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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 26, 2015 

v No. 319137 

Calhoun Circuit Court 

LAWRENCE MICHAEL HINTON, LC No. 2013-002116-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MURPHY and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his convictions following a jury trial of fleeing and eluding, 

MCL 257.602a(3), and two counts of assaulting, battering, resisting, obstructing, or opposing a 

police officer, MCL 750.81d. He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 

serve 60 to 228 months’ imprisonment for the fleeing and eluding conviction and 46 to 180 

months’ imprisonment for the resisting or obstructing convictions. We affirm. 

 On June 27, 2013, Battle Creek Police Officer Benjamin Clark observed a white Lincoln 

Continental with an expired registration sticker. Officer Clark, who was in full uniform and was 

driving a marked police cruiser, pulled behind the car and turned on his emergency lights to 

affect a traffic stop. However, the vehicle did not stop. Instead, it turned onto a different street 

and accelerated to 35 to 40 miles per hour. Officer Clark activated his air horn and emergency 

sirens and pursued the vehicle, which continued at the same speed for some time and then pulled 

over. Officer Clark exited his police cruiser and verbally commanded the driver—whom he later 

identified as defendant—to stop running the engine of his vehicle. However, defendant 

proceeded to drive away. Officer Clark reactivated his sirens and followed defendant. 

Defendant pulled over again, this time “making a lot of . . . movements inside the car.” Based on 

his training and experience, Officer Clark suspected defendant was trying to hide weapons or 

contraband. Officer Clark approached defendant with his firearm drawn. He gave defendant 

loud commands to exit his vehicle with his hands up. However, defendant reached his hand 

through the open window, “flipped” Officer Clark off, and then drove away at a high rate of 

speed. 

 A second police officer in a separate marked police cruiser joined the pursuit. Both 

police cars had their lights activated. Defendant once again pulled over. The second officer 

pulled alongside the driver’s side of the vehicle while Officer Clark pulled his vehicle behind 
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defendant’s car. Both officers approached defendant with their firearms drawn, giving loud 

commands for him to show his hands. Defendant did not comply. The second officer attempted 

to gain control of defendant’s hands, but defendant resisted. Officer Clark explained that it 

appeared defendant was attempting to drive away yet again. Defendant was eventually extracted 

forcibly from his vehicle, handcuffed, and taken to jail. 

 Defendant was charged as a fourth-habitual offender with one count of fleeing and 

eluding a police officer, one count of possession of cocaine, second offense, MCL 

333.7403(2)(a)(v), and two counts of resisting or obstructing a police officer. Defendant waived 

his right to a preliminary examination in exchange for a plea offer. Pursuant to the offer, the 

prosecutor was prepared to dismiss the fourth-habitual offender notice and both charges of 

resisting or obstructing a police officer. The offer was again extended after the preliminary 

examination, but defendant did not accept it. Before trial, the prosecutor dismissed the 

possession of cocaine charge. Trial proceeded, and defendant was convicted as indicated above. 

 On April 7, 2014, defendant filed a motion to vacate his convictions and reinstate the plea 

offer. He asserted that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with the pleabargaining process and requested that the trial court hold a Ginther1

 hearing. The parties 

stipulated that an evidentiary hearing should be held before argument on defendant’s motion. At 

the Ginther hearing, defendant’s trial attorneys, Niels Magnusson and James Jordan, testified 

that they discussed the plea offer with defendant on multiple occasions. Attorney Jordan 

testified that he went over the sentencing guidelines with defendant both under the plea 

agreement and under the scenario of convictions being rendered on all of the charges, including 

consideration of the habitual fourth notice.2

 Both attorneys indicated that they advised defendant 

that it was a good plea offer and that they recognized defendant had a weak case. They also 

testified that defendant was not interested in the plea offer unless he would receive a twelvemonth cap on his sentence (county jail time only), but the prosecution was unwilling to make 

such a deal. Defendant testified that his attorneys did not go over the guidelines with him. He 

claimed that he was told it was possible that if he beat the resisting or obstructing charges at trial, 

he could receive a lower sentence. Defendant claimed that if he knew he would face more time 

if he went to trial he would have pleaded guilty. 

 The trial court denied defendant’s motion. The court first found that defendant’s 

testimony was not credible. On the other hand, the court found that the testimony of defendant’s 

attorneys was credible. Based on the testimony from defendant’s attorneys, the court concluded 

that defendant was told of two scenarios under the guidelines—his scoring under the plea and his 

 

1 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 

2

 When asked by the trial court whether he “went over with [defendant] the guidelines for all the 

offenses including the habitual notice,” Jordan replied, “Yes.” The trial court later inquired 

again whether Jordan “described the guidelines to [defendant] for the offenses as charged,” and 

Jordan responded, “I told him yes.” Jordan testified multiple times about going over the 

sentencing guidelines with defendant in relationship to the plea offer, including dismissal of the 

habitual offender notice. 
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scoring if convicted as charged. The court found that the attorneys informed defendant that 

getting convicted as charged would be “far more serious” than if he accepted the plea offer. The 

court ruled that the “issue here is . . . that he didn’t want to sacrifice two more months under the 

fourteen month minimum under the plea agreement guidelines.” 

 Defendant’s only argument on appeal is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

in conjunction with the plea-bargaining process. He asserts that trial counsel failed to adequately 

explain the consequences of accepting or not accepting the plea offer. Specifically, defendant 

asserts that his attorneys did not provide a thorough and accurate explanation of the potential 

risks and that they spent an inadequate amount of time explaining the plea offer, the maximum 

sentence under the plea offer, and the maximum sentence if defendant was convicted as charged. 

 In People v Armstrong, 490 Mich 281, 289; 806 NW2d 676 (2011), our Supreme Court 

explained the applicable standard of review: 

 Whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. A judge must first find 

the facts, then must decide whether those facts establish a violation of the 

defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. We review 

the trial court's factual findings for clear error. Clear error exists if the reviewing 

court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a 

mistake. We review de novo questions of constitutional law. [Citations and 

quotation marks omitted.] 

 With respect to the assistance of counsel in the context of plea bargaining, the Court in 

People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 591-592; 852 NW2d 587 (2014), observed: 

 As at trial, a defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in 

the plea-bargaining process. A defendant seeking relief for ineffective assistance 

in this context must meet . . . [the] familiar two-pronged standard by showing (1) 

that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In demonstrating 

prejudice, the defendant must show the outcome of the plea process would have 

been different with competent advice. [Citations and quotation marks omitted.] 

 “The defendant has the burden of establishing the factual predicate of his ineffective 

assistance claim.” Id. at 592. “Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant 

bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.” People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App 657, 663; 683 

NW2d 761 (2004). 

 Attorney Jordan explained at the Ginther hearing that he went over defendant’s 

sentencing guidelines with him, both under the plea agreement and were he to be convicted as 

charged with the habitual fourth sentence enhancement. Both attorneys testified that defendant 

wanted a twelve-month cap on his sentence and that anything to the contrary was unacceptable to 

defendant. The plea offer simply did not allow for a twelve-month cap. Both attorneys testified 

that they told defendant that the plea offer was a good offer, and Magnusson testified that he 
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“advised [defendant] that he would be better off with a plea.” In fact, Magnusson testified that, 

after defendant had decided to go to trial, both attorneys still went to the jail “to try and resolve 

the matter and basically indicate to . . . [defendant] what his options were and what the risks 

were of going to trial.” Magnusson believed that defendant understood the potential penalties 

upon conviction of all the counts, together with the habitual offender notice. Defendant argues 

that the attorneys recognized that the evidence against him was overwhelming and should have 

compelled them to make that clear to defendant when he was contemplating the plea offer. We 

surmise that defendant was already fully aware that the evidence against him was overwhelming. 

 To the extent that defendant’s testimony supported his position and conflicted with the 

testimony offered by his attorneys, the trial court found that defendant’s testimony was not 

credible, and credibility determinations are generally left to the trial court when ruling in an 

evidentiary hearing. People v Dendel, 481 Mich 114, 130; 748 NW2d 859 (2008); MCR 

6.001(D); MCR 2.613(C). We decline to disturb the trial court’s factual and credibility 

determinations. The attorneys’ representation of defendant with respect to the plea negotiations 

did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra