to the new

employment center in southwest Washington and

to change the basic configuration downtown from a

branching system to one with lines crossing over

each other in order to increase service levels.

The Proposed Regional System was taken to a

series of 11 public hearings in January 1968.

Following the hearings some minor modifications

were made in route alignment and station

locations, and on March 1, 1968, the WMATA

Board officially adopted the Regional Metro

System.

DECISION TO CONSTRUCT

The decision to build the system was implied by

both Congress’ commitment to the basic system

and by WMATA’s adoption of the regional system.

In fact, the adopted system plan has been

characterized as a formality necessary to establish

the more important regional commitment to a

financial plan for the system’s construction.

The 1962 plan was the first in the evolution of

the Metro system to apportion financing responsibilities. However, as early as 1959 Elmer Staats,

Deputy Director of the President’s Bureau of the

Budget, had expressed Federal willingness to

undertake a portion of the financial responsibility.

In 1963 he testified that Congress should bear twothirds of the cost, the same formula under

discussion at the time for the Federal transit

support activities nationwide. Congress adhered to

the two-thirds formula in 1965 (it was eventually

adopted for UMTA support as well), and the twothirds formula formed the basis of the financial

plan for the 1968 system.

It was assumed from the beginning that there

would be Federal financial support for the rail

system. This was one of the principal reasons

behind the willingness of local governments to

give consideration, and eventually their commitment, to the transit idea. An equally important

aspect of the financial commitment was the

assumption from the beginning that future

operating revenue would pay back to the bond debt.

The voters from the five Washington area jurisdictions that held bond referenda in November 1968

endorsed Metro by an average 71.4 percent ratio,

believing the system would operate at a profit. (The

other jurisdictions were not required by local

regulations to hold bond votes.) By the time the

bonds were to be sold, however, creditors required

them to be backed by a Federal guarantee, which

was granted by Congress in 1972.

WMATA first formally included a construction

allocation in its budget for fiscal year 1969 and set

groundbreaking for October 1968. However, the

continuing battle in other agencies over construction of certain interstate highways played a role in

delaying the groundbreaking until December 1969.

The man behind the budget delay was Congressman William Natcher, Chairman of the

District of Columbia Subcommittee of the House

Appropriations Committee. In 1966, Mr. Natcher

said he would withhold his committee’s recommendation from WMATA budget items until

freeway construction, then curtailed through

actions of the NCPC, was given a green light. Mr.

Natcher was not opposed to Metro per se but was

concerned over cost escalations and time delays in

completing the interstate system through the

District region. The green light came later in 1966,

and Mr. Natcher approved the rapid rail budget; but

subsequently the freeway activities were curbed

once again. The situation was still unresolved in

spring of 1968, and Mr. Natcher did withhold his

approval of WMATA’s money that year. The

House supported him. Under this pressure the D.C.

City Council voted in August 1969 to release the

freeway money and Mr. Natcher agreed to free up

money for Metro. Groundbreaking occurred

December 9. That same day President Nixon signed

into law Federal authorization of the entire 98-mile

Regional Metro System.

Decision To Continue Construction

At present the Metro planners, local jurisdictions

contributing to its financing, and the Federal

Government face a difficult decision whether to
complete the 98-mile system or cut it short. The

source of the dilemma is the dramatic rise in the

estimated total construction cost. It is complicated

by increasing public criticism of Metro.

To be sure, the great majority of the public

appears to support the regional rail system and to

advocate its completion. 15 However, more and

more complaints are being voiced as construction

progresses from the downtown and into residential

areas where people are directly affected.

The growing dissatisfaction with Metro has

three causes. First, people have tended to assume

subways will have no undesired effects on the

neighborhoods they serve. They are surprised and

often angered to find that Metro can stimulate

traffic and growth in their neighborhoods and

destroy homes and businesses—just like the

highways Metro has replaced. Secondly, many

citizens have come to feel that WMATA planners

over the years have purposefully avoided informing them about these impacts and are now giving

them little opportunity, short of confrontation

politics, for resolving them. Thirdly, some people,

particularly from inner city black neighborhoods,

feel they are helping pay for a system that will serve

others and not them.

The recurring increases in the cost of building

the system are also threatening Metro’s support.

By late 1970, estimates had escalated from the

original $2.5 billion to $3 billion, and the most

recent announcement sets the final figure at $4.5

billion. WMATA has submitted a request to OMB

and Congress for a retroactive change in the

Federal-local share from 2 to 1 to 4 to 1, in

accordance with UMTA’s capital grant program

levels. The additional Federal share ($1.25 billion)

would increase by $135 million. However, the

Federal Government is expected to reject the plan.

With the funding situation thus unresolved,

Congressman John McFall has requested the

Department of Transportation to study several

alternative transit modes at the as yet undesigned

extremities of the Metro system. UMTA and DOT

have replied that they are willing to fund such a

study if it is undertaken by the local agencies, but

that they do not wish to conduct it themselves.

Negotiations began in the spring of 1975 between

the WMATA staff, the staff of the Transportation

15 See “Metro is Coming! Metro is Coming!” by Charles

Conconi, The Washingtonian, May 1975.

Planning Board, and UMTA with respect to such a

study, which would look at alternative modes for

Metro’s extensions as well as raise the question of

whether or not the full system should be completed.

Any talk about truncating the system is greeted

with trepidation by WMATA board members and

other agencies in the region because changes would

require adjustments in the financing plan. Thus far

the suburban jurisdictions have plugged proportionally more money into the system that they have

been given back in terms of segments under

construction. Yet the politicians and political

observers in the area seem to agree that new bond

issues would be defeated at the polls. WMATA has

been unsuccessful in getting Congress to take the

lead in obtaining new financing for Metro.

As the debate intensified, in June 1975, the

President appointed DOT Secretary William T.

Coleman to take personal responsibility for coordinating administration policy on WMATA’s

requests for additional aid. Since then, a number of

financing options have been discussed publicly,

including the possibility of using interstate transfer

money from deleted District of Columbia interstate

highways and from northern Virginia’s Interstate

66 to support the regional rail system. By mid-July

DOT produced an interim report that calculated

that available highway money would not cover the

requested Federal share of Metro’s projected cost

overrun. Based on these numbers, UMTA officials

began considering whether to apply the agency’s

newly articulated policy of encouraging

metropolitan areas to build rail systems in incremental stages, as the demand for transit grows,

in the Metro case, Under this policy, available funds

would be spent to build links between the Metro

segments under construction in order to put as

many interconnected miles as possible into service

as early as possible. WMATA argued that by

shifting Metro construction priorities, UMTA’s

approach would delay completion of the full system

4 years until 1985 and hike costs to nearly $ 5

billion,

UMTA backed off its speculations about applying

the incrementalist policy to Metro within a week

after the discussion was reported publicly. On

September 4,1975, UMTA issued a statement that

it had underestimated the highway funds and that

the potentially available supply appeared to be

sufficient to complete at least a fully interconnected

basic system.

17
As of this writ

over how completi

be financed. Altho

predicting

the presen

sight.

a

t

ing, the controversy continues

on of the Metro system should

ugh last spring observers were

decision by the end of the year, from

vantage point no clear resolution is in

., 

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18 
Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

1948-52 The Washington Metropolitan Area

1952

1955

1959

1960

1961

1962

Transportation study, a cooperative

effort of area highway departments,

published several reports projecting

severe traffic congestion in the

Washington area. These catelyzed

plans for rapid transit.

Congress created the National

Capital Planning Commission

(NCPC) and the National capital

Regional Planning Council (NCRPC)

to prepare comprehensive plans,

including regional transportation

plans.

Congress granted funding to NCPC

and NCRPC for a Mass Transportation Survey to study present and

future mass transportation needs.

In July, the Joint Steering Committee

of the Mass Transportation Survey

submitted to Congress the Transportation Plan—National Capital Region, which

called for 248 miles of freeways and

33 miles of rail. The report spurred

controversy over the relative roles of

freeways and transit.

The National Capital Planning Act

created the National Capital

Transportation Agency (NCTA), an

interstate organization charged with

coordinating transit regulatory functions.

The NCPC and the NCRPC published

a regional comprehensive plan, The

Plan /or the Year 2000, popularly called

the “Wedges and Corridors” plan. It

presented new population, employment, and growth data and called for

an organized radial network of

growth corridors separated by lowgrowth green “wedges.”

The NCTA’s November 1 Report 10 the

President proposed a regional transportation plan, based on data from the

“Wedges and Corridors” plan, that

called for an 83-mile seven-line rapid

1963

1965

1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

rail system along with 174 miles of

new freeways.

Congress rejected the NCTA

proposal. Its chief complaint was that

the NCTA bill threatened private

transit enterprise and failed to

guarantee labor protection.

Congress authorized a basic 25-mile

rapid rail system for the District of

Columbia. Dissenters were chiefly

concerned with what they considered

to be an excessive Federal commitment to a local system.

The authorization of the basic rail

system boosted ongoing efforts to

create an interstate compact agency

to plan suburban extensions to the

system. In December the Washington

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority

(WMATA) was ratified by all area

governments. In October, WMATA

officially replaced NCTA.

In December, WMATA published the

“Bronze Report.” The report

presented the Proposed Regional

System (PRS), which extended the

authorized basic system into the

suburbs.

On March 31, following a round of

public hearings, WMATA adopted

the 98-mile, $2,5 billion Regional

Metro System. In November, the

transit issue was supported by 71,4

percent of the voters in the five

suburban jurisdictions that held

referenda.

After a is-month delay, Metro construction began on December 9. The

entire 98-mile Regional Metro

System was authorized by Congress

the same day.

By late 1970, estimates of the cost of

building Metro escalated from the

original $2.5 billion to $2.98 billion.

19
1972 WMATA took over operation of 1975

several privately owned D.C. bus

companies.

Controversy continued over how

continuing construction of Metro is

to be financed.

1974 In late fall, WMATA announced a

revised Metro construction cost estimate of $4.5 billion.

20
Assessment of the Planning and Decision Process

INSTITUTIONAL PROCESS

The Washington region is an institutional jungle.

The Federal Government, two States, the District

of Columbia, four counties, three independent

cities, and numerous smaller jurisdictions have

created a tangle of Federal agencies, regional

organizations, and local governments with overlapping responsibilities and powers. These circumstances pressed the planners of Washington’s

regional transit system to create an independent

interstate compact organization beyond the reach

of local regulation, State law, and even many

Federal requirements. The success of the approach

is measured by miles of rapid transit construction.

Metro is the most significant product to come out

of regional cooperation in the Washington area.

The nature of the institutional context for Metro

planning changed over the years as the responsibilities were transferred from congressionally

appointed agencies to the interstate compact

organization in charge today. In particular, the

degree of accountability to the public, the extent

and effectiveness of citizen involvement, the role of

public agencies, and the adequacy of the forum for

decisionmaking have altered over time. The

following section examines the institutional

framework for Metro decisionmaking with special

attention to its evolution over three periods: the

period of early Metro planning from 1959 to 1965;

the years prior to adoption of the Regional Metro

System in 1968; and the period of system design

and station area development planning since then.

Forum for Decisionmaking

The forum for transit planning was lodged in two

clearly designated institutions during the period of

early Metro planning (the National Capital Planning Commission and the National Capital

Regional Planning Council). Decisionmaking and

implementation authority, on the other hand, was

clearly the prerogative of Congress. In 1966 and

1967, as the Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority (WMATA) took over, some

competition and duplication of system planning

efforts briefly rose between it and suburban

jurisdictions. However, WMATA’s compact clearly

spells out its powers and has allowed the Metro

plans to pass through the complex review channels

and into implementation in the national capital

region with relative ease. Historically, the most

significant issues have been coordination of

multimodal transportation planning and responsibility for station area and development planning.

Both institutions charged with early planning

were Federally appointed bodies. The congressionally funded Mass Transportation Survey,

created in 1959, was a study organization only and

its findings were intended only to guide further

study. Therefore, other agencies were satisfied to

allow this planning forum to operate undisturbed.

The National Capital Transportation Agency

(NCTA), created by Congress in 1960, also

provided a clear forum for transit planning, but its

hold on highway planning responsibilities was less

secure. Unlike its predecessor, NCTA was instructed to produce a plan for actually implementing a program. Its highway recommendations

proved to be so controversial that the responsibilities for highway planning were quietly removed

after 1963.

The key decisions during this period of early

planning16 were made by Congress. Congressional

committee hearings were the arena for input from

local jurisdictions. The suburban governments had

no interest in challenging Congress because the

decisions did not undermine their powers in any

obvious way. It was understood that Congress had

authority to implement the plans in the District of

Columbia but that implementation responsibilities

in the suburban jurisdictions would be given to an

interstate compact organization.

WMATA took decisionmaking power from

Congress in that the system WMATA adopted was

backed by a financing commitment from local

governments. Furthermore, WMATA’s compact

empowered it to construct the system. In 1967, as

alternative regional plans were evaluated, the

16 Establishment of the Mass Transportation Survey in 1955,

the NCTA in 1960, rejection of NCTA’s rail proposals in 1963,

and authorization of the basic system in 1965.

21
Northern ‘Virginia Transportation District performed some of its own technical planning work in

competition with Metro’s consultants. At the time

this was the only sign of disagreement over the

adequacy of the WMATA forum.

Since the system was adopted, local governments

have increased their involvement in transit planning. They have been planning for station area

development, a responsibility that they agree ought

to be lodged where it is in local government rather

than WMATA. Local governments are also undertaking reevaluation of portions of the adopted

system as pressures are felt for change. The

relative responsibility WMATA should assume for

this kind of work has not been clearly defined.

Planning for station area development began

several years after the regional system was adopted

in 1968. WMATA had authority to acquire land

only for right-of-way and for stations. For this

reason, and because UMTA funds for station area

studies are allocated not through WMATA but

through the Transportation Planning Board,

WMATA did not take the initiative in station area

planning.

Maryland’s two counties, the two counties and

three cities in Northern Virginia (through the

Northern Virginia Planning Commission), and the

District of Columbia have been engaged in

development planning for several years. All regret

that the major decisions had been made before their

work began. Development planning could have

been done in the context of a coordinated comprehensive planning effort that would have

included Metro planning. Because this approach

was not taken, development plans are created

piecemeal for different station areas and are not

coordinated at the regional level. Within Virginia,

each city and county takes responsibility for its

element and the elements are assembled with few

adjustments into the Northern Virginia Planning

District’s plan. In the District, development planning might not have occurred at all were it not for

the efforts in 1971 of a newcomer to the Planning

Office staff. Today, after a stack of station area

plans has been developed, citizens still criticize the

District for the lack of a comprehensive plan that

would be a point of reference for the station area

plans.

The issue over responsibility for Metro route

reevaluations has arisen in recent years as construction presses further into residential areas and

people become concerned over the impact of

Metro’s presence (or absence). WMATA’s financing plan was carefully tailored to a specific system,

and any alterations in the system would naturally

require changes in the financing plan. To avoid this

necessity, the WMATA board has agreed that the

extra cost of major changes in the adopted system

must be borne by the locality involved. The locality

also must pay for studies that consider the

necessity of such changes. Maryland DOT recently

completed such a reevaluation in the context of its

I-95 corridor study. The District and Prince

Georges County are preparing to study an alternative alinement for the Suitland route through

Anacostia.

The WMATA board is in the process of creating a

policy statement that will help resolve potential

future conflicts to sift out which types of changes

are the collective responsibility of all WMATA

participants and which are the responsibility of

local governments.

The final issue with regard to decisionmaking

forum and authority concerns coordination

between regional highway and transit planning and

decisionmaking. As the regional organization

charged with coordinating transportation planning

in the national capital region, COG’s Transportation Planning Board (TPB) logically is the appropriate forum. However, it has almost entirely

abdicated its transit decisionmaking powers to

WMATA.

TPB was established in 1965 in response to the

requirements of the 1962 Federal-Aid Highway

Act. It was staffed by highway planners and

engineers. State and District highway department

representatives sit on the Board and tend to

dominate their politician colleagues. Not surprisingly, TPB deals mainly with highway matters.

When the Metro system was adopted in 1968,

TPB had not yet published its first 5-year plan and

hence was not in a strong position to comment

upon the rapid transit proposal. Charged with

carrying out COG’s A-95 reviews on transportation matters since 1969, TPB now passes approval

on any major changes in the system that are

brought to its attention, but TPB never opposes a

WMATA request. The same political actors are

engaged in the WMATA forum and this is where

most policies are hammered out.

TPB has two important functions in transit

planning. It prepares the region’s annual unified

work program for submission to UMTA. There22
Poor coordination between transit systems and adjacent development leads to situations such as this one

at the Washington, DC., Metro’s Rhode Island Avenue station. Residents of the housing complex on the

left have no direct access to the station.

23

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fore, TPB is the conduit of funds for station area

impact studies. TPB also is responsible for developing the transportation element in the region’s longrange plan.

Even in its long-range planning efforts, TPB

defers to WMATA. The current long-range plan

contains Metro extensions as they appeared on the

map of the adopted system in 1968. The reason

these and no other routes appear has been

explained by a TPB staff member in colorful

language: “Jackson Graham (WMATA’s General

Manager) thumped his fist on the table and said,

‘Put them there’.” Another indicator of WMATA’s

power is the fact that the base case network used to

test alternatives for a new long-range plan includes

the entire 98-mile system—even though most of it

is unbuilt—and yet shows no highways other than

those in existence today.

TPB’s highway orientation, in combination with

its relative weakness vis-a-vis WMATA, work

against genuinely multimodal planning in the

national capital region.

Accountability of Decisionmakers

The degree to which Metro planners and

decisionmakers directly represented the people

who would use and pay for the system changed

significantly over time. At first there was no direct

relationship and little substantive communication

between the Federally appointed planners and local

powers. The structure of the WMATA board, on

the other hand, provides for a high degree of

accountability and participation by the local

governments who have been delegated decisionmaking authority by their constituents.

The Mass Transportation Survey and the

National Capital Transportation Agency (NCTA)

work was prepared” by Federal appointees. They

had no direct responsibility to an electorate; their

degree of cooperation with the local governments

varied (Arlington, for example, worked closely with

NCTA, while Alexandria did not) but generally was

minimal. A number of organizations complained

bitterly to Congress in 1963 that they were not

consulted in NCTA’s work.

WMATA was a more politically accountable

organization than its predecessors, and local

agencies participated in planning for the first time

after WMATA was started. WMATA’s accountability is due both the composition of its board and

to the realities of the Metro financing situation.

The board is made up of two delegates from each of

the three major political subdivisions of the

national capital region. They are appointed by the

District of Columbia City Council from among the

Council members, and by Maryland’s Washington

Suburban Transit District (WSTD) and the

Northern Virginia Transportation District

(NVTD) from the members of these commissions.

NVTD’s bylaws require its commissioners to be

members of a governing body; a number of

WSTD’s commissioners may be “qualified

residents” rather than office holders. The District

names members of the City Council. Hence, a

maximum of two of the WMATA board members

(the WSTD delegates) could be private citizens, but

the majority will be public officials accountable for

their actions to their constituents.

A further impetus for accountability at WMATA

is the fact that the compact itself represents a

complex financial plan keyed to a particular

regional transit system. A board member who

might want to change it must be prepared to “put

his money where his mouth is,” in the words of

WMATA’s community relations director Cody

Pfanstiehl, and that necessitates responsiveness to

the will of his constituents.

WMATA brought all the local jurisdictions into

the same room to plan the adopted regional system.

The approach, motivated by the need to negotiate

agreement on the financing plan, differed

dramatically from the approach taken by NCTA:

WMATA succeeded in stemming complaints from

local governments about lack of cooperation.

Public Involvement

Participation by the general public in Metro

decisionmaking began relatively late in the planning process. Until early 1968, when the first public

hearings were held prior to adoption of the regional

system, the public could participate only indirectly.

WMATA reluctantly has created channels for

citizen participation in recent years. Several

significant amendments to the system were made

in response to citizen pressure, and more changes

appear to be in the offing. But, in general,

WMATA’s approach to public involvement has

been defensive and reactive.

Neither the Mass Transportation Survey nor the

NCTA attempted to bring public agencies and

2 4
citizens into the respective studies in a structured

process. Both made a vigorous effort to reach as

much of the public as possible in presentations to

service clubs, civic associations, and the like. The

adequacy of this approach was called into question

in 1959 by a staff report of the Joint Committee on

Washington Metropolitan Problems, which stated

that the business community, banking interests,

and existing transportation concerns were excluded from participation. 17

The NCTA came under heavy criticism for

creating inadequate channels for participation by

the general public and interest groups. Private

transit operators—particularly O. Roy Chalk of

D.C. Transit—complained that they had not been

consulted when the NCTA developed its plan to

mitigate the effect of its transit proposals on bus

operators.

The first opportunity outside Congress for the

public to comment on Metro plans occurred in

January 1968. Regional jurisdictions and the

WMATA Board had approved the Proposed

Regional System the previous month. In January

the plan was presented to the public at a series of 11

public hearings in the District, Maryland, and

Virginia. In general, the hearings were not heavily

a t tended.

The hearings in the District, however, marked

the first time in a public forum on the rapid rail

proposal that the issue of poor service to District

residents was raised. Wilbert Williams of Chase,

Inc., complained that Metro would serve Rockville

residents better than it would the majority of

Washingtonians, particularly those in Anacostia.

The matter of inadequate service to Anacostia is

still an issue today and has prompted the District of

Columbia (with cooperation from Prince Georges

County) to initiate reevaluation of the Suitland

line.

The riots that occurred in Washington in April

1968, shortly after the Metro regional system was

formally adopted, proved a catalyst for an important route change in the District. The mid-city

alinement (the Greenbelt line) was moved from

13th to 14th Street where it could become an

impetus for reconstruction of that riot-torn

1- Arthur Lazarus, “Metropolitan Transportation,” a staff

report prepared [or the Join t Cornrrlittee on Washington

Metr[)p(llltan Problems, April 1958.

corridor. Principal advocate of the change, which

was formally made in June 1970, was Walte r

Fauntroy. Fauntroy was a considerable political

force in the District, having been a Councilman and

a WMATA Board Member. At that time, in early

1970, he was president of the Model Inner City

Community Organization. He is now the District’s

nonvoting delegate to Congress. Fauntroy was able

to bring enough pressure to bear to persuade the

District to provide an extra $3 million to pay for the

increased costs of the route change.

Fauntroy could argue effectively on behalf of the

mid-city route because he was an established

political figure. But there were few opportunities

after the 1968 public hearing for the general public

to affect the system, which WMATA considered

ready for final design and construction. An attempt

by some board members to create a citizens’

advisory committee to ensure continued citizen

involvement never got off the ground. 18

WMATA did not begin holding public hearings

on its station plans until forced to do so by the

courts. It was not until construction had begun on

four Metro stations that WMATA first used its

power of condemnation. This led to a suit by several

landowners, on the grounds that WMATA had

condemned private property without public

notification. The suit resulted in a ruling by the

court requiring WMATA to hold a public hearing

each time it buys a piece of land. 19

WMATA responded by scheduling a public

hearing on its “general plans” for a given area. As a

result of a second suit focusing on the need for

environmental impact reviews, 20 WMATA has

revised its procedure to include two public

hearings, one on alternatives developed in the

impact study and the second on general plans.

The handicapped represent a specific group that

has been dissatisfied with WMATA’s response to

its input. Representatives of a number of organizations for the handicapped testified as early as

ls Mirl ~ tes of one of WMATA’S first board meetings in late

I ~~~ reveal a proposal by a board alternate member to establish

a c i tiiens’ ad~risory committee. It was not discussed and no

al t It)n w.15 taken on i t.

I I ~?(,{,lt,rw, 1,lL, v, LVl\l,q TA, U, S. District Gmrt for the ~strict

~~f L“C)IU rnbia, January 6 , 1971 (amended January 8, 1971),

<’lt<ltit~n 3.?6, Federal Supplement, p. 7Q4.

~’ Birt~//)t: v. WMATA, Civil Action 73-1853.

25
196 5

21 that they wanted Metro to be fully

accessible to the handicapped. Elevators or “inclinators ” were proposed as solutions to the station

access problem. WMATA took no action on the

requests. Now, following a 1973 court decision, 22

WMATA is retrofitting some stations and modifying plans for others to include elevators.

Much of the criticism has come from residents

of the residential neighborhoods now being

impacted as Metro reaches out from the city center.

But in addition to strictly localized opposition,

which has surfaced in many cities when their

system reaches a similar stage of development, the

District’s liberal and radical political elements are

becoming discontented. However, these groups are

not expected to become a major roadblock to

completion of the system as long as funding

continues to be available. In the words of an

individual who was one of Washington’s most

outspoken antifreeway activists in the late 1960’s

and early 1970’s: “It is very fashionable among a lot

of people to hate Metro and not do anything about

it. ”

TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

Due to the dominating role of Congress in Metro

decision making, technical planning for the regional

system in Washington was subjected to more

formal debate than in perhaps any other city. The

technical process, as a result, kept pace with and

adequately informed the decision making.

Decisions were grounded firmly in the technical

information provided.

Goals and Objectives

The plans for the basic Metro system and the

adopted regional system were developed between

1959 and 1968, before it was an accepted planning

procedure to set forma] goals. Therefore, no formal

process was employed and goals were not always

explicitly stated in the Metro plans. However,

implicitly the plans are directed to accomplishing a

clearly identifiable, albeit controversial, set of

goals.

Goals were not formally stated in the two earliest

plans (The Transportation Plan—National Capital Region

II “T(J Au tht)rizc the l’r~)sec ution of a Transit Development

l’r(~gram fc~r the Natitmal Capital Region, ” Hearings before the

(’t~mm]tte( (~n the t}istrict of Columbia, U.S. Senate, 89t h

[ t~ngres+, 1st %ssi(>rl, ]uly 20, 21, and 23, 1965.

‘ ‘ ivll.lfltl,fllvl [ Irh(rtl 1 (’(7,s1((’, 1!11 .,

. . d (II. v. WMATA, Civil Action

~~ti-~~, ]anu,lry ZQ, l~i’~, and October 23, I973.

of 1959, and the National Capital Transportation

Agency’s November 1962 Report to the President). The

former plan stated that its purpose is to accommodate future transportation needs in the face of

an expanding population. The findings and policy

statement prefacing the 1960 Act, 23 which mandated the NCTA study, spelled out the need for an

improved transportation system to enhance the

welfare of the District of Columbia, enable the

orderly growth and development of the national

capital region, and preserve the beauty and dignity

of the Nation’s capital. Each of these concepts

eventually was used to explain the merits of the

transit/highway package that was proposed,

Furthermore, the popular concern over the

implications of growth gave direction to both study

teams. However, the fact that goals were not

explicitly defined allowed confusion to develop over

the mandate of Metro’s early planners and ultimately contributed to (1) a delay in system

construction and (2) an end to multimodal

transportation planning in the region. Although in

1959 it seemed clear that the public supported rapid

rail as a substitute for new highways, highway

interests in 1963 criticized Darwin Stolzenbach and

NCTA for assuming that the protransit feeling

went further than it really did. A number of

observers believe a rapid transit system would be in

operation today if Stolzenbach had not made this

assumption. A public goal-setting process may have

helped resolve the controversy at the beginning.

The desire to plan a coordinated multimodal

network was implicit from the beginning of the

work on Metro, However, adopting a multimodal

approach was never identified as a goal. If it had

been, some voices might have been raised when the

NCTA lost its authority to plan for highways as

well as transit in 1963, victim to the continuing

controversy over the appropriate relative roles of

highways and transit. Instead, stripping the NCTA

of its authority over highway planning led to a

seemingly arbitrary modal bias. Since at that time

express bus transit was assumed to require

reserved lanes in new freeways, and NCTA had lost

all authority over freeway construction, planning

for express bus transit was abandoned.

In another respect, in spite of the lack of explicit

definition of its goals, the Metro technical planning

was able to conform relatively well to the area’s

development objectives as stated in regional

23 Public Law 86-669, July 1960.

26
comprehensive plans. In 1955 the Mass Transportation Survey staff prepared a general development

plan as the first step in its planning process. The

NCTA evaluated its alternative schemes against

the new “Wedges and Corridors” regional plan

prepared in 1961 by area planning bodies. Later, in

1967, population, employment, and land use

forecasts prepared by the Council of Governments

were used in testing alternatives prior to selecting

the final Metro system.

Development and Evaluation of Alternatives

Much of the alternatives evaluation work done

for Metro was solid, and some of the technical

backup was innovative and pioneering. There has

been complaint, however, about the validity of the

technical findings at each stage. In particular, there

have been allegations that the 1962 NCTA plans

were biased toward rail, and that work in preparation for the 1968 referendum relied too heavily on

input from localities.

The 1959 Transportation Survey and the 1962

NCTA study can be commended for their breadth

of coverage. Both studies examined highway as

well as transit alternatives; the NCTA examined

not one but several highway alternatives. The 1959

study concluded with recommendations for three

transportation modes: auto, rapid rail transit, and

express bus. To these modes the NCTA study

added commuter rail. (Both mentioned regular bus

transit but did not develop service recommendations. ) Although today transportation studies

routinely pursue such a multimodal analysis, for

their time these studies were advanced.

Nevertheless, the studies had their shortcomings. The 1959 study was criticized from two

sides. Prorail and antihighway interests attacked it,

claiming that it underestimated the need for rail

transit. At the same time, conflict within the study

staff centered on the allegation that the study’s

conclusions were unfairly biased in favor of rail

rather than bus transit. Although the contention

that the 1959 study underestimates the need for

rail was justified, it was led to such conclusions

because it had to rely on outdated regional

comprehensive plans. The staffers who made the

second allegation—that the study was biased

against rail—have not provided much evidence for

this contention.

The only concrete evidence of the controversy is

that study leaders refused to publish a draft of the

final report prepared by contractors. The consultant, the Institute of Public Administration (IPA),

produced a version of the report that cast doubt on

the feasibility of rapid transit and emphasized the

need for highways; the published version gives

equal emphasis to rail and highway recommendations. The IPA staff claimed that their draft of the

report was not acceptable because of policy

differences, a contention made moot by the fact

that the IPA draft also was poorly written, badly

organized, and contained errors of fact.

Criticisms of the 1962 NCTA plan took two

forms. Some complaints focused on inadequacies in

the technical procedure used. For example, NCTA

used two alternative land-use forecasts in its

evaluation—a commendable step. Unfortunately,

the average of the two was used in the development

of traffic forecasts, and the information that could

have been gained by comparing the effects of two

different land uses was lost, The results of the

analysis would have been much more useful if

separate trip tables for these two land-use futures

had been developed.

However, the most serious charge is that NCTA

biased its technical studies to favor the rail

alternatives. NCTA Director Stolzenbach is

characterized as a foe of highways for whom the

ends justified the means. There are several

concrete allegations at issue. The first criticism is

that NCTA, although it considered five alternatives (including an all-bus system), did not

quantitatively evaluate all five. This criticism is less

strong in light of the fact that several of the

alternatives had been considered in 1959, ably and

in detail, and the NCTA could rely on this

information. The second criticism, by several

prohighway groups, alleged that NCTA assumed a

low average expressway speed to increase its

patronage projections. At low speeds, highway

travel looks less desirable compared to high-speed

transit.

A third criticism was that NCTA projected large

growth for the downtown area in spite of trends

already in evidence for decreasing downtown

growth. The high growth rate favored a radial rail

system, which would be best able to handle high

volumes of traffic to and through downtown. The

dispersion of transit trips throughout the area

tends to increase the attractiveness of a bus system

by decreasing the peak hour volumes. (It is not

likely, however, that decreases in the volumes

forecast by NCTA would have made the all-bus

system clearly superior to the rail system. )

27
Another example of NCTA’s willingness to

manipulate its findings in order to advance its goals

has been alleged by a senior staff member of the

study. The 1962 plan shows a dashed line indicating

a future rail route heading directly east from the

Capitol in the direction of one of the District’s

enclaves of poor, black residents. Reportedly this

line was added to make the plan a more politically

palatable to inner city interests. The route was

never evaluated in the course of the technical work

and was drawn on the map during a midnight

conference as the plan was being rushed to

completion.

The criticisms of NCTA’s lack of objectivity were

stated perhaps most forcefully by Martin Wohl,

writing as a consultant to the Department of

Commerce:

[The NCTA findings] are not supported by

empirical studies and tests and certainly not

by historical population, travel, or bus trends

over the past two decades. In the main, they

merely reflect the judgment of business and

civic groups with a central city orientation and

vested interests of one sort or another. . . . To

use this sort of judgment and “back of the

envelope” thinking may result in chronic

overinvestment and substantial deficits. 24

A final inadequacy in both the 1959 and 1962

studies was lack of attention to the “no-build”

alternative and alternatives involving only minimal

or low capital transit and highway improvements.

Such approaches were not usually considered at the

time. But although this option was given no formal

consideration, over the years some discussion

occurred regarding minimal solutions to improving

transit. Congressman Joel T. Broyhill testified in

1955 that the new Mass Transportation Survey

should determine the feasibility of fringe parking

cost and inquire into the desirability of staggered

hours of work. O. Roy Chalk of D.C. Transit

discussed priority lanes for bus transit in several of

his speeches over the years.25

24 Hearings before Subcommittee No. 6 of the House District

Committee, July 1963, op. cit.

25 A humorous exchange on the subject took place in 1958

before the Joint Committee on Washington Metropolitan

Transportation Problems. Congressman DeWitt S. Hyde asked

Keneth Hoover, director of the 1959 study, whether he would

recommend reductions of parking in order to force people onto

rapid transit. Hoover answered, “I am a man of peace, Mr.

Hyde. ” The two men agreed the best that could be done was to

try to “attract” ridership.

After NCTA recommended its rail system for

Washington in 1962, there was no further consideration of alternative modes of transit. The

analysis that preceded selection of the regional

system in 1968 assumed a rail system and examined

only route options. No public criticism of the 1967

evaluation of alternative route configurations has

come to light, although participants acknowledged

there were two shortcomings.

First, the 1967 work was hampered by inadequate base data. The staff was directed to use the

COG Regional Planning Guide lan d

use/population/employment forecast. The Guide

was acknowledged to be inadequate, and COG was

in the process of updating it at the same time the

alternatives were being developed and evaluated.

To compensate, WMATA hired a consultant to

contact planners in each jurisdiction and record

changes in land use policy from the Guide.

The second criticism was that the route alternatives selected for evaluation in 1967 were biased

by local interests. The 1967 process, led by Alan M.

Voorhees & Associates for WMATA, was relatively

open compared to its precedessors, and local

agencies helped select the alternative systems to be

evaluated. Their influence worked against

Voorhees’ desire to design alternatives for testing

purposes to show most clearly which worked best.

For example, Voorhees had wanted to evaluate the

feasibility of a minimal system, but local politicians

insisted on modifications that spoiled the effectiveness of the test.

Representatives from all the jurisdictions came

together at an Airlie House workshop in July 1967

to assemble a regional system from elements of the

three alternatives. They did so, dividing by State

and adjourning to three separate closed-door

meetings. Afterwards they assembled and agreed

upon the Proposed Regional System. Subsequently, this configuration was tested in light of new

COG data, subjected to public hearings, modified

and adopted.

To the allegation that the basic system had been

chosen because it was best for the District of

Columbia was added the contention that the

regional system, too, served local interests rather

than serving the entire region. The Voorhees staff

director for the project stated that the route and

station locations followed logically from the

technical findings in an inverse proportion to

political pressures in the three major jurisdictions.

In Maryland, where staff had worked closely with

28
WMATA, the alternatives testing yielded data that

provided an adequate base for rational decisions on

routes and station locations. The District also

worked closely with WMATA but was dominated

by the suburbs and usually conceded to their

wishes. Virginia, through the staff of the Northern

Virginia Transportation District, was at

loggerheads with WMATAover a number of issues

and allegedly bowed to the wishes of politicians.

Unrealistic alternatives were tested, and the

system in Virginia therefore did not grow out of a

logical process. The Franconia branch on the

Springfield line was described as an example of a

purely political decision with no technical justification; it was dropped following later study.

WMATA considered the Regional Metro System

to be fixed after it was adopted in 1968. It was

thought to be ready for final design and construction with no further need to look at alternatives.

One and a half years later the National Environmental Policy Act was enacted, and environmental

assessments were legally required of major actions

by the Federal executive branch affecting the

environment. The Metro system was exempted

from NEPA, as it is not sponsored by a Federal

agency, but in 1973 a court ruling26 required

WMATA nevertheless to identify alternatives to

environmentally harmful actions. The studies are

being conducted on segments (portions of line 1 or

2 miles long, usually with a station) or groups of

segments. Their findings are made public at

hearings, citizen comments invited, and the

package presented to the WMATA board for it to

recommend a course of action. One of the six

completed studies has resulted in dropping an

alinement (the Franconia branch, mentioned earlier

in this case assessment).

The environmental review process in theory

gives citizens a role in selecting alternative

alinements and station designs. However,

WMATA’s review did not provide for reevaluation

of major sections of the system. The consultant27

prepared a regionwide environmental assessment

in which highways were the only alternative

considered; alternative modes (e.g., light rail, bus)

were not investigated. The adopted system was

given a stamp of approval.

Some additional alternative studies of portions of

the adopted system have been done or are

~“ Birnberg V. WMATA, Civil Actions 73-1853 and 74-1740.

ZT Wal]ace, McHarg, Roberts & Todd.

underway outside WMATA. The District and

Prince Georges County recently have agreed to

finance a study of an alternative route for the

Branch Avenue line. Citizens in the District’s

Anacostia communities have complained ever since

the 1968 hearings that they were inadequately

served by the line to Branch Avenue.

A particularly admirable process was sponsored

by the Maryland Department of Transportation in

a corridor of Prince Georges County roughly

overlapping the Greenbelt alinement. Goals were

set, evaluation criteria derived, and multimodal

transportation alternatives studied in the context

of a broadly participatory process. The study

concluded with the decision to delete a section of

Interstate Route 95 and to request moving the

Metro alignment several miles to the West. The

WMATA staff approved; the board has not yet

acted.

Financial Plan

Metro’s financial planning has been criticized for

two key failings: (1) costs have been consistently

underestimated, and (2) WMATA has repeatedly

delayed altering its financial plan to keep pace with

rising costs. The shortcomings of Metro’s financial

planning, in combination with steeply rising

construction costs, have jeopardized completion of

the 98-mile system.

An assessment of the financial plan is central to

an evaluation of Metro planning because financial

considerations have influenced the size of the

system, the willingness of the local jurisdictions to

cooperate in the undertaking, and the willingness

of voters to buy into the system.

Since the Regional Metro System was adopted in

1968, the estimated cost of constructing the system

has risen from $2.5 billion to $4.5 billion. Consequently, WMATA faces a dilemma. The financial

plan is keyed to the full 98-mile system. Jurisdictions have all contributed accordingly and would

sue for recovery of funds if service were cut. In

addition, a smaller system could not draw the

original patronage and revenues and would not

balance costs. But WMATA claims that if it does

not get the added funds, 36 stations will have to be

eliminated, causing a 26 percent loss in ridership

and a 35 percent loss in revenue. In addition, more

funds would have to be spent on buses to serve

some of the lost patrons, and new ratios between

patronage, fares, and revenues would have to be

approved.

29
— -—

Inflation, compounded by delays in construction,

is responsible for the increase in the estimated cost

of the WMATA system. The original estimate in

1969 assumed a 5 percent inflation rate over the 40-

year construction period. By 1970, the inflation

assumptions already proved too low and were

adjusted upward to an average of 6.7 percent over 7

years,

A WMATA report, submitted March 31, 1975 to

the House Committee on the District of Columbia

illustrated the impact of inflation on Metro. T h e

table that follows, excerpted from the WMATA

report, is a comparison of WMATA’s 197 0

forecasted rates with the actual annual percentage

change (inflation) and price index.

Comparison of Forecast With Actual Cost of Metro

Forecast Actual

Nov. 30, 1970 Cost Review

Date

Jan. 1, 1969 . . . . . . .

Jan. 1, 1970 . . . . . . .

Jan 1, 1971 . . . . . . .

Jan. 1, 1972 . . . . . . .

Jan. 1, 1973 . . . . . . .

Jan. 1, 1974 . . . . . . .

Jan. 1, 1975 . . . . . . .

Annual Annual

percent Price percent Price

change index change index

— 100,0 — 100.0

7,40 107.4 7.70 107.7

10.99 119.2 10.40 118.9

8.81 129.7 8.66 129.2

7.40 139.3 7.50 138.9

6.25 148.0 7.20 148.9

5.81 156.6 8.93 162.2

The table shows that the original assumption

about inflation was inaccurate by January 1975.

WMATA material illustrates the impact of increasing oil prices on its vast material purchases

and also shows the result of the lifting of Federal

price controls for particular key materials such as

steel. More generally, WMATA also stated that the

original escalation assumptions were wrong

because the 1969 forecasts had assumed the

Vietnam War would be over by late 1971 and that

the war-generated inflation would abate.

In addition to inflation, numerous project delays

contributed to escalating costs. Delays occurred in

acquiring land rights from the railroads, particularly for the Green belt route along the B & O tracks. It

had been assumed that railroad rights of way would

be relatively inexpensive because their use would

minimize the need for relocation. In fact, serious

delays were encountered because the railroad

personnel were not in a position to be generous

because of their own precarious financial position.

Other land acquisition delays were caused by

what WMATA calls “disputes with local jurisdictions. ” For example, the City of Alexandria changed

its mind on whether or not to use a rail right-ofway for a major Metro route. The track right-ofway was finally chosen, but only after time had

been lost. Changes in required administrative

procedures also caused delay and extra expense. For

example, environmental review requirements were

imposed after the original cost estimate had been

made.

Other delays and cost increases relate more

closely to the design and construction methods of

the system. These have to do with unforeseen soil

conditions; requirements (imposed by the U.S. Park

Service, for example, in Lafayette Square) that the

construction method be tunnel rather than cutand-cover as originally assumed; more stringent

utility-handling requirements imposed by the local

utilities company after the original estimate; and

new environmental requirements.

The erroneous inflation assumption in turn

compounded the cost of every project schedule

delay because it meant everything would have to be

purchased at higher prices.

Certain design decisions also added to the cost of

Metro. A vaulted station ceiling was chosen for all

stations. The engineers claimed in the beginning

that the vault was more expensive than boxlike

construction of stations that would allow height to

be determined by individual rock conditions.

Others, led by design-oriented architects, claimed

the regularity of design would save time and cost by

using standardized materials and by allowing

designers to develop each station more quickly and

efficientl y with less chance for requiring change

orders from the field.

The technical aspects of delay and cost increase

are easy to describe, for there is ample precedent on

other major public works. The political delays are

more difficult, particularly the delays Congressman William Natcher caused by withholding

the District’s local matching funds pending a

resolution of the highway funding for Washington.

Mr. Natcher claimed that the system would cost

more than WMATA estimated. WMATA officials

claimed that he created a self-fulfilling prophecy,

because the delays he caused escalated the costs by

over $100 million.

At this point the lesson learned from the cost

increase is not conclusive. On the one hand,

30
The vaulted ceiling design chosen for Metro’s underground stations may have added to the system’s cost

WMATA was criticized for including too small an

inflation factor in the original estimate. On the

other hand, contingency plans were overly optimistic: a 10 percent factor for incomplete design.

The cost estimates were assumed to be valid “if all

went well .“ The history of Metro suggests the

tenuousness of so optimistic an assumption.

Some observers have commented in retrospect

that the size of the system and the source of

funding contributed heavily to the cost increases.

For example, much smaller systems designed in

Montreal and Toronto and funded by local rather

than Federal sources stayed within their budgets

better than WMATA. Others claim that the Corps

of Engineers background of the WMATA builders

led to a lack of concern for cutting costs. And still

others state that WMATA was certainly not the

only body, private or public, that made investment

miscalculations during the late 1960’s.

The financing plan currently in effect is based on

a total system cost of $2,980,200,000. WMATA’ s

plan calls for the Federal Government to provide

$1.441 billion through grants to be matched at a

ratio of two Federal dollars for each local dollar

contributed. Thus the local jurisdictions in the plan

are to provide $720.5 million. The remainder,

slightly less than $900 million is to be made up by

revenue bonds issued by WMATA, bonds which

will have a Federal guarantee together with a good

faith pledge by the localities to support the debt

service. Responsibility for the local share was

divided in accordance with a weighted formula that

took account of amount of construction, train miles

and stations, population, and ridership in each of

the jurisdictions.

When the estimate rose to nearly $4.5 billion,

WMATA called for the Federal Government to

provide an additional $1.25 billion. A portion of this

increase represents a retroactive increase of the

Federal funding share to 80 percent in keeping with

the UMTA capital grant program, The local share

would increase by $135 million.

The chief alternative to this option, other than

reducing the size of the system, is to transfer funds

available for high way construction to the rail rapid

transit. This alternative is available under the 1973

Federal Highway Act and is OMB’s recommendation at least for the D.C. area, which has formally

requested the transfer. The Maryland Department

of Transportation also has requested transfer of

31
funds allocated for a section of I-95 but has not

clearly indicated whether it would commit a portion

of the money thus released to Metro. In Virginia,

the Governor and State highway commission

adamantly oppose diverting funds from deleted I66 to any transit project.

Finally, even with the transfer, the local jurisdictions would be required to produce substantial

sums of money, chiefly because of requirements

that they fund bus operating deficits now as well as

rail capital costs. Once they have exhausted their

own financial capabilities, the localities may turn to

the States for aid. Northern Virginia communities

already requested the State legislature to levy a

sales tax increase in the region to be devoted to

transportation. The State refused in early 1975.

Maryland’s DOT has been providing the Maryland

portion of Metro contributions since 1973. Any

request for additional funds would have to compete

with priorities that are set statewide.

Historically, financing plans and cost estimates

for Metro always have been controversial. One of

the reasons Congress rejected the first financing

proposal in 1962 was its concern that the Federal

share was excessive. NCTA’s revenue projections

in 1962 were ridiculed by many critics, who

doubted that operating revenues from such a rapid

transit system would in fact be able to pay back the

bonded debt.

The doubt continues today. It is exacerbated by

dramatically rising operating deficits on Metro’s

bus operations. During its first years of service,

Metrorail also is expected to operate at a loss.

However, WMATA still holds to its claim that

revenues from the fully operating Metro system

will meet operating costs with a surplus for paying

off part of the bond indebtedness. In August 1975, a

commit tee of WMATA board member s

recommended a fare “structure designed for this

purpose that the Washington Post said might lead to

the “world’s costliest ride” on an urban transit

system. 28 Although WMATA’s projections may be

intended to reassure nervous local governments,

there is little ‘reason to expect that they will be

taken seriously at a time when transit systems

across the country are experiencing rapidly

accelerating rates of growth in operating deficits.

In spring 1975 WMATA, COG, and UMTA were

planning to conduct a study of alternative transportation modes for the yet unconstructed extremities

of the system that would consider the option of

cutting the system back. As of this writing, no

products of such a study had been reported.

Hopefully the effort will provide ample information about alternative courses of action for the

public and their officials to draw upon in making

what promises to be a difficult choice. Some

observers expect this kind of investigation will

show the need for a combined transportation-landuse policy that gets at the source of the transit

financing problem by leading to more efficient

patterns of urban development and land use.

Obviously, it is extremely important for

WMATA to restore faith in its financial planning.

The completion of the system—any system—hangs

in the balance.

28 Jack Eisen, “Metro May Prove the World’s Costliest Ride,”

Washington POst, September 1, 1975.

32
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Summary Case Assessment

The purpose of this section is to summarize the

nature of the transit planning and decisionmaking

process in the Washington region in light of the

guidelines listed in the approach to the assessment.

The summary, therefore, is divided into two parts:

(1) Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2)

Assessment of the Technical Planning Process.

1. ASSESSMENT OF THE

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

● Forum for Decisionmaking.—In early

years Congress provided the Metro

decisionmaking forum. Since the creation

of the Washington Metropolitan Area

Transit Authority (WMATA) in 1966, the

region’s governments have negotiated

most transit policy decisions during

WMATA board meetings, although the

Metropolitan Washington Council of

Governments (through its Transportation

Planning Board) is the officially designated

forum. Under these circumstances

WMATA’s transit planning has tended to

be inadequately coordinated with the

efforts of other agencies. Relevant agencies are notified of WMATA’s plans but, in

general, only those who are helping pay for

the system have influence on the plans.

Early Metro planners were sharply criticized for failure to coordinate effectively with

interested public agencies.

● Accountability of Decisionmakers.—Early

Metro planners bore no direct responsibility to a constituency. In contrast, most

WMATA board members must hold

elected positions in their jurisdictions and,

through them, can be held accountable by

the public for their actions. The agency was

created by interstate compact and given

authority to plan transit (although the

power to make long-range transit decisions

now nominally belongs to the Council of

Governments).

● Public Involvement.—The general public

was excluded from early Metro planning

and involved in system selection only

indirectly through their elected officials.

Although the courts since then have forced

WMATA to hold public hearings on station

area plans, the agency has never taken the

lead in structuring a process to involve

citizens in a more substantive way.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THE TECHNICAL

PLANNING PROCESS

● Goals and Objectives.—Metro was planned before it was common to develop

formal goals. Responding to widespread

public concern over the implications of

future growth, NCTA assumed it had a

mandate to plan an extensive rapid rail

system in order to cut back the highway

program. The ensuing controversy contributed to delaying a decision to build

Metro for several years.

● Development of Alternatives.—The two

early studies (1959 and 1962) considered

highway, express bus, and rail transit

alternatives in a multimodal approach that

was advanced for its time. However, only

transit alternatives were considered in the

1967 study that led directly to adoption of

the Regional Metro System, and at least

one of the alternatives was designed to

answer political rather than technical concerns.

● Evaluation of Alternatives.—Although

based on an outmoded regional comprehensive plan, the Washington region’s

first transit study in 1959 conducted a fair

evaluation of alternatives. In contrast, the

planning during the next 3 years, which

laid the groundwork for the system

eventually adopted, was accused of biasing

its data to favor rail transit. In fact, the

political debate on the transit versus

highways issue had more influence in

shaping transit decisions than the technical

findings did.

3 5
. Financing and Implementation.—From

the earliest period Metro supporters

assumed that the system would be backed

by Federal money and that it would

eventually turn a profit. As construction

costs and projected operating deficits both

rise, local governments and the Federal

Government alike are wary of making new

financial commitments, and as a result

completion of the system is in jeopardy.

36