United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 28, 2016*

Decided April 7, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1575

CHRISTOPHER HICKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

AT&T SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 13-3206

Colin S. Bruce,

Judge.

O R D E R

Christopher Hickson appeals the grant of summary judgment for his former 

employer, AT&T Services, in this diversity suit asserting that he was fired based on a 

prior arrest. See 775 ILCS 5/2-103(A). We affirm.

We recount the evidence in the light most favorable to Hickson, the party 

opposing summary judgment. See Carter v. Chi. State Univ., 778 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 

2015). Hickson worked for AT&T for about ten years as a senior risk specialist when, in 

 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is 

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 15-1575 Page 2

December 2010, he had a car accident. Hickson had been texting on his cell phone while 

driving home from a non-work-related Christmas party and concert, and, distracted, he 

flattened a no-parking sign and knocked a post-office box thirty feet with his truck. 

A police officer followed Hickson home and arrested him after throwing him to 

the ground and smashing his nose. After Hickson was treated at an emergency room, the 

police released him with citations. The police did not ask to administer a field sobriety 

test at Hickson’s house, and Hickson refused blood and urinalysis tests at the hospital.

The next day, December 12, Hickson emailed his AT&T supervisor David Engel 

to inform him that he had been arrested for a traffic incident after a Christmas party. On 

his way home he had been texting while driving, Hickson wrote, and he hit a no parking 

sign. Despite the damage being minimal, police were called. Hickson told Engel that he 

had refused to submit to a DUI test and had been arrested, but his lawyer was confident 

that the charges would be dismissed. Hickson closed his email by stating that he was 

reporting his arrest to Engel in compliance with AT&T’s Code of Business Conduct

(which requires employees to report arrests, charges, and dispositions), and he asked

Engel to let him know if further action was required. Hickson’s email did not mention 

that he had also been charged with leaving the scene of an accident, driving without 

insurance, and improper lane usage, and arrested for resisting a peace officer. Later in 

December Engel informed his supervisor, Wayne Johnson, about Hickson’s accident and 

said that he would apprise him of any developments.

But nothing happened for another nine months, until September 2011, when 

AT&T received an anonymous note from “Concerned Stockholders” about criminal 

charges that had been brought against Hickson as a result of the December 2010 incident. 

The note questioned Hickson’s honesty and integrity and attached a copy of a case 

information from state court records that set forth Hickson’s entire arrest history and 

disposition of his 2010 charges that he had not disclosed to AT&T.

Upon receiving the report, Johnson uttered the first of two comments that 

Hickson considered discriminatory. According to Hickson, Jackson expressed 

“umbrage” that he had left the scene of the accident because his job at AT&T required 

him to train technicians how to handle accidents. Johnson referred the matter to AT&T’s 

Asset Protection Department, which investigates violations of the company’s code of 

business conduct. Johnson later told Hickson that he had received an anonymous note 

and court records, and then made a second discriminatory comment when he stated that 

he knew about Hickson’s prior DUI arrest. But Johnson refused to discuss the 
No. 15-1575 Page 3

investigation and said he would “hold off” discussing the matter until Asset Protection 

issued its report. 

Hickson met in October with both an employee from Asset Protection and his 

new supervisor, Lori Ridder, to discuss the details of his arrest. He provided a signed 

statement admitting that he had been issued citations for driving-under-the-influence, 

leaving the scene, and improper lane usage. Hickson also acknowledged that he had not 

informed AT&T that he had pleaded guilty in August 2011 to reckless driving. But he 

insisted that he substantially complied with AT&T’s Code of Business Conduct by 

emailing Engel about his DUI citation, and he was not required to report the 

reckless-driving disposition until he had paid the fine. 

Johnson received a copy of the Asset Protection investigation report that 

documented inconsistencies between Hickson’s account of his December 2010 arrest and 

the police statements. Hickson had denied being intoxicated or resisting arrest, but the 

police statements said that Hickson had attempted to flee from the police and resisted 

arrest, that he had bloodshot eyes, slurred his words, and smelled of alcohol, and that he 

had refused to submit to a urinalysis test for alcohol. Moreover, Hickson had submitted 

to Asset Protection incomplete police reports that left out incriminating information. 

Johnson forwarded the report to Ridder and asked whether she recommended 

termination. 

Ridder recommended that AT&T fire Hickson based on his “pattern of 

dishonesty” and “ingrained reluctance to be held accountable” for his violations of the 

code of business conduct. Ridder noted that Hickson provided to his prior supervisor 

only the “barest minimum of detail on his arrests” and failed to report the other charges 

and disposition. She also found that Hickson’s story of events stood in “stark contrast”

with the police statements. And Ridder found it “especially troubling” that Hickson 

maintained that he had complied with the code, despite his continued attempts to “cover 

up and/or gloss over” his charges for resisting arrest.

Johnson likewise recommended to his boss that AT&T fire Hickson. Johnson 

thought that Hickson’s decisions to hold back information and evidence brought his 

ethics into question and “contradict[ed]” his responsibilities as a risk specialist to gather 

and maintain evidence. A few days later, on November 3, 2011, Johnson informed 

Hickson without explanation that he was fired.

Hickson then sued AT&T in Illinois state court, asserting that the company had 

used his arrest as a basis for firing him, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 
No. 15-1575 Page 4

ILCS 5/2-103. The statute prohibits an employer to “use the fact of an arrest . . . as a basis 

to . . . discharge.” Id. at 5/2-103(A). The statute, however, does not prohibit the employer 

“from obtaining or using other information which indicates that a person actually 

engaged in the conduct for which he or she was arrested.” Id. at 5/2-103(B). AT&T 

removed the action to federal court and after the close of discovery moved for summary 

judgment.

In granting summary judgment for AT&T, the district court concluded that 

Hickson could not prevail on his discrimination claim under the direct or indirect 

method of proof. Regarding the direct method, the court explained, Hickson provided 

neither direct evidence that he was fired based on the fact of his arrest nor circumstantial 

evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to infer causation between the fact of Hickson’s 

arrest and discharge. The 11 months between his arrest and discharge, the court pointed 

out, was too lengthy to be suspicious. And Johnson’s two comments about the arrest

(expressing “umbrage” and taking note of Hickson’s prior arrest) did not violate the 

statute or even suggest discriminatory intent because they were directed at Hickson’s 

behavior rather than the fact of his arrest. Regarding the indirect method, the court 

found that, even if Hickson were able to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, he

failed to produce evidence from which a rational jury could infer that AT&T’s reason for 

firing him was pretextual.

On appeal Hickson only challenges the district court’s analysis under the direct 

method and specifically its determination that he failed to produce circumstantial 

evidence that supports a connection between his arrest record and termination.

Circumstantial evidence can include suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written 

statements, or “evidence that the employer offered a pretextual reason for an adverse 

employment action.” Diaz v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 653 F.3d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 2011); 

see Hutt v. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 757 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2014).

Hickson disagrees with the district court’s conclusion that the relevant timing 

was the eleven months between his arrest and discharge. Hickson proposes that the 

relevant period is merely 30 days—from September 2011, when Johnson learned from 

the anonymous note about his full arrest history, to October 2011, when Johnson decided 

to fire him. From this close timing, Hickson argues, a reasonable jury could conclude 

that his arrest records influenced Johnson’s decision to fire him. 

But 775 ILCS 5/2-103(A) prohibits using “the fact of an arrest” as the basis for 

discharge, and Hickson gives us no reason to question the district court’s designation of 

December 2010 as the relevant date when Johnson first learned of the fact of his arrest.
No. 15-1575 Page 5

Cf. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (per curiam) (measuring 

relevant time period from when employer first knew of protected activity). And even if 

we were to accept Hickson’s argument that the relevant time period was only 30 days, 

“[s]uspicious timing may be just that—suspicious,” but it may not warrant an inference 

of causality where a significant intervening event destroys the inference. Davis v. Time 

Warner Cable of SE Wis., L.P., 651 F.3d 664, 675 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Loudermilk v. Best 

Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011)). Here the significant intervening event was 

the Asset Management report on Hickson’s failure to report truthfully. The findings in 

this report provided the basis for Johnson’s decision to fire Hickson. 

Hickson next contends that the district court misdated Johnson’s two comments 

(one expressing “umbrage” that Hickson had left the scene of an accident and one 

informing Hickson that he knew about Hickson’s prior DUI arrest) as occurring in 

December 2010, rather than in late September 2011. The factual error, Hickson argues, 

led the court to reason incorrectly that the passage of many months had weakened any

causal connection between Johnson’s comments and his decision to fire him.

Although the district court confused the chronology, its analysis was nevertheless 

correct. As the district court explained, Johnson’s first comment expressed concern about 

Hickson’s behavior in leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in arrest, not the fact

of the arrest, and such concern did not violate 775 ILCS 5/2-103(B) or suggest 

discriminatory intent, see Sroga v. Pers. Bd. of City of Chi., 833 N.E.2d 1001, 1007–08 (Ill. 

App. Ct. 2005) (775 ILCS 5/2-103(B) did not bar consideration of actual conduct as told by 

plaintiff himself, even though conduct led to arrest). And Johnson’s second comment 

about Hickson’s prior DUI arrest is not probative of discriminatory intent because it was 

not “related to the employment decision in question.” Robin v. Espo Eng’g Corp., 200 F.3d 

1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations marks omitted). After Johnson mentioned 

the prior arrest, he expressly told Hickson that he would “hold off” making any decision 

until Asset Protection issued its report. Hickson has not produced evidence to suggest

that Johnson decided to fire him based on the fact of his arrest rather than Asset 

Protection’s report of his lack of truthfulness. See Labor Comm. v. City of Decatur, 968 

N.E.2d 749, 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (no violation of 775 ILCS 5/2-103(A) for entity to 

investigate and find that person committed the conduct that led to arrest).

Hickson finally disagrees with the district court’s conclusion that he cannot show 

that AT&T’s reason for firing him was pretext. He contends that the district court 

weighed his evidence, rather than accepting the facts in a light favorable to him, as 

appropriate when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Hickson points to
No. 15-1575 Page 6

numerous errors in the Asset Protection report that, he believes, led to AT&T’s flawed 

conclusion that he had been dishonest. But the factual accuracy of the Asset Protection 

report is not material. “The question is not whether the employer’s stated reason was 

inaccurate or unfair, but whether the employer honestly believed the reason it has 

offered to explain the discharge.” O’Leary v. Accretive Health, Inc., 657 F.3d 625, 635 (7th 

Cir. 2011); cf. Franklin v. City of Evanston, 384 F.3d 838, 841–42, 846 (7th Cir. 2004) (no

violation of 775 ILCS 5/2-103 where employer fired plaintiff upon discovering from 

newspaper that he had been arrested for marijuana possession, in violation of

employer’s policy, where plaintiff offered no basis to refute that he violated policy). 

What is material is whether Hickson’s supervisors sincerely believed that Hickson had 

been dishonest. See Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 580–81 (7th Cir. 2015) (even 

baseless or overly harsh explanations suffice if honestly believed); Simpson v. Beaver Dam. 

Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 797 (7th Cir. 2015) (plaintiff did not raise genuine issue 

about the honesty of employer’s belief in negative reference about plaintiff from 

anonymous source). Hickson has not introduced any evidence that creates a genuine 

dispute about the sincerity of their beliefs. 

AFFIRMED.