If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re CLOSE/JONES, Minors. September 15, 2022

No. 357938

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2019-000615-NA

In re D. A. JONES, Minor. No. 358902

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2019-000615-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and GARRETT and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 357938, respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s orders terminating 

her parental rights to DAC, MBJ, MMJ, RDJ, and JMJ pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). 

In Docket No. 358902, respondent appeals as of right a separate order terminating her parental 

rights to DAJ pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (g), and (j). For the reasons discussed below, 

we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from the initial removal of seven children from respondent’s care in 2019. 

During the proceedings, respondent gave birth to two additional children, who were also removed 

from her care. These appeals involve the six younger children.1

 

1 The three oldest children, DMM, SMM, and SDM, were initially removed and taken into 

protective care, but respondent’s parental rights to those children were not terminated. Those 

children were placed with their father and are not at issue in this appeal. The father of RDJ and 
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The children were initially taken into care after a domestic-violence incident. Responding 

to the scene, law-enforcement officers found stolen, loaded firearms accessible to the children. At 

the first preliminary hearing, Jasmine Byers of the Department of Health and Human Services 

(DHHS) testified that respondent had a history of using cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol. Byers 

testified that more than one of respondent’s children were born positive for cocaine. Byers testified 

that, at a family-team meeting shortly after removal, respondent admitted that she had relapsed 

“on substances including alcohol and [m]arijuana[,]” and she admitted that she could not provide 

appropriate care for the children. However, during that same family-team meeting, respondent

refused to participate in inpatient substance-abuse treatment. Respondent “refused and reported 

she’s not willing to do in-patient treatment at this time.” Testifying about respondent’s history, 

Byers noted that she “did in-patient treatment on three different occasions. One being last year.” 

Authorizing the petition, the referee ordered respondent to participate in individual therapy, attend 

parenting classes, undergo a psychological examination, obtain a legal source of income, maintain 

contact with the caseworker, and maintain safe and suitable housing. For reasons not entirely 

clear, the referee did not order substance-abuse services. A parent-agency treatment plan dated 

April 25, 2019, reflects that mother agreed to refrain from drug and alcohol abuse and participate 

in random drug and alcohol screens. At the dispositional review hearing on June 25, 2019, 

respondent did not object to the treatment plan, but she requested a housing referral and a parenting 

partner. The trial court granted her requests.

But it became evident that respondent’s substance abuse was a primary issue in the 

proceedings. In September 2019, the trial court ordered that substance-abuse treatment and drug 

screening be added to respondent’s treatment plan, noting that it was unclear why those services 

were not included in earlier orders. Despite referrals to several treatment programs and an order 

to submit drug screens, respondent failed to fully comply with either substance-abuse treatment or 

screening. During the lower-court proceedings, respondent missed 53 of 56 drug screens. She 

continued to use cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol—even during her subsequent pregnancies; and 

both of those children were born with medical issues because of respondent’s drug use during 

pregnancy. Respondent admitted to using cocaine as late as March 2021. Respondent also failed 

to obtain housing, was not fully compliant with her mental-health treatment, and did not 

consistently visit all of the children even though petitioner provided her with bus passes and some 

visits were to be conducted via Zoom.

In May 2021, a termination hearing was held on a supplemental petition seeking 

termination of respondent’s parental rights to DAC, MBJ, MMJ, RDJ, and JMJ. The trial court 

terminated respondent’s parental rights to those children. In June 2021, a combined adjudication 

and termination hearing was held on an original petition seeking removal and termination of 

 

DAC was initially involved in the proceedings, but his parental rights to RDJ and DAC were not 

terminated and those children were returned to his care. The father of MBJ and MMJ had his 

parental rights terminated. The fathers of JMJ and DAJ were not identified, and the trial court 

terminated the parental rights of those unknown fathers. None of the fathers is a party to these 

appeals.
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respondent’s parental rights to DAJ. The trial court found grounds to exercise jurisdiction over 

DAJ and also terminated respondent’s parental rights to him. These appeals follow.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

In both appeals, respondent argues that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts to 

reunify the family by failing to rectify her substance abuse before implementing other aspects of 

her treatment plan. Respondent also argues that petitioner did not present clear and convincing 

evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination. We disagree with both claims.

A. REASONABLE EFFORTS

Respondent argues that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. 

We disagree. Generally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be raised in the trial court. 

Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 227; 964 NW2d 809 (2020). Respondent did 

not argue below that petitioner failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. Indeed, she

never asserted in the trial court that the services offered were unreasonable or insufficient. 

Therefore, this issue is unpreserved. In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 27; 610 NW2d 563 (2000) 

(explaining that “[t]he time for asserting the need for accommodation in services is when the court 

adopts a service plan”). Accordingly, we will review this unpreserved issue only for plain error 

affecting substantial rights. In re Beers, 325 Mich App 653, 677; 926 NW2d 832 (2018). “To 

avoid forfeiture under the plain-error rule, the proponent must establish that a clear or obvious 

error occurred and that the error affected substantial rights.” Id.

Generally, during the dispositional phase, DHHS “has an affirmative duty to make 

reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” In re Hicks,

500 Mich 79, 85; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), citing MCL 712A.18f(3)(b) and (c) and

MCL 712A.19a(2). “As part of these reasonable efforts, the Department must create a service plan 

outlining the steps that both it and the parent will take to rectify the issues that led to court 

involvement and to achieve reunification.” Hicks, 500 Mich at 85-86. The case-service plan must 

include, in relevant part, a schedule of services “to be provided to the parent, child, and if the child 

is to be placed in foster care, the foster parent, to facilitate the child’s return to his or her home or 

to facilitate the child’s permanent placement.” MCL 712A.18f(3)(d); see also In re Mason, 486 

Mich 142, 156; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). The parent should be given a reasonable time to make 

changes and benefit from services before termination of parental rights. See Mason, 486 Mich 

at 159. The trial court should regularly update the plan to account for the parent’s progress and 

developing needs. Id. at 156. “While [petitioner] has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts 

to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part 

of respondents to participate in the services that are offered.” In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 

824 NW2d 569 (2012). To prove a claim of lack of reasonable efforts, respondent must show that 

she would have fared better had petitioner offered other services. See In re Fried, 266 Mich App 

535, 543; 702 NW2d 192 (2005). In this case, respondent argues that petitioner should have 

required her to participate in inpatient drug treatment “the very minute she made admissions in her 

case.” Respondent’s argument lacks merit.

Respondent agreed to a treatment plan after the oldest children initially came into care. 

The treatment plan required her to participate in individual therapy and parenting classes, undergo 
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a psychological examination, obtain a legal source of income, maintain contact with the 

caseworker, and maintain safe and suitable housing. To be sure, respondent was not initially 

ordered to participate in substance-abuse treatment or screening. It is not entirely clear why. But 

the trial court recognized the situation and ordered respondent to participate in these services in 

September 2019, following the first dispositional-review hearing, and respondent was eventually

referred to substance-abuse treatment numerous times.

Even after she was ordered to inpatient substance-abuse treatment, respondent did not 

complete or benefit from those services for a considerable time. The first referral occurred in 

July 2019, but was terminated in November 2019. She attended other outpatient programs in 

November 2019 and March 2020—but she discharged herself after a couple of days on both 

occasions. She also checked into the Genesis House on December 31, 2020. She discharged 

herself the next day. Moreover, despite the treatment offered, respondent was not compliant with 

random drug screens and continued to test positive for cocaine. Respondent told the foster-care 

worker, Ellie Lauer, as recently as March 2021, that she continued to use cocaine and alcohol in 

order to cope. During the proceedings, respondent gave birth to JMJ and DAJ, who both tested 

positive for cocaine at birth. On March 15, 2021, the trial court ordered respondent to participate 

in inpatient treatment. Respondent participated in another inpatient substance-abuse treatment 

program at Positive Images, and then began a second portion of the treatment during which she 

would be assisted in finding suitable housing. However, respondent discharged herself during the 

second portion of treatment against the advice of staff. At the beginning of her court-ordered stay 

at Positive Images, respondent submitted a positive screen. Later still, she checked herself into a 

different treatment center on May 4, 2021, but failed to provide any information regarding the 

treatment she was receiving. Lauer did not believe that respondent was receiving the treatment 

she needed or being drug-screened at that facility. Lauer only knew that the facility offered weekly 

group and individual therapy. In short, the evidence reflected that petitioner offered numerous 

substance-abuse services to respondent, as well as drug screening, but respondent failed to fully

participate in those services. As a result, respondent failed to rectify her substance-abuse barrier. 

At the time of the hearing on the supplemental petition for termination, she had been sober for 60 

days. Two years had passed since removal.

As the reasonableness of reunification efforts depends on the circumstances of a particular 

case, we reject respondent’s request to hold that inpatient treatment should be required first in 

every case involving substance abuse. See In re Fried, 266 Mich App at 542-543. In this case, 

respondent was offered both inpatient and outpatient treatment in conjunction with other services, 

including parenting classes, parenting time with the children, and mental-health counseling. It was 

not unreasonable for petitioner to order these other services at the same time as substance-abuse 

treatment given the importance of some of the other services, particularly visitation and addressing 

respondent’s mental-health concerns. Moreover, respondent cannot show that she would have 

fared better had different services been offered because substance-abuse services were offered but 

she did not benefit from those services for a considerable time. At no time did respondent request 

additional or different substance-abuse treatment and the record does not support that a reasonable 

likelihood existed that she would have completed other treatment had it been offered. In particular, 

respondent’s argument that she should have been placed in a 90-day program is undercut by her 

failure to complete the shorter programs that were offered. Additionally, respondent herself 

claimed that she used drugs to help her “cope,” highlighting that mental-health services were likely 
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necessary to help her fight her substance-abuse problem. Accordingly, respondent has not 

established plain error affecting her substantial rights in regard to reasonable efforts.

B. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Respondent also briefly argues that petitioner failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We disagree. The 

trial court must find at least one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing 

evidence in order to terminate parental rights. In re Gonzalez/Martinez, 310 Mich App 426, 431; 

871 NW2d 868 (2015). If this Court finds that the trial court did not clearly err as to the existence 

of one ground for termination, this Court need not address any additional termination grounds. 

See In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court’s determination under subsection (j).

Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), termination is proper when “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, 

based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is 

returned to the home of the parent.” This statutory factor considers not only the harm that may 

result from the parent’s conduct toward the child, but also harm that might reasonably result from 

the parent’s conduct around the child, such as exposing the child to individuals with criminal 

backgrounds who might exploit the child or otherwise place the child at risk. See In re White, 303 

Mich App 701, 712; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). A parent’s “lengthy period of instability” stemming 

from mental-health issues, combined with a present and “continuing lack of judgment, insight, and 

empathy” for a child, is also relevant to this statutory ground. In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 25; 

761 NW2d 253 (2008). This Court has recognized that subsection (j) considers not only the 

prospect of physical harm, but also the risk of emotional harm. See In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 

261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Harm may also include the prospect that the parent’s behavior 

would negatively influence the children. See In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41; 823 

NW2d 144 (2012). The trial court must “scrutinize the likelihood of harm if the child were 

returned to the parent’s home” at the conclusion of the child-protective proceedings, not at that 

exact moment in time. See In re Pops, 315 Mich App 590, 600; 890 NW2d 902 (2016).

The trial court did not clearly err in relying on this statutory ground. The record reflects 

that respondent had a long history—at least 14 years—of substance abuse that included alcohol 

and cocaine. Several of the children were born positive for cocaine, suffered withdrawals after 

birth, and were suspected of suffering from fetal-alcohol syndrome. Respondent lacked housing 

and income. Respondent also frequently missed parenting-time visits with some of the children, 

claiming that the visits were too overwhelming. In short, petitioner presented clear and convincing 

evidence of respondent’s failure to consistently visit the children, comply with her treatment plan, 

and benefit from services, thus establishing that there was a reasonable likelihood of harm if the 

children were returned to her care. See White, 303 Mich App at 710-711. Accordingly, the trial 

court did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights to the children 

was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

C. BEST INTERESTS

Although respondent does not challenge the trial court’s best-interests findings, a review 

of the record supports the trial court’s determination. “Even if the trial court finds that the 
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Department has established a ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, it cannot 

terminate the parent’s parental rights unless it also finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the best interests of the children.” Gonzalez/Martinez, 310 Mich App at 434. “In 

making its best-interest determination, the trial court may consider the whole record, including 

evidence introduced by any party.” In re Medina, 317 Mich App 219, 237; 894 NW2d 653 (2016) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting 

ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home 

over the parent’s home,” are all factors for the court to consider when deciding whether termination 

is in the best interests of the child. White, 303 Mich App at 713. “The trial court may also consider 

a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, 

the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the 

possibility of adoption.” Id. at 714. On appeal, this Court places its focus on the child, rather than 

the parent. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).

The trial court did not clearly err when it found that termination was in the children’s best 

interests. The record reflects that the children were removed following a domestic-violence 

incident and the discovery of stolen, loaded firearms accessible to them. Several of the children 

were very young; one was born after the others were removed. Witnesses testified that adoption 

offered them needed stability and permanency. Respondent had a 14-year history of drug and 

alcohol addiction and generally did not comply with her treatment plan. Respondent also 

frequently missed parenting-time visits with several of the children, claiming the visits were 

overwhelming.

Affirmed in Docket Nos. 357938 and 358902.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett

/s/ Christopher P. Yates