United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 4, 2021 Decided July 23, 2021

No. 20-5263

MARIA A. SAUNDERS,

APPELLANT

v.

KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, SSA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-cv-02492)

Christine P. Benagh argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant. Elliott Andalman entered an appearance.

Johnny H. Walker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief was R. Craig 

Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: WILKINS and RAO, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.
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WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Maria Saunders appeals the 

Social Security Administration’s denial of her disability claim. 

In 2014, Saunders slipped on ice at work. She filed for 

disability benefits, which an Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) denied after a 2017 hearing. On appeal, Saunders 

raises several claims, including that the ALJ failed to consider

certain medical opinions. We agree with Saunders and reverse 

and remand to the District Court with instructions to remand to 

the Commissioner.

I.

Appellant Maria Saunders worked as a bus attendant for 

the Washington, D.C., school system. In this role, Appellant 

helped students with special needs and those in wheelchairs on 

and off the bus. On January 7, 2014, Appellant slipped and fell 

on ice at work, suffering a hip contusion and back pain. When 

she first received medical attention at the emergency room, 

Appellant was prescribed heat, Bengay, salt soaks, ibuprofen, 

and muscle relaxants. Appellant never returned to work. 

Instead, she filed a disability claim with the Social Security 

Administration (“SSA” or “Commissioner”) six months after 

her fall. Over the next three years, Appellant proceeded to 

receive dozens of medical opinions, including multiple 

opinions from two treating physicians: Dr. Williams, 

Appellant’s generalist, and Dr. Liberman, Appellant’s 

neurologist. Appellant also applied for and received disability 

benefits from the Washington, D.C., workers’ compensation 

board. 

In November 2017, an ALJ held a hearing for Appellant 

after her federal disability claims were denied on 

reconsideration. The ALJ heard Appellant’s testimony and 

heard testimony from a vocational expert. Relying on the 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles, the vocational expert 
3

testified that the closest job description was that of a bus 

attendant, which the Dictionary of Occupational Titles defines 

as “light work.”1

 But the vocational expert acknowledged that 

the job description was not an exact match and that, as 

performed by Appellant, it was heavy work. 

A few months later, the ALJ issued her decision and 

concluded that Appellant was not disabled. The ALJ evaluated 

the medical evidence before turning to some—but not all—of 

the medical opinions that Appellant provided. First, the ALJ 

gave “some” weight to the medical opinions offered by the 

District of Columbia agency consultants—Dr. Walter Goo and 

Dr. Alex Hemphill—who opined that Appellant could carry up 

to twenty pounds occasionally and up to ten pounds regularly, 

but the ALJ ultimately concluded that Appellant could perform 

the full range of light work. J.A. 6. Second, the ALJ gave 

“some” weight to Dr. Stanley Rothschild, who examined 

Appellant in August 2017 and noted that Appellant’s MRI test 

showed nothing atypical, but the ALJ refused to give weight to 

Dr. Rothschild’s conclusion that Appellant could return to 

work. J.A. 6–7. Third, the ALJ gave “little” weight to 

Dr. Eugene Miknowski, who examined Appellant in 

November 2014, because most of his findings were 

inconsistent with the medical evidence. J.A. 7. Fourth, and 

notably for the purposes of this appeal, Appellant gave “no 

weight to the opinion offered by Dr. Joseph Lieberman [sic], 

M.D., in November 2017,” where Dr. Liberman opined that 

1 Light work is work that “involves lifting no more than 20 pounds 

at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 

10 pounds,” “requires a good deal of walking or standing,” or

“involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of 

arm or leg controls.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). A claimant is 

considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work 

only if he or she has “the ability to do substantially all of these 

activities.” Id. 
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Appellant was permanently disabled. Id. Significantly, 

Appellant had also visited Dr. Liberman—her treating 

neurologist—in December 2014, but the ALJ made no note of 

this visit and the ensuing medical opinion. Cf. id. Fifth, the 

ALJ gave no weight to the disability certificate produced by 

Dr. Peter Lavine in October 2014. Id. Finally, the ALJ 

considered some (but not all) of the opinions offered by Dr. 

Edwin Williams—Appellant’s treating generalist—but 

accorded them “little” or no weight because the opinions were 

inconsistent with the medical evidence, some were 

pronouncements of disability, and because Dr. Williams was a 

primary care provider, not a specialist. J.A. 7–8. 

Turning to the question of whether Appellant could 

perform her old job, the ALJ placed considerable weight on the 

vocational expert’s testimony. In so doing, the ALJ concluded 

that the job description offered by the vocational expert was the 

closest match to Appellant’s job as performed generally in the 

national economy, though the ALJ noted the vocational 

expert’s qualification that Appellant actually performed the job 

as heavy work. Nevertheless, the ALJ found that someone with 

Appellant’s functional capacity could perform Appellant’s past 

work as generally performed in the national economy. 

Consequently, the ALJ concluded that Appellant was able to 

perform her past work in a light capacity. The Commissioner 

adopted the ALJ’s decision. 

Saunders appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the 

District Court. After the District Court affirmed the 

Commissioner’s decision, Appellant timely appealed to this 

Court arguing that the ALJ (1) erroneously failed to consider 

certain medical opinions, (2) failed to accord proper weight to 

the opinions she did consider, (3) failed to consider whether 

Appellant was disabled for twelve months, (4) incorrectly 

concluded that Appellant’s job existed in the national 
5

economy, and (5) failed to individually consider each of 

Appellant’s functional capabilities. Because we conclude that 

the ALJ erred when she failed to consider certain medical 

opinions, we remand to the Commissioner.

II.

The Social Security Act (“Act”) sets forth the rules 

governing disability benefits. In pertinent part, the Act defines 

disability as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful 

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to 

last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). An individual suffers from a disability 

“only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are 

of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous 

work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful 

work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 

423(d)(2)(A).

To determine whether a claimant suffers from a disability, 

the ALJ conducts a five-step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520. At step one, the claimant must show she is not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). 

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant 

suffers from a severe impairment. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 

404.1520(c), 404.1509. At step three, the ALJ evaluates 

whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an 

impairment listed in the regulations. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 

404.1520(d). Should the claimant make that showing, she is 

deemed disabled. Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 997 (D.C. 

Cir. 2004). If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four, where the 

claimant must demonstrate that she is incapable of performing 

her previous work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 
6

404.1520(f). A claimant who can perform her previous work 

is not disabled, but if she demonstrates her inability to perform 

her previous work, the ALJ must then determine at step five

whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work 

while taking into consideration the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 404.1520(g). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps, 

but the burden shifts to the Commissioner on the fifth step. 

Butler, 353 F.3d at 993.

In performing this analysis, the ALJ must adhere to certain 

regulatory requirements. The ALJ must consider the 

claimant’s statements, “objective medical evidence from an 

acceptable medical source,” and medical opinions. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.929(a). In considering the latter, the ALJ must generally 

give more weight to physicians who have examined the 

claimant, id. § 404.1527(c)(1), and particularly heavy weight 

to medical opinions from a treating source, i.e., a physician 

with an existing relationship with the claimant, id.

§ 404.1527(c)(2). Indeed, if a treating source’s medical 

opinion “is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical 

and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent 

with the other substantial evidence,” the ALJ must give the 

opinion “controlling weight.” Id.; see also Butler, 353 F.3d at 

1003 (quoting Williams v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 1494, 1498 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993)). 

We review the Commissioner’s ultimate determination of 

disability under the familiar substantial evidence standard. The 

Commissioner’s determination must be “based on substantial 

evidence in the record and correctly appl[y] the relevant legal 

standards.” Id. at 999; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Butler, 353 F.3d at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
7

(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). 

Substantial evidence “requires more than a scintilla, but can be 

satisfied by something less than a preponderance of the 

evidence.” Id. (quoting Fla. Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 315 

F.3d 362, 365–66 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Thus, while “we must 

carefully scrutinize the entire record, . . . we assess only 

whether the ALJ’s finding that [the claimant] is not [disabled] 

is based on substantial evidence and a correct application of the 

law.” Id. (citation omitted). In applying this standard, we must 

also be mindful of the harmless-error rule. See Shinseki v. 

Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009). Consequently, even if we 

perceive error, we will affirm the Commissioner’s decision 

unless the error is prejudicial. 

We agree with Appellant that the ALJ failed to properly 

consider key medical opinions that supported Appellant’s 

claim that she was disabled. Of particular relevance, the ALJ 

failed to consider the medical opinion offered by Dr. Liberman 

in December 2014. Dr. Liberman, Appellant’s treating 

neurologist, examined Appellant almost twelve months after 

she sustained the injury and concluded that Appellant “most 

likely has post[-]traumatic myofascial pain syndrome, which 

has become chronic.” J.A. 204. Dr. Liberman noted that 

Appellant had a “marked limitation of lumbar movement,” was 

“very tender over the left lumbar paraspinal region and left 

buttock,” her “[s]traight leg raising was 15 [degrees] on the left 

and 30 [degrees] on the right,” and she had a “slow and 

antalgic” gait. Id.

The ALJ failed to acknowledge, let alone evaluate, Dr. 

Liberman’s medical opinion despite her obligation to do so. 

SSA’s regulations make clear that “[r]egardless of its source, 

[SSA] will evaluate every medical opinion [it] receive[s].” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (emphasis added). The regulations also 

require ALJs to place more weight on opinions offered by 
8

treating physicians who have examined the claimant, unless the 

opinions are contradicted by substantial evidence. Id. § 

404.1527(c)(1). By failing to even consider Dr. Liberman’s

December 2014 medical opinion, the ALJ fell short of her 

obligation to “explain [her] reasons” for rejecting Dr. 

Liberman’s medical opinion. Butler, 353 F.3d at 1003 (quoting

Williams, 997 F.2d at 1498); see also Jones v. Astrue, 647 F.3d 

350, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (remanding to SSA when the ALJ 

rejected the treating physician’s medical opinion but “did not 

say why that was so”). 

The Commissioner attempts to discount this failure to 

consider Dr. Liberman’s 2014 evaluation because the opinion 

was purportedly duplicative of Dr. Liberman’s 2017 opinion. 

We disagree for two reasons. First, on their face, the two 

opinions contain substantively different assessments. In 2014, 

Dr. Liberman noted that Appellant was unable to raise her legs 

to similar degrees, whereas he made no similar finding in 2017. 

J.A. 204; J.A. 323–24. Dr. Liberman also concluded that 

Appellant’s gait “was slow and antalgic” in 2014, J.A. 204, and 

thus unnatural due to pain and discomfort, see Antalgic,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/medical/antalgic (last visited June 25, 2021), but 

only “a little bit slow and mildly unsteady” in 2017, J.A. 323. 

And although Dr. Liberman stated that Appellant “ha[d] to rest 

several times a day” in 2017, J.A. 324, his 2014 assessment 

concluded with the determination that Appellant could not 

“walk, stand[,] or sit for more than a brief period of time,” J.A. 

204. These conclusions are substantially different, so the 

Commissioner is wrong to argue that they were duplicative. 

Second, over two years passed between the two 

evaluations; Appellant’s medical condition could have 

ameliorated during that stretch but still entitled her to receive 

disability benefits for the period of time during which she was 
9

disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a) (defining disability as 

“the inability to do any substantial gainful activity . . . for a 

continuous period of not less than 12 months”). Thus, even 

assuming that Dr. Liberman’s 2014 opinion was largely 

redundant of his 2017 evaluation, the ALJ still had to consider 

the 2014 opinion—an opinion given almost exactly twelve 

months after Appellant’s fall—to determine whether Appellant 

was entitled to at least a closed period of disability. The ALJ’s 

evaluation of Dr. Liberman’s 2017 opinion thus did not 

incorporate Dr. Liberman’s 2014 opinion, and this incomplete 

consideration prejudiced Appellant. Had the ALJ considered 

Dr. Liberman’s 2014 opinion, she may have concluded that 

Appellant was at least entitled to disability benefits during the 

twelve-month period following Appellant’s fall.

We therefore remand to the Commissioner. Appellant 

raises several other challenges to the ALJ’s failure to consider 

certain medical opinions, but because we are remanding to the 

agency, we need not address these challenges, nor do we 

address Appellant’s claim that the ALJ failed to conduct a 

function-by-function analysis or her argument that the ALJ 

incorrectly concluded that Appellant could perform her past 

relevant work. See, e.g., Berry v. Astrue, 622 F.3d 1228, 1234 

n.3 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Given our remand for a new hearing, we 

need not resolve [the other] claim[s].”). It will be for the 

Commissioner to evaluate these claims in the first instance

after considering all medical opinions.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the 

judgment of the District Court with instructions to remand to 

the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

So ordered.